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Each new generation of Russian people will have their own point of view about armed conflict that will remain in history and our memory as the Second World War (Great Patriotic War). Dates such as the beginning and end of this bloody and senselessly cruel war will never be erased from the memory of a Russian person. And one of the most important parts that fettered the victory of the fraternal peoples of the USSR over the Nazi invaders is the partisan movement.
In the territories occupied by the German troops, the Nazis established the so-called new order. And this one new mode led to massive and brutal resistance of the indigenous inhabitants of the occupied territories. In all territories occupied by the enemy, guerrilla and sabotage warfare grew.
The struggle of partisan detachments and formations on the captured by the Nazi troops became an integral part of the Great Patriotic War. The actions of the partisans in the occupied territories oppressed the German troops morally and physically, they felt that they were in constant expectation of sabotage. And these sabotage was not a fictional, but a real danger, because of them the Germans had numerous casualties and a huge loss of military equipment.
There is a lot of evidence of the conduct of complex and dangerous operations with the participation of the Soviet army about the scale of the conduct of the guerrilla war. One of these operations was carried out from August to September 1943 on the lands of Ukraine and Belarus occupied by the enemy. The purpose of this operation was the destruction of part of the railway communications. The operation was given the secret name " rail war". Leningrad, Smolensk, Orel partisans were involved in this operation.
The order to start Operation Rail War was signed by the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement on June 14, 1943. All areas falling under the operation of the TsSHPD were divided between partisan groups. The reconnaissance of the partisans regularly monitored the objects on which sabotage was to be carried out. The "rail war" began from the second to the third of August and lasted almost until the end of September. Sabotage and sorties behind enemy lines unfolded throughout the entire territory of the operation, which is about one thousand eight hundred kilometers. Almost one hundred thousand people participated in the operation, with the mass support of local residents.
The sabotage strikes inflicted by partisans on railways, railway bridges and stations were unexpected for the Nazi troops. After committing acts of sabotage, the fascist invaders are very long time could not come to their senses and organize systematic and effective counter-partisan actions. During the operation "Rail War" was blown up great amount railway tracks(about two hundred and fifteen thousand rails), bridges, and derailed echelons with equipment and personnel. Also, sabotage reduced the frequency of movement of echelons by almost forty percent, which greatly slowed down the movement of the Germans.
Operation "Concert" pursued similar goals and was, as it were, the second part of the operation "Rail War". It was necessary to destroy as many railway communications under the control of the Germans as possible in a short period of time, as a large-scale offensive was planned Soviet troops to the Dnieper. More than one hundred and ninety-three partisan groups and sabotage detachments, and more than one hundred and twenty thousand people, were involved in it. Operation "Concert" was to begin on September 19 and last until November 1, 1943. But because it got worse weather The start of the operation was decided to be postponed to September 25. And Soviet aviation elementary did not have time to smuggle all the explosives, but transported only half. However, part of the sabotage groups had already advanced to the points, and could not receive an order to postpone the start of the operation, and began sabotage from September 19th.
On the night of September 24-25, railway tracks and bridges were simultaneously blown up at a distance of nine hundred kilometers. During the sabotage operation, about one thousand trains were derailed, seventy bridges were blown up, and sixty outposts of the Germans were defeated. The operation had to be ended, due to the mistakes of the developers of the operation itself, since the partisan groups ran out of prepared explosives. The German fascist invaders, sparing no effort, continuously, in several shifts, led repair work, but still failed. You can also name one minus of the operation, this is that the railway itself was subjected to sabotage, which later also slowed down the offensive of the Soviet troops. It was much more effective to disable the enemy's echelons themselves.
The objectives of the operation "Concert" were similar to the objectives of the operation "Rail War", to reduce the speed of movement of enemy echelons, and this goal was achieved. The partisan formations flawlessly completed the task before them, and all the shortcomings remained on the conscience of the headquarters authorities. That rendered all possible assistance in the defeat of the Nazi invaders in Ukraine, Belarus, Karelia and Crimea.
This "concert" shown by the Russian partisan formations, the Nazi troops could not erase from their memory for a long time.
