Anglo-French diplomacy and Nazi Germany on the eve of the Second World War. Soviet diplomacy during World War II

Anglo-French diplomacy and Nazi Germany on the eve of World War II

Introduction

Chapter 1. The Versailles-Washington system of international relations on the way to the crisis

1 Formation of the Versailles-Washington system; Causes of the crisis

2 The reparations question of Germany in the context of attempts to normalize European international relations

3 Locarno Accords

4 Towards the aggravation of international relations at the turn of the decades

Chapter 2. Anglo-French diplomacy and Nazi Germany in the last pre-war decade

1 The situation in the European diplomatic arena in the early 1930s

2 Growing tensions in Europe with the arrival of the National Socialist Party in Germany

3 Apogee of international tension in 1938

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

Relevance.In Russia, the questions of the origins of the Second World War and historical memory are becoming increasingly heard today. Unfortunately, sometimes there is an impression that this is connected, first of all, with the political situation around the state, and only then we can talk about pure interest in the historical events of that time. This work touches on topics directly related to the political sphere of society. Its time frame refers to the interwar period, which in itself is one of the most remarkable phenomena of the 20th century, although quite short in terms of history. With its help, two, in every sense, completely different worlds are connected - the one that left with the end of the First World War, and the new one, in which the world ended up after the Second World War. The significance of these two and a half decades for historical science, and indeed for all mankind, can hardly be overestimated. This period is replete with bright and controversial events, it attracts with its dynamism and instability. This is the time of revolutions, grandiose economic and political upheavals, and at the same time, the time of the formation of new states, new public sentiments and hopes. The basic or better to say the background idea that accompanied the first half of the interwar period was the idea of ​​maintaining peace, preventing a new war, even when, closer to the middle of the 1930s, the contours of future conflicts and various destructive situations are becoming more and more clearly drawn, this trend still persists. Nevertheless, gradually, they are replaced by one another and various interstate contradictions are growing, which inevitably reflected on international relations.

The diplomatic sphere, better than others, felt the dangerous notes of future problems, already at the time of the creation of a new system of international relations, when a time bomb was laid at its very foundation, which then, coupled with other factors, led the world to the most bloody war in its entire history. history. Frequent attempts by diplomatic departments different countries during the first post-war decade, smoothing out sharp corners was ineffective, and with the advent in the early 30s. The global economic crisis, the contradictions began to heat up with renewed vigor. It is difficult to overestimate the influence of this phenomenon on the relations between countries, and the crisis, of course, also exerted considerable pressure on the internal affairs of states, the consequences of which sometimes, one might say, shocked the world, for example, the coming to power in Germany of the National Socialist Party, in part, associated with the economic problems of the country. In the future, this event will most directly affect the entire international situation in the European region. The relevance of the study also lies in the fact that the use of the complex new literature and source base allows you to effectively and with a greater degree of objectivity reflect real events, opposing the misconceptions and myths that exist to this day about this time. In addition, it is also very important that in the modern international space there are also a number of hotbeds and points of tension, the fight against which is certainly within the scope of consideration by the UN Security Council. As in the past, there is constant debate about what line of conduct in relation to this or that aggressor the world community should follow. It is extremely rare to achieve full agreement and coordination of action, now examples of conflicts in Syria and Ukraine are in sight, so the experience of such work in the past is especially valuable.

Chronological frameworkworks cover the period from the conclusion of the Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919 to the signing of the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR in 1939. powers of the region, determined their global political goals. And it is there that one should look for the origins of the aggravated in the 30s. contradictions. The upper bar was chosen in this way, in view of the fact that this agreement with its entire being followed from the nature of the diplomatic actions of the great powers and Germany and can be considered their natural outcome.

objectThis study is the diplomatic relations of England, France and Germany before the Second World War. Subject:A complex of documents and sources of foreign policy and Great Britain of the French Republic and Germany of the period under review.

aimThis work is the study of the specifics and the study of the results of the diplomatic struggle of Anglo-French and German diplomacy before the Second World War. In accordance with the goal, the work contains the following tasks:

1)To study the initial positions and tasks of the foreign policy of each of the countries;

2)Analyze the available sources related to the field of foreign policy.

3)Research the diplomatic moves of each country;

4)Consider internal and external political factors that influenced the formation of foreign policy;

This issue has been given great attention both in domestic and foreign historiography.Most of the works here can be differentiated into three main groups, firstly, these are monographs and articles on the history and theory of international relations, secondly, studies on the analysis of the history of foreign policy of individual countries, the subject of research of the third group is Germany's bilateral relations with other states . From a huge layer of works related to the history of international relations, we would like to single out the works of a generalizing nature, such as: Systemic History of International Relations, edited by A. D. Bogaturov.

In this work, special attention is paid to the plots of the Versailles settlement, international relations in the zone of the nearest perimeter of Soviet Russia, the eve and the first stage of World War II before the entry of the USSR and the USA into it, as well as the development of the situation in East Asia and the situation in the peripheral zones of the international system., "Diplomacy" by G. Kissinger, which not by chance became a national bestseller in 1994-1995. Echoing the book of the same name by G. Nicholson, the author analyzes the factors that make it possible to assess the strength and durability of a particular world order, starting from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and up to the present day. The reader is presented with a number of politicians "of all times and peoples" - from Richelieu to our contemporaries. Speaking as a participant in many historical events of modern times, the author considers them as milestones in the formation of the so-called "new world order", which is taking shape at the turn of the 20th-21st centuries. "A course of lectures on the history of international relations in 1918-1939." V. N. Gorokhov, this is the result of summarizing many years of experience in lecturing at the Faculty of History of Moscow State University. The advantages of the book include the conciseness of the presentation, the availability of the presentation, the possibility of using it as a teaching aid in preparing for exams. The disadvantages of the book include the absence in the book of references to the literature and sources used, which makes it difficult to identify the original ideas of the author and those that he borrowed from other researchers. The book offers a fairly traditional account of the events of the international political history in terms of political realism and some elements of implicit Marxism-Leninism. In general, the work is a good textbook, but does not pretend to be a monograph. "History of International Relations 1918-1939" by E. di Nolfo, of course, in the framework of the study, we are primarily interested in the first volume. This book is a generalizing survey work on the history of international relations, covering the period from the end of the First World War to the 90s of the XX century. The paper reveals the leading trends in the evolution of the international system, its main nodes and turning points. The book contains not only a narrative of the political and diplomatic history of the chosen period, but also an examination of the economic, financial, military, psychological factors of its development.

The author successfully combines a vivid display of the most significant events with an analytical presentation of his own conceptual approaches to the problems of the history of international relations of the 20th century. "Introduction to the Theory of International Relations" ed.; One of the first general monographs on the history of international relations in the 20-30s, published after 1991, is a four-volume edition prepared by a team of authors edited by A. O. Chubaryan. The authors set themselves the task of presenting the events of the interwar period in a slightly different light, avoiding ideological clichés.; AS Manykina, The manual discusses the basic patterns studied by the theory of international relations. The approaches of the main scientific schools to the key problems of this branch of knowledge are shown. The mechanism of functioning of the system of international relations is analyzed, the factors (ideological, economic, military-strategic) influencing this process are revealed.

Turning to the review of works belonging to the second group, the classification adopted by us, devoted to the analysis of the foreign policy of individual countries, let us pay attention to the monograph by Lemin I.M. devoted to the Foreign Policy of Great Britain7, a number of works on related topics by Trukhanovsky V.G., for example, England at the first stage of the general crisis of capitalism (1918 - 1939).8 This is a monograph that examines the foreign policy of one of the largest imperialist powers in the period between the two world wars. Based on official Soviet and British, German and other public cations and documents, Soviet and foreign memoirs and monographic literature, on the materials of Soviet and foreign frontier printing, the book traces the development over the course of twenty years of Anglo-Soviet relations, the relations of England with Germany, France, Italy and some other European powers, Anglo-American relations, so far called the policy of England in the Near and Far East and in the League of Nations. Or another work by the same author, in which the researcher shows not only the role and place of Eden in English political life, but also reproduces interesting pages in the history of British diplomacy, where Stanley Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, Winston Churchill and many others act alongside Eden. The subject of the author's special attention is Eden's attitude towards the Soviet Union.

Another work by Trukhanovsky, undoubtedly worthy of attention, is a work that tells about the life and work of Winston Churchill, which is shown in close connection with the domestic and foreign policy life of England, as well as with the most important events that took place on the world stage. The reader will get acquainted with a strong, talented and colorful personality, extraordinary both in politics and in private life, I would like to single out the article by I. Yakubovskaya. Extensive material is contained in the work of Z. S. Belousova on French politics, the monograph is devoted to the foreign policy and diplomacy of France in the pre-war decade . At the same time, the main attention is paid to the analysis of the positions of the ruling circles on the problems of European security. The paper shows the reasons why France suffered a major political and diplomatic defeat and found itself on the eve of a military defeat.; Of great value are the articles and dissertation on the problems of French foreign policy by K.A. Malafeev, a very informative article by E.O. Obichkina regarding the dynamics of the development of French diplomacy14. When examining questions of German foreign policy strategy, it is difficult to do without the work of V. N. Dashichev15. If we talk about works published relatively recently, then it is necessary to single out the monograph by A. I. Patrushev on the history of Germany. Let us now turn to a review of foreign historiography on foreign policy issues; In comparison with the domestic one, it is not as widely represented, but nevertheless, it is still worth noting the great importance for labor research, for example, William Shirer.17

We deduced the next group as works on bilateral relations of individual countries. Very strong and useful in this study is the monograph by Borisov Yu. M.K. Simychev analyzes the development of relations between Germany and France, reproducing them against the backdrop of the process of Western European integration. In conclusion to the historiographic review, we note that a characteristic feature of foreign historiography since the post-war period has been reflection on the causes of the war, on missed opportunities, on the criminality of the inaction of the political leaders of Western countries. To this day, both at the level of scientific and historical circles and in general, the public is still arguing about the degree of responsibility of their countries for the onset of the world war, immediately after its end they branded, despised and hung (literally and figuratively) their Chamberlains, Daladiers and Lavals . Over time, there was a change of orientation: historians and publicists began to lean towards looking at the events of the pre-war period not from the height of the historical experience of the Second World War, but through the eyes of political figures who made decisions in the 1930s. and did not know that these decisions were "pre-war". Using new documents, they focus on the variety of different factors that led the countries of Western Europe to move towards a policy of appeasement.

Overview of sources:

The sources that formed the basis of this work are divided into the following groups: these are archival materials, diplomatic and parliamentary documents, publications of speeches by political figures, memoirs, journalism and the press. The first group includes published archival materials of Russia (Foreign Policy Archive - AVP). The second group of sources includes materials that form the basis of almost any work on foreign policy. These are collections of documents, publications of speeches by political figures, transcripts of parliamentary meetings, documents of international conferences and organizations. The main materials on the diplomatic activity of England are presented in the publications published after the war.

British Foreign Policy Documents. This source was taken as a basis by most historians specializing in the history of the interwar period, since it contains a significant number of documents that allow us to analyze not only the foreign policy of England, but also other European states. For the correct use of this publication, it is necessary to take into account a number of its features. First, you need to understand that not all documents of the Foreign Office are presented there. In this regard, the "Documents on British Foreign Policy" should be supplemented by the one implemented in the 1990s. in the United States by the publication "British Documents on Foreign Affairs"21, which presents a number of new sources, including from the Confidential Print (a group of documents sent to a strictly defined number of members of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Foreign Ministry). Secondly, it is very important that the Documents on British Foreign Policy offer a view of international relations from the point of view of the Foreign Office, while, in the early 1920s. its traditional role as the government's chief foreign policy organ was to a large extent called into question by the active intervention of Prime Minister D. Lloyd George. Although the extent of this phenomenon is debated. Thirdly, the work on the Documents on British Foreign Policy was carried out at a time when most of the document flow, especially those related to intelligence activities, remained classified. Excluding this component foreign policy many of the actions of Great Britain on the international scene in the 1920s cannot be fully understood. Diplomatic documents of the 1920s were published, of course, in the USSR, first by the People's Commissariat and then by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition to the “Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR”, which presents a number of materials on the relations of the USSR with Great Britain and France, it is worth highlighting the publication “Locarno Conference” (1959)22 Based on captured German documents, it allows in a number of aspects to supplement the information contained in British and French documents on the subject.

In addition to the above sources, press materials played an important role. The voice of the leading newspapers of Great Britain and France - The Times and Le Tane - was quite significant in the 1920s.

An important source for this study is also the works of contemporaries: political, military-theoretical and journalistic writings written directly in the interwar period, or memoirs compiled later. On the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 D. Lloyd George23. International events of 1922-1923. a series of articles by D. Lloyd George, who had already left the government and tried to prove on the pages of the press the fidelity of the political course pursued by him until then, is devoted. The picture of British foreign policy is perfectly complemented by the memoirs of Winston Churchill, which are distinguished by a very accurate perception of the situation in the international arena24. In many respects, Robert Vansittart was in solidarity with Churchill's position, in 1930-1938. Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs of England. His memoirs and diary entries make it clear that Churchill was by no means alone in his opinion.

Finally, an important group of sources are personal papers, letters and diaries of British and French politicians. It includes the papers of the British Prime Minister S. Baldwin, O. Chamberlain's correspondence with his sisters and other letters, papers of A. Briand, published by his biographer J. Suares26. Such sources give us the opportunity to try to understand some personal experiences, considerations of officials, which could never be expressed officially by them.

The structure of this workdetermined by the subject, purpose and objectives of the study. The work consists of an introduction, two chapters and a conclusion. The introduction reveals the relevance of the issue, establishes the object, subject, purpose and objectives of the study, provides historiographical and source study reviews of the topic.

The first chapter examines the dynamics of the development of the Versailles Washington system of international relations.

The second chapter analyzes the diplomacy of England and France towards Germany during the last decade before the Second World War.

In conclusion, the results of the study are summed up, final conclusions on the topic under consideration are formed.

Chapter 1. The Versailles-Washington system of international relations on the way to the crisis

1.1 Formation of the Versailles-Washington system; Causes of the crisis

Versailles-Washington system of international relations - in historiography, this term refers to a multipolar world order, the foundations of which were laid at the end of the First World War of 1914-1918 by the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, agreements with Germany's allies, as well as agreements concluded at the Washington Conference of 1921- 1922. It took shape in 1919-1922 and was intended to formally consolidate the results of the First World War.

The Versailles component of this system largely depended on the political and military-strategic actions of the victorious states, the key among which, of course, were Great Britain and France. At the same time, one can state a characteristic disregard for the interests of the losing countries and states that have just emerged on the political carriage of Europe (Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia).

The formation of the post-war world order in Europe took place against the background of the revolution in Russia and chaotic events in Eastern Europe. When discussing and drafting the terms of the Versailles Treaty, the leading states pursued various purposes. For France, the primary task was the weakening of Germany, which would allow the final formation of French hegemony in Europe and secure its eastern borders. Great Britain and the United States, on the contrary, were more interested in maintaining the balance of power in Europe, which pushed them to the need to take German interests into account with a greater degree of sensitivity. It is necessary to note the favorable conditions for the use of defeated Germany as a pacifying deterrent and stabilizing factor for the pan-European situation: the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the revolution in Russia, the all-encompassing national revolutionary upsurge and effective Bolshevik propaganda.

The logical outcome, expressed in the Versailles agreements, was the achieved compromises of the extreme positions, mainly, however, at the expense of the vanquished. This, in turn, played a cruel joke on the guarantors of the Versailles-Washington system in the near future. The number of mass communist parties increased sharply, and the direction of Germany's foreign policy acquired a radically revanchist character. At the same time, England and France tried to use the new states that had arisen in Europe, both against the Bolshevik revolution and against German revanchism.

The absence of a coordinated position of Great Britain and France on the issue of the prospects for European equilibrium and the self-withdrawal of the United States from participation in the functioning of the Versailles system, the isolation of Soviet Russia (USSR) and the pronounced anti-German orientation of the Versailles system turned it into an unbalanced and non-universal one, which certainly only undermined the fragile peace and inflamed potential for global geopolitical conflict.

It must be remembered that an integral part of the Versailles Peace Treaty was the Charter of the League of Nations, an intergovernmental organization whose main goals were: the development of cooperation between peoples, the guarantee of peace and security. A noteworthy fact here is that at first the number of countries participating in this organization did not include: the USA, Germany and the USSR. The cornerstone and main idea of ​​the League of Nations was the creation of a system collective security. In a historical retrospective, we clearly see that in practice, these ideas could not be implemented, and in fact in 1939 the League of Nations collapsed, although it officially existed until 1946.

It makes sense to dwell on what served as the foundation of the Versailles-Washington system, and first of all, here we need to recall the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, in which all responsibility for the First World War was assigned to Germany. Even though an armistice with Germany was signed on November 11, 1918, which marked the end of hostilities, a long six-month negotiation process followed in the format of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919-1920. Initially, 70 delegates from 27 countries took part in the talks28. After the defeat, the representatives of Germany, Austria and Hungary were excluded from the negotiations. The Russian delegation was also excluded due to separate peace negotiations with Germany in 1918, during which Germany received a significant part of the territory of the former Russian Empire with rich resources. Until March 1919, a key role in the complex preparations for the almost complete secrecy of the negotiation process, as well as the development of difficult conditions for a peace treaty, was assigned to regular meetings of the so-called "Council of Ten", which included the heads of government and foreign ministers of the five main countries. -winners: Great Britain, France, USA, Italy and Japan. But later this format failed to justify itself and became formal in nature, which did not allow the adoption of any effective solutions. Over time, the representatives of Japan and the foreign ministers of most of the other countries participating in the conference ceased to take part in the main meetings and only representatives of the Big Four remained29. But this was not the last reduction. The final terms of the peace treaty were determined by the leaders of the Big Three: British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau and American President Woodrow Wilson. But here, too, the work went very slowly and protractedly, because the goals of the participants were completely different, as noted above, in the final analysis, this predetermined the fragile nature of the system created. As a result, the process of preparing the text of the peace treaty was called the “unfortunate compromise”30. After numerous consultations, secret meetings, it was finally possible to consolidate the main theses of the peace treaty, which was signed on October 21, 1919 and entered into force on January 10, 1920, after ratification by Germany and the four main allied powers - Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan . Among the signatories of the Versailles Peace Treaty, the United States, Hejaz and Ecuador refused to ratify it. The US Senate refused ratification due to the US unwillingness to commit itself to participation in the League of Nations (where the influence of Great Britain and France prevailed), the charter of which was an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles.

Instead of this treaty, the United States signed a special treaty with Germany on July 21, 1921, almost identical to that of Versailles, but without articles on the League of Nations. An inseparable part of the Treaty of Versailles was the charter of the League of Nations. The question of establishing the League of Nations was important for two other reasons. First, as an international organization, the League could make a practical contribution to regulating international relations and reducing the danger of war. Secondly, it envisaged the inclusion of the United States of America in the circle of global players (although Washington never ratified the peace treaty), and thirdly, its charter was intended to give legal and moral sanction to the policy of the great powers, thereby legalizing it in the eyes of the public. opinions.31 The military control commission formed by the allies did not have the right to independent verification. She had only the right to demand from the German government information about violations. It is clear that such information was hardly amenable to official confirmation or refutation. The commission was dissolved already in 1926, and the revision of Germany's obligations fell to the intelligence services. In this connection, there is nothing surprising that the articles on disarmament were violated in the most flagrant way long before Hitler came to power and his resolute rejection of them.

