The offensive of the German army on Stalingrad. Preparing for a counteroffensive

The second stage of the heroic defense of Stalingrad was the defensive battle of the South-Eastern Front on the outskirts and within the city, the offensive operations of the Stalingrad Front north of Stalingrad and the counterattacks of the left-flank armies of the South-Eastern Front in the area of ​​inter-lake defiles south of the city. All these actions pursued one goal - to hold Stalingrad, bleed the advancing enemy and create conditions for a counteroffensive.

By the beginning of the battle directly for the city, the troops of the Stalingrad Front (six armies) (244) were defending at the line of Pavlovsk, Panshino, Samofalovka, Yerzovka. The troops of the South-Eastern Front (four armies) (245) fought on the line of Stalingrad, Ivanovka, Small Chapurniki, lakes Sarpa, Tsatsa and Barmantsak, Elista.

By September 13, both fronts included about 120 rifle, motorized, cavalry and tank formations. However, many of them, especially rifle divisions, had no more than 20 - 25 percent of the regular strength, and some numbered only 800 people. Each division defended the strip on average more than 10 km.

The actions of the formations were supported by aviation of the 16th and 8th air armies, in which there were 389 serviceable combat aircraft. The troops defending in the city were also supported by artillery fire from the Volga military flotilla.

By September 13, the troops of Army Group B continued to operate against the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts, significantly reinforced by the transfer of formations from the Caucasian direction and from the West. Thus, during the first half of September, the enemy grouping in the Stalingrad region was reinforced by nine divisions and one brigade. By September 13, the 9th and 11th Infantry Divisions were transferred to the same area - from Romania, the January 3 Infantry Brigade - from Italy, as well as seven divisions of the 5th and 2nd Romanian Army Corps from the Army Group " BUT". In total, the 8th Italian, 6th and 4th German tank armies deployed in the Stalingrad direction had about 50 divisions. The advantage in forces and means at this stage of the struggle remained with the enemy. If by quantity personnel the ratio was 1: 1, then in artillery it surpassed the Soviet armies by 1.3 times, in tanks - by 1.6, and in aircraft - by 2.6 times.

The main forces of the South-Eastern Front were concentrated in the area of ​​the city itself to repel the attacks of the main enemy grouping aimed at capturing Stalingrad. Here, in the 65-kilometer strip from the village of Rynok to Malyye Chapurniki, the troops of the 62nd and 64th armies defended themselves, in which there were 16 rifle divisions, 8 rifle brigades, 2 tank corps and a fortified area - a total of 90 thousand soldiers and officers , 1 thousand guns and mortars (caliber 76 mm and larger), 120 tanks.

The enemy operated in this direction with the forces of 13 divisions, including three armored and motorized. In his grouping there were: 170 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.7 thousand guns and mortars (caliber 75 mm and larger), about 500 tanks. A comparison of the forces and means of the parties shows that the advantage was on the side of the enemy. It was especially significant in the 40-kilometer defense zone of the 62nd Army from the village of Rynok to Kuporosnoye, where the Nazis had almost twice as many personnel and artillery and almost 5 times as many tanks.

In order to successfully solve the problem of defending the city, the Stavka continuously reinforced the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts with its reserves, and sent trained marching reinforcements. So, by September 15, 20 thousand people arrived in the Stalingrad region. Eight more tank brigades were sent there. In the Kamyshin area, two tank corps were being restored, which, after being understaffed, were to enter the fronts of the Stalingrad direction.

The Nazi command continued to prepare troops for the assault on Stalingrad. On September 12, a meeting was held at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht near Vinnitsa, to which the commander of Army Group B, General Weichs, and the commander of the 6th Army, General Paulus, were summoned. Hitler resolutely demanded that they capture Stalingrad at any cost and as quickly as possible. This task was assigned to the 6th Army, reinforced by the 48th Tank Corps of the 4th Tank Army. The rest of the formations of the 4th Panzer Army were tasked with reaching the right bank of the Volga south of Stalingrad. In order to free up all the forces of the 6th German Army for an attack on Stalingrad, the 3rd Romanian Army was hastily advanced to the right bank of the Don. This allowed the Nazi command to send three more divisions to Stalingrad. In addition, the 6th Army was reinforced with special engineering units. To cover the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army in the second half of October, the enemy transferred the 7th Romanian Army Corps from the Kuban to the Ketchenery region.

The fierce two-month battles in the Stalingrad direction, the heroic defense of the city by the Soviet troops continuously demanded more and more new replenishment from the Nazi command. The enemy was forced to transfer forces to this area from the direction of the Caucasus. Thus, Army Group B, advancing on Stalingrad, increased from 38 divisions in mid-July to 69 divisions at the end of August, and by the end of September there were more than 80. At the same time, the composition of Army Group A, operating in the Caucasus direction, decreased for the period from July to September from 60 to 29 divisions. From this group, 38 divisions were transferred to Stalingrad, including divisions of the 8th Italian army.

Thus, contrary to the calculations of the Nazi command, the Stalingrad direction in the summer of 1942 turned into a center of struggle for both sides. Here the main forces of the Soviet Army and the German Wehrmacht clashed. The enemy suffered huge losses, but he failed to break the resistance of the defenders of Stalingrad.

The heroic city was supported by the entire Soviet country. In the autumn of 1942, at one of the most difficult stages of the Battle of Stalingrad, a patriotic movement arose in the country to raise funds for the construction of military equipment. Its initiators were the working people of the Lower Volga region. They raised large sums for the construction of the air squadrons "Heroic Stalingrad", "Fisherman of the Volga-Caspian", "Saratov", "Volzhanin" and others. The participants in the Battle of Stalingrad also contributed money for the construction of tank columns named after the 62nd Army, Guardsman, Defender of Stalingrad, and the Heroic Stalingrad air squadron.

To capture Stalingrad, the commander of the 6th Army, General Paulus, decided to strike at its central part: one - with the forces of four divisions (246) from the Aleksandrovka area in the east, the other - with the forces of three divisions (247) from the area of ​​Sadovaya station in the northeast direction . These blows were supposed to cut the front of the defense of the Soviet troops and capture the city. The rest of the enemy troops, located northwest and south of Stalingrad, were supposed to conduct holding operations.

In the current situation, the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts were faced with the task of stubborn defense of the city and counterattacks from the north and south to bleed and stop the enemy strike force, frustrate his plans to capture Stalingrad, hold bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don and accumulate strength in order to cross in the future in a decisive counteroffensive.

This general goal of the immediate actions of the fronts in the Stalingrad direction was determined by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief at a meeting at Headquarters on September 13. At the same time, the idea of ​​a powerful retaliatory strike against the enemy was developed, which became the basis for the future counteroffensive of the Soviet Army in the Stalingrad direction.

Giving instructions to G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky about preparing a future counteroffensive, I.V. Stalin emphasized that now the main task is to hold Stalingrad and prevent the enemy from advancing towards Kamyshin. Proceeding from this task, the troops of the Stalingrad Front were to liquidate the enemy grouping that had broken through to the Volga with strong blows from north to south and link up with the 62nd Army. The South-Eastern Front had to thwart Hitler's plan to capture the city with a tough and stubborn defense, counterattacks and counterattacks.

From September 12, the defense of Stalingrad was entrusted to the 62nd Army, commanded by General V.I. Chuikov, and the troops of the 64th Army, General M.S. Shumilov. The 62nd Army was supposed to defend the northern and central parts of the city, and the 64th - the southern part of Stalingrad (the Kirovsky district, cut off from the rest). The approaches to Krasnoarmeysk were still defended by the formations of the 57th Army of General F.I. Tolbukhin.

The depth of defense of the 62nd and 64th armies was small. The removal of the front line from the Volga in the areas of Orlovka and Krasnoarmeysk did not exceed 10 - 12 km. This limited the maneuver by forces and means both from the depths and along the front. Particularly acute was the question of organizing an uninterrupted supply of troops across the Volga.

Defensive work on the city bypass and in Stalingrad itself were far from complete. Organizing the fight in the city, the command of the South-Eastern Front prepared defenses on the left bank of the Volga, as well as on the islands. So, as early as September 11, it was decided to deploy formations of the 2nd tank corps, which was in the reserve of the front, at the turn of Srednepogromnoye (25 km northeast of Stalingrad), Svetly Yar (30 km southeast of Stalingrad). In the first echelon of the corps, four tank brigades were to take up defense, and in the second - two: one - in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Rybachy, the other - on Sarpinsky Island.

On September 13, the Nazis launched an attack on the central part of Stalingrad. The defenders of the city were hit by a powerful blow from two enemy groups. The first of them had 100 tanks, the second - 250. Their actions were supported by massive air strikes.

Despite the heroic resistance of the soldiers of the 62nd Army, by the end of the first day, the Nazis still managed to move north - to the western outskirts of the villages of the Barrikady and Krasny Oktyabr factories, and in the south - to capture the Sadovaya station and approach the western outskirts of the suburb of Minin . The command post and headquarters of the 62nd Army were located in the city center on Mamaev Kurgan, just 3 km from the enemy, and were under enemy fire throughout the day. On the night of September 14, the command post of the army was moved to an adit on the northern bank of the Tsaritsa River, where the command post of the Southeastern and Stalingrad fronts had previously been located. Only an army observation post was left on Mamaev Kurgan. The command post of General A. I. Eremenko, who led the actions of two fronts, was moved beyond the Volga.

In the context of the beginning of the assault on Stalingrad, General A. I. Eremenko decided to launch counterattacks by the troops of the 62nd and 64th armies against the enemy that had penetrated. To support the planned counterattacks, a front-line artillery group was involved, which included six artillery and mortar regiments. It was also decided to use the artillery of the 2nd tank corps deployed on the left bank of the Volga, the anti-aircraft artillery of the Stalingrad corps area of ​​the country's air defense and the artillery of the Volga military flotilla to defeat the enemy forces that had penetrated.

At the disposal of the commander of the 62nd Army, General V.I. Soviet Union General A. I. Rodimtsev. On the night of September 11, this formation, which became famous in heavy battles in the winter of 1941/42, made a swift march across the Trans-Volga steppe in vehicles from the Kamyshin region to the Middle Akhtuba region, where it was understaffed.

Having become part of the 62nd Army, the 13th Division received from the commander the task of secretly and in dismembered orders to concentrate in the village of Krasnaya Sloboda (opposite the central part of Stalingrad) by 7 pm on September 14 to cross to the right bank. At this time, the Nazis continued their attempts to break into the city. By 17 o'clock a group of enemy submachine gunners, supported by tanks, broke through to the Stalingrad-1 station area. In the situation that had developed, the 13th division was ordered to cross the river to the right bank by three o'clock in the morning on September 15 and strike at the enemy, who had broken through into the center of Stalingrad. The complexity of the task was that there was little time, the troops had to cross along with military equipment at night under aimed enemy fire.