OPERATION PREPARATION
two years peoples Soviet Union are waging the Great Patriotic War against the German invaders who treacherously invaded the territory of our country. In the rear of the German fascist hordes that temporarily seized Belarus, the partisan struggle of the Belarusian people broke out with unprecedented ferocity and persistence to crush the Nazi military machine, to exterminate the criminal army of interventionists by all means available to the people. Particularly serious blows are inflicted by partisans and partisans on the communications of the German army, they crash military echelons with troops, equipment, ammunition, fuel and weapons, military property, undermine railway bridges, blow up or burn station facilities, blow up and burn, shoot locomotives, wagons, tanks at stations and sidings, disassemble the rails on railways Oh. The guerrillas and guerrillas by their combat actions destroy the rear of the enemy, exhaust the enemy, inflict enormous damage on him in terms of manpower and equipment. Many hundreds of military echelons do not reach the front, they fly downhill from the hands of avenging partisans.
The railroads passing through Belorussia are constantly under the influence of partisan detachments and sabotage groups along their entire length, which is of great importance in disrupting the operational and strategic plans of the enemy. At the same time, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus believes that the combat work of the Belarusian partisans to destroy the enemy's supply routes can and should be intensified, there are all prerequisites and opportunities for this. The most important of these conditions are: fast development the partisan movement itself, which takes on the character of a nationwide movement against the invaders, the presence of a wide communications network, airfields and landing sites for aircraft, controllability of all partisan detachments and brigades in the occupied regions and regions of Belarus, the presence of regional and district underground committees of the CP (b) of Belarus working on the spot .
All these favorable conditions and the enormous strength of the movement itself make it possible at the present moment to set before the partisan movement in Byelorussia the task of delivering massive strikes against the enemy's railway communications in order to radically disorganize the entire railway network passing through the territory of Belarus.
This task can be successfully solved by Belarusian partisans not only by organizing the collapse of military trains, blowing up bridges, railway stations, putting out of action steam locomotives, wagons, but also in other ways. The proposals made on this issue to the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Belarus, based on a study of the two-year experience of guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, show that the radical disorganization of the enemy's railway communications can be achieved by massive destruction of the railroad tracks.
Using the “rail war” method, the destruction of communications can be brought to a degree catastrophic for Nazi German troops. With the massive use of this method of fighting, the enemy will be forced to carry out huge labor-intensive work to replace the blown up rails to restore the tracks. It will be necessary to deliver a colossal amount of steel, rolled products, which will be an almost impossible task for him.
Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus
decides:
1. To approve the plan for the deployment of a partisan "rail war" in the rear of the German occupiers, developed on the initiative of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus, comrade Ponomarenko, submitted for consideration by the Central Committee as the most effective method mass destruction of the enemy's railway communications.
2. The Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus calls on all partisans and partisans, commanders and commissars of detachments and brigades, leaders of sabotage groups to strengthen continuous fighting to destroy the enemy's railway communications, to use favorable opportunities summer period for inflicting the strongest mass strikes on the Nazi military machine in the most vulnerable places for it. The radical disorganization of the enemy's railway communications will be the historical merit of the Belarusian partisans and partisans in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders.
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus P. Ponomarenko
Decree of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus "On the destruction of the enemy's railway communications by the method of "rail war" of June 24, 1943 // State security agencies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T. 4. Part 1. No. 1482
“RAILWAR”: SUCCESS OF THE SOVIET COMMAND?
Hero of the Soviet Union, the commander of the partisan unit, Colonel Roman Naumovich Machulsky, in his memoirs, indicates that “... The Assault Brigades”, “People's Avengers”, “Zheleznyak”, detachments of the Begoml-Borisov zone and the brigade named after M. V. Frunze of the Vileika region for the period from 15 August to November 1, 1943, over 2.5 thousand rails were killed on the Molodechno-Minsk section. During this time, the brigades "Death to fascism", "Uncle Kolya", "For Soviet Belarus", them. N. A. Shchors, them. The Pravda newspapers operating on the Minsk-Borisov-Orsha section broke over 8,000 rails. Partisans of the Brigade V.P. Chkalov of the Baranovichi region derailed 21 enemy echelons in 15 days, destroyed more than 1300 Nazis, killed 272 rails, blew up and burned 8 vehicles and 10 bridges.
On November 10 - 30, the troops of the Belorussian Front carried out the Gomel-Rechitsa operation. During this operation, the partisans paralyzed traffic on the Minsk-Gomel, Brest-Luninets-Gomel, Orsha-Zhlobin railways and, by strikes on the highways in these areas, disrupted the regrouping and combat support of the enemy troops, prevented their transfer to the breakthrough sites and thereby contributed to the success advancing troops of the Red Army.
