The role of the militia in the events of troubled times. Second People's Militia

It was very hard. The siege of Smolensk continued for almost two years, which fell in June 1611. The Polish detachments that ended up in Moscow behaved like conquerors. Swedish mercenaries held Novgorod-rod. Detachments of Tushino people "walked" around the country; robber gangs appeared, which included both Russian "thieves" and Poles. They plundered lands, ravaged cities and monasteries.

The Boyar Duma did not enjoy authority and power, the boyars practically did not rule the country. AT different parts states recognized different authorities: some - the Polish prince, others - the newly born baby Marina Mniszek as the legitimate son of Tsarevich Dmitry; the third - False Dmitry II.

The Russian kingdom was threatened with the loss of integrity and independence. The Troubles led to such a sad result. The question stood like this: either the people will “wake up” and defend their country themselves, or Russia will perish. We needed decisive and bold steps. The impasse political situation created by the egoism of the Seven Boyars and the stubbornness of King Sigismund could not remain forever.

The initiative to create a militia was shown by the elected authorities of the cities. They began to send letters to each other with a call to abandon the power of the "traitors" who had settled in the Kremlin. Only by rising "with all the earth" could Moscow be liberated and legally, at the Zemsky Sobor, choose a new tsar.

Patriarch Hermogenes initiated the rise of the people, the Zemsky Sobor was convened from service people - the “Council of the whole earth”. The first militia was headed by the voivode Prokopy Lyapunov, as well as Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy, Cossack ataman Ivan Zarutsky. The participants in the campaign pursued not only selfish goals. In their actions, patriotic sentiments are clearly visible: the desire to clear Moscow of interventionists and elevate an Orthodox tsar to the throne.

Composition of the First Militia

After the death of False Dmitry II, the Cossack ataman I. S. Zarutsky became his political heir, who proclaimed the newly born son of False Dmitry II and Marina Mnishek Ivan as king. Together with Prince D.T. Trubetskoy, Zarutsky led his regiments to Moscow. Simultaneously with the former Tushinians, detachments of the Ryazan nobles under the command of P.P. Lyapunov moved to Moscow.

From the beginning of 1611, detachments of the First Militia from different cities moved towards the capital and in March 1611 approached Moscow.

The inhabitants of Moscow were burdened by the presence of foreigners. In March 1611, the citizens of the capital raised an uprising against the Poles. However, the Poles and their Russian henchmen managed to save the day by starting a fire. Fires started in the city. Forgetting about the rebellion, the townspeople rushed to save their property. The raging fire destroyed most of the Moscow suburb, almost all of Moscow burned out. material from the site

The army of Lyapunov, Trubetskoy and Zarutskoy approached Moscow a few days after the fire. The militia entered the burning city. They managed to capture the White City. The Poles took refuge behind the walls of Kitay-gorod and the Kremlin, which were not damaged by the fire. An attempt to storm the powerful city fortifications was repulsed by the besieged.

Soon strife broke out in the militia camp, enmity broke out between the nobles and the Cossacks. It was skillfully inflated by the Poles and supporters of the Seven Boyars. The leader of the Lyapunov movement was summoned to the Cossack circle, suspected and accused of treason and killed by the Cossacks. After that, the nobles, who had lost their leader, went home. The militia as a single force ceased to exist. However, the Cossack troops continued to stand near Moscow and from time to time attempt to storm it.

Thus, the First Militia broke up, without liberating the capital from the Poles. The situation in the country became almost hopeless.

THE FIRST MILITARY OF 1611 - military and political formation, created to liberate Moscow from the Polish-Lithuanian troops, and further fight against them.

Tra-di-tion of the name-no-va-niya of the os-bo-dating militias (see also the Second militia of 1611-1612) conditions, restoration goes to S.M. So-catch-e-woo and more than once-de-la-et-sya next to the house is-after-to-va-te-lei: lo-kal-nye good-ro-free-com-one-not -niya in-in-sky people, dei-st-in-vav-shie in co-hundred-ve of various state-po-ly-tich. la-ge-ray in the Time of Troubles, from the West and earlier - in 1604-1606 and especially at the end of 1608 - 1609.

For-mi-ro-va-nie of the first militia in Jan-va-re - on-cha-le March 1611, in a non-small step-pe-no sti-hy-noe, became from -ve-tom on a sharp out-of-me-non-situation in the Russian state. From the end of August 1610, there were two processes going on par-ral-lel-but. On the one hand, pro-is-ho-di-lo in more-shin-st-ve cases of good-ro-free-noe at-not-se-nie at-sya- gi ko-ro-le-vi-chu Vla-di-sla-vu (future Polish king Vla-di-glory IV) as a Russian tsar-ryu on os-no-va-nii do-go-vo -ra dated August 17 (27), 1610, under-pi-san-no-go get-ma-nom S. Zhol-kevsky with “Se-mi-bo-yar-schi-noy”, you-stu -deceased on behalf of "all ranks" of the Russian state. The agreement should have been ut-ver-zhde-but on the re-go-in-rachs of the Russian "ve-li-ki" words and the Polish co-ro-la and pre-la-ha-lo, in particular, the re-move of ko-ro-le-vi-cha to the right-of-glory, his quickest arrival in Russia, withdrawal from the country of the ko-ro-left from-rows. On the other hand, the father of Vla-di-slav-va, the Polish king Si-giz-mund III, sought to establish personal power in the Russian state. He did not intend to recognize the agreement either as a whole, or from his separate articles (with the exception of the ty about the selection of a son by the Russian tsar), considered it necessary to pro-ve-de-nie in a second pri-sya-gi one-but-time-men-but on his name and in the name of Vla-di-sla-va. To fight against the forces of False Dmitry II and establish control over the faiths of False Dmitry II of the city-ro-da-mi-ko- ro-lu would-la not-ob-ho-di-ma free from other military actions-st-viy arm-miya, keep-to-keep someone-ruyu he is on-me-re -val-Xia on the medium-st-va from the Russian treasury. From-here-yes you-te-ka-lo to-stand-chi-voe tre-bo-va-nie Si-giz-mun-da III about ka-pi-tu-la-tion gar-ni-zo- on Smo-len-ska (with pri-not-se-ni-em pri-sya-gi only in his name). Ka-pi-tu-la-tion and further fate Smo-len-ska became on the ini-tsia-ti-ve of the Polish se-na-to-ditch from November 1610, practiced ti-che-ski is the only-st-ven-noy te-mine in pe-re-go-vo-ra with the Russian "ve-li-kim in salt-st-vom." “Se-mi-bo-yar-shchi-na” under-der-ji-va-la in the main points on-zi-tsu Si-giz-mun-da III in their letters to by slam and to Smolensk (November 1610 - January 1611). She actually recognized the pre-ro-ha-ti-you of the supreme authority for governing the country (August before -the thief did not give a shaft for this-th right-in-os-no-va-ny).

Separate appointments for various posts (including in pri-ka-zy) in Mo-sk-ve on behalf of ko-ro-la began from the end of August 1610 years, mas-co-vye - from se-re-di-ny september-rya. On-chi-naya from September 1610, Si-giz-mund III began to osu-sche-st-in-lyat many-numbered p-s-lo-va-niya in-places and yes, here- a rank without re-al-no-go accounting for layers-living-shih-sya in a land-of-the-she-ny in one county or another. At the end of the year, in the Ko-ro-Left headquarters near Smo-Len-sk, on-know-cha-whether for order-state duties is already middle and bottom -th-levels, both in a hundred-person and in a place (then, after-after-to-wa-whether separate po-lo-va-nia in the city-ro- to-vye-vo-vo-dy of the Polish and Lithuanian ways-ty-whose).

Under the pretext of fighting against the ot-ry-da-mi False Dmitry II S. Zhol-kevsky on the ini-tsia-ti-ve “Se-mi-bo-yar-schi-ny "introduced the ko-ro-lev-sky gar-ni-zon into Mo-sk-va on the night of September 21 (October 1), 1610 (in ok-tyab-re-but-yab-re took the key -vye-zi-tion in the Kremlin, Ki-tai-go-ro-de and Bel-scrap go-ro-de). The decision of “Se-mi-bo-yar-schi-ny” and the activity of the call from the se-re-di-ny no-yab-rya - December 1610, control whether-ro-wa-lissed by the commanding king-ro-left gar-ni-zo-nom A.K. Gon-sev-skim and sent-slan-ny-mi Si-giz-mun-dom III of his becoming-len-ni-ka-mi. Kill the False Dmitry II on December 11 (21), 1610, causing a crisis in the troops of the self-title and on the territories under his control ri-to-ri-yah, po-zvo-li-lo Si-giz-mun-du III uk-re-drink and there your influence.

In-for-ma-tion about na-me-re-ni-yah and dey-st-vi-yah of the Polish co-ro-la in-stu-pa-la in the cities of the Russian state as from Mo- sk-you, and from “ve-whether-to-go in-sol-st-va” from near Smolensk (in December 1610, the eye-for-elk fak-ti-che-ski under the are- stoma).

Po-dav-le-resurrection in Mo-sk-ve prin-qi-pi-al-but from me-ni-lo lo-zung-gi and po-lytic program-mu first militia. In the April cross-country-ce-lo-val-nyh gra-mo-tah, races-sy-lav-shih-sya on behalf of P.P. La-pu-no-va in the city-ro-dames, sfor-mu-li-ro-va-ny refrain from bringing in-not-se-niya with-sya-gi and Si-giz-mun-du III , and ko-ro-le-vi-chu Vla-di-slav-vu, ban on the eye-for-them any help, any service, tre-bo-va - armed struggle with the goal of expelling the Russian state from the territory of the Russian state (pre-zh-de everything from Mo-sk-you and from under Smol-len-ska) all military for-mi-ro-va-nia Re-chi Po-spo-li-toy. In the ideo-logical plan, this is a track-and-wa-elk as a re-stand-new-le-nie su-ve-re-ni-te-ta royal power and not-for-vi -si-mo-sti of the Russian state, as the preservation of the official status of the Russian right-of-glorious church. About-su-zh-de-niye in-pro-owls about no-si-te-le of the supreme power, deadlines, possible can-di-da-tah and us- lo-vi-yah from-bra-niya but-in-go mo-nar-ha from-kla-dy-va-moose.

Rising in Moscow and the arrival of the first militia to the hundred of sti-mu-li-ro-va-li you-stu-p-le-niya and in other regions nah. So, in ap-re-le, there was a riot of Russian noblemen from the western counties (Smo-len-sko-go, Do-ro-go-buzh-sko-go, Bel -sko-go, To-ro-pets-ko-go, Vya-zem-sko-go, etc.) led by I.N. Sal-you-ko-vym (earlier active side-ron-no-one-ko-ro-la), on-right-len-ny Si-giz-mun-dome III with not-pain- shim from-near-the-house of the Lithuanian ways-ti-chey on the way for the uk-re-p-le-niya of the ko-ro-lev-sky gar-ni-zo-nov along the road to Mo -sk-ve. Already in na-cha-le, in-ho-yes, but-whose way-ti-chi would you kill, and Sal-you-kov letters-men-but in-tre-bo-val from ko-ro- for you-in-yes his troops from the Russian state. This step-le-nie was in many ways connected with mas-so-you-mi con-fi-ska-tion-mi in-place and ra-zo-rit. re-press-si-mi against the Smolensk nobles, un-ver-nuv-shi-mi-sya by the spring of 1611. Soon, Sal-you-kov, together with other persons, undertook to torture the formation of an army in Bryansk for military operations against ko-ro-left troops near Smolensk. As a result, most of the nobles of the western counties appeared to be in the first militia near Moscow by the end of June.