Recalling the events of this day of the defense of Stalingrad, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuikov writes about the anxiety that possessed him when he set a combat mission for General A. I. Rodimtsev: “Will the soldiers and commanders be able to complete tasks that seemed beyond human strength ? If they do not comply, then the fresh 13th Guards Rifle Division may end up on the left bank of the Volga as a witness to a sad tragedy ”(248) .

The guards coped with this task. Under the cover of the advance detachment (one reinforced rifle battalion) and its artillery, the 13th division crossed over to Stalingrad in two nights - September 15 and 16. The crossing of the main forces of the division was carried out by means of the Volga military flotilla and pontoon battalions - on boats, tugboats, barges and even on fishing boats. The movement of these large and small ships through the wide and strong Volga took place under incessant machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire and under air bombardment. Over 6,000 people crossed over to Stalingrad during the first night. The subdivisions of the division went into battle on the move, attacking the enemy who had broken through into the city. By the end of the day on September 15, the 13th division cleared the area of ​​the city east of the railway from the Nazis; two rifle battalions advanced to Mamaev Kurgan.

The rapid transfer of the division to the right bank and the bold actions of its soldiers allowed the 62nd Army to eliminate the enemy's attempt to break through to the Volga in the center of Stalingrad.

About the heroic deeds of the defenders of the city in the critical September days of the defense of Stalingrad, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov wrote in his memoirs: “September 13, 14, 15 were difficult, too difficult days for the Stalingraders. The enemy, regardless of anything, step by step broke through the ruins of the city closer and closer to the Volga. It seemed that people could not stand it. But as soon as the enemy rushed forward, our glorious fighters of the 62nd and 64th armies shot him point-blank. The ruins of the city became a fortress. However, with each passing hour, there was less and less strength left.

Break in these hard days and, as it seemed at times, the last hours were created by the 13th Guards Division of A. I. Rodimtsev ... Its blow was completely unexpected for the enemy. On September 16, the division of A. I. Rodimtsev recaptured Mamaev Kurgan. The Stalingraders were helped by air strikes under the command of A. E. Golovanov and S. I. Rudenko (249), as well as attacks and artillery shelling from the north of the troops of the Stalingrad Front against units of the 8th German Army Corps.

Despite the steadfastness and mass heroism shown by the troops of the South-Eastern Front, the Nazis still managed to break through to the Volga at the junction of the 62nd and 64th armies in the Kuporosnoye area. The enemy's breakthrough extremely complicated the position of the troops of the 62nd Army, which found themselves isolated from the rest of the forces of the front. However, the soldiers of the army continued to courageously fight the enemy. On September 16 and 17, especially intense battles took place in the areas of Mamaev Kurgan and the Stalingrad-1 station. Fascist aviation inflicted massive strikes on the defenders of the city in groups of 50-60 aircraft.

On September 17, the 92nd Rifle Brigade, which had arrived from the Stavka reserve, was transferred to reinforce the 62nd Army. From the 2nd Tank Corps, which occupied positions on the left bank of the Volga, the 137th Tank Brigade was sent to the army, which was ordered to be used in the Mamaev Kurgan area. The headquarters continued to reinforce the South-Eastern Front with its reserves in the following days. The 193rd Rifle Division of General F.N. Smekhotvorov and the 284th Rifle Division of Colonel N.F. Batyuk began to arrive in the battle area, forming the reserve of the front commander.

As the troops of the 62nd and 64th armies strengthened and the defense improved, resistance to the enemy in the city and on the outskirts of Stalingrad increased continuously. As a result of intense fighting, the enemy was able to capture only a small part of the city north of the Tsaritsa River.

The soldiers of the 1st Guards, 24th and 66th Armies of the Stalingrad Front provided great assistance to the defenders of the city. In the difficult September days of 1942, they carried out offensive operations north of Stalingrad, trying to defeat the enemy in the area of ​​​​the village of Rynok and unite with the troops of the 62nd Army, and most importantly, to draw as many enemy forces as possible.

Back in the first decade of September Soviet troops, who stood north of Stalingrad, struck at the enemy, who had broken through north of the city. Basic strike force The Stalingrad Front at that time was the 1st Guards Army. Until September 5, while the other two armies - the 66th and 24th - were finishing their concentration, she was forced to attack the enemy alone, moreover, with formations weakened in battles. But the situation demanded it. These days, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin gave instructions to his deputy General G.K. Zhukov, who was at that time at the command post of the 1st Guards Army: troops."

The advancing troops advanced slowly, meeting the stubborn resistance of the enemy. The Hitlerite command understood what the consequences of a breakthrough of the Soviet troops from the north could be, and continued to condense the battle formations here.

In a situation of heavy bloody battles, the soldiers of the 1st Guards, 66th and 24th armies literally gnawed through the strong enemy defenses, showing selfless courage and heroism. A participant in these battles, Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov, who at that time commanded the 7th Tank Corps, writes: “In seven days of fierce fighting ... parts of the corps advanced only four kilometers. These few kilometers, both for us and for the enemies, were truly a killing field. In battles, all personnel fought selflessly, not sparing themselves” (250).

Persistently performing combat missions, the corps inflicted great damage on the enemy, but it itself suffered significant losses. Hak, from September 3 to September 10, he lost about 400 people killed and wounded, and during this time the Nazis left a thousand dead soldiers and officers on the battlefield in the corps zone.

The overall result of the offensive operations of the armies of the left wing of the Stalingrad Front from 3 to 12 September was territorially insignificant. However, the main result of the army's struggle was, first of all, that they diverted the enemy forces from the city. That is why the Supreme Commander-in-Chief demanded on September 3 from General G.K. Zhukov to attack the enemy from the area north of Stalingrad immediately, without waiting for the final readiness of the troops of the 66th and 24th armies who arrived there. “Your main task is to divert the German forces from Stalingrad,” I.V. Stalin emphasized, “and, if possible, eliminate the German corridor separating the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts.”

The reasons for changing the very idea of ​​​​an offensive operation of the troops of the Stalingrad Front, which was limited only to the task of assisting the defenders of the city by diverting enemy forces from it, are revealed in a report to I.V. Stalin sent on September 12, 1942 by General G.K. Zhukov and GKO member G. M. Malenkov:

“... 2. We do not stop the offensive of the 1st, 24th and 66th armies and carry it out persistently. As we reported to you about this, all available forces and means are participating in the ongoing offensive.

Connection with the Stalingraders was not possible because we were weaker than the enemy in terms of artillery and aviation. Our first guard the army that launched the offensive first had not a single reinforcement artillery regiment, not a single anti-tank regiment, or air defense. The situation near Stalingrad forced the 24th and 66th armies to be put into action on 5.9, not expecting their full concentration and the approach of reinforcement artillery. Rifle divisions entered the battle right from the fifty-kilometer march.

Such an entry into battle of armies in parts and without means of reinforcement did not give us the opportunity to break through the enemy’s defenses and connect with the Stalingraders, but on the other hand, our quick blow forced the enemy to turn his main forces from Stalingrad against our grouping, which eased the position of Stalingrad, which without this blow was would be taken by the enemy.

3. We do not set ourselves any other tasks unknown to the Headquarters. We have in mind to prepare a new operation for September 17... This operation and the timing of its implementation are connected with the approach of new divisions, the putting in order of tank units, the reinforcement of artillery and the supply of ammunition.

4. Today, our advancing units, as well as on previous days, have advanced insignificantly and have heavy losses from enemy fire and aircraft, but we do not consider it possible to stop the offensive, as this will untie the hands of the enemy for actions against Stalingrad.

We consider it obligatory for ourselves, even in difficult conditions, to continue the offensive, to crush the enemy, who bears losses no less than we do, and at the same time we will prepare a more organized and strong blow.

5. The battle established that against the northern group (against the troops of the left wing of the Stalingrad Front. - Ed.) Six divisions are operating in the first line: three infantry, two motorized divisions and one tank division.

In the second line against the northern group, at least two infantry divisions and up to 150-200 tanks are concentrated in reserve" (251).

This document corresponded to the true state of affairs. About the significance of the offensive north of the city for the defense of Stalingrad, one of the participants in this offensive, Marshal K. S. Moskalenko, writes:

“The troops of the left wing of the Stalingrad Front really failed to break through the enemy’s defenses and link up with the 62nd Army. But they were able to carry out the main task of the offensive - to divert large enemy forces: eight selected divisions, a significant part of artillery, tanks and aircraft. Thus, his strike force, aimed at capturing Stalingrad, was sharply weakened. And time was won for organizing the defense of the city, which in turn contributed to the strengthening of the 62nd Army. So, only from the 1st Guards Army, five rifle divisions (13th, 37th, 39th Guards, 308th and 315th) were withdrawn to the Stavka reserve and sent to the 62nd Army, which defended the city.

Thus, the failure of the fascist plans to capture Stalingrad is the result of the joint efforts of the Soviet troops - both directly defending the city and striking the enemy from the north. This determined the success of the offensive of the armies of the left wing of the Stalingrad Front, including the 1st Guards. He got it at a high price: thousands of heroes gave their lives for it. May the glory of the victors in the Battle of Stalingrad shine over them for centuries! (252)

Battles north of Stalingrad continued into the second half of the month. By September 18, the armies advancing here achieved some success. On this day, the troops of the 1st Guards and 24th Armies, reinforced by the 7th and 4th Rifle and 16th Tank Corps, attacked from the areas of Samofalovka, Erzovka, Loznoy in the general direction of Gumrak. The enemy was again forced to turn part of the forces of the 6th Army towards the advancing Soviet troops. This immediately eased the position of the troops defending the city.

On September 18, the commander of the South-Eastern Front ordered both armies to prepare counterattacks. The 62nd Army, which additionally received the 95th Rifle Division of Colonel V.A. Gorishny, received the task of launching a counterattack with the forces of at least three divisions and one tank brigade southbound and clear the captured part of Stalingrad from the Nazis in their lane. The 64th Army was to prepare a strike on its right flank with the task of defeating the fascist troops in the areas of Kuporosny and Elshanka. One rifle division was transferred to this army from the 57th Army. To support the counterattacks, all the artillery of the front-line artillery group, the ships of the Volga flotilla and the aircraft of the 8th Air Army were involved.

The counterattacks of both armies began simultaneously on the morning of September 19 and lasted more than two days. However, they did not bring significant results, although they created considerable tension for the enemy. The lack of necessary time for the preparation of troops and the limited forces involved in counterattacks had an effect.

The bitterness of the struggle in Stalingrad grew with each passing day. On the morning of September 21, an enemy grouping of four divisions, supported by 100 tanks and aviation, began to break through to the Volga in the city center in the defense zone of the 13th Guards Rifle Division, 42nd and 92nd Rifle Brigades. The guards put up stubborn resistance to the enemy. During September 21 and 22, the soldiers of the 13th division repulsed all attacks of the numerically superior enemy forces and did not allow him to break through to the Volga. During these two days, the Nazis were able to advance only a few tens of meters, while losing 500 soldiers and officers and 43 tanks.

