(1938-1939)

THE POLICY OF "APACIFICATION" OF THE FASCIST AGGRESSORS CARRIED OUT BY THE WESTERN POWERS

Despite the growing danger of German and Japanese aggression, the ruling circles of Britain, France and the USA tried to use Germany and Japan to fight against the Soviet Union. They wanted to destroy or at least significantly weaken the USSR with the hands of the Germans and Japanese and undermine its ever-increasing influence. It was precisely this that was one of the main reasons that led the ruling circles of the Western powers to pursue a policy of "appeasement" of the fascist aggressors. The reactionary governments of England and France, with the support of the United States, tried to come to an agreement with Nazi Germany at the expense of the USSR, as well as the states of Southeastern Europe. England was the most active.

The British government sought to conclude a bilateral Anglo-German agreement. To do this, it was ready to provide Germany with long-term loans, to agree on the delimitation of spheres of influence and markets. To this end, a sounding was made on the instructions of the British Foreign Office by the English industrialist Rickens on February 9, 1937. In a conversation with von Papen, Rickens announced the possibility of providing Germany big loan with an insignificant interest rate for a period of 40 years 1 . England would also agree to a customs union between Germany and Austria. The question of such a union, said Rickens, "with the preservation of Austrian autonomy, should be regarded in the most positive way" 2 .

The policy of conspiring with Hitler was especially intensified in England after the government of N. Chamberlain came to power. In November 1937, the British Prime Minister sent his closest collaborator, Lord Halifax, to Germany. Recording of the conversation Gali-

1 IDA of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Recording of the conversation of the German Ambassador to Austria Papen with the English industrialist Rickens on February 9, 1937 (partially published in the journal: History of the USSR, 1962, No. 3, pp. 5-6).

fax with Hitler in Obersalzberg on November 19, 1937 3 testifies that the Chamberlain government was ready to give Nazi Germany "freedom of hands in Eastern Europe", but on condition that Germany promised to redraw the political map of Europe in its favor "by peaceful means" and gradually . This meant that Hitler would undertake to coordinate with England his plans of conquest in relation to Austria, Czechoslovakia and Danzig 4 .

Shortly after this conversation between Halifax and Hitler, the British government invited French Prime Minister Chautain and Foreign Minister Delbos to London. The last to be declared was that the support which France considered due to Czechoslovakia under the Mutual Assistance Pact went far beyond what was approved in England. Thus, the Chamberlain government began to put pressure on France with the aim of her renouncing her obligations under the mutual assistance pact with Czechoslovakia 5 . In London, not without reason, they believed that the mutual assistance pacts that Czechoslovakia had with France and the USSR strengthened it. international positions and so the Chamberlain government pursued a policy designed to undermine these pacts.

Speaking at a government meeting at the end of January 1938, Henderson bluntly stated that "Czechoslovakia will have to get rid of its agreement with Soviet Russia" 6 .

The policy of connivance and complicity in Hitler's aggression in Europe was intended not only to "appease" Hitler and direct Nazi Germany's aggression to the East, but also to achieve the isolation of the Soviet Union.

At the end of April 1937, Henderson, one of the most active supporters of an agreement with Nazi Germany, was appointed British ambassador to Berlin. His appointment was new evidence of the British government's stubborn desire to make a deal with Hitler. This is confirmed by A. Eden in his memoirs 7 .

THE CONQUERATION OF AUSTRIA BY GERMANY. THE STRUGGLE OF THE USSR FOR A COLLECTIVE RESPONDER TO THE AGGRESSORS

On January 26, 1938, Hitler's foreign minister, Neurath, told the new British ambassador that Germany would not allow England to interfere in the settlement of her relations with Austria. The Chamberlain government did not react to this

3 Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War. M., 1948, v. 1, p. 10-48.

6 PRO, cab. 27/623, p. 41.

7 The Eden Memoirs. The Reckoning. London, 1965, p. 447.

8 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945. Ser. D. Washington, 1949, vol. 1, p. 190 (hereinafter - DGFP).

former statement of the Nazis. Germany's new aggressive action soon followed: And in February the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg was summoned to see Hitler. The head of the Austrian government was presented with such demands in the form of an ultimatum, the fulfillment of which would reduce Austria to the position of one of the regions of the Reich. However, this step of the aggressor did not evoke any protest from the British and French governments. After that, Hitler became quite insolent. On February 20, he publicly announced his intention to decide the fate of 10 million Germans living in Austria and Czechoslovakia, and to seek "unification of the entire German people."

In his speech on February 28, Chamberlain hypocritically declared about Hitler's demands on Austria that in this case he did not see any violations of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, although it contained guarantees of Austrian independence. Chamberlain made a similar statement at a meeting of the House of Commons on March 2.

Gradually it became more and more clear that the Chamberlain government set as its main goal in the field of foreign policy the achievement of mutual understanding and agreement with the fascist powers, and above all with Nazi Germany. Describing this policy of the British government, the Soviet plenipotentiary in London reported to Moscow on March 8, 1938: "Chamberlain put both his reputation and the fate of his cabinet on one card - the card of a deal with the aggressor" 9 .

The US government also showed no interest in the fate of Austria. Describing this attitude, Troyanovsky, Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Washington, wrote on March 2, 1938 to the People's Commissar in Moscow: “The fate of Austria does not cause much concern here. Isolationists of all persuasions are generally ready to reconcile themselves to all fascist takeovers, so long as America does not begin to actively participate in international affairs, would not be bound by any agreement with England and would not run the risk of participating in the war.

