The Napoleonic army in the spring of 1812 set out on a campaign against Russia. The fate of not only Russia, but also numerous European states depended on the outcome of this war, for all of them were directly or indirectly dependent on Napoleonic France.

It seemed that nothing could stop Napoleon's army. However, the campaign in Russia, begun by the invincible commander, ended, as you know, in a defeat unprecedented in history. Napoleon's army of thousands, which invaded Russia, was completely destroyed. Only a few thousand soldiers and officers, along with Napoleon, fled.

The war of 1812, which ended with the collapse of the Napoleonic empire and a radical change in the entire political situation in Europe, left an indelible mark on world history. Until now, many issues of the history of the epic of 1812 are being debated. Therefore, this topic remains relevant in history. Today, the history of the Napoleonic invasion of Russia includes thousands of works by Soviet and Russian historians.

Pre-revolutionary historiography is clearly divided into two main areas: conservative-conservative, diligently emphasizing the “domesticity” of the war in the sense of the unity of all classes around the throne, and liberal, which did not insist on the unity of all strata of society.

Soviet historiography. The development of the theme begins in the 1920s. M.N. Pokrovsky calls Russia an aggressor, he gives a low assessment of the Russian army, and he considered the patriotism of the Russian people only to protect their property from marauders. A decisive shift in the field of studying the history of the Napoleonic wars and the events of the Patriotic War in 1812 was observed in the mid-30s, E.V. Tarle "Napoleon", where the academician praises Napoleon's talents, Tarle very clearly defined Napoleon's plans aimed at subordinating Russia economically. The main obstacle to the advance of the Napoleonic troops, as he showed, was the extraordinary strength of the resistance of the peoples of Russia.

WWII historiography was aimed at promoting the experience of the past struggle. During this period, the War of 1812 is perceived as the heroic struggle of the peoples of Russia against the Napoleonic invasion, and much attention is paid to the role of commanders, including M.I. Kutuzov. Soviet historians paid much attention to the coverage of the Battle of Borodino. The economic, diplomatic and ideological aspects of the war were extremely poorly developed, mistakes and inaccuracies were made in the coverage of a number of events. Research lagged behind the available documentary base. Until the end of the Soviet period, the concept prevailed, according to which foreign policy Russia was of a peaceful nature and was aimed solely at containing Napoleonic hegemony and against the aspirations of the French emperor for world domination.

Since 1962, the development of the role of the economic factor in the war of 1812 began L.G. Beskrovny was able to comprehensively show the military and economic capabilities of Russia, refuting the myth of the poor equipment of the Russian army. L.P. agrees with him. Bogdanov. The strategic plan for Napoleon's invasion of Russia has not been specifically studied. Nevertheless, the opinion was firmly established in the literature that long before the invasion, the French commander decided to take over Moscow, A.Z. does not agree with this. Manfred. Conflicting data are still given on the number of troops.

In the 60s - 80s, the gap in the development of the first stage of the war was basically filled. It is covered most thoroughly in the monographs of L.G. Beskrovny, P.A. Zhilina, I.A. Troitsky.

One of the controversial issues in the history of the war of 1812 is its periodization. L.G. Bloodless divides the war into two stages, considering the Battle of Borodino to be the frontier. I.I. Rostunov proposed a three-stage periodization: the beginning of the war before Tarutino, stay in Tarutino and the transition to the pursuit of the enemy until the final defeat of the Napoleonic army.

Released since the early 1990s. works are devoted mainly to private issues of the history of the war of 1812, and if earlier the Russian Empire was a victim in the question of the causes of the war, now the opinion prevails that the war was caused by a complex of political and economic contradictions between Russia and France, a clash of their interests in Germany, Poland, in the Middle East. Napoleon's frank desire for hegemony in Europe is not denied, however, the obvious desire of Alexander I to achieve revenge for the military defeats of 1805-1807 is especially different. The opinion about the suddenness of the attack is also called untenable.

Reasons for the war:

• 1. trade and economic. Russia refused to participate in the continental blockade of England, so as not to inflict its own trade.
• 2. Polish question. Napoleon supported the Poles' desire for independence, which did not suit Russia.

At the turn of the XVIII-XIX centuries. Napoleonic France successfully conducted a whole series of wars of conquest, its army demonstrated the most modern military art, was numerous and combat-ready.

After making peace with Napoleon, Alexander went to war with Sweden (1808-1809). As a result, Finland went to Russia, which became part of Russia as an autonomous principality. June 12, 1812 Napoleon at the head of his army invaded the territory of Russia. He hoped to defeat the Russian armies and impose peace on Russia on his own terms. The Russian army was headed by: M. B. Barclay de Tolly, P. I. Bagration, A. P. Tormasov.

The course of the war. First step. (From the beginning of the invasion on June 12 to the Battle of Borodino on August 26). Second phase. (from Borodino to the battle for Maloyaroslavets on October 12) The third stage: (from Maloyaroslavets to the defeat of the "Great Army" and the liberation of Russian territory on December 25).

Following the plan of M. B. Barclay de Tolly, the Russian army immediately began to retreat. Napoleon's plan was thwarted, he continued the attack on Moscow in the hope of a general battle. Russian society was dissatisfied. This forced the emperor to appoint M. I. Kutuzov as commander-in-chief. On August 26, a battle took place near the village of Borodino near Moscow. On September 1, a military council was held in the village of Fili, where it was decided to leave Moscow to Napoleon, thereby preserving the Russian army. On September 2, Napoleon entered Moscow. Due to lack of food, he decided to leave the Russian capital. Kutuzov was preparing for a counteroffensive, which he launched on 6 October. On October 12, the battle took place at Maloyaroslavets.

The onset of severe frosts and famine turned the French retreat into a flight. On December 25, 1812, the manifesto of Alexander I announced the victorious end of the Patriotic War.

On January 1, 1813, the Russian army crossed the Neman. On October 4-6, 1813, a battle took place near Leipzig, the so-called Battle of the Nations. Soon the allied troops entered Paris. Napoleon abdicated and was exiled to the island of Elba. On May 28, 1815, during the Congress of Vienna, the Final Act was signed, according to which Russia received Bessarabia, Finland and the territory of the former Duchy of Warsaw. On June 6, 1815, the Battle of Waterloo took place. Napoleon was once again defeated and sent to Saint Helena.

Reasons for victory.

• 1) The national liberation, popular character of the war,
• 2) The high level of military art of Russian military leaders.
• 3) The significant economic potential of Russia, which made it possible to create a large and well-armed army.
• 4) The loss by the French army of its best fighting qualities, the unwillingness, and indeed the inability of Napoleon to find support among the peasant masses due to its liberation from serfdom.
• 5) England and Spain made a great contribution to the victory of Russia, diverting significant forces of Napoleon for the war in Spain and at sea.

Consequences of the war:

• 1. Large economic and national damage. Subsequently, the Moscow province quickly recovered from the devastation, and in Smolensk and Pskov the population was smaller than in 1811 until the middle of the century.
• 2. Consolidation of the Russian nation.
• 3. Strengthening Moscow as a spiritual center.
• 4. Rise of national culture.
• 5. The war entailed a series of diplomatic agreements between countries opposed to Napoleonic France. In 1815, when the congress in Vienna ended, the Russian, Prussian and Austrian monarchs signed a treaty of sacred alliance. They undertook to ensure the inviolability of the decisions of the Congress of Vienna. In the future, most of the European ones joined the union.

By the end of the 18th century, a new historical era full of drama had begun in Europe. With the beginning of the French Revolution and the execution of King Louis XVI in 1793, the eternal confrontation between France and England takes on a completely new and deeper meaning.

Emperor of Europe

Republican France begins the transformation of monarchical Europe, meeting resistance not only from England, but from all European monarchs. The significance of the wars waged by France is disputed. On the one hand, coming to the territory of other states, the French established the same rules as in France. For example, they introduced a civil code known as the Napoleonic Code. In addition, unrealistic duties were abolished, which gives reason to many historians to say that the French army acted as the liberator of Europe from the absolutist powers. But at the same time, it is overlooked that the French did come as invaders.

It is the predatory nature of the Napoleonic wars that allows some historians to believe that Napoleon is a war criminal who unleashed a war throughout Europe. True, many French historians could argue with this, saying that he practically did not declare wars, on the contrary, they attacked him. However, many researchers will rightly say that he forced them to attack. So the whole policy pursued by Napoleon is the policy of conquering Europe. But he did not particularly hide it. Nevertheless, the answer to this question is ambiguous. He was a war criminal in the sense that the Russian campaign is a terrible tragedy with colossal losses for both sides. Of course, there is also the issue of personal responsibility. But Napoleon himself still had a crazy dream that he could rebuild Europe in a liberal way.

French soldiers, entering the land of other states, behaved not like liberators, but like robbers and marauders. What advanced orders did Napoleon want to bring if the soldiers of his army raped women, robbed property, behaved defiantly with local population?
The creation of anti-French coalitions, of which there were seven during the years of the Napoleonic wars, became a natural reaction of European monarchs to the aggressive actions of Napoleon. England was the main and constant participant in all anti-French coalitions. The English newspaper Morning Chronicle wrote: “Napoleon wants to wash clothes in the Black Sea, bathe horses in the Mediterranean, fish in the Baltic, Atlantic Ocean take a walk, look in the Quiet instead of a mirror.