If we move on to a more detailed description of the content of the sanctions and restrictions imposed on Germany, then it is probably worth starting with the obligation to return Alsace-Lorraine (within the borders of 1870) to France; the transfer to Belgium of the district of Eupen-Malmedy, as well as the so-called neutral and Prussian parts of Morena; Poland - Posen, parts of Pomerania and other territories of West Prussia; Danzig and its district was declared a "free city"; The Memel (Klaipeda) region (Memelland) was transferred to the control of the victorious powers, but only until February 1923, when it was annexed to Lithuania.

A significant part of Schleswig went to Denmark in 1920, part of Upper Silesia in 1921 to Poland, the southern part of East Prussia remained with Germany; Czechoslovakia ceded a small section of Silesian territory - the Gyulchin district. Saar passed for 15 years under the control of the League of Nations, and after 15 years, the fate of the Saar was to be decided by a referendum. The important thing here is that the coal mines were given into the ownership of France. The eastern borders of Poland were established along the line of the Bug River, west of Brest and Grodno, along the line of demarcation known as the Curzon Line.

Under the treaty, Germany recognized and undertook to strictly observe the independence of Austria, and also recognized the full independence of Poland and Czechoslovakia. The entire German part of the left bank of the Rhine and a strip of the right bank 50 km wide were declared demilitarized. As a guarantee of Germany's compliance with Part XIV of the Treaty, the condition of temporary occupation of part of the territory of the Rhine River basin by the Allied forces for 15 years was put forward. Reparations were also a heavy burden: “The Allied and Associated Governments declare, and Germany acknowledges, that Germany and her Allies are responsible for causing all the loss and damage suffered by the Allied and Associated Governments and their citizens in consequence of the war that was forced upon them by the attack of Germany and her allies<...>Germany will produce during 1919 and 1920. and the first four months of 1921, such payments and in such forms (in gold, goods, ships, securities or otherwise) as the Reparation Commission may determine, the equivalent of these payments being 20,000,000,000 (twenty billion) gold marks.”

The nature of the negotiations that took place can be judged by many testimonies. At a meeting on May 7 in Versailles, at which the Allies handed over to the Germans the text of the peace terms, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, answering Clemenceau, stated, among other things, that the main task of Germany is: the restoration of the warring peoples through the international defense of life, health, and the freedom of the working classes. It is in this sense that articles 55 56 of the German draft statute for the League of Nations were drafted. The draft of the labor agreement proposed by the German delegation in its content was very closely in contact with the resolutions of the Berne Conference in February 1919, which we already know, and with the resolutions of the conference in Leeds.

V German project there was also a proposal to convene a special working conference on the working question, which would meet at Versailles simultaneously with the general peace conference. This irritated Clemenceau and he categorically forbade the workers to enter Versailles, citing the fact that a conference in Washington would soon be held with their participation. He responded no less emphatically to all the other points of the above-mentioned German note criticizing the allied plan of the international labor organization. All that the German delegation at Versailles managed to achieve in the field of labor regulations was to make a few editorial corrections, and even then only in the French text, in which a number of grammatical errors were discovered.33

After we have considered one of the components of the Versailles-Washington system, we must also turn to the second, but in this work we will do this in the format of a very small review, because our study is much less concerned with the Washington system of international relations in comparison with Versailles. Let us single out a characteristic, in our opinion, aspect, which, by and large, distinguishes both components of the Versailles-Washington system, namely, some inconsistency and lack of universality. As in the Versailles component, this is partly due to the neglect of the interests of significant regional states on the part of the leaders. This is mainly about not including the USSR and China among the subjects of the system, which were able to become a significant counterbalance to the same Japanese expansionism in cooperation with the United States and Great Britain. Several factors shaking the system converged here at once: the uncertainty of China's political development, the militaristic and aggressive foreign policy of Japan, the isolationism of the United States, in other matters, it cannot be said that these are the only episodes, but undoubtedly the most significant, especially in the context of the events that brought World War II closer.

Thus, Article 19 of the Treaty of Versailles contained the following financial requirements: “Regardless of subsequent demands of the allies, compensation for damages prohibition of the seizure of public valuables that could serve as a guarantee for the reimbursement of the immediate return of the cash of the Belgian National Bank and any documents in securities and money related to the occupied areas of issuance by the ally of the Russian and Romanian gold"34. The Versailles Peace Treaty contained a provision that the complete disarmament of Germany was to be a prerequisite for a general limitation of armaments of all countries. This subsequently gave Berlin a reason to refer to the Allies' failure to fulfill their promises on the general limitation of the armed forces of all nations and, under this pretext, to renounce the military provisions of the treaty.

The past Paris Peace Conference and the Versailles Treaty concluded could solve the problem of only an approximate pan-European vector for the development of international relations, but it is obvious that many more steps and negotiations were required to resolve the entire complex of problems of the post-war world order. The incompleteness of the process of resolving the geopolitical situation predetermined subsequent events and attempts, often futile, to find compromises. Next, we will try to analyze the following events: the Genoa Conference and the Treaty of Rapallo and the Locarno Accords. First of all, we will consider their significance for Germany and for the two flagships of the Versailles system, France and England, their direct role in these processes and the consequences.

1.2 The reparations question of Germany in the context of attempts to normalize European international relations

Despite the fact that when it comes to the problems of relations between the guarantor powers of the Versailles system of international relations (France and Great Britain) with Germany and the USSR in the 1920s, the issues of reparations and recognition or cooperation, respectively, are much more obvious, in this paragraph we take one out of this common problem, and we reduce these issues to the problem of the full integration of the young Soviet state and Germany into the international system which was ruled by England and France at that time. In the following, an attempt will be made to trace how this process took place. It makes no sense to break the chronology of events, therefore, we will start with the Genoa Conference. The subject of this international meeting in the spring of 1922 was economic and financial matters.

When, at the end of 1921, the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, G. V. Chicherin, noted that Russia was ready to become part of the world community on an equal basis, Lloyd George spoke out in support of this idea. During his meeting with French Prime Minister Aristide Briand in January 1922, a program was developed for the future Genoa Conference. The final decision to convene an international conference on economic issues was taken by the Entente countries at a meeting in Cannes on January 6-13, 1922.

At the talks in Cannes, British diplomacy presented a memorandum emphasizing the need to resolve the "Russian question" as a key one in the restoration of Europe. An agreement was reached between Britain and France on a common line of conduct in relation to Soviet Russia. After a detailed discussion, the Council approved the relevant resolution. The Allied Powers recognized that alleviation of the suffering of all peoples is possible only through the restoration of international trade and the development of the natural wealth of all countries, and that the deliverance of Europe from economic paralysis requires the combined efforts of the most powerful countries. They invited to this conference the countries that lost during the First World War, including Germany, as well as Soviet Russia. At the same time, the Supreme Council outlined six conditions, the recognition of which was to contribute to the success of the whole plan:

a) No state has the right to impose on another state a system of property, internal economic life and government.

b) A state that grants credit to another must be sure that the property and rights of its citizens will be protected.

c) “Actual security guarantees cannot be restored until the governments of all states desiring to take advantage of foreign credit declare quite definitely that they recognize all public debts and obligations entered into or may be entered into or guaranteed by the state, municipalities or any other public organizations, as well as the obligation to restore all property belonging to foreigners or compensate them for losses caused to them by confiscation or sequestration of their property, and a system of legislation and court that would impartially protect the rights and obligations arising from commercial and other types of contracts, and would provide their coercive force.

d) The requirement to organize financial and monetary circulation, which ensures the conduct of trade.

e) refraining from propaganda aimed at overthrowing the existing order

f) urged all countries to make a mutual commitment to refrain from attacking their neighbors.

Germany was also invited to Cannes. The Germans decided to continue their game: to tear the Treaty of Versailles piece by piece, using the differences between the allies. To hide the true intentions of their delegation, the German government turned a blind eye to the persecution of Rathenau in the fascist press. They wrote that a new ultimatum awaits Germany in Cannes. With the help of the upcoming conference, Lloyd George intended to raise his prestige and increase the influence of the liberals in the country due to the aggravation of the internal situation caused by the severe economic crisis and catastrophic unemployment. The conference was called upon, at least in part, to contribute to the correction or mitigation of the emerging situation and at the same time to bring Europe out of the crisis, primarily at the expense of Russia.

Lloyd George's plan can be summarized as follows:

During 1922, the Foreign Office received numerous reports of German-Soviet cooperation. At the same time, the British ambassador in Berlin, Lord D. Abernon, based on his communications with the German representatives, assured the British leadership that Germany would not take any steps that might be contrary to British interests in Russia. W. Müller, the British representative in Warsaw, was concerned about the possibility of cooperation between Germany and Soviet Russia. In the context of the signing of the Anglo-French security treaty on the eve of the Genoa Conference, he noted that France was concerned about a possible German-Soviet alliance, which could well have an anti-Polish orientation. Otherwise, she would not have turned to England for security guarantees.

The Genoese Conference was called upon to smooth out the contradictions between France and Great Britain on the issue of reparations and to establish peace in Europe. The conference was expected to bring back to the European system

Germany and Russia, which have been excluded from it since 1918.

One of the key issues at the Genoa Conference was the problem of debt obligations. According to the calculations of foreign economic publications, the amount of public and private debts of Russia amounted to approximately 18.5 billion gold rubles, which was completely unsustainable. K. Radek wrote about this quite convincingly, who noted in 1922: would amount to about 1.2 billion rubles. The tsarist government, with a huge strain on the population's payment forces, was able, on the basis of pre-war production and the pre-war volumes of foreign trade, which had an excess of exports over imports before the war by an average of 366 million a year, to pay interest and repayments of about 400 million rubles. in year. In order to be able to pay the indicated amount of 1.2 billion a year, Russia must not only reach the output of pre-war products by 1927, but also exceed it three times. In turn, the Russian delegation announced its own claims for economic compensation in connection with the damage caused to the country by the intervention and the Civil War. It is noteworthy that the total amount of claims amounted to 50 billion gold rubles, and this is more than two and a half times the amount of claims against Russia.

The current situation has clearly shown that it will not be possible to reach a quick consensus. An important point was the existence of significant disagreements between France and England in the approach to the issue of compensation for nationalized private property. France, supported by Belgium, believed that, since restitution was not considered, an exclusive, full restoration of the rights of the former owners or compensation to the former owners was necessary. England and Italy defended the principle of compensation. All contradictions came, of course, from different economic interests. France was primarily worried about pre-war debts, England - wartime debts, because they could be used to pay off the debt to America. It is precisely this that even caused the fact that Great Britain raised the question of the complete annulment of inter-allied war debts.

At the Genoa Conference, two lines of policy towards Soviet Russia clashed. Lloyd George's policy was to seek an agreement with Soviet Russia. The alternative political line was to isolate Russia, which was mainly done by France. In Paris, they did not believe the Kremlin's disarmament rhetoric. The Germans quite pragmatically perceived the French line at the Genoa Conference, since it essentially repeated the policy of Prime Minister R. Poincaré, who controlled the head of the French delegation of the Minister of Justice and Alsace and Lorraine, L. Barthou. What caused misunderstanding in Germany was the policy of Lloyd George, who, by hook or by crook, tried to avoid contact with representatives of the German delegation. This is explained by the fact that Lloyd tried to maneuver in order to persuade Russia to pay its debts. Western countries and act as the savior of the European economy.

The British Prime Minister relied on a semi-official discussion of the restoration of Europe and Russia with representatives of the Soviet side, but in the company of delegates from France, Belgium and Italy, so that a united front of states against the RSFSR was formed at the negotiations. question. At first, Lloyd George was very calm about the Soviet-German negotiations, seeing them as a means of putting pressure on France. At the same time, he believed that they would be under British control on the basis of those plans for the economic exploitation of Soviet Russia, which he discussed with Walter Rathenau in Cannes.

The complete disinterest of the allies in the needs of Germany provoked the latter to resume the negotiations begun in Berlin with the Soviet delegation. A telegram was sent to Berlin on this occasion:

“The political situation here seems to require the signing of a separate agreement with Russia in order to ensure German rights, which are threatened by the well-known London proposals. The content of the agreement will correspond to the draft kept by Gauschild. All party representatives and experts here are strongly in favor of concluding a treaty in order to avoid isolation.” As a result of Soviet-German negotiations, the Treaty of Rapallo was concluded, which led to an even greater aggravation of Anglo-French contradictions. A similar assessment of the treaty was given by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissingery “because the Western allies predetermined this event by “ostracizing the two largest European powers through the creation of a belt of small, mutually hostile states, as well as through the dismemberment of both Germany and the Soviet Union.” The Treaty of Rapallo meant the end of the international diplomatic isolation of the RSFSR. For Russia, this was the first full-scale treaty and de jure recognition as a state, and for Germany, the first equal treaty after Versailles39. The German armed forces were given the opportunity to train groups of pilots, tankers and chemical weapons specialists, as well as to train their officers in the handling of new weapons, the manufacture and possession of which was forbidden to Germany. The parties mutually renounced claims for reimbursement of military expenses and non-military losses and were able to agree on a format for resolving differences between themselves. The German side recognized the nationalization of German state and private property in the RSFSR and renounced claims arising from a number of measures by the RSFSR or its bodies in relation to German citizens or to their private rights, provided that the government of the RSFSR would not satisfy similar claims of other states. The size of the German share capital nationalized in Soviet Russia was estimated in a memo by G.V. Chicherin dated March 2, 1922 at 378 million rubles40. The contract was concluded without specifying a period. The terms of the treaty took effect immediately. Only paragraph "b" of Art. 1 on the regulation of public and private law relations and Art. 4 on the most favored nation came into force from the moment of ratification.41 On May 16, 1922, by a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Treaty of Rapallo was ratified. On May 29, 1922, the German government put the treaty up for discussion in the Reichstag and on July 4, 1922 it was ratified. The instruments of ratification were exchanged in Berlin on January 31, 1923.

The Treaty of Rapallo was also a challenge to French security policy. For Germany, in turn, there was a very specific threat from Paris. Already on April 24, a week after Rapallo, French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré, in one of his public speeches, directly pointed out the possibility of French military intervention. France has no more time to waste if she wants to occupy the Ruhr. Further actions of Paris were not long in coming. At the end of 1922, the reparations commission noted a reduction in the supply of timber and coal from Germany. And already on January 9, 1923, Poincaré gave orders for the occupation of the Ruhr region - the industrial heart of the country by French and Belgian troops under the formal pretext of ensuring the activities of a control commission specially sent to the region. In fact, the purpose of the action was to be able to exploit the natural wealth of the region. With the occupation of the Ruhr, Germany lost 88% of coal, 48% of iron, 70% of cast iron. Among the Germans, this step caused a storm of protests, while the government called on the population of the occupied region to passive resistance. In the UK and the US, the French demarche was heavily criticized. It was supposed to contain secret articles concerning military cooperation between the two countries. French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré declared shortly after the signing of Rapallo that new Soviet-German relations could threaten Poland in the future and thus create an indirect danger for France as well. The Treaty of Rapallo made it possible to revise the conditions of Versailles in the East by force, and these are precisely the combination of circumstances that the French leadership tried to avoid in every possible way.

The French newspaper Tan recommended concluding an Anglo-French alliance as opposed to the Soviet-German one: "... it is necessary that England and France mutually undertake to act together in case of danger." The Journal de Deba, which expressed the opinion of R. Poincare, called for the exclusion from the conference not only of Germany, but also of Soviet Russia: “Why was the repressive measure applied only to Germany? Why is it not extended to Russia as well, or, better, why, without taking advantage of the opportunity, once the inconsistency of the treaty with the Cannes resolution has been proven, to demand from Chicherin a categorical recognition of the binding nature of the Cannes decisions? If he had refused, the Russian delegation would have been expelled; in other words, let's say, the whole conference would have failed; a result would be achieved, which is now the only desire of France. Other publications also demanded the dissolution of the conference. But at the same time, the press did not detract from the importance and significance of the Rapallo Treaty. The Parisian newspaper Er Nouvel wrote on May 5, 1922: “If Chicherin does not get any loans, he will nevertheless return to Russia with honor and increased prestige. He will have the Treaty of Rapallo to his credit and the significant fact that among European statesmen he set an example of excellent restraint and did not sacrifice anything on the hated altar of capitalism.

The Treaty of Rapallo caused a sharp aggravation of relations between France and England. R. Poincare frightened Europe with the prospect of a military rapprochement between Germany and Soviet Russia, tried to achieve the annulment of the treaty and the dissolution of the Genoa Conference. Lloyd George, in contrast, was in favor of continuing the conference. He sharply responded to R. Poincaré, declaring that it was impossible to keep Russia and Germany in subjection all the time45. Lloyd George accused France of pushing Germany and Soviet Russia into signing the treaty. He was absolutely convinced that if R. Poincaré had not insisted so harshly on the recognition of Russia's pre-war debts and had not refused to discuss the German problem, then there would have been no Rapallo. L. George's dissatisfaction also grew due to the fact that R. Poincaré instructed the delegation to defend their interests in opposition to England. France was unhappy that there were secret negotiations between Germany and England. R. Poincare believed that at these meetings Germany acted as an intermediary between England and Soviet Russia. Subsequently, Lloyd George wrote that the nations met in Genoa to discuss in a friendly atmosphere questions of the economic recovery of Europe. Reparations issues could have been discussed in the same spirit, but this desire was ruined by Germany, which signed an agreement with Russia46. The efforts of the Western democracies to put pressure on Germany and Soviet Russia with the help of economic levers failed, and the exit of the Soviet state from economic and political isolation served as a prologue to a revision of the position of the European powers on this issue and opened the way for the legal recognition of Soviet Russia.

The need to develop a plan was dictated by the crisis of 1923, when after the occupation of the Ruhr region by the Franco-Belgian troops in the Weimar Republic, an attempted coup d'état took place. The United States and Great Britain decide to limit France's ability to resolve the German issue, skillfully taking advantage of its financial dependence on them. In July 1924, the London International Conference was held, where a plan for the financial and economic rehabilitation of Germany was adopted, proposed by a commission of experts headed by the American banker Charles Dawes. Its content provided for a 4-year reduction in reparation rents while maintaining the total amount of reparations48. In the long term, the implementation of annual reparation payments was to be determined, based on the results of an analysis of the solvency of the German government.

Germany received significant financial assistance in the form of loans from the UK and the states, which was supposed to restart the German economy. Great Britain could not remain aloof from this problem, since Germany at that moment played a significant role for it both politically and economically in the context of ensuring the stability of European relations. Let's also not forget that by this time England no longer occupied a leading position in the field of world trade, the more relevant for her was the Anglo-German political and economic cooperation. In September 1928, an ad hoc committee of experts led by the American Owen Young proposed a revision of the plan in order to weaken financial and economic control over Germany. By agreeing to a revision of the Dawes Plan, England hoped to put an end to the payment of reparations to her in goods. British industry suffered from in-kind deliveries.49 The new Labor Party took the line of restoring great power political status to Germany, chiefly by revising the articles of the Treaty of Versailles. In a similar vein, as a process of eliminating the consequences of the war, the new reparation regulation was perceived.

Germany insisted on reducing the size and changing the timing of reparation payments. British Finance Minister Snowden demanded that Germany pay 457 million Reichsmarks to England annually instead of the 409 million planned for payment. Snowden's demands also extended to an additional payment by Germany to Great Britain of 120 million Reichsmarks from the amount of German reparation payments that are not subject to deferral.50At meetings of the financial committee of the conference the British delegation eventually managed to get most of its demands accepted. Snowden achieved the expected increase in England's share of the UK's annual payments. The results of the Hague Conference in 1929 caused a very controversial reaction in Great Britain. On the one hand, these are the doxologies that have become common in the British press and the majority of the Labor Party.