Hitler felt even more calm when on March 3, through Henderson, Chamberlain's message contained proposals for settling Germany's colonial claims. . Now Hitler had no doubts about the position of England, and he immediately set about implementing his plan to capture Austria.

While the Anschluss was being carried out, Ribbentrop was in London, where he met with many officials, including Foreign Minister Halifax. After meeting with him on March 11, Ribbentrop, in his report to

9 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939. M., 1979, p. 42.

10 Documents of foreign policy of the USSR. M., 1977, v. 21, p. 109.

11 Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War. M., 1948, v. 2, p. 173.

Berlin confirmed that no serious obstacles should be expected from England in the implementation of the Anschluss of Austria. He wrote: "I am fundamentally convinced that England, for her part, will not do anything against this at the present time and will exert a restraining influence on other powers" 12 . On March 12, German troops entered its borders, and a day later Austria was included in the German Reich.

The Soviet government was clearly aware of the great danger to the cause of peace in Europe, which was brought with it by the seizure of Austria by Germany. This, in particular, is evidenced by the letter of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated March 14, 1938. “The capture of Austria,” this letter says, “seems to be the greatest event after the World War, fraught with the greatest dangers, and not least for our Union " thirteen .

The Soviet Union strongly condemned Hitler's aggression against Austria. In a statement to representatives of the press, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, speaking on behalf of the Soviet government, noted that "this time the violence was committed in the center of Europe, creating an undoubted danger not only for the 11 countries that now border on the aggressor, but also for all European states, and not only European ones.

The Soviet government emphasized that Czechoslovakia was in danger first of all, and then it threatened to grow and cause new international conflicts. “The current international situation,” the statement continued, “puts before all peace-loving states, and especially the great powers, the question of their responsibility for the future destinies of the peoples of Europe, and not only Europe.”

The Soviet Union declared its readiness "to participate in collective actions that would be decided jointly with it and which would have the goal of suspending further development aggression and the elimination of the increased danger of a new world slaughter”. The Soviet government was in agreement "to begin discussions immediately with other powers in the League of Nations or outside it of practical measures dictated by the circumstances. Tomorrow it may be too late,” the statement said, “but today the time has not yet passed for this, if all states, especially the great powers, take a firm, unambiguous position regarding the problem of collectively saving the world” 14 .

On the same day, the text of this statement was sent to the governments of Great Britain, France, the USA and Czechoslovakia. However, the United States did not respond, and Britain and France rejected the Soviet proposals. In his official reply dated 24 March

12 DGFP, Ser. D. vol. I, p. 263.

14 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 60.

1938 Great Britain expressly refused any negotiations with the Soviet Union with a view to creating a united front against the fascist aggressors on the pretext that the adoption of "concerted actions against aggression will not necessarily, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, have a favorable effect on the prospects for European peace" . France also reacted negatively to the Soviet proposal. All this confirmed that the British and French governments did not want to organize a collective rebuff to the aggressor, although, as Macmillan admits in his memoirs, "after Austria it was clear that Czechoslovakia was next on the list of victims" 15 .

USSR FIGHT FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA

AGAINST FASCIST AGGRESSION AND THE MUNICH POLICY OF THE WESTERN POWERS

Having barely done away with Austria, the Nazi government began to prepare for the seizure of Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet government considered it necessary to protect Czechoslovakia. During the critical months of 1938, when the fate of Czechoslovakia and its peoples was being decided, only the Soviet Union showed itself to be its true friend.

Even before the outbreak of the crisis in German-Czechoslovak relations, on March 15, 1938, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.P. Potemkin in a conversation with the Czechoslovak envoy to the USSR Z. possible consequences The Anschluss confirmed the readiness of the Soviet Union to provide assistance to Czechoslovakia in accordance with the Mutual Assistance Pact in the event that it was attacked by the Nazi aggressor. "As for the Soviet Union," he assured the Czechoslovak envoy, "no one could ever reproach it for evading the international obligations it had assumed." On the same day, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs confirmed this statement at a meeting with American correspondents. "In response to a question from American journalists what the USSR intends to do in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia," Fierlinger reported, "Litvinov said yesterday that it goes without saying that the USSR would fulfill its allied obligations."

Some time later, on March 28, 1938, the Soviet military delegation, which was then in Czechoslovakia, in turn confirmed to the Chief of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Army that the USSR would assist Czechoslovakia in the event of an attack on it. In April, the Soviet government decided, together with France and Czechoslovakia, to take all measures to ensure

15 Macmillan H. Windy Change. 1914-1939. New York, 1966, p. 491.

16 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 54.

17 Ibid., p. 57.

18 Ibid., p. 76.

As the embassy of the USSR in Paris reported to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in July 1938, “French politicians are well aware that the fate of the post-Versailles redivision of the world is now being decided in Czechoslovakia. They are aware that the falling away of the Sudetenland to Germany and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia will ensure Germany's capture of decisive strategic positions in a future war and a hegemonic position throughout Central Europe. The vast majority of the French agree that today's France is no longer capable of withstanding single combat with Hitler's Germany. France's natural ally is the USSR. “Nevertheless - and this is an indisputable fact - the present government, least of all, builds its Czechoslovak policy based on the assistance of the USSR. Not a single decision that has so far been taken on the Czechoslovak question ... has never been discussed with us beforehand or agreed upon and brought to our attention (and even then not always) only after the fact. Despite the presence of the Soviet-French pact, the presence of parallel pacts with Czechoslovakia ... the leaders of French foreign policy have never seriously (except for Bonnet's fragmentary conversations) proposed to proceed to

19 Ibid., p. 87.

20 Kalinin M.I. O international position. M., 1938, p. fourteen

joint and practical discussion of the question arising from our pacts” 21 .