In order to provide assistance to the 62nd Army, the front commander transferred the 284th and 193rd rifle divisions to its structure. The first two regiments crossed the Volga on September 22 and immediately entered the battle to the right of the 13th division. Reflecting the furious attacks of the enemy, the soldiers of the 62nd Army stubbornly defended the lines they occupied. The struggle for the central part of the city continued until September 26.

Great assistance to the defenders of Stalingrad, as in the period of fighting on the outskirts of the city, was provided by the 8th Air Army. In two weeks of intense fighting, the pilots made more than 4,000 sorties, destroyed more than 50 aircraft in air battles and at airfields, disabled up to 100 tanks and more than 200 enemy vehicles.

The Volga military flotilla actively participated in the defense of Stalingrad. The specially created Northern Group of ships of the flotilla (two gunboats and five armored boats) under the command of Captain 3rd Rank S.P. Lysenko provided the actions of the marine battalion and the tank brigade, and then the operational group of S.F. Gorokhov, allocated by the front command to cover the northern approaches to the city. The ships of the flotilla, having taken up firing positions on Akhtuba, inflicted significant damage on the enemy with well-aimed fire. By doing this, they helped the defenders of the city to thwart the enemy's attempts to break into it from the north.

The Volga military flotilla played an important role in transportation across the Volga. From September 12 to 15 alone, she transported up to 10 thousand people and 1 thousand tons of cargo for the 62nd Army to the right bank. The artillery of the ships took an active part in the suppression and destruction of manpower and military equipment of the enemy in the areas of Akatovka, Vinnovka, Mamayev Kurgan, the city center, Kuporosny. The removal of the wounded to the left bank of the Volga was one of the daily tasks of the flotilla. Its significance has increased especially since September 15, when the enemy destroyed all crossings across the Volga within the city.

Thus, the struggle to repel the first assault of the enemy lasted from 13 to 26 September. Despite fierce attacks, the enemy failed to completely capture Stalingrad. The Nazis were only able to push the troops of the 62nd Army and break into the city center, and on its left flank, at the junction with the 64th Army, go to the Volga. However, in these battles they lost more than 6 thousand people killed, more than 170 tanks, more than 200 aircraft.

The stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops directly in the city, as well as the measures taken by the Headquarters, played a decisive role in repelling the September assault on Stalingrad. Of particular importance was the strengthening of the fighting armies with reserves and the organization of active offensive operations north of Stalingrad. In total, from September 13 to 26, the fronts of the Stalingrad direction received 10 rifle divisions, 2 tank corps and 8 tank brigades from the Stavka reserve (of which 5 divisions were transferred to the 62nd Army).

As for the importance of military operations north of Stalingrad in the defense of the city, their contribution was rightly assessed in the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov: “It is necessary to pay tribute to the soldiers of the 24th, 1st Guards and 66th armies of the Stalingrad Front, pilots -th Air Army and long-range aviation, which, regardless of any casualties, provided invaluable assistance to the 62nd and 64th armies of the South-Eastern Front in holding Stalingrad.

I declare with all responsibility, - the former Deputy Supreme Commander wrote further, - that if there had not been persistent counterattacks by the troops of the Stalingrad Front, systematic air strikes, then perhaps Stalingrad would have been even worse ”(253) .

On September 27, the struggle for Stalingrad entered a new phase. From that time until October 8, factory settlements and the Orlovka area became the center of the fighting. By the beginning of the fighting, the operational situation in the defense zone of the 62nd Army remained very tense. The area, which was held by the army troops on the right bank of the Volga, had sharply decreased by this time. Therefore, it was not possible to place artillery on the threatened left flank of the army. Most of it, especially the reinforcement artillery, occupied firing positions on the left bank of the river.

The enemy was in an advantageous position compared to the defenders of the city. As a result of the September battles, he captured a significant part of the heights that passed along the western outskirts of the city (south of Mamaev Kurgan to Elshanka). This gave him the opportunity to view the most important areas of the city, the Volga and its left bank, and the Soviet troops became even more limited in their freedom of maneuver by forces and means. For the 62nd Army, command and control of troops was also significantly complicated. The command post of the army, equipped in the cliff of the right bank of the Volga to the east of Mamaev Kurgan, was only 2 km from the enemy and was subjected to continuous shelling. The crossing of the Volga continued with great difficulty.

The command of Army Group "B" and the 6th army of the enemy, having failed to capture Stalingrad in the previous grouping, began to regroup forces for a new assault on the city. On September 25, two divisions from the 4th Panzer Army were transferred to the 6th Army. Regroupings of formations within the 6th Army itself were also carried out in order to concentrate the main forces of the army against the center and northern part of the city.

The enemy troops began preparations for delivering strikes in new directions: from the west, from the area southeast of the Razgulyaevka junction, to the village of Krasny Oktyabr and from the south, from the area west of the station, to Mamaev Kurgan in order to break through here to the Volga. This plan of the enemy was revealed by Soviet intelligence. To disrupt the enemy offensive in these directions, the 62nd Army prepared a counterattack, during which it was supposed to clear the city center of the Nazis. The 23rd Tank Corps, 95th and 284th Rifle Divisions were involved in the counterattack. At the same time, the right-flank formations of the 64th Army were to strike from the south with the task of capturing the Kuporosnoye area.

The counterattack of the 62nd Army, which began early in the morning of September 27, was not developed. Due to the strong resistance of the enemy, small formations of the army were forced to suspend the offensive after two hours. The Nazis, recovering from the blow of the Soviet troops, went on the offensive. The struggle in the areas of the village of "Red October" and Mamaev Kurgan went on with varying success. By the middle of the day, 80 enemy tanks with machine gunners broke into the village. The 95th Rifle Division, which had previously captured the western and southern slopes of the Mamaev Kurgan, was forced to leave their positions.

From the dominant height, the Nazis saw the city, wounded, charred, but not defeated, but continuing to fight. From Mamaev Kurgan to the banks of the Volga, only a few hundred meters. But the "conquerors" of Europe, who triumphantly passed through many large and small countries, did not manage to overcome these remaining meters. The Nazis never passed through Mamaev Kurgan. The soldiers of the 284th Rifle Division of Colonel N.F. Batyuk and the 13th Guards Rifle Division of General A.I. Rodimtsev did not leave the steep slopes of the mound. Courage and courage, high skill and selflessness of the Soviet soldiers in the name of victory over fascism became the obstacle that here, on the Volga bank, finally stopped the advance of the Wehrmacht.

During the September battles, the fascist troops failed to break through to the Volga and to the right of Mamaev Kurgan, where workers of three giant factories - Krasny Oktyabr, Barrikade and Stalingrad Tractor Plant - stood in the battle line of the defenders of Stalingrad.

Heavy fighting in those days went on in the southern part of Stalingrad. A particularly tense situation developed in the area north and south of the mouth of the Tsaritsa River, where the 42nd and 92nd rifle brigades and one regiment of the 10th NKVD division were defending. Under the pressure of the numerically superior enemy forces, they began to cross in scattered groups to the left bank of the Volga. This gave the Nazis the opportunity to break through to the river south of the mouth of the Tsaritsa in a section up to 10 km wide. The Soviet troops did not manage to improve the position on the right flank of the 64th Army either: the offensive of the right-flank formations of the army undertaken here was not successful.

The difficult situation that developed in Stalingrad required the Headquarters to urgently send new forces to the battle area. By her order, the 159th fortified area was redeployed there, consisting of 12 machine gun and artillery battalions, which was supposed to arrive from September 28 to October 1. On the same days, three rifle brigades of the 7th rifle corps of General S. G. Goryachev were sent to the South-Eastern Front. For the same front, two tank brigades were transferred from the Saratov region. The Chief of the General Staff recommended that the fortified area be used in full strength for the defense of lines and objects, and only in exceptional cases should it be allowed to participate in the offensive.

The tense nature of the struggle near Stalingrad, the large length of the fronts and the increased number of armies in each of them required the liquidation of the unified command of the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts that had existed since August 9. Therefore, on September 28, each front was directly subordinated to the Headquarters and at the same time renamed: Stalingrad - in the Don, South-Eastern - in Stalingrad. General K.K. Rokossovsky was appointed commander of the Don Front, a member of the Military Council - Corps Commissar A.S. Zheltov, and from October 24 - Brigadier Commissar A.I. Kirichenko, Chief of Staff - General M.S. Malinin. The command and the Military Council of the Stalingrad (former South-Eastern) Front were left in the same composition.

The liquidation of the unified control of the two fronts in the Stalingrad direction also corresponded to the tasks of the upcoming counteroffensive, for which the Stavka had been preparing since mid-September 1942.

During the period of the unfolding battles to repel the enemy assaults on Stalingrad, party-political work in the troops, as before, was aimed at instilling courage and courage in the soldiers, at ensuring iron stamina and perseverance in defense. The task was to repel the attacks of the Nazis in the city, staunchly defend every quarter, every street. It was required to turn every house into an impregnable fortress.

The complexity of the combat situation and the fierce nature of the battle in the city put forward a number of new demands to the military councils of the front, the 62nd and 64th armies, to commanders, political agencies and party organizations in carrying out party political work. In the course of continuous intense street fighting, it was necessary to constantly exert political influence on the soldiers, to work with small groups of fighters in separate houses and centers of resistance, and to ensure their interaction.

Since at that time it was impossible to widely hold mass events, the most commonly used various forms individual work. At the same time, close communication with the soldiers of commanders and political workers, their inspiring words and personal example. However, even in the conditions of the struggle in the city, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations found opportunities for mass forms of work. Even in the most difficult circumstances, short party meetings, meetings of party and Komsomol bureaus were held. They took place right on the front lines - in dugouts, basements of buildings, and even in places such as the open-hearth furnaces of the Krasny Oktyabr plant. They were carried out most often at night, when the tension of the battles somewhat weakened. Often had to interrupt party meetings and bureau meetings to repel enemy attacks. This was the case, for example, on Mamaev Kurgan, when a meeting of the party bureau of one of the subdivisions was interrupted five times (254) .

But even such short meetings were a genuine school for the education of communists and their mobilization for the fulfillment of party duty. Leaving the meeting, members and candidates of the party felt more confident, more clearly aware of their tasks.

During the battle at Stalingrad, the military councils and political departments of the fronts, the military councils and political departments of the armies, the commanders and political agencies of formations focused on providing direct practical assistance to the units. Directives were issued only in exceptional cases.

The military councils of the fronts demanded that the commanding and political staff of all levels focus on such important issues as strengthening party and Komsomol organizations and strengthening party influence on the masses of soldiers, the moral and political mobilization of personnel for the performance of combat missions, the education of stamina and endurance among soldiers, high discipline, a sense of personal responsibility for the execution of the combat order of the commander. Special attention addressed to strengthening the stamina of the troops, to the selfless struggle for every house, basement, for every meter of Soviet land.

