How I got cancer. Rami Blekt Intro to number four...
BATTLE OF KURSK 1943, defensive (July 5 - 23) and offensive (July 12 - August 23) operations carried out by the Red Army in the area of the Kursk ledge to disrupt the offensive and defeat the strategic grouping of German troops.
The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad and its subsequent general offensive in the winter of 1942/43 over the vast expanse from the Baltic to the Black Sea undermined Germany's military power. In order to prevent the decline in the morale of the army and the population and the growth of centrifugal tendencies within the aggressor bloc, Hitler and his generals decided to prepare and conduct a major offensive operation on the Soviet-German front. With its success, they linked their hopes for the return of the lost strategic initiative and a turn in the course of the war in their favor.
It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command revised the method of the planned actions. The reason for this was the data of Soviet intelligence that the German command was planning to conduct a strategic offensive on the Kursk salient. The headquarters decided to wear down the enemy with a powerful defense, then go on the counteroffensive and defeat him strike force. There was a rare case in the history of wars when the strongest side, owning the strategic initiative, deliberately chose to start fighting not offensive, but defensive. The development of events showed that this bold plan was absolutely justified.
FROM THE MEMORIES OF A. VASILEVSKY ON STRATEGIC PLANNING BY THE SOVIET COMMAND OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK, April-June 1943
(...) Soviet military intelligence managed to timely reveal the preparation of the Nazi army for a major offensive in the Kursk salient area using the latest tank technology on a massive scale, and then set the time for the enemy to go on the offensive.
Naturally, under the prevailing conditions, when the expected strike by the enemy with large forces was quite obvious, it was necessary to make the most expedient decision. The Soviet command faced a difficult dilemma: to attack or defend, and if defended, then how? (...)
Analyzing numerous intelligence data on the nature of the upcoming actions of the enemy and on his preparation for the offensive, the fronts, the General Staff and the Headquarters were more and more inclined towards the idea of transition to deliberate defense. On this issue, in particular, there was a repeated exchange of views between me and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief GK Zhukov in late March - early April. The most concrete conversation about planning military operations for the near future took place over the telephone on April 7, when I was in Moscow, at the General Staff, and G.K. Zhukov was on the Kursk ledge, in the troops of the Voronezh Front. And already on April 8, signed by G.K. Zhukov, a report was sent to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an assessment of the situation and considerations on the plan of action in the area of the Kursk salient, in which it was noted: will be if we wear down the enemy on our defenses, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going over to a general offensive, we will finally finish off the main enemy grouping.
I had to be at when he received G.K. Zhukov's report. I remember well how the Supreme Commander, without expressing his opinion, said: "We must consult with the front commanders." Having given the order to the General Staff to request the opinion of the fronts and obliging him to prepare a special meeting at Headquarters to discuss the plan for the summer campaign, in particular the actions of the fronts on the Kursk Bulge, he himself called N.F. Vatutin and K.K. Rokossovsky and asked him to submit his views by April 12 according to the actions of the fronts (...)
At the meeting held in the evening of April 12 at Headquarters, which was attended by I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov, who arrived from the Voronezh Front, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and his deputy A.I. Antonov, a preliminary decision was made on deliberate defense (...)
After a preliminary decision was made on a deliberate defense and on the subsequent transition to a counteroffensive, comprehensive and thorough preparations were launched for the upcoming actions. At the same time, reconnaissance of enemy actions continued. The Soviet command became precisely aware of the dates for the start of the enemy offensive, which were postponed three times by Hitler. At the end of May - beginning of June 1943, when the enemy’s plan to launch a strong tank attack on the Voronezh and Central Fronts using large groupings equipped with new military equipment for this purpose, the final decision was made on a deliberate defense.
Speaking about the plan for the Battle of Kursk, I would like to emphasize two points. Firstly, that this plan is the central part of the strategic plan for the entire summer-autumn campaign of 1943 and, secondly, that the highest bodies of strategic leadership, and not other commanding authorities, played a decisive role in the development of this plan (...)
Vasilevsky A.M. Strategic planning of the Battle of Kursk. Battle of Kursk M.: Nauka, 1970. S.66-83.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh Fronts had 1336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3444 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2172 aircraft. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District (from July 9 - the Steppe Front), which was the reserve of the Headquarters, was deployed. He was supposed to prevent a deep breakthrough from both Orel and Belgorod, and when going on the counteroffensive, increase the force of the strike from the depths.
The German side introduced 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, into the two strike groups intended for the offensive on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk ledge, which amounted to about 70% of the Wehrmacht's tank divisions on the Soviet-German front. In total - 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2700 tanks and assault guns, about 2050 aircraft. An important place in the plans of the enemy was given to the massive use of new military equipment: the Tiger and Panther tanks, the Ferdinand assault guns, as well as the new Foke-Wulf-190A and Henschel-129 aircraft.
APPEAL OF THE Führer TO THE GERMAN SOLDIERS ON THE EVE OF OPERATION "CITADEL", no later than July 4, 1943
Today you are launching a great offensive battle that may have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war as a whole.
With your victory, the conviction of the futility of any resistance to the German armed forces will be strengthened stronger than before. In addition, a new cruel defeat of the Russians will further shake the faith in the possibility of the success of Bolshevism, which has already been shaken in many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces. Just like in the last big war, their faith in victory will disappear no matter what.
The Russians achieved this or that success primarily with the help of their tanks.
My soldiers! Now you finally have better tanks than the Russians.
Their seemingly inexhaustible human masses have thinned out so much in a two-year struggle that they are forced to call on the youngest and oldest. Our infantry, as always, is superior to the Russians to the same extent as our artillery, our tank destroyers, our tankers, our sappers and, of course, our aviation.
The mighty blow that will overtake the Soviet armies this morning must shake them to their foundations.
And you should know that everything can depend on the outcome of this battle.
As a soldier, I clearly understand what I demand from you. In the end, we will achieve victory, no matter how cruel and difficult this or that individual battle may be.
German homeland - your wives, daughters and sons, selflessly rallying, meet enemy air strikes and at the same time work tirelessly for the sake of victory; they look with fervent hope at you, my soldiers.
ADOLF GITLER
This order is to be destroyed at divisional headquarters.
Klink E. Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation "Zitadelle". Stuttgart, 1966.
PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. THE EVE
From the end of March 1943, the Headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command worked on a plan for a strategic offensive, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush the enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. However, in mid-April, on the basis of army intelligence to the leadership of the Red Army, it became clear that the command of the Wehrmacht itself plans to carry out a strike under the bases of the Kursk ledge, in order to surround our troops stationed there.
