Bombing of Berlin by Soviet aircraft in 1941. Berlin bombing

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5-07-2016, 10:49

For some reason, it has become customary to believe that at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army suffered only one defeat. This flawed, rotten stereotype turns into dust, if we recall the bombing of Berlin in August-September 1941. Even Hitler, looking at the burning capital then, could not believe his eyes.

Indeed, in the summer of 1941, Germany choked with delight before the victorious march of its soldiers on Russian soil. Here, it would seem, is the same “blitzkrieg”. Die, Moscow! You didn’t even have aviation left, we defeated it on the fly, while it was still based on the ground. “Not a single bomb will ever fall on the capital of the Reich,” Hermann Goering, commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, declared to the German people. And the people unconditionally believed him because there was no reason not to believe. Adults and children slept in their beds for a healthy, full sleep.

Meanwhile, in the head of Admiral Kuznetsov, the idea lit up to pull the Germans so that the dream and reality of each of them would be filled with a nightmare, so that a piece of sausage would not go down the throat, so that the Germans would think: “Who are they, these Russians, and what are they capable of?” Well, soon Wehrmacht officers will indeed write in their diaries: “Russians are not people. They are made of iron."

So, on July 26, 1941, Kuznetsov's proposal to bombard Berlin falls on the table to Joseph Stalin. Madness? Undoubtedly! From the front line to the capital of the Reich - a thousand kilometers. Nevertheless, Stalin smiled contentedly and the very next day ordered the 1st Mine-Torpedo Aviation Regiment of the 8th Air Brigade of the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet to bomb Berlin.

On July 30, General Zhavoronkov arrives at the indicated air regiment and barely has time to talk about the order of the Headquarters, as the regiment commander Yevgeny Preobrazhensky discourages him by laying out ready-made calculations, a list of crews and a map of the proposed route on the table. Amazing! In those hellish days, the pilots, having anticipated the order, thought with one mind with Admiral Kuznetsov.

At first, the route involved flying over the sea past the island of Rügen (Slavic Ruyan or Buyan, sung by Pushkin). This was followed by a turn to the southern port city of Stettin, and after that a direct passage to Berlin opened.

Eight hours in an oxygen mask and in the cold, from which the windows of the cabins and goggles of headsets froze over. Behind a whole day of intensive training. Total: superhuman loads, never experienced by anyone before.

Over the territory of Germany, the group finds itself ... The Germans contact her by radio and offer to land at the nearest airport. They believe that it is the brave knights of the Luftwaffe who have gone astray. It doesn't even occur to them that it could be an enemy. Therefore, not having received an answer, they calm down. They do not answer, they say, and let them. It will be on their conscience.

Ten planes are forced to drop bombs on Stettin, on its port facilities. Fuel is running out, no more risk. However, the five remaining DB-3Fs make it to Berlin.

Trams and cars move below. Stations and military airfields are illuminated. The windows in the houses are on fire. No blackout! The Germans are convinced of their invulnerability.

Five planes are dropping 250-kilogram FAB-100 bombs on military-industrial facilities located in the very center of the city. Berlin plunges into pitch darkness, torn apart by flashes of fire. Panic sets in on the streets. But it's too late. Radio operator Vasily Krotenko is already transmitting: “My place is Berlin! The task was completed. We're going back to base."

Only after 35 minutes did the Germans realize that they had been bombarded from the air. Beams of searchlights rush into the sky, anti-aircraft guns open fire. However, the fire is carried out at random. Shells explode in vain at an altitude of 4500-5000 meters. Well, it can't be that the bombers flew higher! These are not gods!

The sun rose over the mutilated Berlin, and the Germans did not understand who bombed them. Newspapers came out with ridiculous headlines: “English aircraft bombarded Berlin. There are dead and wounded. 6 British planes shot down. Confused like children, the Nazis decided to lie in accordance with the precepts of Goebbels: "The more impudent the lie, the more they believe in it." However, the British were also confused, hastening to declare that there was no spirit over Germany.

And there was something to look forward to. Soviet aviation continued sorties. Until September 4, 86 of them were committed. From 33 aircraft, 36 tons of high-explosive and incendiary bombs hit Berlin. This is not counting the shells stuffed with propaganda leaflets, and 37 aircraft that bombed other cities in Germany.

Hitler howled like a wounded animal. On September 5, he sent innumerable forces of the North group to smash the Cahul airfield to smithereens. However, Berlin has already ceased to light fires at night, and every German has an animal fear of the darkness of his native Aryan sky.

The first group under the command of Colonel Preobrazhensky returned all, with the exception of the plane, which did not have enough fuel. Lieutenant Dashkovsky managed it. On August 13, 1941, five pilots who bombed Berlin received the title of Hero. Soviet Union and 2 thousand rubles each. The rest of the pilots were also awarded and rewarded. After that, the Preobrazhensky group bombed the capital of the Reich 9 more times.

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According to German radio reports, “on the night of August 7-8, 1941, British aircraft tried to raid Berlin, while a large group of aircraft was scattered on the outskirts of the capital, but several dozen aircraft nevertheless broke through, six of them were shot down and fell within the city limits." British radio immediately issued a refutation, stating that last night, due to bad weather conditions over the British Isles, British planes did not fly to Berlin. It soon became clear that the residents of Berlin were given an unpleasant surprise not by British, but by “completely destroyed” Soviet aviation. The sudden appearance of Soviet bombers over Berlin was not only a good sobering slap in the face of the air defense of the Reich, but also clearly showed the whole world the falsity of Goebbels' propaganda.

After the capture of Belarus by German troops in July 1941, Moscow became one of the main targets for the Luftwaffe units. On the night of July 22, 1941, the first massive enemy air raid on Moscow was made. About two hundred planes entered the city in four waves. This first raid lasted five hours. 22 bombers were shot down by anti-aircraft fire and night fighters. Approximately half of the enemy vehicles managed to break through to the capital and drop 104 tons of high-explosive and more than 46 thousand incendiary bombs (official reports refer only to individual aircraft that broke through, which clearly does not fit with the number of bombs dropped on Moscow). As a result, 130 people. were killed, 662 people. wounded. There were 1166 fires in the city, 37 buildings were destroyed. The next two nights also saw raids, each involving 100 to 125 enemy aircraft.

German bombers made raids, taking off from their forward bases in the area of Minsk, Orsha, Vitebsk and Smolensk. At the same time, the situation at the front did not allow Soviet long-range bomber aircraft to strike back at the capital of the Reich from the airfields of the Western and North-Western fronts. The distance from the front line to Berlin was more than a thousand kilometers, which exceeded the range of Soviet bombers. However, naval aviation, commanded by Lieutenant General S. F. Zhavoronkov, had such an opportunity. To date, it is he who is considered the author of the idea to carry out systematic raids on Berlin by the mine-torpedo aircraft of the Black Sea and Baltic fleets from the airfields of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet located on the islands of the Moonsund archipelago. From here to Berlin, the distance in a straight line was only 900 km, which allowed, albeit at the limit of possibilities, the use of long-range DB-3 bombers. Calculations showed that the fuel supply should be enough, but on the condition that the bomb load of the aircraft does not exceed 750 kg. The duration of the round-trip flight will be about seven hours. In the twentieth of July 1941, Lieutenant General of Aviation S. F. Zhavoronkov reported his thoughts to the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov.

From the memoirs of the People's Commissar of the Navy of the USSR N. G. Kuznetsov:

It was necessary to weigh everything well. And after that, the permission of the Stavka was still required. The case was very serious, it went beyond the rights of the People's Commissar of the Navy.
The Commander of the Air Force of the Navy, S. F. Zhavoronkov, also found himself in a difficult situation. On the one hand, according to his own data, it turned out that such an operation could be carried out. With great risk, at the limit, but possible. On the other hand, what a huge responsibility fell on him if the flight turned out to be unsuccessful! After all, this threatened the loss of all aircraft ...
“I will report to Headquarters,” I told him.

On July 26, 1941, N. G. Kuznetsov turned to I. V. Stalin with a proposal to carry out a strike on Berlin as a response to enemy raids on Moscow. The next day, the Headquarters gave the go-ahead for a strike on Berlin by the forces of two squadrons of the Baltic Fleet. It was decided not to use the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet due to the difficult situation in the south. Initially, the task was set for one hit, because in the context of a continuously deteriorating general situation, it was extremely difficult to predict the possibility of subsequent raids on Berlin.

Operation "Berlin", for which it was decided to involve the 1st mine-torpedo aviation regiment of the 8th bomber aviation brigade of the KBF Air Force, was being prepared in an atmosphere of strict secrecy. On July 27, 1941, the regiment received an order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin to carry out a bombing attack on Berlin and its military-industrial facilities in response to the bombing of Moscow that began on July 22.

On July 28, the commander of the naval aviation, Lieutenant-General S.F. Zhavoronkov, who was entrusted with the overall leadership of the operation, flew to the village. Carefree near Leningrad, where the 1st Mine-Torpedo Aviation Regiment was based. For the direct fulfillment of the task, twenty of the best crews of the regiment were selected, who had flown 1500-3000 hours, had experience in combat operations in the Winter War and made at least 15 sorties in the current war. All crews had experience in high-altitude and night flights. The Special Strike Group, consisting of four units of bombers and a control unit, was headed by the commander of the 1st mtap, Colonel E. N. Preobrazhensky, the military commissar of the regiment, battalion commissar G. Z. Oganezov, and flagship navigator Captain P. I. Khokhlov. From some sources it follows that senior political instructor N.F. Polyakov was appointed commissar of the Special Air Group, but his appointment took place only at the end of August, when Oganezov left the island for the mainland.

In addition to them, the group included all commanders and navigators of squadrons and units of the regiment. The group commanders were the commander of the 1st air squadron (AE) of the regiment, captain A. Ya. Efremov, the commander of the 2nd AE, captain V. A. Grechishnikov, the commander of the 4th AE, captain G.K. senior lieutenant A. I. Fokin; the control link was headed by the commander of the 3rd Red Banner Air Squadron, Captain M.N. Plotkin.

In the forest, three kilometers from the airfield Bezzabotnoe, tents were pitched, where the group was accommodated. A separate dining room with a buffet and classes for working out assignments were also arranged here. All this was dictated by the requirements of the strictest secrecy.

From July 28 to August 1, Colonel E. N. Preobrazhensky conducted classes with the crews on the topic “How to behave in flight at high altitudes and in the most difficult weather conditions”, since in order to avoid losses from balloons and anti-aircraft fire, the pilots had to make a long flight over Germany almost on maximum height. In this case, it was necessary to take into account a number of surprises that could arise in flight. For example, the lack of pressurization of the cabin required, in hot summer conditions, to achieve at least partial adaptation of people to winter uniforms, because during the flight the temperature overboard could drop to minus 45 degrees. It was possible to work at an altitude of five to seven thousand meters only in oxygen masks. Since the capillaries could not withstand pressure drops, it was necessary to morally prepare the crews for the appearance of oozing blood from under the nails, from the ears, and nose. These and other problems needed to be addressed. Serious psychological difficulties were created by the very fact of the need for many hours of non-stop flight over the German-controlled Baltic and German territory. Almost the entire flight must take place in conditions of complete radio silence - the commander was allowed to give signals only with air navigation lights. In addition, they had to fly without air cover (due to the small radius of action, fighters could provide escort only at the beginning of the journey). The only defense of the bombers from enemy air defense was only the height and stealth of the flight.

The flag-navigator of the Special Group P. I. Khokhlov (with the participation of the chief navigator of the Air Force of the Navy, Colonel M. N. Marosanov) was engaged in navigational training with the navigators of the group. The flight route was especially carefully worked out. Each pilot-navigator at any time of the flight had to know by memory what characteristic landmark of the central or southern part of the Baltic Sea he was on. An important role in orientation was played by sea beacons on the east coast of Sweden, the crews had to accurately know the nature and time of work of each. Great importance was attached to the accuracy of instrumental laying of the path and the study of the Berlin area. The crews were required to be well versed in the location of the bombing targets designated for them in the city. In addition to Berlin, alternate targets were studied: Stettin, Koenigsberg, Danzig.

The starting point of the flight is about. Ezel (Saaremaa), the largest of the islands of the Moonsund archipelago in the Baltic. The total length of the route is 1720-1760 km (three options were being prepared). The entire flight to Stettin and back ran over the sea, totaling 1200-1400 km (depending on the route option). The area where their airfield was located (within a radius of 150 km) was very carefully studied in such a way that, when deviating from it, the pilot or navigator, without looking at the map, could determine his place, head for the landing airfield and decide in his mind the time of arrival. The crews should have firmly remembered that if at least one fragment of an anti-aircraft shell hits any of the gas tanks, there may not be enough fuel for the return trip. In this case, landing away from settlements was allowed. At the same time, a strict condition was set: to burn the plane, and the crew to break through the front line.