Napoleon, who led republican France and picked up the banner of struggle against monarchism, became emperor himself and achieved absolute power not only in his own country, but in almost all of Europe. He became emperor of Europe. Beginning in 1799, over the course of twelve years, the territory of France increased significantly due to the annexation of the Netherlands and part of the Italian provinces, the creation of the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807, and the unification of numerous German principalities into the Confederation of the Rhine, controlled by Napoleon. And Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Prussia, Austria, Denmark and Norway were forced by Napoleon into allied relations.

Russia was very concerned about the expansion french empire and the weakening of other European powers, therefore, she took part in the creation of several anti-Napoleonic coalitions. In 1805, a third coalition was formed, where Russia, together with England and Austria, fought against Napoleon, but the war ended sadly for our country - the defeat at Austerlitz. Russian and Austrian troops were defeated.
In 1805, the famous meeting between Napoleon and Alexander I took place in the middle of the Neman River. It was then that the Peace of Tilsit was concluded. This agreement in Tilsit was some kind of misunderstanding. Alexander went to Tilsit in order to achieve the most favorable conditions for Russia through these negotiations and save the position of his country, which had lost the war. Napoleon offers him an alliance, and Emperor Alexander resigns himself to this situation. But in the depths of his soul he never aspired to such an alliance with France, this is clearly seen from his private correspondence.
It is interesting that popular rumor gave this meeting on the Neman a special significance. So, in the notebook of Peter Vyazemsky, a famous Russian poet, there is evidence of a conversation between two peasants, where one is indignant: “How did it happen that Alexander the First went to meet this non-Christ! It's a big sin!" And the second says: “It's okay, because the meeting was on the river. Our king specifically ordered the construction of a raft in order to first baptize Bonaparte in the water, and only after that he allowed him to appear before his clear eyes.

So, judging by external attributes, we can say that the alliance could take place, since both emperors, Napoleon and Alexander, understood each other. They were seen hugging each other on a raft in Tilsit, seen talking in the city, applauding each other. But all documents indicate that Alexander the First was simply playing a comedy in front of Bonaparte. Yes, and Napoleon did not feel tender feelings for him.

War was inevitable

In 1808, in Erfurt, the provisions of the Tilsit agreements were confirmed, the main of which are the recognition by our country of all the conquests of Napoleon, including the Duchy of Warsaw, as well as the accession of the Russian state to the continental blockade of Britain.

The peace of Tilsit unleashed the hands of the ambitious Bonaparte throughout Europe. But Russia also received relative freedom of action against Sweden in the northwest and against Turkey and Persia in the south. In no case did Alexander consider this union as final, he did not aspire to this state of affairs at all. For him, Napoleon remains a usurper, a man outside the law. It should be noted that he never called him "Napoleon", but only "Bonaparte" or even "Buonaparte", emphasizing his Corsican origin.

It was the violation of the provisions of the Tilsit agreement - both by Russia and by France - that became the formal cause of the war of the 12th year. Both countries at about the same time, since 1810, began preparing for war. The main reason was that Russia did not want to comply with the conditions of the continental blockade. Our country did not want to harm its own economy. But the essence of this blockade was to stop the entire continent from trading with England.

The termination of trade with Great Britain, which was the main buyer of Russian goods, was unacceptable for our country. Imagine if today Russia lost the opportunity to sell gas to the West. The loss of the English market undermined the Russian economy. And when Paul I agreed to rapprochement with Napoleon and actually broke off relations with Great Britain, this became a small rehearsal for the future continental blockade: huge problems immediately arose in the Russian economy. The nobility was very dissatisfied, and we know that everything ended very sadly for Paul the First.

France's attempts to replace England, that is, to create favorable opportunities for French entrepreneurs to trade with Russia, run into a strict prohibitive tariff in 1810, which the Russian government introduces. What is it for?

Russia is forbidden to trade with England, it bears losses. But Alexander learns that in France Napoleon is introducing the practice of licensing the actual smuggling trade. Everyone is forbidden to trade with the British, but an entrepreneur can buy a license from the state to import a certain amount of English goods into France and Europe. That is, Napoleon appropriated to himself the exclusive, monopoly right to trade with Great Britain. Not everyone can, but some can.

The personal relationship between Alexander I and Napoleon did not develop either. The latter already had an alliance in Tilsit, which he would like to extend, strengthen and develop through marital ties. It is authentically known that he proposed to the king's sister Catherine, and then to his younger sister, Anna. This happened at the end of 1809.

Officially, Alexander I did not refuse. But he immediately married one sister to the Duke of Oldenburg. As for the youngest, he stated that, according to the laws Russian Empire he has no right to dispose of the will of his sister. Only Anna's mother, Empress Maria Feodorovna, had such a right. And she hated Napoleon.

Napoleon Bonaparte wrote: "The union of France with Russia has always been the subject of my desires." Paradoxically, even in his youth, Napoleon could link his future with Russia. Who knows how history would have turned if in 1788 the young artilleryman Lieutenant Napoleone Buonaparte had not been denied admission to the Russian service. Our country invited volunteers for the war with Turkey. Young Bonaparte, having learned about this, volunteered to serve in the Russian army, but did not agree with the recruitment conditions. The nineteen-year-old lieutenant could not accept the conditions under which every foreigner was accepted into the Russian service with a demotion by one rank.

What would happen if Napoleon entered the service in Russia? Here one can only guess. He probably would have been a good officer in the Russian army. Like many Frenchmen who entered the Russian service.

However, some historians doubt that such a fact ever took place. Besides, it wouldn't make much of a difference. There would be no Napoleon, there would be someone else. After all, there is a certain dominant, according to which the country develops.

War, meanwhile, was becoming inevitable. Initially, Napoleon intended to invade Russia in May 1812, but the shift in time gave him pasture for horses, more time to campaign in the warm season, and so on. The French emperor expected that he would finish the campaign in the late autumn at the latest.

In 1811, Napoleon took advantage of the fact that Alexander I showed dissatisfaction with the strengthening of the Duchy of Warsaw. He presented this discontent as a threat from the Russian emperor to the Polish state, which was actually part of the Napoleonic empire. After that, he moved the troops to the east, citing the defense of the Poles.

The concept of "Grand Army" arose in 1805 just during the war of Napoleon against the third coalition. The word "Grande" in French meant both "great" and "big". Unlike the Year Five Grand Army, the Year Twelfth Army was already multi-ethnic and not purely French.

The size of Napoleon's Grand Army in 1812 was approximately 700,000 men. And only every second of them was French. The Great Army of the 12th year should be regarded as a kind of military prototype of a united Europe. And within the framework of this army, people of different languages ​​and nationalities somehow got used to each other. So the composition of the invading army was very good, and in some aspects it was superior to the Russian army.
In a prayer service written by Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow, Napoleon's army will be called "an army of twenty languages." It was this army that in 1812 approached the border of Russia.

Existed in Russian society early XIX century gallomania, i.e. admiration for everything French, and a well-established bilingualism, when Russian was spoken at home, and letters were written and official petitions were written in French, were seriously undermined by the French invasion of Russia. It is perhaps rare that such a rise in patriotic sentiments has been observed in Russian history. Society was extremely unanimous in the desire to give a fitting rebuff to his "Great Army".

Causes of the Patriotic War

A Corsican on the French throne, a man with great conceit and exorbitant ambitions, Napoleon Bonaparte dreamed of expanding France to the level of the power of Alexander the Great, choosing him as an idol. All agreements with Russia and high-level meetings of the two emperors - Alexander I and Napoleon, were only diplomatic ploys and delaying the inevitable military conflict. Russia was an obvious obstacle to the expansion of Napoleonic power to the East.

The main battles of the Patriotic War

On the night of June 1812, having crossed the border river Neman, the French invaded Russia. By that time, the French troops were many times superior to the Russian forces, since the latter were dispersed throughout the western border of the empire. The Russian army consisted of three formations. The first was commanded by M.B. Barclay de Tolly, the second - by P.I. Bagration, the third - by A.P. Tormasov. The emperor tried to lead the army himself, but, being a man of the world, he was forced to leave for the capital. Napoleon's plans were to smash the main Russian forces one by one and prevent their reunification. The French emperor planned to give a general battle near the border. Barclay de Tolly had to stick to a defensive strategy and retreat inland, luring the French there as well. The first major battle was Smolensk. The city was surrendered and turned into ruins. Nevertheless, the French suffered tangible losses, lost hope for fodder for horses and food supplies. The Russians were already pursuing a scorched earth policy. Meanwhile, M.I. Kutuzov was appointed commander-in-chief. We must pay tribute to Emperor Alexander - he showed the same respect for the field marshal as his father showed for Suvorov, leaving behind his personal dislike. Kutuzov gave a general battle to Napoleon near the village of Borodino near Moscow. Both sides held their ground. There were no winners or losers. It was hard for Kutuzov to decide to leave Moscow to the French. However, he was firmly convinced that "with the loss of Moscow, Russia is not lost," and subsequent events only confirmed the correctness of his great sacrifice. The bloodless French army entered Moscow. Looting and fires began. Taking advantage of the respite, Kutuzov's army retreated to the village of Tarutino, where they camped. On the initiative of the legendary poet and hussar Denis Davydov, a broad partisan movement unfolded, the "club of the people's war" rose, in the figurative expression of L.N. Tolstoy. It caused enormous damage to the French. All Napoleon's appeals to Alexander remained unanswered. Moscow has become a grave for the "Great Army". The French forces were fading, and there was no need to wait for help. The French moved from Moscow to the south of Russia. There the strengthened Russian army blocked their way. Battles took place near Tarutin and Maloyaroslavets, which finally decided the outcome of the war in favor of Kutuzov and his army. The remnants of the once great army with great difficulty crossed the Berezina River. Emperor Napoleon left the army even earlier. Thus, by the end of 1812, the enemy forces were completely defeated and driven back outside Russia, which Kutuzov reported to Alexander I. Soon the field marshal died, covered in unfading glory.