"RAILWAR" IN BELARUS 1943
Evidence of the effectiveness of partisan strikes is that when the enemy made an attempt to stop the offensive of the Red Army in the Mogilev direction and on December 12, 1943, sent the 292nd Infantry Division from the Bykhov region to the Parichi region, it arrived at its destination only on December 30, in connection with which , failed to play the role intended for her in the counterattack undertaken.
The effectiveness of the actions of the partisans in the southeastern regions of Belarus is also confirmed by General Kurt von Tippelskirch, at that time the commander of the 12th Army Corps of the Army Group "Center": "2nd german army- he wrote - starting from September 27, unsuccessfully tried to bring up a sufficient number of forces with the aim of striking at southbound, to restore communication with the Army Group "South" between Pripyat and the Dnieper. Not dense and therefore to the limit overloaded railway network, the capacity of which, already insignificant in the area of the Pripyat swamps, was further reduced as a result of the fierce activity of the partisans, could hardly provide the supply of everything necessary for this army. The transfer of the allocated forces was carried out at a snail's pace, which all the time strained the nerves of the command and forced it to postpone the planned offensive all the time, although the latter became more and more difficult every day.
According to the data of the German Directorate of Railways "Minsk", as a result of partisan actions, traffic on the railway tracks in September 1943 was interrupted for more than 265 days, and on double-track sections, one track was carried out for 112 days.
As a result of the first two stages of the “Rail War”, the operational transportation of the enemy during the period of intense fighting at the front through the territory of Belarus was reduced by 40%, which contributed to the success offensive operations Red Army and prevented the organization of a planned withdrawal German troops and the export of the loot to Germany.
Operations "Rail War" and "Concert" differed in a number of ways. characteristic features. If until the summer of 1943, the fighting of partisans on the railways was reduced mainly to the activities of individual sabotage groups, now almost the entire personnel detachments and formations, and even members of reserve groups.
Both brilliantly conducted operations entered the annals of the Great Patriotic War as large, massive partisan strikes against railway communications carried out on time agreed with the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and were of great operational and strategic importance. In terms of their scale and significance, these operations were a new phenomenon in the history of wars and the partisan movement. Never and nowhere has there been such close interaction between the partisan movement and the army. Never before has the struggle of the people's avengers behind enemy lines played such a role in achieving success on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.
A.S. Rusak, A.V. Galinskaya, N.D. Shevchenko. “Rail war” in Belarus, 1943
“RAILWAR”: A TACTICAL MISTAKE?
In order 0042 dated July 14, 1943, the TsSHPD ordered: “to interrupt the rails on the main highways, spare, access, auxiliary, depot tracks, destroy the spare rails ...”
TsSHPD mistakenly believed that the enemy was lacking rails. Undermining the rails therefore seemed very tempting, simple and accessible way fight. But the enemy had a surplus of rails, the Germans welded them at night and replaced them during the day, and then they came up with an 80-cm circuit bridge and began to let trains pass through it: after all, with the explosion of a 200-gram checker, only 25-40 cm of the rail were knocked out.
In 1943, two "rail war" operations took place. The first began on the night of July 22 by the Bryansk partisans, and the general multi-day one began on the night of August 3 and lasted until September 16. The second operation, called the "concert", began on 16 September and continued until 1 December. The planned "winter concert" did not take place due to the lack of explosives among the partisans.
All this did not give the desired results. The traffic on the railways was completely blocked only in the rear of Army Group Center, and even then only for three days, from August 3 to 6. Moreover, switching the main efforts of the partisans to undermine the rails with a lack of explosives led to a reduction in train crashes, and ultimately contributed to an increase bandwidth roads, but at the same time made it difficult to restore the railways by our military railway workers during the offensive.
Here are the numbers. About 100 thousand partisans participated in the first operation. 214,705 rails were blown up, including at least 185,000 on the roads of the Minsk railway directorate of the enemy. The second operation: 120 thousand participated, 146,149 rails were blown up, including 89 thousand within the Minsk Directorate. In total, 250 thousand rails were broken in the Minsk Directorate, or 60 percent of all the rails blown up in 1943.
Of these 250,000, 25,000 were blown up in unnecessary, unused areas. This slowed down the pace of restoration of highways during the offensive of the Red Army.