Prak-ti-che-ski one-but-time-men-but with the movement of the first militia to Mo-sk-ve, no later than cha-la March 1611; Sal-you-ko-va, fak-ti-che-ski is-full-nyav-she-th function of the 1st military-vo-da (arrived in the city in early October 1610; For example, in se-re-di-not March, the 1st war-in-yes New-go-ro-yes, Prince I.N. Odo-ev-sky Bol-shoi and new-go-rod-tsy in-both-scha-li on behalf of the “New-go-rod-go-su-dar-st-va” military help the first militia. Rat-ni-ki from-pra-vi-lied from Nov-go-ro-da to Mo-sk-ve on April 21 (May 1), 1611, but it is unlikely to the camps of the first militia, the New-go-rod-sky authorities are not the first-you-mi in the country to recognize in se-re-di-not ap-re-la not-for-con-us-mi all ze-mel-nye-s-lo-va-niya on behalf of Vla-di-slav-va, and pre-zh-de all-time-yes-chi in the estate of the palace lands. At the beginning of May, in Novy-go-rod, there would have been half-a-wee before-hundreds of the first militia - so-nickname V.I. Bu-tur-lin (from ok-ru-zhe-niya La-pu-no-va), Prince S.G. Zve-ni-go-rod-sky and others.

In May 1611, the formation of the military and state administration in the first militia continued.

Sooner than all, according to the order of “Co-ve-ta of the whole earth,” P.P. La-pu-nov (played the leading role), as well as Tu-shin-sky battles-re Prince D.T. Tru-bets-koy and I.M. Za-ruts-cue; no later than May 22 (June 1), 1611, all the ra-ditious letters began to be issued on behalf of these persons. There was a deadline for arrival [no later than May 25 (June 4)] to serve in the first militia of the nobles and children of the boyar-skys from under-con- troll-nyh county-dov. For example, but then, when was there a decision about the restoration of the state-administrative activity in the first militia of the state-administrative activity of the pri-ka-call (already in se-re-di-not May - ju-not action-st-in-shaft Po-me-st-order and one of the orders-call-four-vert-tey). This is the way of the fact that in the course and after the resurrection in Moscow, the ranks of the first militia were more than in the lo-vi-noy of the Moscow deacons and the pain-shin-st-vom in the dea-sneezes. In the capacity of the official seal of the first militia from March to the end of July-la 1611, the personal seal of La-pu-no-was used va. In the first militia, along with half-ka-mi (by the end of June there were at least five of them), with a hundred-yav-shi-mi from the nobles, archers, servants, ka-za-kov, pro-du-whether su-shche-st-vo-vat separate from-rows of county children of bo-yar-skys, “ serving ta-tars, ”as well as one hundred ka-za-kov led by ata-ma-na-mi. By June-nu-July-lu 1611, the first militia on-count-you-va-lo, for example, 12-14 thousand warriors with strong, but different, niv-shim-xia in terms of quality -woo-ru-the same-no-em, not-one-on-your-military experience and so-s-st-ven-but different-whether-chav-shi-mi-sya or- ha-ni-rational and dis-qi-p-li-nar-ny-mi ha-rak-te-ri-sti-ka-mi. The artillery park of the first militia was og-ra-ni-chen and practically did not have siege weapons of large ka-lib-ditches.

From June 1611, the strategic situation began to change not in favor of the first militia. On June 3 (13), 1611, the army of Si-giz-mun-da III took Smolensk. New-re-re-go-in-ry 15-16 (25-26) June before-hundred-vi-te-lei sk-ve 7(17) June Ya.P. Sa-pe-goy (on-lu-chil fi-nan-so-vye gar-ran-tii from the commander of the ko-ro-lev-gar-ni-zo-nom in Mo-sk-ve A.K . Gon-sev-sko-go) about-va-li-lis. Sa-pe-ga window-cha-tel-but re-went one hundred-ro-well ko-ro-la (in his day-st-vie “ko-lo” of his cor-pu-sa at -nya-lo decision about this back in May 1611) and on June 23 (July 3) began active actions against the first militia. In battles with a foreign-earth gar-ni-zo-nom in Mo-sk-ve and sa-pe-zhin-tsa-mi from the ranks of the first militia, ut-ra-ti-li part of nya-tyh ra-her in-zi-tsy.

At the same time, from the beginning of June, there were in-ten-siv-nye-re-go-in-ry of new-go-rod-vo-vo-vods and pre-sta- vi-te-ley co-words with the active participation of V.I. Bu-tour-li-na with the commander of the Swedish corps Ya.P. De la garde; Bu-tur-lin mentioned-my-null about the possibility of marrying by the Russian tsar one of the two Swedish princes, sons of Carl IX - Gus-ta -va Adol-fa or Kar-la Phi-lip-pa. The Swedes pre-lo-ji-whether to take Gus-ta-va Adol-fa, to conclude the Russian-Swedish military alliance against Re-chi Po-spo-li-toy and to provide military assistance in the fight against ko-ro-lev-ski-mi howl-ska-mi, etc. After a few days about-su-zh-de-ny in “Co-ve-those of the whole earth” of the Swedish pre-lo-s-s-stand-elk from the marriage of Gus-ta-va Adol-fa by the Russian tsar. The official text of the pri-go-vo-ra “So-ve-ta ...”, for-ve-ren-ny under-pi-s-mi and pe-cha-cha-mi teaching-st-ni-kov for-se -da-nia, was accepted on June 22 (July 2) or June 23 (July 3) (on this day in Nov-go-rod, it was-la on-right-le-on-gra-mo-ta from the first militia and co-pia with-go-in-ra).

Ost-paradise not-grab-ka ma-te-ri-al-no-go obes-pe-che-niya rat-nik-kov of the first militia, not-ure-gu-li-ro-vanity full -my and functions of the military pre-di-te-lei and at-task-of-the-no-th level pri-ve-whether to the yes-che-dv-rya-on -mi, as well as part of the ka-za-kov of collectives of people-lo-bits with the need to resolve these problems . The result of their consideration of the “Co-ve-th of the whole earth” was the adoption of the “Pri-go-in-ra-of the whole earth” of June 30 (July 10) 1611, someone confirmed that P.P. La-pu-no-va, Prince D.T. Tru-bets-ko-go and I.M. For-ruts-ko-go "in all zem-sky and military de-lehs." However, “Pri-go-thief ...” og-ra-ni-chil their half-but-mo-chia with the right of “Co-ve-ta of the whole earth” to recall these persons if not over-le-zha-shchem is-full-of-not-nii-their-their-duties-no-stay and from-to-take new ru-ko-vo-di-te-lei, as well as not- about-ho-di-mo-stu co-gla-co-you-vat with “Co-ve-that ...” death warrants and decisions on land -lams of general sovereignty. The same “Pri-go-in-rum ...” must-ta-nav-li-va-moose, that fi-nan-with-you-mi, pro-do-vols. and others-mi in-stu-p-le-niya-mi in the general kaz-well of the first militia should-we center-tra-li-zo-van-but ve-give orders, and not howl -water and half-ki. At-ka-zy, we should also issue new ones or return the former places-of-places (and from-hour -ty and that's the rank) to the court-rya-to us and the children of the bo-yar-skim, who arrived at the service in the first militia. Were you-ra-bo-ta-ny clear principles-qi-py of con-fi-ska-tion of land vla-de-niy parties-ron-ni-kov ko-ro-la in Mo-sk-ve, pre-zh-de of all-go-beam-ny from him or “Se-mi-bo-yar-schi-ny” (named Vla-di-sla-va ); ut-ver-zhde-on the norm-ma about the return of all the palace-ts-vyh and black-but-solid lands as os-but-you de-tender-nyh and on-tu-ral th fees. Recognized-wa-lis-for-con-us-mi lands in-zh-lo-va-niya tsar Va-si-liya Iva-no-vi-cha Shui-sko-go and False -dmitry II, but "in the measure" of pro-is-ho-zh-de-niya, service-services-pe-hov and in-lo-zhe-niya in the county cor-po -ra-tion. Confirmed-waiting-moose action of the April-th decree-for 1610 of the tsar Vasi-liya Shui-sko-go about re-re-vo-de 1/5 on- me-st-no-go ok-la-yes de-tey bo-yar-sky for military service for the status of "you-served-wife here-ranks." “Pri-go-thief ...” for-kre-drank in-higher-so-qi-al-no-go sta-tu-sa ka-za-kov: hour-ka-za-kov would- la ga-ran-ti-ro-va-on-the-opportunity with the same-la-ni and you-full-not-ni not-many-conditions-lo-viy enter-ti among the living people “according to the father-of-st-vu” (that is, the city-ro-to-y children of the bo-yar-skys) with the use of the lu-che-no-eat de-nezh-no-go zha-lo-va-nya. The rest of the ka-za-kov so-storage-nya-la general status of service people “according to pri-bo-ru” (in my-mo- ro-do-vy ka-za-kov, their composition-la-whether archers, push-ka-ri, etc.) with ga-ran-ti-her de-nezh-no-go and pro- do-vols. providing-pe-che-niya, moreover, in both cases, it’s not pre-la-ha-elk the restoration of their former hundred-tu-sa on-dat-no-go or for-vi-si-mo-go che-lo-ve-ka. Price-tra-li-for-tion on-logs, other payments and on-tu-ral-ny-stu-p-le-ni-ties with the same-st- kim for-pre-that and su-ro-vym on-ka-for-ni-eat sa-mo-free-ditch otd. from-rya-da-mi ka-za-kov (such a practice-ti-ka would have been ordinary in Tu-shin-sky la-ge-re).