This position of the French government was determined to a large extent by the ever-increasing pressure of the Chamberlain government, which was pursuing a course of "appeasement" of fascist Germany at the expense of Czechoslovakia. That is why the Soviet government at the same time decided to draw the attention of the Chamberlain government to the pernicious nature of its policy towards Czechoslovakia. To this end, it instructed its plenipotentiary to visit Halifax and make a statement to him. On August 17, the plenipotentiary met with Halifax and told him that the Soviet Union was “more and more disillusioned with the policy of England and France, that he considers this policy weak and short-sighted, capable of only encouraging the aggressor to further “leaps”, and that thereby the Western countries the responsibility of approaching and unleashing a new world war. All the actions of Britain and France in connection with the threat to Czechoslovakia from Germany "essentially come down to attempts to curb not the aggressor, but the victim of aggression" 22 .

This danger of Chamberlain's policy was also seen by many of Chamberlain's political friends - influential politicians of the Conservative Party, including Macmillan. In this regard, he writes: "I was firmly convinced that the only hope of avoiding war at the present time or later was a bold and firm policy by which Hitler could be stopped" 23 .

It was precisely this policy of rebuffing the aggressor that the Soviet Union pursued. In contrast to London and Paris, which tried to come to terms with the fascist Reich, the Soviet government clearly and definitely declared to the Hitlerite government that the USSR would fulfill its allied obligations to Czechoslovakia.

On August 22, 1938, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs told the German ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, that “the Czechoslovak people, as one person, will fight for their independence, that France, in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia, will oppose Germany, that England, whether Chamberlain wants it or not, will not will be able to leave France without help and that we will also fulfill our obligations to Czechoslovakia.” These words were calculated to deter the Nazis, forcing them to think about the consequences of their aggressive actions.

The People's Commissar bluntly told Schulenburg that "Germany is not so much concerned about the fate of the Sudeten Germans as it is striving for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia as a whole. She wants to take over this country."

21 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 152-153.

22 Ibid., p. 171.

23 Macmillan H. Op. cit., p. 549-550.

24 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 175.

If it comes to war, the people's commissar continued, the Soviet Union, which had promised support to Czechoslovakia, "would keep its word and do everything in its power."

On September 1, the French government officially addressed the Soviet government for the first time with a request whether the USSR could provide assistance to Czechoslovakia and what kind of assistance if Poland and Romania objected to the passage of Soviet troops through their territory (the Soviet Union, as you know, at that time did not have common border with Germany or Czechoslovakia). In response to this question, on September 2, the Soviet Government confirmed its intention to fulfill its treaty obligations and proposed that the necessary measures be taken to influence Poland and Rumania through an appropriate decision of the League of Nations. At the same time, it was again proposed to convene a conference of representatives of the Soviet, French and Czechoslovak armies, as well as a conference of all states interested in maintaining peace. “We believe,” the people’s commissar told the French chargé d’affaires, “that at the present moment such a meeting with the participation of England, France and the USSR and the issuance of a general declaration, which will undoubtedly receive moral support from Roosevelt, has a better chance of keeping Hitler from military adventures than any other measures" 26 .

Regarding Soviet assistance, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Kroft told the American envoy in Prague, Kerr, on September 18 that while the situation was such that the initiative should come from France, “but they were privately informed that in case of emergency the USSR could come to the aid of Czechoslovakia independently. from France" 27 .

On September 19, shortly after receiving the Anglo-French demands, Benes personally addressed the Soviet government through the plenipotentiary with the following questions: 1. Will the USSR, in accordance with the treaty, provide immediate and real assistance to Czechoslovakia if France remains loyal and also provides assistance? 2. Will the Soviet Union, as a member of the League of Nations, help Czechoslovakia on the basis of Articles 16 and 17, which provided for military sanctions against the aggressor in the event of a German attack? 28

On September 20, 1938, the Soviet government gave a positive answer to Beneš's questions in the clearest and most clear manner. Deputy People's Commissar V.P. Potemkin instructed the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Czechoslovakia S.S. Aleksandrovsky to tell E. Beneš the answer to the first question, “whether the USSR, in accordance with the treaty, will provide immediate and real assistance to the Czechoslovak

26 Ibid., p. 188.

27 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938. Washington, 1955, vol. 1, p. 615.

28 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 232.

Slovakia, if France remains loyal to her and also provides assistance, you can give an affirmative answer on behalf of the government of the Soviet Union.

You can give the same affirmative answer to another question by Benes, whether the USSR will help Czechoslovakia, as a member of the League of Nations, on the basis of Art. 16 and 17, if, in the event of a German attack, Benes applies to the Council of the League of Nations with a request for the application of the said articles. This meant that the USSR would provide military assistance to Czechoslovakia even without the participation of France, provided that Czechoslovakia itself would defend itself and ask him for help.