The specific weight of the sums of traffic interruptions from undermining the rails on the tracks between intermediate stations reached 24 percent of the sum of all traffic interruptions from all partisan actions. But in the sections between the junction stations there were only 10.1 percent of such breaks, and on the directions - less than 3 percent, while the crashes gave about 60 percent of the breaks. On January 1, 1943, there were 11 million rails in the occupied territory, and the undermining of 350 thousand rails was only 3 percent: quite tolerable, especially since the explosions sometimes took place where the occupiers themselves could not undermine the rails during the retreat.
The number of delivered Wehrmacht trains not only did not decrease with an increase in the number of blown up rails, but on the contrary, it even increased, since the more rails were torn, the less they caused train wrecks. In August and the first half of September, the partisans spent about 50 tons of explosives to blow up the rails. This was enough to derail at least 1,500 trains. The smartest of the guerrilla commanders realized this, and from September they began to reduce rail blasts while increasing the number of crashes.
What was required in return?
The fight against the enemy army for partisans can only be carried out by organizing crashes, blowing up cars and armored vehicles with mines and, with favorable conditions, ambush attacks. The battles of partisans with units of the Wehrmacht in its rear were associated with greater losses for the partisans than at the front. Two Ukrainian and six Leningrad partisan regiments, having entered into direct combat contact with the invaders, despite their heroism, were defeated.
As of January 1, 1943, the enemy's railway network in operation was 22,000 km. The partisans carried out sabotage almost without loss in areas where there were at least two thousand enemy soldiers per 100 km. Only the most important sections of the roads were protected in this way. If the partisans committed sabotage throughout, and the enemy brought the density of guards up to a regiment for every 100 km, then the total number of guards of the railways in the occupied territories would exceed 400 thousand people - but even they would not save the railway from partisan saboteurs.
As was known from the testimony of the Germans and from intelligence data, the most critical situation for the enemy was with steam locomotives. When the Red Army withdrew, the locomotives were evacuated or put out of action. The Hitlerite command was forced to collect locomotives on the roads of all Europe, not disdaining the most backward, and drive them to the East. The so-called ersatz steam locomotive M-50 appeared, which began to be produced by German steam locomotive plants for eastern railways. The locomotive fleet was catastrophically reduced from the blows of partisans, aviation, resistance forces in the West, as well as from wear and tear.
The greatest interruption in the movement of trains was achieved not by an erroneous "rail war", but by the destruction of bridges and the collapse of trains. Since the bridges were heavily guarded, in winter it was possible to paralyze traffic by simultaneously shutting down the water supply in some area. The destruction of the communication line - so spectacular - made it difficult for transport, but did not stop it for a long time.
Autumn and spring downpours turned dirt roads into impenetrable mud swamps and made their exploitation impossible. The use of rivers as transport arteries was limited to a short period of navigation - in our climate this is a maximum of 5-7 months. The only all-season way to deliver goods was the railway network. Railways, like blood vessels, had to supply the army with everything they needed all year round. Of course, there was also transport aviation, but low power did not allow transporting heavy loads or military equipment with its help.
Thus, the strategic importance of the railways was simply enormous, and their uninterrupted operation was a key factor for the successful conduct of hostilities.
In the summer of 1943, the Soviet command decided to strike at such an important component of the German military machine, and the role of the main executors of the plan of the Headquarters was assigned to partisan detachments.
It is important to note that from the very first days of the War, a people's liberation movement was born throughout the occupied territory. Formed from local residents and Red Army soldiers who escaped from encirclement or escaped from captivity, partisan detachments waged a continuous war in the enemy rear: undermining bridges, derailing enemy trains and destroying garrisons.
Having matured by the summer of 1943, the partisan movement was ready to conduct mass well-coordinated operations.
July 9, 1943 in a letter I.V. Stalin chief of staff P.K.Ponomarenko proposed, in order to disrupt the enemy's railway transportation, to conduct simultaneously and everywhere an operation to destroy the rails on the railway tracks. The central headquarters of the partisan movement adopted in June 1943 a resolution "On the destruction of the enemy's railway communications by the method of rail warfare."
So future operation has acquired the code name "Rail War".
The main goal of the campaign was to inflict maximum damage on the enemy's railway communications in the Oryol-Kursk direction, in order to provide assistance Soviet army at the end of the defeat of the Nazi troops in Battle of Kursk. The main objects of the future strike were to be railway bridges, junction stations, rolling stock and the railway tracks themselves.