The thesis that reparations and sanctions against Germany should be finally lifted was also habitual for the Labor Party. At the same time, there was a well-founded concern in public opinion about the possible escalation of confrontation with France, which could cause significant damage to the policies of the Labor cabinet and adversely affect the emerging trend of British foreign trade. In the interval between the First and Second sessions of the Hague Conference (August 1929 - January 1930), the British government was seriously concerned about the rejection of the Young Plan and the growing resistance from German nationalist circles. Another unpleasant circumstance for the British Labor leadership was the prospect of changing the reparation amounts paid by Germany. Nevertheless, the British were able to show flexibility and endurance at this difficult moment, and tensions in relations nevertheless decreased.

1.3 Locarno Accords

German diplomacy skillfully used the chance that world public opinion had given her regarding France's actions in the Rhineland. Berlin sought to present itself as a victim of French expansion, meeting the understanding of international political opinion. German representatives began to talk about the need to acquire international guarantees against violation of the Franco-German and German-Belgian borders. September 29, 1924

Germany declares its intention to join the League of Nations and claims to be a permanent member of the Council of the League, and on December 12 declared the demand to eliminate "inequality" in armaments, which followed from the Treaty of Versailles. The actions of the German side were taken with the favorable attention of Great Britain, which considered French ambitions a source of instability in Europe. Germany was looking for ways to free itself from the restrictions of Versailles and sought to achieve better settlements with former adversaries. “In my opinion,” Stresemann wrote in a secret letter to the former German crown prince on September 7, 1925, “before the German foreign policy there are three great tasks: a favorable solution of the reparations question and the maintenance of peace as a prerequisite for the future strengthening of Germany. Secondly, I include here the protection of Germans living abroad, i.e. those 10-12 million compatriots who are currently living in foreign countries under a foreign yoke. The third major task is the correction of the eastern borders, the return of Danzig and the Polish Corridor to Germany and the correction of the borders in Upper Silesia. reparation germany tension europe

In the future, the annexation of German Austria, although I am fully aware that this will not only be beneficial, but also very difficult problem of the German Empire 51 The first serious diplomatic success that shook the Versailles order, as mentioned above, was the treaty with Soviet Russia in Rapallo. The French draft treaty between the powers "having interests on the Rhine" - a Franco-Belgian-British alliance - gave a new opportunity for taking the initiative. Germany tried to prevent the formation of such a tripartite bloc, enlisting serious support from London. “Our political task in the West, designed for a long period, is not to revise the Treaty of Versailles, but to push France into the borders provided for by this treaty, that is, to ensure the security of the Rhine zone,” G. Stresemann noted. The memorandum repeated the main idea of ​​V. Kuno, which boiled down to the fact that “the powers that have interests on the Rhine, namely: France, England, Italy and Germany, would mutually undertake, with the guarantee of the American government, not to wage war against each other during the life of one generation, without having received special powers to do so by means of a plebiscite.

In a further edition, on the advice of Lord d'Abernon, the plebiscite clause was removed and the validity period was not indicated, it was proposed to "specially agree on this." had to be kept secret, he had no intention of entering into negotiations with Germany on a matter that would affect the security of France behind her back, and he referred to this proposal as premature. On January 25, 1925, the German government officially presented its own draft of the Rhine Guarantee Pact. The ensuing diplomatic correspondence and subsequent negotiations took place between Britain, Germany and France. Italy, for which, according to Mussolini, the Rhine border was of no interest, did not participate in them. But in Paris they well understood the logic of the British position and saw elements of the actual blocking of Britain and Germany against France. Therefore, it was beneficial for the French side to involve Italy in the negotiations, counting on its potential disagreements with Germany on the issue of Austro-Italian territorial disputes in the Alps. French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand tried to include Rome in negotiations on European borders. He proposed to conclude a guarantee pact for the eastern and southern borders of Germany with her neighbors with the participation of France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria and Germany itself, with France taking on the role of guarantor of such an agreement. The misunderstanding between the alleged partners in the future pact was palpable. The French wanted, together with the pact, Germany would have signed arbitration agreements with France's eastern allies - Poland and Czechoslovakia, so France saw the creation of such a single guarantee complex.

But Great Britain interfered with such a development of events, because it did not want to "encircle Germany", respectively, the Germans themselves were able to disown the legal consolidation of the inviolability of the borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia. In Berlin, they were not even going to make a secret of the fact that the borders in the east of Europe were not final for them. It can be assumed with a high degree of probability that they were not considered as such in London either. First of all, we could talk about the border of Germany with Poland. The victorious European countries in the First World War tried through agreements to reduce tension in their relations with Germany. On January 10, 1925, the term of the unilateral most favored nation trade regime expired, and it was from that moment that Germany received the right to an independent trade policy, while export-oriented French and British enterprises insisted on easing general tensions, including political ones.

However, the treaty was of paramount importance for Germany. It was necessary to get out of international isolation, continue the revisionist policy and liberate the Rhineland. To achieve this goal, it was even possible to give up claims to Alsace and Lorraine, to compromise on the issue of maintaining the Rhine demilitarized zone and to obey the decisions of the League of Nations on territorial disputes. The military Franco-Polish alliance of 1921, which lost its force with the conclusion of the Locarno agreements, played a significant role. In the event of a conflict between Germany and Poland, and this was by no means ruled out by the head of the diplomatic department, it was extremely important to avoid a war on two fronts. Since the violation of the German-French border automatically led to the intervention of the guarantor countries, France could no longer provide military support to Poland without coming into conflict with Great Britain and Italy. However, the French Foreign Minister, Briand, made an official political gesture by reaffirming allied relations with Poland in a guarantee agreement, also concluded on October 19, 1925. And despite this, it was clear to everyone - the security of Poland was significantly impaired by the new international guarantees issued in relation to the western borders of Germany. All attempts by Poland to neutralize these problems in the system of its security with similar guarantees regarding the eastern borders of Germany, suffered a complete failure due to the timely intervention of the German side.

The wing of the right-wing forces of Germany was negatively inclined towards the idea of ​​concluding the Locarno Treaties due to concessions to Germany, primarily on the issue of western borders. The German National People's Party even withdrew from the government in protest. On November 27, the Locarno Accords were ratified by the Reichstag. The government enlisted the support of the German Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party of Germany and, after signing the treaties, resigned, fulfilling its promise on December 5th. Actually, it must be said that the opposite, left wing, also had an extremely negative attitude towards the Locarno agreements, only the motivation was different, the left did not want the unification of Germany and the capitalist countries of Western Europe against the USSR. The obligations assumed by Germany to recognize the inviolability of the borders did not exclude, as Stresemann, who became German Foreign Minister at the end of 1923, the possibility of revising them through negotiations. Indeed, as soon as the Locarno agreements were signed, Germany immediately began secret negotiations with the Belgian government on the transfer of the cantons of Eupen and Malmedy to it. The Locarno Accords were the logical method for solving the German problem. The method chosen for this, Franco-German reconciliation, was the aim of French policy.

The foreign minister, Briand, sought a Franco-German truce, which he considered the key to European stability. At the first stage of the negotiations, according to archival materials from the French Foreign Ministry, Briand tried to secure borders for Germany's eastern neighbors as well. He decided to resort to the Locarno option only after his idea of ​​guaranteeing borders in the east of Europe met with fierce resistance from Germany, together with Great Britain. Briand's diplomacy after the Locarno period illustrates that he relied little on German condescension and looked for ways to strengthen the military-political alliances of small countries, the next stage of the strategy was to analyze options for approaches to an agreement with Soviet Russia. It cannot be said that the assessments of the Locarno agreements were homogeneous, for example, in France there was a strong point of view of disappointment due to quite painful failures for the country, namely, it failed to achieve the Anglo-American guarantee promised at the time. The French were forced to put up with the fact that in the Locarno Pact, France and Germany were considered as politically equal parties. The guarantors of this pact were Great Britain and Italy, which it patronized. To top it off, neither England nor Italy began to extend their guarantees to the eastern borders of Germany, where France's allies Czechoslovakia and Poland remained. Naturally, French diplomacy could not classify the Locarno agreements as one of its own victories55. The Locarno agreements had a positive impact on the geopolitical situation in Europe by reducing tension and unrest among public opinion. Contemporaries assessed the agreements as "the highest point in the revival of Europe" and as "a watershed between war and peace." The "creators of Locarno" - French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, British Foreign Minister Austin Chamberlain and German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann - were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 192556. However, the fixation of two categories of borders - recognized by Germany and guaranteed by other powers and not recognized by Germany and not guaranteed by other powers - "it was not so much the appeasement of Europe as the definition of the field of new battles."

The Achilles' heel of the Locarno agreements was that they were too narrowly focused, focusing almost exclusively on Franco-German reconciliation. Due to such a bias, they could not become an effective mechanism for ensuring European security. It was already possible to predict that some pockets of instability would most likely be expected from the east of Europe. The Treaty of Locarno was not accompanied by the signing of one or more military conventions, and therefore no specific mechanism for including safeguards against a possible violation of the agreed terms was provided58. In the event of a serious conflict, the guarantor countries were only obliged to enter into negotiations to consider the possibility of taking measures against violators. The level of reliability of such guarantees does not stand up to criticism. Nevertheless, the signing of the agreements created in international relations the phenomenon of the "spirit of Locarno", as an expression of the common desire of European countries for reconciliation and cooperation, which became the main leitmotif of the nature of international relations in the second half of the 20s. It is worth noting that Paris also tried to use the United States to "balance" Germany.

A good example was Briand's initiative in June 1927 to conclude a bilateral "Pact of Eternal Friendship" between France and the United States. As a result, after the negative reaction of Washington to the original French project, which led to the signing of the multilateral and abstract Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 on the rejection of war as a means of national policy. In general, French attempts to deepen cooperation with Germany in the framework of discussions about European integration in the late 1920s. encountered, among other things, the unwillingness of Berlin to excessively spoil relations with Washington. Against the backdrop of various French initiatives, “Stresemann had already made reservations since 1928 about following a political course that could damage the good relations between Germany and the United States - the latter were supposed to play the role of an incentive for economic growth in Germany and help in a favorable solution to the reparations issue”

1.4 Towards the aggravation of international relations at the turn of the decades

A cross-cutting issue of international relations regarding the peaceful 20s. can be considered a disarmament issue. The League of Nations could not remain aloof from the world pacifist movement and made certain efforts to resolve the issue diplomatically. Under its auspices, a preparatory commission was created from representatives of more than 20 countries, which considered numerous projects coming to Geneva, but the diversity of the participants and even, first of all, the incompatibility of their interests, did not allow finding a more or less productive solution to the task. The final result of the activity was a declarative convention on disarmament.

Against this background, the project proposed by French Foreign Minister Briand to US Secretary of State Kellag, about a kind of "eternal friendship" and outlawing war, at first glance seemed much more attractive and effective. The parties to the treaty, who gathered in August 1928 in Paris, actually signed their renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy and declared: “The High Contracting Parties recognize that the settlement or resolution of all disputes or conflicts that may arise between them, of whatever nature or whatever origin they were not, should always be sought only in peaceful means.

On the readiness to resolve disagreements and conflicts, regardless of the nature of their origin, only through diplomatic and exclusively peaceful means. It is not difficult to imagine the excitement that reigned around the Briand-Kellogg Pact, if a year later, when it came into force, 44 states, including Soviet Russia, joined it. But it is important to remember that, strictly speaking, real guarantees of peace were not spelled out in it.

It is no coincidence that this episode of international relations of the 20s. XX century, we complete this analytical review. In addition to the chronological aspect, we are also guided by its exponentiality.

The Briand-Kellogg Pact would like to be called a "reflection" of the diplomatic history of this period. In the political moves of Great Britain, France and Germany with them, one can find many examples of both the high art of negotiation and vague diplomatic steps. It is a catchy fact that barely 10 years have passed since the entry into force of this treaty, when the most terrible war in the history of mankind broke out. In fairness, it is impossible not to note along with the above that one way or another, but the Briand-Kellogg Pact - meant the first step towards creating a system of collective security in Europe. Later, in the 1930s, the geopolitical situation in the international arena would begin to change rather quickly, and steadily slide towards a global military conflict, but the source of all these changes must be sought in the very birth of the Versailles-Washington system. The created order of the world order was based on the results of the First World War. The key roles in determining the conditions for peaceful coexistence were given to the victorious powers - Great Britain and France, and, roughly speaking, Germany was made the only one to blame. On the certain time, as much as possible, she was expelled from the world community. However, this political line quickly proved to be untenable. An unreasonable position from the very beginning and opposing actions over the next decade naturally led to an aggravation of international relations. We note right away that the theses expressed above are absolutely not aimed at blaming the countries-guarantors of the Versailles system for all the ensuing world troubles. The reasons for the marked deterioration in European relations, which ultimately resulted in the Second World War, are, of course, much more and they lie far from only in the diplomatic plane. Some of them will be discussed in more detail in the next part of the work.

Chapter 2. Anglo-French diplomacy and Nazi Germany in the last pre-war decade

2.1 The situation in the European diplomatic arena in the early 30s

In this paragraph, we will try to consider what tasks the Foreign Office faced, what main challenges they faced and how British diplomacy behaved in the international situation of the pre-war decade. Since England was the guarantor of the Versailles system, it would be right to single out the key hotbeds of tension that posed a threat to the system of international relations. One of these centers was undoubtedly the situation in the Far East, in connection with the Japanese aggression against China, but here we can state the practical inaction against the aggressor on the part of the Western powers. One more example of the growing tension must, of course, be cited by Italy's increased predatory activity in Africa. This episode will be considered in more detail below, as it is of greater importance for this study. Let us highlight the general point that here the League of Nations took the path of recognizing Italy as an aggressor and applied a set of economic sanctions against it, but the reaction did not go beyond the economic sphere, so there is no need to talk about the final effectiveness either.

The most striking focus of the world conflict was directly the situation in Europe itself. Where did Nazi Germany embark on the path of absolute disregard for the articles of the Treaty of Versailles, driven, in addition to its new ideology, by the sharpened idea of ​​revanchism. The apotheosis of such a policy of non-intervention was the Munich process of 1938, a catastrophic case of disregard for existing international legislation. In this paragraph, we will approach the analysis of the above events from the perspective of the Foreign Office. And we simply cannot ignore the issue of political development and struggle within it during this period. After the end of the First World War, the British Empire significantly increased its capabilities, gaining control of more than half of the territories mandated by the League of Nations. As the leaders of the British diplomatic department noted, England got everything she wanted, and now "the only goal is to keep what we have and live in peace"61. This thesis formed the basis of the British foreign policy doctrine of the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s. However, the opinions of politicians on the priority of tasks, forces and means that should have been used for their implementation did not always coincide. British politicians throughout the 20-30s tried to build their political course in a balancing mode between, on the one hand, maintaining the unity of the complex organism of the Commonwealth of Nations, which united the metropolis, colonies and mandated territories. This can be illustrated by the Westminster Status of 1931, where the following specifics of the mutual statuses of the mother country and dominions were fixed: “in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their internal and external affairs, although they were united by common citizenship to the crown and freely united as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations". On the other hand, official London, while declaring its adherence to the former unity, actually cared about strengthening its own positions. At the same time, it is believed that by the beginning of the 30s. The British Empire as a single organism has actually ceased to exist.

Faced with the need to solve various foreign policy tasks in parallel, the British were forced to link them together. Until the beginning of the decade, the British ruling circles did not see a direct threat to England from the continent, and for their part tried to avoid this, especially in Europe.

At the session of the League of Nations in 1935, S. Baldwin, speaking, drew attention to the danger for the world community of any European conflict, which can be interpreted as the realization by British politicians of the need to maintain global peace and prevent the emergence of a new conflict64. According to the English historian E. Ranson, the formation of the British foreign policy concept was greatly influenced by:

"the bitter memory of the First World War, with its terrible lists of casualties, and the conviction that the pre-war negotiations with France had drawn Britain into a war that was not at all in her interests"65.

The guarantor powers were given the responsibility of pursuing a more far-sighted policy. Here we consider it necessary to refer to the position of the future Prime Minister of England, W. Churchill, who noted the particular importance of actions with the aim of: “... to reconcile the defeated people with their fate, helping the defeated country achieve maximum prosperity with their benevolent actions, and also to strive by all means to lay the foundation of true friendship and community of interests, so that there is less and less incentive to resort to force of arms again. Alas, as we all know, the efforts made by Great Britain in this direction were not enough to extinguish the revanchist fervor of the Germans.

In the early spring of 1930, the attention of British diplomacy was riveted to the situation in the highest political circles of Germany on the question of the likely refusal of the Reichstag to ratify the German-Polish liquidation agreement. Such attention is due to the fact that, in fact, the refusal of the Reichstag to ratify went against the interests of international capital in resolving acute financial disputes among European countries after they approved the Young Plan. Although the British government was well aware that the ratification of the treaty does not give them any special advantages in terms of influence on the contracting countries. The British leadership was aware that France was, of course, a serious barrier for Germany in resolving the issue of the eastern border. British diplomats repeatedly analyzed the situation in order to identify various possibilities for any compromises between Germany and France, but did not see the possibility of achieving them until the French side agreed to meet the German demands regarding the Polish side. According to the head of the Central European Department of the Foreign Office, O. Sargent, the issue of the German eastern border is assessed as the main task of Germany's foreign policy for the near future, the only controversial issue here was whether Germany would agree to cede its demands to Poland, in the event of a decision questions of reparations and evacuation of the Rhineland. The risk of an undesirable reaction from France in the event of the ratification of the liquidation agreement in the German Reichstag was much higher in comparison with the revealed facts of Germany's violation of the military restrictions established by the Versailles Peace Treaty: in particular, it was about subsidizing and building "pocket" cruisers (three German warships : "Lützow", "Admiral Scheer" and "Admiral Spee"). After the London Conference on Naval Armaments, the actual superiority of the United States over Great Britain was revealed, and in this context, the latter especially did not want to strengthen the French positions on the European continent.

After the conclusion of the London Naval Conference, Great Britain assumed the role of an intermediary in the negotiations between France and Italy, which resolved issues of naval construction; Such a position gave solid grounds for the British leadership to count on a favorable outcome of the negotiations. During this process, official London often and skillfully used the facts of subsidizing and building "pocket" cruisers in Germany to put pressure on France. Due to the growing global economic crisis and the customs war between the leading capitalist countries, the governments of European states resorted to various developments of projects for reformatting economic rules on the continent, for example, on May 17, 1930, France promulgated a memorandum on the organization of a European federal union.