The idea of an offensive operation near Kursk arose at Hitler's headquarters immediately after the end of the fighting near Kharkov in 1943. The very configuration of the front in this area pushed the Fuhrer to strike in converging directions. In the circles of the German command there were also opponents of such a decision, in particular Guderian, who, being responsible for the production of new tanks for the German army, was of the opinion that they should not be used as the main striking force in a big battle - this could lead to a waste of forces . The strategy of the Wehrmacht for the summer of 1943, according to such generals as Guderian, Manstein, and a number of others, was to be exclusively defensive, as economical as possible in terms of expenditure of forces and resources.
However, the bulk of the German military leaders actively supported the offensive plans. The date of the operation, which received the code name "Citadel", was set for July 5, and the German troops received at their disposal a large number of new tanks (T-VI "Tiger", T-V "Panther"). These armored vehicles were superior in terms of firepower and armor resistance to the main Soviet T-34 tank. By the beginning of Operation Citadel, the German forces of the Army Groups Center and South had at their disposal up to 130 Tigers and more than 200 Panthers. In addition, the Germans significantly improved the fighting qualities of their old T-III and T-IV tanks, equipping them with additional armored screens and putting an 88-mm cannon on many vehicles. In total, in the Wehrmacht strike groupings in the area of the Kursk ledge, by the beginning of the offensive, there were about 900 thousand people, 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars. On the southern wing of the ledge, the strike forces of Army Group South under the command of Manstein were concentrated, which included the 4th Panzer Army of General Hoth and the Kempf group. The troops of Army Group Center von Kluge operated on the northern wing; the core of the strike group here was the forces of the 9th Army of General Model. The southern German group was stronger than the northern one. Generals Goth and Kemp had about twice as many tanks as Model.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided not to be the first to go on the offensive, but to take up a tough defense. The idea of the Soviet command was to first bleed the enemy's forces, knock out his new tanks, and only then, having brought fresh reserves into action, go on the counteroffensive. Needless to say, it was a rather risky plan. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, his deputy Marshal Zhukov, and other representatives of the Soviet high command remembered well that not once since the beginning of the war had the Red Army been able to organize the defense in such a way that the previously prepared German offensive fizzled out at the stage of breaking through the Soviet positions (at the beginning of the war near Bialystok and Minsk, then in October 1941 near Vyazma, in the summer of 1942 in the Stalingrad direction).
However, Stalin agreed with the opinion of the generals, who advised not to hurry with the start of the offensive. A defense in depth was built near Kursk, which had several lines. It was specially created as anti-tank. In addition, in the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which occupied positions, respectively, on the northern and southern sections of the Kursk salient, another one was created - the Steppe Front, designed to become a reserve formation and join the battle at the moment the Red Army went on the counteroffensive.
The military factories of the country worked uninterruptedly on the production of tanks and self-propelled guns. The troops received both traditional "thirty-fours" and powerful self-propelled guns SU-152. The latter could already with great success fight the "Tigers" and "Panthers".
The organization of the Soviet defense near Kursk was based on the idea of a deep echeloning of combat formations of troops and defensive positions. 5-6 defensive lines were erected on the Central and Voronezh fronts. Along with this, a defensive line was created for the troops of the Steppe Military District, and along the left bank of the river. Don prepared the state line of defense. The total depth of the engineering equipment of the area reached 250-300 km.
In total, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops significantly outnumbered the enemy both in people and in equipment. The Central and Voronezh fronts included about 1.3 million people, and the Steppe Front standing behind them had an additional 500 thousand people. All three fronts had up to 5,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 28,000 guns and mortars at their disposal. The advantage in aviation was also on the Soviet side - 2.6 thousand for us against about 2 thousand for the Germans.
PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. DEFENSE
The closer the launch date of Operation Citadel drew nearer, the more difficult it was to conceal its preparations. Already a few days before the start of the offensive, the Soviet command received a signal that it would begin on July 5th. From intelligence reports it became known that the enemy offensive was scheduled for 3 hours. The headquarters of the Central (commander K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander N. Vatutin) fronts decided to carry out artillery counter-preparation on the night of July 5. It started at 1 o'clock. 10 minutes. After the roar of the cannonade subsided, the Germans could not recover for a long time. As a result of artillery counter-preparation carried out in advance in the areas of concentration of enemy strike groups, German troops suffered losses and launched an offensive 2.5-3 hours later than planned. Only after some time, the German troops were able to start their own artillery and aviation training. The attack of German tanks and infantry formations began at about half past six in the morning.
The German command pursued the goal of ramming through the defenses Soviet troops and go to Kursk. In the zone of the Central Front, the main blow of the enemy was taken by the troops of the 13th Army. On the very first day, the Germans brought up to 500 tanks into battle here. On the second day, the command of the troops of the Central Front launched a counterattack against the advancing grouping by part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd tank armies and the 19th tank corps. The German offensive here was delayed, and on July 10 it was finally thwarted. In six days of fighting, the enemy penetrated the defenses of the Central Front only 10-12 km.
The first surprise for the German command both on the southern and northern wings of the Kursk ledge was that the Soviet soldiers were not afraid of the appearance on the battlefield of new German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther". Moreover, Soviet anti-tank artillery and guns from tanks buried in the ground opened effective fire on German armored vehicles. And yet, the thick armor of the German tanks allowed them to break through the Soviet defenses in some areas and penetrate into the battle formations of the Red Army units. However, there was no quick breakthrough. Having overcome the first defensive line, the German tank units were forced to turn to sappers for help: the entire space between the positions was heavily mined, and the passages in the minefields were well covered by artillery. While the German tankers were waiting for the sappers, their combat vehicles were subjected to massive fire. Soviet aviation managed to retain air supremacy. Increasingly, Soviet attack aircraft appeared over the battlefield - the famous Il-2.
Only on the first day of fighting, the Model group operating on the northern wing of the Kursk ledge lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks that participated in the first strike. Soviet losses were also high: only two companies of the German "Tigers", advancing against the forces of the Central Front, destroyed 111 T-34 tanks during the period of July 5 - 6. By July 7, the Germans, having advanced several kilometers forward, approached the large settlement of Ponyri, where a powerful battle ensued between the strike units of the 20th, 2nd and 9th German tank divisions with formations of the Soviet 2nd tank and 13th armies. The result of this battle was extremely unexpected for the German command. Having lost up to 50 thousand people and about 400 tanks, the northern strike force was forced to stop. Having advanced only 10 - 15 km, Model eventually lost the striking power of his tank units and lost the opportunity to continue the offensive.
Meanwhile, on the southern flank of the Kursk salient, events developed according to a different scenario. By July 8, the shock units of the German motorized formations "Grossdeutschland", "Reich", "Dead Head", the Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler", several tank divisions of the 4th Panzer Army of Gotha and the Kempf group managed to penetrate the Soviet defenses up to 20 and over km. The offensive initially went in the direction locality Oboyan, but then, due to the strong opposition of the Soviet 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards Army and other formations in this sector, the commander of Army Group South von Manstein decided to strike east - in the direction of Prokhorovka. It was near this settlement that the largest tank battle of the Second World War began, in which up to TWO TWO Hundred TANKS and self-propelled guns took part on both sides.