During the on-ho-yes forces Ya.P. Sa-pe-gi for pro-free-st-we-em from-a-row-ladies of the first militia managed to regain control over uk-re-p-le-niya-mi Be- lo-go-ro-yes and again beat No-vo-de-vi-chiy monastery. On-chi-naya from 5 (15) July, from the ranks of the first militia, continue to put up ost-rozh-ki and other for-ti-fi-kats. co-equipment in Za-mo-sk-in-the-river, on-against-the-Kremlin (the first air-ve-de-us back in May). One-on-a-chav-shie-sya in accordance with the norms of “Pri-go-in-ra ...” on-ka-za-niya ka-za-kov you- did they call for a sharp increase in their not-to-vol-st-va (on-right-len-no-go per-so-nal-but against P.P. La-pu-no-va as before -sta-vi-te-la serving the nobility and ini-tsia-to-ra acceptance “Pri-go-vo-ra ...”) and different -gla-this ka-za-kov with the servant of the nobility. One-but-time-men-but both-st-ri-lied from-no-she-niya me-zh-du before-in-di-te-la-mi of the first militia, as it became from the West secret plans of I.M. For-ruts-ko-go about re-re-da-che tro-na sy-nu False Dmitry II and M. Mni-shek “tsa-re-vi-chu” Iva-nu Dmitri-rie-vi -chu Wo-ryong-ku. On-ras-tav-neck pro-ti-in-standing serving-zh-lo-go nobility-st-va and ka-za-kov, mustache-lip-len-noe practice-ti-koy at - me-not-niya of the article “Pri-go-vo-ra ...” about on-ka-for-nii for self-free collection of fodder ka-for-ka-mi and pro-vo -ka-qi-ey A.K. Gon-sev-sko-go (in ka-for-whose ta-bo-ry under-bro-si-li under-del-ku - gra-mo-tu "in all cities-ro-yes" supposedly from the name of La-pu-no-va with the call “to-be-vat ka-za-kov”), led to a political explosion. On ka-zach-em circle July 22 (August 1) -sti gra-mo-you "to all cities-ro-yes", was for-rub-len. Not-for-horse-ra-pra-va over him in-lo-zhi-la na-cha-lo so-qi-al-no-mu, and in the end, and in a lytic race-ko -lu in the ranks of the first militia. Fact-ti-che-ski, the leadership of the first militia went to Za-ruts-ko-mu. Departure for a met hour of the county of the nobility (mostly self-free, and also under the pre-log of servicemen on -significantly and from the official permission to go to the estate) and change of order in more-shin-st-ve at-ka- call (now their voz-glav-vi-li dia-ki Tu-shin-sko-go-la-ge-rya) brought to the effort-le-niyu ro-li ka-za-kov in the first militias, which became the first step in the for-mi-ro-va-nii of serving as a leading military officer -slovia in the country. Since 1611, from the West, the facts have been captured by them in the districts of the districts of the children of the Bo-Yar-skys and foreign zem-tsev in the Russian service, is-me -shche-ny ot. ka-za-kov with the change of so-qi-al-no-go sta-tu-sa, the composition of the official ros-pi-this de-tender and food. collections from draft-lykh hair and mo-on-styr-sky here-ranks in the central region in favor of one or another Cossack-their villages.

Not-bla-go-pleasant for the first militia from-me-not-niya pro-isosh-whether and in the se-ve-ro-for-pa-de-country, where with a grip cor-pu-som Ya.P. De-la-gar-di New-go-ro-da 16-17 (26-27) July continued the active phase of the Swedish Intervention na-cha-la of the 17th century. Soon, De-la-gar-di us-ta-no-vil control practically-ti-che-ski over the entire Nov-go-rod-sky land. After this, on July 25 (August 4), 1611, the Russian New City authorities (the 1st Military Command, Prince I.N. Odo-evsky Bolshoi and others ), Metropolitan Isi-dor, local church council and local co-words, opi-ra-yas on the co-ot-vet-st-vuyu-shchy when -go-thief of the first militia, under-pi-sa-li from the name of “all-of-the-go-go-rod-go-su-dar-st-va” to-go-thief from De-la -gar-di about from-bringing one of the two sons of the Swedish co-ro-la Kar-la IX go-su-da-rem New-go-ro-da with per-spec -ti-howl ras-pro-stra-thread dey-st-vie do-go-vo-ra for everything “Mo-s-kov-go-su-dar-st-vo”. One-on-ko before-in-di-te-li of the first militia in August 1611 of the year fak-ti-che-ski de-non-si-ro-va-li the former pri-go-thief “So-ve -that of the whole earth" about the selection of Gus-ta-va Adol-fa to the Russian throne.

At the end of the summer - in the autumn of 1611, the possibilities of the first militia of the weight of the active and effective military actions of the for-lying for-met-but og-ra-ni-chen-ny-mi. Three-day battles in Moscow on 4-5 (14-15) and 7 (17) August did not bring -one of the sides, one-to-one part of the uk-re-p-le-ny in the southern part of the Be-lo-go-ro-yes again came under the control of ko-ro -left-wing troops, and most importantly - foreign-earth-no-mu gar-ni-zo-well in the Kremlin was-lo-becoming-le-but pro-free-st-vie. From av-gu-hundred began-la-to-beautify-sya ter-ri-to-riya, con-tro-li-rue-may before-in-di-te-la-mi and at-ka-za -mi of the first militia. So, for example, the cities of the Volga region (Nizhny Novy-go-rod, Kazan, etc.) did not let them into their territory to-ryu under-mos-kov-nyh ka-za-kov and on-sign-chen-nyh "Co-ve-th of the whole earth" vo-vod. Oka-hall-sya ma-lo-ef-fektiv-nym collection of fur coats in all counties-ladies in the winter for the militias, big pro-ble-we-would-whether with pack-la- that on-log-gov, with the delivery of pro-to-vol-st-via, bo-e-at-pa-owls, additional forces. At the end of August-gu-hundred and September 15 (25) after art-ob-st-re-la for-zhi-ga-tel-ny-mi yad-ra-mi from-row-dy of the first militia before-pri-nya-whether two not-successful-shie-to-torture navigators-ma Ki-tai-go-ro-da. Ko-ro-left-sky troops in August-September on-count-you-va-li from 5-6 to 8-9 thousand people, professional-sio-nal-but under-go-to-flax -nyh to a long military campaign -lem and his pre-hundred-vi-te-la-mi because of not-you-payments sting-lo-va-nya). On September 24 (October 4), the cor-pus of the great het-ma-on the Lithuanian Ya.K. Hod-ke-vi-cha, what are you-well-di-lo militia-chen-tsev to-ki-nut But-in-de-vi-chiy monastery and burn it, os-ta-vit not-someone -rye other uk-re-p-le-niya. In the battle on September 25 (October 5), 1611, from-ry-ladies Hod-ke-vi-cha and sa-pe-zhin-tsam failed to win a re-shi-tel-noy troubles, at the same time, pro-to-vol-st-vie to-ro-left-to-mu gar-ni-zo-well in the Kremlin again was-lo-dos-tav-le-no, and he himself intensified from-rya-yes-mi died-she-go Ya.P. Sa-pe-gi. Ko-ro-left-sky troops outside the Kremlin-la zi-mo-va-li and co-bi-ra-li pro-do-vol-st-vie on Tver, Suz-Dal and Rus -tov-sky lands, not being afraid of the military actions from the side of the militia.

In September 1611, in the Lower New-go-ro-de on-cha-lo for-mi-ro-vat-sya Second militia of 1611-1612 with the same in-li- tic purposes, but on more wi-ro-kih so-qi-al-nyh wasps-no-va-ni-yah and with greater fi-nan-so-vyh possible -tyah. Despite the gradual strengthening of the crisis in the first militia, his power in the autumn of 1611 recognized about 50 cities, and in Russia, half of Prince D.T. Tru-bets-ko-go (but-November) would you represent-le-we-practice-ti-che-ski all the chi-ns go-su-da-re-va dvor-ra and serve- lye court-rya-not 13 county cor-po-ra-tions.

In December 1611 - January 1612, the military actions of the first militia were involved in attempts to stop the delivery of pro-freedom and fur-ra- Ms. Polish-Lithuanian gar-ni-zo-well in the Kremlin, some-rye-eyes-were-dos-that-precise-but good luck-mi in the 1st de-ka- de de cab-ra. Disintegration of the first militia with a pro-tsi-ro-va-lo recognition of his in-sla-mi - K.D. Be-gi-che-vym and N.V. Lo-pu-hi-nym in January 1612 in Psko-ve False Dmitry III saved-shim-sya tsar-rem "Di-mit-ri-em Iva-no-vi-chem", what are you calling -lo sharp re-action of the ru-ko-vo-di-te-lei of the Second militia. They are because of a me-ne-i-strategy of action and instead of a not-for-slow-go-yes to Mo-sk-ve along a direct route that p-stu-pi-whether to the for-mi-ro-va-niyu pain-sho-go-how-ska and plan-no-mer-no-mu you-tes-non-niyu ka-zach-them from- ranks of the first militia from the cities of the Upper and Middle Volga, central and border districts with Novy-go-ro-dom, to co-zy-vu in Yaro-slav-le “Co-ve-ta of the whole earth-whether” with shi-ro-kim pre-sta-vi-tel-st-vom ter-ri-to-riy and co-words groups, the creation of the sys-te-we of the most important pri-ka-call. Pri-not-se-nie pri-sya-gi in the camps of the first militia to False Dmitry III in March 1612 (according to some data, I.M. Za-rutsky according to others, he and D.T. Tru-bets-koy “do-lo-va-whether the cross is not-in-lei”, about which they pi- sa-whether in June-not in gra-mo-te to ru-ko-vo-di-te-lyam of the Second militia) with-ve-lo to new-in-mu mass-so -to-mu-de-ez-du from under Mo-sk-you voo-waters, noble-ryan-s-ranks and more-shin-st-va pri-kaz-nyh (mainly in Yaro- slavl) and to the open-thing-th-time-ry-vu with the Second-eye army-che-no-eat. In the April neighborhoods of the Second militia of the pre-vo-di-te-li of the first militia, pre-zh-de of all Za-ruts- cue, about-vi-nya-lis "in many wrongs": kill-st-ve P.P. La-pu-no-va, ka-zach-their gra-be-zhah and kill-st-wah "on the roads", unauthorized times-yes-che-great vla-de- ny "his-so-vet-no-kam", in the confession of False Dmitry III. From-me-not-nie-zi-tion before-vo-di-te-lei of the first militia in relation to self-title (at the end of May, his are-sto- va-li in Gdo-ve, then dos-ta-vi-li in Mo-sk-va and in-sa-di-li in prison), public-personal recognition by them was mistaken -koy kre-sto-tse-lo-va-niya to him, their June-salt-st-in in Yaroslavl (attempt to save your influence and find com -pro-miss with whether-de-ra-mi of the Second militia) didn’t come to how-to-be-be-significant re-zul-ta-tam. On the whole, the un-successful-we-we-eyes-were-were the military actions of the first militia in na-cha-le - se-re-di-not June 1612. Ho-cha militias managed to keep the pain-shin-st-in their own positions, Ya. K. Hod-ke-vich again delivered dos-ta-vil to the Polish-Lithuanian gar-ni-zo-well, food and fodder, led the change of the troops of the gar-ni- zone, provided-ne-chil leaving for Speech Po-whether-to-change-niv-she-go-sya half-ka.

The final disintegration of the first militia took place after that, as on July 28 (August 7), 1612, I.M. For-ruts-ki, at the head of ka-zach-them-ranks (2.5-3 thousand people), left the camps of the first militia near Moscow when approaching -nii avant-gard-yes Second militia. Regiment of Prince D.T. Tru-bets-koy remained on their own in-zi-qi-yah (mainly in Za-mo-sk-in-re-whose) and active-but learning-st-in-val in decisive battles with the detachment of Ya.K. Hod-ke-wi-cha August 22-24 (September 1-3). At the end of September 1612, there was a merger of the administrative structures of both their militias.

The first militia became the first torturing sa-mo-or-ga-ni-za-tion of co-words and co-word groups (mainly different layers of "cases" living people in the-in-sko-go-chi-on "headed by the county nobility) for the solution of general-na-tsio-nal-nyh tasks of the state-po-lytic ha-rak-te-ra, for-mi-ro-va-niya war-ska on the good-ro-free-base-no-va-nii, re-sta- new-le-niya in-sti-tu-tov management with shi-ro-kim with-me-no-no-em choice-bor-no-go on-cha-la.

