Rzhev-Vyazemskaya offensive operation of the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts - 02.03-31.03.1943

In the spring of 1943, the position of the German troops on the southern wing of the front deteriorated significantly. In connection with the beginning of the Voronezh-Kastornensky operation, the German command ordered the transfer of troops from the Rzhev region to the area of ​​​​the Soviet offensive.

On January 26, 1943, the commander of Army Group Center, General von Kluge, recommended that Hitler leave the Rzhevsky ledge to level the front line and prevent a possible encirclement of the bloodless 9th and 4th armies. The withdrawal operation was named "Buffalo". Therefore, the Western and Kalinin Fronts were given the task of liquidating the Rzhev-Vyazma salient and developing the offensive in the general direction of Smolensk.

Operation Buffel. Front line from 1 to 30 March 1943

Operation progress

On March 2, the troops of the fronts, following the order, launched an offensive. The Germans widely used various kinds of barriers, and, retreating, left barriers in advance prepared defensive positions. Along with a strong spring thaw, this sharply reduced the pace of advancement of the Red Army, fettered the maneuvers of mobile detachments. As a result, the Soviet troops were unable to cut off the enemy's paths. On March 15-31, the Germans reached a pre-prepared and heavily fortified line northeast of Dukhovshchina, Yartsevo, Spas-Demensk. Here the enemy offered stubborn resistance and the offensive stopped.

Outcome

The only major strategic result of the offensive of the Soviet troops was the elimination of the immediate danger to Moscow. The Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge and the bridgehead on it were eliminated. The cities of Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Sychevka, Bely, Vyazma, Olenino were liberated.

The results of the Rzhev battle

The number of Soviet troops at the beginning of operations

To date, the official point of view on losses is set out in the book "Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study". Here are the figures for the total losses (irretrievable and sanitary) of the fronts in offensive operations:

Rzhev-Vyazemskaya - 01/08? 04/20/1942 - 776889 people

First Rzhev-Sychevskaya (Gzhatskaya) offensive-- 30.07?23.08.1942 - 193683 people

The second Rzhev-Sychevskaya offensive operation ("Mars") - 11/25? 12/20/1942 - 215674 people

Rzhev-Vyazemskaya offensive operation - 02.03? 03.31.1943 - 138,577 people

In just 8 months of fighting (out of 15) - 1324823 people. The figure is not final, because does not take into account the missing, captured. In addition, it does not take into account losses for 7 months when there were no offensive actions. These losses are comparable to the losses of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad.

The fighting on the Eastern Front in November 1943 was very different from the fighting of the previous two years. Although the autumn of both 1941 and 1942 was the time of major operations (respectively, near Moscow and Stalingrad), for many units in other sectors of the front, it was time to prepare for wintering in more or less convenient places of deployment.

The weather was to their aid. After the first night frosts, thaw began - a time of slush, when the mud became impassable even for caterpillar vehicles. And behind it came the Russian winter, which greatly complicated the further advance of the troops. However, unlike the previous two years, in 1943 winter came late and was unusually mild.

This meant that the almost endless fighting after the failed summer offensive of the Wehrmacht near Kursk simply continued. In one of the reports, dated early December, it was written: "All parts have come to such a degree of exhaustion that it is no longer possible to overcome it." The defeat of the troops of the Eastern Front was, in fact, only a matter of time.

The so-called "Panther Line" (often also called the "Eastern Wall"), which Hitler agreed to organize only after much thought, was rather fragile in many of its stretches, because the Wehrmacht forces involved in it were exhausted by long battles. In many places, the Red Army, which greatly outnumbered the German troops in numbers, managed to break through the front line. In early November, she, in particular, managed to recapture Kiev.

Battalions led by captains

Erich von Manstein, commander-in-chief of Army Group South, then left for Hitler's headquarters in East Prussia in order to fully describe to him the situation at the front. From the divisions, in fact, only regiments remained; the battalions commanded by the captains corresponded in strength to the companies; and only a couple of dozen vehicles remained in the tank corps.

First of all, Manstein demanded that the 17th Army be withdrawn from the Crimea, where it risked being cut off and destroyed, and transferred as a reserve force to the Southern Front, where it could be used for a counteroffensive. Manstein was supported at the same time by the head of the department for monitoring enemy forces on eastbound, the future head of the Federal Intelligence Service of Germany, Reinhard Gehlen, who, in turn, reported on the high concentration of Soviet tank troops in front of the positions of Army Group Center. According to him, without the urgent redeployment of the 17th Army on the Eastern Front, there was a "danger of defeat."

Hitler continued to stubbornly. He became obsessed with the idea that with the withdrawal of German forces, the Red Army would have access to minerals in the territory of Ukraine and Romania. He did not think about the fact that this would have happened in the event of the defeat of the 17th Army. The only "concession" that the Fuhrer agreed to was the redeployment of two tank divisions from the western direction.

During the "Kiev strategic offensive operation", as it was called in Soviet historical documents, the Red Army had 670,000 soldiers, 7,000 guns, 675 tanks and 700 aircraft. Thus, in mid-November, she managed to break through the defensive formations of Army Groups "Center" and "South" a gap more than a hundred kilometers wide.

No small success

In this situation, the first units of the 25th Panzer Division reached their unloading stations. A large unit was formed in France, but it was not yet fully armed. The soldiers had minimal necessary training, but had not yet had time to pass the exams in weapons possession in combat conditions, thanks to which the Wehrmacht forces still had at least tactical superiority over the Soviet troops.

Hitler ignored this. Unlike the Red Army, the German command was usually in no hurry to throw their military formations into battle until they were “grown together” from the inside, says historian Karl-Heinz Friser. The very first deviation from this important principle turned out to be problems for the Wehrmacht. For the first time, the entry into battle of the newly formed tank division did not bring even partial success. The 25th Division was destroyed before its tanks even arrived in the combat area.

Hitler was furious and looked for the guilty among the commanders at the scene. Herman Got, commander of the 4th Panzer Army and one of the most capable generals of this branch of the army, who had participated in the Battle of Stalingrad the year before, was removed from his post. Erich Raus was appointed in his place. By this point, the German defensive campaign was already on the verge of failure, writes the famous British military historian Basil Liddel Hart (Basil Liddel Hart). Stalin's assertion during the celebration of the October Revolution that victory was close at hand almost came true.

Harsh criticism of Stalin

That this did not happen is one of the turning points of World War II. In the 1990s, Russian historians, after studying numerous documents, allowed themselves to reproach Stalin that, despite a significant advantage in technology and manpower, the war was not brought to victory even at that moment. “The mistakes of the front command turned into a heavy burden for the soldiers,” the latest edition of the Russian anthology on the Great Patriotic War of the USSR says. According to this publication, however, it was not Stalin who was to blame for the lost victory, but high-ranking front commanders.

But neither the Headquarters, nor the headquarters in Moscow, nor the command of the front headquarters were able to quickly use their own advantage. Stalin stubbornly continued to fight "according to the textbook", and his generals did not dare to raise objections.

The Red Army attacked the troops of the Army Group "South" in the forehead, and Manstein managed to hold his ground. And in mid-November, he launched a counteroffensive that turned into a real sensation.

"Why are we losing the war?" - the most insightful and far-sighted of the German generals began to ask this question already in the late autumn of 1941. Why, despite the suddenness of the attack and the monstrous losses of the Red Army, did the Wehrmacht fail to break the resistance of the Soviet soldiers? Why did the crushing machine of blitzkrieg, which conquered half of Europe for Hitler, fail for the first time and was stopped at the gates of Moscow?

The authors of this book, who were members of the military elite of the Reich, actively participated in the preparations for the war against the USSR and in all major battles on the Eastern Front, developed and carried out operations on land, at sea and in the air. Since this publication was not originally intended for the open press, the German generals could speak frankly, without regard to censorship and propaganda clichés. This is a kind of "work on the mistakes", one of the first attempts to figure out why the successfully started war ended with the defeat of the Wehrmacht and the surrender of Germany.

By September 1943, the front of the Eastern Army was basically a solid line, and only one gap remained open between Army Groups South and Center. However, the strength of the newly created front left much to be desired. There were no significant reserves. The divisions were worn out in battle, their numbers and weapons indicated that they would not be able to withstand new severe tests. On vast sectors of the front, the positions were poorly equipped, the stretching of the front of individual formations did not allow the Germans to create a sufficient operational density of troops even in the main defense zone, not to mention the construction of a deeply echeloned and well-equipped defense system. The problem of the number of formations, which ran like a red thread through the entire Eastern campaign, began to become more and more acute. It became quite obvious that Hitler had set a task for the armed forces in the East that was beyond their power.

Under such conditions, the conclusion suggested itself that it was necessary once again before the start of a new Russian offensive to withdraw troops in an organized manner and occupy the least extended and well-prepared line of defense. First of all, it was necessary to withdraw troops from the Crimea, as well as from the arc protruding to the east along the Dnieper south of Kiev. This was the only way to achieve some reduction in the front of individual formations and create at least a minimum of reserves. But Hitler did not agree to this on account of the political and economic reasons. Although Hitler was constantly up to date with accurate reports and reports and knew how many people and weapons were in individual divisions, he overestimated their ability to resist, as well as underestimated the offensive capabilities of the Russians. In addition, he believed that such a wide water barrier as the Dnieper could be successfully defended even with insignificant forces.