As part of the preparation of the operation, hundreds of tons of explosives were transported to the front line, and the detachments were replenished with demolition men. In some partisan detachments, the production of improvised mines from unexploded shells was launched, and the tol necessary for the bombs was smelted in the so-called "devil's kitchens". Later, in the same kitchens, tol began to be smelted in forms prepared in advance for this, in which it solidified in the form "loaves" as the partisans called them. All members of the detachment, from the cook to the commander, were trained in the basic skills of subversive work.
The Germans also understood the exceptional importance of the railway infrastructure. As part of the prevention of sabotage actions, the German command took a number of countermeasures. Forests were cut down along the railroad tracks for 100 meters, towers, wire fences, and sometimes minefields were installed. Bunkers were installed and permanent garrisons were kept at especially important sections, hauls and junction stations.
Also The Germans carried out a number of operations against the partisans. Their goal was to capture lost territories, which could play an important role in the upcoming summer offensive.
But partisan intelligence was always on the alert and often punitive operations ended ingloriously for the invaders. One of these German units was heavily damaged by their own. The fact that the Nazis were planning an attack on their site, the partisans learned in advance and, having taken the most advantageous position, prepared to meet the enemy. Soon a German aircraft appeared, circled over the area for a while to mark targets for destruction, and then called in two bombers. After the first bombs were dropped, the enemy infantry went on the offensive. But when the partisans opened fire, the Nazis turned back. At this time, the German bombers made another call. Noticing the fugitives, the pilots mistook them for partisans and dropped the remaining bombs on them., and then, to be sure, they combed their infantry with machine-gun fire. The punitive operation failed.
German pilots bombed their infantry
5 / YIII-43, Morning issue of RFI sheet 4 VL
Active Army, 5 August. /Special Corr. TASS/. Partisan intelligence reported that the German punitive detachment was preparing an offensive. Having chosen the height that dominated the area and covering the flanks, the partisans prepared to meet the enemy. Soon a fascist spotter appeared. The plane searched for targets for a long time, then called in two bombers.
Enemy planes made a call and dropped a series of bombs. Immediately, the fascist infantry went on the offensive. The enemy counted on the fact that the combat formations of the partisans were demoralized. When no more than 50 meters were left to the first chain of Germans, the partisans opened fire from machine guns. The Nazis turned back. German bombers at that time were making another approach. The pilots, noticing the fleeing, decided that they were partisans, and began to drop bombs on them. The planes then descended and combed their infantry with machine-gun fire.
The German punitive detachment suffered heavy losses.
V. Medvedev
On July 22, 1943, the partisans of the Oryol region carried out a massive undermining of the rail- it was a kind of rehearsal before a future large-scale operation. By the end of July, preparations were completed. Operation "Rail War" was decided to begin on August 3.
The start time of the strike was not chosen by chance. Under the onslaught of the advancing Soviet troops, the German command continuously transferred mobile units from one sector of the front to another, trying to patch up holes in the defense. The load on the railway tracks was maximum, which means that the damage caused during the destruction would have been the greatest.
During the Second World War, Colonel Starinov, a saboteur-bomber, proposed to carry out large-scale partisan operations on the enemy’s railway communications. His ideas found support from the head of the Central Staff (Central Staff), Lieutenant General Ponomarenko, who presented them to Stalin and received approval for their implementation.
Large-scale guerrilla sabotage was called "Operation Rail War". It was decided to conduct it before the most important strategic battle on the eve of this battle, the balance of forces of the opponents was approximately equal. The outcome of the battle to a large extent depended on how successfully the maneuver was carried out by the troops, the reserves were used and, most importantly, the conditions were provided for supplying the army with everything necessary.
"Rail war" - it was a prepared event. In training centers and partisan schools, the number of trained demolition specialists and instructors has increased.
To disable the entire railway infrastructure of the enemy on the scale that was planned, a huge number of fuses and explosives themselves were required, which the partisans did not have. The detachments were supplied with the help of long-range aviation forces.
The "rail war" was planned to be carried out on the front, the length of which was a thousand kilometers from north to south and seven hundred and fifty kilometers from west to east inland. The sabotage was supposed to be carried out in three stages, each of which was supposed to last fifteen to thirty days.
The "rail war" began in 1943, on August 3rd. Seventy-four thousand partisans simultaneously struck at the enemy's communications.