Acceptance of the plan by Germany would mean an obvious rapprochement between the two leading continental powers. And although in Forinoffis, a Franco-German rapprochement was not considered very likely, in order to have a more serious confidence in this, it was necessary to find a solution to the question of Germany's eastern border in favor of the latter69. At this time, there is a possibility that the German side will be interested in revising the Young Plan. The seriousness of the situation is most clearly manifested at a meeting of the leadership of the National People's Party of Germany with the Minister of Finance W. Dietrich on September 11, where he, according to G. Rembold, denied the rumors that had spread on this topic, but at the same time noted that "in The Hague, since the Versailles peace treaty, obvious progress" in the issue of granting Germany equal rights with the European powers. Great Britain had to be more attentive to the internal political development of Germany, because, immediately after the success of the Nazis, rumors began to be heard in the German ruling circles about the possible beneficial cooperation of the ruling cabinet of G. Brüning with the leaders of the NSDAP. The results of the elections to the Reichstag caused a great resonance in the British press. The Daily Herald saw them as an obvious, widespread rebellion against democratic institutions. As a tool for resolving probable conflict situations in the future, the Foreign affairs magazine offered Germany, in exchange for territorial concessions made to it by Poland, "the guarantee of its eastern border from encroachments by the USSR"

In the new year, 1931, the question of the growing tension in German-Polish relations was raised more and more often at meetings of officials and representatives of the business circles of England and Germany. On January 17, 1931, during a meeting in Berlin with the British Foreign Minister J. Curtius, he raised the issue of the situation of the German minority in Upper Silesia, emphasizing at the same time that at the moment there was no desire to start discussing the revision of the borders. This could only mean that the possibility of discussing this topic in the future71 was allowed. A few days earlier, the British diplomatic department became aware that concessions regarding the Polish Corridor in favor of Germany were considered by official representatives of the German side, on the issue of disarmament, which was a key one for the Foreign Office. On March 24-25, 1931, the National Security Conference was held in London.

The agenda was aimed entirely at resolving the issue of relations between Germany and Poland, first of all, the issue of the possibility of changing the eastern border of Germany, the likelihood of a military clash between the two states was considered. The weak productivity of the political steps taken by the British diplomatic department in the direction of mediation in European relations can be clearly seen against the backdrop of the financial and economic crisis in the summer of 1931. The difficult situation in Germany forced the Western countries to look for ways to resolve this impasse in the shortest possible time. England's intention to formulate preliminary conditions so that the reparation obligations at the London Conference convened in July 1931 could not be realized due to the sharply opposed position of France and the United States, so the issue of revising the borders temporarily faded into the background.

2.2 Growing tensions in Europe with the rise of the National Socialist Party in Germany

With the coming to power of the Nazi Party in Germany, foreign policy acquired a completely different character. Aggressive tasks came to the fore, which were detailed in Hitler's Mein Kampf. Basically they boiled down to the following:

1)predatory war against the USSR;

2)the defeat of France;

)the defeat of the British Empire and the small states in Europe.

Preparation was necessary to carry out these tasks. Therefore, the foreign policy program of the NSDAP proceeded from the need for a gradual progress towards both final and intermediate goals. "In the pre-war foreign policy of fascist Germany, three stages can be distinguished, the implementation of which should have preceded the transition to an open struggle for dominance in Europe."

The first stage, 1933 - 1935: the internal consolidation of the regime, the buildup of armaments, the strengthening of foreign policy positions by destroying the existing balance of power in Europe.

The second stage, 1935 - 1937: the transition to an open arms race, the rejection of the territorial establishments of the Treaty of Versailles, actions to escalate international tension (intervention in the civil war in Spain, the creation of a political bloc Berlin - Rome - Tokyo).

The third stage, 1938 - 1939: the transition to aggressive actions in Europe, the seizure of the territories of sovereign states, forced military-economic, ideological and political-diplomatic preparations for war.

It is clear that in order to achieve such ambitious foreign policy goals, colossal diplomatic preparation was needed, here is the need to search for allies, and destabilize the European security system and, of course, prevent potential enemies and victims from exposing their strategic plans. The Hitlerite government camouflaged its aggressive actions with the demands of revising Versailles and granting Germany equality with other powers in the matter of armaments. Another characteristic feature of his speeches was the emphasized anti-Soviet orientation of foreign policy.

In October 1933, at the ongoing Geneva Conference, the British side put forward a new plan for French arms control in Germany, which already took into account the interests of the French side to a greater extent. After that, the German delegation leaves Geneva and a little later Germany leaves the League of Nations. The main task remains the question of the possibility of legal weapons. On November 24, 1933, the French ambassador in Berlin, François-Ponce, held a meeting with Hitler, who announced that Germany would come to an agreement with France on "arms limitation". In reality, Germany sought sanctions from the Western powers, and primarily from France, to increase the number of the Reichswehr to 300 thousand people and to reduce the term of service in it. On December 11, another meeting between Hitler and François-Poncet took place, where the German leader demanded not only the full approval of German weapons, but also the immediate transfer of the Saarland to Germany. There is a strong opinion that “the French government did not actively resist such demands. But let's make a reservation right away that it certainly was not about the transfer of the Saar region, in this matter France was not going to concede to Germany without a plebiscite provided for in the Treaty of Versailles. At that time, this demand remained unsatisfied, and of course, the French presented their response somehow: a guarantee of the inviolability of the Franco-German border, adherence to the Locarno agreements.

Strengthening of German revanchism, aggressive foreign policy could not but disturb France. By this point, they could no longer count on all those allies that supported them during the First World War. The republic tried to defend its positions by creating a system of alliances with small countries like Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia. But the reliability of such alliances was highly doubtful, especially in view of the ever-increasing power of Germany. Relations with Soviet Russia become strategically important at this moment for France. In the spring of 1930, the USSR and France began negotiations on a non-aggression pact and a temporary trade agreement. The first step here was, based on reciprocity, the abolition of discriminatory measures of a trade and economic nature, and then on August 10, 1931, they initialed the text of the pact. However, for Paris it was important to close the Soviet-French relations on the relations of the USSR with the French allies. In this connection, France actively stood on the need to conclude a Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact without fail, before signing the Soviet-French one. In the context of the Soviet-French negotiations, the USSR signed non-aggression pacts with Finland (January 21, 1931), Latvia (February 5, 1931), Estonia (May 4, 1932). The Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact was concluded on July 25, 1932, and the Soviet-French one on November 29, 1932.

With regard to France, German diplomacy tried to convince Paris that the only difference in relations between these countries was the issue of the Saar region. Taking into account the fact that by 1933, France is a country with one of the most powerful military potentials in Western Europe, the Nazi leadership intended to impose an unfavorable arms agreement on the French, and carried out activities aimed at destroying the system of alliances. In Paris in 1934, the intelligence officer Otto Abets was sent, who was able to organize the Franco-German Committee, which became the Nazis' springboard in Paris. The activities of the German agents were very effective. The proof is that at the beginning of 1935 France compromised with Germany on many issues. However, even the accession of the Saar region to the Germans did not give the French guarantees of reconciliation with the Reich. The geopolitical position of France was also complicated by the fact that this position on smoothing out sharp corners in relations with Germany was realized more and more due to the neglect of the interests of the allies in the Little Entente. Plus, Poland was increasingly drawn into the sphere of influence of Germany. Undermining security was the so-called "Pact of Accord and Cooperation", or "Pact of Four", signed by representatives of the four powers of England, France, Germany and Italy on July 15, 1933. The parties to the agreement undertook to harmonize their foreign policy, to revise the peace treaties, to recognize the equality of the armed forces of the parties to the pact, that is, first of all, to actually approve the rearmament of Germany.

“The danger of the four-power pact was that it could give reason to believe that we are neglecting Russia and are going to untie Germany’s hands in the East,” wrote General Gamelin, chief of the French general staff. general sound like a prophecy, the pact was indeed perceived as a direct threat to the USSR. At that moment, this agreement failed, due to its sharp rejection by public opinion in France and the countries of the Little Entente. This pact is also interesting to consider from the standpoint of Great Britain. British politicians, regardless of party affiliation, noted with concern the extreme inefficiency of the functioning of the disarmament conference and the rapid weakening of the League of Nations in the issue of control over aggressors. Therefore, to a certain extent, they were ready to revise the Versailles system for the sake of stabilizing European international relations. And just from here we come to an attempt to conclude a pact of four. In addition to the fact that the negotiations revealed the difference in the methods and motives of the leading European powers, they also illustrated the readiness of B. Mussolini to make significant efforts to ensure Italian interests in the Danube basin, in the Balkans, and also in Africa. Such a firm position of Benito allowed the British to see him as a possible ally in the problem of confronting the growing German revanchism. The danger of a close rapprochement between the two dictatorial regimes, if visible, is not yet very clear.

Separately, I would like to single out the Abessinian crisis, which became a serious test for a kind of alliance of great powers, moreover, it can be stated that it had a certain impact on the further development of international relations.

The Italo-Ethiopian military conflict that flared up in early October 1935 became the basis for formalizing the foreign policy of S. Baldwin's cabinet. And the League of Nations itself has become a platform for diplomatic struggle. The convened special assembly of the League of Nations went to implement the economic sanctions provided for by the charter against Italy. Against this background, the rapprochement between England and France was very successful. Hitler took this with all seriousness, in his understanding, all this meant the possibility of the transition of the Western powers to decisively counteract the hotbeds of tension, and this seriously complicated the plans of the Third Reich, if not to say that it nullified them, here, of course, we are talking in the first place about the remilitarization of the Rhine zone and the creation of a military-political bridgehead near the Franco-Belgian border. In this regard, Germany behaved very actively in an effort to support Italy, trying to prevent its isolation. But since Germany was not a member of the League of Nations, she was naturally deprived of legal and effective opportunities to put pressure on the Western powers. Therefore, all vigorous activity did not go beyond diplomatic demarches and threats, such as the threat of the fall of the existing regime and the establishment of "communism" in Italy. It should be noted that the further policy of the British and French governments was dictated not so much by the intention to assist Mussolini in winning glory for Italian fascism. A more realistic assessment of the possibilities of economic sanctions has been a key driving force. Both Great Britain and France were aware that the effectiveness of economic measures could only be affected if an absolutely complete embargo was introduced, for a long time, and this required a comprehensive economic blockade, which was impossible, if only because the United States opposed it. because it was against their economic interests.

America during the hostilities in Ethiopia significantly increased the volume of oil sales to Italy. Great Britain faced a difficult problem, on the one hand, the public, forcing them to act in line with the League of Nations, along the path of pacifying Italy, on the other hand, such behavior in the external arena would certainly bring closer the folding of the Rome-Berlin axis, and in other words, the rapprochement of dictatorial regimes. Under the circumstances, S. Baldwin considered the most profitable option - to join the French foreign policy line pursued by P. Laval, who in January 1935 became Prime Minister of the Third Republic. He sought to secure peace for France through a direct agreement with Hitler's Germany, the fallback was, accordingly, an agreement with Italy. The British leadership knew about this intention, and was somewhat concerned about it. However, as mentioned above, this tactic, the essence of which boiled down to - satisfaction of the colonial claims of Italy, looked acceptable for British diplomacy. These actions were intended to prevent the rapprochement between Italy and Germany, and then to bring Italy into the sphere of British diplomatic influence in Europe.

Further, France takes over the leadership in this diplomatic party. B. Mussolini made clear his willingness to cooperate by taking part in the Stresa conference held in April 1935, where he joined the condemnation of Germany, which freed his hands in Ethiopia. In addition to this, P. Laval assured that the issue of Italian immigrants in French Tunisia will be resolved. Promising to simultaneously resolve the issue of the status of Italian settlers

Great Britain, of course, also did not stand aside, on the initiative coming from the Assistant Deputy Foreign Minister and at the same time the head of the Prime Minister's personal secretariat, Robert Vansittart, the "Abyssinian problem" was discussed only at the unofficial part of the Stresa conference. Moreover, the first secretary of the British Foreign Ministry, H. Thompson, warned the head of the African department of the Italian Foreign Ministry that: "Italy cannot hope to cooperate with the United Kingdom in the event of an attack against Ethiopia."

However, it was too early to put an end to this issue. The head of British diplomacy, S. Hoare, under the pretext of a vacation, arrived in Paris in early December 1935, where tripartite negotiations were held with Laval and Mussolini (with the latter contact was maintained by direct telephone). . received the name in historiography: "the Hoare-Laval plan." The essence of the plan was that the military conflict was to be extinguished by concessions to Italy at the expense of the national interests of Ethiopia, which was to transfer the lion's share of non-Amharic lands under the mandate of Italy and renounce claims to territories that have been in direct Italian possession since 1896 .. For all this, Ethiopia was left with only a narrow passage to the sea through the territory of Somalia, controlled by Italy.

The example of the Abessinian crisis clearly shows the exceptional degree of flexibility that British diplomacy had to act with. Looking globally, it becomes clear that, first of all, Great Britain sought to prevent the weakening of the League of Nations, and that is why the sanctions method against Italy was not productive, since, according to the conservatives, Mussolini could follow the example of Germany and leave the League. And the preservation of the strength of this organization was considered by the British primarily in the wake of their influence on European politics, especially the ability to influence France and the USSR.

At a time when the representatives of England, France and Italy had already reached certain agreements, in France, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alexi Leger, resorting to various information channels of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, went to disavow Laval’s actions, and on December 9, the “Hore-Laval plan” developed in secret became public knowledge. It was published by French newspapers, and the level of length and accuracy of information can be judged by the fact that it even contained maps of the partition of Ethiopia. It is impossible in this case to avoid explaining such radical actions of the secretary. The motivation is not hard to find in his views, Leger was an inveterate representative of the French colonial circles. He saw French foreign policy in line with the issues of the Asian region, and it is quite natural that such actions of the Prime Minister were unacceptable for him.

Public opinion, from the exposure of the treaty, both in France and in England, was extremely negative. Opposition attacks on the government began in the British Parliament: the parliamentarians were outraged by the actions of the Conservative minister. There was a direct threat to the Baldwin cabinet, in connection with which, he did not lobby for the Hoare-Laval agreement, even though it was generally supported by the cabinet at the meetings of December 9, 10 and 11, 1935.

On the same month, S. Baldwin made a statement that the moral position of the government in the face of the public is paramount, in passing comparing the prime minister with an anchor holding the ship of the nation from imminent death. Further actions were the recognition of the agreement as "absolutely dead" and the subsequent resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Turning more thoroughly to the analysis of the diplomatic actions of Great Britain in these years, I would like to consider the following. The British leadership at that time preferred to level the contradictions with the fascist states through various agreements, which often caused both the Versailles system and third countries to suffer. Already at an early stage of fascist expansion, the British government made efforts to reach a similar agreement with Mussolini and Hitler. However, as The Times wrote in October 1935, by the summer-autumn of that year, the opinion of the British in relation to the fascist regimes had changed significantly and acquired a persistently negative connotation78. Public opinion in Britain initially held great differences between the Fascist regime in Italy and Germany. Italian fascism was generally assessed positively, was considered "an Italian regime for Italians." This opinion prevailed in British political circles until the end of 1933.79 The dispatch of Italian armed forces to the Austrian border in 1934 made it possible to avoid the Anschluss, and the British got a reason to be convinced of the discrepancy between the interests and goals of the German and Italian leaders. However, the Italian attack on Abyssinia in 1935 radically changed the perception of the Duce regime by British society and politicians, and 1935-1936. became a milestone in the development of both the domestic and foreign policy of the ruling groups in England. During these years, the fundamental change in the balance of power in Europe, which followed the Nazi coup in Germany, became obvious to the British. The subcommittee on defense needs of the Imperial Defense Committee, formed in 1933, submitted a report to the British government in March 1934, which stated, in addition to the fact that Japan was the main security threat to England, it was also that Germany was perceived by experts as: “... the main and a very dangerous potential adversary against whom our long-term defense policy must be directed.

The external situation was not unequivocally perceived by the Conservative Party itself. There was a group of old politicians, led by S. Baldwin and the "Birminghamites" - the brothers Austin and Nevil Chamberlain, who could not part with the outdated ossified view of Europe in the 1920s. They saw a powerful empire with serious finances and leadership in the League of Nations, so it was quite logical for them to count on the possibility of reaching a compromise resolution of issues through some concessions in favor of the German side. They were opposed by the so-called "internal opposition", whose leader was W. Churchill, and L. Emery's group gravitating towards him. These politicians, who also formed their assessments of the European situation through the position of the Empire as a whole, saw the key to the security of Great Britain in the revival of the Entente. They argued the need for rapprochement with France by the requirements of protecting the mother country, which in the new situation becomes the rear of the Empire, and adhered to a "hard" course towards Germany. It was also obvious to everyone that in any case it was necessary to avoid a war on two fronts against Japan and Germany. Analyzing the alignment of possible Anglo-German negotiations, the British leadership naturally came to the issue of armaments, considering this aspect just as a possible concession to Germany. For example, the option of legalizing the achieved volume of German weapons, because, as we remember at that time, the actions of the young Third Reich in this area were illegal. For this, one could demand a return to the League of Nations.83 But in March 1935, a stunning event took place in England - the termination by Hitler of the restrictive articles of the Treaty of Versailles, from that moment on, the policy of "appeasement" had only one tool left, it was carried out directly at the expense of territories in Europe.

It was necessary to somehow respond to such a turn of events and, moreover, as quickly as possible. At the end of March 1935, Foreign Minister J. Simon and Minister without Portfolio A. Eden arrived in Berlin, where they tried to find a compromise solution to the problem - the conclusion of an air pact. To which Hitler replied that German aviation had already achieved equality with England, which the British delegation was also, to put it mildly, very surprised.

The possibility of finding a consensus with Hitler was exhausted, which led to the search for building bridges with Poland and a preliminary analysis of the position of Soviet Russia. The answer of the latter, which stated that the USSR intended: "...to live with Germany on friendly terms"86, could not satisfy Great Britain at all. From these events comes the idea of ​​the revival of the Anglo-French Entente, which had a fairly broad support in the French government circles. Started in February 1935 and continued in April of the same year, the Anglo-French negotiations, in which Italy was involved as one of the Locarno guarantors, were aimed at strengthening the Anglo-French-Italian foundation of the Locarno treaty complex. The result was the speech of these countries with the condemnation of the termination by the Nazis of the military-political restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, which meant the beginning of the path to the consolidation of the forces of the Western powers.

Before Great Britain the question of rearmament was sharply raised, but it was far from being so obvious to the masses, seized at that time by the ideas of pacifism. In one of his speeches in the autumn of 1935 A. Eden said:

“We all live in an era when nations will try to understand each other. Only through the League of Nations can we hope to create a new order in which no country, even for a moment, will think of resorting to war as an instrument of national policy. We are ready at all times to play our part in maintaining peace.” In these words of A. Eden, (at that time the Lord of the Press) was, in fact, formulated the basis of the foreign policy program that the conservatives proposed to the voters and thanks to which they won. In the future, the Conservatives can sometimes be reproached for using the mood of the British public as an excuse for a foreign policy line aimed at "appeasement".

With the advent of the new head of the British cabinet, Stanley Baldwin, a course was set for political balancing, or, one might say more roughly, adaptation to the foreign policy circumstances in which the British conservative cabinet had to act. This is expressed in a rather capacious formula, formulated by Baldwin himself: "politics cannot be made, but it must be allowed to develop itself" and "the main duty of the government is to remain in power."

It was important for Great Britain to prevent the annexation of Austria to Germany, since the implementation of this German plan would open the way for other aggressive actions of the Nazis. However, British diplomacy was clearly not enough to prevent the Anschluss. In this situation, Italy loomed favorably, the leader of which sought to prevent the growth of the positions of Nazism in Austria and in every possible way demonstrated his readiness to defend its independence. However, everything turned out to be not so rosy, an attempted coup d'état took place in Austria, because of which Chancellor E. Dollfuss was killed, this even more heated the atmosphere and at the same time demonstrated Italy's inability to act according to its assurances. This situation arose due to the fact that the Duce expected that England and France, as guarantor countries, would support his intention to defend Austria, but they did not do this, and there were no other opportunities to influence the situation in essence. In order to effectively guarantee the borders of Austria and other states of the Danube-Balkan region, it was necessary to expand the base of cooperation between the three powers. On July 31, 1934, the Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A. Leger, proposed the creation of a tripartite commission in Rome to consolidate actions in the event of threats to the independence of Austria.