The Battle of Prokhorovka is a largely collective concept. The fate of the opposing sides was not decided in one day and not on the same field. The theater of operations for the Soviet and German tank formations represented an area of more than 100 square meters. km. Nevertheless, it was this battle that largely determined the entire subsequent course not only of the Battle of Kursk, but of the entire summer campaign on the Eastern Front.
On June 9, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. Rotmistrov from the Steppe Front to help the troops of the Voronezh Front, who was tasked with launching a counterattack on the enemy’s wedged tank units and forcing them to retreat to their original positions. It was emphasized that it was necessary to try to engage German tanks in close combat in order to limit their advantages in armor resistance and firepower of turret guns.
Having concentrated in the Prokhorovka area, on the morning of July 10, Soviet tanks moved to the attack. In quantitative terms, they outnumbered the enemy in a ratio of approximately 3:2, but the fighting qualities of the German tanks allowed them to destroy many "thirty-four" even on the way to their positions. The fighting continued here from morning until evening. The Soviet tanks that broke through met the German ones almost armor to armor. But this is exactly what the command of the 5th Guards Army wanted. Moreover, soon the battle formations of the opponents mixed up so much that the "tigers" and "panthers" began to expose their side armor, which was not as strong as the frontal, to the fire of Soviet guns. When the battle finally began to subside towards the end of July 13, it was time to count the losses. And they were truly gigantic. The 5th Guards Tank Army has practically lost its combat power. But German losses also did not allow them to further develop the offensive in the Prokhorovka direction: the Germans had only up to 250 serviceable combat vehicles left in service.
The Soviet command hastily transferred new forces to Prokhorovka. The battles that continued in this area on July 13 and 14 did not lead to a decisive victory for one side or the other. However, the enemy began to gradually run out of steam. The Germans had the 24th Panzer Corps in reserve, but sending it into battle meant losing the last reserve. The potential of the Soviet side was immeasurably great. On July 15, the Headquarters decided to deploy the forces of the Steppe Front of General I. Konev on the southern wing of the Kursk ledge - the 27th and 53rd armies, with the support of the 4th Guards Tank and 1st Mechanized Corps. Soviet tanks were hastily concentrated northeast of Prokhorovka and received an order on July 17 to go on the offensive. But the Soviet tankers no longer had to participate in a new oncoming battle. The German units began to gradually move away from Prokhorovka to their original positions. What's the matter?
As early as July 13, Hitler invited Field Marshals von Manstein and von Kluge to his headquarters for a meeting. On that day, he ordered the continuation of Operation Citadel and not to reduce the intensity of the fighting. Success near Kursk seemed to be just around the corner. However, just two days later, Hitler suffered a new disappointment. His plans were falling apart. On July 12, the troops of the Bryansk Front went on the offensive, and then, from July 15, the Central and Left Wings of the Western Fronts in the general direction of Orel (Operation ""). The German defense here could not stand it and cracked at the seams. Moreover, some territorial successes on the southern wing of the Kursk salient were nullified after the battle of Prokhorovka.
At a meeting at the Fuhrer's headquarters on July 13, Manstein tried to convince Hitler not to interrupt Operation Citadel. The Fuhrer did not object to the continuation of the attacks on the southern wing of the Kursk salient (although it was no longer possible to do this on the northern wing of the salient). But the new efforts of the Manstein group did not lead to decisive success. As a result, on July 17, 1943, the command of the German ground forces ordered the withdrawal of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps from the Army Group South. Manstein had no choice but to retreat.
PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. OFFENSIVE
In mid-July 1943, the second phase of the gigantic battle of Kursk began. On July 12-15, the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts went on the offensive, and on August 3, after the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts pushed the enemy back to their original positions on the southern wing of the Kursk salient, they launched the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev "). Fighting in all areas continued to be extremely complex and fierce. The situation was further complicated by the fact that in the offensive zone of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts (in the south), as well as in the zone of the Central Front (in the north), the main blows of our troops were inflicted not on a weak, but on a strong sector of the enemy defense. This decision was made in order to shorten the time for preparing for offensive operations as much as possible, to catch the enemy by surprise, that is, precisely at the moment when he was already exhausted, but had not yet taken up a solid defense. The breakthrough forward was carried out by powerful strike groups on narrow sections front using a large number tanks, artillery and aviation.
The courage of Soviet soldiers, the increased skill of their commanders, the competent use of military equipment in battles could not but lead to positive results. Already on August 5, Soviet troops liberated Orel and Belgorod. On this day, for the first time since the beginning of the war, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow in honor of the valiant formations of the Red Army that won such a brilliant victory. By August 23, units of the Red Army had pushed the enemy back to the west by 140-150 km and liberated Kharkov for the second time.
The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions; about 500 thousand soldiers killed, wounded and missing; 1.5 thousand tanks; more than 3 thousand aircraft; 3 thousand guns. Even greater were the losses of the Soviet troops: 860 thousand people; over 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns; 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, the balance of forces at the front changed in favor of the Red Army. It had at its disposal an incomparably greater number of fresh reserves than the Wehrmacht.
The offensive of the Red Army, after the introduction of new formations into battle, continued to increase its pace. On the central sector of the front, the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts began to advance towards Smolensk. This ancient Russian city, considered since the 17th century. gate to Moscow, was released on September 25. On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, units of the Red Army in October 1943 reached the Dnieper in the Kyiv region. Capturing several bridgeheads on the right bank of the river on the move, Soviet troops carried out an operation to liberate the capital of Soviet Ukraine. On November 6, a red flag was raised over Kyiv.
It would be wrong to say that after the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the further offensive of the Red Army developed unhindered. Everything was much more difficult. So, after the liberation of Kyiv, the enemy managed to launch a powerful counterattack in the region of Fastov and Zhytomyr against the advanced formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front and inflict considerable damage on us, stopping the offensive of the Red Army on the territory of the right-bank Ukraine. The situation in Eastern Belarus was even more tense. After the liberation of the Smolensk and Bryansk regions, by November 1943, Soviet troops reached the areas east of Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. However, the subsequent attacks of the Western and Bryansk fronts against the German Army Group Center, which had taken up a tough defense, did not lead to any significant results. Time was needed to concentrate additional forces in the Minsk direction, to give rest to formations exhausted in previous battles and, most importantly, to develop a detailed plan for a new operation to liberate Belarus. All this happened in the summer of 1944.
And in 1943, the victories near Kursk and then in the battle for the Dnieper completed a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht suffered a final collapse. By the end of 1943, 37 countries were at war with the Axis powers. The collapse of the fascist bloc began. Among the notable acts of that time was the establishment in 1943 of soldiers' and commanders' awards - the Orders of Glory I, II, and III degrees and the Order of Victory, as well as the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1, 2 and 3 degrees as a sign of the liberation of Ukraine. A long and bloody struggle still lay ahead, but a radical change had already taken place.
Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all)
Irrevocable - 70 330
Sanitary - 107 517
Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front
Irrevocable - 112 529
Sanitary - 317 361
Operation Rumyantsev: Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front
Irrevocable - 71 611
Sanitary - 183 955
General in the battle for the Kursk salient:
Irrevocable - 189 652
Sanitary - 406 743
In the Battle of Kursk in general
~ 254 470
killed, captured, missing
608 833
the wounded, sick
153 thousand small arms
6064
tanks and self-propelled guns
5245
guns and mortars
1626
combat aircraft
1000
tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet
less 1696
aircraft
| The Great Patriotic War |
|---|
| Invasion of the USSR Karelia arctic Leningrad Rostov Moscow Sevastopol Barvenkovo-Lozovaya Kharkov Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad Rzhev Stalingrad Caucasus Velikiye Luki Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Voronezh-Kastornoye Kursk Smolensk Donbass Dnieper Right-Bank Ukraine Leningrad-Novgorod Crimea (1944) Belarus Lviv-Sandomierz Iasi-Chisinau Eastern Carpathians the Baltics Courland Romania Bulgaria Debrecen Belgrade Budapest Poland (1944) Western Carpathians East Prussia Lower Silesia Eastern Pomerania Upper Silesia Vein Berlin Prague |
The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, wear down the enemy troops and inflict defeat on them, inflicting counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. To this end, a defense in depth was created on both faces of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average density of mining in the direction of the expected enemy strikes was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front.
In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with the different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as the difference in the methods of accounting and classification military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is associated with the inclusion or exclusion from the calculations of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1500 tanks). The following table contains some estimates:
| Source | Personnel (thousand) | Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns | Guns and (sometimes) mortars | Aircraft | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| the USSR | Germany | the USSR | Germany | the USSR | Germany | the USSR | Germany | |
| MO RF | 1336 | over 900 | 3444 | 2733 | 19100 | about 10000 | 2172 2900 (including Po-2 and far) |
2050 |
| Krivosheev 2001 | 1272 | |||||||
| Glantz, House | 1910 | 780 | 5040 | 2696 or 2928 | ||||
| Mueller Gill. | 2540 or 2758 | |||||||
| Zett, Frankson | 1910 | 777 | 5128 +2688 "Stavka reserve" over 8000 in total |
2451 | 31415 | 7417 | 3549 | 1830 |
| KOSAVE | 1337 | 900 | 3306 | 2700 | 20220 | 10000 | 2650 | 2500 |
The role of intelligence
However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on the data of the intelligence agencies of the fronts of the Kursk direction, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk salient:
... I believe that the enemy will deploy the main offensive operations against these three fronts in order to defeat our troops in this direction and gain freedom of maneuver to bypass Moscow in the shortest direction.
2. Apparently, at the first stage, the enemy, having gathered the maximum of his forces, including up to 13-15 tank divisions, with the support of a large number of aircraft, will strike with his Oryol-Krom group around Kursk from the northeast and the Belgorod-Kharkov group around Kursk from the southeast.
Thus, although the exact text of the Citadel lay on Stalin's desk three days before Hitler signed it, the German plan became apparent to the highest Soviet military command four days before.
Kursk defensive operation
The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the time of the start of the operation, at 3 o'clock in the morning ( german army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow 5 o'clock in the morning), 30-40 minutes before it began, artillery and aviation counter-training was carried out.
Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 o'clock in the morning our time, the Germans also inflicted bombing and artillery strikes on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern face was inflicted in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having not achieved success, the Germans suffered a blow in the direction of Ponyri, but they were unable to break through the Soviet defenses here either. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which, from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of the tanks, the 9th German Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main blows of the Germans were directed to the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.
July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky.
To accomplish the task, the units of the 48th TC on the first day of the offensive (Day "X") needed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I. M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I. P. Sivakov) and the 67 Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A. I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoye and carry out a breakthrough with armored units in towards the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th shopping mall determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, part 48 of shopping mall. were supposed to reach the city of Oboyan.
However, as a result of the actions of the Soviet units and formations, the courage and stamina they showed, as well as the preparation of defensive lines they carried out in advance, the Wehrmacht's plans in this direction were “significantly adjusted” - 48 shopping mall did not reach Oboyan at all.
The factors that determined the unacceptably slow rate of advance of the 48th mk on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the terrain by the Soviet units (starting from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the defense and ending with radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of assault aircraft on the accumulated front engineering obstacles to enemy tanks, competent location of anti-tank strongholds (No. 6 south of Korovin in the lane of the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the lane of the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the combat formations of battalions of the 196th Guards Rifle Division .sp (Colonel V. I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassky, timely maneuver by the divisional (245 otp, 1440 sap) and army (493 iptap, as well as 27 oiptabr colonel N. D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units 3 TD and 11 TD with the involvement of forces 245 otp ( lieutenant colonel M. K. Akopov, 39 tanks) and 1440 glanders (lieutenant colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), as well as the not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the outposts in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 battalions. 199th guards regiment, captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of workers' barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of 48 TC (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of 11 TD and 332 RD before the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day "X-1", however, the resistance of the combat guard was not completely suppressed by dawn on July 5). All of the above factors affected both the speed of concentration of units in their original positions before the main attack, and their advancement during the offensive itself.
Machine-gun crew firing at the advancing German units
Also, the shortcomings of the German command in planning the operation and the poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units affected the pace of the corps' offensive. In particular, the Great Germany division (W. Heierlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and 10 tank brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 command tanks Pz.V) under the current conditions battles turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, for the entire first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow "corridors" in front of engineering barriers (overcoming the swampy anti-tank ditch south of Cherkassky caused especially great difficulties), came under a combined attack Soviet aviation(2nd VA) and artillery - from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments of 33 Otpabr (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially in the officer corps), and did not was able to turn around in accordance with the offensive schedule on the tank-accessible terrain at the Korovino-Cherkasskoye line for a further strike in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkasskoye. At the same time, infantry units that overcame anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own fire weapons. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd Battalion of the Fusiliers Regiment, which was at the forefront of the strike of the VG division, at the time of the first attack, found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division could not actually bring them into battle for a long time.
The result of the resulting congestion on the advance routes was also the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th tank corps in firing positions, which affected the results of the artillery preparation before the start of the attack.
It should be noted that the commander of the 48th TC became a hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of the higher authorities. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative effect - all divisions of the corps were put into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.
The development of the offensive of 48 mk on the afternoon of July 5 was most facilitated by: active operations of sapper-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and an overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the initiative actions of units 11 TD (I. Mikl) and 911 TD. division of assault guns (overcoming the strip of engineering obstacles and access to the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy by a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).
