Summer campaign on the eastern front.

Rzhev-Vyazemskaya offensive operation of the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts - 02.03-31.03.1943

In the spring of 1943, the position of the German troops on the southern wing of the front deteriorated significantly. In connection with the start of the Voronezh-Kastornensky operation, the German command ordered the transfer of troops from the Rzhev region to the offensive area Soviet troops.

On January 26, 1943, the commander of Army Group Center, General von Kluge, recommended that Hitler leave the Rzhevsky ledge to level the front line and prevent a possible encirclement of the bloodless 9th and 4th armies. The withdrawal operation was named "Buffalo". Therefore, the Western and Kalinin Fronts were given the task of liquidating the Rzhev-Vyazma salient and developing the offensive in the general direction of Smolensk.

Operation Buffel. Front line from 1 to 30 March 1943

Operation progress

On March 2, the troops of the fronts, following the order, launched an offensive. The Germans widely used various kinds of barriers, and, retreating, left barriers in advance prepared defensive positions. Along with a strong spring thaw, this sharply reduced the pace of advancement of the Red Army, fettered the maneuvers of mobile detachments. As a result, the Soviet troops were unable to cut off the enemy's paths. On March 15-31, the Germans reached a pre-prepared and heavily fortified line northeast of Dukhovshchina, Yartsevo, Spas-Demensk. Here the enemy offered stubborn resistance and the offensive stopped.

Outcome

The only major strategic result of the offensive of the Soviet troops was the elimination of the immediate danger to Moscow. The Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge and the bridgehead on it were eliminated. The cities of Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Sychevka, Bely, Vyazma, Olenino were liberated.

The results of the Rzhev battle

The number of Soviet troops at the beginning of operations

Rzhev battle	Battle of Stalingrad
Operations: Quantity						Defend.	Come.
Page, moto., kav., tank. divisions
Str., Mor., Tank., Brigades
Number (person)

To date, the official point of view on losses is set out in the book "Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study". Here are the figures for the total losses (irretrievable and sanitary) of the fronts in offensive operations:

Rzhev-Vyazemskaya - 01/08? 04/20/1942 - 776889 people

The first Rzhev-Sychevskaya (Gzhatskaya) offensive operation - 07/30? 08/23/1942 - 193683 people

The second Rzhev-Sychevskaya offensive operation ("Mars") - 11/25? 12/20/1942 - 215674 people

Rzhev-Vyazemskaya offensive operation - 02.03? 03.31.1943 - 138,577 people

In just 8 months of fighting (out of 15) - 1324823 people. The figure is not final, because does not take into account the missing, captured. In addition, it does not take into account losses for 7 months when there were no offensive actions. These losses are comparable to the losses of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad.

At the end of 1942, after the massive German offensive against Stalingrad and the concentration of Soviet forces to defend the city, the warring parties came to a decisive moment in the course of the war. The stretching of the German front due to further advances allowed the Soviet Army to carry out breakthroughs north and south of Stalingrad, which led to the encirclement of the 6th Army under the command of Colonel General Paulus. Hitler, who did not appreciate the balance of power, forbade the exit from the boiler. The offensive of the tank army, which was supposed to break through the encirclement, failed. On January 31, 1943, the 6th Army capitulated. Around the same time, the Germans had to leave the vast territories conquered in 1942.

Only after this battle did it become clear that the war against Soviet Union cannot be won with the available military means. Despite this, in July 1943 the German side made another attempt to seize the military initiative by concentrating on one sector of the front an unprecedented number of tanks and armored vehicles. The purpose of this major offensive was to encircle the strong, well-equipped Soviet formations that occupied the defenses on the ledge of the front line in the Kursk (Kursk Bulge) region. But the offensive of the Wehrmacht troops was stopped at the cost of huge losses on both sides. The German troops were forced to retreat.

Now, in the course of the war, the superiority was on the Soviet side. In 1943, the Wehrmacht was reinforced in terms of manpower and equipment, but the young soldiers of the new draft had an enemy in front of them, which, in terms of technical equipment and combat experience, was already incomparable with Soviet Army 1941 True, the victories of the Soviet troops were achieved at the cost of heavy losses. Proceeding from these heavy losses, the German leadership, especially Hitler, built calculations for the continuation of the war, erecting more and more new lines of defense on which the enemy should be "bloodless". At the same time, the huge own losses and the obvious backwardness of the troops in comparison with the superior forces of the enemy were given secondary importance. This concept, which was still rooted in notions of Russian racial inferiority and that the German soldier was generally superior to the Russian soldier, finally led to the military collapse of the Center group in the summer of 1944, with the loss of about 350,000 soldiers.

From June to September 1944, the Soviet Army liberated Belarus, and at the end of the year it was in the south - in Hungary and Yugoslavia, in Poland - near Warsaw and on the border of East Prussia.

Chronicle: November 1942 - May 1945

11/19/1942 The beginning of a large Soviet offensive, which led to the encirclement of the 6th Army and the Romanian formations in Stalingrad.

On January 31, 1943, the encircled troops surrendered, 90,000 survivors (out of 250,000 people) were taken prisoner. 5. 7. 1943 Large (600,000 people and 2,700 tanks) German offensive near Kursk. The Soviet Army repels the offensive and pushes back the German troops with a counterattack. German troops are pushed back to the Dnieper. Unsuccessful attempt with the help of the system of fortifications ("Eastern shaft") to stop the advance of Russian troops.

6.11. The Soviet Army occupied Kyiv.

28.11.-1.1. Tehran conference. The original border between Poland and the Soviet Union, envisaged after the 1st World War (Curzon Line) is approved as a post-war border, the new western border of Poland should pass along the Ode-RU-

January 1944 Army Group Nord is pushed back behind Lake Peipsi, the end of the blockade of Leningrad.

March. Beginning of the Soviet spring offensive. German troops are completely expelled from Ukraine. Crimea will be abandoned only in May with heavy losses.

22.6. The beginning of the Soviet summer offensive in the central sector of the front. It led to the defeat of the entire German sector of the front, while 35,000 people. killed or taken prisoner. During this and subsequent offensives, the systematic German defense was broken.