On August 1, 1941, the Special Aviation Group received an order to relocate from the Carefree airfield to the Kogula airfield (Oezel Island) for operations in Berlin. Colonel E. N. Preobrazhensky gave an order according to which on August 2, 1941, the flight crew of the Special Group was considered to have left for a new location. For the commander of the 1st mine-torpedo aviation regiment, his deputy captain K. I. Fedorov remained.

Kogula airfield on about. Ezel was located 18 km northwest of the town of Kuresaare. It was built on the eve of the war for fighters and was an irregular circle, the borders of which were covered on almost all sides with small shrubs. The 12th Separate Red Banner Fighter Aviation Squadron under Major Kudryavtsev was based here, which provided air cover for the airfield. The unpaved runway was only 1,300 meters long, which was unacceptable for bombers. From the west and northwest, at a distance of 600-1000 m, a small forest approached the airfield. Farms adjoined the borders of the runway from the south and north. All this made the Kogula airfield extremely difficult to take off and land.

To determine the weather along the route, two MDR-6 (Che-2) flying boats under the command of Captain F. A. Usachev were allocated to help the Special Air Group. They were placed at the Kihelkonna maritime airfield. Boat crews, among other things, were charged with providing assistance to aircraft crews who made an emergency landing on the water. In the southwestern part, near the edge of the airfield, there was an underground fighter aviation command post. Now the headquarters of the operational group headed by S. F. Zhavoronkov is also located here.

E. N. Preobrazhensky himself was the first to fly to Ezel Island, by the evening of August 2, nine more crews arrived, the next day - the remaining ten. It took two days to place and disguise the aircraft. The planes were placed close to the outbuildings of farms, one or two at a time (depending on the number of buildings and the density of the surrounding vegetation) and covered with camouflage nets. The cars were at a distance of 300-600 m from each other. Earthen shelters were made for individual bombers. Around the airfield, by the efforts of the personnel, taxiways were made to disperse the aircraft. Mechanics and technicians armed with rifles and grenades were placed in outbuildings to guard the aircraft in parking lots. The camouflage measures taken allowed the Special Group to avoid losses from enemy air raids during virtually the entire time they were on Ezel (with the exception of September 6).

The proximity of enemy airfields caused serious concern, since the air defense of the Kogul airfield was frankly weak: two 76 mm anti-aircraft batteries and 14 I-153 Chaika fighters. In addition, the VNOS posts were located on the sea coast too close to the airfield and could not notify in a timely manner of the approach of enemy aircraft. There were no ground-based radio navigation aids: there was neither a radio station nor a radio beacon.

At dawn on August 3, minesweepers and self-propelled barges, which had left Kronstadt and two Estonian ports not yet occupied by the Germans, were delivered to about. Ezel stockpiled bombs and aviation fuel, as well as steel plates for extending the runway, two tractors, a bulldozer, an asphalt compactor, a galley and bunks for flight and technical staff Special strike group. Throughout the period, there was a lack of fuel and bombs due to the difficulty of their delivery. Sea caravans delivering goods to Ezel suffered losses from minefields and attacks by enemy aircraft. This explains the impossibility of conducting daily raids on Berlin.

The weather didn't work out either. The date of the first flight to Berlin had to be postponed several times due to unfavorable weather conditions during the period 3-6 August, when there were low clouds and dark moonless nights. These days, the aircraft of the group took off to perform other combat missions. For example, a blow was struck at Swinemünde. This flight was primarily reconnaissance in nature.

On the night of August 5, a trio of bombers (captains M. N. Plotkin, V. A. Grechishnikov, Lieutenant N. M. Leonov) made a test reconnaissance flight in the direction of Berlin. The planes of Plotkin and Grechishnikov reached Danzig and dropped six FAB-100s on the city, after which they went back. The crew of Lieutenant Leonov only reached Vindava, lost their bearings on their return and decided to land on the well-known Kotly airfield near Leningrad. But the pilots were not expected there, the airfield was not lit. While landing, the plane crashed into the ground. Lieutenant N. M. Leonov and navigator Major M. I. Kotelnikov (chief of staff of the 1st Mtap) died immediately, gunner-radio operator Sergeant P. I. Rybalko died three days later. This was the first, but by no means the last, loss of the Special Air Group.

On the afternoon of August 5, yet another tragedy nearly struck. An order was received from the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to bomb an enemy observation post in the Pärnu area. Colonel E. N. Preobrazhensky decided to personally lead a trio of bombers on a mission. Under the fuselage, each aircraft carried three FAB-500 bombs. Departure was scheduled for 13.00. While they were waiting and taxiing to the start, the engines overheated due to the hot weather. As soon as the plane took off from the ground, the thrust of the right engine fell sharply. E. E. Preobrazhensky had no choice but to land the car “in front of him” on a rocky surface. The plane demolished the fence and, hitting the forester's house with its wing, turned 180 degrees. By some miracle, the bombs on the external sling did not detonate.

I opened the lower hatch of my cabin and jumped down without a ladder. Slipped and fell on his back. Three powerful bombs were still swinging on holders over my head.
The plane did not take off during landing only by a lucky chance. He ran into a large boulder, towering 80 centimeters above the ground, walked along it with the bottom, destroying the lower part of the fuselage to the very tail unit. The stone pushed up the access hatch of the gunner-radio operator. But bombs? None of them touched the stone.

Due to a bad forecast, on the night of August 6, the bombers of the Special Group bombed not Berlin, but Vindava. Due to bad weather conditions on the night of August 7, the flight did not take place at all. However, by the evening of August 7, the weather had improved. Captain F. A. Usachev, who flew on the MDR-6 for reconnaissance, reported: six points of cloudiness with a lower edge of 1300 meters. Visibility is good. To the south of this parallel, the cloudiness becomes denser, reaching up to nine points. Visibility is five kilometers. Fifty kilometers before the southern coastline of the sea, continuous cloudiness begins, in some places light rain. In general, the weather is difficult, but you can fly. Having received this information, General S. F. Zhavoronkov scheduled the departure time for Berlin at 21.00. Twelve crews were ready for the upcoming flight.

From the memoirs of P. I. Khokhlov:

The hands of the clock were approaching the number 9. I opened the astro hatch and, with a rocket launcher in my hand, rose above my cockpit. E. N. Preobrazhensky nodded his head to me, which meant - give a signal. A green rocket traced the air in the late afternoon twilight. The engines started. Everything around was noisy, buzzed, flashed.
The flagship, moving heavily along the taxiway, entered the airfield and taxied to the start. Here, with two flags in his hands, stood General Zhavoronkov. Waving to us, he held out a white flag along the runway, this is permission to take off. And I entered the first entry in the logbook: "Takeoff - at 21 o'clock."

First, the first four took off, led by Colonel E. N. Preobrazhensky (he is also the leader of the group). Together with him, the cars of Captain M.N. Plotkin, Senior Lieutenant P.N. Trychkov and Lieutenant N.F. Dashkovsky took off. The planes lined up in a rhombus and lay down on the course. Fifteen minutes later, the four of Captain V. A. Grechishnikov started, and fifteen minutes later, Senior Lieutenant A. Ya. Efremov. Together with them, the crews of captains E.E. Esin and G.K. Belyaev, senior lieutenants A.I. Fokin and I.P. Finyagin, lieutenants K.A. Milgunov, and A.F. Kravchenko went on a mission. After two and a half hours of flight, the flagship from the sea accurately brought the group to the reference point, after which the bombers crossed the coastline and headed for Stettin, from which it was a stone's throw to Berlin. The Stettin airfield was flashing with lights. Apparently, the Germans considered the approaching Soviet bombers to be their own. On the airfield, beams of searchlights illuminated the long runway, inviting them to land. In the moonlight, the Stettin-Berlin motorway was clearly visible.

The German capital from air attacks was covered quite well. Anti-aircraft batteries were located within a radius of 100 km around the city. The anti-aircraft artillery coverage area extended for 160 km from Berlin, around which three defense rings were created: the first with a radius of 20-30 km, the second with a radius of 10-15 km and the third directly above the city. Searchlight batteries served all areas of Berlin. Their number increased as they approached the city. Barrage balloons were widely used, forcing bombers to bomb from a height of at least 4000 meters. However, Berlin, like Stettin, did not expect the raid at all.

Soon, patches of light appeared ahead of us. Berlin was in full view. The windows of the houses were not lit, but the streets and squares were illuminated. The squares of blocks and the lines of electric lamps stood out clearly. With navigation lights, Preobrazhensky gave the command to disperse and go to the target on his own. The flagship plane rushed to the Stettin railway station. In total, five crews managed to get to Berlin, dropping 30 bombs. Attacks were made on military installations on the shores of Lake Tegeler, government offices on the outskirts of the Tiergarten, warehouses, factories and oil storage facilities on the outskirts of the city. The rest of the group's aircraft bombed on alternate targets. Only after the first bombs fell on the capital of the Reich and fires blazed below, an air raid alert was announced. The city plunged into darkness, anti-aircraft artillery opened fire, night fighters appeared in the sky. But the deed was done. Soviet planes, freed from bombs, went north to the sea.

From the memoirs of P. I. Khokhlov:

We left Berlin, completely immersed in the darkness of the night. And I involuntarily thought: where is your arrogant self-confidence, Berlin - the citadel of bloody fascism? Where are your brightly lit streets, the glitter of their shop windows? We, the Baltic pilots, instantly plunged you into the darkness of the night, leaving bonfires of conflagrations instead of shining lights. Get what you brought to our Soviet cities.
The thirty-minute flight to Stettin was not easy for us. Fascist fighters raged in the air, trying at all costs to intercept the Soviet bombers. And, probably, that is why the gunner-radio operator of the flagship Krotenko hastily transmitted a radiogram to his airfield with a prearranged text: “My place is Berlin. Completed the task. I'm coming back." It should have been handed over with our going to sea. But Krotenko reasoned as follows: what if they shoot down the plane, and think and guess later, were we over Berlin or not, shot down us over the target or on the way to it?
He did the right thing, of course.

On August 8, 1941, at 8.50, the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (KBF), Admiral V.F. Tributs, sent the following radiogram to the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Direction, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. The regiment completed the task. Everyone returned." Two and a half hours later, a radiogram was also sent to the commandant of the Coastal Defense of the Baltic Region (BOBR), Colonel E. N. Preobrazhensky: “The Military Council of the KBF congratulates the personnel of the first aviation regiment on the successful completion of a special combat mission. We are sure that the Baltic pilots will fulfill any task set by the party and the government.”

Generally first raid to Berlin was successful. All crews returned to the Kogula airfield without loss. From that moment on, Soviet pilots began to inflict air strikes on Berlin regularly. In total, during August-September 1941, the German capital was subjected to ten raids carried out by naval mine-torpedo and army long-range bomber aviation (DBA). At the same time, the organization of each raid looked like this. Aviation Lieutenant General S.F. Zhavoronkov, who was in charge of the overall operation, personally set the task, instructed and gave permission to take off to each crew commander. Colonel E. N. Preobrazhensky with his staff led the direct daily preparation and organization of sorties. For each bombardment, he made a preliminary decision (usually in the morning), which determined the number of aircraft and bomb load, depending on the state of the airfield and the degree of readiness of the crews, after which preparations for the combat mission began. After studying the latest weather data an hour and a half before departure, the necessary adjustments were made to the preliminary decision, and E. N. Preobrazhensky made the final decision for the flight. First of all, the time of departure of the first link was set and the time interval was set, with which the rest of the links took off after the first one. To minimize the risk during takeoff, the units started before dark. The last aircraft of the group took off already at dusk no later than 22.30.

For the flight, the shortest route was chosen, minimizing the possibility of loss of orientation (most aircraft did not have radio semi-compasses) and providing reliable access to the target, as well as stealth from enemy VNOS posts. The route was laid with the least number of breaks. The first hour the cars flew at an altitude of 200-500 m, then rose to 4000 m. Over 100 km from the coast they gained altitude up to 5000 m. Over the territory of Germany (from Swinemünde to Berlin and back) the flight took place at a maximum lakes served as landmarks. The side lights of the aircraft were turned off, which made the task of the driven crews extremely difficult - in the dark it was possible to keep a place in the ranks, focusing only on a faintly noticeable (no further than 30 m) flame of the exhaust pipes. Therefore, strikes were often carried out by single aircraft.

For more than half of the way to the target, the aircraft usually flew in formation. However, with the onset of darkness, the crews could no longer withstand the formation and went to the target on their own. Bombing was carried out from various heights. Usually the first link struck from a height of 5500 m, while the height of the bombing for other links increased, reaching 7000 m. In the air defense zone, the pilots, actively maneuvering, even lost the leading formation, as a result of which the aircraft often had to return one by one. Departure from the target was carried out with a slight decrease at maximum speed. When returning, the pilots tried to keep to the coastline, which practically eliminated the loss of orientation. The return flight over the sea took place at an altitude of 3000-4000 m. About an hour before landing, the planes descended to 1000-2000 m. was visible for 30-40 km.