Introduction

The period of the "Time of Troubles" had a great influence on Russian history, leaving a deep mark in the memory of descendants and contemporaries. A huge number of events that occurred in such a short period of time amazes every person. People's liberation struggle, invasions of the interventionists and all kinds of coups on the royal throne, the appearance bright personalities on a national scale make this era incredibly interesting for studying both the general problems of the history of the Time of Troubles and its specific stages.

Troubles - a special period in national history. Bringing the Russian people such a large number of disasters and destruction, the Time of Troubles showed a very important historical lesson to the entire state. The knowledge and experience that the Troubles gave, positive and negative, although not always taken into account by the people, always affected, to one degree or another, the historical development of Russia.

This topic of work is relevant today, because, despite the identification by modern researchers of new sources on the history of the Time of Troubles, there are no special studies on the first Zemstvo militia in modern historiography. Until now, there is no single point of view in the literature about the nature of the activities of the First Militia. All this forces us to turn again to the study of this topic.

Chronological framework this study cover January - August 1611

The aim of the work is to study the main issues of the formation and activities of the first militia.

Work tasks:

1.To trace the development of historical thought, which is associated with this topic.

.To identify the features of the process of formation of the first militia.

.To trace the evolution of the activities of representatives of the people's liberation movement in the period of 1611.

.Analyze the main results of the activities of the first militia and determine its contribution to the process of the liberation struggle against foreign invaders.

The object of research is the problem of the formation of the first zemstvo militia. The subject is the study of the formation, activities and collapse of the first zemstvo militia.

The practical significance of this study lies in the fact that it allows you to gain knowledge on this important historical problem, as well as explore the approaches of various scientists, which is necessary for further consideration of issues related to the struggle of the Russian people for independence and freedom at the beginning of the 17th century.

The work consists of introduction, 3 chapters, conclusion, list of sources and references.

The study is based on the study of both documentary and narrative sources. An important source for studying the events of the Time of Troubles, including the activities of the first militia of this period, are bit records from the beginning of the 17th century, published by S.A. Belokurov. They contain information about the military and administrative appointments of the members of the first militia, about military operations at the time of interest to us. Sources of paramount importance for the disclosure of the topic are documents emanating from the very first militia - I.E. Zabelin. The verdict of June 30, 1611 and various letters of the Militia, collected and published by S.B. Veselovsky. Valuable information about the composition of the first militia is contained in the Feeding Books of the quarters of the early 17th century, which recorded increases in the monetary salaries of servicemen, including increases for participation in the activities of the first militia. When conducting our research, we also use the latest publications of act material, which also contain letters related to the history of the first militia.

Of great interest is the study of narrative sources. Among them is the Tale of Avraamy Palitsyn, who was a participant and eyewitness of the events taking place at the beginning of the 17th century, was close to the militia. Many of the information reported by Palitsyn is unique and not available in other sources. The chronicle of Konrad Bussow is one of the most important narrative sources of foreign origin. It covers the period from the reign of Boris Godunov to the liberation of Moscow by Minin and Pozharsky. The author was in the center of the events he describes and managed to record this in his notes. The new chronicler is a monument of official historiography, compiled in the environment of Filaret. This source gave the official concept of Russian history from the end of the reign of Ivan IV and had a great influence on the subsequent historiography of the Time of Troubles. Approved letter of election of Mikhail Fedorovich - official document, depicting not only the activities of the Zemsky Sobor in 1613, but also giving a look at the events of the Time of Troubles, including the activities of Zemstvo militias from the standpoint of the new Romanov dynasty.

1. Historiography

1Pre-revolutionary and Soviet historiography

AT historical research events in Russia at the end of the 16th - beginning of the 17th centuries. the term "Trouble" is used. In Russian historiography of the beginning of the XIX century. the stereotype of Troubles was established as Polish-Swedish intervention. In the XIX - early XX centuries, it was understood as the struggle of the people against the state. Contemporaries of those events considered the Time of Troubles a punishment for sins. In Soviet times, views on this topic changed.

N.I. Kostomarov considered one of the reasons for the Time of Troubles to be the desire of the Western Church, led by the Pope, to subjugate all of Russia. IN. Klyuchevsky was the first to create a holistic concept of the Russian Troubles as a result of a severe social crisis. The reason for it, according to the historian, was the indignant state of the people after the oprichnina of Ivan the Terrible and the termination of the Rurik dynasty. According to V.O. Klyuchevsky, the cause of the Time of Troubles was "the very structure of the state with its heavy tax base and the uneven distribution of state duties."

The fundamental work of S.F. Platonov "Essays on the history of the Troubles in the Muscovite state of the XVI-XVII centuries." Cause of Troubles S.F. Platonov considered the result of the crisis that the Moscow kingdom was experiencing in the 16th century. At the same time, disagreements in the social field were manifested in it, on the one hand, between the supreme power and the tribal aristocracy, which resulted in the defeat of the aristocracy and the emergence of a noble elite, on the other hand, for land and labor hands between the feudal lords. The dissatisfaction of the enslaved masses of the peasants was expressed in their increased access to new lands and to the Cossacks.

For S.F. Platonov's characterization of the spiritual life in the Muscovite state at the beginning of the 17th century is also important: according to the historian, this time minor deviations from the old Moscow customs became common. This was caused by the events of the Troubles, as well as the influx of foreigners under Mikhail Fedorovich. These deviations gave rise to the ideas of guarding, the struggle against Protestant propaganda.

Then a monograph by G.A. Zamyatin. The author of this book consistently pursues the idea that the candidacy of M.F. Romanova was not the main one at the Council in February 1613, and that earlier, in the summer of 1612, the most important persons of the Second Home Guard, including Prince Dmitry Pozharsky, supported the plan to elect a Swedish prince to the Moscow throne, and this idea was formulated back in the First Home Guard. G.A. Zamyatin criticized not only the official ideologists of the Romanov reign ― from the Moscow boyars of 1615 to their contemporaries, but also S.F. Platonov, who doubted the legitimacy of the Council of All the Earth in 1611 and its competence to choose the tsar. The main source for research G.A. Zamyatin was served by the collection "Swedish Affairs" from the former archive of the Ambassadorial Prikaz. The scientist managed to recreate an accurate picture of the negotiations between the Novgorodians with the First and Second Militias and the promotion of the idea of ​​electing a Swedish prince to the throne of Moscow.

The Soviet paradigm in understanding the Time of Troubles in the 17th century. arose as an opposition to the pre-revolutionary. This paradigm was based on an international rather than a national understanding of history. The main ideologist of this approach to the study of the history of Russia was M. N. Pokrovsky. It was he who first formulated the thesis that the Time of Troubles is a class conflict. The complexity of the events of the beginning of the XVII century. he reduced it only to social movements. The impostors False Dmitry I and False Dmitry II, according to M.N. Pokrovsky, - peasant tsars. And only because of the unification of the nobles and boyars against the peasant tsars, the agitated people were forced to cooperate with foreigners and fight the nobles together with them. And the militias, including the Nizhny Novgorod militia led by K. Minin and D.M. Pozharsky is a social direction against the revolution.

Thus, M.N. Pokrovsky wrote that in Russia at the beginning of the 17th century. there was a great upsurge of the class struggle, in other words, a peasant uprising, and the emergence of impostors was generated by internal reasons, and not only by the Polish invasion.

Moreover, the book dedicated to the Time of Troubles is named M.N. Pokrovsky - The Peasant Revolution. "Bourgeois" historians, according to M.N. Pokrovsky, sought to hide the class essence of this movement, so they “began to tell that the new Tsar False Dmitry or Named Dimitri, as he was called, was put forward precisely by the Polish landowners and the Catholic Church.” Here the historian draws a parallel with modernity, but not with the Soviet-Polish war, but with the revolution in Russia: in 1917, “bourgeois newspapers also said that the Germans arranged this business, that all this was bribed, arranged with foreign money, etc. .".

B.D. Grekov, following M.N. Pokrovsky, concluded that the enslavement of peasants in the 16th century. paved the way for the revolution of the early 17th century.

From the beginning of 1934, the national question and the teaching of history began to be discussed in historiography in such a way that the autocracy did not represent the interests of the ruling classes only, which, of course, was directly opposite to the views of M.N. Pokrovsky, who died in 1932. The approach of M.N. Pokrovsky was officially condemned, to which his students were also involved.

In the postwar period, important in the study of the beginning of the XVII century. began to play research I.S. Shepelev. Shepelev considered False Dmitry II a protege of the ruling circles of the Commonwealth, used the term "hidden intervention" in relation to him. And especially fresh was the material he collected on the history of the First Militia, which until then had almost always been in the shadow of the more successful Second (Nizhny Novgorod) Militia. Despite the unattractive title, it contained a lot of new and useful material. The book of I.S. Shepelev is distinguished by the completeness of the materials used. Shepelev made the First Militia the subject of his interests, independently researching a large array of sources. He paid the main attention to the role of the Cossacks in the liberation of Moscow, for the first time showing them not just as a destructive environment, but as an important social force.

Books by I.S. Shepelev, the materials he collected and analyzed facilitated and even prepared the transition to a new understanding of the Time of Troubles.

N.P. Dolinin studied well-known sources on the history of the first militia. He was able to dispel the myth that Patriarch Hermogenes organized a campaign of patriots against Moscow and prove the involvement of Prokopy Lyapunov in this. The historian also examined the preparatory steps of Prokopy Lyapunov to organize the militia, related to negotiations with the Polish hetman Sapieha, the Cossack ataman Ivan Zarutsky and Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy. The contribution of N.P. Dolinin in the study of the geography of the first militia.

R.G. Skrynnikov argued that the main social contradiction within the layer of service people was the hatred of the poorly provided with estates and monetary salaries of small children of the boyar southern districts (only relatively recently included in the Moscow state) to the well-provided Moscow service people, i.e. capital nobles, stewards, and even more so - duma ranks. It was the small servicemen of the southern counties that became the breeding ground for all anti-government initiatives. Detachments of all impostors went through these counties, quickly acquiring participants from among the local service people.

Works by A.L. Stanislavsky and R.G. Skrynnikov presented a special view of the Time of Troubles - as a civil war. It was these two researchers who challenged the idea of ​​the Troubles as a peasant war. A.L. Stanislavsky argued that the main destructive force acting in the Time of Troubles was the free Cossacks. But these were not the Don or Volga Cossacks, who had long lived on the outskirts of the country. Free Cossacks were - a bunch of people from different social strata right in the center of the Moscow state. These were people who had lost their former social status, who, as a result of the economic crisis, were thrown out into the street and did not receive protection from the tsar: both former service people, and former peasants, and former townspeople, and former serfs. The decisive share among them was played by combat serfs, professional military men. They - free Cossacks became the main force of all anti-government forces in the Time of Troubles. It was they who were interested in continuing the unrest, because. they did not have a stable position, service and salary necessary for life, and obtained funds for it mainly by robberies or were kept by impostors. According to the historian, the Cossacks fought both interventionists and government troops, on the side of the “oppressed classes”.

Ultimately, A.L. Stanislavsky and R.G. Skrynnikov moved away from understanding the Time of Troubles as a peasant war. Instead of class conflict, they pointed to the struggle within the layer of service people. The core of the Troubles lay in the internal difficulties of the Muscovite state, and not in the invasion of foreigners, which only exacerbated the situation. R.G. Skrynnikov opposed the assessment of the movement of False Dmitry II as a covert intervention, showing separately that this impostor was put forward by Russian rebels.