• The place of Borodino, where one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century took place, belonged to the partisan poet DV Davydov.
• The French army was called the “army of twelve languages”, because not only the French, but also Poles, Italians, Austrians, Dutch, etc. fought in it, and representatives of many “languages” inhabiting it rose to the defense of Russia: Ukrainians, Belarusians, Tatars, Bashkirs and etc.

Beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812

2012 marks the 200th anniversary of the military-historical patriotic event - the Patriotic War of 1812, which is of great importance for the political, social, cultural and military development of Russia.

The beginning of the war

June 12, 1812 (old style) Napoleon's French army, having crossed the Neman near the city of Kovno (now it is the city of Kaunas in Lithuania), invaded the Russian Empire. This day is recorded in history as the beginning of the war between Russia and France.

In this war, two forces clashed. On the one hand, Napoleon's half-million army (about 640,000 men), which consisted of only half the French and included, in addition to them, representatives of almost all of Europe. An army intoxicated with numerous victories, led by famous marshals and generals, led by Napoleon. Strengths the French army were large numbers, good material and technical support, combat experience, faith in the invincibility of the army.

She was opposed by the Russian army, which at the beginning of the war represented one-third of the French in numbers. Before the start of the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian-Turkish war 1806-1812. The Russian army was divided into three groups far apart from each other (under the command of Generals M. B. Barclay de Tolly, P. I. Bagration and A. P. Tormasov). Alexander I was at the headquarters of Barclay's army.

The blow of Napoleon's army was taken over by the troops stationed on the western border: the 1st Army of Barclay de Tolly and the 2nd Army of Bagration (a total of 153 thousand soldiers).

Knowing his numerical superiority, Napoleon pinned his hopes on a blitzkrieg war. One of his main miscalculations was the underestimation of the patriotic impulse of the army and the people of Russia.

The beginning of the war was successful for Napoleon. At 6 o'clock in the morning on June 12 (24), 1812, the vanguard of the French troops entered Russian city Kovno. The crossing of 220 thousand soldiers of the Great Army near Kovno took 4 days. After 5 days, another grouping (79 thousand soldiers) under the command of the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, crossed the Neman to the south of Kovno. At the same time, even further south, near Grodno, the Neman was crossed by 4 corps (78-79 thousand soldiers) under the general command of the King of Westphalia, Jerome Bonaparte. In the northern direction, near Tilsit, the Neman crossed the 10th Corps of Marshal MacDonald (32 thousand soldiers), which was aimed at St. Petersburg. On the southbound from Warsaw through the Bug, a separate Austrian corps of General Schwarzenberg (30-33 thousand soldiers) began to invade.

The rapid advance of the powerful French army forced the Russian command to retreat inland. The commander of the Russian troops, Barclay de Tolly, evaded the general battle, saving the army and striving to unite with Bagration's army. The numerical superiority of the enemy raised the question of an urgent replenishment of the army. But in Russia there was no universal military service. The army was completed by recruiting sets. And Alexander I decided on an unusual step. On July 6, he issued a manifesto calling for the creation of a people's militia. So the first partisan detachments began to appear. This war united all segments of the population. As now, so then, the Russian people are united only by misfortune, grief, tragedy. It didn't matter who you were in society, what wealth you had. Russian people fought unitedly, defending the freedom of their homeland. All people became a single force, which is why the name "Patriotic War" was determined. The war became an example of the fact that a Russian person will never allow freedom and spirit to be enslaved, he will defend his honor and name to the end.

The armies of Barclay and Bagration met near Smolensk at the end of July, thus achieving the first strategic success.

Battle for Smolensk

By August 16 (according to the New Style), Napoleon approached Smolensk with 180 thousand soldiers. After the connection of the Russian armies, the generals began to insistently demand a general battle from the commander-in-chief Barclay de Tolly. At 6 am August 16 Napoleon launched an assault on the city.

In the battles near Smolensk, the Russian army showed the greatest stamina. The battle for Smolensk marked the unfolding of a nationwide war between the Russian people and the enemy. Napoleon's hope for a blitzkrieg collapsed.

Battle for Smolensk. Adam, circa 1820

The stubborn battle for Smolensk lasted 2 days, until the morning of August 18, when Barclay de Tolly withdrew troops from the burning city in order to avoid a big battle with no chance of victory. Barclay had 76 thousand, another 34 thousand (Bagration's army). After the capture of Smolensk, Napoleon moved to Moscow.

Meanwhile, the protracted retreat caused public discontent and protest among most of the army (especially after the surrender of Smolensk), so on August 20 (according to the new style), Emperor Alexander I signed a decree appointing M.I. Kutuzov. At that time, Kutuzov was in his 67th year. The commander of the Suvorov school, who had half a century of military experience, he enjoyed universal respect both in the army and among the people. However, he also had to retreat in order to gain time to gather all his forces.

Kutuzov could not avoid a general battle for political and moral reasons. By September 3 (according to the New Style), the Russian army retreated to the village of Borodino. Further retreat meant the surrender of Moscow. By that time, Napoleon's army had already suffered significant losses, and the difference in the size of the two armies was reduced. In this situation, Kutuzov decided to give a pitched battle.

To the west of Mozhaisk, 125 km from Moscow near the village of Borodina August 26 (September 7, New Style), 1812 there was a battle that went down in the history of our people forever. - the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 between the Russian and French armies.

The Russian army numbered 132 thousand people (including 21 thousand poorly armed militias). The French army, pursuing her on the heels, 135,000. Kutuzov's headquarters, believing that there were about 190 thousand people in the enemy's army, chose a defensive plan. In fact, the battle was an assault by French troops on the line of Russian fortifications (flashes, redoubts and lunettes).

Napoleon hoped to defeat the Russian army. But the steadfastness of the Russian troops, where every soldier, officer, general was a hero, overturned all the calculations of the French commander. The fight went on all day. Losses were huge on both sides. The Battle of Borodino is one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century. According to the most conservative estimates of cumulative losses, 2,500 people died on the field every hour. Some divisions lost up to 80% of their composition. There were almost no prisoners on either side. French losses amounted to 58 thousand people, Russian - 45 thousand.

Emperor Napoleon later recalled: “Of all my battles, the most terrible is what I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory in it, and the Russians - to be called invincible.

Cavalry fight

On September 8 (21), Kutuzov ordered a retreat to Mozhaisk with the firm intention of preserving the army. The Russian army retreated, but retained its combat capability. Napoleon failed to achieve the main thing - the defeat of the Russian army.

September 13 (26) in the village of Fili Kutuzov held a meeting on a further plan of action. After the military council in Fili, the Russian army, by decision of Kutuzov, was withdrawn from Moscow. “With the loss of Moscow, Russia is not yet lost, but with the loss of the army, Russia is lost”. These words of the great commander, which went down in history, were confirmed by subsequent events.

A.K. Savrasov. The hut in which the famous council in Fili was held

Military Council in Fili (A. D. Kivshenko, 1880)

Capture of Moscow

In the evening September 14 (September 27, new style) Napoleon entered deserted Moscow without a fight. In the war against Russia, all the plans of Napoleon were consistently destroyed. Expecting to receive the keys to Moscow, he stood for several hours in vain on Poklonnaya Hill, and when he entered the city, he was met by deserted streets.

Fire in Moscow on September 15-18, 1812 after the capture of the city by Napoleon. Painting by A.F. Smirnova, 1813

Already on the night of 14 (27) to 15 (28) September, the city was engulfed in fire, which increased so much by the night of 15 (28) to 16 (29) September that Napoleon was forced to leave the Kremlin.

On suspicion of arson, about 400 townspeople from the lower classes were shot. The fire raged until September 18 and destroyed most of Moscow. Of the 30 thousand houses that were in Moscow before the invasion, after Napoleon left the city, "hardly 5 thousand" remained.

While Napoleon's army was inactive in Moscow, losing combat effectiveness, Kutuzov retreated from Moscow, first to the southeast along the Ryazan road, but then, turning to the west, went to the flank of the French army, occupied the village of Tarutino, blocking the Kaluga road. gu. In the Tarutino camp, the foundation was laid for the final defeat of the "great army".

When Moscow was on fire, bitterness against the invaders reached its highest intensity. The main forms of the war of the Russian people against the invasion of Napoleon were passive resistance (refusing to trade with the enemy, leaving bread unharvested in the fields, destroying food and fodder, going into the forests), partisan warfare and mass participation in militias. To the greatest extent, the course of the war was influenced by the refusal of the Russian peasantry to supply the enemy with food and fodder. The French army was on the verge of starvation.