An important factor in the success of the German tank units was the qualitative leap that had taken place by the summer in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of the anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units manifested itself in the fight against both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and with modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet Iptap were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective range of fire of the latter, heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in combined arms 6 Guards A, but also in the 1st Tank Army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).
Only after overcoming in the second half of the day the main mass of tanks of anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassky, having repelled a number of counterattacks of the Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11 TD were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00 division commander A. I. Baksov ordered the withdrawal of units of the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassky, as well as to the center of the village. During the withdrawal of units of 196 Guards Rifles, minefields were set up. At about 21:20, a battle group of grenadiers of the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th brigade, broke into the Yarki farm (north of Cherkassky). A little later, the 3rd TD of the Wehrmacht managed to capture the Krasny Pochinok farm (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th TC of the Wehrmacht was the wedging into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the background of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating east in parallel with 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. BUT.
Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was suppressed around midnight on July 5 . However, the German units were able to establish full control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.
Thus, the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division, not possessing large tank formations (they had only 39 American tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245 otp and 1440 sap) for about a day held five enemy divisions (of which three are armored). In the battle on July 5 in the Cherkassky region, the fighters and commanders of the 196th and 199th Guards especially distinguished themselves. rifle regiments 67 guards. divisions. The competent and truly heroic actions of the fighters and commanders of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner, pull up the army reserves to the place where the units of the 48th TC were wedged in at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this sector in the following days of the defensive operation.
As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoye actually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts: “it was a lunar landscape”).
The heroic defense of the village of Cherkasskoye on July 5 - one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.
July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.
By the end of the first day of the offensive, 4 TA wedged into the defense of 6 Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the offensive section of 48 shopping malls (near the village of Cherkasskoye) and 12-13 km in the section of 2 shopping malls of the SS (in the area of Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the first line of defense of the Soviet troops to the full depth, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I. M. Nekrasov), and approached the front 5-6 km directly to the second the line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), engaging in battle with its advanced units.
However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - on July 5 did not complete the task of the day, faced with stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the advancing 4th tank army. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely MD "Dead Head", to cover his right flank against the 375th Rifle Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units brilliantly proved themselves in the battles of July 5 .
Nevertheless, the success achieved by the divisions "Leibstandarte" and in particular "Das Reich" forced the command of the Voronezh Front in conditions of not complete clarity of the situation to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakov on the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin, by his order, transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad shopping mall (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34s and 21 are Churchill Mk.IVs) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34s and 17 are Mk.IV Churchills) under the command of the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards Rifle Division with the forces of the 5th Guards Rifle Division. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 TC SS with the forces of 2 Guards. TTK (straight through the battle formations of 375 rifle divisions). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I. M. Chistyakov puts the commander of the 5th Guards. Stk Major General A. G. Kravchenko tasked with withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy, using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strongholds) of the main part of the corps (two of the three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and the infliction of a counterattack by these forces on the flank of the Leibstandarte MD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture with. Luchki tanks of the Das Reich division, and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the implementation of this order. However, under the threat of arrests and execution, they were forced to proceed with its implementation. The attack of the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.
Sufficient own artillery means of the 5th Guards. Stk did not have, and the order did not leave time to link the actions of the corps with neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on level ground and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of MD Das Reich, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted significant fire damage on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After that, pulling up anti-tank artillery and organizing flank maneuvers, between 17 and 19 hours, units of the Das Reich MD managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenap (Major Savchenko) and 464 guards artillery that had withdrawn from the village of Luchki .division and 460 guards. mortar battalion of the 6th guards msbr. By 19:00, units of MD "Das Reich" actually managed to surround most of the 5th Guards. Stk between s. Luchki and Kalinin farm, after which, building on success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka, tried to seize the Belenikhino junction. However, thanks to the initiative actions of the commander and battalion commanders of the 20 brigade (lieutenant colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) of the 5th Guards, which remained outside the encirclement ring. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikhino from various parts of the corps at hand, managed to stop the offensive of MD Das Reich, and even force the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without communication with the headquarters of the corps, on the night of July 7, the encircled units of the 5th Guards. Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and connected with parts of the 20 brigade. During July 6, units of the 5th Guards. Stk for combat reasons, 119 tanks were irretrievably lost, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unexplained reasons, and 19 were sent for repair. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 exceeded even the losses of the 29th Tank Corps during the attack on July 12 at the Oktyabrsky temporary storage warehouse).
After the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, continuing to develop success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment md "Das Reich", using the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of army defense, occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V. D. Kryuchenkon) , near the Teterevino farm, and for a short time wedged into the defense of the 285th joint venture of the 183rd rifle division, however, due to a clear lack of strength, having lost several tanks, he was forced to retreat. The exit of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front already on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.
Battle of Prokhorovka
Belfry in memory of those who died on the Prokhorovsky field
Results of the defensive phase of the battle
The central front involved in the battle in the north of the arc, for July 5-11, 1943, suffered losses of 33,897 people, of which 15,336 were irretrievable, its enemy, the 9th Army of the Model, lost 20,720 people over the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which participated in the battle on the southern face of the arc, lost on July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including only the Voronezh Front - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed the losses of their front to be 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irretrievable. If, contrary to Soviet documents of the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of the losses of the Soviet and German sides is 4.95: 1 here.
During the period from July 5 to 12, 1943, the Central Front used up 1079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh - 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.
The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front is in the smaller massing of forces and means in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern face of the Kursk salient. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.
On the southern front, the counteroffensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at about 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, the Soviet troops on August 11 cut railway Kharkov-Poltava, August 23 captured Kharkov. The German counterattacks were not successful.
After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as " Watch on the Rhine" () or the operation at Balaton () were also not successful.
The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from 07/05/1943 to 08/23/1943, is a turning point in the Great Patriotic War and a giant historical tank battle. The Battle of Kursk lasted 49 days.
Hitler had high hopes for this major offensive battle called the Citadel, he needed a victory to raise the spirit of the army after a series of failures. August 1943 was fatal for Hitler, as the countdown to the war began, the Soviet army confidently marched to victory.
Intelligence service
Intelligence played an important role in the outcome of the battle. In the winter of 1943, the intercepted encrypted information constantly mentioned the "Citadel". Anastas Mikoyan (a member of the Politburo of the CPSU) claims that on April 12, Stalin received information about the Citadel project.
Back in 1942, British intelligence managed to crack the Lorenz code, which encrypted the messages of the 3rd Reich. As a result, the summer offensive project was intercepted, and information about general plan"Citadel", location and structure of forces. This information was immediately transferred to the leadership of the USSR.
Thanks to the work of the Dora reconnaissance group, the deployment of German troops along Eastern Front, and the work of other intelligence agencies provided information in other directions of the fronts.