On September 21, the Soviet representative declared at the plenum of the Council of the League of Nations about the need for urgent measures in support of Czechoslovakia. He demanded that the issue of German aggression be raised in the League of Nations, reaffirmed the readiness of the USSR to fulfill its obligations and participate in a military conference of the three states, as well as the need to convene a conference of European great powers and other interested states "to work out a collective demarche" 30 . On September 23, at the Political Committee of the League of the USSR, he again confirmed that he was ready to fulfill his obligations.

In a conversation with Firlinger on September 22, 1938, Potemkin responded positively to the envoy's question about whether the government of the USSR, in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia, could provide assistance to the latter without waiting for the decision of the Council of the League of Nations. He stated the following: “I answered this question with a reference to Art. 1 of the Minutes of the Signing of the Soviet-Czech Treaty on Mutual Assistance, which provides for the provision of this assistance by the parties in cases where, for one reason or another, the Council of the League does not make the recommendation they require or does not come to a unanimous decision” 31 .

Thus, the Czechoslovak government could not doubt that the USSR would fulfill its obligations under the pact with Czechoslovakia - it would provide military assistance to it in the event of a German attack. The Soviet Union did not limit itself to statements. He moved 30 rifle divisions to his western border, put aviation and tank units on alert. Only in two military districts - Belorussian and Kiev - 246 bombers and 302 fighters were concentrated.

This was also reported to Paris. Therefore, on September 8, 1938, when the US Ambassador in Paris, Bullitt, asked Bonnet whether the information that “the Russians were concentrating large military forces on the border with Romania” was correct, Bonnet confirmed the correctness of this information 32 . September 23 Soviet ruler

29 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 240.

30 Ibid., p. 261.

31 Ibid., p. 264.

32 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, vol. 1, p. 583.

The government warned the reactionary government of Poland, which was looking for deals with Hitler in order to participate in the partition of Czechoslovakia, that if Polish troops invaded Czechoslovakia, the USSR would consider this an act of aggression and would denounce, without further warning, the non-aggression pact with Poland of July 25, 1932 33

Continuing its struggle to maintain peace, on September 28, 1938, the Soviet government declared that "the most effective means for preventing further aggression and for preventing a new world war is seen in the immediate convening of an international conference" 34 .

So, at all stages of the Czechoslovak tragedy that ended in Munich, the Soviet Union was ready to fulfill its treaty obligations. Moreover, he agreed to provide military assistance to Czechoslovakia even without the participation of France, on the only condition that Czechoslovakia itself resist the aggressor and ask for Soviet assistance. This fact was recognized even by Beneš in 1939 in a conversation with T. Mann's daughter. There is absolutely clear and convincing evidence on this issue in an article by K. Gottwald published on December 21, 1949 in the newspaper For a Lasting Peace, for People's Democracy. Other Czechoslovak leaders also highly appreciated the position of the USSR and its desire to help Czechoslovakia throughout the Czechoslovak crisis. The editor-in-chief of the Prager Presse newspaper, Laurin, in a conversation with the USSR plenipotentiary in Prague S. S. Aleksandrovsky on July 29, 1938, noted that Minister of Foreign Affairs Kroft “spoke warmly about the restrained and dignified position of the USSR, which is extremely helping Czechoslovakia in its struggle against general pressure” 35 . On October 15, 1938, Cermak, an employee of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that “the behavior of the USSR is impeccable and its voice should have been listened to more carefully ... Not a single honest Czechoslovakian can reproach the USSR and will always be only grateful to him for his goodwill and readiness to help Czechoslovakia" 36 .

Unfortunately for Czechoslovakia, the Western powers did not support the aspirations of the Soviet Union to save Czechoslovakia. On the contrary, they sold it to Nazi Germany.

The British government used German claims to Czechoslovak lands for its own selfish purposes - for secret negotiations on the conclusion of an Anglo-German agreement that would guarantee the security of England and inviolability.

33 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 269.

34 Ibid., p. 311.

35 WUAs of the USSR. Recording of the conversation between the Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Czechoslovakia and the editor-in-chief of the Prager Presse Laurin on July 29, 1938.

36 WUAs of the USSR. Recording of a conversation between the Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Czechoslovakia and an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia Chermak on October 15, 1938

the newness of its colonial possessions. This was meant to pay Hitler by giving him Czechoslovakia.

Chamberlain, Halifax and G. Wilson (Chamberlain's closest adviser on economic issues) took part in these negotiations on the British side, Dirksen, Kordt (adviser to the German embassy in London) and others participated on the German side. be achieved by the Germans only with the consent of England. The British government made it clear that it was opposed to unilateral German occupations not sanctioned by it. The Chamberlain government conditioned its consent to these German conquests by concluding an Anglo-German agreement, according to which it wanted to receive firm guarantees from Germany that Hitler, after satisfying her conquest plans in Central and Eastern Europe, would not oppose Great Britain.

Kordt emphasized in his letter to Dirksen of August 11, 1938, that the British government would agree to meet German demands only if Hitler agreed to conclude a broad agreement with England. “The British,” Cordt wrote, “consider as a threat to themselves any further increase in the power of Germany, which occurs without their approval or even against their will” 37 . “They see this as a threat to the British world empire,” Kordt wrote further, “since accession is not accompanied by guarantees that would exclude the possibility of using all the forces of this colossal Central European space under German leadership against the British Empire. This possibility they regard as the greatest danger imaginable.