2Modern historiography

Among modern historians dealing with this issue, it should be noted the study of B.N. Flory. It shows some aspects of the mentality of the urban nobility, which are revealed in the sources of the Time of Troubles, primarily in the Sentence of the Moscow Region militia. international relationships in Central and Eastern Europe during the period of late feudalism. Here the researcher writes about Russia's struggle for access to the Baltic Sea and about relations with the Commonwealth. The identification of many new points related to Moscow-Polish relations during the Time of Troubles is the strength of the monograph by B.N. Flory, in which he talks about the intervention of the Polish-Lithuanian state in the domestic political life of Russia at the beginning of the 17th century.

AND ABOUT. Tyumentsev, a student of R.G. Skrynnikov, refutes the point of view of the Tushens as foreign invaders, and shows them as Russian rebels. AND ABOUT. Tyumentsev not only showed that the Tushinos were not interventionists, but also explained the mass nature of this movement. In his opinion, the inhabitants of the counties that went over to the side of False Dmitry II, especially service people, derived great benefits for themselves. Those who, in the normal course of affairs, could not count on promotion to the ranks, now, having entered the court of the impostor, received a higher status, as well as estates and estates from among the possessions of noble supporters of Vasily Shuisky. They also received previously inaccessible posts of governors in cities that were going over to the side of the impostor, even duma ranks in his Boyar Duma. In addition, False Dmitry II actively distributed to his supporters the palace lands that were under his rule. All this was especially important for the marginal (small southern as well as northwestern) urban communities of service people, whose members had never before had access to power and wealth.

In an extensive and informative study about the Time of Troubles, owned by V.N. Kozlyakov, valuable observations are made. The most important of them is the rejection of attempts to understand the personal composition of the "Seven Boyars", instead of which it is advisable to treat this term as a successful rhetorical image. Important for understanding the events of 1612 is considered by V.N. Kozlyakov specially the composition of the First Militia after the death of P. Lyapunov, which allowed the researcher to get rid of the traditional naming of his "Cossack". As a result of the research done, he abandoned the interpretation of the Time of Troubles as a confrontation between patriotic nobles and traitor boyars with the entire period and generally lost its old content.

The personnel of the First Militia, the biographies and social strategies of its members - these problems have hardly been studied in science. And an example of such a study, the purpose of which is to create a large-scale database, was the monumental work of A.A. Selina, built on Novgorod material. It is extremely interesting to study the services and fates of officials of the Novgorod orders. An innovative character is the study of behavioral strategies and Everyday life Novgorodians, as well as the relationship between Novgorodians and Swedes during the period of occupation. In general, from the pen of A.A. Selina published many extensive studies of the Time of Troubles.

It is important to note that this issue is of interest not only to domestic, but also to foreign researchers. For example, the British historian Maureen Perry in her works explores various aspects of the relationship between power and social groups, including during the first militia.

Having traced the development of historical thought in this period, we can say that at different times researchers treated this period of national history in different ways. Since the 19th century in historiography, the problems of the emergence of the Time of Troubles were considered, many reasons were proposed for its occurrence from a severe social crisis to the desire of the Catholic Church to seize Russia, as well as the plight of the peasants. In Soviet historiography, ideas about the Time of Troubles changed, the historians of this period brought to the fore the factor of the class struggle in order to comply with the ideological doctrine of the new state. New stage research - the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. New historians appeared, new materials were introduced into scientific circulation (for example, A.A. Selin in the study of the Novgorod land).

In general, it should be noted that the events that took place in this short period of time left behind a significant number of monuments that researchers of the 19th - early 21st centuries became interested in.

The achievements of modern researchers of the Time of Troubles as a whole rethought the old politics of the history of the Time of Troubles. The events taking place in the Time of Troubles (including the uprising of Bolotnikov, the change of impostors, the invasion of interventionists) are considered in a new way. However, in modern historiography, the question of the formation and activities of the first militia remains not fully explored. The conclusions of Soviet and pre-revolutionary historiography related to the first militia require rethinking in the light of the achievements of modern historiography in general. Therefore, the task of my research is to consider the formation and activities of the first militia using the achievements of modern historiography of the Time of Troubles.

2. Militia formations: the initial stage

1 Formation of the militia

July 1610 was the overthrow of Vasily Shuisky, who established himself as an indecisive and short-sighted ruler. A group of boyars gained power, a month later they concluded an agreement with Stanislav Zolkiewski (Polish hetman) on the recognition of Vladislav, the heir to the king of the Commonwealth, Sigismund III, sovereign of Moscow. After 2 months, in September, the Polish-Lithuanian troops and mercenaries who served the crown entered Moscow. Alexander Korvin Gosevsky was chosen as the head of the garrison of the Commonwealth, and Piotr Barkovsky was chosen as the commander of the mercenaries.

Foreigners built their own system of relations with the Russians:

· they were provided by the collection of taxes from the population outside Moscow, while they treated him with disdain and arrogance, considering him a defeated people;

· representatives of the elite were expelled from Moscow - noblemen and military men, boyar children, archers, chieftains with villages;

· they robbed the treasury and wealthy people, brought to the Kremlin all the artillery, gunpowder, handguns that previously belonged to Muscovites and were used by them for defensive purposes.

There are many in the sources concrete examples characterizing the relationship of the local population with the interventionists. For example, it is known that in the period from September 23, 1610 to March 3, 1611, mercenaries, on foot and on horseback, received about 35,000 rubles in money and other items. Among the things they seized were gold items, diamonds, pearls and other valuables. The officer of the Polish garrison Samuil Maskevich in his testimonies pointed out that his colleagues, collecting provisions from the Russian villages, behaved as they wanted, and could even forcibly take away the wife or daughter of a great boyar.

The Russian people very soon realized that the foreigners who had settled in Moscow were a cruel and powerful enemy that had to be expelled and destroyed. However, for this it was necessary to raise the entire people to the liberation struggle, which was not so easy. At the end of 1610, the inhabitants of Moscow kissed the cross on how to unite all the Russian lands in order to expel the Lithuanian people to one and all. Muscovites appealed to their brothers, Orthodox Christians, with an appeal about the need for unity in the fight against a common enemy, insisting on sending this appeal to all cities in order to avoid the death of Russia.

Along with this, within the society of service people, the provisions of the letter of Russian captives from the camp of the Polish king near Smolensk circulated. They wrote with pain and bitterness about the killed and secured captive compatriots, desecrated shrines, devastated Russian land. They also warned about the plans of Sigismund III to take the Moscow throne instead of Prince Vladislav. The prisoners called for their appeal to be sent to the north of Russia, while they were still free, so that these lands would unite in the struggle for the Orthodox peasant faith.

The message of Patriarch Hermogenes also had a great influence, who called for clearing the country of the enemy, to elect a ruler "from his own blood, who will be the patron and protector of his subjects." L.M. Sukhotin, who studied the message of the patriarch, doubted that he helped the first militia. The researcher writes: "the Lyapunov uprising and the joining of the cities of Ryazan, Ukrainian and Zaotsky to his uprising occurred independently of Hermogenes." As N.P. Dolinin notes, “serious doubts arise that Germogenes wrote these letters at all. He could write them only on December 6, 1610, when he spoke at the Assumption Cathedral against the oath of the population to the Polish king Sigismund. After that, it was almost impossible for him to communicate with the population, since “he had no one to write to, deacons and clerks and all sorts of courtyard people were caught, and his entire yard was plundered.” Later V.I. Koretsky published the message of Hermogenes to the first militia. “Although the published message of Hermogenes was written at a time when the first militia was already standing near Moscow, but it, undoubtedly testifying to the connections of the patriarch with the militias, seriously undermines the opinion of L.M. Sukhotin about the non-involvement of Hermogenes in the case of the first militia and makes one assume the existence of such connections before. Further, V.N. Kozlyakov, he stated that the connection between Hermogenes and the militia is one of the controversial moments in the history of the Time of Troubles. However, in the notes in his work, he nevertheless points out that the creation of the Zemstvo militia in the southern parts is the merit of Prokopiy Lyapunov, and not Patriarch Hermogenes.

The initial symptoms of a crisis of Pole power in Moscow appeared in 1610, when princes Vorotynsky and Golitsyn were convicted for their relationship with False Dmitry. Then there was a story connected with the steward Buturlin, who was reproached for the fact that, together with Lyapunov, he “secretly persuaded the Germans in Moscow” to beat the Poles. It is not clear whether these reproaches were enough, but they led to significant results. The Poles considered them important enough to interfere in Moscow's affairs: take the keys to the city gates, raise the entire capital to a military situation, completely close most of the city gates.

Moscow was like a besieged territory: the people were not allowed to have weapons, suburban peasants were forbidden to be in the city, a curfew was introduced, according to which it was impossible to move through the streets at night. Peaceful obedience to Tsar Vladislav looked like a humiliating captivity and foreign possession. At the same time, when this martial law was created in the city, the first secret letters were received from the ambassadors, sent by them at the end of October, with notifications about Sigismund's plan. Robbery in Moscow, contacted with news of violence in Smolensk. The attack on Smolensk, which took place on November 21, failed. Information about it should have alarmed the Moscow mind, which did not understand how the ruler could resume hostilities during the discussion of an unarmed union of states. For the Russian population, the blood near Smolensk was a justification for the duplicity of the king and made it possible to completely distrust neither the ruler nor his Moscow entourage.

Patriarch Hermogenes refused all kinds of concessions and showed his displeasure when M.G. came to him on November 30. Saltykov tried to talk about the king, although, probably, to induce the patriarch to indulge Sigismund. On another day, the rest of the boyars came to him and asked him to "bless the cross to kiss the king." Hermogenes did not accept this proposal, and a quarrel arose between him and Saltykov, according to one information, a verbal skirmish arose, and according to others, he almost attacked the patriarch with a knife. We do not know for sure whether the boyars of the patriarch were asked about the kissing of the cross in the name of the monarch, but he literally interpreted their proposal in this way. The Patriarch immediately called the Moscow guests and merchants to the Assumption Cathedral. At the meeting, he explained the situation to them, forbade them to swear allegiance to the king. Thus, he openly opposed King Sigismund.

At the beginning of this struggle, Hermogenes did not consider it possible to involve the people in direct unrest against the Poles. Several factors changed his mind and forced him to take decisive action. One of these circumstances is the death of False Dmitry, and the other is the scattering of the great embassy and the departure of its participants to Moscow, which also happened in December. According to all orders, after the death of False Dmitry, he began to think and speak about a direct struggle against foreign subjugation in Moscow. The departure from Smolensk of zemstvo nominees, who were staying with the ambassadors, would help legitimize for the patriarch an appeal to the protest of the population. In autumn, an extraordinary act took place - a coup d'état, which consisted in the fact that the government of the boyars was replaced by a layer of royal confidants. In winter, in December, this political process ended with the destruction of the zemstvo council, which was with the ambassadors. Polish commanders and officials, Russian traitors who were listed with the king, replaced the components of the Moscow administration. The territory of the country fell under the influence of foreign and heterodox invaders.

Hermogenes dared to directly activate his flock to raise a rebellion in full combat readiness against the enemy. The patriarch began to send his own letters around the country, in which he wrote about the royal betrayal, and asked urban population immediately go to Moscow against foreign conquerors.