To hinder the work of German air defense systems, the direction of approach to the target changed in each flight. In total, three route options were developed: the shortest - with a distance to the target of 840 km, and also with an approach to the target from the west (910 km) and northeast (860 km). In practice, the established route was not always adhered to, the main reason was, as a rule, weather and engine wear. In fact, in each flight, more than half of the crews violated the assigned route. But it was precisely this tactic of giving each crew the right to make independent decisions in the target area and when returning home that made it possible to minimize direct combat losses of flight personnel and equipment in the Special Air Group of Colonel E. N. Preobrazhensky. For the entire time of the bombing of Berlin, the Special Group lost only one crew from enemy air defense systems (and that one over the target in conditions of dense anti-aircraft fire).

For the implementation of the first raid on Berlin, by the Decree of the PVS of the USSR of August 13, 1941, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to Colonel E. N. Preobrazhensky, captains V. A. Grechishnikov, A. Ya. Efremov, M. N. Plotkin and P. I. Khokhlov. The Order of Lenin was awarded to 12 people, the Order of the Red Banner - 21 people, the Order of the Red Star - 20 people, the medal "For Military Merit" - 14 people.

Second raid Aviation of the Baltic Fleet to Berlin took place on the night of August 8-9 with the forces of 12 vehicles of the 1st Mine-Torpedo Aviation Regiment. Already over Stettin appeared German fighters. However, most of the crews made their way to Berlin. The bombardment lasted from 0.55 to 1.25. In addition to 72 bombs (mostly incendiary ZAB-100s), leaflets with a speech by I.V. Stalin dated July 3, 1941 were dropped on the capital of the Reich. This time, the Berlin air defense met the Soviet bombers with strong anti-aircraft fire. The crew of flight commander senior lieutenant I.P. Finyagin, who was shot down over the target, did not return from this flight (navigator Lieutenant A.N. Dikiy, gunner-radio operator (squadron communications chief) junior lieutenant V.I. Marokin and air gunner Red Navy N.P. . Shuev). In addition, when landing in extremely difficult weather conditions, several aircraft rolled out of the airfield and damaged the landing gear, and the aircraft st. Lieutenant A. I. Fokin, unsuccessfully sat down almost at the end of the lane, was defeated. Most of the cars returned with numerous holes.

Third raid on Berlin was committed on the night of August 10. This raid falls out of the general series, since it was carried out not by the group of E. N. Preobrazhensky, but by pilots of the army DBA, and not from Fr. Ezel, and from the airfield in Pushkin near Leningrad. This episode needs to be told in more detail.

Back in June 1941, several aviation regiments began to be formed from volunteers at the Air Force Research and Testing Institute. Two regiments of MiG-3 fighters, a Pe-2 bomber regiment and an Il-2 attack aircraft regiment soon flew to the front. In addition, four special-purpose long-range bomber regiments were formed, designed to perform special tasks and equipped with TB-7 (Pe-8) bombers - the 412th and 413th regiments and Yer-2 - the 420th and 421st regiments. Soon they became part of the formed 81st air division of the Hero of the Soviet Union brigade commander M. V. Vodopyanov. In fact, in July 1941 an attempt was made to create a Soviet strategic aviation.

ORDER
ON THE FORMATION OF THE 81st LONG-TERM AVIATION DIVISION

In pursuance of the decision of the USSR State Defense Committee of July 14, 1941, I order:

1. Form the 81st long-range aviation division on TB-7 aircraft, consisting of:
management of the 81st aviation division according to the state number 015/140,
432nd aviation regiment TB-7 according to the state number 015/141,
433rd aviation regiment TB-7 according to the state number 015/141.
2. Each regiment should have five squadrons of TB-7s, consisting of three ships each, one squadron of security fighters of the Yak-1 or LaGG-3 type, consisting of 10 aircraft, and an airfield maintenance battalion.
3. Formation of the management of the 81st Aviation Division and the 432nd Aviation Regiment to be completed by July 20, 1941. The personnel and materiel of the 412th Aviation Heavy Bomber Regiment TB-7 should be directed to the formation.
The formation of the 433rd Aviation Regiment should be completed as aircraft are received from industry.
4. Appoint brigade commander Comrade Vodopyanov as commander of the 81st Aviation Division.
5. Commander of the Red Army Air Force, Lieutenant General Aviation Comrade Zhigarev, staffing the 81st Aviation Division with the flight and technical staff of the Research Institute of the Air Force of the Spacecraft, allocated from the Northern Sea Route and the NKAP, and the most qualified staff of the Red Army Air Force.
6. Establish a salary of 5,000 rubles for the commander of the 81st Aviation Division. All flight personnel of the 81st Aviation Division shall maintain the salaries they previously received, but not lower than the salaries established for long-range aviation regiments.
7. The head of the Political Propaganda Department of the Red Army and the head of the Personnel Department of the Red Army to ensure the ongoing activities by the command staff of the combined arms categories.
8. To the Chief Quartermaster of the Red Army and the central departments of the NPO to provide the ongoing activities with all the required types of allowances.

Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army
General of the Army Zhukov

From the very moment of formation, the connection had a special status. Although the division was directly subordinate to the Air Force Commander P.F. Zhigarev, at first I.V. Stalin personally set tasks for it. The most combat-ready were considered the 412th (later 432nd) air regiment of Colonel V.I. Lebedev and the 420th air regiment of Colonel N.I. Novodranova, formed according to state No. 015/131.

From the memoirs of P. M. Stefanovsky:

But soon an order was received to transfer all the ships to one of the aircraft factories to replace the installed engines with M-40 diesel engines with turbochargers. In principle, this was a reasonable decision: diesel fuel is less susceptible to fire than gasoline. In addition, each new engine had two turbochargers, which increased its altitude and, consequently, improved the flight performance of the entire ship. But here's the trouble: the outbreak of the war prevented aircraft diesels from being tested in flight; After all, they were just recently put into production, and they have not yet had time to finish all the necessary fine-tuning.
Lebedev had to hastily install new power plants on the aircraft without the required tests. And it was necessary to fly into the deep rear of the enemy.
The change of motors took a month. At the same time, the crews were being retrained for the new materiel.

Although the Baltic Fleet aircraft carried out a successful raid on the German capital, the damage caused to the enemy was extremely insignificant. Therefore, the Headquarters decided to deliver a powerful blow to Berlin with the latest TB-7 and Yer-2 bombers, capable of carrying a serious bomb load. The calculations showed that the TB-7 with M-40F diesel engines (it was on these machines that hopes were pinned) is capable of flying to Berlin with a bomb load of 4000 kg (of which 2000 kg is on an external sling) and, having bombed at the target, safely return to the base . Er-2, in turn, could carry a bomb load of more than a ton over long distances.

However, there was a serious danger. Diesels on TB-7 worked extremely unstable. This was especially often manifested in flights at high altitudes - the engines often malfunctioned and stalled.

Serial Yer-2s also caused great criticism, primarily because of their high fire hazard due to design errors. Defects in the landing gear cleaning system became another serious nuisance - there were several accidents due to the folding of the landing gear during the run. Almost all cars needed factory refinement. However, the war did not leave time to eliminate the identified defects.

The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense contains a note dictated by I. V. Stalin to G. M. Malenkov at a meeting of the State Defense Committee on the night of August 9, 1941.

To oblige the 81st Aviation Division, led by the division commander Comrade Vodopyanov, from 9.8 to 10.8 or one of the following days, depending on weather conditions, to raid Berlin. During a raid, in addition to high-explosive bombs, it is imperative to drop incendiary bombs of small and large caliber on Berlin. In the event that the engines begin to fail on the way to Berlin, have the city of Konigsberg as a backup target for the bombing. I. Stalin. 8.8.41

Around the same time, an order was signed on material rewards for the Baltic pilots who made the first raid on Berlin. The content of the last two paragraphs of the order is noteworthy. Probably, I. V. Stalin, placing great hopes on the 81st Aviation Division, but at the same time depriving M. V. Vodopyanov of time even for the minimum study of the operation and training of crews, thus tried to somehow stimulate the flight crew.

ORDER
ON THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE BOMBING OF THE CITY OF BERLIN

On the night of August 7-8, a group of Baltic Fleet aircraft made a reconnaissance flight to Germany and bombed the city of Berlin.
5 aircraft dropped bombs over the center of Berlin, and the rest on the outskirts of the city.
I express my gratitude to the personnel of the aircraft participating in the flight.
I am entering with a petition to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on rewarding those who have distinguished themselves.
Issue 2,000 rubles to each crew member who participated in the flight.
From now on, to establish that each member of the crew who dropped bombs on Berlin should be given 2,000 rubles.
An order to announce to the crews of the aircraft that participated in the first bombing of Berlin, and to all personnel of the 81st long-range air division.

People's Commissar of Defense
I. STALIN

On August 10, a group of M. V. Vodopyanov, consisting of 18 TB-7 and 16 Yer-2, flew to the Pushkin jump airfield near Leningrad. The commander of the Air Force, Lieutenant General P.F. Zhigarev, also arrived here. After landing, tired pilots and navigators were not given time to rest.

From the report of M. A. Brusnitsyn:

Upon arrival in Pushkin, the personnel were assembled to give instructions to unload the aircraft and hang bombs on 7 FAB-100. Flight commanders and navigators were assembled to work out the mission. At 15.00, a combat order was received to fly to the Berlin target ... The flight order was set as follows. The first link takes off TB-7, followed by the Er-2 link at 20.30 under the command of Captain Stepanov, followed by the TB-7 link at 20.45 and at 21.00 the Er-2 link under the command of Captain Brusnitsyn, followed by the next link TB-7. Behind the TB-7 link, a pair of Yer-2s take off under the command of junior lieutenant Molodchy ...

From the memoirs of A.P. Shtepenko:

We were gathered at the headquarters. The flag navigator pins a map to a large blackboard. A thick black line stretches across the mainland, the sea, the mainland again and rests at the end in Berlin. From Berlin, the black line goes into the sea, makes several bends and returns to the starting point. Everything became clear - the flight was scheduled for Berlin.
The flag navigator introduces the flight plan, heading, altitude, time and speed in detail. One of the pilots asked one of the generals present a question: what to do with orders and documents, leave them here or can you take them with you? The general replied:
- Why leave? You will all be here tomorrow morning.

However, not everyone was here tomorrow morning. In the upcoming raid, it was decided to use 12 TB-7 and 8 Yer-2. Further events developed rapidly, but not at all in the way that the Air Force commander, Lieutenant General of Aviation P.F. Zhigarev, who personally set the task of taking off, had planned. Presumably, it was he who ordered that the TB-7 take off from the concrete strip, and the Yer-2 from the unpaved one. As it turned out, the power of the M-105 engines was not enough for a normal take-off of the overloaded Yer-2 from such a short runway. The M-40F diesel engines installed on the TB-7 also caused a lot of trouble.

Links TB-7 and Er-2 were supposed to take off alternately. The flight was delayed by about half an hour. At 20.50, the pair Kurban - Peregudov started, immediately after it at 21.05 - the pair Vodopyanov - Tyagunin. At 21.10, the Er-2 link (Stepanov, Kubyshko, Malinin) took off. For some reason, the next TB-7s did not take off (perhaps due to the failure of the engines in the car of Captain M.V. Rodnykh), so the Er-2s began to take off. Captain M.A. Brusnitsyn took off safely and, in anticipation of the followers, began to circle over the airfield. Yer-2 junior lieutenant A. I. Molodchiy took off. However, the pilot failed to lift the heavily loaded car off the ground and, having landed outside the runway in a drainage ditch, demolished the landing gear.

From the memoirs of A. I. Molodchiy:

When the edge of the airfield flashed under the plane, I had no choice but to take the helm, although the speed for separation was still low. The movement of the yoke caused the aircraft to reluctantly raise its nose. The main wheels hung in the air, and the tail continued to roll on the ground. The plane did not fly, it hung on the motors, it still lacked speed a little. The prematurely increased takeoff angle worsened its aerodynamics, and it again sank to the ground with its main wheels.
Maybe everything would have cost, but outside the airfield there was a ditch of the drainage system. That's where the wheels came in. A sharp, tremendous blow followed. For a while, everything - both heaven and earth - was mixed with dust. There was one thing in my mind: now, an explosion will follow, and we will fly into the air. But not on the wings of the aircraft, but from our own bombs.