Confrontation
The Soviet command was aware of the exact time of the start of the German operation. Therefore, the necessary counter-preparation was carried out. The Nazis began the assault on the Kursk Bulge on July 5 - this is the date the battle began. The main offensive attack of the Germans was in the direction of Olkhovatka, Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets.
The command of the German troops sought to get to Kursk along the shortest path. However, the Russian commanders: N. Vatutin - the Voronezh direction, K. Rokossovsky - the Central direction, I. Konev - the Steppe direction of the front, adequately responded to the German offensive.
The Kursk Bulge was supervised by the enemy by talented generals - these are General Erich von Manstein and Field Marshal von Kluge. Having been rebuffed at Olkhovatka, the Nazis tried to break through at Ponyri, using the Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But here, too, they failed to break through the defensive might of the Red Army.
Since July 11, a fierce battle has been going on near Prokhorovka. The Germans suffered significant losses of equipment and people. It was near Prokhorovka that the turning point in the war took place, and July 12 became a turning point in this battle for the 3rd Reich. The Germans struck immediately from the southern and western fronts.
One of the global tank battles took place. The Nazi army advanced 300 tanks into the battle from the south, and 4 tank and 1 infantry divisions from the west. According to other sources, the tank battle consisted of about 1200 tanks from 2 sides. The defeat of the Germans overtook by the end of the day, the movement of the SS corps was suspended, and their tactics turned into a defensive one.
During the Battle of Prokhorovka, according to Soviet data, on July 11-12, the German army lost more than 3,500 men and 400 tanks. The Germans themselves estimated the losses Soviet army in 244 tanks. Only 6 days lasted the operation "Citadel", in which the Germans tried to attack.
Used technique
Soviet medium tanks T-34 (about 70%), heavy - KV-1S, KV-1, light - T-70, self-propelled artillery mounts, nicknamed "St. SU-122, met in confrontation with German tanks Panther, Tigr, Pz.I, Pz.II, Pz.III, Pz.IV, which were supported by Elefant self-propelled guns (we have Ferdinand).
The Soviet guns were practically incapable of penetrating the frontal armor of the Ferdinands in 200 mm, they were destroyed with the help of mines and aircraft.
Also, the German assault guns were tank destroyers StuG III and JagdPz IV. Hitler strongly relied on new equipment in the battle, so the Germans postponed the offensive for 2 months in order to release 240 Panthers to the Citadel.
During the battle, Soviet troops received captured German "Panthers" and "Tigers", abandoned by the crew or broken. After the elimination of breakdowns, the tanks fought on the side of the Soviet troops.
List of forces of the USSR Army (according to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation):
- 3444 tanks;
- 2172 aircraft;
- 1.3 million people;
- 19100 mortars and guns.
As a reserve force, there was the Steppe Front, numbering: 1.5 thousand tanks, 580 thousand people, 700 aircraft, 7.4 thousand mortars and guns.
List of enemy forces:
- 2733 tanks;
- 2500 aircraft;
- 900 thousand people;
- 10,000 mortars and guns.
The Red Army had a numerical superiority by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk. However, the military potential was on the side of the Nazis, not in terms of quantity, but in terms of the technical level of military equipment.
Offensive
On July 13, the German army went on the defensive. The Red Army attacked, pushing the Germans further and further, and by July 14 the front line had moved up to 25 km. Having battered the German defensive capabilities, on July 18 the Soviet army launched a counterattack in order to defeat the Kharkov-Belgorod group of Germans. The Soviet front of offensive operations exceeded 600 km. On July 23, they reached the line of the German positions that they occupied before the offensive.
By August 3, the Soviet army consisted of: 50 rifle divisions, 2.4 thousand tanks, more than 12 thousand guns. On August 5 at 18 o'clock Belgorod was liberated from the Germans. From the beginning of August, a battle was fought for the city of Orel, on August 6 it was liberated. On August 10, the soldiers of the Soviet army cut the Kharkiv-Poltava railway line during the offensive Belgorod-Kharkov operation. On August 11, the Germans attacked in the vicinity of Bogodukhov, slowing down the pace of fighting on both fronts.
Heavy fighting lasted until 14 August. On August 17, Soviet troops approached Kharkov, starting a battle on its outskirts. The German troops carried out the final offensive in Akhtyrka, but this breakthrough did not affect the outcome of the battle. On August 23, an intensive assault on Kharkov began.
This day itself is considered the day of the liberation of Kharkov and the end of the Battle of Kursk. Despite the actual fights with the remnants of the German resistance, which lasted until 30 August.
Losses
According to various historical reports, the losses in the Battle of Kursk vary. Academician Samsonov A.M. claims that the losses in the Battle of Kursk: more than 500 thousand wounded, killed and captured, 3.7 thousand aircraft and 1.5 thousand tanks.
Losses in the heavy battle on the Kursk Bulge, according to information from the research of G.F. Krivosheev, in the Red Army amounted to:
- Killed, disappeared, were captured - 254,470 people,
- Wounded - 608833 people.
Those. in total, human losses amounted to 863303 people, with average daily losses - 32843 people.
Losses of military equipment:
- Tanks - 6064 units;
- Aircraft - 1626 pieces,
- Mortars and guns - 5244 pcs.
The German historian Overmans Rüdiger claims that the losses of the German army were killed - 130429 people. The losses of military equipment amounted to: tanks - 1500 units; aircraft - 1696 pcs. According to Soviet information, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, more than 420 thousand Germans were destroyed, as well as 38.6 thousand prisoners.
Outcome
Irritated Hitler put the blame for the failure in the Battle of Kursk on the generals and field marshals, whom he demoted, replacing them with more capable ones. However, in the future, the major offensives "Watch on the Rhine" in 1944 and the operation at Balaton in 1945 also failed. After the defeat in the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the Nazis did not achieve a single victory in the war.
In the summer of 1943, one of the most grandiose and important battles of the Great Patriotic War took place - the Battle of Kursk. The Nazis' dream of revenge for Stalingrad, for the defeat near Moscow, resulted in one of the most key battles, on which the outcome of the war depended.
Total mobilization - selected generals, the best soldiers and officers, the latest weapons, guns, tanks, planes - such was the order of Adolf Hitler - to prepare for the most important battle and not just win, but do it spectacularly, indicatively, avenging all the previous lost battles . A matter of prestige.
(In addition, it was precisely as a result of the successful Operation Citadel that Hitler assumed the opportunity to negotiate a truce from the Soviet side. German generals repeatedly stated this.)
It was for the Battle of Kursk that the Germans prepared a military gift for Soviet military designers - a powerful and invulnerable Tiger tank, which there was simply nothing to resist. Its impenetrable armor was too tough for Soviet-designed anti-tank guns, and new anti-tank guns had not yet been developed. During the meetings with Stalin, Marshal of Artillery Voronov said literally the following: "We do not have guns capable of successfully fighting these tanks"
The Battle of Kursk began on July 5, and ended on August 23, 1943. Every year on August 23, Russia celebrates the "Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the Victory of the Soviet Troops in the Battle of Kursk."