At Christmas time in 1610, the Poles were able to catch this letter for the first time. After that, they received at their disposal lists from the letters of Hermogenes, on which are the dates of the beginning of January of the next year. In these letters, the patriarch hoped for Lyapunov and the service population of Ryazan subject to him, the letters were also addressed to Nizhny Novgorod and Suzdal. Apparently, he went to Lyapunov, probably earlier than to the others, and Lyapunov began the uprising a month after the death of False Dmitry, somewhere in early January 1611. Sigismund knew about Ryazan's refusal already around mid-January, according to information from the capital. Thus, the aggressive activity of Hermogenes to Sigismund and his absolute opposition to the reorganized Moscow administration were revealed. The clerks who helped him contact various cities, were caught, and the entire yard was destroyed. About this robbery in early January in Nizhny Novgorod were already aware. Information about this also came to Lyapunov. He immediately stood up for the patriarch and sent his own letter to Moscow. This letter influenced the conditions of detention of Hermogenes, he was given more freedom, but this did not last long, and he continued to be under close supervision while in the Kremlin.

Continuing the conversation about the active actions of the people's militia, we must say that the patriarch, unable to take action through the state apparatus, subject to him, rushed directly to the population, urging them to defend their native land. In such a non-standard situation, in a state in which power now has an unusual metropolitan structure, the population was forced to rally around its own leaders and their entourage. It is understandable that in such a situation the most important role fell on the people who held the positions of leaders of local communities. Accordingly, the larger and more powerful this organization, the wider and more capable was the power of its supporters, the more famous they themselves were. Following from this reasoning, we conclude that the most important position in the people's liberation movement was to be taken by the military leaders and nobles of the most major cities and the elected authorities of the most populous and wealthy cities. In the taxable strata, the awakening of popular unity caused a willingness to donate their property and people, then in the layers of the provincial nobility, they saw not only a willingness to sacrifice the necessary, but also to lead the people's militias, with a full understanding of the duties assigned in this case.

2 The composition of Russian cities and the campaign against Moscow

At the time when they learned that traitors and foreigners “own everything” in Moscow, that clerks with reports come to Gonsevsky not only to the palace, but also to his home, then the provincial service population came to the conclusion that it was they who needed to become security public order. Often they were related to the Moscow nobility, people were chosen from among them to serve in the capital in government positions, so we can argue that what was happening in Moscow was clear to them.

Most notable in this regard was the Ryazan population, which developed close relations with Moscow during the siege of Tushino. Because of these relations, the people of Ryazan are accustomed to playing an important role in the capital's processes. In a certain period of time, Prokopy Lyapunov settled as a leader. He belonged to a noble Ryazan family. In 1605, after the death of Boris Godunov, Lyapunov, heading the army of Ryazan nobles, went over to the side of False Dmitry I. It is known that in early 1606 he and a detachment took part in the uprising of the peasants led by Ivan Bolotnikov, pursuing his own goals. However, frightened by its scale, Lyapunov in November 1606 brought a confession to Tsar Vasily Shuisky. Subsequently, in 1607 he became a duma nobleman. In the period from 1608-1610, he led the Ryazan movement of service people, directed against accomplices and the peasant uprising. At the same time, as R.G. Skrynnikov, Patriarch Germogen could not fully trust Lyapunov, knowing his speeches against Shuisky. Moreover, it was the Lyapunovs who subsequently played the most important role in the deposition of Vasily Shuisky, when the patriarch himself was subjected to serious persecution. A number of authors agree that the first zemstvo militia in Ryazan was also formed under the influence of Hermogenes' correspondence with the Archbishop of Ryazan Theodoret. Already by 1611, the central point of the liberation struggle moved from the northern lands to the Ryazan region. When the appeals of Hermogenes reached Ryazan, Lyapunov ordered them to be sent to nearby cities, attaching his own appeals to this.

Procopius Lyapunov was in a rather comfortable position on his territory, this allowed him to have extraordinary strength and power. On the one hand, he was a duma nobleman and close to the court of Vasily Shuisky, and was also the leader of the district nobility. That is, he had in his hands both administrative power and power over the everyday situation. As governor, he was in one of the most significant regions of the country, providing Moscow with bread and a military garrison on his land. He had the confidence of the people, understood the significance of his territory, and therefore thought that he should interfere in state affairs.

After appealing to the Boyar Duma, Lyapunov began to send letters around the state, in which the question of the transition from disagreement to active actions was already raised. The idea of ​​marching on Moscow was clearly borrowed from the letters of the patriarch.

When Lyapunov learned about the storming of Smolensk, he decided to openly challenge the Seven Boyars. The leader of the Ryazan nobles accused the king of violating the Moscow agreement on the division of power with the boyars and threatened to immediately start a campaign against Moscow in order to liberate the capital from the invaders. Soon a messenger was sent to Moscow by Lyapunov, who called on everyone to a patriotic struggle against the invaders. In turn, the Seven Boyars turned to Sigismund with a request to send new detachments to Moscow. Voivode Isaak Sunbulov was sent to Ryazan, whose detachments united with the Zaporozhye Cossacks and laid siege to Prontsk, in which Lyapunov and a detachment of the insurgent troops were hiding. In this situation, Lyapunov sent appeals for help in all directions. The first to respond was Prince Dmitry Pozharsky, the governor of Zaraisk. He came from the princely family of Starodubsky. In 1610, Vasily Shuisky appointed him governor in Zaraysk and gave him control over 20 villages. After the deposition of Shuisky, Pozharsky swore allegiance to the son of the Polish king Vladislav, however, when Sigismund III expressed claims to the Russian throne, Pozharsky entered into opposition to the Poles. Having attached detachments to his ranks along the road from Kolomna and Ryazan, he went to the aid of Lyapunov. As a result, Sunbulov was forced to retreat, and Pozharsky and Lyapunov, at the head of a single zemstvo army, entered Ryazan.

After that, having returned to Zaraysk, Dmitry Pozharsky defeated the detachments of Sunbulov and the Cossacks, who tried to seize the city suddenly. In parallel, events took place near Tula.

Together with these processes, a similar situation arose in the Ryazan lands in the rest of the Moscow regions. One of these points was Nizhny Novgorod. This city had a great influence on the eastern part of the country. He had a huge market and a powerful fortress, he served as the most important point during the hostilities. Even in the winter of 1610, this city had strong relations with the patriarch, which continued into the next year. Nizhny Novgorod often sent their people to Hermogenes, even when he was imprisoned, and in early January 1611 they received instructions from the patriarch to fight Sigismund. They spread this news to the rest of the regions, thereby assuming a leading role in the cause of resistance.

One of the leading positions was occupied by a large city - Yaroslavl. Trials against the Poles spread here before Hermogenes began to send letters of his own to Lyapunov. The Yaroslavl people themselves rose up against the Poles, moreover, throughout their territory. Their own military organization for the campaign was formed by the end of February. Yaroslavl considered itself the center of the northern regions, attracted other cities to create a common militia in the north for the subsequent campaign.

After analyzing the state of affairs in the main regions and the appeals of the patriarch, in which he addresses his flock, involving them in the struggle, it can be noted that this speech then fell on fertile soil, which gave the appropriate results. People living in large centers were ready to rise to the defense of their state and drive out foreigners. And immediately after the first appeal of Hermogenes, they rushed to the capital. Somewhere at the beginning of 1610, the patriarch began his appeal to the population of Ryazan and Yaroslavl, so the Nizhny Novgorod detachments set off in early February, and the Yaroslavl detachments recovered at the end of February. At the end of March 1611, people who met in the Zemstvo militia started a war near Moscow. So on March 25, the first detachments began to come to the city and stopped at the Simonov Monastery. Looking at the burnt capital, recent burials, seeing the grief of people who lost their property, they could not remain indifferent. In documents recovering from the militia, April 1, 1611 was called the start of the siege of Moscow. After that, the militias took up positions at the gates of the White City. Instead of creating a ring around the stone city, the militias tried to capture those gates, the capture of which would help to further attack the walls of Kitai-Gorod. Strength to storm wooden structures Zamoskvorechye is no more.

The fighting that began immediately took on a protracted character, and for the militia it was necessary to solve many problems in order to strengthen itself in the role of a recognized zemstvo authority. A new cross-kissing record was created in the militia, which stated that the accession of Vladislav was completely excluded. He was quickly abandoned as a real Russian monarch.

Representatives of various territories of the country entered the militia. So, for example, the Ryazan cities left Ryazan with Lyapunov, the people of Murom came together with F. Masalsky, together with A.A. Repinin, people from Nizhny Novgorod, together with A. Izmailov and A. Prosovetsky, people from Suzdal and Vladimir, with F. Nashchekin, Pomeranian settlements and others. That is, there is a rather extensive geography of Russian cities. Also, after the calls of Hermogenes, everyone who was fond of Tushino was now carried away by the processes associated with the overthrow of Polish rule. Cossacks from Moscow, Circassians, children of the boyars, who had previously worked with False Dmitry, and after his death were taken by surprise by the popular movement, went to clean up Moscow, joining the militia. The appearance of long-standing enemies did not affect the mood of the militias, they rather rejoiced at the increase in their order by new people. Lyapunov consciously sought out that part of society that wanted to social reforms and before that got up on different paths, in pursuit of change.

The struggle of the people against the Poles and traitors arose and was organized when the backbone of people surrounding False Dmitry in Kaluga had not yet disappeared. The number of associates of False Dmitry decreased after his removal from Tushin in 1610, the Cossacks stopped serving him, the boyars fled to Sigismund. The last boyars who remained at the final stage of False Dmitry's stay in Kaluga were D.T. Trubetskoy and D.M. Cherkassky, the rest belonged to the Cossacks. Some were in Kaluga, and the rest in Tula with Zarutsky. These people still posed some kind of threat even after the death of False Dmitry, for the people and for the authorities. Both the Moscow authorities and Lyapunov from Ryazan are trying to improve relations with Kaluga. The protege from Moscow could not agree with his cousin, for Lyapunov it was vital to conclude an alliance, because he could not leave the left flank and rear with foreign troops. Lyapunov, with the help of his nephew, was able to negotiate with Kaluga and Tula in January 1611, an action plan was created, according to which the militia from Ryazan should have gathered in Kolomna, and detachments from Kaluga, Severa, and Tula should have gathered in Serpukhov. Thus, former enemies met in a common service.

Because of these events, which brought Lyapunov closer to former supporters False Dmitry and the Cossacks, he should have felt the irreversible results of such consolidation. Now it seemed to him to consider the oldest "thieves" on an equal footing with the rest of the militias, one and the other now fought for the independence of the Russian state. It was the same with Lyapunov's appeal, in which he wanted to invite all Cossacks to serve in the militia, and to some extent this appeal worked. At that time, various boyar people and all kinds of representatives of the Cossacks began to come near Moscow, who hoped to receive salaries and freedom.

In general, more or less, several layers can be traced in the militia:

.Former military of Tsar Vasily, the territory of the Oka, the Volga places, Skopin's detachments.

.From Kaluga, associates of False Demetrius.

.Cossacks, from Tula, from Suzdal, and by draft letters.

Each layer had its own leader. So, for example, Lyapunov was at the head of the first, Trubetskoy was at the head of the Kaluga detachments, Zarutsky and Prosovetsky were chieftains of large Cossack formations. Settled near the capital walls, various troops formed their camps. For example, the camp of Trubetskoy and Zarutskoy was located between the Lyapunov camp and the rest of the Zemstvo militia camps. The disunity between the nobles and the Cossacks of the weak first militia was fatal for the entire first militia.