Ponomarenko, using the ideas of Starinov, subsequently developed his own plan for carrying out subversive measures. Ponomarenko believed that risky strikes against enemy echelons were inappropriate. In his opinion, it was enough to deliver pinpoint strikes on the railway itself, undermining the rails with small charges. Thus, it was planned to create a shortage of railway tracks among the Germans and the collapse transport system before the Battle of Kursk.
Starinov, in turn, defended his point of view, arguing that it was the echelons of the enemy that had a strategic purpose. Moreover, the destroyed rails are quite easy to restore in comparison with the repair of damage from the collapse of the train. This would lead to much more extensive destruction and interruption in traffic.
As a result, Starinov was sent to the Ukrainian headquarters, and Ponomarenko continued to implement his plan.
Not without the traditional Soviet formalism. Ponomarenko set a certain plan for the partisan detachments in terms of the number of rails blown up. It should be noted that this approach did more harm. The order mentioned the undermining of not only the main, but also alternate, as well as poorly or not at all guarded routes. As a result, many commanders chose to blow up insignificant paths, unexploited branches.
At the same time, the Germans quickly learned how to restore "point damage", which, I must say, were usually no more than 30-35 centimeters. They invented a "rail bridge" that overlapped the destroyed area. The Nazis compensated for the lack of linen with rarely used Belgian, Dutch branches.
Thus, the "Rail War" at the first stage caused, according to various estimates, more damage to the Red Army itself than to the Germans.
During the second and third stages, the leadership of the partisan movement took into account the mistakes. This time, not single "point" explosions were carried out, but the rails were blown up on large plots, destroyed sleepers. In December 1943, the third stage was completed.
Despite the mistakes made, the "Rail War" made it possible to reduce the main cargo flow that went from Europe to the East by more than 30%.
, Ukrainian SSR
Operation goals achieved
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Operation Rail War- the code name of the operation of the Soviet partisans, carried out from August 3 to September 15 of the year in the occupied territory of the RSFSR, BSSR and part of the Ukrainian SSR as part of the rail war.
The purpose of the operation
On July 14, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the operation to be carried out. The local headquarters of the partisan movements and their representations at the fronts determined areas and objects of action for each partisan formation. The partisans were provided with explosives and mine-blasting equipment, demolition instructors were sent to them. In June 1943 alone, 150 tons of special-profile heavy bombs, 156,000 meters of igniter cord, 28,000 meters of hemp wick, 595,000 detonator caps, as well as weapons and ammunition were thrown into partisan bases. The exploration of railway communications was actively conducted.
Operation progress
During the first night of the operation, 42,000 rails were blown up. The actions, in which about 100 thousand partisans participated, unfolded in the rear areas of the Army Groups "Center" and "North" (the length along the front is about 1000 kilometers, to a depth of 750 kilometers). At the same time, Ukrainian partisans were actively fighting in the rear of Army Group South. The fascist German command for some time could not organize opposition to the partisans.
Operation results
During the operation, about 215 thousand rails were blown up, a significant number of trains (only by Belarusian partisans - 836 trains and 3 armored trains), bridges and station buildings were blown up. Particularly significant destruction was carried out in the areas Polotsk - Molodechno, Minsk - Bobruisk, Luninets - Kalinkovichi and Mogilev - Zhlobin. By autumn, enemy operational transport had been cut by 40 percent. On some railways, traffic was delayed for 3-15 days, and the highways Mogilev - Krichev, Polotsk - Dvinsk, Mogilev - Zhlobin did not work throughout August. In order to restore the destroyed railway tracks, the enemy was forced to turn double-track sections into single-track sections, weld undermined rails, dismantle individual sections, and deliver the missing rails from Poland and Germany, which further increased the intensity of transportation. The German command was forced to use 5,000 platforms and hundreds of locomotives to transport rails, and to attract additional forces to protect the railways. The operation significantly hampered the regrouping and supply of the retreating enemy troops.
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Notes
Literature
- Rail War // / ed. M. M. Kozlova. - M .: Soviet Encyclopedia, 1985. - S. 608. - 500,000 copies.
- Rail War // Railway transport: Encyclopedia / Ch. ed. N. S. Konarev. - M .: Great Russian Encyclopedia, 1994. - S. 363. - ISBN 5-85270-115-7.
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An excerpt characterizing the Operation "Rail War"
He ran his hand through her hair.“I called you all night…” he said.