On October 7, the Russians, having previously captured a small bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper in the area south of Kiev, which the Germans failed to liquidate, went on the offensive. They concentrated their main effort at first between Kremenchug and Dnepropetrovsk, as well as in the area of ​​Zaporozhye and Melitopol. After heavy fighting, during which the German troops and command, realizing the decisive importance of holding the occupied lines for the entire Eastern campaign, strained all their forces and stubbornly repulsed the onslaught of superior Russian forces, the latter managed to break through the front of the 6th Army in the Melitopol region on October 23. They threw back the army behind the Dnieper in its lower reaches and cut off the Crimea, blocking the Perekop isthmus. At the same time, they landed in the eastern part of the Crimea on the Kerch Peninsula. However, both near Perekop and on the Kerch Peninsula, the advance of Russian troops was temporarily stopped. The Crimean peninsula continued to remain in the hands of the Germans.

On the front of the 1st Panzer Army, which took place in the sector from Chigorin to Nikopol, the Russians, having failed in an attempt to eliminate the German bridgehead in the Zaporozhye region, crossed the Dnieper between Dnepropetrovsk and Kremenchug and broke through the defenses of the German troops along the Dnieper on a wide front. With forces of up to about 100 divisions, including many tank units and formations, they struck at westbound and went to Krivoy Rog. Army Group A, whose right wing was still holding the defense along the Dnieper in its lower reaches, turned around from Nikopol with its front to the west. Now the front line passed through Krivoy Rog and west of Kirovograd. Army Group South, having pulled back the troops of the right wing of the 8th Army after the 1st Panzer Army, at first continued to hold the old positions in the zone of this army. As a result, a new protrusion of the front was formed here, strongly elongated to the east.

A critical situation also developed on the front of the 4th Panzer Army, which operated as part of Army Group South. This army, in the course of bloody battles that lasted almost four weeks, repulsed all the attacks of the enemy, who was trying to make a breakthrough in the Kiev region. Only in a few sectors did the enemy manage to slightly push her troops. But after these battles, the army was bled and unable to continue resistance.

When, on November 3, the Russians, with up to 50 divisions, launched a decisive offensive from the bridgeheads they had captured on the right bank of the Dnieper, the 4th Panzer Army was unable to provide sufficient resistance to the Russian strike force. Kiev fell on November 6th. The front of the German troops was broken, and the Russian tank and motorized units, almost without resistance, rushed to the west. On November 11, the advanced units of the advancing Russian troops approached Zhitomir.

At the same time, the Russians also went on the offensive on the front of the 2nd Army, which operated on the right flank of Army Group Center. Having struck south and north of Gomel, the Russians pushed the army back to the northwest. As a result, the gap that existed between the army groups widened even further. A desperate situation arose. If the Russians now began to build on the success they had achieved, then the fate of Army Groups "A" and "South", and at the same time the fate of the entire Eastern Front, would be finally decided. The situation could only be saved by striking the left flank of the Russian troops that had broken through. Having gathered all the forces that could be withdrawn from other sectors of the front, replacing them with temporary, hastily formed units from vacationers, as well as consolidated units of rear services, etc., and transferring here individual units from other theaters of military operations, the Germans managed to create in the area between Fastov and Zhytomyr the grouping necessary to carry out this task. This strike force launched a counteroffensive against the left flank of the Russian troops that had broken through and stopped their advance to the west.

Battles for the Dnieper in autumn 1943.

Although the Germans did not have enough forces to achieve a decisive success, they nevertheless managed to eliminate the mortal danger of a deep breakthrough of Russian formations and their entry into the operational space. By transferring part of the forces to the west, the Germans were able to detain the enemy approximately on the Fastov-Radomyshl-Korosten line. For this failure, the Russians tried to respond with a new offensive on the front of the 8th Army and Army Group A. In the course of heavy fighting, which dragged on until December 1943, they managed to achieve some local successes here: to seize a bridgehead in the Kherson region and capture Chigirin and Cherkassy. But the Germans still retained the integrity of their front. The serious danger that threatened the front in October-November had passed. However, despite this seemingly satisfactory development of events, the German troops, despite everything that was done to increase their combat effectiveness, became even weaker. The fact that in the course of its counter-offensive the 4th Panzer Army, despite the skillful leadership of the command, favorable conditions and the selfless actions of the troops, failed to build on the initial tactical success and achieve victory on an operational scale, should have been a new wake-up call for the Germans. The superior forces of the Russians, operating as part of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, threatened to break through the thin fabric of the German defense in any place they desired with a new blow.

The troops of Army Group Center, meanwhile, made a systematic withdrawal and also took up new defenses. The front line now ran along the Sozh and Pronya rivers and, continuing further north east of Orsha and Vitebsk, connected in the area east of Nevel with the front line of Army Group North. But the troops of the army group could not get at least a small respite on this new frontier. The large forces of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts operating here made frequent attacks on the German troops, trying to outflank them, in the sector of the 2nd Army and break through the weak front of the army group. However, the German troops, with the support of the small, but extremely operational aviation units of Colonel-General von Greim, successfully overcame numerous and sometimes very dangerous positions.

The situation that developed on the right flank of the 2nd Army, where the defeats suffered by the Army Group South, made itself felt especially strongly, took on the most critical character. Becoming more and more open, this flank forced the army command to allocate part of the forces to cover it. The Russians took advantage of the difficult situation in which the army found itself and went on the offensive in the direction of Gomel. In stubborn battles, the Germans at first managed to hold their positions and prevent the enemy from breaking through their front. However, in early November, when the front of the neighboring 4th Panzer Army (Army Group South) was broken through and the Russians began to advance in the direction of Korosten, the situation deteriorated significantly. Now the enemy launched an offensive also against the completely uncovered junction of Army Groups "South" and "Center". After fierce fighting, the Russians broke through the front of the 2nd Army, which threw its last reserves into battle, and, turning then to the northwest, began to advance towards Rechitsa and Mozyr. As a result, the formations operating on its right flank south of the Pripyat River were cut off from the army, and a threat was created to the main communications of the Germans, the Minsk-Mozyr railway. Communication with the 4th Panzer Army, maintained for quite a long time only by moving units, was completely lost. The enemy went deep into the rear of the troops of the right flank of the 2nd Army in the Ovruch area. The small southern grouping, cut off from the main forces of the army, was under the threat of encirclement, which it managed to avoid only as a result of a quick breakthrough in the north-western direction. The breakthrough was carried out successfully, and the grouping again connected with the main forces of the army in the area southeast of Mozyr. But the gap that existed between Army Groups Center and South widened to more than 100 km. A serious threat arose to the troops defending on the eastward ledge of the front in the Gomel region. Despite this, Hitler rejected a proposal to withdraw these troops to new positions. As a result, the situation became even more aggravated. On November 17, Rechitsa was surrendered, and after that the Russians went to the Mozyr-Zhlobin railway and thereby cut the last communication linking the troops defending Gomel with the main German forces.

Now the Russians went on the offensive and, in the sector of the front north of Gomel, in the Propoisk region, in the course of heavy fighting, they broke through the German defenses to a considerable depth. The advance of the enemy was stopped approximately only at the Chausy-Bykhov line. German troops operating in the Gomel region were under the threat of encirclement. The resulting situation forced the German command at the very last moment to withdraw its troops from the ledge of the front they occupied. By mid-December, the troops took up new positions along the Dnieper, and their position was somewhat strengthened. The gap formed during the fighting between the main forces of the Army Group and the 2nd Army was liquidated as a result of the counteroffensive undertaken here. Thus, by the end of the year, the troops of the right wing of Army Group Center again occupied a more or less strong position, and only the gap that existed at the junction of Army Groups Center and South in the area south of Mozyr was still not closed. Since the beginning of winter, the Pripyat swamps have become relatively passable, at least here it was now possible to conduct fighting, and this forced the Germans to allocate additional forces to cover the swamps.

In front of the central sector of the front of the army group, the Russians concentrated their main effort on the direction of Smolensk - Orsha - Minsk. Here they tried several times with large forces to launch an offensive with the aim of breaking through the front of the 4th Army on its right flank. Thanks to the exceptional stamina of the troops, the skillful actions of the commanders of units and formations, as well as the presence of a deeply echeloned and well-equipped defense here, the Germans managed to repulse all the attacks of the significantly superior enemy forces that they made until December 1943. The Russians suffered great damage here.