By some miracle, the plane not only did not explode, but did not even catch fire. However, the flights of the remaining Yer-2s were cancelled. Only M. A. Brusnitsyn, who had already taken off, received a command from the ground to wait, and he continued to fly over the airfield. In the meantime, at 22.00, a flight consisting of TB-7 majors K.P. Egorov and M.M. Ugryumov, lieutenants V.D. Bidny and A.I. Panfilov began to take off.

The ship No. 42046 of Major Egorov took off at 21.58, while climbing 30-40 meters, turned sharply to the right into the ground with an angle, as a result of which the aircraft was completely destroyed. From the crew, 6 people were killed, 6 people were seriously injured. Of these, 2 died in the hospital.

As it turned out later, both right engines failed in Yegorov's plane. Immediately after that, the takeoff of the vehicles remaining on the ground was stopped. The TB-7s that managed to take to the air headed for Berlin, Captain M.A. Brusnitsyn received the command to land. But even here it was not without trouble. Loaded to the eyeballs Er-2, the run length turned out to be too long. In order not to crash into the cars standing at the end of the lane, the pilot had to slow down, as a result of which the right landing gear broke. But everything worked out. Thus, seven TB-7s and three Yer-2s left to complete the task. However, the chain of tragic accidents did not end there.

The fact is that under the conditions of the regime of special secrecy, even the front command was not warned about the appearance near Leningrad of the latest, hitherto unknown heavy bombers to anyone. No one thought that the Soviet air defense could take those found in the sky unfamiliar cars for the enemy. Inconsistency, carelessness and haste had tragic consequences. Events in the sky unfolded as follows.

The first TB-7 No. 42016 of Lieutenant Colonel A. A. Kurban and No. 42025 of Senior Lieutenant A. A. Peregudov, who took off first, walked in pairs for about an hour. In the area of Lake Lubenskoye, Peregudov's plane was attacked by our I-153 fighter, and a little later fired upon by our anti-aircraft artillery. At 21.30, after the failure of one of the engines, the crew received a radio command to return. Having dropped bombs into the sea, at 0.30 A. A. Peregudov made an emergency landing in Pushkin. In doing so, he was severely wounded. The plane counted two shrapnel and eleven bullet holes.

Lieutenant Colonel A. A. Kurban, left alone in the area of \u200b\u200bFr. Dago continued the task. At 1.30, navigator Major G.P. Molchanov dropped three FAB-500s and two RRAB-3s on Berlin from a height of 7500 m (each cassette was equipped with 116 incendiary bombs of 2.5 kkg each). One FAB-500 did not leave the holders and was not dropped. On the way back, the engine caught fire, I had to go on three. In the area of the Luga Bay, they came under fire from our coastal and naval anti-aircraft artillery. 35 km east of Pushkin, another engine failed, because of this, A. A. Kurban made an emergency landing near the village of Maloye Zabolotye. The car was damaged, but the crew, fortunately, remained unharmed.

TB-7 No. 42045 captain A.N. northern tip the eastern cape of the Luga Bay was attacked twice by our fighters, after which they were fired upon by our anti-aircraft artillery. The shells hit the left plane and the engine, the plane caught fire and began to collapse. The navigator dropped bombs into the sea, after which the commander, turning to the shore, ordered the crew to jump. The crew members descending on parachutes were also fired upon by fighters from the ground. As a result, four were killed, one was missing.

The division commander M. V. Vodopyanov managed to escape from the I-16 attack, after which, despite the periodic failure of one of the engines, he reached Berlin, dropping eight FAB-250s and two RRAB-3s on the target. However, when moving away from the target, anti-aircraft fire damaged the fuel tanks. Due to a lack of fuel, it was necessary to make an emergency landing directly on the forest in the Estonian territory occupied by the enemy in the Jõhvi region. Thanks to the skill of M.V. Vodopyanov, the crew was not injured. The plane was burned and two days made their way to the east. A successful outcome was greatly facilitated by the knowledge of the Estonian language by a member of the commander's crew, Major E.K. Pusep.

It was possible to bombard Berlin and TB-7 No. 42055 of Major M. M. Ugryumov. The beams of searchlights could not break through low clouds and did not create problems, anti-aircraft artillery fired at random. Two RRAB-3s and four out of eight FAB-250s were dropped - the rest hung and did not leave the rails. At an altitude of 7400 m, the stern gunner fired at a link of night fighters, after which the TB-7 went into the clouds. On the way back, we managed to free ourselves from two bombs. When dropping leaflets over the territory of Germany, an assistant flight engineer, military engineer of the 1st rank, A. G. Smirnov, who accidentally cut off the hose of an oxygen device, died from a lack of oxygen. Due to loss of orientation, having used up fuel in an almost ten-hour flight, M. M. Ugryumov made an emergency landing in the Torzhok area. The crew and aircraft were not injured.

The crew of Lieutenant V. D. Bidny in car No. 42035 was less fortunate - they were attacked by German fighters and fired at by anti-aircraft guns, after which the commander was able to take the plane with a damaged engine into the clouds. However, they soon began to lose altitude. Not having reached the target only 370 km, V. D. Bidny decided to drop thirty hundred-kilogram high-explosive bombs at st. Lauenberg. On the way back, another engine failed. Already in the Leningrad region at an altitude of 1000-1500 m, the damaged TB-7 was fired upon by our anti-aircraft artillery, after which at 7.45 our fighters landed on the site in Obukhovo.

The fate of the crew of TB-7 No. 42026 Lieutenant A.I. Panfilov was tragic. The report says little about it.

From combat report No. 1 of the headquarters of the 432nd air regiment dated 08/19/1941, 20.00:

Ship No. 42026 t. Panfilov took off at 22.00. Having a bomb charge FAB-250 - 8 pieces, ZAB-50 - 16 pieces, after takeoff there was no information about the ship.

For a long time the fate of the crew remained unknown. Only much later did certain details of the tragedy that had unfolded in the Baltic sky come to light. Shortly after takeoff, the plane came under fire from our anti-aircraft artillery. Almost immediately, the commander of the ship, Lieutenant A.I. Panfilov, and the navigator, Senior Lieutenant G.S. Balaboshko, were killed. The engines sparked violently, oil leaked from the damaged cooling system, but despite the threat of fire, the crew tried to maintain the route. Apparently, they soon had to get rid of the bombs by dropping them into the sea, although there is a possibility that the pilots still managed to strike at one of the spare targets. On the way back, the two motors no longer sparked, but burned. In addition, the lack of a navigator had an effect - by mistake, instead of the Pushkin airfield, they headed for Helsinki. When they realized it and began to turn around the burning car, it was too late, the plane fell into the forest in the Lapignarvi area. During the fall, a flight engineer, military technician of the 1st rank, A. G. Gainutdinov, a flight mechanic, a military engineer of the 1st rank, V. E. Tyushkin, a nose gunner, Lieutenant I. V. Shatrov, and a gunner-radio operator, senior sergeant V. I. Stanevsky, were killed. The co-pilot, Senior Lieutenant M. I. Antipov and four gunners survived: Lieutenant S. I. Kizilov, Sergeant K. G. Sharlykov and junior sergeants G. A. Kirillov and M. I. Krysin. When trying to get to their own, they stumbled upon the Finns. In 1944, only M. I. Antipov, M. I. Krysin and S. I. Kizilov returned from Finnish captivity.

No less tests fell on the crews of Yer-2 from the group of 420 long-range bomber regiment. A troika went on a flight to Berlin, led by the deputy regiment commander, Captain A. G. Stepanov. Each plane carried seven hundred-kilogram FAB-100 high-explosive bombs. Shortly after takeoff, Stepanov's troika was attacked by Soviet I-16 and I-153 fighters and fired upon by their own anti-aircraft artillery. Despite the fact that the Yer-2 crews gave prearranged signals (green rockets), the fighters did not stop attacking. It got to the point that the bomber gunners had to return fire on our fighters.

Shortly after we managed to get out of the shelling zone, multi-layer clouds appeared, the group broke up. Here, over the sea, about 150 km from the place of departure, the followers last saw the plane of A. G. Stepanov. Judging by the received radiogram, he managed to break through to Berlin and bombed safely. However, the crew did not return from the mission, the circumstances and place of his death are unknown.

The plane of the flight commander, Lieutenant B. A. Kubyshko, bombed at 02.05 from a height of 6000 m with a thirty-second interval. Approximately three minutes later, anti-aircraft artillery opened fire, but the shooting was carried out well below the aircraft. When returning home, they came under anti-aircraft fire in the Stettin area, then in the Tallinn area. And just 30 km from the landing airfield at an altitude of 600 m, the plane of B. A. Kubyshko was mistakenly attacked and set on fire by a link of Soviet fighters. At the same time, the gunner-radio operator was wounded. Fortunately, the entire crew managed to escape by parachute and return to the regiment.

The deputy squadron commander, Lieutenant V. M. Malinin, having approached the target at an altitude of 6000 m, descended to 900 m and dropped bombs on the suburbs of Berlin. After that, he abruptly went into the clouds and, with a climb, lay down on the return course. The crew of V. M. Malinin was the only one who managed to land safely in the morning at their airfield.

The results of the raid were depressing. Of the eight TB-7s taking off, the 432nd regiment irretrievably lost exactly half of the vehicles, the rest received various damage. Losses in personnel - 13 people were killed, 5 were wounded, 13 were missing. In the 420th regiment, two Yer-2s were irretrievably lost, and two more vehicles were damaged. One crew did not return from the mission.

ORDER
ON THE RESULTS AND DEFECTS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FLIGHT OF THE 81st AIR DIVISION ON THE BERLIN AREA

The first strike of the 81st Air Division on the Berlin area was successful. Seven heavy ships bombarded enemy military installations and dropped leaflets.
However, during the preparation and flight, a number of significant shortcomings were identified that require immediate corrections.
The command of the division managed the organization of the flight insufficiently, and the chief of staff of the division, Colonel Lyshenko, withdrew from the leadership. As a result of poor linking of the route, aircraft flying on a mission were fired upon by their own fighters, FOR coastal defense and ships.
The flight crew, despite the lengthy preparation for the flight, did not fully master the material part of the engine and weapons and did not know its operation well.
The operation of the engine on the TB-7 ships turned out to be unsatisfactory and caused several forced landings.

I order:

1. The Military Council of the Air Force of the Spacecraft should pay special attention to the preparation and condition of the 81st Air Division, replenishing its regiments with TB-7 ships with AM-35 and AM-35A engines, Yer-2 aircraft with AM-37 engines and DB-3 aircraft with additional tanks, referring to the use of the division for systematic attacks on military targets deep behind enemy lines.
2. For personal participation in the bombing flight to the Berlin region, I express gratitude to brigade commander comrade Vodopyanov, commanders of the ships: comrade Kurban A.A., comrade Ugryumov M.M., comrade Panfilov A.I., comrade Bidny V.D. , Comrade Kubyshko V.A. and all the personnel of the crews.
3. Issue a one-time reward to participants in the flight to the Berlin area, and present the best of them for a government award.
4. Given the personal fighting qualities of Comrade Vodopyanov, as a pilot-commander of the ship, but at the same time not having sufficient command skills and experience in the organizational work necessary in commanding formations, release Comrade Vodopyanov from command of the 81st Air Division.
5. Appoint Lieutenant Colonel Comrade Golovanov as commander of the 81st Air Division and give him the military rank of colonel.
6. Remove Colonel Lyshenko, Chief of Staff of the 81st Air Division, as having failed to do his job.
7. Appoint Lieutenant Colonel Comrade Ilyin N.I. as Chief of Staff of the 81st Air Division.

Supreme Commander People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR
I. STALIN

There were some inaccuracies in the order. It was not seven heavy vehicles that struck Berlin - it is unlikely that three twin-engine Yer-2s can be attributed to the class of heavy ships. Of the four heavy four-engine TB-7s that reached the target, only three worked in Berlin - the Bidny crew was forced to bomb the station. Lauenberg, located more than three hundred kilometers from the capital of the Reich. In total, in this raid, the pilots of the Vodopyanov group dropped almost nine tons of bombs on Berlin. They were rewarded very sparingly.

Brigade commander M.V. Vodopyanov, although he received personal gratitude from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, was removed from command of the division, but he was soon awarded the rank of major general. He fought in the 746th (former 432nd) long-range aviation regiment until 1944. Perhaps this was the only general who fought as an ordinary ship commander.

After such an obvious failure, the Soviet command abandoned the use of heavy bombers to attack Berlin. From now on, all raids were to be made only from the island of Ezel. It was decided to reinforce the Ezel group with army aviation aircraft, for which a consolidated group was involved, consisting of aircraft from the 40th long-range bomber aviation division under the command of the deputy commander of the 200th regiment, Major V. I. Shchelkunov and the 81st air division under the command of squadron commander Captain V G. Tikhonova. However, the overall leadership of the operation remained with S. F. Zhavoronkov and E. N. Preobrazhensky.