A letter from the Military Council and the Political Directorate of the Stalingrad Front to the Communists, the defenders of the impregnable Volga bastion, played a mobilizing role in increasing the stamina and perseverance of the soldiers who held Stalingrad (255).

“The entire Red Army is now learning fortitude and heroism from the units defending Stalingrad,” the letter said. - The Communists fight stubbornly, fearlessly, in the most decisive places of mortal combat, they fight to the last opportunity, not sparing their lives ...

Each of us Bolsheviks fighting these days for Stalingrad must remember that by participating heroically in the struggle, he multiplies the glory of Soviet weapons, he writes new pages in the heroic history of our party.

This letter was widely discussed in parts of the front at party meetings held in October. Those communists who lagged behind in the fighting competition and were not organizers of the non-party masses were severely criticized. The meetings outlined concrete measures to enhance the vanguard role of the Communists in the battle.

The letter from the Military Council and the political administration of the front, as well as the decisions of the party meetings, contributed to the strengthening of internal party work, the increase in the combat activity of the communists, and at the same time the combat activity of the entire personnel of the units and formations that fought for Stalingrad.

During the fighting in the city, a very effective means of strengthening the morale of the soldiers and increasing their combat activity was the personal example of the commander, political worker, and each member of the party. In the difficult conditions of the struggle in the zone of operations of the 62nd Army, the Military Council of the Army, the commanders of formations and units showed restraint, great firmness and found ways to restore the disturbed command and control of troops, to establish combat interaction between units and formations.

At the end of September, the enemy, without ceasing persistent attacks in the defense zone of the 62nd Army, strove at all costs to achieve success in capturing Stalingrad. Stubborn battles were waged in those days by the defenders of the city for the industrial settlements "Barrikada" and "Red October", as well as in the Orlovka area. The struggle was further complicated by the fact that assistance to the Stalingraders from the armies stationed to the north and northwest of the city was stopped. Preparing for the upcoming counteroffensive, they were forced to stop attacks on the troops of the northern flank of the 6th German Army.

In order to assist the defenders of the city, the commander of the Stalingrad Front, General A. I. Eremenko, decided on the night of September 29 to conduct a private offensive operation south of the city with the forces of his front. The purpose of the operation was to reach the rear of the enemy's southern grouping in the area of ​​Tinguta, Abganerovo, Sadovoye stations and force the enemy to ease pressure directly in the city, to help the 62nd Army in holding Stalingrad.

One combined detachment from the 57th and 51st armies (256), as well as aviation from the 8th air army, was involved in the planned operation. During the night of September 29, the latter was supposed to strike at seven enemy targets within the city and disorganize the enemy’s preparations for another attack on the positions of Soviet troops. At the same time, the formations of the 62nd Army were given the task of providing the leading edge with light signals in order to exclude strikes against them by their aircraft.

The operation started exactly on time. The consolidated detachment of the 51st Army during the night deepened into the enemy's position for 5 km in the region of 75 km from the southern outskirts of Stalingrad, and the detachment of the 57th Army quickly moved forward to a depth of up to 18 km and captured the Sadovoe area. The actions of both detachments were supported by fire and part of the forces of the 15th Guards Rifle Division of the 64th Army.

As a result of the night actions of the combined detachments of the left-flank armies of the Stalingrad Front, Soviet troops captured all the gaps between the lakes Sarpa, Tsatsa and Barmantsak. The capture of these defiles and the strengthening of the position of the troops of the front on its left wing as a whole created favorable conditions for the deployment of shock groups of Soviet troops here during the transition to the counteroffensive.

However, the blow of the 57th and 51st armies was not so powerful as to force the enemy to change the grouping of forces directly in the city, where he continued to attack persistently. September 29 - 30, the Nazis managed to capture the villages of "Barricades" and "Red October".

In connection with the new complication of the situation in the zone of the 62nd Army, the front commander transferred the 39th Guards Rifle Division under the command of General S.S. Guryev to the disposal of General V.I. ". At the same time, the 308th Rifle Division of Colonel L.N. Gurtiev and the 37th Guards Rifle Division of General V.G. Zholudev began to concentrate in the areas of Krasnoy Tuksir and Gypsy Dawn.

In those tense days of the heroic defense of Stalingrad, the Headquarters closely followed the events on the Volga and continued to continuously strengthen the Stalingrad direction.

From the end of September 1942, it became obvious that the offensive capabilities of Army Group B were completely exhausted. Its troops went on the defensive, except for the areas of the city itself, in the struggle for which two armies of this group were involved. Therefore, the formations sent to Stalingrad by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were now intended not so much to strengthen the defense, but to create shock groups of fronts in order to go over to a decisive counteroffensive.

The struggle in the city continued with unrelenting tension. The Nazis made especially fierce attacks on October 1 in the Orlovka area. At the same time, they resumed the onslaught in the city center against units of the 13th Guards Rifle Division. By the end of October 4, the enemy broke through to the Stalingrad Tractor Plant. Part of the forces of the 115th rifle and 2nd motorized rifle brigades, defending in this area, were surrounded. Only by the morning of October 8, having repulsed all the attacks of the enemy outnumbered, did the soldiers of these brigades break out of the encirclement and take up defensive positions at the confluence of the Orlovka and Mokraya Mechetka rivers.

In general, in late September - early October, the situation of the Soviet troops in Stalingrad remained very difficult. The Nazi troops, having captured part of the city, reached the Volga in a number of sections. However, due to the growing resistance of the defenders of the city, whose morale and will to win were not broken, the Nazis advanced in 12 days of fighting (from September 27 to October 8) in the direction of the main attack, in the area of ​​​​factory settlements, only 400 - 600 m .

In October, the fascist German command was preparing a general assault on Stalingrad. At the same time, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the command of the Stalingrad Front carried out the necessary measures aimed at holding the city.

To reinforce the 62nd Army, the 37th Guards Rifle Division of General V. G. Zholudev and the 84th Tank Brigade of Colonel D. N. Bely were transferred to it, which on the night of October 4 began crossing to the right bank.

On October 5, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in a directive to the front commander, General A.I. Eremenko, demanded to organize defense in the city so that every house, every street would be turned into a fortress. The directive noted that the front had the necessary forces and means for this and that the city should under no circumstances be surrendered to the enemy, and that part that turned out to be occupied by the enemy should be liberated.

By decision of the Headquarters, nine machine guns of artillery battalions were transferred from its reserve to organize a solid defense of the islands on the Volga - Disputed, Zaitsevsky, Golodny and Sarpinsky. In addition, the Headquarters transferred the 45th Rifle Division of Colonel V.P. Sokolov to the Stalingrad Front, ordering it to be used also for the defense of the islands, and above all Golodny Island and the northern part of Sarpinsky Island. To cover the islands from the air, the Headquarters sent an air defense regiment (12 37 mm caliber guns and 20 heavy machine guns) to the front.

Among the measures to further strengthen the defense of Stalingrad were the organization and conduct of strong artillery counter-preparations against the enemy prepared for a breakthrough to the Volga.

So, on October 5, more than 300 guns and mortars, including 4 regiments of the front-line artillery group, participated in counter-training against the Nazi troops, who were trying to organize a breakthrough to the Volga between the Stalingrad Tractor Plant and the Barrikady plant. For ease of management, the group, which consisted of 250 barrels (including 150 guns and mortars of 120 - 152 mm caliber), was divided into four subgroups.

Aviation of the 8th Air Army was active. Leading a persistent struggle for air supremacy, it directed its main efforts to destroy enemy tanks and manpower on the battlefield in their areas of concentration. From September 27 to October 8, the air army made about 4 thousand sorties. However, there were also serious shortcomings in the actions of the fighters. Patrolling of duty aircraft was carried out not on the outskirts of the covered troops, but directly above them or far from the front line of defense. Enemy bombers were attacked from long distances (800 - 1000 m), and their pursuit by fighters until the ammunition was completely used up was not always carried out. As a result, the effectiveness of the actions of fighter aircraft decreased.

The Volga military flotilla worked hard. Heroically fought with the enemy of the Stalingrad corps area of ​​the country's air defense.

Thus, the resistance of the Soviet troops in all sectors of the front in the Stalingrad region increased.

However, the enemy continued to build up his forces here, preparing for the last, “general” assault on the fortress on the Volga. During October, about 200,000 trained replacements were sent to the Stalingrad region, up to 90 artillery battalions of the reserve of the Supreme High Command, in which there were up to 50,000 people and over 1,000 guns. In addition, about 40 sapper battalions, specially trained for the assault on the city, were deployed there by air.

By October 9, eight divisions remained in the enemy's main strike force operating in front of the 62nd Army of the Stalingrad Front. Now they numbered 90,000 men, 2,300 guns and mortars, and about 300 tanks. Their actions were still supported by up to 1 thousand combat aircraft of the 4th Air Fleet. These enemy forces at the turn of Rynok, the settlement of the tractor factory, the Barrikady and Krasny Oktyabr factories, the northeastern slopes of Mamaev Kurgan, the Stalingrad-1 station were opposed by the troops of the 62nd Army, weakened by long battles. It had 55 thousand people, 1400 guns and mortars, 80 tanks. The 8th Air Army had only about 190 serviceable aircraft (257). The Soviet troops were inferior to the enemy in the number of personnel and in artillery by 1.7 times, in tanks - by 3.8 times and in combat aircraft - by more than 5 times.

In such unequal conditions, battles began for the tractor factories, "Barrikada" and "Red October", which continued until November 18.

The whole world followed the courageous struggle of the Stalingraders. Soviet soldiers showed unparalleled stamina and perseverance, high military skill, and mass heroism.

In the difficult days of the autumn of 1942, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, D.Z. Manuilsky, in one of his speeches to the commanders and political workers of the 62nd and 64th armies, assessed the feat of the defenders of Stalingrad as follows: “Comrades, it’s hard for you, it’s harder for you, than anyone at the front and in the rear. The Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government know this. I can assure you that you will soon receive tangible support from all the people. Our party, our people are delighted and proud that they could bring up people like you - the defenders of Stalingrad, who turned the city into an impregnable fortress" (258).

On October 3, the 10th Plenum of the Stalingrad Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took place in the village of Nikolaevsky. It adopted an appeal to the defenders of the city: “In these difficult days, let's be imbued with one thought - there is nowhere to retreat. The paths of retreat are closed by the order of the Motherland, by the command of the people ... Without Stalingrad, there is no life for us, no happiness.”

All new heroes were born in the battles of Stalingrad. The defenders of the city steadfastly performed their duty. They felt the support of the whole country, they believed that a big offensive would soon begin. Over 100,000 Marines fought at the walls of the hero city throughout the battle. A vivid expression of their courage was the immortal feat of the Komsomol member M.A. Panikakha, who entered into an unequal struggle with fascist tanks. The exploits of the soldiers of the garrisons of the House of Sergeant Ya. F. Pavlov, the House of Lieutenant H. E. Zabolotny and Mill No. 4 gained worldwide fame.