Less successful were the actions of the 3rd Panzer Army, which was defending on the right wing of the army group. In early October, the Russians broke through it to the Nevel front in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe junction with the 16th Army (Army Group North). The inner flanks of both armies had to be turned back. It was not possible to close the ever-widening gap, and since Hitler this time again rejected the proposal to withdraw troops located on the flanks of both armies and found themselves in danger of being captured, the danger was gradually created that the Russians would go behind the rear of the left wing of the 3rd Panzer Army from the north and northwest. Since both army groups did not have the strength to close the gap by counterattack, as Hitler repeatedly demanded, the pressure of the enemy against the open left flank of Army Group Center became more and more sensitive. Gradually, a great threat arose for the main communications of the 3rd Panzer Army, which passed through Polotsk. On December 13, the Russians launched a decisive offensive. They launched a series of attacks in converging directions from the east, north and northeast. The division, which was defending on the left flank of the army, was defeated; its remnants managed to break through the encirclement, but at the same time all the materiel was lost. The tank army was thrown back to Vitebsk, but here it managed to gain a foothold and hold a bridgehead on the right bank of the Western Dvina. All attacks of the enemy, who tried to break through the front of the army, were repulsed. The gap between Army Group Center and Army Group North, covered only by insignificant forces, continued to exist and posed a serious danger, since the Russians could use it to advance along the Western Dvina to the northwest in order to deeply envelop Army Group North ".

On the front of Army Group North, the Russians limited themselves to a slight increase in activity. However, this allowed them to pin down the significant forces of the army group, which, because of this, was unable to find the means to eliminate the crisis near Nevel, which also posed a serious danger to it.

SUMMER-FALL CAMPAIGN 1943, the designation of military operations in the Great Patriotic War adopted in Russian literature from July to the end of December. At the end of March 1943, after fierce winter battles (see. Winter campaign 1942/43) on the Soviet-German front there was a relative calm. Both belligerents used the operational pause to intensify preparations for new operations.

Owls. the command led preparations for the struggle to hold the initiative and complete the radical turning point in the war. The army received more and more military equipment and weapons. By July 1943, the number of automatic weapons in the active army almost doubled compared to April, anti-tank artillery - 1.5, anti-aircraft - 1.2, aircraft - 1.7, tanks - 2 times. Particular attention was paid to the accumulation of Stavka reserves. By summer, there were 8 combined arms, 3 tank and 1 air armies in the strategic reserve. At the same time, on the territory of the USSR, Foreign military formations from representatives of the peoples of some European countries.

The enemy by this time still possessed great power. Germany and its allies conducted a total mobilization, sharply increased the output of military products. Big hopes for him. the command assigned to the new tanks T-V "Panther", T-VI "Tiger", which had powerful armor and weapons, as well as assault guns "Ferdinand". The vast majority of human and material resources headed for the Sov.-German. front, but the enemy did not have large strategic reserves here. By the beginning of July 1943, there were only 2 infantry, 3 security and 1 cavalry divisions, as well as 3 infantry and 1 cavalry brigades in the reserve of the main command of the German ground forces.

Planning for military action eastern front summer 1943, German. the leadership understood that the Wehrmacht was not able to attack simultaneously in several strategic directions. Therefore, it was decided to conduct a major offensive operation in the summer of 1943 in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. No active hostilities were planned for the rest of the front in the first half of the summer. It was supposed to carry out an operation near Leningrad only in July.

Owls. The Supreme High Command revealed the enemy's plans for the summer of 1943 in a timely manner. In doing so, not only was the general plan of the German command established, but the groupings of the enemy's troops throughout the Sov.-German were precisely determined. front, the combat and numerical strength of his troops in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, the general directions of their main attacks, and then the time of the start of the offensive. Considering these circumstances, the command decided to use deliberate defense to wear down and bleed the enemy strike groups in the Kursk region, and then to launch a general offensive in the western and southwestern directions, to defeat the main forces of the army groups "South" and "Center". The task was set for the troops: after repelling the enemy’s offensive, they themselves would go on the offensive and crush his defenses on the front from Velikiye Luki to the Black Sea. They had to liberate the Left-bank Ukraine, Donbass, overcome the river. Dnieper, move the front further from Moscow and the Central Industrial Region, liberate the eastern regions of Belarus, clear the Taman Peninsula and the Crimea from the enemy. The first operations were planned in detail, subsequent ones were outlined only in general terms.

The troops operating in the northwestern direction were to pin down the opposing enemy forces and prevent him from maneuvering with reserves. The troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts had to attack the Mga to disrupt the enemy's impending attack on Leningrad, to draw his operational reserves into the battle. Thus, the main events in the Sov.-German. front in the summer of 1943 were to deploy in the area of ​​the Kursk salient.

Prior to the start of the main events of the campaign, owls. the command decided to complete the liberation of the North Caucasus. At the end of March, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved the plan for the offensive operation of the North Caucasian Front to defeat the 17th German. army. Her plan was to bypass the village of Krymskaya - a key node of resistance on it. defensive line "Gotenkopf" - "Head of the Goth" (in Russian historiography - "Blue Line") - from the north and south, to seize it and the blows of the troops of the right wing and the center of the front to Varenikovskaya, and the left - to Anapa in parts to defeat the opposing enemy, then discard the rest of the German-Roman. troops from Taman to the sea. The main role in the operation, which was planned to be carried out in a relatively short time, was assigned to the 56th Army.

The offensive began after a week of preparation on 4 April. In all directions, owls. The troops encountered strong resistance. The enemy, having concentrated 820 combat aircraft, including 510 bombers, on the airfields of the Crimea and the Taman Peninsula, and also using up to 200 bombers based in the Donbass and in southern Ukraine, unleashed powerful bombing attacks on the attackers. The 4th and 5th air armies of the North Caucasian Front, together with the air group of the Black Sea Fleet, being inferior in the number of aircraft, could not provide the necessary resistance. Soon the enemy achieved significant air superiority over the Kuban.

On April 6, the offensive was suspended. Only on April 14, after the regrouping, it was resumed, however, this time the tasks were not completed. Since April 17, active hostilities have ceased in most sectors of the front. At the same time, fierce air battles in the Kuban 1943. In the second half of April - early May, the enemy made several attempts to eliminate the bridgehead captured by the owls. troops south of Novorossiysk, - the heroic "Little Land" However, all of his attacks were repulsed.

Meanwhile, the troops of the North Caucasian Front were preparing to continue the offensive operation. The armies were replenished with personnel and military equipment, their provision with material resources was significantly improved, and new tasks were assigned to the troops. On April 29, the offensive resumed. The main blow was delivered by the 56th Army north and south of Krymskaya. The strikes of other armies were coordinated with her actions. After heavy fighting on May 4, the village was liberated. But there was no longer any strength to develop success. On May 19, the 56th Army went on the defensive at the reached line, without completing the tasks defined by the operation plan. Later, from May 26 to June 7, and then at the end of June - beginning of July, the North Caucasian Front undertook a number of private operations to break through the German-Roman defense. troops, but did not achieve decisive success. From the first days of July, the active operations of the North Caucasian Front ceased. The troops went on the defensive. The time has come for the decisive battles of the campaign in the Kursk region.

As a result of the winter 1942/1943 offensive of the owls. troops and their forced withdrawal in March 1943 from Kharkov formed the so-called. Kursk ledge. The configuration of the front line gave both sides certain advantages for offensive operations, but at the same time created threats in the event that they went on the offensive. The troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts located on the Kursk ledge threatened the German flanks and rear. Army Groups "Center" and "South". In turn, these enemy groupings, occupying the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads, had favorable conditions for inflicting flank attacks on the owls. troops defending in the Kursk region. The leadership of the Wehrmacht decided to take advantage of these conditions. It planned an offensive operation with the code name "Citadel". The plan of the operation provided for strikes in converging directions from the north and south at the base of the Kursk salient on the 4th day of the offensive to surround and then destroy the owls here. troops. Subsequently, strike at the rear of the Southwestern Front and launch an offensive in a northeast direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central group of owls. troops and creating a threat to Moscow.

To repel enemy attacks, the troops of the Central, Voronezh Fronts and the Steppe Military District created a powerful defense, which included 8 defensive lines and lines with a total depth of 250–300 km.

There was no more than a hundred meters between the tanks - you could only fidget, no maneuver. This was not a war - beating tanks. They crawled and fired. Everything was on fire. An indescribable stench hung over the battlefield. Everything was covered with smoke, dust, fire, so that it seemed - twilight had come. Aviation bombed everyone. Tanks were on fire, vehicles were on fire, communications were down...

From the memoirs of V.P. Bryukhov, tanker

Second winter of the war

SS division "Totenkopf" before the offensive.

After fierce battles in the winter of 1942-1943. there was a lull on the Soviet-German front. The belligerents drew lessons from past battles, outlined plans for further actions, the armies were replenished with people and new technology reserves accumulated. Hitler understood that the Reich desperately needed a brilliant victory. In the winter of 1943, the “Russian barbarians” suddenly appeared as a strong and merciless enemy, and the German victories achieved in 1941 faded considerably. The jubilation of the Nazi army gave way to restraint, and then to alertness. In January 1943, Soviet troops inflicted devastating damage on german army near Stalingrad: total losses fascist troops from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943 amounted to over 1,500,000 (killed and captured) people, about 2,000 tanks and assault guns, 3,000 aircraft.