The command had very high hopes for this air group, consisting of twenty aircraft, because it included DB-Zf (IL-4) bombers. These machines were equipped with more powerful boosted engines, and, consequently, they had a larger bomb load. Since it was not possible to place such a number of aircraft at the Kogul airfield, the Aste airfield, located 20 km northeast of Kogul, began to urgently prepare to receive the army air group. The consolidated air group began to arrive in Aste on 10 August. The placement and camouflage of aircraft at the Aste airfield was carried out in the same way as at the Kogul airfield. However, instead of the promised twenty DB-Zf, only fifteen were allocated - eight in the Shchelkunov group and seven in the Tikhonov group. In general, only twelve bombers flew to Ezel - two planes were waiting for the replacement of engines, another one was shot down over the Gulf of Finland during the flight. In addition, of the twelve cars that arrived, two required repairs. In fact, only ten combat-ready crews were available. And this despite the fact that they could not take a greater load than the DB-3 Preobrazhensky, DB-3f Shchelkunov and Tikhonov took due to the severe deterioration of the motors.

August 12 fourth raid to Berlin, which was attended by four aircraft of the 1st mine-torpedo air regiment and nine aircraft of the army air group, for which this flight was the first. Of the thirteen aircraft that took off from about. Ezel, eight reached Berlin. 80 high-explosive bombs FAB-250, FAB-100, FAB-50 were dropped on the city, on which the inscriptions "Hitler", "Goering", "Goebbels", "Himmler" and more than 100 thousand leaflets were made in red paint. Due to the fact that the flight took place in difficult meteorological conditions, five aircraft dropped bombs on alternate targets - Libau (Liepaja) and Kolberg (now Kolobrzeg). In total, 3 FAB-250s, 20 FAB-100s and 12 incendiary ZAB-50s were dropped on them. The documents kept in the Central Naval Archive in St. Petersburg and covering the history of the 1st Guards Mine-Torpedo Aviation Regiment vividly describe some of the details of this flight (for the pilots of the regiment, this flight was the third in a row).

From the history of the 1st Guards. mtap:

The third flight was the most difficult to complete. Cloudiness, rain, sometimes strong hail, headwind, enemy anti-aircraft fire and the duration of the flight could not but affect the well-being of the pilots. Leaving the cockpit, they no longer looked, as usual, for holes in the planes, did not drain fuel, but, choosing nice grass, fell on her, as if dead. Everyone was breathing heavily and coughing. It was difficult for them to talk about anything. Andrei Efremov, a strong pilot, could not even reach the lawn - he gnashed his teeth and, clinging to the frame rack, fell near the rubber wheels. Mikhail Plotkin's nose started to bleed. He lost consciousness. They all had pale faces, sunken eyes. [...]
Colonel Preobrazhensky lay with his head resting on a gray stone. Navigator Khokhlov slept sitting, holding his helmet with his hand. [...] Doctors were standing here and whispering softly.

In general, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command declared the actions of the air group of V.I. Shchelkunov, which participated in the raid on Berlin for the first time, to be successful, which was later reflected in the Decree of the USSR PVS of September 16, 1941, according to which five pilots of the group were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union .

On August 12, another event occurred: German aviation for the first time attacked the Kogul airfield. During the bombing, the Nazi intelligence groups from the Estonian battalion Erna II were active, which carried out target designation using signal rockets. As a result, two DB-3s were burned. On the same day, additions were made to Directive No. 34, signed by the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, V. Keitel, which contained the following instructions: “... follows the joint efforts of the formations ground forces, aviation and navy to eliminate the naval and air bases on the islands of Ezel and Dago. In this case, it is especially important to destroy enemy airfields from which raids on Berlin are carried out. The coordination of the preparatory measures is entrusted to the command of the ground forces.

August 16 at fifth raid 17 aircraft participated. Fifteen of them flew to Berlin and from 00.50 to 2.40 dropped 5 bombs FAB-250, 56 FAB-100, 62 ZAB-50, 600 ZAB-1, as well as several tens of thousands of leaflets. One plane dropped bombs on Stettin, the other on Neubrandenburg. The flight was difficult, we had to land again in zero visibility, the searchlight and landing lights were turned on only before leveling off and extinguished as soon as the plane touched the runway. In these difficult conditions, during landing, it collided with the ground and exploded DB-3 Lieutenant V. G. Alexandrov. Together with the commander, the navigator (who is also the head of the mine and torpedo service of the squadron) Captain I.M. Bulanov and the gunner-radio operator of the Red Navy V.K. Dikov died, the air gunner Sergeant I.M. Rusakov was seriously injured. And soon the same fate befell another crew. Wing Commander Lieutenant A. F. Kravchenko from last strength pulled his crippled bomber on one engine that worked intermittently. When he stopped, too, the plane crashed, quite a bit short of the runway. In addition to Kravchenko, the navigator of Art. lieutenant N. G. Sergeev, gunner-radio operator of the Red Navy V. P. Rachkovsky and air gunner foreman E. E. Titov.

August 19 at the sixth raid a group of six aircraft left for Berlin. From 2.56 to 3.12, 8 FAB-250, 6 FAB-100 and 10 ZAB-50 bombs were dropped on the city. The crews over the target observed single fires. One bomber did not reach Berlin and attacked Swinemünde.

The idea of the need to increase the bomb load arose after the second raid on Berlin. The question was discussed at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command: can DB-3 bombers carry one 1000 kg bomb or two 500 kg bombs on an external sling to strike at the enemy capital. V.K. Kokkinaki was involved as an expert, who tested this machine and knew all its properties very well. V. K. Kokkinaki confidently confirmed that this is quite feasible. People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov was against it, citing reasonable arguments that the aircraft would start from unsuitable unpaved airfields and fly to full range, while the external suspension of large-caliber bombs would cause additional air resistance and, therefore, increased fuel consumption . In addition, worn-out motors of cars simply will not be able to develop the necessary power. However, all his objections were rejected. On the personal order of I.V. Stalin, V.K. Kokkinaki flew to Ezel, where preparations began for a dangerous experiment with an increased bomb load. After a thorough check of the naval and army air groups, two aircraft were selected, which, with a conditional guarantee, could take either one FAB-1000 or two FAB-500s for external suspension. These were the planes of Captain V. A. Grechishnikov (Kogul airfield) and Senior Lieutenant G. E. Bogachev (Aste airfield). A FAB-1000 bomb was hung under Grechishnikov's plane, and two FAB-500 bombs were hung under Bogachev's plane.

From the memoirs of P. I. Khokhlov:

Captain Grechishnikov's plane is the first to taxi to the start at Kogul. The most experienced pilot V. A. Grechishnikov taxied to the very extreme line of the starting strip in order to have the maximum distance for the run. I tested the engines and began to take off. All of us could see how the plane ran most of the runway, but did not take off from the ground. Runs and runs. Stop taking off too late. Dangerous situation. Only at the very border of the airfield is it possible to tear the plane off the ground, but it does not have sufficient speed. Ready to fall at any second, the plane rolled over the hedge and bush, touched down again, blew off the landing gear, turned to the right and caught fire.

By an incredible chance, the bomb did not detonate, and the crew of the aircraft remained unharmed (according to one of the versions, the navigator managed to drop the bomb as soon as the plane began to fall). However, an order was soon received: to stop the launch from the Kogul airfield. Perhaps this explains such a small number of crews of the 1st Mtap participating in this sortie. And at the Aste airfield, for the time being, everything went on as usual. The planes took to the air one after another and fell on course. The plane of senior lieutenant G. E. Bogachev with two FAB-500 bombs taxied to the start and began to take off.

From the memoirs of P. I. Khokhlov:

Having run the entire length of the runway, he never took off the ground. Already outside the airfield, it hit an obstacle and instantly exploded. The entire crew was killed. The navigator in it was senior lieutenant A. K. Shevchenko from our regiment, seconded to the long-range aviation group.
So the risky experiment with large-caliber bombs ended tragically, against which everyone was opposed - from airfield specialists to the people's commissar. S. F. Zhavoronkov reported to the People's Commissar of the Navy about what had happened at the airfields of Kogul and Aste and asked for further instructions.

A small clarification should be made here. In his memoirs, P. I. Khokhlov mistakenly believes that Senior Lieutenant Pavlov was the crew commander. However, it follows from the TsAMO documents that the deceased crew was led by the flight commander of the 53rd long-range bomber aviation regiment of the 40th aviation division G. E. Bogachev - he flew to Berlin for the first time on his DB-3f. In total, this disaster at the Aste airfield claimed the lives of six people.

After that, V.K. Kokkinaki, in a depressed state, flew to Moscow, leaving a bad memory of himself on Ezel.

From the memoirs of N. G. Kuznetsov:

Commander of the Air Force of the Navy S.F. Zhavoronkov, who had until then been inseparably in charge of flights on the spot, and commander of the Air Force of the Red Army P.F. Zhigarev were summoned to Headquarters. JV Stalin often did this in relation to any people's commissar. By this he seemed to say: “Now I will check you. Now let's hear what practical workers have to say.
When Zhigarev, Zhavoronkov and I entered, Stalin looked at us angrily. About him bad mood It also testified that he did not sit and stand near the table, as usual, but walked with quick steps from wall to wall. As soon as we entered, he got right down to business.
Most of all went to P.F. Zhigarev, who sent aircraft with fairly worn engines to replenish the aviation of the KBF. As for us sailors, JV Stalin, although he did not recognize our arguments as correct, now no longer ordered to take bombs weighing a ton for the bombardment of Berlin.

August 21 at seventh raid seven crews went to Berlin. Only three of them reached the goal. From a height of 6000-7300 m through the clouds from 0.50 to 3.30 they dropped fifteen FAB-500, FAB-100 and ZAB-50 bombs on the city. The remaining four vehicles, due to a sharp deterioration in the weather (fog, overcast, icing), were forced to drop bombs on Danzig, as well as in the areas of Swinemünde and Liepaja. All cars returned to their airfield, but for the crew of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain M.N. Plotkin, this flight almost became the last. Taking off with a high temperature, Plotkin lost consciousness after dropping bombs from overvoltage. Only at an altitude of 3000 m was it possible to stop the fall of the bomber, which had lost control.

Another strike on the capital of Germany on the night of August 23-24 did not take place. The four bombers of the squadron commander of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain A. Ya. Efremov, who took off into the air, Art. Lieutenant P. N. Trychkov, Lieutenants N. F. Dashkovsky and K. A. Milgunov could not reach Berlin due to overheating of worn-out engines, dropping bombs on a spare target.

After that, the raids on Berlin temporarily stopped - the entire stock of main-caliber bombs - FAB-250, FAB-100 and ZAB-50 was used up, only a few FAB-500 and a large number of FAB-1000, which, due to the depreciation of the aircraft fleet, could not be used. Attempts to import the necessary calibers on any aircraft arriving at Ezel did not solve the problem. The delivery of ammunition by sea, which was already a difficult task, now, due to the deterioration of the general situation at the front, became extremely complicated and was associated with a mortal risk.

On the night of August 24, an attempt was made to deliver a cargo of aerial bombs to Ezel. A caravan of three base minesweepers T-209 "Knecht", T-214 "Bugel" and T-206 "Verp", escorted by two small hunters, left Kronstadt. However, at the passage between Cape Yuminda and Cary Island, the minesweepers "Knecht" and "Bugel" were blown up by mines and sank, after which the remaining "Verp" and both boats of the Ministry of Defense returned to the base by order of the KBF headquarters.

The next night, the attempt was repeated - the T-203 "Patron" and T-298 minesweepers, loaded with aerial bombs, accompanied by a small hunter No. 208, headed for Ezel. After having passed Fr. Lavensaari, the caravan was subjected to the most severe air raid of the enemy. About three hundred air bombs were dropped on the "Patron" alone. Despite the continuous attacks of enemy aircraft and losses in personnel, on August 26 the ships managed to break through to Ezel Island and unload.

By this time, many aircraft at the airfields of Aste and Kogul were so damaged and worn out that they could no longer carry a bomb load, such aircraft began to be used for reconnaissance. In addition, the group again began to be involved in solving operational and tactical tasks. The ring around Ezel was shrinking, but the combat work continued. All this happened in the conditions of constant raids by enemy aircraft. Preobrazhensky's group suffered losses. On August 27, when attacking a convoy in the Gulf of Riga, enemy fighters shot down the German transport DB-3 of Captain E.E. Esin (navigator senior lieutenant G.Kh. Khabibulin, air gunner senior lieutenant E.N. radio operator of the Red Navy I. A. Nyankin).