Moiarussia has collected the most interesting facts about this great confrontation:
Operation Citadel
In April 1943, Hitler approved military operation codenamed Zitadelle ("Citadel"). For its implementation, a total of 50 divisions were involved, including 16 tank and motorized; more than 900 thousand German soldiers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft. The location of the operation is the Kursk salient.
German sources wrote: “The Kursk ledge seemed to be a particularly suitable place for delivering such a blow. As a result of the simultaneous offensive of German troops from the north and south, a powerful grouping of Russian troops will be cut off. They also hoped to defeat those operational reserves that the enemy would bring into battle. In addition, the elimination of this ledge would significantly shorten the front line ... True, even then someone claimed that the enemy was expecting the German offensive in this area and ... that therefore there was a danger of losing more of their forces than inflicting losses on the Russians ... However, it was impossible to convince Hitler , and he believed that the operation "Citadel" would succeed if it was undertaken soon"
The Germans were preparing for the Battle of Kursk for a long time. The start of it was postponed twice: either the guns were not ready, or the new tanks were not delivered, or the new aircraft did not have time to pass the tests. On top of that, Hitler's fears that Italy was about to withdraw from the war. Convinced that Mussolini was not going to give up, Hitler decided to stick to the original plan. Fanatic Hitler believed that if you strike at the place where the Red Army was strongest and crush the enemy in this particular battle, then
"The victory at Kursk," he declared, would strike the imagination of the whole world.
Hitler knew that it was here, on the Kursk ledge, that the Soviet troops numbered more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, about 2.9 thousand aircraft. He knew that he would lose this battle by the number of soldiers and equipment involved in the operation, but thanks to an ambitious strategically correct plan developed and the latest weapons, which, according to the assurances of the military specialists of the Soviet army, would be difficult to resist, this numerical superiority would be absolutely vulnerable and useless.
Meanwhile, the Soviet command did not waste time in vain. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command considered two options: attack first or wait? The first option was promoted by the commander of the Voronezh Front Nikolai Vatutin. The commander of the Central Front insisted on the second . Despite Stalin's initial support for Vatutin's plan, Rokossovsky's safer plan was approved - "wait, wear down and go on the counteroffensive." Rokossovsky was supported by the majority of the military command and, first of all, by Zhukov.
However, later Stalin doubted the correctness of the decision - the Germans were too passive, who, as mentioned above, had already postponed their offensive twice.
(Photo by: Sovfoto/UIG via Getty Images) Waiting for latest technology- tanks "Tigers" and "Panthers", the Germans on the night of July 5, 1943 began their offensive.
That very night took place telephone conversation Rokossovsky with Stalin:
- Comrade Stalin! The Germans are on the offensive!
- What are you happy about? - asked the surprised leader.
“Now victory will be ours, Comrade Stalin!” - answered the commander.
Rokossovsky was not mistaken.
Agent Werther
On April 12, 1943, three days before Hitler approved Operation Citadel, an exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel” translated from German by the German High Command appeared on Stalin’s desk, signed by all services of the Wehrmacht. The only thing that was not on the document was the visas of Hitler himself. He put it in three days after the Soviet leader got acquainted with it. The Fuhrer, of course, did not know about this.
Nothing is known about the person who obtained this document for the Soviet command, except for his code name - "Werther". Various researchers put forward different versions of who "Werther" really was - some believe that Hitler's personal photographer was a Soviet agent.
Agent "Werther" (German: Werther) - the code name of the alleged Soviet agent in the leadership of the Wehrmacht or even in the top of the Third Reich during the Second World War, one of the prototypes of Stirlitz. For all the time he worked for Soviet intelligence, he did not allow a single misfire. It was considered the most reliable source in wartime.
Hitler's personal translator, Paul Karel, wrote about him in his book: “The heads of Soviet intelligence addressed the Swiss residency as if they were asking for information in some kind of information bureau. And they got everything they were interested in. Even a superficial analysis of radio interception data shows that in all phases of the war in Russia, the agents of the Soviet General Staff worked first-class. Part of the transmitted information could only be obtained from the highest German military circles.
- it seems that the Soviet agents in Geneva and Lausanne were dictated to the key directly from the Fuhrer's Headquarters.
Biggest tank battle
"Kursk Bulge": Tank T-34 against the "Tigers" and "Panthers" The key moment of the Battle of Kursk is considered to be the largest tank battle in the history of the war near the village of Prokhorovka, which began on July 12.
Surprisingly, this large-scale clash of armored vehicles of the warring parties to this day causes fierce disputes among historians.
Classical Soviet historiography reported 800 tanks for the Red Army and 700 for the Wehrmacht. Modern historians tend to increase the number of Soviet tanks and decrease the number of German ones.
None of the parties managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and the Soviet troops failed to surround the enemy grouping.
Based on the memoirs of German generals (E. von Manstein, G. Guderian, F. von Mellenthin and others), about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle (some of them probably fell behind on the march - “on paper” the army had more than a thousand vehicles ), of which about 270 were shot down (meaning only the morning battle on July 12).
Also preserved is the version of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, son of Joachim von Ribbentrop, commander of a tank company, a direct participant in the battle:
According to the published memoirs of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, Operation Citadel pursued not strategic, but purely operational goals: to cut off the Kursk salient, destroy the Russian troops involved in it, and straighten the front. Hitler hoped to achieve military success during the front-line operation in order to try to enter into negotiations with the Russians on a truce.
In his memoirs, Ribbentrop gives detailed description the disposition of the battle, its course and result:
“In the early morning of July 12, the Germans had to take Prokhorovka, an important point on the way to Kursk. However, suddenly, units of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army intervened in the course of the battle.
The unexpected attack on the deep-seated spearhead of the German offensive - by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army, deployed overnight - was undertaken by the Russian command in a completely incomprehensible way. The Russians inevitably had to go into their own anti-tank ditch, which was clearly shown even on the maps we captured.
The Russians drove, if they ever got that far, into their own anti-tank ditch, where they naturally became easy prey for our defenses. Burning diesel fuel spread a thick black fumes - Russian tanks were burning everywhere, partly colliding with each other, Russian infantrymen jumping between them, desperately trying to orient themselves and easily turning into a victim of our grenadiers and artillerymen, who also stood on this battlefield.
The attacking Russian tanks - there should have been more than a hundred of them - were completely destroyed.
As a result of the counterattack, by noon on July 12, the Germans "with surprisingly small losses" occupied "almost completely" their previous positions.
The Germans were stunned by the extravagance of the Russian command, which threw hundreds of tanks with armored infantrymen to certain death. This circumstance forced the German command to think deeply about the power of the Russian offensive.