Suddenly, in early autumn, Britain refuses to participate in any guarantee regarding Austria. This step can be explained by the fact that the government of R. Macdonald was a coalition, that is, the domestic political situation was not simple, the British had no desire to take on obligations that went beyond the League of Nations. Against this background, the French side also decided not to take part in agreements outside the League of Nations and without allies in the Little Entente. From February 1 to February 3, 1935, a Franco-British agreement was drawn up in London on the accession of Great Britain to consultations on the Austrian question. The terms of the declaration of 11 December 1932 were reaffirmed, and a wording about the refusal to unilaterally revise disarmament obligations was added separately. The agreement approved the principle of collective security and non-interference in the internal affairs of the states of Central Europe, and allowed Germany to return to the League of Nations. On March 16, 1935, Hitler decided to openly violate the military articles of the Treaty of Versailles by reintroducing universal military service. The French immediately appealed to the League of Nations. On March 25-26, J. Simon and A. Eden were in Berlin, who tried to regulate relations with Germany based on five provisions: disarmament, Germany's return to the League of Nations, the Danube Pact, the Eastern Pact ("Eastern Locarno"), the Pact on military air force but these negotiations came to nothing. Mussolini was very worried about the plans of the German command, so he turned to Great Britain and France with a proposal to create another agreement in order to control the unilateral arming of Germany, at the same time guarantee the independence of Austria and prevent remilitarization

Rhine zone. This proposal received different responses from France and England. P. Laval expressed the opinion that Germany needed to issue a clear warning, but the British point of view was based on the intention to conclude an agreement with Germany in order to achieve its return to the League of Nations, which could allow the Germans to return to the collective security system and raise the question of disarmament again .

On April 11, a conference was held in Stresa on Franco-British and Franco-Italian cooperation. The result was a resolution dated April 14, in which the three governments announced a developed joint political line, namely: continued operation of security agreements in Eastern Europe; statements in support of Austrian independence were once again repeated; as a recommendation, it was said about the possibility of concluding an alliance between the governments concerned on the problems of Central Europe; and in addition to the above, the initiative of the pact on air power and the provisions on the question of disarmament, according to the communiqué of 3 February, were reaffirmed. The European press started talking about the fact that the aggressor was now opposed to the "Stresa front." in Europe. In general, it was rather intended to provide an answer on how to respond to such cases in the future. Ultimately, the conference did not have any real tangible political weight. Although during the first time after the conference, the Stresa Front, outwardly, gave the impression of being the basis of all European politics. It was in line with security guarantees that the Franco-Soviet security pact was concluded on May 2. But still, the goals of each of the three great powers were separate. England wanted, as mentioned above, to return Germany to the Euro-security system. Along this path, in June 1935, the countries concluded a naval agreement, the subject and essence of which was that Germany acquired the right to build a Navy in the amount of 35% of the power in relation to the total naval power of the British Empire. 90 Such an agreement hit primarily on the Stresa Front itself. Great Britain deliberately took the path of condoning the militarization of Germany, which means violating the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, by this she tried to secure a certain degree of control over this process. When it became obvious to Italy and France that England was not going to do anything for the Austrian security, they decided to consolidate mutual obligations by a military agreement, which they signed on June 28, 1935. As a result, the "Stresa Front" actually ceased to exist due to internal contradictions.

2.3 Apogee of international tensions in 1938

On the way to the culmination of the policy of "appeasement" - the Munich Agreement (conspiracy), Nazi Germany managed to carry out another strong foreign policy action, the Anschluss of Austria should undoubtedly be attributed to the category of diplomatic defeats of the great powers, which, after the end of the First World War, diligently tried to ensure its autonomous existence from Germany. Such a situation, in particular, was fixed by the Treaty of San Germain, not to mention the Treaty of Versailles. Back in 1931, the German and Austrian governments jointly proposed a variant of a customs union, but then the leading European countries did not allow these plans to materialize. A more favorable situation for Hitler developed in 1937, when the Western powers began to consider the capture of Austria not as another step towards the "appeasement" of Germany. In November, at the ongoing negotiations with Hitler, Lord Halifax agreed on behalf of his government to the "acquisition" of Austria by Germany. In our time, certain documents have been preserved that describe how everything happened when the case entered active circulation. Twenty-seven have been documented telephone conversations Göring, starting at 02:45 March 11. The first time Seyss-Inquart called the field marshal was at 2.45 am. Goering told him that canceling the plebiscite was not enough, that after a conference with Hitler he would call back. He did it at 3.05. Schuschnigg, he declared, should resign, and Seyss-Inquart should be appointed in his place within two hours. Goering also ordered Seyss-Inquart "to send a telegram to the Fuhrer in accordance with the agreement." This is the first mention of a telegram that will be remembered many times over the next few hours and on the basis of which Hitler concocted a lie that justified the aggression against Austria in the eyes of the Germans and the whole world. The plans for the operation can be judged from the message of Hitler himself, classified as classified, it said in particular that the nature of the actions should initially be as peaceful as possible, however, when resisting, it was appointed to act in the most decisive way. On the night of March 11-12, 1938, German troops, previously concentrated on the border in accordance with the Otto plan, entered Austrian territory. On the 13th, Hitler himself entered Vienna, and the law was published: "On the reunification of Austria with the German Empire." On April 10, a plebiscite was held on the annexation of Austria to Germany, where the vast majority of the population voted "for" the Anschluss. After the annexation of Austria, Germany received a strategic base for the subsequent capture of Czechoslovakia, and further offensive in South-Eastern Europe and the Balkan direction, abundant sources of raw materials, impressive human resources and military production. The Anschluss of Austria meant that it turned out to be an important stage in the collapse of the Versailles order, which was eventually broken by force. As already mentioned above, the next target of the Nazi offensive policy was Czechoslovakia. The method of influence, and at the same time very effective, was actions through the “Sudet-German” party headed by K. Heinlein. Campaigns and propaganda were launched against the alleged oppression of ethnic Germans. Slogans for autonomy were put forward, which very soon grew into calls for complete self-determination of the Sudetenland.

The leaders of Great Britain and France did their best to find a compromise with Germany, which had become more active at the expense of Czechoslovakia. In this duet, Great Britain took the leading position more and more convincingly. The position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of England received the following assessment from the Soviet plenipotentiary, Maisky, regarding the issue of Czechoslovakia: “The emergency situation is an artificial state that is unable to either defend itself or receive outside help. England will not remain aloof from the Central European events, but France must put stronger pressure on Prague, demanding decisive concessions from the latter to Heinlein. We must force the Czechs to come to an agreement with the Germans. This was precisely the main purpose of the mission of the British Lord Runciman, who was in Czechoslovakia as an intermediary between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechoslovak government from August 3 to September 16, 1938.

Germany, actively using the Sudeten Germans, increased pressure on Czechoslovakia. In the draft directives for Operation Grün, signed by Hitler on June 18, 1938, the following was written: “In the foreground of my political intentions, as an immediate goal, is the solution of the Czech question on my own initiative. I intend to use any political pretext to achieve this goal starting from 10/1/1938…. However, I will make a final decision to start a campaign against Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced, as was the case when the demilitarized zone was occupied and when the troops entered Austria, that France will not oppose us and this will not entail the intervention of England. It is imperative to keep in mind in this situation the factor of German propaganda, which seriously escalated the situation and threatened with real military actions against Czechoslovakia, in case of ignoring or refusing German demands.

The position of the Czechoslovak side was greatly complicated by the fact that the country was under bilateral pressure, Germany was advancing on the one, England and France on the other, from which, under the initial disposition, Czechoslovakia had the right to expect real help. Instead, the Western democracies offered her to go for a significant reduction in her own borders, and all the territories of the Sudetenland, where the population consisted of half Germans, were offered to be given to Germany. But the conditions of Great Britain and France did not end there either, Czechoslovakia had to renounce mutual assistance treaties with France and the USSR, the latter, by the way, confirmed its obligations under the treaty, while noting the mandatory participation of France. Upon satisfaction of all these requirements, England and France were ready to take responsibility for guaranteeing new borders. The negotiation process took place in an extremely tense atmosphere, Czechoslovakia refused to accept such demands for a long time, however, the "guarantor countries" of the Versailles system only increased pressure, hoping that a concession to Germany was the only way to avoid the capture of Czechoslovakia, moreover, the Anglo-French intended in case of disagreement, accuse the Czechoslovak side of starting a big war.

In this situation, the Czechoslovak government, on September 21, was forced to accept the Anglo-French ultimatum97. Then something happened that, after many years, seems quite natural and understandable, but at that time the Anglo-French foresight was probably not enough to foresee such a development of events - Hitler, at a meeting with Chamberlain, when he found out that the requirements had been met, satisfactorily went to them tightening, threatening military conflict in case of non-compliance. The essence of the new ones was that the establishment of a new border of Czechoslovakia would be carried out without any international commission, as it was originally, and the evacuation from the areas transferred to Germany would be significantly accelerated.

September, during the next Anglo-French negotiations, French Prime Minister E. Daladier admitted that Hitler's ultimatum meant "the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and German domination in Europe." Most British ministers refused to accept Hitler's demands, the French cabinet rejected them unanimously. The aggressive actions of Nazi Germany brought Europe to the brink of war. Throughout the Czechoslovak crisis, there was a tangible rapprochement between Nazi Germany and Poland, which tried to implement a similar scenario in relation to Czechoslovakia. Now the issue of autonomy and subsequent transfer was directed to the territory of Cieszyn Silesia. The reaction of England and France in this situation was limited only to notifying Poland of possible consequences armed attack through diplomatic channels. Left alone, Czechoslovakia was forced to capitulate here too, the Teszyn region was given to Poland. This loss was also painful because of the geographical factor, the main railway line connecting the Czech Republic and Slovakia ran through this territory.

Munich was a fatal disaster for the Versailles system, which, albeit with huge problems and shortcomings, tried to regulate European relations. Czechoslovakia became the main victim of the Munich crisis, during this process a huge threat to the very existence of the country was posed, the losses in the field of heavy industry were enormous. But for all the depressing situation of Czechoslovakia, it would be absolutely wrong to call it the only loser from such a result. After all, France suffered a deep political defeat - it was a discouraging blow to its strategy of building a system of alliances in Eastern Europe. Confirmation of this assessment can be found in the words of the Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Paris Ya.Z. Surica: “The fact that France survived its second Sedan, and that it suffered a terrible defeat in Munich, is now understood by any Frenchman.” The international prestige of France was undermined in the context of providing guarantees. In addition, it became apparent that Paris began to follow in the wake of British policy.

The main goal of the policy of appeasement was the intention to prevent a global war, and those who adhered to this course were unable to resist the zealous pressure of the German leader, whose main message was statements about the need to revise the mistakes of the Versailles system. The quality of the appeasement policy was greatly influenced by discrepancies in the ruling circles of Great Britain and France, in addition, it is necessary to take into account the internal political situation. The positions of the leaders of the military departments of the two countries were also strong, declaring that they were not ready for a possible war. Well, one should also not discount the fear of Western democracies about the strengthening of the positions of "communist" Russia and the probable spread of the communist current across Europe.

In Russian historiography, there is an opinion that Munich became a kind of "point of no return", which led to further movement towards the beginning of the war. So, E.N. Kulkov and O.A. Rzheshevsky argue: "The fatal political event that ultimately led to the Second World War was the Munich Conference (September 29-30, 1938)"99. But still, the position of the Russian historian S.Z. Sluch seems more balanced:

“The Munich Treaty did not exclude an alternative development of international relations and was not a turning point on the road to war; it cannot be explained only by the anti-Sovietism of the leadership of the Western powers, since the main motive for their actions was the desire to avoid war at any cost.

The perception of Munich by Great Britain and France can be characterized as a vision of the possibility of a new concept of international order, similar in its essence to the project of the “pact of four”. This thesis is easily confirmed by the concluded Anglo-German declaration. On September 30, 1938, noting the fundamental importance of Anglo-German relations, both for the two countries and for the whole of Europe, A. Hitler and N. Chamberlain showed determination to use the consultation method to prevent possible sources contradictions for the sake of peace in Europe. Less than 3 months later, on December 6, the French and German foreign ministers signed a Franco-German declaration of a similar nature in Paris. It recorded the commitment of the two governments to the development of peaceful and good neighborly relations between the two countries and the absence of any unresolved issues of a territorial nature between them. Both governments decided to maintain contact with each other on all questions of interest to both countries, and mutually consult in case the subsequent development of these questions could lead to international complications.

The Franco-German agreement on consultations was perceived in Paris as a contribution to the preservation of peace in Europe. The calculation was made to appease Nazi Germany through concessions in Eastern Europe and colonial issues. The inconsistency in the positions of Great Britain, France, the USSR is explained by various factors. England and France at that time had already indicated their interest in preventing further strengthening of Germany's positions in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, they had already assumed certain obligations in relation to Poland, Romania, and Greece. Great Britain was not ready to accept the Soviet proposal to create a broad military-political alliance of three powers, capable of "repelling" many potential allies and rallying the members of the anti-Comintern pact. Added to this was deep suspicion and mutual distrust between London and Paris, on the one hand, and Moscow, on the other. However, at the same time, experts from the British Foreign Office came to the conclusion that the Anglo-French-Soviet treaty was perhaps "the only means of preventing war."

May representatives and France in Moscow presented V.M. Molotov a draft tripartite agreement on mutual assistance against aggression.105 V.M. Molotov then officially admitted that the Anglo-French proposals meant “a step forward”, because they provided “in the event of a direct attack by aggressors, the principle of mutual assistance between England, France and the USSR on the terms of reciprocity”106. At the same time, in a conversation with representatives of Great Britain and France, Molotov declared a negative attitude towards the proposed document, putting forward various comments and reservations. The main unresolved issue was the issue of guarantees to the Baltic countries: Finland, Estonia and Latvia.

Most likely, the Anglo-French and secular proposals formed the basis for the conclusion of a tripartite agreement on mutual assistance and guarantees.

July, Daladier told the Soviet plenipotentiary: “We must finish as soon as possible, especially since I don’t see any serious disagreements now”107. The message of the French side contained the message that the main purpose of the agreement was to integrate the USSR into the Anglo-French system and maintain its support for the sake of Poland and Romania. Also, the goal was considered achieved.

In the spring and summer of 1939, there was an objective increase in contradictions between Germany and Great Britain, which made it almost impossible to reach a compromise between the leadership of the two countries. In addition, the tripartite talks in Moscow caused growing unease in Berlin. In this context, German diplomacy tried to intensify its contacts with Moscow. A number of attempts were made to gradually improve relations, the key stage of which was political rapprochement. Soviet diplomacy, however, did not have unnecessary illusions and perfectly understood that sooner or later Germany would put the Polish question as a subject of discussion. In parallel, tripartite negotiations were held with England and France. After the introductory official part, the Soviet representatives on August 14 raised the question point-blank: “Will the Soviet troops be allowed through the territories of Poland and Romania to contact the enemy in the event of an attack by the aggressor on England and France, Poland or Romania, and also on Turkey,” and when foreign delegations tried to avoid answering, they were given to understand that, without a concrete explanation of this position, there was no subject for discussion. The negotiations stalled, although the French, in view of their greater interest, made an attempt to resolve this issue directly with Poland, but to no avail. After that, in a certain sense, the road to the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was predetermined.

The events that have taken place in the context of their significance for France, these are missed opportunities and unambiguously tragic consequences, in addition to regret, also raise questions. The inadequate assessment of the significance of the position of the USSR in August 1939 had its own reasons. One of them is a low opinion of the military capabilities of the Red Army, weakened by the "disappearances" in 1937-1939. its command top (this was written by French military magazines in 1939). But the main reason undoubtedly lies in the mutual distrust of the participants in the failed tripartite pact, in the lack of understanding of the main threat and, as a result, in the belated appearance of political will for an agreement. Unlike Nagiar, Bonnet and Beck did not believe that Stalin and Hitler would agree until the moment when it became a reality. The prevailing opinion was that the threat of a German invasion or a real attack against Poland should provoke the USSR to conclude an agreement with the Western powers.

If we are talking about the UK, then here, with a similar general background of results, there was, of course, its own specifics. The last days of peace passed for British diplomacy in a feverish activity aimed at preventing war through concessions to Germany at the expense of Poland. On August 22, 1939, Chamberlain turned to Hitler and offered mediation services in solving the Danzig problem at the negotiating table between Germany and Poland 108. In a response letter, Hitler fiercely attacked Poland, accusing her of neglecting German rights in Danzig. He further assured prime minister that he never looked for a quarrel with England and always sought to strengthen Anglo-German relations109. Such an exchange of messages, in fact, did not give anything in regard to the plans of the parties, but left the members of the British Cabinet hope for a peaceful settlement of the Polish question.

At the end of August, Germany proposed through Dahlerus its version of the draft Anglo-German agreement, in which Great Britain was required to recognize Germany's supremacy in Europe in exchange for a guarantee of its integrity. The Polish issue would be resolved in a negotiation format, and the contentious issues between Germany and Great Britain - in the format of top-level consultations.

In other words, Germany has made the final choice. An extensive agreement with England was not of great interest to her, since there were already very specific plans for a war with Poland. The era of agreements such as Munich has sunk into oblivion. But to guarantee success in the upcoming war, it was necessary to normalize relations with the USSR and ensure its neutrality. Other options for solving the problem, which were desirable for Great Britain and for which it had a lot to do, were no longer relevant for the German government.

Conclusion

A comprehensive study of the entirety of British-French diplomatic relations with Nazi Germany illustrates, mainly, that throughout almost the entire interwar period, the policy of Western democracies was unconsolidated in relation to Germany, and could not be so, at least because of competing positions in the European region. According to the tragic irony for the guarantors of the Versailles system, both of them are the losers. So France, stage by stage since the 20s. surrenders its positions in the international arena to the assertive diplomacy of the Germans, and allows the complete loss of its political status, turning into a losing power.

During the period under review, there was also close cooperation between France and Germany, mainly in the economic sphere. Various agreements were concluded not only at the state, but also at the private level, and here it is also necessary to note the inconsistent nature of such cooperation, which had several reasons, often it was the result of rivalry with other countries, and the format of the Versailles system imposed certain restrictions, which should be abandoned, for France was impossible. You can also talk about the uncertain and indecisive political course of the French, which indirectly influenced the arrival of the National Socialist Party in Germany. One can judge for a long time what would have happened if the French leadership had adhered to a tougher policy towards Germany, from the point of view of historical retrospective, we can only say that the policy of "appeasement" and "containment" carried out by France did not bring the expected results and turned out to be unable to solve the problem of preventing war.

England, in its usual manner throughout the period under study, applied the concept of balancing power in its foreign policy. London still believed that it was necessary to meet the requirements of Germany, since this was required by objective changes in the balance of power in the international arena. The "containment" of Germany by the articles of the Treaty of Versailles seemed inappropriate to England, both because of the habitual desire to prevent French hegemony on the continent, and because of the significant increase in the military potential of the Soviet Union. To neutralize these factors, she used the traditional balance sheet policy. So, during the height of the Abessinian crisis, the preservation and strengthening of the authority of the League of Nations, according to the conservative leaders of England, was necessary for the implementation of its policy in Europe, in particular to influence France and the USSR, which could, using the agreement they concluded in May 1935 d. an agreement on mutual assistance, to go against the British foreign policy course.