At the end of August, S. F. Zhavoronkov was summoned to Moscow to report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the progress of flights to Berlin. He flew on an Il-4 plane. For cover, the commander of the KBF Air Force, Major General Aviation M. I. Samokhin, sent a fighter to the Kogula airfield, piloted by the already famous Baltic ace, Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain P. A. Brinko. The commander of the Air Force was no longer able to return to the island of Saaremaa, since the situation at the front deteriorated sharply. As early as August 28, when the Nazi troops occupied Tallinn and Paldiski, the air group of Colonel E. N. Preobrazhensky was cut off from the fuel and ammunition supply bases by more than 400 km. After the main base of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was relocated from Tallinn to Kronstadt, the supply of fuel and ammunition to the aviation group on Ezel was finally stopped. In addition, the weak air defense of the islands of the Moonsund archipelago affected, which did not allow reliable cover for Soviet airfields on about. Ezel during the beginning of the battle for the Moonsund Islands. So, on September 6, 1941, the Kogula airfield was twice attacked by 28 enemy aircraft. Six of the twelve bombers on the airfield at the time were destroyed. Il-2 and MiG-3 from the air defense group were also destroyed.

Nevertheless, on August 31, attacks on Berlin resumed. By this time, there were no more army pilots on the island - on the eve of the last three cars from the group of Major V. I. Shchelkunov flew to the mainland. AT eighth raid six aircraft participated, due to severe meteorological conditions, only two crews reached the target. They dropped 2 FAB-500s, 12 ZAB-50s and 2,000 leaflets on the city. The rest were bombed in Vindava and presumably in Danzig and Libava. At each point, one FAB-500, six ZAB-50s and a thousand leaflets were dropped. Returning from a combat mission, 20 km from the Kogula airfield, he lost speed and, during the landing approach, the plane of the flight commander, Lieutenant N.F. Dashkovsky, fell from a low altitude. Together with him, the navigator of the link Art. Lieutenant I. E. Nikolaev and gunner-radio operator Sergeant S. A. Elkin.

From the history of the 1st Guards. mtap:

Only one plane did not reach the airfield for only some hundred meters. [...] Burnt overalls; Dashkovsky's right hand lay on his chest. Eyes are open. A frozen smile. Dashkovsky seemed to be saying: "Comrade Commissar, they did everything they could, they did everything." The pilot's face is pale and aged. Nikolaev was lying next to Dashkovsky with a leather helmet clutched in his hand. Dark-haired Nikolaev returned gray-haired. Elkin seemed to fall asleep...

The second dead crew was the crew, which included the flight commander, Lieutenant M.P. Rusakov, flight navigator, Lieutenant V.F. Shilov, gunner-radio operator of the Red Navy V.S. Sarancha.

On the ninth bombardment Berlin on September 2, only two planes were able to take off. One reached the goal by dropping bombs on the city center. Another did not reach Berlin and dropped bombs on Libava.

September 4th was the last tenth raid to Berlin with four bombers. Three of them dropped 32 FAB-500, FAB-100 and ZAB-50 bombs on the German capital, one dropped bombs in the Svinemyugde area. Presumably it was the plane of Lieutenant K. A. Milgunov (navigator Lieutenant P. Ya. Chubatenko, gunner-radio operator junior sergeant G. M. Kuleshov), who did not return from the mission

Colonel E. N. Preobrazhensky requested permission to relocate the aircraft remaining at his disposal to Leningrad (only three aircraft remained in service). By decision of the command, further raids on Berlin from Esel ceased, on September 5, 1941, an order was given for evacuation. The bombers, packed to capacity with people, left for the Bezabotnoye airfield, where the pilots, who joined their regiment, soon took part in the defense of Leningrad. Contrary to the established version, the personnel of the group of Colonel E. N. Preobrazhensky was completely evacuated, with the exception of the crew of Lieutenant N. I. Yurin, whose plane had received severe damage the day before during an emergency landing on the fuselage. The car was still repaired the next night, and the screws were straightened with a sledgehammer by eye. Nevertheless, the pilot managed to lift the bomber into the air and headed for the Nizino airfield near Leningrad. They landed without landing lights, using only aircraft headlights. There was no longer our aviation at this airfield, as the Germans approached it. Yurin's crew spent the night on the airfield, and at dawn flew to the airfield of their regiment.

But for the transportation of ground personnel of two units of the KBF Air Force permanently stationed here - the 12th Red Banner Separate Aviation Squadron of the 10th Aviation Brigade and the 15th Separate Aviation Squadron of the 15th Naval Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment, as well as personnel of the air base and Air Force workshops KBF transport was not. All of them were placed at the disposal of the commandant Ezel and later took an active part in the defense. On September 17, the Germans crossed the strait and clung to the eastern coast of the island. The enemy advanced on Ezel in three directions: on the northern coast, threatening our coastal batteries and at the same time cutting off the defenders of Ezel from the island of Hiiumaa; in the center - along the highway to the main city of the island of Kuresaare; the third group advanced along the south coast. The remnants of scattered units of the defenders retreated towards Kuresaare. By the end of September 20, our people left the city. Some of the defenders died in heavy unequal battles, the rest were captured, many were shot by the Nazis. Only at the lighthouse of Syrve, from the last forces, small groups of Ezel's defenders still held out. On October 16, 1941, Colonel-General Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, wrote in his official diary: "Esel Island is occupied by our troops."

According to archival data, during Operation Berlin, which lasted from August 8 to September 4, 1941, our aviation made 78 sorties, while 33 aircraft managed to reach Berlin and bombed. Some Soviet official sources give somewhat different data - 81 sorties and 55 bombed aircraft. It was dropped on the capital of Germany according to data from various sources 635 high-explosive (from 50 to 250 kg) and incendiary (from 1 to 50 kg) bombs with a total weight of 34.5 tons and hundreds of thousands of leaflets (34 so-called "agitation bombs"). As a result of strikes by Soviet bombers in Berlin, up to 32 fires were registered. At the same time, it is important to take into account that the bombing of Berlin took place in extremely difficult conditions during the defense of Tallinn and the relocation of the Baltic Fleet from Tallinn to Kronstadt.

In addition to Berlin (according to archival data), strikes were made against the cities of Keisling (probably the Germanized name of Helsinki), Stolp, Memel (Klaipeda), Vindava (Ventspils), Pernov (Pärnu) and other targets: Risti station, coastal batteries and enemy ships in the Baltic Sea.

Unfortunately, the main task was not always successful. 37 aircraft, unable to reach the main goal (mainly for meteorological and navigational reasons), bombed other cities: Stettin, Neubrandburg, Kolberg, Danzig, Libau. In addition, 16 aircraft were forced to return to their airfield due to equipment failure and poor meteorological conditions.

Information about the losses suffered by our bombers during the operation is also contradictory. The death of four TB-7s and two Yer-2s from the Vodopyanov group, as well as ten DB-3s from the Preobrazhensky group, is confirmed to be confirmed - a total of 16 vehicles. According to the researcher K. B. Strelbitsky, the irretrievable losses of the Preobrazhensky group amounted to 21 aircraft, of which 14 aircraft were lost on Ezel as a result of catastrophes and enemy air raids, two aircraft were shot down over German territory, two over the Baltic Sea, one was lost on the Soviet territory, two more planes were missing. According to the data of L. A. Nalivkin, which he cites in his dissertation, “the losses of the aviation group that carried out the Berlin operation amounted to, in accordance with archival data, 10 aircraft (six of them were destroyed during assault raids by enemy aircraft, one lost in air combat with enemy fighter aircraft, three did not return for unknown reasons) and 4 crews (one full, three incomplete, without an air gunner). There are other sources that operate with other numbers of losses. Therefore, it will be possible to obtain an exhaustive answer to the question of losses only after a scrupulous study of archival documents.

There is no doubt that the bombing of Berlin by Soviet aircraft in August-September 1941 had not so much a military-practical, as a huge political significance. From this point of view, the testimony of an eyewitness is very interesting, who initially, as they say now, “was in the subject”:

Air raid alert in Berlin shortly after midnight. The true causes of this air raid alert were at first very mysterious. The alarm was only raised when several bombs had already been dropped in the suburbs. The planes slipped into the capital completely silently and imperceptibly. At first it could be assumed that these were new British bombers, which are distinguished by their extreme flight altitude. But soon it was irrefutably established (first of all, by the dropped leaflets that contained Stalin's appeal to the Soviet people) that only Soviet aircraft could be here. They are supposed to have flown in from Ezel Island and made a surprise raid on the capital, causing some damage in the process. Material damage not as great as, probably, moral damage.

The whole piquancy is that this entry was left in his diary by none other than the Gauleiter of Berlin and part-time Reich Minister of Propaganda J. Goebbels, whose department went out of their way to try to hide from the German population the ownership of the planes that struck on the night of August 8, 1941 d. a sudden bombing attack on the capital of the Reich! The brat could smell how much damage the truth about the raid could do.

To a large extent Soviet bombing the German capital influenced the establishment of allied relations between the USSR, Great Britain and the USA. It is no secret that at first Churchill had no illusions about the possibility of the Soviet Union to contain the onslaught of Germany, although he was not opposed to encouraging the fight against Hitler in every possible way. He did not want to send too much aid to the USSR, fearing that it would not work for the future and would be captured by the Germans. In turn, Roosevelt was also inclined to believe that in the summer of 1941 Germany would defeat the USSR. Both Roosevelt and Churchill changed their minds after witnessing unwavering Soviet resistance, aided greatly by Soviet air raids on Berlin. It is no coincidence that already at the end of September 1941 a tripartite conference was held in Moscow, which resulted in the signing of a detailed agreement on the supply of aid to the Soviet Union by Great Britain and the United States.

The importance attached to the operation "Berlin" by the Soviet government can be judged even by decrees on rewarding the participants. Ten Heroes of the Soviet Union and several dozen awarded the highest government award - the Order of Lenin - and this is in 1941! This fact alone speaks volumes.

It is also appropriate to add that already in July 1942, Soviet air raids on Berlin resumed (mainly by Il-4 aircraft). Long-range aviation (ADD) delivered massive strikes against Danzig, Koenigsberg, the Ploiesti oil fields, Budapest and Bucharest. Naturally, Western historians try not to remember this at all.

After the war, the Kogula airfield was restored. The runway was lined with perforated metal plates, traces of which are clearly visible even now. Until the autumn of 1955, MiG-15 fighters were based here. At present, almost nothing has been preserved from the airfield. metal plating from the runway was torn off. From the buildings, only the skeleton of a one-story building remained, in which the command post was once located. According to the stories of local residents, there was a glazed all-round tower on the roof. Now the Kogula airfield looks like this.

Two kilometers from the runway is the village of Kyarla. A small memorial was created at the local cemetery in memory of the Soviet soldiers who died during the defense and liberation of Ezel Island. Among the modest tombstones is a small stele, on which the names of eleven pilots of the 1st mine-torpedo aviation regiment of the KBF Air Force from the crews of V. G. Aleksandrov, A. F. Kravchenko and N. F. Dashkovsky, who participated in the first raids on Berlin and who died on the island in 1941 while returning from a combat mission.

They say that on May 9, 1945, the first Soviet commandant of the defeated Berlin, Colonel-General N. E. Berzarin, sent a telegram to the Baltic pilots with the following content: “You were the first to launch an assault on the den of fascism from the air. We finished it on the ground and hoisted the Banner of Victory over the Reichstag. Congratulations, Baltic pilots, on the occasion of the Victory and the end of the war!”

Twenty-two years later, on May 9, 1967, in the village of Kogula, on the building of the local Padlas secondary school, where the pilots of the 1st Mine and Torpedo Regiment were stationed in August 1941, a memorial plaque was installed and solemnly opened, the text of which read: “ Pilots of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet lived in this building, who were the first to storm the capital of Nazi Germany - Berlin from the air in 1941 from August 7 to September 5 under the command of Heroes of the Soviet Union Colonel Preobrazhensky Evgeny Nikolaevich and Captain Khokhlov Pyotr Ilyich. For many years veterans of the regiment came here. Now everything has changed. Estonia has turned into a foreign territory, the board was removed, the school building fell into disrepair.

And in the seventies, on the 18th kilometer of the Kuresaare-Kihelkonna highway, to the right of the road, where the Kogula airfield began, another monument to the heroic pilots was opened. On a concrete obelisk in Estonian and Russian, strict chased lines were visible from afar: “From here, from the Kogula airfield, pilots of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet took off in 1941, the first to bomb Berlin.”

Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the former fraternal republics (including Russia), a rampant anti-Soviet movement began. Has come finest hour national-patriotic trash of all colors and shades. It is not surprising that the Soviet monument to the Baltic pilots was destroyed "to the ground, and then" ... Then, "independent" Estonia had completely different heroes. The immortal feat of the soldiers of the Red Army was spat on, mixed with dirt, forgotten ... However, to hell with it, with all this neo-Nazi scum. The main thing is that we do not forget about it. And, like a relay race, they passed on the bright memory of the heroic past of their ancestors to their children and grandchildren. I would like to believe that they will treat it more carefully than we do.