From June to August 1812, Napoleon's army, pursuing the retreating Russian armies, traveled about 1,200 kilometers from the Neman to Moscow. As a result, her communication lines were greatly stretched. Given this fact, the command of the Russian army decided to create flying partisan detachments for operations in the rear and on the enemy’s communication lines, in order to prevent his supply and destroy his small detachments. The most famous, but far from the only commander of the flying detachments was Denis Davydov. Army partisan detachments received comprehensive support from the spontaneous peasant partisan movement. As the French army moved deep into Russia, as violence from the Napoleonic army grew, after the fires in Smolensk and Moscow, after the decrease in discipline in Napoleon's army and the transformation of a significant part of it into a gang of marauders and robbers, the population of Russia began to move from passive to active resistance to the enemy. Only during their stay in Moscow, the French army lost more than 25 thousand people from the actions of the partisans.

The partisans constituted, as it were, the first ring of encirclement around Moscow, occupied by the French. The second ring was made up of militias. Partisans and militias surrounded Moscow in a dense ring, threatening to turn Napoleon's strategic encirclement into a tactical one.

Tarutinsky fight

After the surrender of Moscow, Kutuzov apparently avoided a major battle, the army was building up strength. During this time, a 205,000 militia was recruited in the Russian provinces (Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Tula, Kaluga, Tver and others), and 75,000 in Ukraine. By October 2, Kutuzov led the army south to the village of Tarutino, closer to Kaluga.

In Moscow, Napoleon found himself in a trap, it was not possible to spend the winter in the city devastated by fire: foraging outside the city did not work out well, the stretched communications of the French were very vulnerable, the army began to decompose. Napoleon began to prepare for a retreat to winter quarters somewhere between the Dnieper and the Dvina.

When the "great army" retreated from Moscow, its fate was sealed.

October 18(according to the new style) Russian troops attacked and defeated near Tarutino Murat's French corps. Having lost up to 4 thousand soldiers, the French retreated. The battle of Tarutino became a landmark event, marking the transition of the initiative in the war to the Russian army.

Napoleon's retreat

October 19(according to the new style) the French army (110 thousand) with a huge convoy began to leave Moscow along the Old Kaluga road. But the road to Kaluga to Napoleon was blocked by Kutuzov's army, located near the village of Tarutino on the Old Kaluga road. Due to the lack of horses, the French artillery fleet was reduced, large cavalry formations practically disappeared. Not wanting to break through a fortified position with a weakened army, Napoleon turned in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Troitskoye (modern Troitsk) onto the New Kaluga Road (modern Kiev highway) in order to bypass Tarutino. However, Kutuzov transferred the army to Maloyaroslavets, cutting off the French retreat along the New Kaluga road.

Kutuzov's army by October 22 consisted of 97 thousand regular troops, 20 thousand Cossacks, 622 guns and more than 10 thousand militia warriors. Napoleon had at hand up to 70 thousand combat-ready soldiers, the cavalry practically disappeared, the artillery was much weaker than the Russian one.

October 12 (24) took place battle near Maloyaroslavets. The city changed hands eight times. In the end, the French managed to capture Maloyaroslavets, but Kutuzov took a fortified position outside the city, which Napoleon did not dare to storm. On October 26, Napoleon ordered a retreat north to Borovsk-Vereya-Mozhaisk.

In the battles for Maloyaroslavets, the Russian army solved a major strategic task - it thwarted the plan for the French troops to break through to Ukraine and forced the enemy to retreat along the Old Smolensk road he had devastated.

From Mozhaisk, the French army resumed its movement towards Smolensk along the same road along which it had advanced on Moscow.

The final defeat of the French troops took place at the crossing of the Berezina. The battles of November 26-29 between the French corps and the Russian armies of Chichagov and Wittgenstein on both banks of the Berezina River during the crossing of Napoleon went down in history as battle on the Berezina.

The retreat of the French through the Berezina on November 17 (29), 1812. Peter von Hess (1844)

When crossing the Berezina, Napoleon lost 21 thousand people. In total, up to 60 thousand people managed to cross the Berezina, most of them civilian and non-combatant remnants of the "Great Army". Unusually severe frosts, which hit even during the crossing of the Berezina and continued in the following days, finally destroyed the French, already weakened by hunger. On December 6, Napoleon left his army and went to Paris to recruit new soldiers to replace those who died in Russia.

The main result of the battle on the Berezina was that Napoleon avoided complete defeat in the face of a significant superiority of Russian forces. In the memoirs of the French, the crossing of the Berezina occupies no less place than the largest Battle of Borodino.

By the end of December, the remnants of Napoleon's army were expelled from Russia.

The results of the war

The main result of the Patriotic War of 1812 was the almost complete destruction of Napoleon's Great Army. Napoleon lost about 580,000 soldiers in Russia. These losses include 200 thousand killed, from 150 to 190 thousand prisoners, about 130 thousand deserters who fled to their homeland. The losses of the Russian army, according to some estimates, amounted to 210 thousand soldiers and militias.

In January 1813, the "Foreign campaign of the Russian army" began - the fighting moved to the territory of Germany and France. In October 1813, Napoleon was defeated at the Battle of Leipzig, and in April 1814 he abdicated the throne of France.

The victory over Napoleon as never before raised the international prestige of Russia, which played a decisive role at the Congress of Vienna and in the following decades exerted a decisive influence on the affairs of Europe.

Main dates

June 12, 1812- The invasion of Napoleon's army into Russia across the Neman River. 3 Russian armies were at a great distance from each other. Tormasov's army, being in Ukraine, could not participate in the war. It turned out that only 2 armies took the hit. But they had to retreat in order to connect.

August 3rd- the connection of the armies of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly near Smolensk. The enemies lost about 20 thousand, and ours about 6 thousand, but Smolensk had to be left. Even the united armies were 4 times smaller than the enemy!

8 August- Kutuzov was appointed commander in chief. An experienced strategist, wounded many times in battles, Suvorov's student fell in love with the people.

August, 26th- The Battle of Borodino lasted more than 12 hours. It is considered a pitched battle. On the outskirts of Moscow, the Russians showed mass heroism. The losses of the enemies were greater, but our army could not go on the offensive. The numerical superiority of the enemies was still great. Reluctantly, they decided to surrender Moscow in order to save the army.

September October- Seat of Napoleon's army in Moscow. His expectations were not met. Failed to win. Kutuzov rejected requests for peace. The attempt to move south failed.

October December- the expulsion of Napoleon's army from Russia along the destroyed Smolensk road. From 600 thousand enemies, about 30 thousand remained!

December 25, 1812- Emperor Alexander I issued a manifesto on the victory of Russia. But the war had to continue. Napoleon had armies in Europe. If they are not defeated, then he will attack Russia again. The foreign campaign of the Russian army lasted until victory in 1814.

Perception of the events of the Patriotic War of 1812 by the Russian common people

The theme of the perception of the events of the war of 1812 by contemporaries remains one of the least developed in the extensive historiography of this event. The focus continues to be exclusively on the military and political aspects of the topic.

This problem has been of interest for a long time. Back in 1882, N.F. Dubrovin spoke about the need to create a non-military history of 1812, in 1895 he published a number of interesting articles on the perception of Napoleon by Russian society in the early 19th century.

In 1893, on the pages of the Russian Starina magazine, V.A. Bilbasov wrote that the study of the influence of the war of 1812 on contemporaries (both representatives of the educated class and the common people) is of particular interest for history; numerous memoirs of the era contain valuable material on this issue. In the famous seven-volume book "Patriotic War and Russian Society", which was created with the participation of more than 60 prominent Russian historians, only a few articles contained material on the perception of the events of the Patriotic War by Russian contemporaries (an educated society). Almost nothing was said about the attitude towards the war of the bulk of the population (the peasantry, the common people in the cities, the semi-educated urban society), only information was given about the anti-serf uprisings of 1812, as well as some general arguments about the “people in 1812”, which were not based on to sources.

Until the revolution of 1917, according to the prominent historian K.A. Voensky, the "everyday" history of 1812 remained completely undeveloped.

IN Soviet period the theme of the Patriotic War of 1812 until 1937 remained unclaimed. In the 1920s, the theory of “historian number one” M.N. Pokrovsky, voiced in his "History of Russia in the most concise essay", as well as in the collection "Diplomacy and wars of tsarist Russia in XIX century» . The author, as he himself admitted, basically "turned the face of literature", he portrayed the war of 1812 as a struggle between reactionary Russia and the progressive Napoleonic army, the bearer of democratic principles. The people in 1812 thought only of the liberation and overthrow of the hated regime. In the same spirit, the work of Z. and G. Gukovsky "Peasants in 1812" was written.

From the end of the 1930s, and especially after 1951, Soviet historians actually revived the monarchical myth about the people during the Patriotic War of 1812, only without the tsar. The people acted as a faceless gray mass, doing nothing but performing patriotic deeds.

From the works related to the topic of the perception of the war of 1812 by contemporaries, two articles devoted to the educated Russian society came out in the Soviet period.

Of the latest research, only one article can be noted, also devoted to the reflection of the events of 1812 in the minds of an educated society (based on letters from contemporaries). The bulk of Russians in 1812 again remained out of sight of researchers. As far as we know, there are no special studies of the problem of the perception of the war of 1812 by the common people.