3. The final stage

1 The verdict of the first militia and the fight against the invaders

In military terms, the goal of the militia was not simple. The foreign corps was located in two main points of Moscow, the Kremlin, Kitay-Gorod, and in the west of the city they had at their disposal the White-Gorod towers. They needed to occupy these defensive structures, but with the then existing technologies, this was impossible. Sitting around the walls, not being ready to carry out a general assault and not having sufficient weapons, everything led to the blockade of the fortress, cutting off the approaches from all sides. Yes, and a complete siege was able to establish only by July 1611. Until that time, the nobles and militias were sentenced to the usual displacement and not to let help to the defenders and to stand on their own in their own fortified point between Yauza and Neglinnaya.

More important and more difficult was the institutional goal - to create a government not only for the squad, but for the entire territory of the country that gave birth to and supported this militia. The diversity of layers of the people's militia was a direct factor in the conflicts in the army. It was necessary to create unity within. At the very beginning of the siege of Moscow, in the spring of 1611, this problem was raised for discussion. All zemstvo people began to discuss who would become the head of the militia. In the end, they decided together to choose Trubetskoy, Lyapunov and Zarutsky. From the very beginning, when the militia settled in Moscow, a council was formed around Lyapunov, which included boyars, military leaders, boyar children and the service population. The powers of this council included not only the militia, but the whole country. It is not clear who was part of it, but according to the charter dated April 11, 1611, it can be said for sure that such a body existed. Serving people and hard-working citizens - two strata of the population that created the militia had their own representatives, with the help of whom they could communicate and exchange information with the council. These representatives were also under the capital, creating their own zemstvo council. Lyapunov did not want to unite these bodies around himself and lead in this way, so he had a military council subordinate to him.

In the spring of 1611, along with Lyapunov, other elected governors began to rule. The unification of Lyapuny's militia with the Cossacks of Zarutsky and the thieves' people of Trubetskoy into a single body took place at the end of spring. It turns out that the entire composition of the militia management was developed in its form back in the spring, but this process still did not allow establishing agreements within the militia, as well as creating the necessary conditions to the territory that recognizes it. And all the same, the governors who met near Moscow did not succeed in building a zemstvo union. The lack of finances and food could still be endured, but it turned out that there was no way to run away from a conflict of interest.

The understanding of one's own weakness to cope with the disorder and the crisis turned the leadership towards the adoption of a single order, which would define the powers of power, would streamline the service and everyday life of people. This order was created on June 30, 1611, and it reflected the whole mess of social life, reflected the struggle of different interests, in general, everything that Moscow people did not like so much. When the population agreed with each other about a campaign against Moscow, it was one thing, but when detachments of nobles and Cossacks began to act side by side in a single vein, the past distrust and resentment returned. There was no agreement, first of all, among the main leaders of the people's liberation struggle. The “New Chronicler” mentioned the beginning of conflicts near the walls of Moscow: “There would be great strife between them near Moscow, and there would be no strife between them in the cause of war.” The election of the heads of the militia had no effect on calming the differences. On the contrary, it turned out that in the past, the Tushino boyars had to confirm in the regiments the awards made to the service people for the defense of Moscow from the adherents of False Dmitry.

The verdict was needed, first of all, by the nobles in order to slow down the “disorganization” of the leadership, which already concerned the authority of “the whole earth”. The "New Chronicler" mentions that the creation of the document on June 30, 1611 was preceded by a joint petition of the "military people" of the militia - the Cossacks and nobles united because of this. In it, they wrote, "so that the boyars wish to be near Moscow and be in the council and the military people would complain according to the number, according to their wealth, and not through measure." It turned out, as the chronicler wrote, that there were two of their three main leaders “that their petition was not loved,” and simply “Prokofey Lyapunov, to their priest’s advice, was ordered to write a sentence.” It turns out that the people who gathered in the militia already wanted to stop the emerging conflicts and destructive desires for new ranks and profit for those who found themselves near Moscow. Unfortunately, the boyars who ended up in the militia were no exception to this number. The boyars were called upon to “take for themselves the estates and estates of the boyar property; any chief would take one boyar. Instead, the militia began to race for countless distributions of public lands to private hands.

Those who formed the composition of the Sentence sought to take into account the differences of the layers that were part of the militia. It was this composition that set itself the task of creating a new government for the state and solving issues that were relevant for that moment. Because of this, the document turned out to be very extensive and informative. It included all the decrees and resolutions since the beginning of the militia, in the order in which they were created. At the beginning of the decree on the creation of the government of Trubetskoy, Lyapunov and Zarutsky. Then it is said how the state should be led, after which a decree is given on the return of the runaway people to their owners. The text of the sentence concludes with a provision stating that the elected positions of people in the government may lose their powers if they do not justify themselves or cannot govern the country. B.N. Florya, sees in the Judgment of June 30, 1611, first of all, a reflection of the political ideas of the “nobility”, service people who pushed all other ranks out of participating in the “Council of All the Earth” and made their choice in favor of “strong central power”. Such power, which is not limited to "any elected bodies" and relies on the "primordial political elite." Probably, in general, such moods of returning to the times of Ivan the Terrible really existed. However, in the articles of the Verdict there is a solution not only, relatively speaking, "noble" issues; it made an attempt to organize the Cossacks, townspeople and even peasants. Rather, those who in the Judgment spoke about the power of the boyars elected by the land expressed the “striving for order as it happened under the previous sovereigns” that had long arisen in the Time of Troubles, and were not busy looking for some kind of strong power, to which the estates voluntarily give up their right to rule the country .

According to the verdict, all power was in the council. The boyars and military leaders were subordinate according to the verdict, they had administrative and judicial powers in their hands. By the death penalty, they fought against the arbitrariness of the governor. In terms of property, the boyars and other officials divided it in accordance with their social status, and the power of the voivode was consolidated in the militia.

Under the authority of the council and the boyars, there was to be a central administration. Instead of orders operating in occupied Moscow, the militia created their own. They were not created immediately, when it was necessary to put in order this or that sphere of life of the militia. The authorities failed to achieve their own authority in the eyes of the population, due to all sorts of conflicts and disagreements within the militia. Although the provisions of the Judgment on June 30 tried to mitigate the existing contradictions within the militia. However, they not only did not bring results, but, on the contrary, whipped up the situation in which the militia of 1611 completely collapsed. There were also prerequisites for this, the first was the arbitrariness of the military leaders, who were forced to plunder property to provide for the militia. These people were getting rich, and ordinary militias were dying of hunger. The next premise was that the Cossacks were given power and they, using this, rob the people. Outraged by the chaos, the militias even met together and sent a petition to the boyars to change it. The arbitrariness of military leaders in the allocation of land was one of the foundations of the military organization. Serving people were equipped only with a land estate and, with the loss of it, could not be in the service. The verdict stated that the salaries of the entire service population were to return to the size before the Moscow ruin. Some territories were confiscated, for example, Tushino or royal.

The verdict of June 30 was primarily devoted to the land problem. His first article could be the most important: “And the estates for the boyars be boyar, and take for themselves the estates and estates of the boyars, and the roundabout and dumny nobles, the boyar boyar, and the roundabout roundabout, trying on the former great boyars, as it was the former Russian natural sovereigns” . From the point of view of the members of the militia, there was an ideal zemstvo organization.

The verdict reacted to the problem of the Cossacks with the same mood. From the army of Zarutsky and Prosovetsky, the Cossacks traveled along the roads, drove up to settlements and everywhere committed robberies and robberies. Because of this, traffic on the roads decreased and people were afraid to go to the militia camps near Moscow. Lyapunov told other military leaders many times that it was necessary to stop the robberies and not let the Cossacks leave the regiments. The verdict of June 30 sought to preserve and strengthen the old order without any concessions to the desires of the free Cossacks. Now they were under the careful control and supervision of service people. It should be noted that, as in the old days, serfdom triumphed in the rati. It was the cause of an acute social contradiction between the landowners, to whom the service people belonged, and on the other hand, the Cossacks, who represented a different type of military service people of the Moscow population, in contrast to the nobles.

The June verdict demanded the abolition of the Cossack bailiffs, i.e., the quartering of the Cossacks in the areas that were supposed to support them. Knowing the then Cossacks, it is not difficult to imagine what the population experienced when they received such guests for their maintenance. This article of the sentence was violated, and this is explained by the fact that the governors were concentrating all their forces near Moscow to besiege the Poles. In any case, they used a softened form of bailiffs, that is, they gave the Cossack village a city for maintenance with the right to send large or small detachments there for food.

With this method of collecting income, the population paid with the last of its strength, constantly thinking that military people would be sent to them in full.

The Cossacks, of course, understood the situation that was arranged for them by the decree of June 30, and they did not want to agree with it. They didn't have a chance to change the situation in a legal way, and they could not influence the revision of the document in their favor. That is why the Cossacks decided to stage an uprising against the authorities. Most of all, they reacted most of all to the one whom they found the source of the verdict - to Lyapunov. The reason was the active application of the sentence of June 30, aimed at the robberies of the Cossacks. At the next outbreak of the conflict, Lyapunov's enemies invited him to their place and treacherously killed him.

In the June verdict, the council demanded that the customs and taverns be taken from the military leaders to the treasury, but the military leaders violate this article and, directly or indirectly, stretch their hands to the taverns that bring money. In Przemysl, a peasant Zarutsky Shipov buys a tavern. The clerk Volkov with two Cossacks of Zarutsky is heading to Mikhailov to the customs office in the office of the head (at that moment it was elective office) and ask to appoint them, citing the fact that they do not have enough funds. Appointed by order of Zarutsky, these heads then quarrel with the local commander and accuse each other of theft.

The June verdict demanded the destruction of regimental orders, and from one document we learn about the existence of a special category in Zarutsky. Evdokimov sits in this category, shortly before this he was granted the clerkship from the clerks of the Novgorod land.

The Poles managed to prepare a fake document signed by Lyapunov. It said that he allegedly called on all the townspeople to a merciless fight against the Cossacks. This document appeared in the militia camp. Angry Cossacks got together and invited Lyapunov. CM. Solovyov describes these events as follows: “Lyapunov entered the circle: Ataman Karamyshev began to shout that he was a traitor, and showed a letter signed by his hand, Lyapunov looked at the letter and said: The hand is similar to mine, only I did not write . Discord began and it ended with Lyapunov lying dead. He died just when the militias achieved real success and conquered almost all the main towers of the White City, for the first time arranging a real siege of a real siege of Moscow.

The death of Lyapunov greatly impressed the whole army, especially the noble Zemstvo and service people, who hurried to slip away from the capital. There were also those who were able to buy from Zarutsky a voivodeship or some position, but they immediately fled from Moscow. The Cossacks did not hide their enmity towards the noble militia and threatened service people with robberies and reprisals. They robbed Lyapunov's dwelling in a camp near Moscow and other neighboring buildings of the nobles. Rampant on the roads and violence against the population reached unprecedented proportions. The noble units could not isolate themselves from the Cossacks, because their camp, as it was said before, divided their camp, where it would be possible to wait out and fight off the Polish attack and Cossack violence.