According to Kordt, Wilson said that if Britain and Germany succeeded in reaching an agreement, then the Czechoslovak problem could be resolved even in spite of the resistance of Czechoslovakia and France. In his letter to Dirksen dated September 1, 1938, Kordt cites the following words of Wilson: "If the two of us - Great Britain and Germany - agree on the settlement of the Czech problem, then we will simply eliminate the resistance that France and Czechoslovakia itself could put up to this solution of the issue" 39 .

The former secret archival documents of the British Foreign Office, which have recently become available to researchers, make it possible to make significant additions to the picture of the preparation of the Munich Agreement, which Chamberlain and his closest

37 IDA USSR MFA. Letter from Counselor of the German Embassy in London Kordt to Ambassador Dirksen dated August 1938

39 Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War, vol. 2, p. 48.

the advisers were leading in deep secrecy long before this deal was made. The now-publicized "Plan Z", the plan to hand over Czechoslovakia to Hitler, was worked out by Chamberlain, Halifax, J. Simon and S. Hoare. In a secret memorandum dated August 30, 1938, from Chamberlain's trusted collaborator Horace Wilson, submitted to the Foreign Policy Committee of the British government, this plan is stated as follows: "There is a plan that can be called "Plan Z" and which is known and should be known only to the Prime Minister Minister, Treasury Secretary (Sir John Simon), Foreign Secretary (Lord Halifax), Sir Neville Henderson (British Ambassador in Berlin) and myself. This plan is also mentioned in the secret memorandums of G. Wilson dated August 31 and September 9, 1938. “The success of the plan,” he writes, “if it is carried out, depends on its complete surprise and therefore it is extremely important that nothing is said about it ". N. Chamberlain reported this plan to other government ministers only on September 14, 1938, when, according to "Plan Z", the issue of Chamberlain's meeting with Hitler in Berchtesgaden, scheduled for September 15, 1938, had already been agreed. "The main bait for Hitler in the proposed negotiations - it was noted at a meeting of the internal cabinet - it should be possible to ensure best relationship between Germany and England" 41 .

His essence boiled down to the following: the British Prime Minister was waiting until Nazi Germany had created a very tense situation around Czechoslovakia in order to personally come to Hitler under the guise of "saving the world" to negotiate the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany. As a result of this visit, Chamberlain hoped to reach an understanding with Hitler, which was to be the basis for reaching a broad Anglo-German agreement. That is why the Chamberlain government during the summer of 1938 exerted strong pressure on the Beneš government, seeking from him complete surrender to Hitler. This is confirmed by Benes himself in his memoirs "Days of Munich". “The British ambassador, Sir Basil Newton,” writes Beneš, “warned me that in the event of war the Czechoslovak Republic would be in a regrettable position ... and added a warning from the British government: it is more than doubtful, they say, that in the event of a victorious end to the war it would be possible to restore Czechoslovakia to the extent that it currently has.

Describing the British secret documents concerning the Munich deal that have become available, such a bourgeois

41 Ibid.; Ovsyany I.D. The mystery in which the war was born. 2nd ed., M., 1975, p. 204-214

the newspaper, like The Guardian, came to the conclusion that "the main goal of the British government was to assist Hitler in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia", and that N. Chamberlain "personally took steps to hide this fact from Parliament" 42 .

On September 15, 1938, the prime minister flew to Germany, to Berchtesgaden, where Hitler's residence was located. During the meeting, the leader of the German fascists stated that the western and northwestern regions of Czechoslovakia should be torn away from her and transferred to Germany. Chamberlain, acting in accordance with "Plan Z", agreed to the separation of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia and its transfer to Nazi Germany.

Then the British Prime Minister returned to London, where on September 18, 1938, together with the French ministers, he formulated the terms of the Anglo-French ultimatum to Czechoslovakia. England and France insisted that Czechoslovakia agree to meet Hitler's demands, that is, to give him the border areas and terminate the mutual assistance agreement with the USSR. The next day, September 19, the ultimatum was delivered to the Czechoslovak government.

The Anglo-French ultimatum caused an outburst of indignation among the people of Czechoslovakia. On September 22, a general strike began in the country, which took place under the slogans: do not withdraw Czechoslovak troops from the borders, declare a general mobilization, and block the way for German troops to the Sudetenland. Massive demonstrations took place throughout Czechoslovakia. The demonstrators sent their delegations to the Soviet embassy in Prague. On the night of September 22, the Soviet plenipotentiary received delegations even at 4 in the morning. The plenipotentiary assured the delegates that “the USSR cherishes the Czechoslovak Republic and the interests of its working people, and therefore is ready to help defend against attack. The path to assistance is complicated by the refusal of France, but the USSR is looking for ways and will find them if Czechoslovakia is attacked and forced to defend itself. At this critical moment for the fate of the country, the Czechoslovak communists urged the government to embark on the path of a decisive rebuff to the Nazi aggressors, firmly believing that the Soviet country would provide Czechoslovakia with the necessary assistance. “We know,” Leonid Brezhnev noted, “that in friendship with the Soviet Union the Czechoslovak working class and its vanguard, the Communist Party, have always seen the way to ensure the lasting independence and freedom of the Czechoslovak state. In the tragic days of Munich, the Czechoslovak communists called on the country to firmly rely on the Soviet Union, which clearly demonstrated its loyalty to the allied duty.

43 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 263.