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In July 1941, the Fuhrer of the Nazi Air Force Hermann Goering reported to Hitler that the Russian military aviation was completely destroyed. Only after this victorious argumentation was it decided to start aerial bombing of Moscow.
Meanwhile, in the head of Admiral Kuznetsov, the idea lit up to pull the Germans so that the dream and reality of each of them would be filled with a nightmare, so that a piece of sausage would not go down the throat, so that the Germans would think: “Who are they, these Russians, and what are they capable of?” Well, soon Wehrmacht officers will indeed write in their diaries: “Russians are not people. They are made of iron."
So, on July 26, 1941, Kuznetsov's proposal to bombard Berlin falls on the table to Joseph Stalin. Madness? Undoubtedly! From the front line to the capital of the Reich - a thousand kilometers. Nevertheless, Stalin smiled contentedly and the very next day ordered the 1st Mine-Torpedo Aviation Regiment of the 8th Air Brigade of the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet to bomb Berlin.
On July 30, General Zhavoronkov arrives at the indicated air regiment and barely has time to talk about the order of the Headquarters, as the regiment commander Yevgeny Preobrazhensky discourages him by laying out ready-made calculations, a list of crews and a map of the proposed route on the table. Amazing! In those hellish days, the pilots, having anticipated the order, thought with one mind with Admiral Kuznetsov.

It remains only to start the task. But it's easy to say... All conditions were against the flight. First, the huge distance. A minute error in the route threatened to affect the fuel supply in the most fatal way. Secondly, takeoff was possible only from the territory of the Baltic States, from the Cahul airfield, on the island of Saarema, where there was a short land strip, quite suitable for fighters, but not for heavy bombers. And, thirdly, it was necessary to fly at an altitude of 7 thousand meters with a temperature overboard of minus 45-50 degrees Celsius. Killing cold for an eight-hour flight. The calculations showed that TB-7 with M-40F diesel engines with a bomb load of 4000 kg (of which 2000 kg on an external sling) could fly to Berlin and return back. To carry out the flights, 12 TB-7 and 28 Yer-2 were selected, which flew to the airfield on August 10. Here, after a more careful selection, 10 TB-7 and 16 Yer-2 were left. In the evening of the same day, the planes took off heading for Berlin.

"...They are made of iron." Exactly. August 7 at 21:00 with an interval of 15 minutes, DB-3F aircraft took off. Three flights of five bombers each. The first link was headed by the commander of the regiment Preobrazhensky. In the sky, the planes lined up in a diamond formation and took the direction to Germany.
At first, the route involved flying over the sea past the island of Rügen (Slavic Ruyan or Buyan, sung by Pushkin). This was followed by a turn to the southern port city of Stettin, and after that a direct passage to Berlin opened.
Eight hours in an oxygen mask and in the cold, from which the windows of the cabins and goggles of headsets froze over. Behind a whole day of intensive training. Total: superhuman loads, never experienced by anyone before.
Over the territory of Germany, the group finds itself ... The Germans contact her by radio and offer to land at the nearest airport. They believe that it is the brave knights of the Luftwaffe who have gone astray. It doesn't even occur to them that it could be an enemy. Therefore, not having received an answer, they calm down. They do not answer, they say, and let them. It will be on their conscience.
Ten planes are forced to drop bombs on Stettin, on its port facilities. Fuel is running out, no more risk. However, the five remaining DB-3Fs make it to Berlin.

Trams and cars move below. Stations and military airfields are illuminated. The windows in the houses are on fire. No blackout! The Germans are convinced of their invulnerability.
Five planes are dropping 250-kilogram FAB-100 bombs on military-industrial facilities located in the very center of the city. Berlin plunges into pitch darkness, torn apart by flashes of fire. Panic sets in on the streets. But it's too late. Radio operator Vasily Krotenko is already transmitting: “My place is Berlin! The task was completed. We're going back to base."
Only after 35 minutes did the Germans realize that they had been bombarded from the air. Beams of searchlights rush into the sky, anti-aircraft guns open fire. However, the fire is carried out at random. Shells explode in vain at an altitude of 4500-5000 meters. Well, it can't be that the bombers flew higher! These are not gods!
The sun rose over the mutilated Berlin, and the Germans did not understand who bombed them. Newspapers came out with ridiculous headlines: “English aircraft bombarded Berlin. There are dead and wounded. 6 British planes shot down. Confused like children, the Nazis decided to lie in accordance with the precepts of Goebbels: "The more impudent the lie, the more they believe in it." However, the British were also confused, hastening to declare that there was no spirit over Germany.

It was then that the "blitzkrieg" singers admitted that the raid was carried out by Soviet aces. Shame fell on the head of the Ministry of Propaganda, and the heart of the entire German nation ached. What else to expect from Russian "subhumans"?
And there was something to look forward to. Soviet aviation continued sorties. Until September 4, 86 of them were committed. From 33 aircraft, 36 tons of high-explosive and incendiary bombs hit Berlin. This is not counting the shells stuffed with propaganda leaflets, and 37 aircraft that bombed other cities in Germany.
Hitler howled like a wounded animal. On September 5, he sent innumerable forces of the North group to smash the Cahul airfield to smithereens. However, Berlin has already ceased to light fires at night, and every German has an animal fear of the darkness of his native Aryan sky.
The first group under the command of Colonel Preobrazhensky returned all, with the exception of the plane, which did not have enough fuel. Lieutenant Dashkovsky managed it. On August 13, 1941, five pilots who bombed Berlin received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and 2,000 rubles each. The rest of the pilots were also awarded and rewarded. On August 19, 1941, another order of the people's commissar "On the procedure for rewarding air force pilots for good combat work" was signed.
It said: “To establish a cash reward for fighter pilots for each downed enemy aircraft in aerial combat in the amount of 1,000 rubles. In long-range bomber and heavy bomber aviation, for each successful bombardment, members of the crew receive a cash award of 500 rubles each. During operations in the political center (capital) of the enemy, for each bombardment, each member of the crew receives a monetary reward in the amount of 2,000 rubles.
After that, the Preobrazhensky group bombed the capital of the Reich 9 more times. The last one was September 5th. When I had to leave Tallinn, flights from the islands became impossible. In just ten raids on Berlin, 311 bombs were dropped and 32 fires were registered.

From the memoirs of the navigator of the airship G.P. Molchanov about the flight:
"Let's take off! I mark the time - 20h.30m. We are going with a gradual climb of a given altitude up to 6500 m. The planes were supposed to pass along the route: the island of Rügen - the confluence of the Warta River with the Oder River and then straight to Berlin. Soon followed by the report of the "gunner" of the tower installation: "To the right of the board, two I-16 fighters dive at our plane much higher. Didn't our fighters recognize their own? The commander gives the order: when attacking, return fire. Our mission is too important. The fighters fired from a long distance and left. The rest of our ships crossed the traverse of Tallinn without encountering fighters.
On the territory of Germany, calmly, as if in peacetime, rivers, lakes, settlements and unshaded cities are perfectly visible. I take the ship to BC. A few minutes to the destination. Below us is the LAIR OF FASCISM! I'm bombing! As a heartbeat, the impulses of the separated FAB-500 are counted. The ship is in the right turn, the explosions of our bombs are visible. Berlin has already woken up. A huge number of powerful anti-aircraft searchlights are operating. Defensive fire for and MZA, but fortunately for us, the gaps are below the echelons of our bombers. It can be seen that the enemy air defense did not guess our height and all the fire was concentrated at about 4500-5000 meters in height.
In a spread, after Fr. Rügen, the 4th engine failed. The plane began to shake. Without changing the echelon we go on three engines. We are going down. In the right turn, the shore of the bay is visible, but what is it? From the sea /probably from a submarine/ and from the shore, anti-aircraft fire routes are visible, we immediately leave with a climb.
"Die" two more engines. How the plane fell - neither I nor anyone else from the crew could see, because. by the time two more engines failed, the altitude was less than 100 m. At random, by some miracle, Sasha Kurban managed to land the plane on its belly. The crew was unharmed, apart from some bruises and bruises. All twelve, as best they could, got out of the plane, grouping around the commander of the ship. With sin in half, they reached the nearest village, from where they gave the regiment commander a telephone message: “The task was completed, when returning, as a result of the failure of 3 engines, they crashed. Crew unharmed, awaiting instructions.

Unfortunately, there were casualties and emergency landings, the cause of which was the attacks of their fighters and-16 (the mission was secret and they did not recognize the silhouettes of their bombers), as well as damage from the fire of anti-aircraft batteries of the Nazis and their own. Below are some details:
On takeoff, the Yer-2 Molodchy demolished the landing gear on the drainage at the edge of the airfield.
On Major Yegorov's TB-7, immediately after taking off from the ground, two right M-40F diesel engines failed, and the plane crashed. After that, Zhigarev P.F. stopped the departure of the rest of the aircraft. As a result, 7 TB-7 and 3 Yer-2 went to Berlin.
The plane of M. V. Vodopyanov, while climbing, was attacked by I-16 fighters, but reached the target and bombed Berlin. After that, he came under German anti-aircraft fire and was damaged, he was forced to land on the territory of Estonia occupied by the Germans in the Jyhvi region. The co-pilot in the crew was an Estonian born in Siberia, E.K. Pusep, so only he communicated with the local population, and the rest of the crew did not come into contact with the locals. Two days later, the crew went to their own.
On the plane of Lieutenant V. D. Vidny, the left external engine caught fire over German territory. The crew managed to extinguish the fire, but the plane continued to fly with a loss of altitude. Not having reached Berlin 370 km, the crew dropped bombs and lay down on the return course. After the failure of another M-40F, the aircraft made an emergency landing at the airfield in Obukhov.
On the TB-7 of Captain A.N. Tyagunin, one of the engines failed on the way back. In addition, their anti-aircraft gunners fired at the plane over the Baltic coast. On landing, the car crashed.
Er-2 Lieutenant B. A. Kubyshko was shot down by an I-16 fighter on the way back. The crew escaped by parachute.
Ep-2 captain A. G. Stepanov went missing.
On the TB-7 of Major M. M. Ugryumov, the engines failed several times at high altitudes. The crew bombed Berlin, used up all the fuel and made an emergency landing in Torzhok.
TB-7 senior lieutenant A. Panfilov over the territory of Germany came under fire from anti-aircraft guns and received significant damage. The crew dropped bombs, but two M-40Fs failed on the way back. During a forced landing in Finland, five people died, and the rest were taken prisoner by the Finns while trying to cross the front line.
The TB-7 of Major Kurban A.A., having bombed Berlin, was damaged by anti-aircraft fire and crashed during an emergency landing in the Ropsha area.
Of the 10 vehicles that left for Berlin, they reached the target and only six were bombed. Only two cars returned to Pushkin. After this departure, Vodopyanov was removed from the post of division commander, and Colonel A. E. Golovanov was appointed in his place. m long-range bomber aviation regiment, then after its renaming - in the 746th long-range aviation regiment

From the memoirs of N.G. Kuznetsova: “The first raid was followed by others. But conditions have become more difficult. Now the enemy met our planes with fierce fire, as soon as they crossed the coastline, and around Berlin acted a complex system air defense. Each time I had to develop a special tactic. Rescued still high altitude. Above 7 thousand meters, our bombers were no longer so afraid of night fighters with special powerful headlights, and anti-aircraft fire was not so terrible.
Hitler's headquarters demanded from his command "to liquidate the naval and air force bases on the islands of Dago and Ezel, and first of all, the airfields from which the raids on Berlin are carried out." We had to strengthen the protection of airfields. Almost all the anti-aircraft weapons of the islands and a modest fighter force were redeployed there.

In total, following the results of daring and skillful raids on the fascist lair in August-September, 13 people were awarded the Order of Lenin, 55 people were awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Red Star. In September, 5 more people became Heroes of the Soviet Union, many received orders and medals.

The Soviet army reached Berlin in the victorious 45th, but our pilots bombed the German capital already on initial stage war. In August-September 41st, in response to, and exactly a year later - in 42nd. "Defend Russia" remembers how it was.

The blow of "defeated aviation"

In June-July 1941, the Soviet forces retreated inland with huge losses.

In the euphoria of victories, Germany promised to end the "blitzkrieg" in the east in a matter of weeks, and Goebbels and Goering, against the backdrop of heavy losses in the Red Army's air force, declared that Soviet aviation had been defeated, and not a single bomb would ever fall on the capital of the Reich.