In February 1943, Hitler demanded that his generals "recompense in the summer what was lost in the winter"; he needed a victory that would restore the image of the "invincible armada" to the German army. The German fascist command, planning summer campaign 1943, decided to launch a major offensive on the Soviet-German front in order to regain the lost strategic initiative. For the counteroffensive, the Reich generals chose the so-called Kursk ledge, which went into the location of the German troops up to 200 km, which was formed during the winter-spring offensive of the Soviet troops. The Citadel plan provided that the German army would encircle and destroy Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge with two simultaneous counter attacks in the general direction of Kursk: from the Orel region to the south and from the Kharkov region to the north. In the future, the German generals intended to expand the front of the offensive from the area east of Kursk - to the southeast - and defeat the Soviet troops in the Donbass.

This is what the plan of the Citadel looked like.

If you look at the front line that took shape in the spring of 1943, it will immediately catch your eye that the front in the Orel-Kursk-Belgorod-Kharkov region bizarrely curved back to the letter S - in the north a ledge was wedged into the Soviet defenses, in the center of which was Orel, and right under it was exactly the same ledge, which was held by the Soviet troops and the center of which was Kursk. Hitler liked the idea of ​​"cutting off this Kursk balcony" very much, and on March 13, 1943, he signed an order to begin preparations for Operation Citadel.

It is interesting: In this directive of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, an interesting quote can be noted: “It should be expected that the Russians, after the end of winter and spring thaw, having created stocks of materiel and partially replenished their formations with people, will resume the offensive. Therefore, our task is to preempt them as far as possible in the offensive in places in order to impose their will, at least on one of the sectors of the front ... ”Thus, the defeat of the Red Army and the victorious end of the war were no longer discussed.

The start of the German offensive was planned for May 3 - the German command was counting on the surprise factor and the fact that the Russians would not be able to replenish personnel and equipment after exhausting battles in the winter. But, having carefully studied the state of the German troops, the Wehrmacht High Headquarters reported to the Fuhrer that "an offensive is possible only in June, after the arrival of reinforcements to the troops, since the equipment of the units is below 60%."

Despite the signed order for Operation Citadel, there were disputes in the German generals about the need for a summer offensive. The main argument of supporters of the encirclement of Soviet troops in the Kursk salient was expressed by Field Marshal Keitel at a meeting with the Fuhrer: "We must attack for political reasons." To which Guderian, an ardent opponent of the Citadel plan, replied:

To this direct question, Hitler honestly replied that at the mere thought of the operation, his “stomach starts to hurt.” But Guderian could not dissuade the Fuhrer.

German training

The spring thaw gave the belligerents a break, which the Wehrmacht used to prepare for the offensive. High losses in people and equipment after the Battle of Stalingrad and the battles in Ukraine that followed it led to the fact that all German army reserves were exhausted, and there was simply nothing to restore the formations operating at the front. From January to March 1943, the Wehrmacht lost 2,500 tanks, which accounted for 60% of all combat vehicles produced in 1942. On the entire eastern front, at the end of January, 500 tanks remained in service!

The problem of a shortage of personnel was also acute, and on January 13, the Fuhrer signed a decree on "Total War", under which general mobilization was announced. Men from 16 to 60 years old, women from 17 to 45 were subject to conscription. An increased conscription into the German army in the occupied territories also began, Poles, Slovaks, Czechs, as well as Russians who emigrated to Europe after the revolution of 1917 were sent to the front and industry. In many concentration camps for prisoners of war, the Germans recruited prisoners of the Red Army into special units.

Nevertheless, all these measures could not close the gap in the human resources of the Wehrmacht, and from February 11, 1943, 15-year-old schoolchildren were called up for auxiliary positions in the German Air Force (however, let's not forget that women and children worked at the factories of the USSR at that time ).

All these measures, together with the significant industrial potential of Germany, albeit slowly, but restored the strength of the Wehrmacht. According to the plan of Operation Citadel, the breakthrough of the Russian defense was assigned to tank wedges, which were to be led by the latest T-5 and T-6.

On a note: in German military terminology, tanks were denoted by the index Pz.Kpfw (Panzerkampfwagen - armored fighting vehicle), and the model number - by Roman numerals. For example: Pz.Kpfw V . In this article, the names of German tanks are given in Russian transcription, with the index "T" and Arabic numerals.

"Panthers" on the march.

T-6 "Tiger"

Fire escort was supposed to be carried out by modernized T-4 tanks and self-propelled artillery, but a significant problem was in equipping tank divisions with new vehicles. The production of one T-6 "Tiger" required as much material resources and time as the production of three T-4s, and the production of "Panthers" was just being deployed. In addition, the latest T-5 Panther tank was not tested at the front and did not participate in battles, and no one knew how the vehicle would behave in combat conditions. The inspector of the Wehrmacht tank troops, General Guderian, told the Fuhrer that the tank was frankly “raw” and that it was simply stupid to throw the Panther into battle without modification.

But Hitler relied on the tactics of the "Tank wedge" and at the end of March demanded that the production of 600 T-5 tanks be set up. Despite all the efforts of the German industry, no more than 200 combat vehicles were produced by the end of May, and the refinement of the already assembled tanks to the required state was difficult, new defects and shortcomings were discovered.

Also lagging behind schedule was the production of the latest Ferdinand self-propelled gun. All this caused the date of the offensive to be postponed to June 12, and later to July 5.

At the end of June 1943, the German command concentrated forces:

The strike force in the Orel area consisted of 270,000 soldiers and officers, about 3,500 guns and mortars, about 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns. She was supposed to deliver the main blow in the direction of the Orel-Kursk railway.

The strike force north of Kharkov consisted of 280,000 soldiers and officers, more than 2,500 guns and mortars, and up to 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns. It was supposed to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 4th Panzer Army along the Oboyan-Kursk highway and the auxiliary one with the forces of the Kempf task force in the direction of Belgorod-Korocha.

There were twenty more divisions (320,000 personnel) on the flanks of the strike groups.

In total, in order to carry out their plan, the fascist German command concentrated about a million soldiers and officers, about 10,000 guns and mortars, about 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, and over 2,000 combat aircraft on the Kursk salient.

Russian training

The action plan of the Red Army in the spring and summer of 1943 went in parallel with the planning of the German operation "Citadel" - from March to July. As in the generals of the Wehrmacht, Stalin's headquarters did not have a single view on whether to go on the offensive or go on the defensive.

Marshals of the Red Army Vasilevsky and Zhukov believed that it was necessary to give the initiative to the Germans and go on the defensive, destroying the advancing tank forces of the Nazis, counterattack and defeat the enemy. The opponents were the commanders of the Voronezh and Southern Fronts, Malinovsky and Vatutin, who believed that an immediate offensive was required until the Germans recovered from their defeat in the winter of 1943.

At the end of March, Marshal Zhukov visited the fronts and prepared a report for Stalin, in which he stated the following:

« I consider it inappropriate for our troops to go on the offensive in the coming days in order to forestall the enemy. It would be better if we exhausted the enemy on our defenses, drove out his tanks, and then brought in fresh reserves; by switching to a general offensive, we will finally finish off the main enemy grouping».

This report formed the basis of the defense plan in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. The Red Army embarked on a deliberate defense.

It is interesting: the plan of defense on the Kursk ledge was signed by Stalin at a meeting on April 12. On the same day, a draft of Order No. 6, a counterattack by German troops near Kursk, lay on the table to Hitler. This was the final version of Operation Citadel.

Secret Front of the Battle of Kursk

Experience 1941-1943 showed that in order to prepare an offensive operation, it is necessary to move a huge amount of manpower, tanks, guns, various military equipment, and ammunition to a certain sector of the front; set in motion hundreds of thousands of people over a vast territory, sometimes hundreds of kilometers from the intended point. Only in the case of more or less complete awareness of all these movements in the enemy rear will the command receive real benefit from the information of the scouts about the day of the offensive.

Regular reports on the movement and strength of enemy military units give a picture of the enemy's possible actions. And for this it is necessary to have a well-hidden, reliable, well-functioning intelligence service.

By 1943, hundreds of Soviet intelligence officers were working behind German lines. But the first serious information, which confirmed the correctness of the calculation of the Soviet command, was sent by the London residency. On April 25, 1943, British intelligence intercepted a telegram from the German General Weichs. It was a detailed plan for Operation Citadel and an assessment of the state of the Soviet troops in the Kursk salient. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, having read the text of the document after deciphering it, decided to hand it over to Soviet intelligence.

In early May, information began to arrive from front-line and strategic intelligence that the Germans were concentrating troops at the base of the ledge, transferring the most combat-ready units, new equipment. At the end of April, several groups of scouts were landed in the area of ​​​​the city of Orel occupied by the Germans, who informed about the movements of enemy troops.

Foreign intelligence of the USSR and the NKVD made its contribution to the defense of the Kursk Bulge. Disinformation was required, which would force the Wehrmacht generals to redeploy their units and transfer new reinforcements to the front. This will require additional time, which means it will postpone the German offensive and enable the Red Army to better prepare the defense and counteroffensive plan. In March 1943, the headquarters of the USSR command decided that disinformation data for the German command should be transmitted by A.P., a participant in the Monastery project. Demyanov.

Operation Monastery

At the beginning Patriotic War it became necessary to infiltrate the German intelligence network - the Abwehr - operating on the territory of the USSR. It was possible to recruit several agents - Abwehr radio operators - and use them to lure out other German agents.