The main source for studying the Russian common people in 1812 are the memoirs of Russians and foreigners. Among the memoirs of the Russian educated society, there is very little information about the people, since the memoirists had almost no contact with them and, as a rule, did not consider the “rabble” worthy of their attention. A typical example is the famous memoirs of A.T. Bolotov, who left one of the largest memoirs of the epoch of the 18th - early 19th centuries. (completely not yet published). As soon as in his notes it comes to the “rabble”, “vile people”, the author immediately says that everything related to this “does not deserve any attention”. As Bolotov himself points out, he first became acquainted with the "Russian people" in 1762, when he rounded up all his peasants to equip the garden. The nobles of 1812 did not know their people at all, revolving exclusively in a narrow circle of an elected society - for example, the landowner M.A. Volkova in 1812 first became acquainted with the provincial society (Tambov), this happened due to extreme military circumstances that forced her to leave Moscow. Also as a result of this move, she gained some insight into the "people" by watching the warriors from the window of her house.

Of the memoirs of an educated society, the memoirs of Muscovite A. Ryazantsev, who survived the entire period of the occupation of the capital and left detailed notes about this time, are of the greatest interest for research. The author himself was very close to the urban common people, in 1812 he was 14 years old, he studied at the Slavic-Greek-Latin Academy. His memoirs draw a detailed portrait of Moscow in 1812: the author used many records of peasant conversations, dialogues between the Moscow common people and residents of villages near Moscow, described in detail the situation in Moscow under the French, and provided valuable data on contacts between the local population and the enemy.

In addition, some curious information about the masses of the people in 1812 is scattered throughout the extensive memoirs of other representatives of the educated Russian class, of particular interest are synchronistic sources - diaries and letters.

The main source for studying our topic is the memoirs of the representatives of the common people themselves in 1812: soldiers, peasants, courtyards, poor merchants and low-ranking priests. Unfortunately, the tradition of writing memoirs among the bulk of Russian contemporaries of 1812 was completely absent: in the entire 18th century, only 250 Russians left memoirs, of which only one peasant. The memoirs created by the representatives of the common people themselves in 1812 are an extremely rare phenomenon, as a rule, their memoirs have come down to us in the form of records of oral stories.

We know one memoir of a soldier in 1812 and two memoirs of 1839 from the words of a private and a non-commissioned officer who participated in the Battle of Borodino. "Notes" by Pamfiliya Nazarov is the rarest memoir written by a soldier in 1812. The author is completely alien to any historical or ideological assessments of the events of 1812-1814, he is poorly aware of the importance of what he experienced. In form, these are notes for himself and a narrow circle of relatives, which he wrote in 1836 at the end of his service life. The publishers of "Russian Antiquity" noted the uniqueness of this source, which "does not resemble anything."

The works of I.N. Skobelev, published in the 1830-1840s. In the 1800s, the author served in the lower ranks for more than four years, subsequently rising to the rank of general, a participant in the Patriotic War (with the rank of captain). Contemporaries quite reasonably asserted that he knew the Russian soldier like no one else. In his works “Soldier's Correspondence of 1812” and “Stories of a Russian Armless Disabled Man”, the author describes the events of the Patriotic War on behalf of a simple soldier. These books contain the most valuable material: this is the soldier's language of the era of 1812 and the peculiarities of the perception of the war by Russian soldiers, transmitted by Skobelev.

Of particular interest are the memoirs of A.V. Nikitenko - in 1803-1824. Serf Count Sheremetyev, later a professor at St. Petersburg University and a prominent official of the Ministry of Public Education. The author describes in detail the life and customs of serfs, the provincial society of Russia in the 1800-1820s.

The most valuable material on the topic was collected in the 1860s - 1880s. writer E.V. Novosiltseva (pseudonym T. Tolycheva). She focused on collecting memories of 1812 among the common people, as a result of searches in Moscow and Smolensk, she collected unique memories of witnesses of the Patriotic War living out their lives from peasants, former serfs and courtyards, merchants and clergymen. In total, she managed to record the memoirs of 33 witnesses to the war of 1812. In 1894, Novosiltseva created a work for the people "The Old Woman's Tale of the Twelfth Year" - a story about the events of 1812 from the beginning of the invasion to the expulsion of Napoleon from Russia, where the story is told in the first person. As Novosiltseva pointed out in the preface, the information given in the book was not fictitious, all of it was gleaned by her during a survey of her contemporaries in 1812 from the people, many of the memoirs collected by the author were not published, but were reflected in this book.

An analysis of Novosiltseva's published memoirs shows that the original notes were stylistically and systematically reworked to give them a more coherent and literary look.

In 1912, on the occasion of the centenary of the Patriotic War, interesting memoirs and legends of the inhabitants of the Smolensk province about the period of the Napoleonic invasion were published in the Smolensk Diocesan Gazette, based on materials from local archives, as well as on the basis of questions from old-timers. It is also worth noting the records of the memoirs of three peasants published in 1869, witnesses of the crossing of Napoleon's army across the Berezina, which, unfortunately, are extremely short and uninformative.

Rumors were the main source of information about the war for most Russians in 1812 (both educated society and commoners). An important role was played by printed materials; on their basis, some rumors were formed that circulated among the people; during the Patriotic War, the indirect influence of the press on the population was quite significant. It is impossible to clearly separate the influence of oral and printed sources of information on Russians, since both sources were closely related.

More or less reliable information about the war of 1812 was provided by printed materials. Their use presupposes the ability to read, and the level of literacy in Russia in 1812 was negligible. The most detailed study of literacy in Russia, closest to the period under study, took place in 1844; 735,874 people were surveyed. :

Thus, only 3.6% of all respondents were literate and semi-literate. In France, even by the end of the Old Order (1788-1789), the total number of literates was at least 40% of the population (52% of men and about 27% of women), during the Revolution and especially under Napoleon, many new schools were opened, education was provided free of charge or at the most reasonable cost.

Under Alexander I, they talked a lot about "enlightenment", but all the achievements in this environment were exclusively in words: the total number of students in secular educational institutions in Russia increased from 46 thousand (1808) to 69 thousand (1824), figures so insignificant that they are hardly worth mentioning! For comparison - in 12 million Prussia in 1819, more than 1.5 million people studied in elementary secular schools alone (already then almost all the population of school age received an education), in 1830 this number exceeded 2.2 million people.

in Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. up to 2.8 million people lived in cities, the main population of cities were philistines, merchants and courtyards, as can be seen from the table, their level of education was approximately the same, on average about 30% of them could read, this amounted to 750 thousand people per the whole empire. The average literacy rate among peasants did not exceed 3%, or about 1 million people. So, the number of literate people in the cities in 1812 was almost equal to the number of literate people throughout the rest of Russia.

In addition, bookstores were located exclusively in the cities (in 1811, out of 115 bookstores, 85 were located in Moscow and St. Petersburg), it was possible to subscribe to time-based publications. In addition to total illiteracy, the most important obstacle to the distribution of printed materials was its high cost and, of course, the poverty of the population: in 1812, as can be seen from the advertisements placed in the St. average cost books amounted to 5-7 rubles, and the price of an annual subscription to a newspaper or magazine - 15-20 rubles, amounts unthinkable for most Russians. For clarity, we will give information about the earnings of residents of territories that were invaded by Napoleonic troops (although these data refer to the 1840s, they almost correspond to the realities of 1812): in a fairly rich Moscow province, a farmer earned an average of 35-47 rubles. per year, in the Vitebsk province - 12-20 rubles, less often - 36 rubles, in Smolensk - 10-15 rubles, very rarely - up to 40 rubles. (women and teenagers were paid several times less); the majority of urban residents (philistines) at that time did not have a regular income, their incomes were extremely low; in the most privileged position were Moscow coachmen, who received up to 20-30 rubles. per month (240-360 rubles per year), as well as watchmen and janitors, who earned 100-130 rubles each. per month, but the latter constituted an extremely small part of the population.

Domestic books had the least influence on the population. According to researchers, the total number of active readers of Russia in 1820 was only 50 thousand people, or less than 0.1% of the population of the Empire. The number of publications was extremely small, they hardly touched on any topical topics, most of them were novels. In the most educated Moscow in 1803, only about 20 thousand books were sold with a population of 250 thousand people, that is, one book for ten people. Presumably, the greatest influence on the common people of the era of the Patriotic War was exerted by a small essay by F.V. Rostopchin “Thoughts aloud on the Red Porch of the Russian nobleman Sila Andreevich Bogatyrev”, published in 1807 and sold in an unprecedented circulation of 7 thousand copies. As far as we know, this is the most circulated work of secular literature of that time, moreover, it is one of the few books addressed to the people. The work is a monologue of a tipsy nobleman trying to speak in a "folk style". In fact, this is a continuous abuse against the French and their imitators, where the French are presented as worthless and insignificant people. The book contributed to the maintenance of frivolous and hatred moods among the people. During the campaign of 1812, only a few propaganda books about the war were published, they initially focused on the upper strata of society, in general, their influence was negligible.

More or less up-to-date information about the events was provided by the periodical press. Due to censorship restrictions (despite the liberal censorship charter of 1804), she also almost did not touch on topical topics, in fact she had no right to express her point of view on anything. The situation as a whole almost corresponded to the words of L.V. Dubelt on the rights of the periodical press, said in a conversation with F.V. Bulgarin in 1826: “The theater, exhibitions, guest houses, flea markets, taverns, confectioneries - this is your area, and not a step further!”