In the same 1935, not disdaining to violate the articles of the Treaty of Versailles, Great Britain agreed to conclude a maritime agreement with Hitler's Germany, which the British government satisfied Hitler's demand that "the power of the German fleet was 35% in relation to the total power of the British Empire." The proportion of 35:100 was to be applied both to the total tonnage of the fleet and to each class of ships. Thus, Germany received the right to build a fleet with a total tonnage of 420,595 long tons. For the construction of battleships, 184,000 tons were allocated, for heavy cruisers - 51,380, light cruisers and destroyers should not exceed a total tonnage of 119,700 tons. In fact, the Germans were given the opportunity to build 5 battleships, two aircraft carriers, 21 cruisers and 64 destroyers. The result of the agreement was the final elimination of all restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. The British leadership at that moment did not hide a certain anti-Soviet orientation of the concluded treaty, it was supposed to allow Germany to achieve military superiority in the Baltic Sea. There are several motives that prompted the British government to conclude such an agreement, among them the public mood, seized by pacifism during this period, and the instability of the domestic political situation, and the hypothetical threat from Soviet Russia.

The contradictions between the guarantor powers of the Versailles system, their general distrust of the Soviet Union, reinforced by the revisionist goals of Italy and the general misunderstanding of the essence and scale of the Nazi threat ultimately led to the formation of an extremely unfavorable international situation in the European region by the mid-1930s. very unstable situation in the international arena by mid-1935.

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Diplomacy during World War II

German attack on the USSR. Speeches by Roosevelt and Churchill. An anti-Hitler coalition is being formed, the basis of which was the alliance of 3 great powers: Great Britain, the USSR and the USA. The statements of Churchill and Roosevelt met with the support of the majority of the British and American peoples, although some US and British statesmen considered the mutual exhaustion of Germany and the USSR more desirable. Their point of view was expressed by Senator Truman (later President). In England, Minister of Aviation Industry Moore-Brabazon shared similar views, but the leaders of the British and American governments considered it necessary to cooperate with the USSR in the fight against Germany. Since the USSR and Great Britain, unlike the USA, had already fought against Germany, the Soviet government proposed to England that they conclude an agreement on joint actions. England agreed. On July 12, 1941, an Anglo-Soviet agreement was signed on joint actions in the war against Germany. The USSR and England pledged to "provide assistance and support to each other", + "not to negotiate, not to conclude a truce or a peace treaty, except by mutual consent." On July 31, 1941, the 1st English warship arrived in Arkhangelsk with technical means and ammunition for the USSR. Then to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk - English "convoys" - transport ships guarded by warships with weapons and ammunition. Until the end of 1941, 7 British convoys arrived in the Union.

In order to stop the activities of Nazi agents in Iran, the USSR and England, by mutual agreement - and in accordance with the Iranian-Soviet agreement 1921-25 August 1941 sent their troops to Iran. The Shah of Iran, oriented towards Nazi Germany, abdicated and fled. The new Iranian government concluded an alliance treaty with Great Britain and the USSR. It undertook to ensure the transportation through Iran of goods destined for the USSR, and the USSR and England undertook to withdraw their troops from Iran no later than 6 months after the end of hostilities against Germany and its allies. Taking into account the wishes of the USSR, on December 6, 1941, England declared war on Germany's allies who fought against the USSR - Hungary, Romania and Finland.
 In an effort to expand the coalition of anti-fascist forces, the USSR decided to reach an agreement not only with Great Britain, but also with the emigre governments and groups that opposed Nazi Germany. In July 1941, the USSR signed agreements with the emigrant governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland based in London. The Soviet government recognized the Soviet-German treaties "on territorial changes in Poland" as "invalid", but the question of future Polish borders remained open. The parties pledged to assist each other in the war against Germany. The Union agreed to form Czechoslovak military units and a Polish On September 27, 1941, the Soviet government, following the example of England, recognized General de Gaulle as the leader of all free French. It promised to provide free French "comprehensive assistance and assistance in the common struggle against Germany and its allies "+ expressed the determination to "ensure the full restoration of the independence and greatness of France" after achieving a joint victory. In response, General de Gaulle pledged to "fight on the side of the USSR and its allies until victory over the common enemy is achieved and to provide the USSR with comprehensive assistance and assistance."

Moscow conference of 3 powers: the USSR, England and the USA in September-October 1941. The governments of the USA and England pledged to transfer to the USSR a significant amount of weapons, more than 3,500 aircraft and 4,500 tanks, and the USSR pledged to supply England and the USA with strategic raw materials. On October 30, Roosevelt ordered to provide the USSR with an interest-free loan of 1 billion dollars, and on November 7, 1941, he extended the lend-lease law to the USSR. American and British weapons, equipment and food began to systematically enter the USSR. They went in 3 ways: northern, through the Arctic, to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk; southern - through Iran; and east - through Vladivostok. At first, these deliveries are small.

Atlantic charter - the main policy document of the anti-Hitler coalition, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill on August 14, 1941 on a ship off the coast of Canada. According to the charter, the United States and Great Britain "do not seek territorial or other acquisitions" and "respect the right of all peoples to choose for themselves the form of government under which they wish to live." To seek the restoration of "sovereign rights and self-government of those peoples who were deprived of this by force"; ensure equal access for all countries to trade and to world raw material sources; “the ability to freely navigate the seas and oceans”; organize economic cooperation. Roosevelt and Churchill announced that they considered it necessary to disarm the aggressors and create a reliable system of general security. They called on all states to "renounce the use of force" in the future. Although the Atlantic Charter was adopted without consultation with the USSR, it did not say anything about the specific tasks of the struggle against fascism, the USSR in September 1941 agreed with its principles. At the same time, fearing that the provision on the restoration of the sovereign rights and self-government of those peoples who were deprived of them by force, can be applied to the territory. acquisitions of the USSR in 1939-1940, stipulated that practical use principles of the charter "should be consistent with the circumstances, needs and historical characteristics of a particular country."

Contradictions in the anti-Hitler coalition. There were serious contradictions in the coalition, caused by differences in the social and political system of the state-tvs that were part of it; their goals and their policies. + Differences on the issue of the 2nd front in Europe, the creation of which the USSR considered the most effective way to achieve victory over Germany. Already on July 18, 1941, a week after the agreement on joint actions with England, Stalin raised this issue in a message to Churchill. Referring to the lack of forces and means, Churchill rejected this and all subsequent proposals to open in 1941 "a 2nd front in the Balkans or in France."
 Another problem is the problem of post-war borders and, in general, the post-war structure of the world. Neither England nor the United States recognized the new borders of the USSR, established in 1939-1940, and feared a possible "Bolshevization of Europe", while the USSR wanted to legally fix its new borders. This problem was first discussed in detail during the visit of the British Foreign Minister Eden to Moscow in December 1941. Eden intended to supplement the Anglo-Soviet agreement on joint actions during the war with an agreement on post-war cooperation and brought with him a draft of such an agreement, according to which England and The USSR pledged to cooperate during the war and "in the reorganization of Europe after the war with attention to the interests of each other", in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter that both sides "do not seek territorial or other acquisitions" and will not interfere in the internal affairs of other peoples . The Union proposed drafts of 2 treaties: "on the alliance and mutual military assistance between the USSR and England in the war against Germany", the other - "on the establishment of mutual agreement between the USSR and Great Britain in resolving post-war issues and on their joint actions to ensure security in Europe after the end war with Germany. To the 2nd treaty, Stalin, unexpectedly for Eden, suggested adding 2 secret protocols, in which a specific plan for the organization of post-war Europe was outlined. These protocols provided for the restoration of the pre-war borders of the USSR and the borders of European countries occupied by Germany, with territorial changes for some. Above the pre-war borders, the USSR claimed territories at the expense of Romania, Finland and part of East Prussia from the city of Koenigsberg. The Soviet government proposed to expand Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia at the expense of Hungary and Italy, and Turkey, in order to reward her for her neutrality, at the expense of Italy and Bulgaria. It was planned to transfer to Poland certain areas of Western Ukraine or Western Belarus with a Polish population and to expand its territory in a westerly direction at the expense of East Prussia. Germany was supposed to be completely disarmed and divided into a number of states, restoring Austria as an independent state. The aggressors must compensate the victims for the losses caused by their attack. To preserve the future peace in Europe, it was proposed to create an international organization - the European Council and put at its disposal "a certain number of troops." Stalin suggested to Eden that British military, air and naval bases be set up in France, Belgium, Holland, Norway and Denmark. The British government did not want to bind itself with specific obligations, + earlier it announced its non-recognition of the territory. changes after 1939, and promised the US government not to enter into secret agreements on a post-war arrangement without consulting it. Eden did not agree to guarantee the new borders of the USSR, and Stalin refused to sign draft treaties with Great Britain. These disagreements were kept secret, but they seriously complicated the relationship.

Japan is making plans against England, USA, Holland. Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 11 Dec Germany and Italy + Hungary, Romanian, Bolg, Slovak, Croatian declared war on the United States. Treaty of Japan, Germany and Italy on Mutual Assistance. 18 Jan 41 Agreement on the delimitation of zones of military operations.

Signing of the 26th antifa by the states of the declaration of the United Nations in Washington.

Union of 3 great powers. After the US entered the war, the British and US governments agreed on military-political plans. In December 1941, a common Anglo-American war plan was adopted. The opening of the 2nd front in Europe was not envisaged by the plan. Instead, it was planned to organize the landing of Anglo-American troops in French possessions in North Africa, which were controlled by Vichy and where there were no German and Italian troops. Such an operation could not divert significant forces from the decisive Soviet-German front, but it was simpler, could take Italy out of the war and strengthen the positions of England and the United States in the Mediterranean. Having coordinated their plans without the participation of the USSR, the governments of England and the USA continued negotiations with the Union. Again the question of the 2nd front. The Soviet government insisted that Britain and the USA set up a second front against Germany in Europe as soon as possible, during 1942. The opening of a second front was demanded by broad sections of the population in England and the USA. Roosevelt recognized the validity of this. But the military leaders of the United States and Britain, like Churchill, believed that there were still no conditions for landing troops in Europe. To discuss further plans for the anti-Hitler coalition, Roosevelt and Churchill invited Molotov to visit London and Washington in May-June 1942. The British government agreed to conclude an agreement on post-war cooperation with the USSR, but without specific reference to the future borders of the USSR. Molotov intended to postpone the signing of the treaty, but Stalin, given that Germany had launched an offensive on the Eastern Front, instructed him to accept the project proposed by England. On May 26, 1942, an Anglo-Soviet treaty "on an alliance in the war against Nazi Germany and its accomplices in Europe and on cooperation and mutual assistance after the war" was signed in London. The treaty confirmed the agreement on joint actions against Germany of July 12, 1941 and provided for joint actions in the post-war period, + the provision of mutual assistance if one of the parties again becomes involved in the war with Germany or states associated with it. The USSR and England agreed to cooperate in organizing the security and economic prosperity of Europe; not enter into any alliances and not take part in any coalitions directed against the other side. The term of the contract is 20 years. On June 11, 1942, the USSR and the USA concluded an agreement "on the principles applicable to mutual assistance in waging war against aggression." The parties undertook to contribute to the defense and mutually provide materials, services and information. At the end of the war, the Soviet government promised to return to the United States those defense materials supplied to the USSR that would not be destroyed, lost, or used and could be useful for the defense of the United States. In the final settlement after the end of the war, the USA must take into account all the property, information, and other benefits that they received from the USSR. In the postwar period, the possibility of concerted actions of the USSR and the USA was envisaged in order to develop mutually beneficial economic relations̆ in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter. The signing of an agreement with England and an agreement with the United States completed the legal registration of the union of 3 great powers: the USSR, Great Britain and the USA. Roosevelt suggested that the USSR create after the war "an international police force of 3-4 powers: the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and China," and Stalin replied that "Roosevelt is right."

Yielding to the USSR and the pressure of public opinion, the governments of England and the USA signed an Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American communiqué, which stated that between the USSR, Britain and the USA "an agreement was reached on the creation of a 2nd front in Europe in 1942." In exchange, the US government obtained from the USSR consent to a reduction of about 40% in Lend-Lease deliveries in order to use the freed resources for organizing a 2nd front, and the British government accompanied the communiqué with a confidential clause: “it is impossible to say in advance whether the situation will be such that it will become possible carry out this operation when the specified time comes. England and the USA did not fulfill their obligations on the 2nd front. A week after the publication of the communique, Churchill again met with Roosevelt and convinced him to postpone the creation of a 2nd front in Europe. They returned to the previous plan for French North Africa. The USSR again had to fight alone with the main forces of Germany and its allies.

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The Soviet Union entered World War II two and a half weeks after it began. On September 17, 1939, the Red Army crossed the Polish border. It struck from the east against the Polish army, which was desperately defending itself from the German invasion. Poland was crushed by the combined efforts of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. This was openly and loudly declared by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 31, 1939.

In a fairly short interval between the campaign in Poland and the German attack on the USSR, three stages of Soviet foreign policy can be conventionally outlined: the first - from September 1939 to the defeat of France in June 1940, the second - until the Soviet-German negotiations in Berlin in November 1940, the third - before the German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

At the first stage, Stalin, using two agreements with Nazi Germany, tried to quickly realize the opportunities that were opened up by secret agreements.

After the Red Army occupied Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, that is, Eastern Poland, preparations began for a "free will" of the twelve million people living there in favor of unification with the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSR. But even earlier, special units of the NKVD arrived in the territories just occupied by the Red Army. They began to identify "class alien" elements, arrested and deported them to the east of the country. On October 31, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted laws on the "reunification" of these regions with the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSRs, respectively.

Curious documents have been preserved in the archive - the texts of the declarations of the People's Assembly of Western Belarus on the confiscation of landowners' lands, on the nationalization of banks and large-scale industry, on the nature of the power being created in Western Belarus with additions and corrections made by the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Zhdanov. So to speak, an outpouring of will is an outpouring of will, but you don’t have to make a mistake ...

Stalin's plan to absorb the Baltic countries

As I already mentioned, the three Baltic republics - Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia - also went into the sphere of state interests of the USSR. In the autumn of 1939, just at the moment when Molotov and Ribbentrop were signing the friendship and border treaty in Moscow, the USSR forced the Baltic countries to sign mutual assistance pacts and allow the introduction of “limited contingents” of Soviet troops into their territory.

Stalin's Baltic plans were coordinated with Hitler through Ambassador Schulenburg and Ribbentrop himself. As in the case of Eastern Poland, the Soviet scenario was the same - in October 1939, i.e. when the Baltic republics were still independent, although they were forced to accept Soviet garrisons, the NKVD (General I. Serov) issued an order to prepare for the deportation of hostile elements. This means that the plan for the takeover of the Baltics was already worked out then.

The schedule of "free will" of Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians was prepared in Moscow. In strict accordance with the established timetable, people's governments were established in these countries; then on June 17-21, 1940, elections were held to the People's Seimas of Lithuania and Latvia, on July 14-15 in State Duma Estonia. On July 21, 1940, on the same day, Soviet power was proclaimed in all the Baltic countries, and three weeks later all three were accepted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR into the Soviet Union. Practical preparations began immediately for the mass deportation of part of the indigenous population.

It was the turn of Bessarabia. On June 26, Molotov demanded from Romania the immediate return of Bessarabia, annexed to Romania in 1918. In August, Bessarabia was already united with the Moldavian ASSR, which was part of the Ukrainian SSR, and thus the Moldavian Union Republic was created. At the same time, Northern Bukovina was also "grabbed", to which there were no historical rights, since it was part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This act was not provided for by the German-Soviet secret protocol. The Germans, of course, grimaced. Molotov explained to the German ambassador Schulenburg that Bukovina "is the last missing part of the united Ukraine."

The occupation of the Baltic states, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina was, of course, connected with the defeat of France and the occupation by Germany of the territories of several European states in the north and northwest of Europe. The victories of the German partner in the West had to be balanced.

Stalin was now afraid of the imminent conclusion of peace in the West, while the USSR had not yet implemented a program of territorial expansion.

The Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938, and the capitulation of Czechoslovakia to German demands under pressure from England and France gave Stalin hope that the Soviet Union should not postpone the implementation of its own geopolitical and strategic plans.

Literally a few days before the opening of the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Finland was offered to lease to the Soviet Union part of the Finnish territory, namely the islands of Sursari (Gogland) and three others, on which the USSR intended to build its military bases. The proposal was made by Litvinov two months before his own resignation from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The freedom-loving Finns, of course, rejected this proposal, even despite the proposal to receive in return a much larger territory of Soviet Karelia. Let us note that Litvinov, whose name is invariably associated with the policy of collective security, did not see anything shameful in persuading independent state give up your territory. For Finland, however, these were not "barren islands", but part of their native land.

Preparation of the USSR for the war with Finland in 1939

In the summer of 1939, that is, already during the ongoing negotiations with Great Britain and France on mutual assistance in the event of German aggression, the Main Military Council of the Red Army considered the plan of military operations prepared by the General Staff against Finland. He was reported by the Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov. Although the possibility of direct support for Finland from Germany, Great Britain, France, and also the Scandinavian states was recognized, it was not for this reason that the plan was rejected by Stalin, but because of the overestimation of the difficulties of the war by the General Staff. The new plan was developed by the commander of the Leningrad Military District, K.A., who had just been released from prison. Meretskov. The plan was designed for the initial strike and defeat of the Finnish army within two to three weeks. It was a kind of plan for the Soviet blitzkrieg. It was based on the factor of surprise and arrogant disregard for the potential capabilities of the enemy, just as it was in the German calculations of the war against the USSR.

While the war plan against Finland was being developed (this lasted five months), the Soviet Union exerted continuous diplomatic pressure on Finland, putting forward more and more new demands, each of which meant not only the transfer to the Soviet Union in the form of an exchange of part of the Finnish territory, not only leasing another part of the territory for the construction of Soviet military bases there, but also the disarmament of the Finnish defensive line on the Karelian Isthmus ("Mannerheim Line"), which completely transferred the fate of Finland into the hands of a powerful southern neighbor. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union used these diplomatic maneuvers to cover preparations for war, or, as the current Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army M. Moiseev, writes now, "the final military preparations were hastily carried out." The Soviet historian Viktor Kholodkovsky, without any doubt, the most competent expert in the country on the history and politics of Finland and Soviet-Finnish relations, cites in one of his recent articles the words of Kekkonen, at that time a minister in the Cajander government, who rejected the Soviet demands: "We knew that the cession of the required territory would mean a fatal gap in the country's defense system. And we could imagine what such a gap would mean in the presence of such a neighbor as Russia. "

In the USSR, psychological preparations began for the war against Finland. The tone was set by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov, who delivered a long speech to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 31, 1939. In it, he admitted, among other things, that Finland had been asked to disarm its fortified areas, which, according to Molotov, was in the interests of Finland. For some reason, the Finns themselves did not think so. What prompted the Soviet leadership to pursue such a stubborn policy of pressure on the small Finnish people? Confidence in the right of strength, its originality; and most importantly, it was safe, since Finland, by agreement with Nazi Germany, went into the sphere of Soviet interests, just like the Baltic states, and England and France were absorbed in their own military concerns. By this time, the three Baltic states had already been forced by the Soviet Union to sign treaties of mutual assistance with it and allow the stationing of a “limited contingent” of Soviet armed forces on their territory, which very soon turned into unlimited hostage on the territory of the still sovereign Baltic republics.

Finland, of course, did not want a war and would prefer to resolve the complications that arose through the fault of the Soviet Union peacefully, but Stalin sought to unconditionally accept his demands. The company of intimidation of the Finns went in parallel with military preparations. Pravda published articles that were unprecedentedly rude towards Finland. Their tone could only be compared with the tone of Soviet newspapers during the Moscow trials in the second half of the 1930s.