“Stalin allegedly wanted to court-martial the commander of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov, who attacked us. In our opinion, he had good reasons for this. Russian descriptions of the battle - "the grave of German tank weapons" - have nothing to do with reality. We, however, felt unmistakably that the offensive had run out of steam. We saw no chance for ourselves to continue the offensive against the superior forces of the enemy, unless significant reinforcements were given. However, there were none."
It is no coincidence that after the victory at Kursk, Army Commander Rotmistrov was not even awarded, as he did not justify the high hopes placed on him by the Headquarters.
One way or another, the Nazi tanks were stopped on the field near Prokhorovka, which actually meant the disruption of the plans for the German summer offensive.
It is believed that Hitler himself ordered the termination of the Citadel plan on July 13, when he learned that the Western allies of the USSR had landed in Sicily on July 10, and the Italians had failed to defend Sicily during the fighting and it became necessary to send German reinforcements to Italy.
"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev"
Diorama dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. Author oleg95 When they talk about the Battle of Kursk, they often mention Operation Citadel - the German offensive plan. Meanwhile, after the onslaught of the Wehrmacht was repulsed, the Soviet troops carried out their two offensive operations, which ended in brilliant successes. The names of these operations are much less known than Citadel.
On July 12, 1943, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Three days later, the Central Front began its offensive. This operation was codenamed "Kutuzov". During it, a major defeat was inflicted on the German Army Group Center, whose retreat was stopped only on August 18 at the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. Thanks to Kutuzov, the cities of Karachev, Zhizdra, Mtsensk, Bolkhov were liberated, and on the morning of August 5, 1943, Soviet troops entered Oryol.
On August 3, 1943, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began offensive operation "Rumyantsev", named after another Russian commander. On August 5, Soviet troops captured Belgorod and then proceeded to liberate the territory of the Left-Bank Ukraine. During the 20-day operation, they defeated the opposing forces of the Nazis and went to Kharkov. On August 23, 1943, at 2 am, the troops of the Steppe Front launched a night assault on the city, which ended in success by dawn.
"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev" became the reason for the first victorious salute during the war years - on August 5, 1943 in Moscow it was held to commemorate the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.
Maresyev's feat
Maresyev (second from right) on the set of a film about himself. The painting "The Tale of a Real Man." Photo: Kommersant The book of the writer Boris Polevoy "The Tale of a Real Man", which was based on the life of a real military pilot Alexei Maresyev, was known to almost everyone in the Soviet Union.
But not everyone knows that the glory of Maresyev, who returned to combat aviation after the amputation of both legs, was born precisely during the Battle of Kursk.
Senior Lieutenant Maresyev, who arrived at the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, faced distrust. The pilots did not want to fly with him in pairs, fearing that the pilot with prostheses would not be able to cope in difficult times. The regiment commander did not let him into battle either.
Squadron commander Alexander Chislov took him to his pair. Maresyev coped with the task, and in the midst of the fighting on the Kursk Bulge he made sorties on an equal basis with everyone else.
On July 20, 1943, during a battle with superior enemy forces, Alexei Maresyev saved the lives of two of his comrades and personally destroyed two enemy Focke-Wulf 190 fighters.
This story immediately became known all over the front, after which the writer Boris Polevoy appeared in the regiment, immortalizing the name of the hero in his book. On August 24, 1943, Maresyev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Interestingly, during his participation in the battles, fighter pilot Alexei Maresyev personally shot down 11 enemy aircraft: four before being wounded and seven after returning to service after amputation of both legs.
Battle of Kursk - losses of the parties
The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including seven tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops surpassed the German ones - they amounted to 863 thousand people, including 254 thousand irretrievable. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about six thousand tanks.
After the Battle of Kursk, the balance of forces on the front changed dramatically in favor of the Red Army, which provided it with favorable conditions for launching a general strategic offensive.
In memory of the heroic victory of Soviet soldiers in this battle and in memory of the dead, the Day of Military Glory was established in Russia, and in Kursk there is the Kursk Bulge Memorial Complex, dedicated to one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War.
Memorial complex "Kursk Bulge" Hitler's revenge did not take place. The last attempt to sit down at the negotiating table was destroyed.
August 23, 1943 is rightfully considered one of the most significant days in the Great Patriotic War. After the defeat in this battle, the German army began one of the longest and longest retreat routes on all fronts. The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion.
As a result of the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the greatness and stamina of the Soviet soldier was demonstrated to the whole world. Our allies have no doubts and hesitations about the right choice of side in this war. And the thought that let the Russians and the Germans destroy each other, and we look at it from the side faded into the background. The foresight and foresight of our allies prompted them to intensify their support for the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the winner will be only one state, which at the end of the war will get vast territories. However, that's another story...
Found an error? Select it and left click Ctrl+Enter.
The Battle of Kursk (Battle of the Kursk Bulge), which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Orel (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.
During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counteroffensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"). The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient. For this, a military operation was developed and approved in April 1943 under the code name "Citadel". Having information about the preparation of the Nazi troops for the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk Bulge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike groups and thereby create favorable conditions for the transition of the Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive. .
To carry out Operation Citadel, the German command concentrated 50 divisions in the area, including 18 tank and motorized divisions. The enemy grouping, according to Soviet sources, consisted of about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command had created a grouping (Central and Voronezh fronts), which had more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops that occupied the ledge relied on the Steppe Front as part of the rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 cavalry corps (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.
On July 5, 1943, according to the plan of Operation Citadel, German strike groups launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod regions. From the side of Orel, a grouping under the command of Field Marshal Günther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) was advancing, from Belgorod, a grouping under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Task Force Kempf of the Army Group South).
The task of repelling the offensive from the side of Orel was entrusted to the troops of the Central Front, from the side of Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.
On July 12, in the area of the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place - a battle between the advancing enemy tank group (Task Force Kempf) and the Soviet troops inflicting a counterattack. On both sides, up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle. The fierce battle lasted all day, by the evening the tank crews, together with the infantry, fought hand to hand. In one day, the enemy lost about 10 thousand people and 400 tanks and was forced to go on the defensive.
On the same day, the troops of the Bryansk, Central and left wing of the Western Fronts launched Operation Kutuzov, which had the goal of crushing the enemy's Oryol grouping. On July 13, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy defenses in the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol directions and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 km. On July 16, the troops of the Bryansk Front reached the line of the Oleshnya River, after which the German command began to withdraw its main forces to their original positions. By July 18, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front completely eliminated the enemy's wedge in the Kursk direction. On the same day, the troops of the Steppe Front were introduced into the battle, which began to pursue the retreating enemy.
Developing the offensive, the Soviet ground troops, supported from the air by strikes from the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies, as well as by long-range aviation, by August 23, 1943, they pushed the enemy back to the west by 140-150 km, liberated Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. According to Soviet sources, the Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops surpassed the German ones; they amounted to 863 thousand people. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about 6,000 tanks.