“If I knew…” she said through her tears. - I was afraid to enter.
He shook her hand.
- Didn't you sleep?
“No, I didn’t sleep,” said Princess Mary, shaking her head negatively. Involuntarily obeying her father, she now, just as he spoke, tried to speak more in signs and, as it were, also with difficulty rolling her tongue.
- Darling ... - or - my friend ... - Princess Marya could not make out; but, probably, from the expression of his look, a tender, caressing word was said, which he never said. - Why didn't you come?
“And I wished, wished for his death! thought Princess Mary. He paused.
- Thank you ... daughter, friend ... for everything, for everything ... sorry ... thank you ... sorry ... thank you! .. - And tears flowed from his eyes. “Call Andryusha,” he suddenly said, and something childishly timid and distrustful expressed itself in his face at this request. It was as if he himself knew that his demand was meaningless. So, at least, it seemed to Princess Mary.
“I received a letter from him,” answered Princess Mary.
He looked at her with surprise and timidity.
- Where is he?
- He is in the army, mon pere, in Smolensk.
He was silent for a long time, closing his eyes; then in the affirmative, as if in answer to his doubts and in confirmation that he now understood and remembered everything, nodded his head and opened his eyes.
“Yes,” he said clearly and quietly. - Russia is dead! Ruined! And he sobbed again, and tears flowed from his eyes. Princess Mary could no longer restrain herself and wept too, looking at his face.
He closed his eyes again. His sobs stopped. He made a sign with his hand to his eyes; and Tikhon, understanding him, wiped away his tears.
Then he opened his eyes and said something that no one could understand for a long time and, finally, he understood and conveyed only Tikhon. Princess Mary was looking for the meaning of his words in the mood in which he spoke a minute before. Now she thought that he was talking about Russia, then about Prince Andrei, then about her, about her grandson, then about his death. And because of this, she could not guess his words.
“Put on your white dress, I love it,” he said.
Understanding these words, Princess Marya sobbed even louder, and the doctor, taking her by the arm, led her out of the room to the terrace, persuading her to calm down and make preparations for her departure. After Princess Mary left the prince, he again spoke about his son, about the war, about the sovereign, twitched his eyebrows angrily, began to raise a hoarse voice, and with him came the second and last blow.
Princess Mary stopped on the terrace. The day cleared up, it was sunny and hot. She could understand nothing, think of nothing, and feel nothing, except her passionate love for her father, a love which, it seemed to her, she had not known until that moment. She ran out into the garden and, sobbing, ran down to the pond along the young linden paths planted by Prince Andrei.
“Yes… I… I… I.” I wished for his death. Yes, I wanted it to end soon... I wanted to calm down... But what will happen to me? What do I need peace of mind when he’s gone, ”Princess Marya muttered aloud, walking quickly through the garden and pressing her hands on her chest, from which sobs frantically burst out. Walking around the circle in the garden, which led her back to the house, she saw m lle Bourienne (who had remained in Bogucharovo and did not want to leave) coming towards her and unknown man. It was the leader of the district, who himself came to the princess in order to present to her the need for an early departure. Princess Mary listened and did not understand him; she led him into the house, offered him breakfast, and sat down with him. Then, apologizing to the leader, she went to the door of the old prince. The doctor, with an alarmed face, came out to her and said that it was impossible.
- Go, princess, go, go!
Princess Marya went back into the garden and under the hill by the pond, in a place where no one could see, sat down on the grass. She did not know how long she had been there. Someone's running female steps along the path made her wake up. She got up and saw that Dunyasha, her maid, obviously running after her, suddenly, as if frightened by the sight of her young lady, stopped.
“Please, princess ... prince ...” Dunyasha said in a broken voice.
“Now, I’m going, I’m going,” the princess began hastily, not giving Dunyasha time to finish what she had to say, and, trying not to see Dunyasha, she ran to the house.
“Princess, the will of God is being done, you must be ready for anything,” said the leader, meeting her at the front door.
- Leave me. It is not true! she yelled angrily at him. The doctor wanted to stop her. She pushed him away and ran to the door. “And why are these people with frightened faces stopping me? I don't need anyone! And what are they doing here? She opened the door, and a bright daylight in this previously dim room terrified her. There were women and a nurse in the room. They all moved away from the bed, making way for her. He lay still on the bed; but strict look his calm face stopped Princess Marya on the threshold of the room.