On October 5, the following Soviet demands were transferred to Finland: the exchange of the territory of the Karelian Isthmus, which belongs to the Finns, for twice as large, but sparsely populated and undeveloped part of the territory of Soviet Karelia; the right to lease the Hanko Peninsula, located at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, and the ice-free port of Petsamo on the Rybachy Peninsula for the construction of Soviet naval and air bases there. For Finland, accepting Soviet conditions would have meant the loss of any opportunity to defend itself. The proposals were rejected. In the face of the impending military threat from the USSR, Finland was forced to take the necessary defensive measures. Even now, in 1990, the Soviet military department is trying to place equal responsibility for the outbreak of war on both sides.

"The Finnish side," the commentary of the USSR Ministry of Defense already quoted above says, "not only did not show readiness to reach any mutually acceptable agreements with the USSR, but..." and so on. or "Having not exhausted all the possibilities of a political settlement, the USSR and Finland practically took a course towards solving problems by military means." That is, the aggressor and his victim are put on the same board. On November 3, 1939, Pravda ominously declared in an editorial: “We will cast aside any game of political gamblers and go our own way, no matter what. We will ensure the security of the USSR, no matter what, breaking down any and all obstacles in the way to the goal".

Meanwhile, four Soviet armies were deployed on the Karelian Isthmus, in Eastern Karelia and the Arctic. Finally, on November 26, the Soviet government announced the shelling of Soviet territory in the area of ​​​​the village of Mainila, located 800 meters from the Finnish border; there were casualties among the Soviet military. The USSR accused the Finns of provocation and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops to a distance of 25-30 km from the border, i.e. from its line of defense on the Karelian Isthmus. Finland, for its part, proposed a mutual withdrawal of troops and an investigation at the scene in accordance with the 1928 convention. According to Khrushchev's testimony, Stalin had no doubt that the Finns would be frightened and capitulate after the USSR unilaterally broke the non-aggression pact on November 28. Finland was accused of keeping Leningrad under threat. On November 30, Soviet troops opened hostilities. The little people were not afraid. The war has begun.

The lessons of the war against Finland for the USSR

It turned out that, despite five months of preparations, the Red Army was not ready for war. Failure to act in winter conditions emerged immediately. Neither the Komsomol volunteers, abandoned from Moscow and Leningrad, nor the mobilized skiers-athletes, many of whom died senselessly and ingloriously, did not help. Attempts to overturn the Finnish army with frontal attacks on the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line turned into bloody losses. "Our troops, - says the Commentary of the Ministry of Defense, - in none of the directions, primarily on the Karelian Isthmus, failed to fulfill the assigned task."

Everything failed: tanks bound by frost; roads clogged with traffic; there were not enough mortars and small arms, there were no winter clothes. The culprit was immediately found: Meretskov was replaced by Marshal Timoshenko, Army General Stern was called from the Far East. Only after significant forces of all types of troops were transferred to the Finnish front, on February 11, 1940, a new offensive began, the struggle went on for meters. A month later, the Finnish defensive line was broken through, and Finland was forced to accept the conditions imposed on her by the winner. The peace treaty, signed in Moscow on March 12, 1940, transferred the Karelian Isthmus to the Soviet Union, including Vippuri (Vyborg) and the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga with the cities of Kexholm, Sortavala, Suoyarvi, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, and a number of others territories on the Sredniy and Rybachy peninsulas, as well as for renting the Khanko peninsula, with the right to maintain here, in addition to naval and air force bases, also ground garrisons.

The principle of ideological warfare, used as early as during the civil war, was applied in preparation for and during the war against Finland. A puppet government was prepared for it, headed by one of the leaders of the Comintern, the former leader of the Communist Party of Finland, O.V. Kuusinen. The plan provided for the subsequent creation of the Karelian-Finnish Union Republic by uniting the Karelian ASSR with Finland.

However, Kuusinen himself did not play any independent role in this political farce. A.A. Zhdanov - the first secretary of the Leningrad regional party committee, he is also a member of the Military Council of the 7th Army in the field, he is also a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was a key figure here.

Archival documents brought to us curious evidence of how the Finnish Democratic Republic was created, with the government of which the USSR immediately signed an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship.

The first document - the message about the formation of the FDR government and the declaration of the "People's Government" - was written by Zhdanov's hand. Considering, apparently, the form for its publication, Zhdanov made notes: "radio interception" and "translation from Finnish" (!). The Leningrad secretary was an educated person... This six-page document announced the liberation of the Finns from the power and oppression of the "bourgeoisie, its henchmen"; in a word, the document contained a full set of derogatory epithets against the "ruling clique" and a promise to the Finns of freedom from exploitation. The second document written by Zhdanov is a draft instruction on how to begin political and organizational work in the areas of Finland "liberated from white power."

The third document (eleven pages) - an appeal to the working people of Finland - was also written personally by Zhdanov. The funniest thing of all, however, if only it is appropriate to use this word here, is the text of the oath of a soldier of the People's Army of Finland. As a basis, Zhdanov took the printed text of the military oath of the Red Army servicemen and made several purely formal amendments to it.

This inglorious war cost the Soviet people considerable sacrifices. According to the information contained in the reference-commentary of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the losses of the Red Army in killed alone exceeded 67 thousand people. The Finnish army lost over 23 thousand people. These data are seriously different from those given by various researchers. V.M. Kholodkovsky believes, based on sources, that Soviet losses amounted to about 74,000 killed and 17,000 missing, and only 290,000. Finnish losses were 3-4 times less. B.V. Sokolov agrees with the Finnish estimate that Soviet casualties were about 200,000 and gives his own calculations on this score.

Negative consequences of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939

The moral damage caused by the war against Finland was colossal. In December 1939, the League of Nations formally condemned the USSR as an aggressor and expelled it from the League of Nations. Only three states were branded as aggressors - Japan, Italy and Germany. Now the USSR has been added to this list. One of the reasons that prompted the USSR to quickly conclude a peace treaty with Finland and not try to completely capture this country was that there was a real danger that the center of the war would move from the Western Front to North-Eastern Europe. The Western Allies began to seriously consider sending a 50,000-strong volunteer corps to help Finland. However, the Finnish government did not want to turn the territory of their country into a power field of the great powers, as happened with Spain in 1936-1939.

Another negative result for the USSR, more important than its expulsion from the League of Nations, was Germany's increased confidence that militarily the USSR was much weaker than it seemed before. This strengthened the position of supporters of the war against the USSR.

"In our war against the Finns," Khrushchev said, "...we could ultimately win only after enormous difficulties and incredible losses. Victory at such a cost was in fact a moral defeat."

The borders of the USSR were moved to the west. However, there was very little time left for their strengthening. This should have become evident after the signing of the Tripartite Pact on 27 September 1940 by Germany, Japan and Italy.

Although the Soviet Government had been informed by Germany of the forthcoming conclusion of the Tripartite Pact even before its publication, it was not deceived as to the true nature of the pact. The leading article of the Pravda newspaper of September 30, 1940, on the subject of the Tripartite Pact, emphasized that its signing meant "further aggravation of the war and expansion of its sphere of action." At the same time, the Soviet press drew attention to the reservation that the Tripartite Pact did not affect the relations of its participants with the USSR, and explained that this reservation should be understood "as confirmation of the strength and significance of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany and the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Italy".

The fact that the USSR did not doubt the meaning of the Tripartite Pact as a pact on the preliminary division of the world was also evidenced by the more friendly tone of the Soviet press towards England. For example, on October 5, 1940, Pravda published a very detailed and sympathetic correspondence from London about a visit by a TASS correspondent to one of the London field batteries of anti-aircraft guns. From this article, the reader could easily conclude that England is fighting in earnest and her strength is growing. There were many other events that made Stalin think about the near future. It seemed very gloomy. Germany was clearly aiming at the Balkans.

In these months, only one event will truly please Stalin. On August 20, 1940, the NKVD finally completed the hunt for L.D. Trotsky. He is mortally wounded by an ice pick. "Pravda" publishes an editorial titled "The Death of an International Spy", and "Izvestia" - and even worse - an article by D. Zaslavsky "To a dog - a dog's death."

But the assassination of Trotsky cannot change anything in a formidable situation, just as her articles in the Soviet press against "the aggressor of Great Britain and the United States of America helping her military efforts" cannot change. The Soviet Union continues to maintain diplomatic relations with both states, but attempts by England to enter into closer relations with the USSR are rejected by Stalin. Although the tone of the Soviet press softens, and the stupid campaign against the US entry into the war stops altogether, Stalin continues to orient himself towards Germany, despite the frictions that arise between the USSR and the Reich (the Vienna Arbitration, the problem of Sweden's neutrality, the sending of German troops to Romania, etc.). ). Relations between the two states begin to deteriorate.

Possible agreement on the division of the world between the USSR and Germany

By the end of 1940, under the heel of Germany was a territory of 4 million square meters. km with a population of 333 million people. Since the summer of 1940, the systematic use of the European economy for the needs of the war began. Thus, a significant number of Germans were released for military service. The development of a plan for an attack on the USSR goes on as usual, but in the meantime Ribbentrop invites Molotov to come to Berlin. There Molotov met with Hitler. November 12, 1940 Molotov, accompanied by a large group of experts, arrives in Berlin. The official German record of his talks with Hitler says: “Molotov expressed his agreement with the Fuhrer’s statements about the role of America and England. The participation of the USSR in the tripartite pact seems to him completely acceptable in principle (emphasis mine. - A. N.), meaning, that Russia should cooperate as a partner, and not just as an object. In this case, he sees no difficulty in the participation of the Soviet Union in the common effort." At the same time, Molotov demands clarifications, in particular about the "great Asian space", puts forward a number of demands regarding Finland and Southern Bukovina, Bulgaria and the straits. Before leaving for Moscow, Molotov was given projects on the division of the world into spheres of influence between Germany, Italy, Japan and the USSR. On November 14, Molotov returned to Moscow.

In the Soviet Union, a version was established for 50 years (and it is present in all historical studies, without exception, official histories, memoirs published before 1989), that the USSR rejected Hitler's proposal to participate in the division of the world. Nothing of the sort happened. On November 26, a response was sent to Hitler, in which the Soviet government agreed with the German project for dividing the world, but with some amendments: the Soviet sphere of influence was to extend to the areas south of Baku and Batum, i.e. include eastern Turkey, northern Iran and Iraq. The Soviet Union also demanded consent to the establishment of its naval base in the Straits. In addition, Soviet demands concerned the role of Turkey, the withdrawal of German troops from Finland, the liquidation of Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin, the inclusion of Bulgaria in the Soviet orbit.

Later, Molotov asked the Germans several times for a response to the Soviet counterproposals, but the German government did not return to this problem again. Thus, if the agreement on the division of the world did not take place, then there was no merit of the Soviet government.

Soviet-Bulgarian relations before the Second World War

Since the end of 1939 there has been some improvement in Bulgarian-Soviet relations. Economic and cultural agreements were concluded, which contributed to the establishment of closer ties between the USSR and Bulgaria. The traditional sympathies of the Bulgarian people for the Russian people, who had helped in the past in their struggle against Turkish rule, the widespread idea of ​​Slavic solidarity, were cemented by the great interest of the Bulgarians in Russia and the socialist traditions of the Bulgarian labor movement. In addition, the significant strengthening of Germany in the Balkans as a result of her victory in the west caused considerable excitement in Bulgaria. The fear of an attack from Turkey also played a role. The Soviet Union was the only country that could really resist the German intrigues in the Balkans. During the Soviet-Bulgarian negotiations in the autumn of 1939, the Soviet government offered to sign a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance. However, the Bulgarian government rejected this proposal. In the future, under the influence of events in Western Europe and the fear of increased Soviet influence, the Bulgarian government was increasingly inclined towards a bloc of fascist aggressors.

After the November negotiations in Berlin, on November 19, 1940, the Soviet government turned to Bulgaria with a proposal to conclude a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance. A week later, General Secretary of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs A. A. Sobolev arrived in Sofia and confirmed this proposal. The Soviet Union declared its readiness to provide Bulgaria with assistance, including military assistance, in the event of an attack on it by a third power or a group of powers. The USSR expressed its readiness to provide Bulgaria with financial and economic assistance. At the same time, the Soviet Union declared that the pact would in no way affect the existing regime, the independence and sovereignty of Bulgaria. However, it was no longer a secret that the Soviet Union was aiming south. The Soviet attack on Finland served as a warning. On the same day, November 25, the Soviet proposal was discussed at a narrow meeting of the Bulgarian Cabinet of Ministers with Tsar Boris and rejected. The German envoy in Sofia was informed of this Soviet proposal.

Although the Bulgarian government rejected the Soviet proposal, it played a certain positive role, slowing down Bulgaria's transition to the camp of the fascist aggressors. The Bulgarian envoy in Stockholm reported to his government in mid-December 1940: “Here they note with interest the recent Russian intercession in favor of Bulgaria and Sweden in order to keep these two countries not only out of the war, but also out of the combination of Germany against England ".

In January 1941, in connection with the widespread reports that German troops were being transferred to Bulgaria with the consent of the USSR, the Soviet government officially announced that if such a fact really took place, then "this happened and is happening without the knowledge and consent of the USSR."

Four days later, the Soviet government declared to the German ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, that it considered the territory of the eastern part of the Balkans as a security zone of the USSR and could not remain indifferent to events that threatened this security. The same was repeated on January 17, 1941 by the Soviet plenipotentiary in Berlin to the State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, Weizsäcker. However, on March 1, the Bulgarian government joined the Tripartite Pact, providing its territory for the passage of German troops for military operations against Greece, and then against Yugoslavia.

The Soviet government in a special statement condemned this step of the Bulgarian government, pointing out that its position "leads not to the strengthening of peace, but to the expansion of the sphere of war and drawing Bulgaria into it." On March 3, the German ambassador in Moscow was told that Germany could not count on the support of the Soviet Union for her actions in Bulgaria.

The failure with Bulgaria showed that Germany had already begun hostile military-political steps against the USSR. The clash in Bulgaria was in fact a test of the strength of Soviet-German relations. Appropriate conclusions should be drawn from the results of this test.

Germany masks preparations for an attack on the USSR

Serious fears arose in the Soviet Union because of Turkey's position during the "strange war", and also due to the fact that the Turkish government continued to maneuver between the warring parties, leaning first to one, then to the other, depending on the emerging balance of forces in each this moment. However, the entry of German troops into Bulgaria frightened the Turkish government. As a result of an exchange of views between the Soviet and Turkish governments in March 1941, mutual assurances were given that in the event of an attack on one of the parties, the other could "count on complete understanding and neutrality ..."

Events in the Balkans showed that relations between Germany and the USSR were developing in a menacing direction. The German-Soviet contradictions, which, as a result of the Nazis' striving for world domination, had an irreconcilable character and were only softened by the agreements of 1939, now made themselves felt with new force. Germany continued to prepare bridgeheads near the borders of the USSR. Faced with the negative position of the Soviet Union regarding German policy in the Balkans, the Nazis tried to intimidate the Soviet Union with their military might. On February 22, 1941, the responsible official of the German Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Richter, on behalf of his superiors, in a strictly secret coded telegram to Ambassador in Moscow Schulenburg, informed that the time had come to announce the data on the number of German troops stationed in Romania in order to make an appropriate impression on Soviet circles . The 680,000-strong German army is in full combat readiness. It is well technically equipped and includes motorized parts. This army is supported by "inexhaustible reserves". Ritter suggested that all members of the German missions, as well as through proxies, begin disseminating information about German assistance. This assistance must be presented in an impressive manner, Ritter wrote, emphasizing that it is more than sufficient to meet any eventuality in the Balkans, from whatever side it comes from. It was proposed to disseminate this information not only in government circles, but also among interested foreign missions accredited in Moscow.

Along with intimidation, the Nazis tried to disguise the ongoing military preparations along the Soviet-German border. On January 10, 1941, an agreement was signed between Germany and the Soviet Union on the Soviet-German border from the river. Igorka to the Baltic Sea. After the conclusion of the agreement, the demarcation of the border determined by the agreement was to be carried out by authorized representatives of both parties. Negotiations on the procedure for the work of the commission began on 17 February. The German side dragged them out in every possible way. At the request of the High Command of the Ground Forces, Schulenburg was instructed to delay the negotiations in every possible way in order to prevent the work of the Soviet commission on the border. The Germans feared that otherwise their military preparations would be exposed.

The Nazis stepped up aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet border areas. At the same time, for the purpose of camouflage, they began to assert that rumors of an impending German attack on the Soviet Union were being deliberately spread by "English warmongers." Just at this time, the Soviet Union received warnings through diplomatic channels about German plans to attack the USSR.

A new complication of relations between the USSR and Germany then occurred because of Yugoslavia. On March 27, 1941, the government of Cvetkovic was overthrown in Yugoslavia, which signed an agreement on accession to the Tripartite Pact. The Yugoslav people were determined to offer armed resistance to the German aggressor. “The recent events in Yugoslavia,” Pravda wrote, “showed with all clarity that the peoples of Yugoslavia are striving for peace and do not want war and the country’s involvement in the maelstrom of war. Through numerous demonstrations and rallies, broad sections of the population of Yugoslavia expressed their protest against foreign policy government of Cvetkovic, which threatened Yugoslavia by drawing it into the orbit of the war ... ". On April 5, a treaty of friendship and non-aggression was signed between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, according to which, in the event of an attack on one of the parties, the other undertook to observe the "policy of friendly relations towards it." This formula was vague and not binding. On the day the treaty was published, April 6, Nazi Germany attacked Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union publicly condemned this act of aggression in the report of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs dated April 13, 1941, on the attitude of the USSR government towards the Hungarian attack on Yugoslavia. Although Hungary was condemned in the statement, the initiator of the aggression, Nazi Germany, was also condemned. The events connected with Yugoslavia showed that relations between Germany and the USSR were approaching a denouement.

Improvement of relations between the USSR and Japan before the Second World War

In an atmosphere of growing tension, the Soviet Union managed to achieve major success in dealing with another potential adversary - Japan.

Already from the end of 1939, the prospect of at least a temporary improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations gradually began to emerge. After Khalkhin Gol, some sobering up began in Japanese military circles. Attempts to put pressure on the Soviet Union by military means ended in failure. The war against the USSR seemed to be an extremely difficult and dangerous matter. The conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, which caused a cooling in relations between the partners of the "axis", also had a certain influence on Japanese policy. Japan's ruling circles were aware that under these conditions, Japan's chances of waging a victorious war against the USSR were significantly reduced. Despite the anti-Soviet campaign launched in Japan during the Soviet-Finnish conflict, things did not go beyond anti-Soviet statements in the press. A number of Japanese industrialists and financiers interested in developing economic relations with the USSR, and especially fishermen, put pressure on the government, demanding better relations with the USSR and the signing of a new fishing convention, since the previous one expired in 1939. Articles appeared in the Japanese press insisting signing a non-aggression pact with the USSR.

Such was the situation at the time of the collapse of France. This event significantly strengthened those Japanese circles that were in favor of expansion towards the southern seas. They also found support from Germany, which at that time considered waging war against England as its main task and therefore advocated the settlement of Soviet-Japanese relations "in order to untie the hands of Tokyo for expansion to the south. This was to draw the attention of England and the United States to Pacific Ocean, weakening their positions in Europe".