In the ranks of the troops defending Stalingrad, formations and units of the NKVD troops also fought. They vigilantly guarded the rear of the armies, guarded and protected communications and crossings. Military prowess and dedication marked fighting The 10th division of the NKVD troops under the command of Colonel A. A. Saraev, in which there were many border guards. The division fought the most fierce battles on the outskirts of Mamaev Kurgan, in the area of ​​the tractor plant and in the city center. The 2nd, 79th, 91st and 98th border regiments of the rear guard troops of the army were active in the battles for Stalingrad. The 79th border regiment, for example, during the battle in the city fell to guard and protect the most important crossing over the Volga near the tractor plant, which was constantly fired upon by artillery and mortars, and was bombed from the air. But even in these conditions, the border guards selflessly performed their duty. Stopping the sabotage and reconnaissance actions of the enemy, they entered into battles with his many times superior forces. The regiment in a fierce battle defended the crossing, making it possible to transport the arriving reinforcements to Stalingrad.

On October 14, 1942, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 1 of the High Command ground forces on the transition to strategic defense on the entire Soviet-German front, thereby recognizing the failure of the Wehrmacht's summer offensive plans in the east. Although the Nazi troops reached the Volga and deepened into the Caucasus, they were unable to capture Stalingrad, the main oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus and the passes of the Main Caucasian Range. However, the offensive did not stop in the Stalingrad region. On this day, the Nazis went on another assault on the Volga bastion.

Enemy attacks followed one after another. On October 15, the Nazis managed to capture the Stalingrad Tractor Plant and reach the Volga on a narrow 2.5-kilometer stretch. The position of the troops of the 62nd Army became extremely complicated. Part of the army forces operating north of the plant was cut off. But the heroic struggle continued. For a month, there were heavy street battles for every quarter, house, for every meter of Volga land.

Gradually, the onslaught of the enemy began to weaken. On November 11, the Nazis made their last attempt to storm the city. On this day, they were able to occupy the southern part of the Barrikady plant and make their way to the Volga in a narrow area. The heroically fighting troops of the army of General V. I. Chuikov were cut into three parts. The main forces of the army firmly defended the territory of the Krasny Oktyabr plant and the narrow coastal part of the city, almost to the Tsaritsa River. The group of Colonel S. F. Gorokhov occupied the area of ​​​​the villages of Rynok and Spartanovka. The 138th division of Colonel I.I. Lyudnikov defended the eastern part of the Barrikady plant.

On November 14, the onset of ice formation on the Volga made it impossible for the division to maintain communication with the left bank. For five days she fought, pressed against the Volga, but did not give up her positions. Before the transition of the Soviet troops to the counteroffensive, the position of the 62nd Army in the city did not change.

So, fascist german troops failed to completely capture the city. The main enemy grouping operating in the Stalin-192 area

hail, suffered such heavy losses that it was forced to finally go on the defensive. On November 18, 1942, the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad ended. The city was held. The enemy did not reach his goal. In the bloody battles on the outskirts of Stalingrad and in the city itself, its offensive capabilities were exhausted.

Introduction

On April 20, 1942, the battle for Moscow ended. The German army, whose offensive seemed unstoppable, was not only stopped, but also thrown back from the capital of the USSR by 150-300 kilometers. The Nazis suffered heavy losses, and although the Wehrmacht was still very strong, Germany no longer had the opportunity to attack simultaneously on all sectors of the Soviet-German front.

While the spring thaw lasted, the Germans developed a plan for the summer offensive of 1942, code-named Fall Blau - "Blue Option". The original goal of the German strike was the oil fields of Grozny and Baku with the possibility further development attack on Persia. Before the deployment of this offensive, the Germans were going to cut off the Barvenkovsky ledge - a large bridgehead captured by the Red Army on the western bank of the Seversky Donets River.

The Soviet command, in turn, was also going to conduct a summer offensive in the zone of the Bryansk, Southern and Southwestern fronts. Unfortunately, despite the fact that the Red Army was the first to strike and at first the German troops managed to push back almost to Kharkov, the Germans managed to turn the situation in their favor and inflict a major defeat on the Soviet troops. On the sector of the Southern and Southwestern fronts, the defense was weakened to the limit, and on June 28, the 4th Panzer Army of Hermann Goth broke through between Kursk and Kharkov. The Germans went to the Don.

At this point, Hitler, by personal order, made a change to the Blue Option, which later cost dearly. Nazi Germany. He divided Army Group South into two parts. Army Group "A" was supposed to continue the offensive in the Caucasus. Army Group B was to reach the Volga, cut off the strategic communications that connected the European part of the USSR with the Caucasus and Central Asia, and capture Stalingrad. For Hitler, this city was important not only from a practical point of view (as a major industrial center), but also purely for ideological reasons. The capture of the city, which bore the name of the main enemy of the Third Reich, would be the greatest propaganda achievement of the German army.

The alignment of forces and the first stage of the battle

Army Group B, advancing on Stalingrad, included the 6th Army of General Paulus. The army consisted of 270 thousand soldiers and officers, about 2200 guns and mortars, about 500 tanks. From the air, the 6th Army was supported by the 4th Air Fleet of General Wolfram von Richthofen, which numbered about 1200 aircraft. A little later, towards the end of July, the 4th Panzer Army of Herman Goth was transferred to Army Group B, which included on July 1, 1942 the 5th, 7th and 9th Army and the 46th Motorized corps. The latter included the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich.

The Southwestern Front, renamed Stalingrad on July 12, 1942, consisted of about 160,000 personnel, 2,200 guns and mortars, and about 400 tanks. Of the 38 divisions that were part of the front, only 18 were fully equipped, while the rest had from 300 to 4000 people. The 8th Air Army, which operated along with the front, was also significantly inferior in numbers to von Richthofen's fleet. With these forces, the Stalingrad Front was forced to defend a sector more than 500 kilometers wide. A separate problem for the Soviet troops was the flat steppe terrain, on which enemy tanks could operate at full strength. Taking into account the low level of anti-tank weapons in front units and formations, this made the tank threat critical.

The offensive of the German troops began on July 17, 1942. On this day, the vanguards of the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht entered into battle with units of the 62nd Army on the Chir River and in the area of ​​​​the Pronin farm. By July 22, the Germans pushed the Soviet troops back almost 70 kilometers, to the main line of defense of Stalingrad. The German command, which expected to take the city on the move, decided to surround the Red Army units at the villages of Kletskaya and Suvorovskaya, seize crossings across the Don and develop the offensive against Stalingrad without stopping. For this purpose, two strike groups were created, advancing from the north and south. The northern group was formed from units of the 6th Army, the southern group from units of the 4th Panzer Army.

The northern group, striking on July 23, broke through the defense front of the 62nd Army and surrounded its two rifle divisions and a tank brigade. By July 26, the advanced units of the Germans reached the Don. The command of the Stalingrad Front organized a counterattack, in which the mobile formations of the front reserve, as well as the 1st and 4th tank armies, which had not yet completed the formation, took part. Tank armies were a new regular structure within the Red Army. It is not clear who exactly put forward the idea of ​​their formation, but in the documents this idea was first voiced to Stalin by the head of the Main Armored Directorate, Ya. N. Fedorenko. In the form in which the tank armies were conceived, they did not last long enough, subsequently undergoing a serious restructuring. But the fact that it was near Stalingrad that such a staff unit appeared is a fact. The 1st Panzer Army struck from the Kalach area on July 25, and the 4th from the villages of Trekhostrovskaya and Kachalinskaya on July 27.

Fierce fighting in this area lasted until August 7-8. It was possible to unblock the encircled units, but it was not possible to defeat the advancing Germans. Negative influence The development of events was also influenced by the fact that the level of training of the personnel of the armies of the Stalingrad Front was low, and a number of errors in the coordination of actions made by the unit commanders.

In the south, Soviet troops managed to stop the Germans near the settlements of Surovikino and Rychkovsky. Nevertheless, the Nazis were able to break through the front of the 64th Army. To eliminate this breakthrough, on July 28, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered, no later than the 30th, the forces of the 64th Army, as well as two infantry divisions and a tank corps, to strike and defeat the enemy in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Nizhne-Chirskaya.

Despite the fact that the new units entered the battle on the move and their combat capabilities suffered from this, by the indicated date the Red Army managed to push the Germans and even threaten their encirclement. Unfortunately, the Nazis managed to bring fresh forces into battle and help the group. After that, the fighting escalated even hotter.

On July 28, 1942, another event occurred that cannot be left behind the scenes. On this day, the famous Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 227, also known as "Not a step back!", was adopted. He significantly toughened the penalties for unauthorized retreat from the battlefield, introduced penal units for the guilty fighters and commanders, and also introduced barrage detachments - special units that were engaged in detaining deserters and returning them to duty. This document, for all its rigidity, was adopted quite positively by the troops and really reduced the number disciplinary violations in military units.

At the end of July, the 64th Army was nevertheless forced to withdraw beyond the Don. German troops captured a number of bridgeheads on the left bank of the river. In the area of ​​​​the village of Tsymlyanskaya, the Nazis concentrated very serious forces: two infantry, two motorized and one tank division. The headquarters ordered the Stalingrad Front to drive the Germans to the western (right) bank and restore the line of defense along the Don, but it was not possible to eliminate the breakthrough. On July 30, the Germans went on the offensive from the village of Tsymlyanskaya and by August 3 made significant progress, capturing the Repair station, the station and the city of Kotelnikovo, the settlement of Zhutovo. On the same days, the 6th Romanian corps of the enemy came to the Don. In the zone of operations of the 62nd Army, the Germans went on the offensive on August 7 in the direction of Kalach. The Soviet troops were forced to retreat to the left bank of the Don. On August 15, the Soviet 4th Tank Army had to do the same, because the Germans were able to break through its front in the center and split the defense in half.

By August 16, the troops of the Stalingrad Front withdrew beyond the Don and took up defensive positions on the outer line of the city fortifications. On August 17, the Germans resumed the onslaught and by the 20th they managed to capture the crossings, as well as a bridgehead in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Vertyachiy. Attempts to discard or destroy them were unsuccessful. On August 23, the German group, with the support of aviation, broke through the defense front of the 62nd and 4th tank armies and advanced units reached the Volga. On this day, German aircraft made about 2,000 sorties. Many quarters of the city were in ruins, oil storage facilities were on fire, about 40 thousand civilians died. The enemy broke through to the line Rynok - Orlovka - Gumrak - Peschanka. The struggle passed under the walls of Stalingrad.

Fighting in the city

Having forced the Soviet troops to retreat almost to the outskirts of Stalingrad, the enemy threw six German and one Romanian infantry divisions, two tank divisions and one motorized division against the 62nd Army. The number of tanks in this grouping of the Nazis was approximately 500. From the air, the enemy was supported by at least 1000 aircraft. The threat of the capture of the city became tangible. To eliminate it, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command transferred to the defenders two completed armies (10 rifle divisions, 2 tank brigades), re-equipped the 1st Guards Army (6 rifle divisions, 2 guards rifle, 2 tank brigades), and also subordinated the 16th to the Stalingrad Front air army.