28.7. Soviet troops in Brest.

August. Beginning of the Warsaw Uprising against the Germans occupation authorities. It is brutally suppressed, since the Soviet troops have not yet reached Warsaw.

October. Army Group Nord is cut off in Courland and fights until surrender in May 1945.

20.10. The capture of Belgrade by Soviet and Yugoslav troops.

12/1/1945 Start of the great Soviet offensive, which from February advanced from Warsaw to Silesia across the Oder. Beginning of a mass ill-prepared transfer of the German civilian population (refugees).

4.-11. 2. Conference of Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in Yalta. Decision on the division of Germany into occupation zones and on reparations supplies, confirmation of new Polish borders.

11.2. The Soviet Army occupied Budapest.

13.4. The Soviet Army occupied Vienna.

16.4. The beginning of the offensive of two large Soviet groups ("fronts") under the command of Zhukov and Konev with the aim of capturing Berlin.

30.4. Hitler's suicide in the bunker of the Berlin Reich Chancellery.

2.5. Surrender of the commandant of Berlin, General Weidling.

8.5. The German surrender was signed by Field Marshal Keitel at the Soviet Headquarters in Berlin-Karlshorst. (7.5 at the American headquarters in Reims).

9.5. The entry of the Soviet Army into Prague.

212. German soldiers in the Stalingrad cauldron, December 1942

Text 142
Entries from the diary of the German Corporal Heinz W. from November 8, 1942 to February 3, 1943 on the situation in Stalingrad up to the capture.

Heinz W. worked as a cartographer at the headquarters of the sapper battalion.

11/8/1942/9. 11.1942

On 9.11 we go to the center of Stalingrad to bring logs for the construction of the bunker. The impression of Stalingrad is terrible. The few stone houses that stood there were razed to the ground during a raid on the city. Wooden houses dismantled by the infantry into logs for the construction of bunkers, so that Stalingrad is a complete ruin. We can say: Stalingrad no longer exists. Frost 15 degrees.

10. 11. 42
And today we went to Stalingrad for the forest. It is rather difficult to find good construction timber. 19 degrees below zero.

11. 11. 42
Today there was an attack against the Russians who had settled in the northern part of the city. In the morning we went to the brick factory for bricks, and in the afternoon to the central station behind the forest. 15 degrees below zero. [...]

22. 11. 42
The Soviet village of Krasny was abandoned by us and immediately occupied by the Russians. About 20 planes and gasoline were blown up at one airfield. Now we are moving along the road to the Don. In the dark, we lag behind the division and wander. Russians everywhere! Since the road is being shelled by the enemy, we are accompanied by tanks. This time we hit the cauldron. [...]

26. 11. 42
At 0800, the battalion moves through Rossoshka to Gorodishche, north of Stalingrad. The weather is getting worse and worse. In addition, we must look for holes in the ground where we could spend the night. In the ravine we have built ourselves the most beautiful bunker, and now we have settled down underground. Meals two days ago cut in half. If we are completely surrounded, then there is a lull at the front.

27. 11. 42
They threw us out of the hole that we dug for ourselves, because the commander wants to live there. The battalion was completely scattered, one part in the boiler, the other - in Kotelnikovo in the reserve sapper column.

2. 12. 42-4. 12. 42
This weather makes life bleak. In addition, a bad bunker for housing. People are sent to search for firewood. From time to time enemy artillery fires at our village. [...]

31. 12. 42
The last day of 1942 has begun. To our great joy, we were given some bread and, in addition to rations, chocolate. For Christmas Eve, a bottle of schnapps, cookies and good coffee in grains. As we expected, the Russians launched their attack at 20:00 in the northern part of Stalingrad and in Spartakovka. At 22 o'clock the hellish roar began. But this time our artillery fired. In spite of everything, we welcomed 1943 well! Our thoughts were, of course, at home. In the 3rd company - 9 killed, 23 wounded and 4 missing.

1. 1. 43
At 7.30 we went together with everyone from our bunker to Gorodishche for sanitation. [...]

17. 1. 43
The company was reduced from 1 officer and 55 soldiers to three people. Senior Lieutenant Rost returned wounded. This is his seventh wound (already the sixth in Stalingrad).

18. 1. 43/19. 1. 43
The map of positions and minefields is almost complete. The terrible frost has eased. There hasn't been any bread for three days now. [...]

26. 1. 43
In the darkness of the night we move further north. We learned that there should be a division in the area of ​​the tractor plant. So, we make our way to the north of Stalingrad. After a long search, they finally found the headquarters, located in a damp basement.

27.1. 43
After a terribly cold night in the evening, we moved to a new location, namely the heating tunnel leading to the tractor factory. Day and night heavy artillery fire and aircraft.

28. 1. 43 - 1. 2. 43
In this heating basement we remained to lie. Further resistance is futile. This was also recognized by the leadership of the Northern part, the 11th Army Corps after southern part Stalingrad 29.1 capitulated. The surrender order came the next morning (General Strecker).

2. 2. 43
We piled our weapons in front of the entrance, hung a white flag and waited to be taken prisoner. At 0900 the first Russian soldiers came and took us away. We went past the village, past the northern cut-off position, then all the way north. This march lasted all the next night.

3. 2. 43
In the morning we, mortally tired, ended up in a large settlement. The battalion headquarters still held together. We were placed in great hall. It's terrible that I can't deliver the message to my parents. Almost 400 of us were lying in this hall without light and air. We will soon be devoured by lice, of which there are hundreds of us. Our food: 400 g of bread and 1/2 liter of soup per day.

213 Collection site for the corpses of German soldiers in Stalingrad, February 1943. The dead were often undressed by the survivors, who needed clothing in severe cold conditions.

Text 143
Letter from a German soldier sent by field mail from Stalingrad on December 31, 1942.

After the surrender of the 6th Army, the field mail, which could no longer be sent from the boiler, was captured by the Soviet Army as a trophy. These letters were then transferred to the funds of the Museum of Stalingrad-Volgograd.

December 31, 1942

My favorite!