44 Brezhnev D.I. Leninsky course: Speeches and articles. M., 1973, v. 3, p. thirteen.

The readiness of the Soviet Union to fulfill its obligations with respect to Czechoslovakia is also forced to be recognized by Benes in his already mentioned memoirs: “I myself never had any doubts about the actions of the Soviet Union,” he writes. “I was sure that he would fulfill his obligations!”

But the government of Benes-Goji remained deaf to this call and did nothing to organize the defense of the country. It was more concerned about how to cover up its capitulatory position. Moreover, it acted not in the interests of the Czechoslovak people, but in the narrow class interests of the reactionary circles of the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie. Therefore, it was afraid to call on the people to repulse Nazi Germany and did not turn to the USSR for help.

Moreover, the Beneš government was preparing the surrender in deep secrecy. As the charge d'affaires of Germany in England G. Kordt reported in his telegram to Berlin on August 30, 1938, the Czechoslovak government agreed to accept Henlein's Carlsbad demands and expressed its readiness "to discuss its foreign policy relations with Soviet Russia."

However, the government did not dare to speak openly about its true position, knowing the patriotic mood and extreme excitement of the working people of Czechoslovakia.

On September 21, a second ultimatum from the British and French governments followed, demanding submission.

So, Benes and Goxha, having taken the path of capitulation, did not consider it necessary to seek Soviet help. Under the guise of a new Anglo-French ultimatum, they betrayed the country to Hitler. The Munich Conference, convened on September 29, 1938, was intended to legalize this shameful deal with the aggressor. At the conference, Daladier and Chamberlain, without the participation of representatives of Czechoslovakia, signed an agreement with Hitler and Mussolini. This meant the betrayal of Czechoslovakia and the death sentence for the Czechoslovak state.

Under the Munich Agreement, Hitler achieved the implementation of all his demands that he then presented to Czechoslovakia, i.e., the dismemberment of this country and the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany. The Munich agreement also provided for the satisfaction of territorial claims in relation to Czechoslovakia on the part of the reactionary governments of Horthy Hungary and "sanitation" Poland.

The Munich Agreement contained the obligation of England and France to participate in "international guarantees" of the new Czechoslovak borders, the determination of which was within the competence of the "international commission". Hitler, for his part, accepted the obligation to respect the inviolability of the new borders of the Czechoslovak state. As a result of the dismemberment, Czechoslovakia lost almost 1/5 of its territory and about 1/4 of its population,

and the German border began to pass 40 km from Prague. Czechoslovakia lost half of its heavy industry. The Munich Agreement was a cynical betrayal of Czechoslovakia by England and France, for whom Czechoslovakia was only a bargaining chip in the big imperialist game when making a deal with Hitler.

The French government abandoned its ally, failed to fulfill its allied obligations.

The British diplomat Kirkpatrick, who participated in the Munich conference as part of his country's delegation, characterizes France's position in his memoirs as follows: “The French, including Daladier, decided to reach an agreement at any cost. They were a funny little group of people who felt no shame at participating in the dismemberment of their ally.

After Munich, it became obvious that the obligations given by the then France under the allied treaties were not worth the paper on which they were written. This applied both to the Franco-Polish alliance and to the Soviet-French mutual assistance treaty of 1935. What grounds were there for hoping that the Third Republic would fulfill its obligations after it had failed to fulfill them with respect to Czechoslovakia?

When Chamberlain returned to England after the disgraceful Munich Conference and landed at Croydon airfield, he made a pompous speech in which he assured that "from now on peace is secured for a whole generation." He quoted Shakespeare's "Henry IV": "Out of the nettles of peril we shall draw the flowers of salvation."

The Soviet newspaper Izvestia at the same time reminded the self-confident and narrow-minded English prime minister that immediately after the phrase he quoted, Shakespeare says the following: “The undertaking you undertook is dangerous. The friends you listed are unreliable, the timing is bad. And your whole plot is too frivolous to outweigh such serious difficulties.

Events have confirmed these words of the great English playwright as applied to the plans of the Munich people.

In Munich, not only the death sentence for the Czechoslovak state was signed. In the same place, an advance was also issued to Hitler to further encourage German aggression, subject to prior coordination of the actions of the German government with England and France. At the same time, Munich, as D. Z. Manuilsky, head of the CPSU(b) delegation to the Executive Committee of the Comintern, noted in his speech at the 18th Party Congress, “... was a conspiracy of reaction against the international working class, against the anti-fascist movement of all countries, against peace

45 The Sunday Times, 1959, May 31, p. 12; Kirkpatrick. The Inner Circle. London, 1959, p. 128.

and the freedom of all peoples” 46 . But first of all it was directed against the USSR. This was the essence of Munich. In the Appeal of the communist parties of 10 European countries, as well as Canada and the USA of October 9, 1938, this Munich deal between Chamberlain and Daladier and Hitler was given a real assessment. It said: “The Munich betrayal did not save the world, but only threatened it, for it dealt a blow to the alliance of the forces of peace in all countries and encouraged the fascists to aggravate their demands all the more because they now feel the support of the reactionary circles of various countries” 47 .

The prominent English historian Wheeler-Bennett was forced to admit that "the meaning of the Munich Agreement was to destroy Czechoslovakia as an independent military, political and economic factor and to prepare the conditions for the further expansion of Germany towards Poland and Russia" 48 .