On September 5 and 18, the troops of the Stalingrad Front (September 30, it will be renamed Donskoy) carried out two major operations, thanks to which they managed to weaken the German onslaught on the city, pulling back about 8 infantry, two tank and two motorized divisions. Again, it was not possible to carry out the complete defeat of the Nazi units. Fierce battles for the internal defensive bypass went on for a long time.

Urban battles began on September 13, 1942 and continued until November 19, when the Red Army launched a counteroffensive as part of Operation Uranus. From September 12, the defense of Stalingrad was entrusted to the 62nd Army, which was transferred under the command of Lieutenant General V. I. Chuikov. This man, who before the start of the Battle of Stalingrad was considered insufficiently experienced for military command, set up a real hell for the enemy in the city.

September 13 in the immediate vicinity of the city were six infantry, three tank and two motorized divisions of the Germans. Until September 18, there were fierce battles in the central and southern parts cities. South of the railway station, the onslaught of the enemy was held back, but in the center the Germans drove out the Soviet troops up to the Krutoy ravine.

The battles on September 17 for the station were extremely fierce. It changed hands four times during the day. Here the Germans left 8 burnt tanks and about a hundred killed. On September 19, the left wing of the Stalingrad Front tried to strike in the direction of the station with a further attack on Gumrak and Gorodishche. The advance was not carried out, however, a large enemy grouping was held down by battles, which facilitated the situation for the units fighting in the center of Stalingrad. In general, the defense here was so strong that the enemy did not manage to reach the Volga.

Realizing that success could not be achieved in the center of the city, the Germans concentrated troops to the south to attack in an easterly direction, to Mamaev Kurgan and the village of Red October. On September 27, Soviet troops launched a pre-emptive attack, operating in small infantry groups armed with light machine guns, Molotov cocktails, and anti-tank rifles. Fierce fighting continued from 27 September to 4 October. These were the same Stalingrad city battles, stories about which freeze the blood in the veins even of a person with strong nerves. There were battles not for streets and quarters, sometimes not even for entire houses, but for separate floors and rooms. The guns were fired with direct fire almost at point blank range, an incendiary mixture was used, fire from short distances. Hand-to-hand fights have become commonplace, as in the Middle Ages, when edged weapons ruled the battlefield. In a week of continuous fighting, the Germans advanced 400 meters. Even those who were not intended for this had to fight: builders, soldiers of pontoon units. The Nazis gradually began to run out of steam. The same desperate and bloody battles were in full swing at the Barrikady plant, near the village of Orlovka, on the outskirts of the Silicate plant.

In early October, the territories occupied by the Red Army in Stalingrad were so reduced that they were shot through with machine-gun and artillery fire. Support for the fighting troops was carried out from the opposite bank of the Volga with the help of literally everything that could float: boats, steamers, boats. German aircraft continuously bombed the crossings, making this task even more difficult.

And while the soldiers of the 62nd Army were shackling and grinding the enemy troops in battle, the High Command was already preparing plans for a large offensive operation aimed at destroying the Stalingrad group of Nazis.

"Uranus" and the surrender of Paulus

By the time the Soviet counter-offensive began, in addition to the 6th Army of Paulus, there were also the 2nd Army of von Salmuth, the 4th Panzer Army of Goth, the Italian, Romanian and Hungarian armies near Stalingrad.

November 19 Red Army three fronts launched a large-scale offensive operation, code-named "Uranus". It was opened by about three and a half thousand guns and mortars. The artillery barrage lasted about two hours. Subsequently, it was in memory of this artillery preparation that the day of November 19 became professional holiday artillerymen.

On November 23, the encirclement ring closed around the 6th Army and the main forces of the 4th Panzer Army of Goth. On November 24, about 30 thousand Italians capitulated near the village of Raspopinskaya. By November 24, the territory occupied by the encircled Nazi units covered about 40 kilometers from west to east, and about 80 from north to south. Further "compression" progressed slowly, as the Germans organized a dense defense and clung to literally every piece of land. Paulus insisted on a breakthrough, but Hitler categorically forbade it. He still did not lose hope that he would be able to help the encircled from outside.

The rescue mission was entrusted to Erich von Manstein. Army Group Don, which he commanded, was supposed to release the besieged army of Paulus in December 1942 with a blow from Kotelnikovsky and Tormosin. On December 12, Operation Winter Storm began. Moreover, the Germans did not go on the offensive with full strength - in fact, by the time the offensive began, they were able to put up only one Wehrmacht tank division and a Romanian infantry division. Subsequently, two more incomplete tank divisions and some infantry joined the offensive. On December 19, Manstein's troops clashed with the 2nd Guards Army of Rodion Malinovsky, and by December 25, the "Winter Thunderstorm" died out in the snowy Don steppes. The Germans retreated to their original positions, having suffered heavy losses.

Grouping Paulus was doomed. It seemed that the only person who refused to admit it was Hitler. He was categorically against retreat when it was still possible, and did not want to hear about capitulation when the mousetrap finally and irrevocably slammed shut. Even when the Soviet troops captured the last airfield from which the Luftwaffe aircraft supplied the army (extremely weak and unstable), he continued to demand resistance from Paulus and his people.

On January 10, 1943, the final operation of the Red Army began to eliminate the Stalingrad group of Nazis. It was called "The Ring". On January 9, the day before it began, the Soviet command issued an ultimatum to Friedrich Paulus, demanding to surrender. On the same day, by chance, the commander of the 14th tank corps, General Hube, arrived in the boiler. He conveyed that Hitler demanded that resistance be continued until a new attempt was made to break through the encirclement from the outside. Paulus carried out the order and rejected the ultimatum.

The Germans resisted as best they could. The offensive of the Soviet troops was even stopped from 17 to 22 January. After the regrouping of the Red Army, they again went on the attack and on January 26 the Nazi forces were split into two parts. The northern group was located in the area of ​​the Barrikady plant, and the southern group, in which Paulus himself was, was located in the city center. Paulus' command post was located in the basement of the central department store.

On January 30, 1943, Hitler awarded Friedrich Paulus the rank of field marshal. According to the unwritten Prussian military tradition, field marshals never surrendered. So on the part of the Fuhrer, this was a hint of how the commander of the encircled army should have ended his military career. However, Paulus decided that it is better not to understand some of the hints. On January 31, at noon, Paulus surrendered. It took two more days to liquidate the remnants of the Nazi troops in Stalingrad. On February 2, it was all over. The battle of Stalingrad is over.

About 90 thousand German soldiers and officers were captured. The Germans lost about 800 thousand killed, 160 tanks and about 200 aircraft were captured.

The Battle of Stalingrad is the largest land battle in world history that unfolded between the forces of the USSR and Nazi Germany in the city of Stalingrad (USSR) and its environs during World War II. The bloody battle began on July 17, 1942 and continued until February 2, 1943.

Causes and background of the Battle of Stalingrad

As everyone is well aware, the forces of Nazi Germany launched a massive attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941, and their troops advanced rapidly, defeating units of the regular army of the Union one after another.
After the defeat in the attempt to capture Moscow, Adolf Hitler wished to strike where the Soviet leadership did not expect, this target was the city of Stalingrad. This city was an important strategic point that opened the way to oil deposits, as well as the Volga River, the main water artery of the USSR. Hitler understood that the capture of Stalingrad would be for the Union with a strong blow by industry.
After the defeat of the Red Army offensive near Kharkov in May 1942, the road to Stalingrad was completely open to the Germans. Hitler hoped, by capturing this city, to undermine the morale of the Soviet army and, most importantly, to motivate his regular units, because the city bore the name of the leader of the Soviet Union.

Composition of forces

Before the Battle of Stalingrad itself, the German army had 270 thousand soldiers, more than three thousand guns and almost a thousand tanks. The German army had air support in the form of 1200 aircraft of the latest fighter models.
The number of soldiers of the Red Army before the start of the battle became almost 600 thousand soldiers, but a small amount of equipment, guns and aircraft. The number of aircraft was more than two less, tanks, by about a third.

The course of the Battle of Stalingrad

The Soviet leadership, realizing that the German army would hit Stalingrad, began preparing for the defense of the city. Most of the Union soldiers are new recruits who have never seen combat before. In addition, some parts suffered from the absence or small amount of weapons and ammunition.
The Battle of Stalingrad began on July 17, when the advanced units of the Red Army clashed with the German vanguard. The forward detachments of Soviet soldiers held the defense tightly and the Germans had to use 5 out of 13 divisions in this area in order to break their defense. The Germans managed to break the forward detachments only five days later. Then the German army advanced to the main defensive lines of Stalingrad. Seeing that the Soviet army was desperately defending, Hitler reinforced the Sixth Army even more. large quantity tanks and aircraft.
On July 23 and 25, the forces of the northern and southern groups of the Germans launched a large-scale offensive. The Nazi army, thanks to technology and aviation, successfully pushed through the direction and took up positions in the Golubinsky area, reaching the Don River. As a result of a massive enemy attack, three divisions of the Red Army were surrounded, a catastrophic situation developed. A few days later, the Germans managed to push the Red Army even further - now the defense of the Red Army was located behind the Don. Now the Germans needed to break through the defenses along the river.
More and more German forces were converging near Stalingrad, at the end of July there were already desperate battles for the outskirts of the city. At the same time, an order came from Stalin, which said that Soviet soldiers should stand to death and not give the enemy not a centimeter of land without a fight, and anyone who refuses to fight and runs should be shot without delay in the same place.
Despite the onslaught of the Germans, the soldiers of the Red Army firmly held their positions and the Germans' plan - a swift, massive blow to immediately break into the city, did not work out for them. In connection with such resistance, the German command somewhat reworked the offensive plan, and already on August 19 the offensive began again and this time successfully. The Germans managed to cross the Don and fortify themselves on its right bank. On August 23, Stalingrad was hit by a powerful air strike, the total number of German bomber sorties was about 2 thousand, entire neighborhoods were badly destroyed or completely wiped off the face of the earth.
A massive attack on Stalingrad began on September 13, and as a result, the Germans managed to enter the city for the first time, the Soviet soldiers did not expect such an onslaught and could not resist it, fierce battles ensued for every street and house in the city. In August-September, the Red Army made several attempts to organize a counterattack, but only a few kilometers were able to break through and with very heavy losses.
Before the Germans managed to break into the city, they managed to evacuate only a quarter of the entire population of the city (100 thousand out of 400 thousand). Many women and children remained on the right bank and were forced to help organize the defense of the city. On the day of August 23, the German bombardment claimed the lives of more than 90,000 civilians, a terrible figure paid by a mistake in the evacuation of the city. Terrible fires raged in the city, especially in the central regions, caused by incendiary shells.
A fierce battle was fought for the tractor factory, where tanks were now being built. Right during the battle, the defense and work of the plant did not stop, and the tanks released from the assembly line immediately went into battle. Often even these tanks went into battle without a crew (having only a driver) and without ammunition. And the Germans moved deeper and deeper through the city, but suffered heavy losses from Soviet snipers in assault groups.
From September 13, the Germans continue to advance mercilessly and by the end of the month they completely push back the 62nd Army and capture the river, now it is in full fire for the German troops, and the Soviet army has lost the opportunity to transport its forces without huge losses.
In the city, the Germans could not fully use their ability to interact with different types of troops, so the German infantry was on a par with the Soviet and she had to fight for every room of a residential building without the cover of her powerful tanks, artillery and aircraft. In the fire of Stalingrad, sniper Vasily Zaitsev was born - one of the most productive snipers in history, he has more than 225 soldiers and officers, 11 of them snipers.
While the fighting in the city continued, the Soviet command developed a counteroffensive plan, which was called "Uranus". And when it was ready, the Red Army went on the offensive on November 19. As a result of this attack, the Soviet army managed to surround the 6th army of the Wehrmacht, which interrupted its supply of supplies.
In December, the German army went on a new offensive, but was stopped on December 19 by fresh Soviet forces. Then the offensive of the Red Army resumed with renewed vigor, and a few days later, fresh tank troops were able to break through to a depth of 200 km, the German defense began to burst at the seams. By January 31, the Soviet army during the operation "Ring" managed to divide the 6th army of the Wehrmacht and capture parts of Paulus. It was soon defeated, and the rest of the 6th Army and about 90 thousand soldiers were taken prisoner.
After the surrender of Paulus, almost all parts of the Wehrmacht began to capitulate, and the Soviet army liberated the city and its environs inexorably, although some parts of the Germans were still firmly on the defensive.