It's Christmas Eve and when I think about home, my heart breaks. How bleak and hopeless everything is here. For 4 days I have not eaten bread and I live only with a ladle of lunch soup. In the morning and in the evening, a sip of coffee and every 2 days, 100 grams of stew or half a can of sardines or a little cheese paste from a tube - hunger, hunger, hunger and more lice and dirt. Day and night, air raids and artillery fire are almost unceasing. If a miracle doesn't happen soon, I'll die here. It's bad that I know that your 2-kilogram parcel with pies and marmalade is somewhere along the way, and also parcels with pies and other delicacies from Arzand Hede and Zinderman are somewhere along the way. I constantly think about it, and I even have visions that I will never get them. Although I am exhausted, I cannot sleep at night, I lie with my eyes open and see pies, pies, pies. Sometimes I pray and sometimes I curse my fate. But everything does not make any sense - when and how will relief come? Will it be death by bomb or grenade? From a cold or from a painful illness? These questions keep us busy. To this we must add constant homesickness, and homesickness has become a disease. How can a man endure all this! Is all this suffering God's punishment? My dears, I should not have to write all this, but I no longer have a sense of humor, and my laughter is gone forever. Only a bundle of trembling nerves remained. The heart and brain are painfully inflamed, and trembling as from high fever. If I am court-martialed and shot for this letter, I think it will be a boon for my body. I have no more hope, but I beg you, do not cry too much if you are told that I am no more. Be kind and sweet to each other, thank God for every day you have, because life at home is so good.

Sincerely yours, Bruno

Text 144
Letter from a German officer sent by field mail from Stalingrad on January 14, 1943.

Dear uncle! January 14, 1943

First, I would like to sincerely congratulate you on your promotion and wish you continued good luck as a soldier. By a happy coincidence, I again received mail from home, however, last year, and in that letter there was a message about this event. Mail now occupies a sore spot in our soldier's life. Most of it from last year hasn't arrived yet, not to mention a whole stack of Christmas letters. But in our current situation, this evil is understandable. Maybe you already know about our present fate; it is not in pink colors, but the critical mark, probably, has already been passed. Every day, the Russians ramble on some sector of the front, throw into battle a huge number of tanks, followed by armed infantry, but the success in comparison with the forces expended is small, at times not worthy of mention at all. These battles with heavy losses are strongly reminiscent of the battles of the world war. Material security and mass - these are the idols of the Russians, with the help of this they want to achieve a decisive advantage. But these attempts are shattered by a stubborn will to fight and an indefatigable strength in the defense of our positions. It simply does not describe what our excellent infantry does every day. This is a high song of courage, bravery and endurance. Never before have we been waiting for the onset of spring so much as here. The first half of January is soon over, it will still be very hard in February, but then a turning point will come - and there will be a great success. Well, I'm done.

Best regards Albert

214 Aerial photograph of Stalingrad, January 1943.

215 German soldiers on their way to captivity. Stalingrad, January/February 1943. Of the 90,000 soldiers taken prisoner at Stalingrad, fewer than 10,000 survived.

216 The advance of the Soviet troops, 1943.

217 Retreat of German soldiers from the Demyansk bridgehead, March 1943.

218 German retreat in Ukraine, 1943.

Text 145
Letter from the German corporal Helmut K. about the flight from the Crimea, sent by field mail, 27. 4.1944

Crimea, 27. 4. 44

My dear parents + Renata!

You probably look forward to the mail every day in great concern for me. But you know, I write as often as I can. I've been through bad days. Since Easter, I have experienced such days and hours that cannot be compared with anything. The leadership of the troops here, in the Crimea, turned out to be absolutely mediocre. I, with five comrades from our company, fled from Ivan for four days. We had to dodge to the right, then to the left. The rest of our company are either dead or in captivity. In the Crimea, there was a real flight of the Germans. Yesterday the Fuhrer's order came to hold Sevastopol. Probably, hard times will come for us soon. At present, the situation on the battlefield is not at all in our favor. It's no good when little people decide to become politicians. On the second day of Easter I received a letter from my mother dated March 28, 1944. So, Wernigerode also became a victim of this criminal war!

Let's hope that her culprit will soon stand in the pillory and be convicted. How are you and how are things going? I hope your home and yard are not affected. Currently, you can only write by airmail. Please say hello to all my loved ones. Did Frau Hermann send wine and what did she write? How much did a Mercedes repair cost in December, and how does it drive now? Write if I can write to Karl-Otto (address). After all, Aunt V. died a terrible death.

He sends heartfelt greetings to everyone and is waiting for letters from you.

Yours Helmut

Text 146
From the notebook of Lieutenant of the 267th Artillery Regiment Wilfried S. from 2 to 11. 7.1944

Wilfried S. died in July 1944. His notebook was found by a Soviet soldier.

2. 7. (Sun.): Observer] at the forward position on the highway Mogilev-Minsk. Retreat through the Berezina.

219 Soviet tank attack in the Odessa region, April 1944.

Air raid on firing point Trostyanka.

Night march.

3. 7. (Mon.): Firing point on Fortsee At lunchtime - attacks from the northeast

Repulsed tanks and anti-tank guns.

Change of position in the evening.

Night march.

4. 7. (Tuesday): Roads clogged

5 o'clock meeting, guns blown up [vans] Department disbanded senior lieutenant...? - company Night march Partisan attack

5. 7. (cf.): The retaliatory strike broke the entire column. The flight from the cap. Haussmann [?]

Walking in the direction of Yu-3 Overnight in the forest

6. 7. (Thurs.): Hiking Crossing the river in the village attack by Russians After lunch they stumbled upon their troops Went out to the highway (pilots) Overnight in the forest thicket

7. 7. (five.): (not enough water) slept all day in the forest

2 Russians came close Night crossing, found water a long distance, lost two

8. 7. (Sat.): in the morning an air raid ahead of us slept all day in a forest (on a high-rise) 21.30: night march out (we found a wire) 2 times we found water (a small pond)

Vladimir Viktorovich Volk - expert of the Center for Scientific Political Thought and Ideology

Photo: One of the countless battles on the Mius Front. July 1943 near the village of Stepanovka

Anyone who has ever been to Taganrog, Matveev-Kurgan, Kuibyshevo, Rostov region, Snezhnoye and Torez, Donetsk, Krasny Luch and Vakhrushevo, Lugansk regions, knows that the first thing guests are taken to is the legendary Mius heights. Here, in each settlement at different times, unique memorial complexes were built at the expense of folk funds - the pride of local residents.