In their desire to "canalize" the Nazi aggression to the East, against the Soviet Union, the Chamberlain government, as well as the Daladier-Bonnet government, which followed in the wake of its policy, did not want to notice that the Munich agreement to dismember Czechoslovakia meant at the same time a serious weakening of the position of England and France. Meanwhile, this simple truth was then seen by Chamberlain's political associates - prominent conservative politicians, including Eden, Churchill, and others. consequences of the "betrayal of the Czechs" 49 . Eden and Churchill “also understood the colossal changes in the entire strategic situation in Central and Eastern Europe as a result of the virtual destruction of the Czech ability to resist German expansion. The West was correspondingly weakened, and the relative strength of the French army diminished, as the forty Czech divisions that threatened Hitler's eastern front were demobilized and disbanded, huge fortifications were surrendered, huge arsenals and storehouses fell into German hands, and the French elaborate structure of defensive alliances was actually undermined" 50 .

The Soviet press resolutely opposed the Munich agreement between the Western powers and the aggressor at the expense of Czechoslovakia. Here is what, for example, Pravda wrote about the Munich Treaty: “The whole world, all peoples clearly see: behind the veil of elegant

46 XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) March 10-21, 1939: Stenogr. report. M., 1939, p. 55.

47 Communist International, 1938, no. 10, p. 125-126.

49 Macmillan H. Op. cit., p. 562.

50 Ibid., p. 563.

phrases to the effect that Chamberlain allegedly saved world peace in Munich, an act was committed that, in its shamelessness, surpassed everything that took place after the first imperialist war. The French and British ruling circles spread false rumors that the USSR was in agreement with the Munich Agreement. The Soviet government exposed this slander. A TASS report dated October 2, 1938 stated: “The Paris correspondent of the United Press agency reports to New York that the government of the USSR allegedly authorized Daladier to speak at the four-power conference in Munich on behalf of the USSR. TASS is authorized to report that the Soviet government, of course, did not give Mr. Daladier any authority, nor did it have and has nothing to do with the conference in Munich and its decisions. The United Press report in question is a preposterous fabrication from beginning to end.

The British and French governments carried out their agreement with Hitler in Munich with the support of the US government, which approved their policy of condoning fascist aggression and the shameful Munich deal. US diplomatic representatives sympathetically assessed the actions of London and Paris in committing the Munich betrayal. This is confirmed by the fact that the American President sent congratulations to Chamberlain on the signing of the Munich Agreement.

In Munich, Hitler finally agreed to sign (September 30) a bilateral Anglo-German declaration, which was essentially a non-aggression pact. It spoke of "the desire of our two peoples never again to wage war against each other, to eliminate any reason for disagreement." Chamberlain triumphed. He was sure that he had achieved his goal - collusion with Hitler.

On December 6, 1938, in Paris, Bonnet and Ribbentrop signed the Franco-German Declaration. In it, the French and German governments declared that they would make every effort to develop peaceful and good-neighbourly relations between their countries, that there were no territorial disputes between them, and that both governments would maintain contact and consult with each other in the event of a threat of complications in international relations. It was essentially a non-aggression pact between France and Germany.

After the signing of the Franco-German declaration of December 6, 1938, the ruling circles of France pursued an active policy of collusion with Hitler, hoping that Germany would eventually attack the Soviet Union. After all, it was no coincidence that in an official notice to all French ambassadors, Bonnet declared that as a result of negotiations in Paris with Ribbentrop, he had the impression that "German policy would henceforth be directed towards the struggle against Bolshevism" 52 .

52 Rounaud P. La France a sauve l "Eugore. Paris, 1947, vol. 1, p. 575.

Pushing fascist German aggression towards the USSR, the Daladier-Bonnet government was ready to sacrifice the interests of France in Eastern Europe for this. After Munich, during negotiations in Paris, Bonnet told Ribbentrop: “France renounces all political interests in Eastern Europe and specifically agrees not to influence Poland against the conclusion of an agreement with Germany, according to which Danzig would be returned to Germany and Germany would receive an extraterritorial corridor from East Prussia to Reich, through the territory of the Polish Corridor” 53 .

Sargent, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of England, confirmed this in his letter dated December 22, 1938, to Phipps, the British Ambassador in Paris. “We tend to suspect,” wrote Sargent, “that Ribbentrop might have left Paris with the impression that Bonnet had given him free rein in Eastern Europe without French intervention, just as Mussolini concluded from Laval’s position in Rome in January 1935 that as far as France is concerned, he has freedom of action in Abyssinia.

After Munich, it became obvious that the French government was not fulfilling its obligations under the allied treaties. In negotiations with Ribbentrop on the Franco-German declaration, Bonnet, for reasons of domestic policy, did not dare to openly renounce the mutual assistance pact with the USSR, the alliance with Poland and other allied obligations, which Ribbentrop sought. This omission had to be made up for. L. Noel (former French ambassador in Warsaw) writes in his memoirs that Bonie was going to "cleanly and immediately denounce all the agreements concluded by France: he had in mind the Franco-Polish agreements and the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact" 55 . In Paris, they did not even hide their efforts to push Germany against the Soviet Union.

Such plans were hatched even more actively in London. Chamberlain hoped that after Munich Germany would direct its aggressive aspirations against the USSR. During the Paris talks with Daladier on November 24, 1938, the British Prime Minister said that "the German government may have an idea of ​​starting the dismemberment of Russia by supporting agitation for an independent Ukraine" 56 . Chamberlain was concerned that France would not allow herself to be drawn into the struggle against Germany. Foreign Minister Bonnet completely reassured him on this score. Halifax and the French ambassador in London also talked about Hitler's anti-Soviet plans in their conversations.