In early June, the issue of the border line between Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic in the conflict area of ​​1939 was settled. A month later, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Togo, proposed to conclude a Soviet-Japanese treaty for a period of 5 years. The essence of such a treaty, which would be based on the Soviet-Japanese treaty of 1925, was to maintain neutrality in the event that one of the parties was attacked by a third party. The Soviet Union agreed to the Japanese proposal, but made it conditional on the rejection of the 1925 treaty as "the basis of the new agreement, since the 1925 convention was largely outdated. In connection with the change of cabinet in Japan in July 1940, the negotiations were interrupted, and the ambassador of Togo was recalled to Tokyo. However, the trend towards a settlement with the USSR continued to intensify as favorable prospects emerged for intensifying Japanese aggression in Southeast Asia as a result of the weakening of England and the defeat of France and Holland. This trend was briefly formulated at the end September 1940 by the Japanese newspaper Hopi: "If Japan wants to advance in the south, it must be free from fears in the north." A new ambassador was appointed to Moscow - Taketawa, who, according to Foreign Minister Matsuoka, was instructed "to open a new page in relations between Japan and the Soviet Union".

The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940 meant, under those specific conditions, the strengthening of the Japanese circles advocating aggression in the southern direction, i.e. against British possessions in Asia. At the same time, one had to take into account the fact that in the event of a change in the international situation, for example, in the event of a German attack on the Soviet Union, Japan could provide her support. This point was repeatedly stressed by the responsible leaders of the Japanese government in secret meetings.

In autumn 1940 and early 1941, Soviet-Japanese negotiations continued. The USSR put forward a proposal to sign a treaty of neutrality, subject to the liquidation of Japanese oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin. In this case, the USSR undertook to compensate the concessionaires and supply Japan with Sakhalin oil for 5 years on normal commercial terms. The Japanese government agreed to discuss the draft treaty, but rejected the proposal to liquidate the concessions.

However, despite all the difficulties, Soviet-Japanese relations were already entering a period of temporary settlement. Its prospects improved after the signing in the second half of January 1941 of a protocol extending the fishing convention until the end of 1941. The unsuccessful start of Japanese-American negotiations also had a certain impact on Japan's position.

Shortly after the signing of the Tripartite Pact, the Japanese government approached the USSR government with a proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact. At the same time, Japan asked Germany to facilitate the conclusion of the pact.

The plan proposed by Ribbentrop was rejected in November 1940 by the Soviet government. Meanwhile, supporters of the direction of Japanese aggression to the south exerted an ever greater influence on Japanese foreign policy and demanded, for this purpose, to ensure the security of the Japanese rear in the north, i.e. in the northeastern regions of China bordering the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic. A significant role was played by the fact that the lessons of Khalkhin Gol had not yet been forgotten by the Japanese military. The prospect of a war against the USSR seemed much more dangerous than an attack on British possessions in Southeast Asia, given that England was in a very difficult situation. On February 3, 1941, at a joint meeting of the government and representatives of the military circles, the "Principles for Negotiating with Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union" were approved. On March 12, Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka left for Europe. During a stop in Moscow, Matsuoka suggested that the Soviet government conclude a non-aggression pact. Recall that in the 1930s the Soviet Union repeatedly approached Japan with such a proposal, but then it was rejected by Japan. In the new situation, the Soviet Union did not consider it sufficient to conclude only a non-aggression pact. It was important to secure Japanese neutrality in case of complications with Germany. Therefore, the Soviet Union put forward a counterproposal: to conclude a treaty of neutrality. On March 26, with this proposal, Matsuoka went to Berlin.

German pressure on Japan to incline towards a pro-German position

After the issuance of the "Barbarossa" directive, Nazi Germany began to put pressure on Japan in order to force her to take a position that would favor German plans. In the second half of January 1941, at a meeting with Mussolini at the Berghof, Hitler speaks of Japan "whose freedom of action is limited by Russia, just like Germany, which must keep 80 divisions on the Soviet border in constant readiness in case of action against Russia." Assessing Japan as an important factor in the struggle against Britain and the United States, Hitler deliberately emphasized that part of the Japanese forces were pinned down by the Soviet Union.

Hitler, receiving on February 3, 1941, the Japanese ambassador Kurusu, who came to him on a farewell visit, made transparent hints to the ambassador regarding the possible development of German-Soviet relations. "Our common enemies," he said, "are two countries - England and America. Another country - Russia - is not an enemy at the moment, but poses a danger to both states (i.e., to Germany and Japan. - A. N At the moment, everything is in order with Russia. Germany believes in this country, but the 185 divisions that Germany has at its disposal ensure its security better than treaties do. Thus, Hitler concluded, "German interests and Japan are absolutely parallel in three directions."

Seek to involve Japan in the war as soon as possible - such a directive was given in the directive of the German High Command of the Armed Forces No. 24 of March 5, 1941 regarding cooperation with Japan. This document explicitly stated that the goal of German policy was to involve Japan in active operations in the Far East as soon as possible. "Operation Barbarossa," it was said later, "creates especially favorable political and military conditions for this." From this The directive made it clear that Japan was attacking British possessions, while Germany, attacking the Soviet Union, released the Japanese troops chained in the Far East.

During the stay of the Japanese Foreign Minister in Berlin, this attitude was the leitmotif of all the conversations with him between Hitler and Ribbentrop. Emphasizing that England had already been defeated and it was advantageous for Japan to immediately oppose her, the head of the German Reich also drew the attention of the Japanese minister to the fact that England's hope was American help and the Soviet Union. By referring to the Soviet Union in this connection, Hitler wanted to prevent Japan from signing any political agreements in Moscow. Ribbentrop also tried to impress Matsuoka with the idea of ​​the imminent defeat of England and the liquidation of the British Empire; therefore, Japan should hurry, attacking, say, Singapore. Ribbentrop in every way made it clear to his interlocutor that the war of Germany against the USSR was inevitable. Hence, Matsuoka himself had to come to the conclusion that there was no point in entering into a political agreement with the Soviet Union. After all, Japan's ally, Germany, takes over everything... Ribbentrop explained to Matsuoka: "The German armies in the east are ready at any time. If Russia one day takes a position that can be interpreted as a threat to Germany, the Fuhrer will crush Russia. Germany is convinced that the campaign against Russia will end in the absolute victory of German arms and the complete defeat of the Red Army and the Russian state.The Führer is convinced that in the event of action against the Soviet Union in a few months there will no longer be a great power of Russia ... It should also not be overlooked that the Soviet Union, despite to all denials, is still carrying out communist propaganda abroad... Further, the fact remains that Germany must secure its rear for a decisive battle with England... The German army has practically no opponents on the continent, with the possible exception of Russia.

In a conversation dated March 29, 1941, Ribbentrop, in his usual provocative manner, assured Matsuoka: "If Russia ever attacks Japan, Germany will attack immediately." Consequently, the security of Japan in the north is assured.

Pressure was exerted on Matsuoka with unrelenting persistence during the entire stay of the Japanese minister in Berlin. On April 4, Matsuoka spoke again with Hitler, and on April 5 with Ribbentrop. Again and again the German ministers assured Matsuoka that England was about to collapse and that peace would be achieved at the price of her total surrender. Japan should hurry. Matsuoka sympathetically agreed, pretending to agree with everything, and asked for Japan's assistance in armaments, in particular in the equipment of submarines. Matsuoka promised his partners in Tokyo to support a plan to attack Singapore, although during his stay in Berlin he received a warning from the high command against making any military commitments, for example, an attack on Singapore. Matsuoka himself proceeded from the calculation that a war with England would not necessarily mean a war with the United States of America as well. Despite Ribbentrop's assurances that Germany would ensure the security of Japan in the north, Matsuoka, acting in the spirit of the directives received in Tokyo, decided to seek a direct Japanese-Soviet agreement. As early as February 2, the document "On Forcing the Policy of Advancement to the South" was approved in Tokyo.

Negotiations on the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese pact resumed on April 8, after Matsuoka returned to Moscow. They took place in an atmosphere of ongoing disagreement over the nature of the treaty. The Japanese Foreign Minister insisted on a non-aggression pact. The Soviet side agreed to this on the condition that the Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin be liquidated. After much debate, it was decided to sign a neutrality treaty, which was done on April 13, 1941. At the same time, Matsuoka gave a written commitment to resolve the issue of concessions in Northern Sakhalin within a few months. Later, in connection with the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, the problem of concessions was no longer returned.

The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was approved in Tokyo, since at that moment the supporters of expansion to the south had the upper hand. This was also expressed in the fact that on June 12 it was decided to intensify Japan's actions in the south, not stopping before the war with England and the United States of America. The final decision was made 10 days after the German attack on the Soviet Union, at the imperial conference on July 2, 1941.

German attack on the USSR. Speeches by Roosevelt and Churchill. Builds up anti-Hitler coalition, fundamentals? who? became an alliance of 3 great powers: Great Britain, the USSR and the USA. The statements of Churchill and Roosevelt met with the support of the majority of the British and American peoples, although some US and British statesmen considered the mutual exhaustion of Germany and the USSR more desirable. Their point of view was expressed by Senator Truman (later President). In England, similar views were shared by the Minister of Aviation? industrial Mur-Brabazon, but the leaders of the British and American governments considered it necessary to cooperate with the USSR in the fight against Germany. Since the USSR and Great Britain, unlike the United States, had already fought against Germany, the Soviet government offered England to conclude an agreement on joint actions. England agreed. On July 12, 1941, an Anglo-Soviet agreement was signed on joint actions in the war against Germany. The USSR and England pledged to "provide assistance and support to each other", + "not to negotiate, not to conclude a truce or a peace treaty, except by mutual consent." On July 31, 1941, the first one arrived in Arkhangelsk. English? Skies? military? ship with technical equipment and ammunition for the USSR. Then to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk - English "convoys" - transport ships guarded by warships with weapons and ammunition. Until the end of 1941, 7 British convoys came to the Union.

In order to stop the activities of Nazi agents in Iran, the USSR and England, by mutual agreement - and in accordance with the Iranian-Soviet agreement 1921-25 August 1941 sent their troops to Iran. The Shah of Iran, guided by Nazi Germany, abdicated and fled. Has the new Iranian government concluded an alliance treaty with the UK? and the USSR. It undertook to ensure the transportation through Iran of goods destined for the USSR, and the USSR and England undertook to withdraw their troops from Iran no later than 6 months after the end of hostilities? against Germany and her allies. Taking into account the wishes of the USSR, on December 6, 1941, England declared war on Germany's allies who fought against the USSR - Hungary, Romania and Finland. and groups that opposed the Nazis? Germany. In July 1941, the USSR signed agreements with the emigrant governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland based in London. The Soviet government recognized the Soviet-German treaties “on territorial changes in Poland” as “invalid”, but the question of future Polish borders remained open. The parties pledged to assist each other in the war against Germany. The Union agreed to form Czechoslovak military units on the territory of the USSR and the Polish army (mainly from Polish prisoners of war who were in the USSR).On September 27, 1941, the Soviet government, following the example of England, recognized General de Gaulle as the leader of all free French. It promised to provide the free French with "all-round assistance and assistance in the common? struggle with Germany and its allies, "+ expressed its determination to "ensure the complete restoration of the independence and greatness of France" after achieving a joint victory. In response, General de Gaulle pledged to "fight on the side of the USSR and its allies until victory over the common enemy is achieved and to provide the USSR with comprehensive help and assistance?

Moscow conference of 3 powers: the USSR, England and the USA in September-October 1941. The governments of the USA and England pledged to transfer to the USSR a significant amount of weapons, more than 3,500 aircraft and 4,500 tanks, and the USSR pledged to supply England and the USA with strategic raw materials. On October 30, Roosevelt ordered to provide the USSR with interest-free? a loan of 1 billion dollars, and on November 7, 1941 extended the Lend-Lease law to the USSR. American and British weapons, equipment and food began to systematically enter the USSR. They went 3 ways: northern, through Northern? Arctic?, to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk; southern - through Iran; and east - through Vladivostok. At first, these deliveries are small.

Atlantic Charter - the main policy document of the anti-Hitler? coalition signed by Roosevelt and Churchill on August 14, 1941 on a ship off the coast of Canada. According to the charter, the United States and Great Britain “do not seek territorial or other acquisitions” and “respect the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government under which? they want to live." To seek the restoration of "sovereign rights and self-government of those peoples who were deprived of this by force"; ensure equality? for all countries access to trade and to world raw material sources; “the ability to freely navigate the seas and oceans”; organize economic cooperation. Roosevelt and Churchill announced that they considered it necessary to disarm the aggressors and create a reliable system of universal security. They called on all states to "renounce the use of force" in the future. Although the Atlantic Charter was adopted without consultation with the USSR, it did not say anything about the specific tasks of the struggle against fascism, the USSR in September 1941 agreed with its principles. At the same time, fearing that the provision on the restoration of the sovereign rights and self-government of those peoples who were deprived of them by force, can be applied to the territory. acquisitions of the USSR in 1939-1940, stipulated that the practical application of the principles of the charter “should be consistent with the circumstances, needs and historical features of the country? or other countries.

Contradictions in the anti-Hitler? coalitions. There were serious contradictions in the coalition caused by differences in social and the political system of the state-tv included in it; their goals and their policies?. + Differences on the issue of the 2nd front in Europe, the creation of which the USSR considered the most effective way to achieve victory over Germany? Already on July 18, 1941, a week after the agreement on joint actions with England, Stalin raised this issue in a message to Churchill. Referring to the lack of manpower and means, Churchill rejected this and all subsequent proposals to open in 1941 “2oi? front in the Balkans or in France.? Another problem is the problem of post-war borders and, in general, the post-war structure of the world. Neither England nor the United States recognized the new borders of the USSR, established in 1939-1940, and were afraid of the possible? "Bolshevization of Europe", and the USSR wanted to legally secure its new borders. For the first time this problem was discussed in detail during the visit of the British Foreign Minister Eden to Moscow in December 1941. Eden intended to supplement the Anglo-Soviet agreement on joint actions during the war with an agreement on post-war cooperation and brought with him? a draft of such an agreement, according to which England and the USSR pledged to cooperate during the war and "in the reorganization of Europe after the war with attention to each other's interests," in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic? charter that both parties "do not seek territorial or other acquisitions" and will not interfere in the internal affairs of other peoples. The union proposed drafts of 2 treaties: “on the union and mutual? military? assistance between the USSR and England in the war against Germany”, others? - “On the establishment of mutual agreement between the USSR and Great Britain? in resolving post-war issues and on their joint actions to ensure security in Europe after the end of the war with Germany? To the 2nd treaty, Stalin, unexpectedly for Eden, proposed adding 2 secret protocols, in which specific ones are outlined? plan of the device? post-war? Europe. These protocols provided for the restoration of the pre-war borders of the USSR and the borders of European countries occupied by Germany, with territorial changes for some. Above the pre-war borders, the USSR claimed territories at the expense of Romania, Finland and part of East Prussia from the city of Koenigsberg. The Soviet government proposed to expand Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia at the expense of Hungary and Italy, and Turkey - to reward her for her neutrality - at the expense of Italy and Bulgaria. It was planned to transfer to Poland certain regions of Western Ukraine or Western Belarus with a Polish population and expand its territory in a westerly direction at the expense of East Prussia. Germany was supposed to be completely disarmed and divided into a number of states, restoring Austria as an independent state. The aggressors must compensate the victims for the losses caused by their attack. To preserve the future of peace in Europe, it was proposed to create an international organization - European? Council and put at its disposal "a certain number of troops." Stalin suggested to Eden that British military, air and naval bases be set up in France, Belgium, Holland, Norway and Denmark. The British government did not want to bind itself with specific obligations, + earlier it announced its non-recognition of the territory. changes after 1939, and promised the US government not to enter into secret agreements on a post-war organization without consulting it. Eden did not agree to guarantee the new borders of the USSR, and Stalin refused to sign draft treaties with Great Britain?. These disagreements were kept secret, but they seriously complicated the relationship.

Japan is making plans against England, USA, Holland. Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 11 Dec Germany and Italy + Hungary, Romanian, Bolg, Slovak, Croatian declared war on the United States. Treaty of Japan, Germany and Italy on Mutual Assistance. 18 Jan 41 Agreement on the delimitation of zones of military operations.

Signing of the 26th antifa by the states of the declaration of the United Nations in Washington.

Union of 3 great powers. After the US entered the war? Well, the British and US governments agreed on military-political plans. In December 1941 adopted a general? Anglo-American? war plan? The opening of the 2nd front in Europe was not envisaged by the plan. Instead, it was planned to organize the landing of Anglo-American troops in French possessions in North Africa, which were controlled by Vichy and where there were no German and Italian troops. Such an operation could not divert significant forces from the decisive Soviet-German front, but it was simpler, could withdraw Italy from the war and strengthen the positions of England and the USA in the Mediterranean. Having coordinated their plans without the participation of the USSR, the governments of England and the USA continued negotiations with the Union. Again the question of the 2nd front. The Soviet government insisted that Britain and the United States set up a 2nd against Germany? front in Europe as soon as possible, during 1942. Open 2i? front demanded by broad sections of the population in England and the United States. Roosevelt recognized the validity of this. But the military leaders of the United States and Britain, like Churchill, considered that there were no conditions yet for a landing in Europe.

To discuss further plans for the anti-Hitler? Roosevelt and Churchill invited Molotov to visit London and Washington in May-June 1942. The British government agreed to conclude an agreement on post-war cooperation with the USSR, but without specific reference to the future borders of the USSR. Molotov intended to postpone the signing of the treaty, but Stalin, given that Germany launched an offensive on the Eastern Front, instructed him to accept the project proposed? England?. May 26, 1942 in London signed the Anglo-Soviet? agreement “on an alliance in a war? Not against Hitler? Germany and its accomplices in Europe and about cooperation and mutual? assistance after the war?

The agreement confirmed the agreement on joint actions against Germany of July 12, 1941 and provided for joint actions in the post-war? period, + rendering mutual? help if one of the parties gets involved again? in the war? Well, from Germany? or related to it? gos. The USSR and England agreed to cooperate in organizing the security and economic prosperity of Europe; not enter into any alliances and not take part in any coalitions directed against the other side. The term of the agreement is 20 years. On June 11, 1942, the USSR and the USA concluded an agreement "on the principles applicable to mutual assistance in waging war? Ny against aggression.

The parties undertook to contribute to the defense and mutually provide materials, services and information. The Soviet government promised at the end of the war to return to the United States those of the defense materials supplied to the USSR, which would not be destroyed, lost or used and could be useful for the defense of the United States.

In the final settlement after the end of the war, the USA must take into account all the property, information, and other benefits that they received from the USSR. In the post-war? period provided for the possibility of concerted action? USSR and the USA with the aim of developing mutually beneficial economic relations? in the spirit of the Atlantic? charters. Signing an agreement with England? and agreements with the United States, the legal registration of the union of 3 great powers: the USSR, Great Britain and the USA was completed. Roosevelt suggested that the USSR create after the war "an international police force of 3-4 powers: the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and China," and Stalin replied that "Roosevelt is right."

Yielding to the USSR and the pressure of public opinion, the governments of England and the USA signed an Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American communiqué, which stated that between the USSR, Britain and the USA "an agreement was reached on the creation of a 2nd front in Europe in 1942."

In exchange, the US government obtained from the USSR consent to a reduction of about 40% in lend-lease supplies in order to use the freed resources for organizing a 2nd front, and the British government accompanied the communiqué confidentially? reservations?: “it is impossible to say in advance whether the situation will be such that it will be possible to carry out this operation when the indicated ones come? term". England and the USA did not fulfill their obligations on the 2nd front.

A week after the publication of the communique, Churchill again met with Roosevelt and convinced him to postpone the creation of a 2nd front in Europe. Back to the old French plan? North Africa. The USSR again had to fight alone with the main forces of Germany and its allies.