But, firstly, such an operational game could not continue for a long time, and secondly, during it it was hardly possible to convey serious misinformation to the enemy. Therefore, Lieutenant General of the NKVD Sudoplatov decided to imitate the existence of the monarchist organization Throne in the USSR, which welcomes the victory of the Germans and wants to help them.

A candidate for the underground monarchist organization was soon found - it was Alexander Petrovich Demyanov, who came from a noble officer family. In 1939, he made contact with German intelligence agents in Moscow, and this contact developed so successfully that the Germans practically considered Demyanov their agent, giving him the nickname "Max".

On February 17, 1942, Demyanov's "flight" across the front line was organized. German counterintelligence at first was distrustful of the Russian intelligence officer - he was interrogated and checked with passion, not trusting the stories about the existence of the "Throne", on behalf of which he fled to the Germans to ask them for help. The Germans staged a shooting as a test, but Demyanov showed courage and did not split.

After an answer was received from Berlin to the request of the front-line division of the Abwehr that the defector - known to the Abwehr "Max", who can be trusted - the attitude towards him changed, and they began to prepare him for being thrown into the Soviet rear. His training was short-lived, but extremely intensive: Demyanov studied cryptography, cipher and radio business.

On March 15, 1942, only twenty-six days after "passing over to the Germans," he was dropped by parachute over Yaroslavl region. On the same day he was delivered to Moscow with a report to the leadership of the NKVD.

Two weeks later, as agreed before the cast, "Max" went on the air. From that day on, he began regular radio contact with German intelligence. Operation Monastery developed successfully; it became clear that its capabilities go far beyond the goals outlined at the beginning. Now we could talk not only about "catching" German agents, but also about supplying the Germans with large-scale disinformation, prepared on the very high level.

In October 1942, couriers from Abwehr came to Max, delivering a walkie-talkie, encryption pads and money. After the couriers were captured by the NKVD, they were recruited, and now "information" to the Germans went through several channels.

December 18, 1942 "Max" and one of the radio operators were awarded the German Order - "Iron Cross" with swords for bravery. The radio play continued. German intelligence couriers increasingly arrived not only in Moscow, but also in other cities where the "Throne" allegedly had its strongholds: in Gorky, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Novosibirsk. In total, more than fifty agents were captured during the operational game.

But the main merit of the participants in the operation "Monastery" is the transfer of a large amount of the most important disinformation. According to the legend for the Germans, "Max" worked as a junior communications officer in the General Staff of the Red Army. Demyanov's reports dealt mainly with the rail transportation of military units, military equipment, which made it possible for the Germans to calculate the actions planned in advance by our army. But the leaders of the operation "Monastery" proceeded from the fact that the monitoring of the railways is carried out by real German agents. Therefore, wooden "tanks", "guns" and other "equipment" were sent along the routes indicated by "Max" under tarpaulin covers.

In order to confirm Demyanov's reports about acts of sabotage committed by "his people", the press published notes on sabotage on railway transport.

The information reported by "Max" was divided into information obtained by his "sources" and by himself. Of course, while "his" information was poorer, given his low position.

The radio game continued until the end of 1944, after which it was decided to stop it and start a new operation - Berezino.

"Reliable source" weekly reported to the Germans data on the deployment of the main parts Soviet army south of Moscow. According to legend, he had access to information in the General Staff. The scout reported on the active transfer of Soviet troops and armored vehicles to the Kursk-Orel region, but they are not maneuverable enough, so their use is difficult. The transfer really went on, but in the reports of "Max" its dimensions were increased many times over. As the head of the NKVD intelligence service, Sudoplatov, later said: “Max’s disinformation, as it became known from the memoirs of the head of German intelligence (BND) Gehlen, contributed to the fact that the Germans repeatedly postponed the offensive on the Kursk Bulge, and this was in the hands of the Soviet Army ... »

defensive lines

The main idea of ​​the USSR command plan to repel the German strike on the Kursk ledge was a defense in depth system with a large number of engineering structures and obstacles.

Defense preparation.

The depth of tactical defense was 15-20 kilometers. Particular importance in the preparation of the defense was attached to the equipment of trenches of a full profile, interconnected by communication lines. They served as shelters from artillery and mortar fire, as well as from air strikes, and provided covert maneuver along the front. In some areas of defense, the trenches were in four lines, with a distance of 250 meters between them. Shelters were also equipped there: cracks, niches, long-term firing points, dugouts under the timber frame.

As a rule, the first line of trenches was engaged in submachine gunners, tank destroyers, anti-tank gun crews. The main firing structures were anti-fragmentation nests for shooters, and for machine guns - bunkers (wood-and-earth firing points - a wooden frame two by two meters, almost completely buried in the ground, and covered with several logs on top).

The troops worked day and night, and the main difficulty was that, in order to disguise themselves on the front line, the fighters dug only at night.

General I.M. Chistyakov, commander of the 6th Guards Army on the Voronezh Front, recalled:

« So, we started building our defensive lines. The trenches and communication passages were deep - a meter and seventy centimeters, they dug, built dugouts and shelters, prepared positions for fire weapons. There was a lot of work. The army occupied 64 kilometers along the front, and an offensive could be expected along the entire front: swamps and forests, the so-called passive areas, inconvenient for an offensive, were not here ... "

Thus, on the proposed directions of the enemy's main attacks, each front had six lines of defense with a separation depth of up to 110 km on the Central Front and up to 85 km on the Voronezh Front.

To repel the attacks of German tanks and motorized infantry, a widely developed system of engineering barriers was used: anti-tank ditches, scarps (an anti-tank obstacle, which is an artificially cut edge of a slope or river bank at a large angle), three rows of barbed wire, blockages of trees, minefields. In places where a breakthrough of German tanks was possible, the density of mines reached 1,500 pieces per kilometer of the front. In addition, for the implementation of the operational setting of mines directly in front of the advancing tanks (in those years called "impudent mining"), special mobile barrage detachments (PZO) were organized. The cover was provided by a platoon of anti-tank rifles on off-road trucks or captured armored personnel carriers.

It is interesting: in addition to regular mines, in the defense on the Kursk Bulge, fire explosives were widely used, which were a box with incendiary bottles, in the center of which a saber, a grenade or an anti-personnel mine was placed. Unlike conventional minefields, they hit the enemy not only with a blast wave and fragments, but also with a flame resulting from the explosion. A minefield with fire explosives, with good camouflage, cannot be cleared. From such land mines, several barrier fields were created, which proved to be very effective both against infantry and against light and medium tanks.

The volume of work carried out by the engineering services of the fronts was colossal. Only in the location of the Central Front in April-June, up to 5,000 km of trenches and communications were dug, more than 300 km of wire obstacles were installed (of which about 30 km were electrified), more than 400,000 mines and land mines, over 60 km of gouges, up to 80 km of anti-tank ditches.

The crew of the 45-mm gun is ready to open fire.

Considering that the Germans were going to use heavy tanks and self-propelled guns, powerful anti-tank mines were required, but the Red Army did not have enough of them. For example, when hitting a Soviet mine YaM-5, the German T-2 was completely destroyed, and the T-6 "Tiger" lost one or two tracks from the caterpillar. If the Wehrmacht had a well-established repair system, damaged vehicles were quickly put into operation. Knowing this, in some areas, Soviet sappers used the simultaneous installation of two mines (one above the other) in one hole against enemy tanks "Tiger", "Panther" and assault guns "Ferdinand".

The basis of the Soviet anti-tank defense was anti-tank strongholds (PTOP). These were well-camouflaged firing positions for 6-10 anti-tank guns with a caliber of 45 and 76 mm, with a wide sector of fire. From the fire of the German motorized infantry, the PTOOP covered a platoon of submachine gunners.

It is worth noting that all firing positions were prepared only by battery crews. As the commander of the anti-tank gun, a participant in the Battle of Kursk, M.P. Badigin:

“The most difficult thing in war is work, sometimes physically exhausting work, before you have to fight, go on the attack ... It is sometimes even easier than this work. According to calculations, in order to dig in a 45-mm cannon, it is necessary to take out about thirty cubic meters of earth, and a 76-mm one - already fifty-six cubic meters. If according to peaceful calculations, this is two days of work. And without calculation - it was necessary to be in time by morning ... They dug as much as dozens of people, maybe they won’t have to dig up the earth in a lifetime ... Let’s say this: we got into a firing position, the commander, for example, decided to change a kilometer to the right. We must dig again, throw away fifty-six cubic meters of earth. I didn’t have time to dig - they say: five kilometers to the left. Digging again ... The soldier just runs out of breath mentally and physically, runs out of breath, can't. But nevertheless, the tasks are worth it, this is war. Not dug in - this is death. So, they found the strength in themselves and dug ... First, as a rule, ditches are dug for shelter, and then only - a platform for a gun. One has only to dig two bayonets, you can already lie down, hide in the ground - it’s no longer dangerous here. And there was such a rule - it was not instituted by anyone, but we firmly followed it: you will definitely dig a ditch in the place, if there is such a place, where there is a trace of mines or a shell that has exploded. Because we ourselves, gunners, know that a projectile hits the same place twice extremely rarely ... "

Leading edge masking

Along with the creation of a strong defense, the Soviet command was faced with the task of masking the front line. German intelligence did not sit still and conducted a large-scale collection of information in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. All means were used: round-the-clock surveillance of the front line, reconnaissance groups parachuted into the rear of the Russian units, and the Germans systematically captured prisoners. But aerial reconnaissance turned out to be the most effective - German reconnaissance aircraft regularly photographed the front line of the Soviet defense. And comparing the photographs with the previous ones, taken two or three weeks ago, one could see how the area was changing, where the Russians were setting up artillery batteries, and where the infantry had dug in.