In 1801-1806. in Russia there were only 27 newspapers and magazines, by 1810 - 60, by 1824 - 67 (of which only 33 were in Russian). The most circulation time-based publications during this period were the newspaper Severnaya Pochta, which had 1768 subscribers in 1810, by 1816 - 2306 people, the journal Vestnik Evropy with a circulation of 1200 copies. (1802), by 1820 this figure had dropped to 1,000 copies. The popular patriotic magazine of S. N. Glinka "Russian Messenger" in 1811 had only 750 subscribers (300 of them in Moscow). Other publications were issued in microscopic editions. Under Alexander I, the newspaper "Russian Invalid" had the largest circulation - 4 thousand copies (1821). In general, the reading audience of the Russian periodical press was very small, however, as already mentioned, it had an indirect influence on the common people.

In Russian villages in 1812, newspapers and magazines met, here literate people read them in the presence of the entire population. It should be especially noted that the common people of that time had great confidence in the printed word. In 1807-1812. for political reasons, the government diligently concealed its contradictions with France; only brief correspondence appeared on the pages of newspapers, reporting, as a rule, on the successes of the French. Extremely valuable evidence of the influence of the press on the common people is contained in the secret report of the head of the office of the Special Department of the Ministry of Police M.Ya. von Fock (May 15, 1812): “unenlightened people living inside the Empire, and especially the middle class and commoners, who are accustomed to considering everything that is printed as undeniable truth, become discouraged and hear only about victories and conquests Napoleon, who enslaves all peoples, lose their spirit of vivacity, especially in remote cities and villages, where every sexton and clerk is a luminary and every printed line is a Gospel.

Information from the pre-war press about the successes of Napoleon caused panic among the Russian population, the rumors generated by them, which greatly exaggerated everything, convinced many common people that the enemy was invincible.

During the war, Russian newspapers and magazines published official news from the army about the course of hostilities, letters, captured documents (rarely), correspondence from different places, and translations of foreign articles. In journalistic articles, the enemy was humiliated in every possible way, often in a rude way, the idea was carried out about the superiority of everything Russian over foreign. During 1812, the main printed source of information about the war was flying leaflets published by the army's field printing house and sent to officials, the texts of these leaflets were reprinted by newspapers and published as supplements (often in a distorted form). In total, in July-December 1812, about 80 such leaflets were issued. They contained daily records of the movements of the army, military clashes, enemy losses and trophies (always greatly exaggerated), from the autumn of 1812 they described the plight of the French army.

It was difficult for a simple person to delve into the text of many leaflets published in the summer - early autumn of 1812, since they contained a lot of meaningless names of settlements, a lot of names unknown to him. Leaflets were read publicly in large crowds. DI. Zavalishin recalled how the governor of Vologda read the news about military operations, and the people listened to him and sobbed. All that could be understood was that the Russian army was retreating, and from October 1812 it was advancing.

In Moscow, the posters of F.V. Rostopchin, the printed appeals of the governor to the residents, written in a folk style, they very much resembled the chatter of the tipsy Sila Andreevich Bogatyrev. In total, the researchers identified 57 Moscow “posters” created in July-December 1812, of which 23 are attributed to F. V. Rostopchin. The author reassured and encouraged the inhabitants, assuring them that the enemy was about to be defeated, sneered at the French, sometimes recounted the content of official news about military operations, and cited astronomical figures about the number of Russian troops. Posters were famous not only in Moscow.

As early as 1811, a wide variety of rumors about the coming war with Napoleon were circulating among the Russian common people, and quite reliable information was circulating among the mass of absurdities that England and Sweden would help Russia. However, it was not political news that had the greatest influence on the Russians of that time, but the famous comet of 1811, which began to pay close attention from August. Here is what D.I. wrote about this. Zavalishin, who lived at that time in Tver: “It was in August and, therefore, when we went to church, it was still very light. But towards the end of the vigil, but even before the time when the people dispersed, there was an unusual movement on the porch at the door of the church. Somehow people would come out and come in again, and as they went in, they sighed heavily and began to pray fervently. Finally, the time came to leave the church, but the first ones to leave stopped, and the crowd thickened so that it was impossible to squeeze through it. And those standing behind, having lost patience, began to loudly ask: “What is it there? Why don't they come?" The answer was: "Star". Little by little, however, the crowd dispersed, so that we, too, could go out almost behind everyone and saw the famous comet of 1811 directly in front of us.

The next day, even before sunset, people began to go out into the street and look at the place where yesterday they saw the rising of a star. At twilight, our square was almost completely crowded with people, so that it was very difficult not only for the carriages to pass, but also to push through on foot. In place of yesterday's appearance of the star, however, there was a black cloud. Despite all this, the people did not leave, but persisted in waiting. In other parts of the sky it was clear and there were already small stars. But as soon as 9 o'clock struck, the cloud seemed to settle under the horizon, and yesterday's star appeared in an even more formidable form. As if on cue, everyone took off their hats and crossed themselves. I heard heavy, where suppressed, where loud sighs. For a long time they stood in silence. But then one woman fell into hysterics, others sobbed, a conversation began, then loud exclamations: “It’s true, the Lord was angry with Russia”, “They sinned in a wrong way, well, they waited,” etc. Comparisons began: who said that the tail of a comet this is a bunch of rods, who likened a broom to sweep all the lies out of Russia, etc. Since then, the people crowded the streets every evening, and the star became more and more terrible. Rumors began about the end of the world, about the fact that Napoleon is the predicted Antichrist, indicated directly in the Apocalypse under the name of Apollyon.

Interesting information about the comet of 1811 was recorded by a contemporary of the Patriotic War, Muscovite Pyotr Kicheev (according to "Annuaire pour l'an 1832"): the light from this comet at the moment highest voltage was equal to 1/10 of the light of the full moon, on October 15, 1811, the comet approached the Earth at minimum distance(47 million leagues), the diameter of its core was 1089 leagues, and the length of the tail reached 41 million leagues (172 million 200 thousand versts). In the vault of heaven, the comet occupied up to 23 degrees. Kicheev also noted the great impression made by the comet on Muscovites.

An inexperienced Russian in 1812 was convinced that war is God's punishment, therefore, it cannot depend on the tricks of diplomats and the will of individuals; he tried to unravel the traces of its approach and its course by various signs (the comet of 1811, frequent fires, etc.). During the war, the Russians tried to find answers to all questions in the most revered and authoritative source - the Bible. D. Zavalishin recalled how the inhabitants of the province came to people who had a Slavic Bible and asked them what was written there about Bonaparte and what he would do with Russia, deeply convinced that all this was described there. In 1812, various predictions, revelations, descriptions of signs, etc., became extremely widespread among the people.

The Muscovite A. Ryazantsev left the most detailed notes on the reaction of the common people to the invasion: after the news of the declaration of war, the people of Moscow gathered in the square and began to reason. First of all, it was unanimously decided that war is God's punishment and that one should pray fervently, and one merchant said that he had long smelled something was wrong: and the porridge in his pot was cooking wrong, and brownie got naughty and the cat Vaska began to look unkindly. Fables about the French began to spread intensively, here is one of them: “The French, leaving the Christian faith, turned into idolatry, invented some kind of god Egghead and slavishly worship him, that this blockhead Egghead ordered them all to be equal and free, forbade them to believe in the true God and not recognize any earthly authorities. The idolaters, obeying their idol, rebelled, plundered their churches and turned them into places of entertainment, destroyed civil laws and, to complete their atrocities, killed their innocent, good, lawful king. This description of the French Revolution coincides almost verbatim with the description of F.V. Rostopchin from the mentioned book "Thoughts aloud on the Red Porch ...", which is why it is more or less plausible, here we are dealing with the indirect influence of his work, which confirms its importance for the formation of public opinion. Or: “The French surrendered themselves to the Antichrist, chose as their generals his son Appolion, a wizard who, by the course of the stars, determines, predicts the future, knows when to start and when to end the war, moreover, has a wife, a sorceress who speaks firearms that are opposed to her husband why the French come out victorious. E.V. Novosiltseva wrote down some folk legends in 1812, which said that the French were afraid of the cross, etc. A. Ryazantsev recalled that in the summer of 1812, from everything he heard, his “young fantastic imagination painted the French not as people, but as some kind of monsters with wide mouth, huge fangs, bloodshot eyes with a copper forehead and an iron body, from which, like peas from a wall, bullets bounce off, and bayonets and sabers break like torches. At the end of August 1812, he went to look at a group of prisoners of war who had arrived in Moscow to make sure “whether the enemy soldiers really do not look like people, but like terrible monsters?” . Almost all of Moscow gathered to look at the prisoners.

In the described rumors, the worldview of the Russians is clearly traced - a bizarre mixture of pagan and Christian ideas. The pagan element seems to be stronger. This is most clearly confirmed by the following example: a Moscow janitor explained the cause of death of the French cavalrymen killed by the Cossacks as follows: they were strangled by the brownie, because they did not pray to God when they went to bed. A.T. Bolotov was convinced that the majority of Russian peasants remained pagans. A.V. Nikitenko, having visited the village of Timokhovka in the Mogilev province in the summer of 1839, wrote in his diary that local peasants go to pray to the gods and gods.