For a long time, the events of the Mius Front were rarely written and spoken about, there was not a word about them in history textbooks, as well as about the battles near Rzhev and Vyazma, and the archives for long period were closed. This silence is associated with the colossal loss of life - about 830 thousand people - the battle, which ranks fourth in terms of the number of losses of the Red Army. In terms of its significance, bloodshed and the scale of losses, the breakthrough of the Mius Front is comparable to the Battle of Kursk. And the impregnability of this defensive line, which ran from Taganrog to Krasny Luch, can be compared with the Mannerheim and Maginot lines. By the way, the title of "city of military glory" was given to Taganrog precisely for the Mius Front.

The small river Mius, overgrown with forests, which takes its source from the village of Fashchevka, which is almost near Debaltsevo, and flows into the Sea of ​​​​Azov, first became a solid obstacle for the Nazi troops during their southern offensive operation.

Mius River

During the fighting from September 29 to November 4, 1941, the Nazi troops lost about 50 thousand soldiers and officers, over 250 tanks, more than 170 guns, about 1200 vehicles with military supplies. In defensive battles, the 383rd and 395th Mining Rifle Divisions, formed mainly from local workers, especially distinguished themselves.

In early November 1941, the front stopped at the Mius and the Seversky Donets. The constant counterattacks of our troops fettered big forces enemy on the southern wing during the crucial period of the battle near Moscow. The most terrible in Primiusye, the old-timers from the inhabitants of Ryazhenny and Matveev-Kurgan, always considered 1942, when in just a few days all the snow-covered beams, fields and hills around became red-black from the blood and overcoats of our soldiers. This despite the fact that under the snow in these fields, thousands of those who died in the unsuccessful December and January attempts to storm the German fortifications were already lying uncleaned. All the slopes of the Mius hills in the spring of 1942 were littered with corpses. And these dead lay there, before the eyes of local residents, for several months. Those who saw this picture as a child admitted that they had never seen anything worse before or after ...

In February 1942, Marshal Timoshenko decided to launch an offensive. The troops of the Southern Front near Rostov were to cut off the German ledge between Matveev Kurgan and Sambek and liberate Taganrog. Three such “attempts to break through” were made in a few days: near Matveev Kurgan, near the village of Kurlatskoye and near the Soleny barrow in the Neklinovsky district. According to official figures alone, more than twelve thousand people died during the operation. Twenty thousand were injured or frostbitten.

Under Matveyev Kurgan, during the assault on Volkovaya Gora and other heights from March 8 to March 10, 1942, 20 thousand people were killed and wounded. During the three days of the offensive from July 30 to August 1, 1943, 18,000 people were put out of action west of the village of Kuibyshevo. Search engines are still working there. They raise sunken Soviet tanks, find the unburied remains of soldiers. The Taganrog offensive operation in March 1942 remained a dark, terrible and unknown page in the history of the war. Nothing is written about her either in military encyclopedias or in history books. The few surviving participants in those tragic battles did not like to remember her either. The sacrifices were too great...

In the summer of 1942, due to strategic and tactical errors in the actions of the command of the Southwestern Front during the Kharkov offensive operation, at the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to break through the Mius defenses and reach the Volga and the foothills of the Caucasus Range. The troops of the Southern Front were forced to withdraw beyond the Don. Hitler called the line along the Mius "the new state border of Germany - inviolable and inviolable." And after the defeat of the Nazis in Stalingrad, the Mius line was supposed to become, according to the plan of the Nazis, the front of revenge for this defeat.

On the right bank of the Mius, along its entire length and a hundred kilometers deep, three lines of defense were created during the three years of the war. The first passed directly at the river bank, had a depth of 6–8, and in some directions 10–12 km. It was followed by a well-prepared second lane in terms of engineering. The third is along Kalmius (where the line of contact between the punitive troops of Ukraine and the Novorossiya militias passes today). The total length of trenches, trenches and communications only at the forefront along the coast exceeded the distance from Mius to Berlin. Each of the three lines of defense had its own systems of hundreds of pillboxes and bunkers. Minefields were widely used with a density of 1500-1800 mines per kilometer of front and with a depth of fields up to 200 meters. Every square kilometer was littered with machine-gun emplacements under armored caps.

The Nazis used the advantages of the right bank of the river, rich in cliffs, ravines, rocks and heights. The defense system included the mound Saur-Mogila - the dominant height near the village of Saurovka in the Shakhtyorsky district of the Donetsk region. Almost all the main heights near Taganrog, Matveev-Kurgan, Kuibyshevo, Krasny Luch were under the control of the Nazis. An interesting clarification - the old-timers of the region claim that the Ukrainian punishers, trying to capture Primiusye last summer, followed the old German routes ... Accident or heredity?

The July offensive operation of the Southwestern and Southern fronts on the Seversky Donets and on the Mius did not bring success to the Red Army. The Donbass grouping of the enemy retained their former positions. However, this operation was strategic implications in other sectors of the Soviet-German front. The Soviet troops did not allow the German command to transfer part of the forces from the Donbass region to the Kursk salient, reinforcing strike groups during the offensive operation "Citadel". Moreover, the German command had to remove up to five tank divisions from the Kursk direction, as well as significant aviation forces, and redeploy them to hold positions on the Seversky Donets and Mius. This weakened the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping of the Wehrmacht and created more favorable conditions for the operation "Rumyantsev" by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts. Thus, the troops of the South-Western and Southern solved the main problem - they did not allow the German command to use all the operational reserves of Army Group South in Operation Citadel and attracted significant enemy forces from the Kursk Bulge.

In the period from August 3 to 10, 1943, the 3rd Panzer Division, the SS Panzer Divisions "Reich" and "Totenkopf" were sent to the Mius Front from the 6th Army, and the SS Panzer Division from the 1st Panzer Army "Viking". Almost simultaneously, the 23rd Panzer and 16th Motorized Divisions were deployed from the Mius River to the Izyumsko-Barvenkovskoe direction, closer to the northern flank of the Donbass grouping. By mid-August, the 1st Panzer and 6th Armies, defending in the Donbass, numbered 27 divisions.