German reconnaissance aircraft crosses the neutral zone.

On May 28, 1943, a German reconnaissance aircraft Focke-Wulf 189 ("frame" - the Russian pilots called this aircraft) was shot down over the territory of the first echelon of defense of the Soviet troops. The captured pilot with documents and a map was immediately taken to the front headquarters. And when the commander of the Voronezh Front superimposed the captured map on the divisional defense scheme, it turned out to be very similar - in some places the combat positions, especially artillery and tanks, were as if copied from the Soviet map.

A plan was immediately developed for the regrouping of Soviet troops. A truly titanic work lay ahead: re-equipping hundreds of strongholds, digging up tons of earth - and all this in as soon as possible. Changes of firing positions were carried out only at night. A decision was also made: to put mock-ups of guns at the former positions of the artillery, to put mock-ups of plywood in the places of the former concentration of tanks. During the flights of German reconnaissance, anti-aircraft fire was simulated over decoys. The Second Air Army had to create false airfields at the site of the previous deployment. Part of the combat aircraft remained with mock-ups, which were periodically moved around the runway to simulate. When a Luftwaffe scout approached, a pair of fighters rose from the airfield, the task of which was only to scare away the German spy.

The bulk (up to 90%) of the tanks were concentrated on the probable directions of the main attacks of German tanks. The front commanders adhered to the principle of the massive use of tank troops in the decisive sectors of the front.

Soldier training

The March-June period preceding the Battle of Kursk was used to thoroughly prepare the troops for combat operations. The commanders and headquarters of rifle, tank and artillery formations and units conducted joint exercises on the ground, during which options for delivering counterattacks and counterattacks were worked out. Special attention in the course of combat training, emphasis was placed on the ability to organize the repulsion of large tank attacks, the preparation and conduct of counterattacks and counterattacks, and the implementation of a wide maneuver of forces and means in order to create superiority over the enemy. Combat training went on in each category of servicemen in their own specific areas. For example, units of anti-tank rifles (PTR) practiced practical interaction with tank units. Much attention was paid to the development of infantry combat methods with new German tanks. This became especially true after the Wehrmacht, along with the German propaganda about the “wonder weapon of the Third Reich”, used heavy T-6 Tiger tanks during the winter battles near Kharkov, which had a strong moral impression on the exhausted Russian troops.

As the infantryman G.S. Genkin, who fell under the terrible blow of Manstein's tanks, rushing to help the encircled Paulus group near Stalingrad in December 1942:

« And then tanks came at us... Dozens of tanks... We somehow managed to cut off the German infantry, and then the carnage began. German tanks crushed us.

What kind of shooting at the viewing slots here ?! And then the German infantry joined in the extermination of our battalion. Battalion PTR-sheep managed to fire several shots at the tanks and were crushed by caterpillars. We couldn't even step back. Tanks from all sides! Their caterpillars were red with blood. Those of our people who tried to get up and run were immediately killed by bursts from tank machine guns ... Naked, flat as a table steppe. It was a terrible fight, believe me... Bloody porridge... I lay among the crushed human bodies and waited for their fate to befall me too».

Impressions from a 56-ton armored vehicle spewing fire and lead only strengthened German propaganda, so it was extremely important to prove to a soldier who was preparing for defensive battles that even an infantryman could fight the "tiger".

"Tigers" on the march.

The military publishing house issued special instructions and posters, which clearly showed the vulnerabilities of enemy armored vehicles, gave advice on how to more effectively use each of the anti-tank weapons available to the infantry (grenades, Molotov cocktails, anti-tank rifles, etc.). In order to "eliminate the elements of tank fear", the entire personnel of rifle and motorized rifle units were tested with tanks at special tankodromes. And for the running-in of infantry and anti-tank artillery regiments in the rear of the defense, a special training ground was built, where in June there were systematic firing and exercises. For these purposes, tank crews of neighboring units were involved.

In the training of tank units, the emphasis was primarily on training drivers in the practical driving of combat vehicles, primarily in real combat conditions, as well as firing on the move and with short stops.

Considerable importance was attached to the study of techniques and methods of camouflage, the preservation of equipment and people from German air strikes. At the beginning of May 1943, information was received from Soviet intelligence about the appearance of a new attack aircraft based on the Ju-87 (Junkers 87, also known as Laptezhnik) from the German aviation. The Germans tested the Model G in an experimental squadron located in the Crimea.

This "German response to the Il-2" was a modernized Junkers 87 dive bomber. It was equipped with two 37 mm cannons that could penetrate armor up to 40 mm. But, as it turned out later, the Germans abandoned the mass production of this attack aircraft due to design flaws, and 174 copies were produced before the end of the war. The new attack aircraft had such a low speed that it barely overtook the old Hs 126 reconnaissance aircraft, contemptuously referred to in the Red Army as a “crutch”. The new Ju-87 also earned a lot of nicknames: "Cannon bird" (Kanonenvogel) or "Thing with long sticks" (Stuka mil den Langen Stangen).

Attack of the German infantry under the cover of self-propelled guns.

By July 5, the defense on the Kursk ledge, which has a length of 550 kilometers, was occupied by the troops of the Central (commander - General of the Army Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander - General of the Army Vatutin) fronts. They included 1,336,000 people, more than 19,000 guns and mortars, over 3,500 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts (including over 900 T-60 and T-70 light tanks), 2,900 aircraft (including 728 long-range and light aircraft). bombers Po-2). To the east of Kursk, the Steppe Military District, which was in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, was concentrated, renamed on July 9 into the “Steppe Front” (commanded by Colonel General I.S. Konev), which had 573,000 people, 8,000 guns and mortars, about 1,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations , up to 400 combat aircraft.

Operation "Citadel" and the Kursk defensive operation July 5-23, 1943

On the afternoon of July 4, a strong air strike and artillery fire were dealt to the combat guards and forward detachments of the army of General Chistyakov. As the German Field Marshal Manstein wrote in his memoirs, this attack was aimed at capturing "the observation posts necessary to lead the offensive." In addition, the Germans sought to reconnoiter in detail before the start of the offensive and, if possible, destroy the system of Russian minefields and bring their troops as close as possible to the front line of defense of the Soviet army. The Wehrmacht attack was repulsed in two hours. At the headquarters of the Soviet command, no one doubted that the Germans were conducting "reconnaissance in force."

On July 5, at four o'clock in the afternoon, German artillery preparation began - tons of shells hit the Soviet defense line. From the memoirs of Wehrmacht soldiers and officers participating in Operation Citadel:

ACS Stug is firing.

« ... silence reigned between Belgorod, Tomarovskaya and Faustov. The Russians were waiting. And on the other side of the neutral zone, the Germans were waiting. The sound of aircraft was heard. People raised their heads, Captain Laik, commander of the 3rd Battalion of the Grenadier Regiment of the "Grossdeutschland" division, looked at the sky, and then at his watch. “Minute by minute,” he said ... And at that moment, a squadron of Stuka bombers roared over the trenches towards the enemy. Fighters flew high above them. The Stukas banked and dived with a howl. On the other side, on the slopes of Gertsovka and Butovo, fountains of earth and smoke rose. It was there that the observation posts of the Soviet artillery were located ... The next squadron flew over our positions, and after it another and another. At 15:00 the last bomb exploded. Then the artillery came in. Roaring, howling hell... Ten minutes later, under the cover of artillery fire, the platoons were running through the passages in the minefields, assault guns were moving on their heels.

Detachments of sappers fled between them, ready to remove any unexpected obstacle ... Soon, however, the garrisons of the still surviving Russian strongholds recovered from surprise and opened fire from all types of weapons that they had .... And Soviet artillery intervened in the matter, setting a deadly barrier. Volley after volley hit the attack area. The swept German assault guns began to run into Soviet mines. There was a roar of anti-tank rifles and a howl of mortars. Red fighters, uttering piercing cries, flew like a hawk on the slopes and already got the German assault squads with machine guns and cannons ...»

South of Orel and north of Belgorod, fierce battles began. The main blow was inflicted on the village of Olkhovatka, and the auxiliary ones - on Maloarkhangelsk and Fatezh. Soviet troops met the Germans with dense fire from howitzers and anti-tank guns. The Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses, and only after the fifth attack did they manage to break into the front line of defense of the 29th Rifle Corps in the Olkhovat direction.

central front

On the Central Front, the enemy dealt the main blow to the center of the 13th Army, commanded by General Pukhov. Having concentrated up to five hundred tanks here, the Germans hoped to break the defense of the Soviet troops with a powerful armored ram, supported by aviation and artillery. The enemy delivered an auxiliary blow to Gnilets.