Battle results

The Battle of Stalingrad went down in history as the bloodiest battle in the history of mankind. Also, this battle was decisive during the Great patriotic war as well as during World War II. After this victory, the Soviet army continued to advance inexorably along the entire front, and the Germans could not stop this offensive and retreated to Germany.
The Red Army acquired for itself the necessary experience of encircling enemy forces and their subsequent destruction, which later came in very handy during the offensive.
It’s sad to talk about the victims of the Battle of Stalingrad - both the German and the Soviet side lost many of their best parts, the amount of destroyed equipment went off scale, but besides this, German aviation also weakened forever, which later perfectly reflected on the attack of the Soviet army.
The world highly appreciated the victory of the Soviet army. It was also the first time during the Second World War that the German army had suffered such a crushing defeat, and in fact it had won one victory after another before. The world saw that the ingenious tactics of the Germans could crack. The leaders of many states (Churchill, Roosevelt) wrote to Stalin that this victory was simply brilliant.

Few people in our country and in the world will be able to challenge the significance of the victory at Stalingrad. The events that took place between July 17, 1942 and February 2, 1943 gave hope to the peoples who were still under occupation. Next, 10 facts from the history of the Battle of Stalingrad will be given, designed to reflect the severity of the conditions in which the hostilities were fought, and, perhaps, to tell something new that makes you take a different look at this event from the history of World War II.

1. To say that the battle for Stalingrad took place in difficult conditions is like saying nothing. The Soviet troops in this area were in dire need of anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft artillery, and there was also not enough ammunition - some formations simply did not have them. The soldiers got what they needed as best they could, mostly taking it from their dead comrades. There were enough dead Soviet soldiers, since most of the divisions thrown to hold the city, named after the main man in the USSR, consisted either of unfired newcomers who arrived from the Stavka reserve, or of soldiers exhausted in previous battles. This situation was aggravated by the open steppe terrain in which the fighting took place. This factor allowed the enemies to regularly inflict heavy damage on Soviet troops in equipment and people. Young officers, who just yesterday left the walls of military schools, went into battle like ordinary soldiers and died one after another.

2. At the mention of the Battle of Stalingrad, images of street fighting, which are so often shown in documentaries and feature films, pop up in the minds of many. However, few people remember that although the Germans approached the city on August 23, they began the assault only on September 14, and far from the best Paulus divisions participated in the assault. If we develop this idea further, we can come to the conclusion that if the defense of Stalingrad had been concentrated only in the city, it would have fallen, and fallen quite quickly. So what saved the city and held back the enemy onslaught? The answer is continuous counterattacks. Only after repulsing the counterattack of the 1st Guards Army on September 3, the Germans were able to begin preparations for the assault. All offensives by Soviet troops were carried out from the northern direction and did not stop even after the start of the assault. So, on September 18, the Red Army, having received reinforcements, was able to launch another counterattack, because of which the enemy even had to transfer part of the forces from Stalingrad. The next blow was inflicted by the Soviet troops on September 24th. Such countermeasures did not allow the Wehrmacht to concentrate all its forces to attack the city and constantly kept the soldiers on their toes.

If you are wondering why this is so rarely mentioned, then everything is simple. The main task of all these counter-offensives was to reach the connection with the defenders of the city, and it was not possible to fulfill it, while colossal losses were incurred. This can be clearly seen in the fate of the 241st and 167th tank brigades. They had 48 and 50 tanks, respectively, on which they pinned their hopes as the main striking force in the counteroffensive of the 24th Army. On the morning of September 30, during the offensive, the Soviet forces were covered by enemy fire, as a result of which the infantry fell behind the tanks, and both tank brigades hid behind a hill, and a few hours later, radio communications with the vehicles that broke deep into the enemy defenses were lost. By the end of the day, out of 98 vehicles, only four remained in service. Later, two more damaged tanks from these brigades were able to be evacuated from the battlefield. The reasons for this failure, like all the previous ones, were the well-built defense of the Germans and the poor training of the Soviet troops, for whom Stalingrad became a place of baptism of fire. The chief of staff of the Don Front, Major General Malinin himself, said that if he had at least one well-trained infantry regiment, he would march all the way to Stalingrad, and that it’s not the enemy’s artillery that does its job well and presses the soldiers to the ground, but in the fact that at this time they do not rise to the attack. It is for these reasons that most writers and historians of the post-war period were silent about such counterattacks. They did not want to darken the picture of the triumph of the Soviet people, or they were simply afraid that such facts would become an occasion for excessive attention to their person by the regime.

3. The soldiers of the Axis who survived the Battle of Stalingrad, later usually noted that it was a real bloody absurdity. They, being by that time already hardened soldiers in many battles, in Stalingrad felt like rookies who did not know what to do. The Wehrmacht command seems to have been subjected to the same sentiments, since during urban battles it sometimes gave orders to storm very insignificant areas, where sometimes up to several thousand soldiers died. Also, the fate of the Nazis locked in the Stalingrad cauldron was not facilitated by the air supply of troops organized by order of Hitler, since such aircraft were often shot down by Soviet forces, and the cargo that nevertheless reached the addressee sometimes did not satisfy the needs of the soldiers at all. So, for example, the Germans, who were in dire need of provisions and ammunition, received a parcel from the sky, consisting entirely of women's mink coats.

Tired and exhausted, the soldiers at that time could only rely on God, especially since the Octave of Christmas was approaching - one of the main Catholic holidays, which is celebrated from December 25 to January 1. There is a version that it was precisely because of the upcoming holiday that Paulus' army did not leave the encirclement of Soviet troops. Based on the analysis of the letters of the Germans and their allies home, they prepared provisions and gifts for friends and waited for these days as a miracle. There is even evidence that the German command turned to the Soviet generals with a request for a ceasefire on Christmas night. However, the USSR had its own plans, so on Christmas the artillery worked at full strength and made the night of December 24-25 the last in their lives for many German soldiers.

4. On August 30, 1942, a Messerschmitt was shot down over Sarepta. Its pilot, Count Heinrich von Einsiedel, managed to land the plane with the landing gear retracted and was taken prisoner. He was a famous Luftwaffe ace from the squadron JG 3 "Udet" and "part-time" great-grandson " iron chancellor» Otto von Bismarck. Such news, of course, immediately hit the propaganda leaflets, designed to raise the spirit of the Soviet fighters. Einsiedel himself was sent to an officer camp near Moscow, where he soon met with Paulus. Since Heinrich was never an ardent supporter of Hitler's theory of a superior race and purity of blood, he went to war with the belief that the Great Reich was waging war on the Eastern Front not with the Russian nation, but with Bolshevism. However, the captivity forced him to reconsider his views, and in 1944 he became a member of the anti-fascist committee "Free Germany", and then a member of the editorial board of the newspaper of the same name. Bismarck was not the only historical image that the Soviet propaganda machine exploited to boost the morale of soldiers. So, for example, propagandists started a rumor that in the 51st Army there was a detachment of submachine gunners commanded by Senior Lieutenant Alexander Nevsky - not just the full namesake of the prince who defeated the Germans under Lake Peipsi, but also his direct descendant. He was allegedly presented to the Order of the Red Banner, but such a person does not appear on the lists of holders of the Order.

5. During the Battle of Stalingrad, Soviet commanders successfully used psychological pressure on the sore points of enemy soldiers. So, in rare moments, when hostilities subsided in certain areas, propagandists through speakers installed near enemy positions transmitted songs native to the Germans, which were interrupted by reports of breakthroughs by Soviet troops in one or another sector of the front. But the most cruel and therefore the most effective was considered a method called "Timer and Tango" or "Timer Tango". During this attack on the psyche, the Soviet troops transmitted through the loudspeakers the steady beat of a metronome, which, after the seventh stroke, was interrupted by a message in German: "Every seven seconds, one German soldier dies at the front." Then the metronome again counted seven seconds, and the message was repeated. This could go on 10 – 20 times, and then a tango melody sounded over the enemy positions. Therefore, it is not surprising that many of those who were locked in the “boiler”, after several such impacts, fell into hysterics and tried to escape, dooming themselves, and sometimes their colleagues, to certain death.

6. After the completion of the Soviet operation "Ring", 130 thousand enemy soldiers were captured by the Red Army, but only about 5000 returned home after the war. Most of died in the very first year of her stay in captivity from illness and hypothermia, which the prisoners had earned even before the capture. But there was another reason: total number only 110 thousand prisoners turned out to be Germans, all the rest were from among the “Khivi”. They voluntarily went over to the side of the enemy and, according to the calculations of the Wehrmacht, had to faithfully serve Germany in its liberation struggle against Bolshevism. So, for example, one sixth of the total number of soldiers of the 6th army of Paulus (about 52 thousand people) consisted of such volunteers.

After being captured by the Red Army, such people were already considered not as prisoners of war, but as traitors to the motherland, which, according to the law of wartime, is punishable by death. However, there were cases when captured Germans became a kind of "Khivi" for the Red Army. bright volume an example is an incident that occurred in the platoon of Lieutenant Druz. Several of his fighters, who were sent in search of the "language", returned to the trenches with an exhausted and mortally frightened German. It soon became clear that he did not have any valuable information about the actions of the enemy, so he should have been sent to the rear, but due to heavy shelling, this promised losses. Most often, such prisoners were simply disposed of, but luck smiled at this. The fact is that the prisoner before the war worked as a teacher of the German language, therefore, on the personal order of the battalion commander, they saved his life and even put him on allowance, in exchange for the fact that the Fritz would teach German intelligence officers from the battalion. True, according to Nikolai Viktorovich Druz himself, a month later the German was blown up by a German mine, but during this time he more or less taught the soldiers the language of the enemy at an accelerated pace.