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Gennady Matishov, in his interview, claims that the Mius-Front pulled back and crushed parts that, perhaps, the Wehrmacht did not have enough for success in the battles near Moscow, Leningrad, on the Kursk Bulge. In 1943, the July offensive of the Southern Front forced the Germans to transfer three tank divisions from the Kursk Bulge to the Mius Front. This helped us win near Kursk. Few people know that on July 30-31, 1943, in the battle near Mius, the elite SS tank corps lost more people and equipment than near Prokhorovka two weeks earlier. We learned to fight in battles. On the Mius Front, for one dead German soldier, there were seven or eight of ours. For many years in the domestic literature they were silent about this, they hid information about the losses incurred then.

Malinovsky and Grechko, commanders of large formations in the south of the country, who were ministers of defense of the USSR in 1957-1976, preferred not to recall the unsuccessful episodes of their military biography.

The Mius pool is three years of stubborn, bloody and unsuccessful battles. Our command clearly imagined that it would not be easy to defeat the opposing enemy. The troops had to advance in extremely difficult conditions - they had to overcome numerous water lines, operate on terrain favorable to the defender, break through powerfully fortified positions from huge amount fire weapons.

The main offensive of the troops of the Southern Front was launched on August 18, 1943. Previously, a 70-minute artillery preparation was carried out, in which 1,500 artillery pieces and mortars took part. After artillery preparation, units of the 5th shock army began to advance. Tanks attacked, sappers walked in front of them, who showed passages in minefields, because due to dust and smoke, the view was difficult and the tankers did not see the flags set by the sappers. The infantry followed the tanks. From the air, the attack was supported by "Ilys" - attack aircraft of the 7th Aviation Corps. The Mius Front was broken through to a depth of 8–9 kilometers.

On August 19, near the village of Kuibyshevo, the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps under the command of Lieutenant General I.T. Tanaschishin advanced 20 kilometers beyond the front line. Their tanks approached Amvrosievka. In the following days, as a result of German counterattacks, the Soviet troops retreated slightly. On August 22-26, the German command transferred a tank division from the Crimea. Having gathered units from neighboring sectors of the front, the Germans tried to surround the attackers with flank attacks. On the night of August 24, Soviet troops went on the attack and occupied the villages of Artemovka, Krinichki, and the Semyonovsky farm. The road to Taganrog was occupied, which deprived the German troops of the opportunity to transfer reserves.

One of the most important stages of the Mius breakthrough - the assault on the dominant height of Saur-Mogila, was launched on August 28. Parts of the 96th Guards Rifle Division, commanded by Guards Colonel Semyon Samuilovich Levin, took part in it. At the top was the central observation post of the sixth German army. On the slopes of the mound, armored caps with fire weapons, dugouts with several rolls and bunkers were dug into the ground. The firing positions of the all-round defense were located in several tiers. Flamethrower tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled artillery mounts, artillery pieces and mortars were also used for defense. On August 29, after an artillery raid, Soviet troops almost captured the summit, but the German counterattack pushed the attackers back. The height was finally taken on the morning of 31 August. During these battles, 18 thousand Soviet soldiers died in just a few days. One of the many songs about the Mius Front and the Saur Grave contains the following lines:

• "Listen to the winds over Saur-Mogila,
  And you will understand who saved this earth,
  Whose courage in battles freed,
  Donbass not submitted to the enemy.

After the war, a memorial was built on top of the mound, which was destroyed last year by a new generation of fascists.

According to the estimates of Gennady Matishov, the Red Army lost more than 830 thousand people on the Mius Front, of which 280 thousand were killed. This is approximately 25-30 divisions, or 3% of the total losses of our army killed during the entire war. For the south of Russia, according to Matishov, Matveev-Kurgan means no less than Mamaev in Stalingrad, and Kuibyshevo, Ryazhenoe, Sinyavskoye, Sambek, and many Primius villages deserve the honorary title of "City of Military Glory".

On the territory of Russia, the DPR and the LPR, there are more than a hundred memorials and military graves associated with the battles on the Mius Front. However, most of them were created in Soviet times, when much about those events was not known. In May 2015, near the village of Kuibyshevo, Rostov Region, the memorial to the soldiers-guards "Breakthrough" was solemnly opened. The search engines propose to build worship crosses on all the key heights of the Mius Front, of which there are 12, indicating all the formations and units that participated in the battles. According to one of the local legends, in the early seventies, the Red Ray was one of the contenders for the title of hero city. Officials and local historians sought such a right and even built a unique memorial and museum of military glory on the Mius River, where every year on May 9 local residents, young and old, gather. Nobody organizes them, they do it at the call of their hearts, raising flowers and wreaths to the top of the mountain near the village of Yanovka. Flowers are laid at the memorial to the victims of fascism at the Bogdan mine, into the pit of which the Nazi executioners dumped more than two and a half thousand unsubdued Soviet people.

Not far from the village of Knyaginovka, the searchers erected a monument to the military commissar of the reconnaissance company of the 383rd rifle division, Spartak Zhelezny, and the local partisan Nina Gnilitskaya, heroes of the Soviet Union. In a mass grave, along with them, two dozen Soviet soldiers of Ossetian nationality who took an unequal battle with the Nazis were buried.

Is this a foreign land for the Russians? Are hundreds of thousands of victims of the Mius Front, brought on the altar of our common Victory, cheaper than zeros in the bank accounts of the oligarchs and can be forgotten in favor of the powers that be, who are solving their own problems?

The most important battles during the period of a radical change during the Great Patriotic War, according to the authors of the book “Mius Front in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1942, 1943"

SUMMER-FALL CAMPAIGN 1943, the designation of military operations in the Great Patriotic War adopted in Russian literature from July to the end of December. At the end of March 1943, after fierce winter battles (see. Winter campaign 1942/43) on the Soviet-German front there was a relative calm. Both belligerents used the operational pause to intensify preparations for new operations.