Commander's T-4.

Soviet armor-piercers.

The Russians met the blows of the advancing enemy with exceptional stamina. All anti-tank weapons, and above all tank and self-propelled artillery regiments, in cooperation with infantry units, sappers and units of other branches of the military, inflicted great damage on the Germans. The actions of the ground troops were supported by the formations of the 16th Air Army of General Rudenko. The German command continuously increased its strike, throwing new tank and infantry units into battle, trying at any cost to break the defenses of the 13th Army. By the end of the day, the Germans in the main, Olkhovatsk, direction wedged into the Soviet defense for eight kilometers and reached the second defensive strip.

The commander of the Central Front, General Rokossovsky, decided on the morning of July 6 to launch a counterattack against the Nazi grouping with the forces of the 2nd Panzer Army. The counterattack began early in the morning on July 6, the 16th Panzer Corps under the command of General Grigoriev struck at Butyrki and pushed the enemy back two kilometers to the north. But the German command pulled up fresh tank units to this area. A battle broke out between 100 Soviet and 200 German tanks. Tankers, showing exceptional courage and stamina, held the captured positions for a long time. However, using their numerical superiority, the Germans repulsed the counterattacks of the formations of the 16th Panzer Corps, and then went on the offensive with two tank divisions of the 41st Tank Corps and two infantry divisions, supported by aviation.

Attack T-34

The Germans often used captured T-34s.

The 19th Panzer Corps, commanded by General Vasiliev, concentrated in the starting area on the morning of July 6th. Significant time was spent on organizing interaction with rifle divisions and clearing the passages, so the formations of the 19th Panzer Corps struck in the direction of Podolyan only at 17:00, that is, when the brigades of the 16th Panzer Corps were already forced to retreat to their original position. Met by heavy fire from enemy artillery, tanks and aircraft, the 19th Panzer Corps suffered losses and retreated to its original position. The counterattack of the 2nd Panzer Army did not reach its goal, but played a large and important role in the defensive operation of the Central Front. The active and decisive actions of the Soviet troops halted the German offensive in front of the second line of defense.

On July 7, the enemy concentrated his main efforts on three directions: Ponyri, Olkhovatka, and Teploe. Replenished with reserve tanks, the battered divisions of the Nazis sought to break through the defenses of the Red Army troops.

After strong artillery preparation and with the support of 150 aircraft, the Germans attacked Ponyri. 150 Wehrmacht tanks took part in the attack. Fierce fighting broke out, lasting until the very night. Hitler's tanks, together with infantry, supported by heavy artillery fire and massive air strikes, attacked eight times, but each time their attack was repulsed.

Rare shot - captured T-60.

The main forces of the German strike force went on the offensive in the directions of Olkhovatka and Teploe. Up to 300 German tanks broke into these areas, but here they were met with heavy fire from tanks and anti-tank artillery. In the very first minutes of the battle, several dozen German tanks were set on fire. The fire of the Soviet troops forced the enemy to retreat. On July 7, the Germans advanced only three kilometers into the defenses. On July 8, the Nazis brought up reserves and again struck in the same directions.

Particularly stubborn and heavy fighting unfolded in the Ponyri area. 80 tanks, supported by motorized infantry, attacked this locality. However, the Russians pushed the Germans back to their original position. On the Olkhovat direction, the Germans launched 13 powerful attacks that day, but all of them were repulsed by strong infantry, artillery and tank fire, supported by air strikes. In the area of ​​the Ponyri station on the morning of July 10, about 300 German tanks attacked Soviet positions. German tanks moved in echelons of 50-60 vehicles, and the Russian defenses were subjected to continuous bombardment in groups of 40-60 aircraft.

Nevertheless, the defense held out, destroying 60 Wehrmacht tanks. For six days, the Germans, at the cost of huge losses in manpower and military equipment, wedged into the defense of the Soviet troops. In the Olkhovatsk direction - 12 kilometers, and in auxiliary directions only 1-3 kilometers. During this time, the German forces were exhausted, and they were forced to go on the defensive without reaching the goal.

Voronezh Front

Russian infantry attack.

Infantry digs in positions.

Bloody battles unfolded in these July days on the Voronezh front. The Germans delivered the main blow in the general direction to Kursk, it was here that the bulk of the Wehrmacht tanks were concentrated. On the first day, the Germans brought into the battle up to 700 tanks and self-propelled guns, supported by a large number of artillery and aircraft. At the cost of huge losses in manpower and equipment, the Wehrmacht troops managed to break through the main line of defense of the 6th Guards Army in some areas. The commander of the Voronezh Front, General Vatutin, decided to counterattack the Wehrmacht tank units, exhausted by battles. At night, Soviet tanks made a march and on the morning of July 6 took up defensive positions near Shepelevo.

During the day, 160 German tanks entered Shepelevo in four columns and tried to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops on the move. But here they met with powerful fire from rifle units, tank and artillery formations.

From July 9 to 14, after fierce fighting, the Germans managed to penetrate the defenses of the Soviet troops to a depth of about 35 kilometers. After unsuccessful attempts to break through to Kursk along the highway to Oboyan, the Germans decided to do it to the east, through Prokhorovka. The Russian command decided to counterattack the Nazi tank units.

Prokhorovka

Wehrmacht tanks near Prokhorovka.

The counterattack during the Battle of Kursk on July 12, 1943 near Prokhorovka was characterized by official Soviet historians as the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War, which was won by the Soviet troops. It is alleged that it clearly showed the complete superiority of Soviet tanks and military art over German weapons and the skill of the German army commanders. Here is the interpretation of this battle in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia:

« On July 12, 1943, in the area west and south of Prokhorovka, during the Battle of Kursk, the largest battle in the history of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 took place. oncoming tank battle between the advancing Nazi tank grouping (2nd SS Panzer Corps and 3rd Panzer Corps, about 700 tanks and assault guns in total) and the counterattacking 5th Guards Tank Army and three tank and mechanized brigades (about 800 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, self-propelled guns). In fierce battles that lasted all day, the enemy lost over 350 tanks and assault guns, over 10 thousand people. killed and was forced to go on the defensive, the 5th Guards Tank Army lost about 300 tanks and self-propelled guns. On July 12, a turning point occurred in the Battle of Kursk, the enemy went on the defensive, and on July 16 he began to withdraw his forces. The troops of the Voronezh, and from July 19 and the Steppe Front, began to pursue and threw back Nazi German troops to the starting point».

There is an alternative version of modern historians, according to which no more than 311 German tanks and self-propelled guns (SPGs) fought near Prokhorovka on July 12 against 597 Soviet tanks and SPGs. I will not go into details, quote from documents, orders, reports - this will require much more space than the format of the article allows.

Self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", blown up by a Soviet mine.

Wrecked Panthers.

Since everyone studied “official history” at school, I will introduce you to an alternative version: in an expanded form, the Battle of Prokhorov (as an episode of the Battle of Kursk during German troops Operation Citadel) lasted from 10 to 13 July 1943. It was on July 10, having met stubborn resistance in their movement to Oboyan, that the Germans changed the direction of the main attack on the Prokhorovka railway station. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was advancing here as part of the SS motorized divisions (called tank divisions in Russia, although they officially became such in October 1943) “Dead Head”, “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” and “Reich” (“SS-Division “Totenkopf ”, “Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler” and “SS-Das Reich”), which broke through two lines of long-term fortifications of the Soviet troops, the main and the second, in five days, and went out on the sixth day to the third, rear, line ten kilometers southwest railway station Prokhorovka. At four in the morning on July 12, 1943, the "Dead Head" division began to advance on the bridgehead near the Psel River, and "Adolf Hitler" and "Reich" took up defense at the Prokhorovka station.

Exactly at eight in the morning on July 12, 1943, Soviet artillery preparation began, which lasted fifteen minutes, at 8:30 the 18th tank corps went on the attack (68 T-34s, 18 Mk4 Churchills, 58 T-70 light tanks) and by noon approached the positions of the German Leibstandarte division, which took up defense near the Prokhorovka station (there were 56 tanks: 4 Tigers T-6, 47 T-4, 5 T-3, 10 Stug assault guns and 20 Marder anti-tank self-propelled guns) and , having met with strong resistance, went on the defensive. At 10:30, the 29th Tank Corps (122 T-34s, 70 T-70 light tanks and 20 self-propelled guns) also approached the German positions located near the Oktyabrsky state farm, where it was stopped by the Germans. Having the ability to conduct effective fire to kill from a distance of two kilometers, German tankers shot attacking Soviet tanks, as if at a training ground, from camouflaged positions. At 11:00 "October" was taken by a motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Corps, but after a German counterattack, the brigade retreated. At 16:00, the last attack was made by the forces of the remaining 15 T-34s - hiding behind a forest plantation and the smoke of burning Soviet tanks, they managed to slip through the strongholds of the German Leibstandarte assault guns - heights 242.5 and 241.6 - and break into the state farm.