7. On February 2, 1943, the last German soldiers laid down their arms in Stalingrad. Field Marshal Paulus himself surrendered even earlier, on January 31. Officially, the place of surrender of the commander of the 6th Army is his headquarters in the basement of a building that was once a department store. However, some researchers do not agree with this and believe that the documents indicate a different place. According to them, the headquarters of the German field marshal was located in the building of the Stalingrad executive committee. But such a "defilement" of the building of Soviet power, apparently, did not suit the ruling regime, and the story was slightly corrected. True or not, perhaps it will never be established, but the theory itself has the right to life, because absolutely everything could happen.

8. On May 2, 1943, thanks to the joint initiative of the leadership of the NKVD and the city authorities, a football match took place at the Stalingrad Azot stadium, which became known as the “match on the ruins of Stalingrad”. The Dynamo team, which was assembled from local players, met on the field with the leading team of the USSR - Spartak Moscow. The friendly match ended with the score 1:0 in favor of Dynamo. Until today, it is not known whether the result was rigged, or whether the defenders of the city, hardened in battle, were simply used to fighting and winning. Be that as it may, the organizers of the match managed to do the most important thing - to unite the inhabitants of the city and give them hope that all the attributes of peaceful life are returning to Stalingrad.

9. On November 29, 1943, Winston Churchill, at a ceremony in honor of the opening of the Tehran Conference, solemnly presented Joseph Stalin with a sword forged by special decree of King George VI of Great Britain. This blade was given as a token of British admiration for the courage shown by the defenders of Stalingrad. Along the entire blade was an inscription in Russian and English: “To the inhabitants of Stalingrad, whose hearts are strong as steel. A gift from King George VI as a token of the great admiration of the entire British people."

The decoration of the sword was made of gold, silver, leather and crystal. It is rightfully considered a masterpiece of modern blacksmithing. Today, any visitor to the Museum of the Battle of Stalingrad in Volgograd can see it. In addition to the original, three copies were also released. One is in the Museum of Swords in London, the second is in the National Museum of Military History in South Africa, and the third is part of the collection of the head of the diplomatic mission of the United States of America in London.

10. An interesting fact is that after the end of the battle, Stalingrad could completely cease to exist. The fact is that in February 1943, almost immediately after the surrender of the Germans, before Soviet government the question arose sharply: is it worth restoring the city, after all, after fierce fighting, Stalingrad lay in ruins? It was cheaper to build new town. Nevertheless, Joseph Stalin insisted on restoration, and the city was resurrected from the ashes. However, the residents themselves say that after that, for a long time, some streets exuded a putrid smell, and Mamayev Kurgan, because of a large number bombs dropped on it for more than two years has not been overgrown with grass.

The significance of the Battle of Stalingrad in history is very great. Just after its completion The Red Army launched a full-scale offensive, which led to the complete expulsion of the enemy from the territory of the USSR, and the allies of the Wehrmacht abandoned their plans ( Turkey and Japan in 1943 planned a full-scale invasion into the territory of the USSR) and realized that it was almost impossible to win the war.

In contact with

The battle of Stalingrad can be briefly described if we consider the most important:

• history of events;
• a general picture of the balance of forces of opponents;
• the course of the defensive operation;
• the course of the offensive operation;
• results.

Brief background

German troops invaded the territory of the USSR and moving fast winter 1941 ended up near Moscow. However, it was during this period of time that the troops of the Red Army launched a counteroffensive.

In early 1942, Hitler's headquarters began to develop plans for the second wave of the offensive. The generals suggested continue the attack on Moscow, but the Fuhrer rejected this plan and proposed an alternative - an attack on Stalingrad (modern Volgograd). The advance to the south had its reasons. In case of luck:

• control over the oil fields of the Caucasus passed into the hands of the Germans;
• Hitler would have gained access to the Volga(which would cut off the European part of the USSR from the Central Asian regions and Transcaucasia).

If the Germans captured Stalingrad, Soviet industry would have suffered serious damage from which it would hardly have recovered.

The plan to capture Stalingrad became even more realistic after the so-called Kharkov catastrophe (the complete encirclement of the Southwestern Front, the loss of Kharkov and Rostov-on-Don, the complete “opening” of the front south of Voronezh).

The offensive began with the defeat of the Bryansk Front and from the positional stop of the German forces on the Voronezh River. At the same time, Hitler could not decide on the 4th Panzer Army.

The transfer of tanks from the Caucasian direction to the Volga and back delayed the start of the Battle of Stalingrad for a whole week, which gave the opportunity for Soviet troops to better prepare for the defense of the city.

balance of power

Before the start of the offensive on Stalingrad, the balance of forces of the opponents looked as follows*:

*calculations taking into account all nearby enemy forces.

Beginning of the battle

The first clash between the troops of the Stalingrad Front and the 6th Army of Paulus took place July 17, 1942.

Attention! Russian historian A. Isaev found evidence in military journals that the first clash occurred a day earlier - on July 16th. One way or another, the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad is the middle of the summer of 1942.

Already to July 22–25 German troops, having broken through the defenses of the Soviet forces, reached the Don, which created a real threat to Stalingrad. By the end of July, the Germans successfully crossed the Don. Further progress was very difficult. Paulus was forced to resort to the help of the allies (Italians, Hungarians, Romanians), who helped to surround the city.

It was at this very difficult time for the southern front that I. Stalin published order number 227, the essence of which was displayed in one brief slogan: “ No step back! He called on the soldiers to increase resistance and prevent the enemy from getting closer to the city.

In August Soviet troops saved three divisions of the 1st Guards Army from complete disaster who entered the battle. They launched a counterattack in a timely manner and slow down the advance of the enemy, thereby frustrating the Fuhrer's plan to rush to Stalingrad.

In September, after certain tactical adjustments, German troops went on the offensive trying to take the city by storm. The Red Army could not resist this onslaught. and was forced to retreat to the city.

Street fighting

August 23, 1942 Luftwaffe forces undertook a powerful pre-assault bombardment of the city. As a result of a massive attack, ¼ of the city's population was destroyed, its center was completely destroyed, and strong fires began. On the same day, shock the grouping of the 6th army reached the northern outskirts of the city. At this moment, the defense of the city was carried out by the militia and the forces of the Stalingrad air defense, despite this, the Germans advanced into the city very slowly and suffered heavy losses.

On September 1, the command of the 62nd army made a decision to force the Volga and entrance to the city. The forcing took place under constant air and artillery shelling. The Soviet command managed to transport 82 thousand soldiers to the city, who in mid-September offered stubborn resistance to the enemy in the city center, a fierce struggle to maintain bridgeheads near the Volga unfolded on Mamaev Kurgan.

The battles in Stalingrad went down in world military history as one of the most brutal. They fought literally for every street and for every house.

The city practically did not use firearms and artillery weapons (because of the fear of rebound), only piercing and cutting, often went hand to hand.

The liberation of Stalingrad was accompanied by a real sniper war (the most famous sniper is V. Zaitsev; he won 11 sniper duels; the story of his exploits still inspires many).

By mid-October, the situation became extremely difficult, as the Germans launched an offensive against the Volga bridgehead. On November 11, Paulus' soldiers managed to reach the Volga. and force the 62nd army to take up a tough defense.

Attention! Most of the civilian population of the city did not have time to evacuate (100 thousand out of 400). As a result, women and children were taken out under shelling across the Volga, but many remained in the city and died (calculations of civilian casualties are still considered inaccurate).

counteroffensive

Such a goal as the liberation of Stalingrad became not only strategic, but also ideological. Neither Stalin nor Hitler wanted to retreat and could not afford defeat. The Soviet command, realizing the complexity of the situation, began to prepare a counteroffensive back in September.

Marshal Eremenko's plan

September 30, 1942 was the Don Front was formed under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky.

He attempted a counter-offensive, which by the beginning of October had completely failed.

At this time, A.I. Eremenko proposes to the Headquarters a plan to encircle the 6th army. The plan was fully approved, received the code name "Uranus".

In the event of its 100% implementation, all enemy forces concentrated in the Stalingrad area would be surrounded.

Attention! A strategic mistake in the implementation of this plan on initial stage was allowed by K.K. Rokossovsky, who tried to take the Orlovsky ledge with the forces of the 1st Guards Army (in which he saw a threat to a future offensive operation). The operation ended in failure. 1st Guards Army was completely disbanded.

Chronology of operations (stages)

Hitler ordered the command of the Luftwaffe to carry out the transfer of goods to the Stalingrad ring in order to prevent the defeat of the German troops. The Germans coped with this task, but the fierce opposition of the Soviet air armies, which launched the "free hunting" regime, led to the fact that the German air traffic with the blockaded troops was interrupted on January 10, just before the start of Operation Ring, which ended the defeat of the German troops at Stalingrad.

Results

In the battle, the following main stages can be distinguished:

• strategic defensive operation (defense of Stalingrad) - from 17.06 to 18.11.1942;
• strategic offensive(liberation of Stalingrad) - from 11/19/42 to 02/02/43.

The Battle of Stalingrad lasted a total of 201 days. It is impossible to say exactly how long the further operation to clean up the city from the Khiva and scattered enemy groups took.

The victory in the battle was reflected both in the state of the fronts and in the geopolitical alignment of forces in the world. The liberation of the city was of great importance. Brief results of the Battle of Stalingrad:

• Soviet troops gained invaluable experience in encircling and destroying the enemy;
• have been established new schemes of military-economic supply of troops;
• Soviet troops actively impeded the advance of German groups in the Caucasus;
• the German command was forced to send additional forces to the implementation of the Eastern Wall project;
• Germany's influence on the allies was greatly weakened, neutral countries began to take the position of not accepting the actions of the Germans;
• The Luftwaffe was severely weakened after attempts to supply the 6th Army;
• Germany suffered significant (partly irreparable) losses.

Losses

Losses were significant for both Germany and the USSR.

The situation with prisoners

At the time of the end of Operation Kotel, 91.5 thousand people were in Soviet captivity, including:

• ordinary soldiers (including Europeans from among the German allies);
• officers (2.5 thousand);
• generals (24).

The German Field Marshal Paulus was also captured.

All prisoners were sent to a specially created camp number 108 near Stalingrad. For 6 years (until 1949) surviving prisoners worked on the construction sites of the city.

Attention! The captured Germans were treated quite humanely. After the first three months, when the death rate among the prisoners reached peak levels, they were all placed in camps near Stalingrad (part of the hospitals). The able-bodied worked a regular working day and received for work wages, which could be spent on food and household items. In 1949, all surviving prisoners, except for war criminals and traitors