Owls. the command led preparations for the struggle to hold the initiative and complete the radical turning point in the war. The army received more and more military equipment and weapons. By July 1943, the number of automatic weapons in the active army almost doubled compared to April, anti-tank artillery - 1.5, anti-aircraft - 1.2, aircraft - 1.7, tanks - 2 times. Particular attention was paid to the accumulation of Stavka reserves. By summer, there were 8 combined arms, 3 tank and 1 air armies in the strategic reserve. At the same time, on the territory of the USSR, Foreign military formations from representatives of the peoples of some European countries.

The enemy by this time still possessed great power. Germany and its allies conducted a total mobilization, sharply increased the output of military products. Big hopes for him. command assigned to new T-V tanks"Panther", T-VI "Tiger", which had powerful armor and weapons, as well as assault guns "Ferdinand". The vast majority of human and material resources headed for the Sov.-German. front, but the enemy did not have large strategic reserves here. By the beginning of July 1943 in the reserve of the main command ground forces Germany had only 2 infantry, 3 security and 1 cavalry divisions, as well as 3 infantry and 1 cavalry brigades.

Planning military operations on the eastern front in the summer of 1943, it. the leadership understood that the Wehrmacht was not able to attack simultaneously in several strategic directions. Therefore, it was decided to conduct a major offensive operation in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. No active hostilities were planned for the rest of the front in the first half of the summer. It was supposed to carry out an operation near Leningrad only in July.

Owls. The Supreme High Command revealed the enemy's plans for the summer of 1943 in a timely manner. At the same time, not only the general plan of the German command was established, but also the groupings of enemy troops throughout the Sov.-German were precisely determined. front, the combat and numerical strength of his troops in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, the general directions of their main attacks, and then the time of the start of the offensive. Considering these circumstances, the command decided to use deliberate defense to wear down and bleed the enemy strike groups in the Kursk region, and then to launch a general offensive in the western and southwestern directions, to defeat the main forces of the army groups "South" and "Center". The task was set for the troops: after repelling the enemy’s offensive, they themselves would go on the offensive and crush his defenses on the front from Velikiye Luki to the Black Sea. They had to liberate the Left-bank Ukraine, Donbass, overcome the river. Dnieper, move the front further from Moscow and the Central Industrial Region, liberate the eastern regions of Belarus, clear the Taman Peninsula and the Crimea from the enemy. The first operations were planned in detail, subsequent ones were outlined only in general terms.

The troops operating in the northwestern direction were to pin down the opposing enemy forces and prevent him from maneuvering with reserves. The troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts had to attack the Mga to disrupt the enemy's impending attack on Leningrad, to draw his operational reserves into the battle. Thus, the main events in the Sov.-German. front in the summer of 1943 were to deploy in the area of ​​the Kursk salient.

Prior to the start of the main events of the campaign, owls. command decided to complete the liberation North Caucasus. At the end of March, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved the plan for the offensive operation of the North Caucasian Front to defeat the 17th German. army. Her plan was to bypass the village of Krymskaya - a key node of resistance on it. defensive line "Gotenkopf" - "Head of the Goth" (in Russian historiography - "Blue Line") - from the north and south, to seize it and the blows of the troops of the right wing and the center of the front to Varenikovskaya, and the left - to Anapa in parts to defeat the opposing enemy, then discard the rest of the German-Roman. troops from Taman to the sea. The main role in the operation, which was planned to be carried out in a relatively short time, was assigned to the 56th Army.

The offensive began after a week of preparation on 4 April. In all directions, owls. The troops encountered strong resistance. The enemy, having concentrated 820 combat aircraft, including 510 bombers, on the airfields of the Crimea and the Taman Peninsula, and also using up to 200 bombers based in the Donbass and in southern Ukraine, unleashed powerful bombing attacks on the attackers. The 4th and 5th air armies of the North Caucasian Front, together with the air group of the Black Sea Fleet, being inferior in the number of aircraft, could not provide the necessary resistance. Soon the enemy achieved significant air superiority over the Kuban.

On April 6, the offensive was suspended. Only on April 14, after the regrouping, it was resumed, however, this time the tasks were not completed. Since April 17, in most sectors of the front, active fighting stopped. At the same time, fierce air battles in the Kuban 1943. In the second half of April - early May, the enemy made several attempts to eliminate the bridgehead captured by the owls. troops south of Novorossiysk, - the heroic "Little Land" However, all of his attacks were repulsed.

Meanwhile, the troops of the North Caucasian Front were preparing to continue the offensive operation. armies were replenished personnel and military equipment, their provision with material resources has significantly improved, new tasks have been assigned to the troops. On April 29, the offensive resumed. The main blow was delivered by the 56th Army north and south of Krymskaya. The strikes of other armies were coordinated with her actions. After heavy fighting on May 4, the village was liberated. But there was no longer any strength to develop success. On May 19, the 56th Army went on the defensive at the reached line, without completing the tasks defined by the operation plan. Later, from May 26 to June 7, and then in late June - early July, the North Caucasian Front undertook a number of private operations to break through the German-Roman defense. troops, but did not achieve decisive success. From the first days of July, the active operations of the North Caucasian Front ceased. The troops went on the defensive. The time has come for the decisive battles of the campaign in the Kursk region.

As a result of the winter 1942/1943 offensive of the owls. troops and their forced withdrawal in March 1943 from Kharkov formed the so-called. Kursk ledge. The configuration of the front line gave both sides certain advantages for conducting offensive operations, but at the same time created threats in the event that they went on the offensive. The troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts located on the Kursk ledge threatened the German flanks and rear. Army Groups "Center" and "South". In turn, these enemy groupings, occupying the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads, had favorable conditions for inflicting flank attacks on the owls. troops defending in the Kursk region. The leadership of the Wehrmacht decided to take advantage of these conditions. It planned an offensive operation with the code name "Citadel". The plan of the operation provided for strikes in converging directions from the north and south at the base of the Kursk ledge on the 4th day of the offensive to surround and then destroy the owls here. troops. Subsequently, strike in the rear of the Southwestern Front and launch an offensive in a northeast direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central group of owls. troops and creating a threat to Moscow.