Oil was added to the fire by official propaganda, in 1812 the Synod, as before in 1807, obediently proclaimed Napoleon the Antichrist; for propaganda in the army, professor at Dorpat University V. Getzel sent M.B. Barclay de Tolly, an article in which he argued that Napoleon is the Antichrist, he proposed to distribute its content among the soldiers. For the French, this had the most unfortunate consequences. Among the Russian common people and soldiers, the Great Army was perceived in the most literal sense as the army of the devil. I.N. Skobelev in "Soldier's Correspondence of 1812" calls Napoleon "the warlock Bounaparte", Napoleonic soldiers - "sorcerers", describing the retreat of the Napoleonic army, he writes that Napoleon calculated when to retreat "according to his black (i.e. witchcraft - L.A.) books.

Repeatedly distorted and completely ridiculous rumors reached the provinces, a resident of the Smolensk province F.I. Levitsky recalled: “It was terrible in Moscow, and it was even more terrible in county towns and villages. Something that was not told by the people! You used to hear enough of these rumors, so you won’t fall asleep at night. ” Many residents were sure that the French... eat people! Back in 1807, when Napoleon was first declared the Antichrist by the Synod, one captured Russian officer asked the French not to eat his subordinates! Such absurd statements were based on primitive counter-revolutionary propaganda, in every possible way depicting that in France since 1793 almost the end of the world had come. F.V. Rostopchin in "Thoughts aloud ..." claimed that the French during the revolution fried people and ate! F.N. Glinka seriously believed that the French during the revolution unnecessarily “killed, fried and ate many of their mayors. Their own history is not silent about this. Colonel M.M. Petrov believed that the French during the revolution guillotined millions their compatriots. Peasant woman Agafya Ignatieva of the village of Volti (Smolensk province) recalled that in 1812 she was sure that the French would eat her (she was then 9 years old), all peasant children thought so. Meanwhile, the French (natural French, not their allies) almost never offended children and treated them very kindly. In a number of settlements, nothing was known about the war at all. This was due to the fact that in 1812 on the territory of Belarus and central Russia(the main theater of operations), the vast majority of villages were located far from the roads, population migration was minimal, many villages were in the impenetrable wilderness, where no outsider had ever set foot. in Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. the bulk of the population had absolutely no experience of communicating with foreigners, the enemy did not appear on the primordially Russian territories for almost 200 years, which was quite rightly pointed out by M.I. Kutuzov in a conversation with the French ambassador Lauriston in the autumn of 1812. Russian peasants lived in isolation and traditionally, everything new was decidedly alien to them. As can be seen from a number of memoirs, for many residents of the Russian hinterland, a meeting with a Napoleonic soldier was an event more surprising than a meeting with an alien for modern man. As we have shown above, the imagination of the peasants was fueled by the most monstrous rumors about the enemy, very often it is fear before the enemy as such forced them to leave their homes. The Napoleonic officer, Italian C. Laugier, in his diary describes the occupation of Smolensk by the Great Army - the locals mostly fled, those who remained hid in churches and prayed fervently, hoping that Holy place protect them from the enemy. The Italian soldiers who entered the church, wanting to distribute food to them, were themselves dumbfounded with fear, when those who were there began to utter wild cries of horror, it was truly animal fear .

In August 1812, a deaconess from the village of Novy Dvor (Smolensk province), having seen the French cavalrymen, lost consciousness and did not recover for a long time, she was introduced to Napoleon, and she, trembling, continuously crossed herself and prayed, convinced that the French were devils out of hell .

Of course, not all representatives of the common people perceived the French so primitively: an old peasant woman from the village of Staraya Rusa (80 miles from Moscow) was not afraid of the French, saying: “They won’t touch me, an old woman. And what profit would they have to kill me? After all, they are not animals either.

Kuzma Yegorovich Shmatikov, a resident of Smolensk, tells how the people perceived the war of 1812 in their own way, as he describes the assault on Smolensk in August 1812: “I can’t tell you what fear we were in, because until then we hadn’t assumed how the city would be taken. Well, let's say we were children and there were all women around us. Yes, some men reasoned no smarter than us: they thought that the armies would go one against the other in a fistfight. Many climbed up the trees to watch it.” Comments are generally unnecessary here. When Napoleon's army entered Moscow, crowds of people for about two hours (exactly the French troops entered the capital) argued whether it was the Swedes or the British who came to our aid.

Having processed a large array of materials, we came to the conclusion that the behavior of the inhabitants of central Russia during 1812 can be divided into four main types: 1) panic; 2) perfect calmness and arrogant hatred moods; 3) the desire to throw off the serf yoke, the hope for the help of Bonaparte; 4) absolute ignorance or indifference. Arrogant moods, the belief in absolute superiority over the enemy were extremely common among the people, especially in territories that had not been invaded. Similar sentiments were even among the most educated segments of the population, the commander-in-chief of the 2nd Western Army P.I. Bagration was deeply convinced that the French would be defeated instantly, on June 8, 1812, he wrote to the tsar, begging him to allow the Russians to advance and invade Poland themselves. Many other memoirs also record similar hatred moods, they were actively supported by the press, especially Rostopchin's posters. Grandfather P. Kicheev firmly believed them and therefore remained in Moscow, one Moscow priest on the very day of the surrender of Moscow laughed at his wife, who claimed that there were French in the city, his argument was as follows: “You believe the deacon, but you don’t believe the governor-general!” When the French came to his house, he fell silent and tore up the poster.

I must say that such moods instantly disappeared with the approach of the enemy, impudent self-confidence was instantly replaced by panic and apathy, which is described in detail in the memoirs.

In Russia in 1812 there were many people who thought about the possibility of freeing themselves from the serfdom, the war provided a good opportunity for this. In 1812, the serfs made up about 44% of the population of the Empire (23 million people), the living conditions of the majority of the serfs were monstrous both materially and morally. Recently, the realities of serfdom have been actively hushed up in historiography, trying in every possible way to embellish it. The most detailed and accurate life of the serfs of the early XIX century. described in the memoirs of A.V. Nikitenko, it is supplemented by the memoirs of the surgeon F. Mercier, who spent two years in Russian captivity. The vast majority of Russian landowners were small landlords and, as a rule, owned a few dozen peasants, and in order to live “decently for their rank”, they needed hundreds or even thousands of rubles a year. Knowing the size of the earnings of the peasants (see above), it is easy to calculate that the serf gave most of the money earned to the landowner, who sucked all the juice out of him. Add to this the robbery of estate managers, whom no one actually controlled, oppression by wealthy peasants, etc. For thinking people, such as Father A.V. Nikitenko, the most terrible thing in their position was the complete lack of rights and the terrible humiliations associated with it, to which this noble man was subjected until his death. The following figure gives an idea of ​​the scope of the atrocities committed by the landowners against the serfs: only in 1834-45. 2838 landlords were brought to trial for cruel treatment of peasants, of which 630 were convicted. At the same time, the vast majority of the crimes of the landowners remained unpunished.

According to historians, only for 1796-1825. more than 1,200 major peasant uprisings took place in Russia, these figures are far from complete. Since 1961, it is believed that in 1812 there were 60-67 anti-serf uprisings, this figure is greatly underestimated and needs to be clarified. Here, information about uprisings in the occupied territories, which were most affected by the anti-serfdom movement, is almost completely ignored. As contemporaries note, in particular, Brigadier General of the Great Army Dedem de Gelder, quartermaster of the Vitebsk province A. Pastore (an official of the French occupation administration), who acted in the rear of the French partisans A.Kh. Benckendorff, all Belarus (the territories of the Vitebsk, Minsk and Mogilev provinces) was engulfed in an anti-serfdom fire, the peasants here rebelled against their landowners everywhere.

Sometimes anti-serf uprisings took place "not without instigation from the enemy", such as a major uprising on the Baryshnikov estate in the Dorogobuzh district.

Hatred of the nobles continued to smolder among the people; only 37 years had passed since the time of the Pugachevshchina in 1812. The nobles themselves instinctively felt this hatred and were extremely afraid of it. It is impossible to estimate the scope of anti-serfdom sentiments in 1812 by the number of uprisings; it is clear from the memoirs that the hope for freedom from Bonaparte was extremely widespread. A memoirist from the Moscow common people heard with his own ears from the peasants near Moscow who were ordered to prepare horses in the bar: “How! We will prepare horses about the master's good. Bonaparte will come, he will give us freedom, but we don’t want to know the gentlemen anymore! Former serf A.A. Sazonova recalled that “the people grumbled at the gentlemen very much”, Muscovite G.Ya. Kozlovsky, who survived the occupation of Moscow, claimed that he was much more afraid of Russian peasants than the French. D.M. Volkonsky, in his diary on September 10, 1812, noted with horror that the people were already ready for excitement. Marshal L.G. Saint-Cyr was absolutely right when he wrote that the war of 1812 demonstrated the internal weakness of Russia, the French simply did not take advantage of it.

About the attitude towards the war in the provinces, A.V. Nikitenko (lived in Ukraine in 1812): “It is strange that at this moment of great upheavals that Russia was experiencing, not only our close circle, with the exception of the young Tatarchukov, but also the entire surrounding society was indifferent to the fate of the fatherland. ... I never heard notes of warm participation in the events of the time in their conversations. Everyone seemed to be only interested in their own personal affairs. The name of Napoleon caused more surprise than hatred. In a word, our society was striking in its imperturbable attitude towards the misfortune that threatened Russia. This could partly come from the remoteness of the theater of war ... But main reason that, I believe, was hiding in the apathy characteristic of people who were alienated, as the Russians were then, from participation in public affairs and accustomed not to talk about what was happening around, but only to unquestioningly obey the orders of their superiors.