However, on the night of August 8, 1941, Berlin, which lives a peaceful life, was raided. The next morning, the German information bureau reported that 15 British aircraft managed to reach Berlin and drop a number of high-explosive bombs, buildings were damaged by bombardment, there were casualties, German night fighters and bombers shot down six enemy aircraft.

The English press, in response to "an interesting and mysterious report about the bombing of Berlin," wrote that British aviation did not raid the German capital on the night of August 7-8.

The Germans had to admit that on that night it was the planes of the “defeated Soviet aviation” that made the city of millions shudder.

Punch on punch

At the end of July 1941, in response to the bombing of Moscow by German aircraft, Soviet pilots were preparing to strike at Berlin. The choice fell on the pilots of the 1st mine-torpedo aviation regiment of the 8th air brigade of the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet. For the airstrike, at the suggestion of the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov, they decided to use the Cahul airfield on the island of Ezel (Saaremaa) - the westernmost point of land at that time, controlled by the Soviet troops, but already in the rear of the rapidly advancing Nazi troops.

The operation was planned to use long-range bombers DB-3, Il-4, TB-7 and Yer-2, which, given the maximum range, could make an air drop to Berlin and back.

Soon the Military Council of the Baltic Fleet received an order to pick up 15 crews of the 1st Mine and Torpedo Regiment and relocate them to Ezel by 10.00 on August 2.

To reinforce the group of naval pilots, two squadrons of the 22nd air regiment from 20 Il-4 arrived on the island under the command of the deputy commander of the regiment, Major Vasily Shchelkunov and the squadron commander, Captain Vasily Tikhonov.

From August 3 to 6, preparations lasted: lengthening the runway on the island, test flights and reconnaissance, and on the evening of August 6, the crews of the first strike group received a combat mission.

Bombing of Berlin in 1941

The group included 15 naval aviation crews on DB-3 bombers. On August 7, at 21:00, the planes took off and headed for Berlin. The route 1756 km long, of which 1400 km - over the sea, passed in a straight line: the island of Ezel (Saaremaa) - Swinemünde - Stettin - Berlin. The flight was to be made over the territory occupied by the Germans - the task is already so difficult, besides, in order to maintain the strictest secrecy, the fighters of the air group did not accompany.

The pilots reached the northern border of Germany in three hours. Flying over its territory, our planes were repeatedly detected from German observation posts, but the Nazi air defense did not open fire.

Courage and reasonable risk, based on accurate calculation, paid off. The Germans did not expect such audacity. During the approach of our aircraft to the target, they requested signals from the ground: what kind of cars, where are they flying? Considering that they had lost their way, the pilots were offered to land on one of the nearest airfields.

Hypnotized by Goebbels' propaganda, the watchmen on duty did not even allow the thought that Soviet planes might appear over their heads.

From the book of Nikolai Kuznetsov "On the way to victory"

That night, five out of 15 aircraft, led by Evgeny Preobrazhensky, flew over Berlin. The rest were bombed in the Berlin suburb and the port city of Stettin.

At dawn on August 8, the air group in full force returned to base. In the future, the airfield of the city of Pushkin near Leningrad was used for sorties, and long-range aviation pilots also made sorties. However, the enemy air defense, which had given up during the first bombardment, was now ready for new strikes.

Now the enemy met our planes with fierce fire, as soon as they crossed the coastline, and around Berlin there was a complex air defense system. Each time I had to develop a special tactic. Rescued still high altitude. Above 7 thousand meters, our bombers were no longer so afraid of night fighters with special powerful headlights, and anti-aircraft fire was not so terrible.

From the book of Nikolai Kuznetsov "On the way to victory"

Despite the powerful protection, none of the pilots did not save in the face of mortal danger. Pilot Alexei Tsykin, in his book “A Brief History of Long-Range Aviation,” recalled the August sorties: “The anti-aircraft guns were silent, but searchlights probed the sky. The moon shone brightly. When heavy bombs rained down from the first planes, the air defense set in motion. The anti-aircraft guns were firing at a hurricane, shell explosions stained the sky at various heights, beams of hundreds of searchlights fumbled all around. But not a single Soviet crew turned off course. Bombs dropped on target.

The last in 1941 air raid on the capital of the Reich, Soviet pilots made on September 5th. After the Germans occupied Tallinn, it became impossible to use the airfield on the island. In ten raids on Berlin, 311 bombs were dropped and 32 fires were registered.

Almost a year later, Stalin again set the task of striking at Berlin, timing the operation to coincide with the anniversary of the German attack on the Soviet Union, June 22, 1942. The commander of long-range aviation (ADD) Alexander Golovanov managed to postpone the task to the end of August. The reasons were weighty: on the twentieth of June, the shortest and brightest nights, that is, the pilots have to overcome significant distances during daylight hours - and this is an additional risk. Stalin agreed. The operation began at the end of August 1942 and continued until mid-September.

At that difficult time, almost all air forces were thrown into the Stalingrad defensive operation. (…) There seemed to be no task more important than this. But the commander of the ADD, remembering Stalin's demands and his "debt" to him, cut off a little more than two hundred selected crews from the Stalingrad tasks and sent them to Berlin, Budapest, Bucharest, Warsaw, Stettin, Koenigsberg, Danzig.

From the book "What was - it was"

Base airfields were used, and for the most distant targets, front-line jump airfields.

The ADD struck its first blow on the night of August 27, 1942. Acting in difficult weather conditions at military-industrial facilities in Berlin, our newspapers reported, 9 fires were caused there, and 9 in Danzig, and 10 in Koenigsberg, accompanied by explosions.

From the book by Vasily Reshetnikov "What was - it was"

The raids of 41 and 42, although they did not significantly affect the course of hostilities, had a strong moral and psychological effect. In addition, the Nazis were forced to organize a more powerful air defense system, removing from Eastern Front significant artillery and aviation forces.

The summer of 1941 was bitter for the Soviet Union. Hitler's armies were rapidly advancing to the East, the Red Army was leaving one city after another, the losses in manpower and equipment were huge.

On July 22, 1941, exactly one month after the start of the war, German aircraft made their first raid on Moscow. Since that day, such attacks have become regular.

It was not possible to destroy the capital of the bomber aviation of the Third Reich. Moscow's air defense system proved to be very effective and reduced the effectiveness of German air strikes to a minimum. The Germans, breaking through to the city, suffered very heavy losses.

Nevertheless, the beginning of the bombing of Moscow had a serious psychological effect. This fact did not give courage to either the soldiers of the Red Army or the civilian population.

A retaliatory action was required that would show that the Soviet Union, too, was capable of inflicting painful blows on the enemy. But how to answer if the Germans are moving further and further?

Wartime propaganda poster. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

Island of strategic importance

Four days after the first bombardment of Moscow for an appointment with Stalin came People's Commissar of the Navy of the USSR Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov. People's Commissar presented a plan developed Navy Aviation Commander General Semyon Zhavoronkov. This plan called for the bombing of Berlin.

In the first days of the war, General Zhavoronkov considered plans for possible air strikes on German ports. Analyzing the options, he realized that bomber aircraft could "get" to Berlin.

The task was the most difficult - by the end of July, Soviet troops left Lithuania and Latvia, with difficulty holding on to part of Estonia.

The island of Ezel (Saaremaa) also remained under the control of the Soviet troops - the westernmost point of land, from where at that time the Nazis could not drive out the Red Army. On Ezel there was an airfield Cahul, which could be prepared for an attack on Berlin.

Stalin approved the plan proposed by the Navy. 1st mine-torpedo aviation regiment of the 8th air brigade of the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet under the command of Colonel Evgeny Preobrazhensky an order was given to bomb Berlin and its military-industrial facilities. General command of the operation was entrusted to General Zhavoronkov.

A task of increased complexity

The preparations were carried out in the strictest secrecy. The 15 best crews that made up the strike group were selected for the regiment.

On August 3, 1941, a caravan of ships approached Ezel Island, bringing everything necessary to equip the airfield. On August 4, aircraft of the strike group arrived at the Cahul airfield.

The task was very difficult. The bombers had to spend about eight hours in the air. In order not to reveal themselves, complete radio silence was established on the air. The flight was supposed to take place at an altitude of 7000 meters, at a temperature of "minus 40" and a lack of oxygen. For the latter reason, the pilots had to wear oxygen masks at all times.

The flight range was also limited by the carrying capacity - no more than one 500-kilogram bomb or two 250-kilogram bombs.

On the night of August 6, five aircraft of the group made a reconnaissance flight to Berlin. It was found that the well-equipped air defense of the capital of the Third Reich is located in a ring around the city within a radius of 100 km.

It was not easy to break through, but the effect of surprise was on the side of the Soviet pilots - no one expected their appearance in the skies of Germany. Head of the Luftwaffe Hermann Goering assured that not a single Soviet bomb would fall on Berlin, and the main Nazi propagandist Dr. Goebbels assured that the Soviet Air Force no longer exists.

Teachings of German air defense. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

"My place is Berlin"

At 21:00 on August 7, a group of 15 DB-3 bombers under the command of Colonel Preobrazhensky took off from the Cahul airfield. In addition to high-explosive bombs, the bombers also equipped with "agitation bombs" stuffed with leaflets. These leaflets were supposed to show the Germans exactly who had struck.

The Germans saw planes heading towards Berlin. In the Stettin area, German searchlighters even offered to land at the nearest airfield with their light. The ground services of the Third Reich were sure that their planes were returning from a mission above them.

When the first group of bombers approached Berlin, they clearly did not expect an attack. No blackout, the city is brightly lit, and that helped. Soviet pilots in striking. The lighting in Berlin was switched off only when the first bomb explosions were heard.

Part of the planes of the Preobrazhensky group struck not at the city itself, but at its suburbs.

Hitler's air defense "came to life". The bombers broke back through the bursts of enemy shells. Breaking the radio silence, the group commander Yevgeny Preobrazhensky ordered to transmit to the headquarters: “My place is Berlin. I've done the work. I'm coming back." Whatever happens upon return, the Motherland must know that the attack on the capital of the Reich took place.

German air defense. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

"The report about the bombing of Berlin is interesting and mysterious"

By 4 am on August 8, 14 out of 15 aircraft of the group returned to the base. One DB-3 crashed already on the way to the Cahul airfield.

On August 8, Berlin radio reported: “On the night of August 7-8, large British aviation forces, in the amount of 150 aircraft, tried to bomb our capital ... Of the 15 aircraft that broke through to the city, 9 were shot down, they will soon be put on public display.”

In response, the BBC reported: "The German message about the bombing of Berlin is interesting and mysterious, since on August 7-8 British aircraft did not fly over Berlin."

The point in the dispute was put by the message of the Sovinformburo about the successful Soviet air raid on Berlin.

This really made an impression on everyone - both the Soviet people and the Germans, and even the allies. It turned out that the USSR was not broken by the first failures and was capable of hitting the Reich in the very heart.

The consequences of night air raids on Berlin in 1941. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

The failure of division commander Vodopyanov

Air strikes on Berlin continued until 5 September. Each time they became more and more difficult, losses grew - the enemy, who already knew where the threat was coming from, used air defense to the maximum. And sometimes, when returning, Soviet bombers fell under the "friendly fire" of their own anti-aircraft gunners.

On the night of August 10-11, the latest Pe-8 bombers from the 81st bomber air division, commanded by a participant in the rescue of the Chelyuskinites, joined the attacks on Berlin, Hero of the Soviet Union Mikhail Vodopyanov.

However, the operation was not the most successful. Due to the crash of one of the planes during takeoff, instead of the 26 planned cars, only 10 went to Berlin. Six managed to reach the target, and only two returned to base. Vodopyanov, who commanded the operation, was shot down over the occupied territory of Estonia upon his return, made an emergency landing, and for two days, together with the crew, got out to his own. Fortunately, the Germans failed to capture the famous Hero of the Soviet Union. After returning, Vodopyanov was removed from the post of division commander and continued the war as an ordinary pilot.

Awards and prizes

In total, in 1941, Soviet aviation made 9 raids on Berlin, dropping 21 tons of bombs on it and causing 32 fires in the city. Aircraft that failed to reach the main target bombed other cities in Germany. During the operation, 17 aircraft and 7 crews were lost.

Hitler was furious, and demanded the immediate capture of the island of Saaremaa, from which strikes were being made. Tallinn fell on August 28, which made it impossible to continue supplying the air group at the Cahul airfield. Soviet bombers returned to their places of permanent deployment. The battles for the island of Saaremaa continued throughout September, and only on October 3 the remnants of the Soviet units were evacuated from there.

For the bombing of Berlin, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 10 participants in air raids, 13 people were awarded the Order of Lenin, 55 - the Order of the Red Banner and the Red Star.

In addition, each crew member for a strike on Berlin was entitled to a cash bonus of 2,000 rubles, which is four times higher than the standard bonus for long-range bomber crew members for a successful flight.