Komsomolets went deepest into the enemy defenses - five kilometers. But the Germans blocked the state farm and inflicted a powerful artillery and air strike on it. Ultimately, the units that broke through were almost completely destroyed.

"Ferdinand", abandoned by the crew.

Set on fire T-34.

At ten in the morning, the 2nd Tank Corps (35 T-34s, 4 Churchills, 46 T-70 light tanks) and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps (84 T-34s, 3 Churchills, 52 light tanks T -70). Their target was the German division "Reich" located south of the Prokhorovka station (1 "Tiger", 8 captured Soviet tanks T-34, 18 T-4, 34 T-3, 27 assault self-propelled guns and about 70 field and anti-tank artillery guns). By noon, the advance of Russian tanks was stopped by German artillery and tanks. At 15:00, the "Reich" division launched a counteroffensive, pushing back the Soviet units, and advanced two kilometers in a five-kilometer-wide area, suffering relatively light losses.

At noon, the Dead Head division launched an offensive (94 tanks, 10 Tigers, 30 T-4s, 54 T-3s, 21 assault self-propelled guns) and, having crushed the defenses of the 6th Guards Army, captured the Polezhaev farm. In the middle of the day, the Totenkopf units broke through to the high western bank of the Psel River, from which the battle formations of the Soviet 18th Panzer Corps were easily shot through with flanking fire. But the Germans were unable to force the river, although they forced the 110th and 181st tank brigades of this corps to finally withdraw from the battle.

From the memoirs of V.P. Bryukhov, commander of the T-34 tank of the 2nd tank corps:

« In the Battle of Prokhorovka, our corps was at first in the second echelon, providing for the entry of other corps, and then went forward. There was no more than a hundred meters between the tanks - you could only fidget, no maneuver. This was not a war - beating tanks. They crawled and fired. Everything was on fire. An indescribable stench hung over the battlefield. Everything was covered with smoke, dust, fire, so it seemed that twilight had come. Aviation bombed everyone. Tanks were on fire, vehicles were on fire, communications were down. All wiring was wound on the tracks. Radio communication is blocked. What is a connection? I'm working on the transfer, suddenly they kill me - the wave is clogged. It is necessary to switch to a spare wave, and when will anyone guess? At eight in the morning we went on the attack and immediately clashed with the Germans. About an hour later my tank was knocked out. A shell flew in from somewhere and hit the side, repulsed the sloth and the first roller. The tank stopped and turned around. We immediately jumped out - and let's crawl into the funnel. It's not up to repair. This is Prokhorovka! There, if the tank stopped, jump out. If you haven't been killed now, the next tank will come up and finish you off. Shot at point blank range. I switched to another tank. He, too, was soon burned. The shell hit the engine compartment. The tank caught fire and we all jumped out. They climbed into the funnel and sat, firing back. Well, while I was fighting in the tank, I didn’t play the fool either - with the first shell I covered the 75-mm cannon, which the crew rolled out to the firing line, and burned the T-3 tank. The battle lasted until about seven o'clock in the evening, we had heavy losses. In a brigade of sixty-five tanks, about twenty-five remained, but on the first day I got the impression that the losses on both sides were the same ... On the evening of the 12th, an order was received to go on the defensive, and for another three days we fought off counterattacks ...»

The results of the battle on July 12, 1943 near the Prokhorovka station

Counterattack.

The Soviet offensive was stopped, after stubborn fighting in the area of ​​the Oktyabrsky state farm, the Germans remained in their previous positions. In the northern sector, the Totenkopf division advanced five kilometers, wedged into the Russian defenses. In the southern sector, the SS division "Reich" advanced two kilometers.

Attacking the enemy southwest of Prokhorovka station, the Soviet tank troops, squeezed in a six-kilometer-wide strip and being shot at by gunfire, could not realize the advantage in the mobility of their tanks and suffered catastrophic losses: 329 tanks and self-propelled guns (according to other sources, 343). Almost all the Soviet tanks knocked out in the battles on July 12, suitable for refurbishment, remained on the territory occupied by the enemy, and were captured and destroyed by him. Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka region not only failed to recapture territory from the enemy, but also lost part of their own.

The Germans lost about 120 combat vehicles, but most of the German tanks and self-propelled assault guns were restored in mobile military repair units, which, located not far from the front line, with their own forces and means usually commissioned up to 90% of the wrecked armored vehicles.

It is interesting: Soviet reports reported dozens of Tigers and Ferdinands knocked out by the Red Army. The number of T-6s destroyed in Soviet reports for the Battle of Prokhorov is several times higher than the number of Tigers participating in it. Tanks T-4G / H and T-3L / M with hinged armor screens were often confused by Soviet tankmen and gunners with the T-6, and self-propelled guns of the StuG type with the Ferdinands.

The failure of the Citadel

On July 12, at five in the morning, the Oryol offensive operation "Kutuzov" began. The purpose of the operation was to defeat the German army grouping "Center" and eliminate the Oryol ledge with strikes from the Western and Bryansk fronts. As a result, the German command was forced to stop the attack on the Kursk salient and go on the defensive. By the evening of July 13, units of the Red Army had broken through the German defenses to a depth of twenty-five kilometers. On July 15, the divisions of the Central Front joined the advancing units of the two fronts. On July 17, after the start of the Soviet attack on the Orlovsky bridgehead, the Germans finally abandoned the hope of resuming the Citadel.

Counterattack near Orel.

T-34 in the Oryol operation.

On July 26, the Germans were forced to leave the Orlovsky bridgehead and begin a retreat to positions east of Bryansk. On July 29, Volkhov was liberated, on August 5, Orel, by August 18, Soviet troops approached the defensive lines near Bryansk. This ended the Oryol-Kursk operation, but the counteroffensive on the Kursk Bulge developed into a general offensive of the Red Army along the entire front.

On July 19, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts pushed the Germans back to the starting line, from which the Wehrmacht attacked the Kursk Citadel on July 5. On August 5, Belgorod was liberated. By August 11, the troops of the Voronezh Front cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway. The troops of the Steppe Front came close to the outer defensive contour of Kharkov. Having unsuccessfully tried to counterattack, the Germans finally went on the defensive. On August 23, after stubborn fighting, the troops of the Steppe Front completely cleared Kharkov of the Nazis.

Results

The results of the Battle of Kursk were rather disappointing for the Soviet Union in terms of loss ratio. Between July 5 and August 23, 1943, Soviet losses reached approximately 1,677,000 killed, captured, wounded and sick; while approximately 360,000 belong to the Wehrmacht.

These figures became available to the public only in 1993, after the declassification of documents from the archives of the USSR Armed Forces. Prior to this, Soviet historians underestimated the losses of the Red Army, while German ones exaggerated.

Soviet irretrievable losses of tanks and self-propelled guns during the Battle of Kursk amounted to 6064 vehicles. This figure is confirmed by data on the irretrievable losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the Soviet tank armies during certain operations of this battle. These losses are four times higher than the German ones, even if we take the traditional Soviet estimate (most likely overestimated) of 1,500 enemy tanks and assault guns destroyed.

The fifth mission for the Red Army begins with an order to take up defense. Fortified areas, minefields, several echelons of defense, a large number of tanks and self-propelled guns - everything looks like it was on a hot July day in 1943.

Five waves of attacks by German "armored wedges", strong opposition from howitzer artillery, a flurry of fire and elements of a three-dimensional landscape that are being erased from the face of the earth convey the scale and atmosphere of a global battle.

Codename: Panzers

Developer: Stormregion

Publisher: Akella

Genre: strategy

Excellent graphics, bright special effects - and a complete lack of realism. So you can characterize this RTS. The medium tank of the Wehrmacht T-3 withstands the hit of a rocket fired by the Katyusha and continues to fire - where has this been seen? The battle on the Kursk Bulge will begin in the fourth mission, in the company of the USSR, where the player is asked to cover the Russian defenses with volleys of rocket artillery.

Great Battles: Kursk Bulge (Supplement to Blitzkrieg 2)

Developers: Nival/N-Game

Publisher: Akella

Genre: strategy

In my opinion, this time the developers frankly cheated. Where did the German self-propelled guns Hetzer come from in July 1943 on the battlefield near Kursk? And where did the Russian T-34-85 come from? Their release was established only in 1944.

Also, the disadvantages include the complete absence of the atmosphere of a global battle. Artificial Intelligence, to put it mildly, is lame: the tank can easily substitute the side during an artillery duel, and the enemy’s “panther” will not notice the execution in the stern from the Russian self-propelled guns, since it is “busy” with the destruction of infantry in the trenches.

Call of Duty: United Offensive

Developer: Gray Matter Studios

Publisher: Activision

Genre: first person shooter

The developers of the action movies could not get past the battle on the Kursk salient. Call of Duty: United Offensive has a "Kursk" mission.

In it, the player is given the opportunity to attack the Germans on the T-34 tank. Despite the big name, this is a rather boring mission. It is surprising that the German infantry had the Panzerfaust 30 - it entered service with the Wehrmacht only in September 1943, when the Battle of Kursk ended.

Also, this historical episode was covered in such games as IL-2: Sturmovik, Battlefield 1942, Panzer Campaigns.