In Russian historiography, the myth is often repeated that in 1812 the people happily joined the army. It is based on the memoirs of representatives of the nobility. Let us cite the most valuable evidence from the diary of the Rostov official M.I. Marakuev, entry dated July 12, 1812: Emperor Alexander arrived in the Kremlin, a huge number of people gathered, a rumor suddenly spread that they would be ordered to “lock all the gates and take everyone by force into soldiers. As soon as this rumor rushed, the mob rushed out and in a few minutes the Kremlin was empty. From the Kremlin, an echo spread throughout Moscow and many black people fled from it. This happened in the presence of the emperor himself! The next day, outside Moscow, he met crowds of peasants who had fled the capital. They asked him if they were recruiting soldiers in Moscow. P. Nazarov, drafted into the army in September 1812, wrote that no one from his village wanted to serve. During the war, the authorities repeatedly reassured the militias, confirming that they were serving in the army only temporarily. The war ends sooner or later, and you will have to serve for 25 years, if you are not killed, you will be disabled, most likely without a pension. P. Nazarov received a pension of 20 rubles for 25 years of service and several severe wounds. per year, which was barely enough to live on. Here is what the soldiers themselves said about their problems (from the memoirs of D.I. Zavalishin): “I tell the truth that even after December 14, the soldiers of those regiments and detachments where there were no members of society and were not, therefore, the goals of the coup were explained to them, entered willingly talking with us ... talking about the double oath to Konstantin and Nikolai, they constantly told us the same thing: “We didn’t care either one or the other. Now, if, gentlemen, you then told us that there would be a deduction from service, that they would not be driven into a coffin with sticks, that you would not walk around with a bag after retirement, that children would not be irrevocably taken to the soldiers, well, we would have gone for this ” » . Only for 1815-1825. 15 uprisings took place in the Russian army.

As a result of the study, we outlined some prospects for studying the theme of the perception of the Patriotic War by the common people.

Russian-French war 1812-1814 ended with the almost complete destruction of Napoleon's army. During the hostilities, the entire territory of the Russian Empire was liberated, and the battles turned to and Let us further briefly consider how the Russian-French war took place.

the date of the beginning

The fighting was primarily due to Russia's refusal to actively support the continental blockade, which Napoleon saw as the main weapon in the fight against Great Britain. In addition, Bonaparte pursued a policy towards European countries that did not take into account the interests of Russia. At the first stage of hostilities, the domestic army retreated. Before Moscow passed From June to September 1812, the advantage was on the side of Napoleon. From October to December, Bonaparte's army tried to maneuver. She sought to retreat to winter quarters, located in an undestroyed area. After that, the Russo-French War of 1812 continued with the retreat of the Napoleonic army in conditions of famine and frost.

Prerequisites for battle

Why did the Russo-French War take place? The year 1807 determined for Napoleon his main and, in fact, his only enemy. They were the UK. She captured the French colonies in America and India, created obstacles to trade. Due to the fact that England occupied a good position at sea, Napoleon's only effective weapon was her effectiveness, in turn, depended on the behavior of other powers and their desire to follow the sanctions. Napoleon demanded from Alexander the First a more consistent implementation of the blockade, but constantly met with Russia's unwillingness to break off relations with its key trading partner.

In 1810, our country participated in free trade with neutral states. This allowed Russia to trade with England through intermediaries. The government adopts a protective tariff that raises customs rates, primarily for imported French goods. This, of course, caused the extreme displeasure of Napoleon.

Offensive

The Russian-French war of 1812 at the first stage was favorable for Napoleon. On May 9, he meets in Dresden with allied rulers from Europe. From there he goes to his army on the river. Neman, which separated Prussia and Russia. June 22 Bonaparte addresses the soldiers with an appeal. In it, he accuses Russia of failing to fulfill the Tizil Treaty. Napoleon called his attack the second Polish invasion. In June, his army occupied Kovno. Alexander I at that moment was in Vilna, at the ball.

On June 25, the first clash occurred near the village. Barbarishki. Battles also took place at Rumshishki and Popartsi. It is worth saying that the Russian-French war took place with the support of Bonaparte's allies. The main goal at the first stage was the crossing of the Neman. So, from the south side of Kovno, the Beauharnais (Viceroy of Italy) group appeared, from the north - the corps of Marshal MacDonald, from Warsaw through the Bug the corps of General Schwarzenberg invaded. On June 16 (28) the soldiers of the great army occupied Vilna. On June 18 (30), Alexander I sent Adjutant General Balashov to Napoleon with a proposal to make peace and withdraw troops from Russia. However, Bonaparte refused.

Borodino

On August 26 (September 7), 125 km from Moscow, the largest battle took place, after which the Russian-French war went according to Kutuzov's scenario. The forces of the parties were approximately equal. Napoleon had about 130-135 thousand people, Kutuzov - 110-130 thousand. The Russian army did not have enough guns for 31 thousand militias of Smolensk and Moscow. Pikes were handed out to the warriors, but Kutuzov did not use people as they performed various auxiliary functions - they carried out the wounded and so on. Borodino was actually an assault by the soldiers of the great army of Russian fortifications. Both sides made extensive use of artillery in both attack and defense.

The Battle of Borodino lasted 12 hours. It was a bloody battle. Napoleon's soldiers at the cost of 30-34 thousand wounded and killed broke through the left flank and pushed back the center of the Russian positions. However, they failed to develop their offensive. In the Russian army, losses were estimated at 40-45 thousand wounded and killed. There were practically no prisoners on either side.

September 1 (13) Kutuzov's army was located in front of Moscow. Its right flank was near the village of Fili, the center - between the village. Troitsky and s. Volynsky, left - in front of the village. Vorobyov. The rearguard is located on the river. Setun. At 5 o'clock on the same day, a military council was convened in Frolov's house. Barclay de Tolly insisted that the Russo-French War would not be lost if Moscow was given to Napoleon. He talked about the need to save the army. Bennigsen, in turn, insisted on holding the battle. Most of the rest of the participants supported his position. However, Kutuzov put an end to the council. The Russian-French war, he believed, would be ended with the defeat of Napoleon only if the national army could be preserved. Kutuzov interrupted the meeting and ordered to retreat. By the evening of September 14, Napoleon entered the deserted Moscow.

Exile of Napoleon

The French did not stay long in Moscow. Some time after their invasion, the city was engulfed in fire. Bonaparte's soldiers began to experience a shortage of provisions. The locals refused to help them. Moreover, partisan attacks began, the militia began to be organized. Napoleon was forced to leave Moscow.

Kutuzov, meanwhile, positioned his army in the path of the French retreat. Bonaparte intended to go to cities not destroyed by hostilities. However, his plans were thwarted by Russian soldiers. He was forced to go almost along the same road that he came to Moscow. Insofar as settlements on the way they were destroyed by him, there were no products in them, as well as people. Exhausted by hunger and disease, Napoleon's soldiers were subjected to constant attacks.

Russian-French war: results

According to Clausewitz's calculations, the great army with reinforcements numbered about 610 thousand people, including 50 thousand Austrian and Prussian soldiers. Many of those who were able to return to Koenigsberg died almost immediately from illness. In December 1812, about 225 generals, a little more than 5 thousand officers, and 26 thousand of lower ranks passed through Prussia. As contemporaries testified, they were all in a very miserable condition. In general, Napoleon lost about 580 thousand soldiers. The remaining soldiers formed the backbone of Bonaparte's new army. However, in January 1813, the battles moved to the lands of Germany. Then the fighting continued in France. In October, Napoleon's army was defeated near Leipzig. In April 1814 Bonaparte abdicated.

Long Term Consequences

What did the won Russian-French war give the country? The date of this battle has firmly gone down in history as a turning point in the issue of Russia's influence on the affairs of Europe. Meanwhile, the strengthening of the country's foreign policy was not accompanied by internal changes. Despite the fact that the victory rallied and inspired the masses, the successes did not lead to reforming the socio-economic sphere. Many peasants who fought in the Russian army passed through Europe and saw that serfdom was abolished everywhere. They expected the same action from their government. However, serfdom continued to exist after 1812. According to a number of historians, at that time there were still no fundamental prerequisites that would lead to its immediate abolition.

But the sharp surge of peasant uprisings, the creation of political opposition in the progressive nobility, which followed almost immediately after the end of the battles, refute this opinion. The victory in the Patriotic War not only rallied people and contributed to the rise of the national spirit. At the same time, the boundaries of freedom expanded in the minds of the masses, which led to the uprising of the Decembrists.

However, not only this event is associated with 1812. The opinion has long been expressed that the entire national culture, self-consciousness received an impetus during the period of the Napoleonic invasion. As Herzen wrote, the true history of Russia is revealed only from 1812. Everything that was before can be considered only a preface.

Conclusion

The Russo-French war showed the strength of the entire people of Russia. Not only the regular army participated in the opposition to Napoleon. The militias formed detachments and attacked the soldiers of the great army. In general, historians note that before this battle, patriotism was not particularly manifested in Russia. At the same time, it is worth considering that in the country the ordinary population was oppressed by serfdom. The war with the French turned people's minds upside down. The masses of the people, having rallied, felt their ability to resist the enemy. It was a victory not only for the army, its command, but for the entire population. Of course, the peasants expected a change in their lives. But, unfortunately, they were disappointed with further events. Nevertheless, the impetus for freethinking and resistance has already been given.