To repel enemy attacks, the troops of the Central, Voronezh Fronts and the Steppe Military District created a powerful defense, which included 8 defensive lines and lines with a total depth of 250–300 km.

The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1933-1945

Their aces were rightfully considered the best in the world.

Their fighters dominated the battlefield.

Their bombers wiped entire cities off the face of the earth.

And the legendary "things" terrified the enemy troops.

The Air Force of the Third Reich - the famed Luftwaffe - was as important a part of the blitzkrieg as the tank forces. The resounding victories of the Wehrmacht would have been impossible in principle without air support and air cover.

Until now, military experts are trying to understand how the country, which was forbidden to have combat aircraft after the First World War, managed not only to build a modern and efficient air force in the shortest possible time, but also to maintain air supremacy for many years, despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy. .

This book, published by the British Air Office in 1948, literally "hot on the heels" of the just ended war, was the first attempt to comprehend her combat experience. This is a detailed and highly competent analysis of the history, organization and combat operations of the Luftwaffe on all fronts - Eastern, Western, Mediterranean and African. This is a fascinating tale of the meteoric rise and disastrous fall of the Third Reich air force.

Sections of this page:

Summer Campaign on the Eastern Front

Direction of the main attack

Contrary to expectations summer campaign Soviet troops began on June 10 with a major offensive on the Finnish border in Karelia along the coast of the Gulf of Finland, as a result of which Vyborg was taken on June 20. At first, the Germans did not try to strengthen the Luftwaffe grouping in this direction, not wanting to weaken the main front in order to support the Finns, but the rapid deterioration of the situation forced them to transfer 50 dive bombers and single-engine fighters from Narva to Finland.

When the main offensive of the Soviet troops began on June 23, German aviation north of the Pripyat marshes was already somewhat weakened by the events on the coast of the Gulf of Finland, which was aggravated by the withdrawal of another 50 fighters to Germany to strengthen the Reich air defense system, weakened by the transfer of significant forces to Normandy. By July 3, the advancing Soviet troops had already occupied Vitebsk, Mogilev and Minsk. It was necessary to urgently strengthen the central direction, and literally every aircraft that could be removed from other fronts was hastily transferred here.

40 fighters from among those transferred to the Reich air defense were immediately returned, about the same number were transferred to the north from the 4th Air Fleet, but the need for attack aircraft was most felt for operations against the advancing Soviet columns. Accordingly, the already weakened Italian front was forced to give up another 85 FV-190, having lost (and irretrievably) the last strike forces that could be thrown to support the ground forces. 40 aircraft were transferred from Normandy, despite the critical situation that developed there after the capture of the bridgehead by the Allies (however, they did not play a big role there), and another 70 aircraft from the 4th Air Fleet. Thus, to relieve pressure on the central sector of the front, which was already beginning to fall apart, by the beginning of July, about 270 aircraft were sent.

These forces were clearly not enough to stop the flight. During the day of July 12, Soviet troops in the Baltic advanced more than 30 km; On July 13 they occupied Vilnius; it was followed by Pinsk and Grodno. South of the Pripyat marshes, the retreat was also in full swing. During the period from 24 to 28 July, the Germans left Brest, Lublin, Lvov and Przemysl. The defeat was so complete that all possible forces were transferred to this sector, even despite the risk of exposing the Carpathian and Balkan directions in Romania. In an attempt to plug the gap, the 4th Air Fleet was taken away last strength direct support of ground forces. There was nothing more to throw into battle.

Thus, by the end of July, the distribution of Luftwaffe forces on the Eastern Front had undergone noticeable changes, and the losses incurred during July far exceeded the reinforcements received, as a result of which the number of aircraft on the main front from the Baltic to the Black Sea was reduced to about 1750 aircraft:

Fleet	Long range bombers	Stormtroopers	Night bombers	Single engine fighters	twin-engine fighters	Long range scouts	Tactical scouts	Total
1st WF	-	155	110	70	-	30	35	400
6th WF	305	375	50	215	50	55	110	1160
4th WF	30	-	35	30	40	25	40	200
Total	335	530	195	315	90	110	185	1760

Moreover, the constant changes in airfields, caused not only by the transfer of units from other sectors of the fronts, but also by constant retreats and relocations, led to severe disorganization and a serious deterioration in the state of technology. As a result, despite the significant strengthening of the central direction, the average aviation activity did not exceed 500-600 sorties per day, which was completely insufficient to ease the pressure on the battered and exhausted ground forces.

Events in the Balkans

It was at this moment that the situation in the Balkans suddenly escalated. The weakness of the Luftwaffe in Romania was already shown by Allied air raids from Italy on the Ploiesti oil fields on July 9 and 15, against which no more than 50 sorties were made in total (of which half were made by Romanian units), and on July 22 the activity of fighter aircraft was even lower. Thus, the transfer of fighters from the southern direction to Poland and Galicia has already begun to affect.

However, the greatest concern among the Germans at this moment was the political situation. By the end of July, it became clear that it was hardly worth counting on Turkey's neutrality any longer. The expected actions of Turkey required the Luftwaffe to take early action. The Directorate of the II Air Corps, released from duties in France, was sent to Bulgaria on July 31 solely for the purpose of organizing defense and ensuring security, since there were no longer enough large forces for offensive operations.

The front line roughly corresponds to the situation at the time the Soviet offensive began (see also map 21). The 5th Air Fleet (Vostok) continued to control aviation operations in Finland and Northern Norway, and the 1st Air Fleet covered the Baltic. The zone of responsibility of the 6th air fleet completely included the Polish and Belarusian directions up to the Carpathians, and the 4th air fleet occupied the section from Galicia to the Black Sea along the line of the Prut River. In the Balkans, operations in Yugoslavia, Albania and Northern Greece were still the responsibility of a separate Luftwaffe Command South East.