The militia of 1611 fell apart due to internal contradictions, all kinds of conflicts within the allies, at a time when, in a legal way, "the whole earth" worked out the entire organization of the administrative and public device states. The Moscow and Ryazan military people went to their territories, and starting from August, a relatively small part of the nobility remained near Moscow. Cossacks and Cossack authorities continued to be under the leadership of Trubetskoy and Zarutskoy. The government, which arose with the help of the Zemshchina, began to work for the Cossacks. Possession of such a central administrative apparatus sent leaders into government power and enabled them to dominate the entire state. It was a real threat to attract the general population to the militias.

Above the society there were now two governments, the Polish-Lithuanian in the capital and near Smolensk, and the Cossack near Moscow. The threat from the first is a political takeover, and from the second - a social upheaval. From one came a real military threat, and from the second threatened to capture only the created state structure. At that time, society could not resist any of them.

Conclusion

Zemsky Cossack militia

Based on the tasks set, it was possible to draw the following conclusions:

1.Detailed history analysis people's militias was made by the famous historians S.M. Solovyov, V.O. Klyuchevsky and S.F. Platonov. And the Soviet period, when the term “Trouble” itself was considered a historiographic anachronism, the history of the national and liberation movement of the First Militia and Cossack camps was studied by I.S. Shepelev. Historian L.V. Cherepnin studied zemstvo cathedrals near Moscow in 1611-1612, and A.L. Stanislavsky reconstructed the biographies of the Cossack atamans, members of the people's militias. The history of the First Militia is being developed at the present time. As a modern researcher, one can single out B. N. Florya, who studied the details of the initial formation of the zemstvo movement and wrote a separate work on the content of the Sentence on June 30, 1611. Based on the study of historical thought on this topic, it was possible to establish that many studies have been devoted to the struggle of Russia for freedom and independence, but specifically the question of the history of the first militia at the beginning of the 17th century. has not been finally developed, which means that this problem is promising from a research point of view.

2. The collapse of the central apparatus of power, which began at the end of September 1610 due to the acquisition of full control of the royal throne by Polish proteges, contributed to the activation of the local zemstvo and provincial administration, which was gaining an increasingly important role in creating a military rebuff to the invaders. The creation of rebellious forces according to the Cossack principle was characteristic feature all popular movements of the seventeenth century. In the Moscow and Ryazan cities, the organization of local military forces began, designed to clear main city Russian state. The highest degree of expression of the liberation popular movement in the Time of Troubles was the zemstvo militia. By 1611, the center of the national liberation movement moved from the north of the country to the Ryazan lands. Zemstvo troops began to organize there, in February 1611, heading towards Moscow. The unification among the noble detachments from Ryazan and the Cossacks from Kaluga became the basis for the formation of the First Zemstvo militia, later it included formations from Nizhny Novgorod, Vladimir, Yaroslavl and other cities. In the newly formed military-political organization, at first there was no unity, which was required for the successful conduct of the liberation war.

Based on the requirements of the nobles and Cossacks, the Verdict of the first militia was written. The verdict consolidated and approved the class-representative organization of the government and the regulations for governing the state. The main organ of the militia was the provisional zemstvo government transformed on the basis of the Sentence. After the verdict on June 30, serious disagreements intensify in the camp near Moscow. Separate irritation in the troops was caused by the actions of Prokopy Lyapunov against the Cossacks and the focus of the militia leadership on Sweden.

The national liberation activities of the representatives of the first militia had several important directions: attempts to besiege Moscow and the territories close to it in order to liberate it from the invaders, mobilize the population to fight for freedom, form a Zemstvo government in opposition to the Poles, etc. And, although the First Zemstvo militia did not solve the tasks facing it, however, the experience of its creation and functioning had great importance to organize the Second Militia and its future victory.

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Only relying on the people, it was possible to win back and preserve the independence of the Russian state. The first to understand this was Patriarch Hermogenes. He called for a fight against the invaders. He sent messages throughout the country calling for an uprising and the expulsion of the Latins. His messages, although after his death, achieved their goal - they were copied, distributed, read in the squares and in churches. The messages shaped public opinion in favor of the uprising.

At the beginning of 1611, the first militia was created in the Ryazan land, which was headed by the nobleman Lyapunov. The militia moved to Moscow, where an uprising broke out in the spring of 1611. The interventionists, on the advice of the traitorous boyars, set fire to the city. The troops fought on the outskirts of the Kremlin. Here, in the Sretenka area, Prince Pozharsky, who led the forward detachments, was seriously wounded. However, the Russian troops could not build on the success. The leaders of the militia called for the return of the fugitive peasants to their owners. Cossacks did not have the right to hold public office. Lyapunov's opponents, who sought to establish a military organization of the militia, began to sow rumors that he supposedly wants to exterminate the Cossacks. They called him you Cossack "circle" and in July 1611 they killed him.

The first militia broke up. By this time, the Swedes captured Novgorod, and the Poles, after a months-long siege, captured Smolensk. The Polish king Sigismund the Third announced that he himself would become the Russian tsar, and Russia would enter the Commonwealth.

In the autumn of 1611, the mayor of Nizhny Novgorod, Kozma Minin, appealed to the Russian people to create a second militia. With the help of the population of other Russian cities, the material base of the liberation struggle was created: the people raised significant funds for waging war against the interventionists. The militia was headed by Kozma Minin and Prince Dmitry Pozharsky, who participated in all the wars of the Time of Troubles.

In the spring of 1612, the militia moved to Yaroslavl. Here the provisional government of Russia "Council of All the Earth" was created. In the summer of 1612, from the side of the Arbat Gate, the troops of Minin and Pozharsky approached Moscow and joined with the remnants of the first militia. Almost simultaneously, on the Mozhaisk road, Hetman Khodkevich approached the capital, moving to help the Poles who had settled in the Kremlin. In the battle near the walls of Moscow, Khodkevich's army was driven back. On October 22, 1612, on the day of finding the icon of Our Lady of Kazan, accompanying the militia, Kitay-gorod was taken. Four days later, the Polish garrison in the Kremlin surrendered. In memory of the liberation of Moscow from the interventionists on Red Square, a temple was erected in honor of the icon of Our Lady of Kazan at the expense of Dmitry Pozharsky.

The victory was won as a result of the heroic efforts of the Russian people. The symbol of loyalty to the Motherland is forever the feat of the Kostroma peasant Ivan Susanin, who donated own life in the fight against the Polish invaders.

Grateful Russia erected the first sculptural monument in Moscow to Kozma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky (on Red Square, sculptor I.P. Martos, 1818). The memory of the defense of Smolensk and the Trinity-Sergius Monastery, the struggle of the inhabitants of the city of Korela against the Swedish invaders has been preserved forever.

In 1613, the Zemsky Sobor was held in Moscow, at which the question of choosing a new Russian tsar was raised. As candidates for the Russian throne, the Polish prince Vladislav, son Swedish king Karl-Philip, son of False Dmitry II and Marina Mnishek Ivan, nicknamed "Raven", representatives of the largest noble families, and the leader of the second militia Dmitry Pozharsky.

Almost immediately, everyone abandoned foreign applicants - the struggle for the Russian throne was remembered too well. Moreover, the people wanted to see the Russian tsar at the head of the state, and not the alien princes. Another contender for the throne, Dmitry Trubetskoy, was thrown back by the nobles, since, although he was a prince, he commanded the Cossacks. The Cossacks did not want to have Prince Dmitry Pozharsky as sovereign: after all, he was the leader of the noble militia. But there was another candidate - a quiet and completely colorless person, sixteen-year-old Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov, the great-nephew of Ivan the Terrible's first wife, Anastasia Romanova. Mikhail's father, Fyodor Nikitich Romanov, intrigued at one time against Boris Godunov, for which he was tonsured a monk (under the name Filaret). On behalf of the Boyar Duma, after Moscow kissed the cross of allegiance to Vladislav on August 27, 1610, Filaret went with an embassy to Sigismund III Vasa, but failed: the Poles arrested him and mistreated the ambassador in prison. In the difficult times of the Time of Troubles, Romanov Sr. was associated with the Tushino people, but did not play any significant role. Now it turned out that the name of the Romanovs, precisely because it did not show itself in any way in the old days and, accordingly, did not have any support, suits everyone. The Cossacks were in favor of Mikhail, since his father, who was friends with the Tushins, was not an enemy to the Cossacks. The boyars remembered that the applicant's father comes from a noble boyar family and, moreover, is related to Fedor Ivanovich, the last tsar from the family of Ivan Kalita. The hierarchs of the church spoke out in support of Romanov, since his father was a monk, and in the rank of metropolitan. And for the nobles, the Romanovs were good as opponents of the oprichnina. Found the golden mean. An embassy was sent to the Ipatiev Monastery near Kostroma, where Mikhail and his mother knew nothing about the decision. On May 2, 1613, Mikhail arrived in Moscow, where on July 11 he was married to the kingdom. Soon, the leading place in the government of the country was taken by his father, Patriarch Filaret, who "mastered all the affairs of the king and the military." Power was restored in the form of an autocratic monarchy.

As a result of subsequent peace treaties with enemy countries, Russia basically restored its territorial unity, although part of the Russian lands remained with the Commonwealth and Sweden. These are the consequences of the events of unrest in the foreign policy of Russia. In the internal political life of the state, the role of the nobility and the top tenants has grown significantly.

During the turmoil, in which all strata and classes of Russian society took part, the question of the very existence of the Russian state, the choice of the path of development of the country, was decided. It was necessary to find ways for the survival of the people. In the specific conditions of the early 17th century, a way out of the turmoil was found in the awareness by the regions and the center of the need for a strong statehood.

After a troubled time, the choice was made in favor of preserving the largest power in Eastern Europe. In the specific geopolitical conditions of that time, the path of further development of Russia was chosen: autocracy as a form of political government, serfdom as the basis of the economy, Orthodoxy as an ideology.

The people, driven to the limit by riots, by the predatory actions of the "allies", revolted. Everyone, forgetting about the differences, rallied, not sparing the latter for the sake of restoring justice and establishing the former order. Having achieved the departure of the invaders, people hope for a new king - not corrupted by the authorities, young and not involved in massacres, and most importantly - at least somehow related to the former dynasty.

Now only the people could save the independence of the country. Patriarch Hermogenes in 1610 called on the people to fight against the interventionists, for which he was arrested.

A national liberation movement began to unfold against the invaders. First militia was created on the Ryazan land in early 1611. It included the former detachments of the "Tushino camp" under the leadership of P.P. Lyapunova, D.T. Trubetskoy, I.M. Zarutsky. They even created a temporary body of power - the Council of All Russia. In March 1611 first militia besieged Moscow, in which an uprising against the Poles had already broken out. On the advice of the boyars, Polish accomplices, the interventionists set fire to the city.

The fighting was already on the outskirts of the Kremlin. In this battle, in the Sretenka area, Prince Pozharsky, who led the forward detachments, was seriously wounded. It was possible to capture only part of the city, but it was not possible to completely expel the Poles. The reason for this was the disagreement that arose between the nobles and the Cossacks inside militia. Its leaders called for the return of the fugitive peasants to their owners. With regard to the Cossacks, it was said that they would not have the right to hold public office. Opponents of P. Lyapunov began to spread rumors that he plans to exterminate all the Cossacks. In July 1611, the Cossacks gathered the “Cossack circle”, invited P. Lyapunov there, where they killed him.

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