Coup in Romania

An alarming lull set in on the southern sector of the front, interrupted on August 23 by a coup in Romania, which coincided with the forcing of the Prut River by Soviet troops. The Germans, taken by surprise, immediately sent additional aviation forces to the new threatened area. 40 Yu-87s were transferred to the Ziliste airfield from Estonia, and 30 FV-190 fighters arrived from the other side of the Carpathians. Attempts were made to airlift reinforcements to Bucharest, but since most of the airfields, including Baneas, were now in Roman hands, and Otopeni, held by the Germans, became unusable after the American bombardment, the results were insignificant and did not affect the situation. An attempt to bring in airborne troops from Yugoslavia had to be canceled on 25 August due to bad weather, a shortage of trained crews, and a lack of sufficient serviceable Me-323s. Thus, the attempt to recapture Bucharest by airborne forces failed, and similar operations against Ploiesti and Focsani had to be cancelled. The last attempt to restore the situation in the capital by bombing Bucharest on the same day did not produce any results.

It was clear that the situation was rapidly spiraling out of control, and any attempt to stop the Soviet offensive with limited resources would be futile. Constanta was occupied on the 29th, Ploiesti on the 30th, and on August 31, Soviet troops entered Bucharest. It only remained to save what could still be saved from complete destruction, and to withdraw all the remaining units of German aviation as soon as possible, mainly to Hungary, destroying airfield facilities, equipment and supplies before retreating. For the units withdrawn to Bulgaria, the respite was short-lived. Already on September 6, Bulgaria declared war on Germany, and the Balkans had to be abandoned less than two weeks after the start of the disaster.

By mid-September, the front line was restored in the eastern and southeastern directions (this time on the borders of Yugoslavia), and the Luftwaffe forces in the Banat region in the northern part of this region were included in the zone of responsibility of the 4th Air Fleet in early October. However, one can hardly speak of a significant strengthening, and the reorganization did not compensate for the weaknesses of the Luftwaffe in the southern direction, for which reinforcements were still not expected. In addition, it was precisely at this time that in the East, as in the West, a shortage of fuel began to be felt, and the intensity of military operations was sharply reduced. In view of the tense situation with fuel in the zone of responsibility of the 4th Air Fleet, combat operations were carried out extremely economically and with small forces. The consequences of such a decision can be judged at least from the fact that during the day of September 11, German aviation made only 250 sorties on the entire Eastern Front against 2000-2500 sorties of Soviet aviation. The advantage of Soviet aviation was so overwhelming that the actions of the Luftwaffe in the Balkans, as well as in other sectors of the Eastern Front, could no longer affect the overall development of the situation.

Eastern front from October to December

Meanwhile, the collapse in the northern and central sectors of the front continued. On September 4, an armistice was signed in Finland, on October 9, Soviet troops reached the coast of the Baltic Sea, and on October 13, Riga fell. Soon Soviet troops entered East Prussia. Belgrade was taken in the Balkans on the 20th.

By this time, the 1st Air Fleet was blockaded in Courland, and the 6th Air Fleet occupied the entire front from the Baltic coast of East Prussia to Slovakia. The 4th Air Fleet is responsible for operations on the outskirts of Austria through Hungary and Yugoslavia. The 1st Air Corps, which repels the attack on Budapest in Hungary, and the Luftwaffe South-East Command in northern Yugoslavia are subordinate to him.

By this time, the pace of the Soviet offensive in Poland and the Balkans had temporarily slowed down, and the main air battles were taking place in the Baltic states and East Prussia, where the 1st Air Fleet was eventually cut off and blocked in Latvia. However, the lack of fuel chained to the ground almost the entire long-range bomber aircraft, depriving the exhausted german armies air support, with the exception of the ongoing minor activities of four squadrons specially assigned to operations against railway lines. Despite the measures taken, the activity of other types of aviation also had to be reduced, and on average no more than 500 sorties were made per day, of which 125-150 were in the area south of the Carpathians.

The area was in need of significant reorganization. In mid-October, Oberst General Dessloh, who had not spent long in the West as commander of the 3rd Air Fleet after the removal of Sperrle, was again appointed to the post of commander of the 4th Air Fleet. At the same time, all the forces of the Luftwaffe South-East Command were placed at his disposal. These forces were now based in the region of the city of Pec and operated against the Soviet troops advancing along the Danube from Belgrade, but they were weakened during the evacuation from southern Yugoslavia, from Albania and from northern Greece. The rest of the forces, which most 4th Air Fleet, were now under the command of the 1st Air Corps in the area of ​​​​the city of Kecskemet and covered the approaches to Budapest. Thanks to the reorganization, any of the sectors could easily be strengthened at the expense of the other, but nevertheless it was clear that all the forces available were far from sufficient even with a normal supply of fuel.

Until the end of the year, relative calm was established, and the front line, now running from the Carpathians to East Prussia, changed little. At the end of October, heavy fighting broke out in the Kecskemét area, and all the forces of the 1st Air Corps were thrown into these battles against the Soviet tank columns advancing on Budapest. This situation continued throughout November, and although the Soviet advance was halted at Lake Balaton, the threat to Budapest from the north and south increased. The calm in the north allowed the 4th Air Fleet to be slightly strengthened, the number of which was increased to 500-600 aircraft (compared to only 200 machines in July), of which 200 were attack aircraft. Coinciding with the arrival of reinforcements, a slight improvement in the supply of fuel allowed for a partial recovery of forces, and by mid-November activity on this sector of the front increased to 400 sorties per day. However, no matter what the Luftwaffe did, they could not stop the Soviet advance on Budapest, and on December 9 the Red Army reached the Danube north of the city.

The six months from June to December 1944 were the time of unparalleled catastrophes of German weapons both in the East and in the West. In the East, the last gains so easily won in 1941 were lost, and there was not the slightest glimmer of hope like von Rundstedt's offensive in the West, although plans were already being prepared for a major counter-offensive in early 1945. On all fronts, the Germans faced the complete superiority of the enemy in people and equipment. The deplorable inability of the Luftwaffe to influence the situation was fully manifested. Numerous Soviet aviation outnumbered by 5-6 to 1 the most powerful forces that the Luftwaffe could put up against them, and it was quite clear that the Luftwaffe again, as in 1943, could not play a big role either in the East or in the West. They again did not have reserves, and the battles in the West and the defense of the Reich from the air attack "ate" the entire annual increase in the number of fighters. Now the situation was hopeless, and although in 1945 the Germans threw all possible forces into the last battle in the East, they were no longer able to prevent the impending catastrophe.