53 Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers, 1940, vol. 1. General, p. 53.

54 Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. Third Series, vol. 3, p. 366. Footnote (hereinafter - DBFP).

55 Noel L. L "aggression Allemande contre la Pologne. Paris, 1946, p. 259.

56 DBFP, Third Series, vol. 3, p. 306-307.

Corbin in December 1938 57 . On December 6, 1938, Counselor of the British Embassy in Germany, Ogilvy-Forbes, reported to Halifax: “In both Nazi and non-Nazi circles, there seems to be a unanimous opinion that the next goal, measures for the implementation of which can be taken as early as 1939, will be creation, with or without the assistance of Poland, of an independent Russian Ukraine under the tutelage of Germany” 58 . Ogilvy's report, however, also expressed a fear: it might not happen that the “tiger” would make its next leap not to the East, but to the West ... Such fears prompted the British rulers to further intensify their policy of collusion with Hitler .

AFTER MUNICH

Some facts seemed to confirm the post-Munich hopes of reactionary circles in the West that now the fascist beast would rush not to the West, but to the East.

On November 2, 1938, at the behest of Berlin, a puppet state was created in Transcarpathia, which previously belonged to Czechoslovakia - "Carpathian Ukraine". At the head of the new "state" Hitler placed the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists - traitors to the Ukrainian people who were completely dependent on German fascism. The creation of "Carpathian Ukraine" was used by the German press to organize a noisy campaign for Soviet Ukraine to join the "independent" "Carpathian Ukraine". The Nazis hoped to create in Transcarpathia a major center of subversive activities against the USSR. Anti-Soviet plans of this kind were generously described by the French bourgeois press. At the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in March 1939, the Report of the Central Committee exposed plans to “attach the elephant, i.e., Soviet Ukraine, to the goat, i.e., to the so-called Carpathian Ukraine.”

With their Munich policy of complicity in fascist aggression, France and England in every possible way encouraged Germany's desire to take over the Ukraine. That is why, after the signing of the Munich Agreement, the English and French press began to devote much space to the “Ukrainian issue”. At the same time, both from London and Paris, Hitler was given to understand that this issue does not affect the interests of either England or France. It seemed to the people of Munich that the political course they had chosen was triumphant: Hitler, they thought, was about to set off on a campaign against the Soviet Union.

But several months passed, and the complete failure of the short-sighted calculations of the creators of the Munich policy became clear to the whole world.

Hitler's refusal from his Ukrainian-Carpathian venture was a big shock for the Munich people: in March 1939 he was liquidated

57 DBFP, Fhird Series, vol. 3, p. 436.

58 Ibid., p. 387.

shaft "Carpathian Ukraine", giving it to the Hungarian dictator Horthy. Hitler allowed him to capture the "Carpathian Ukraine", where the Hungarian troops were introduced. Hopes for Hitler's campaign against Soviet Ukraine were fading. Soon the whole tragedy of the atrocity committed in Munich became clear from the point of view of the fate of not only Czechoslovakia, but also of all mankind.

On March 15, 1939, Hitler very expressively demonstrated that he did not in the least consider either England or France, or the obligations that he had assumed to them. The meaning of the Munich Agreement was that Germany should carry out its aggression, the robbery of Czechoslovakia, only with the consent of England and France. Under Hitler's commitment, Germany was to respect the new Czechoslovak frontiers. And now German troops suddenly invaded Czechoslovakia, completely occupied it and liquidated it as a state. The Czech Republic was turned into a province of the German Reich - the "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia." Slovakia was separated from the Czech Republic and turned into a puppet republic. As early as November 1938, its southern part was given to Horthy Hungary.

In the very first days after the capture of Czechoslovakia by the fascists, Hitlerite diplomats in London and Paris sent reassuring messages to Berlin regarding the position of England and France. Noting the anti-German sentiment in England and the decline in the prestige of the Chamberlain government, Dirksen at the same time stressed: "The accession of the Czech Republic to Germany will not lead to an increase in tension to such an extent that it threatens war." He wrote: "It would be wrong to create illusions that there have been fundamental changes in England's attitude towards Germany" 59 ​​. From Paris, the German ambassador reported: "France will actually do nothing in the situation created by the German actions in Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia" 60 .

The Soviet Union was the only great power that did not stain itself with the Munich betrayal. The USSR even now came out resolutely in defense of the Czechoslovak people and condemned the new Hitlerite aggression.

In its note of March 18, 1939, the Soviet government angrily condemned the lawlessness and violence committed by the Nazis. It declared that the actions of the German government "cannot be recognized as arbitrary, violent, aggressive." The Soviet Union, it was said further, “cannot recognize the inclusion of the Czech Republic in the German Empire, and in one form or another also Slovakia, as lawful and in accordance with generally recognized standards. international law and justice or the principle of self-determination of peoples”. Finally

59 DGFP, Ser. D. vol. 6, p. 38.

60 Ibid., p. 23.

The Soviet government pointed out that the actions of the German government increased the danger to world peace, disrupted political stability in Central Europe, increased the elements of the state of alarm that had already been created in Europe and dealt a new blow to the feeling of security of the peoples.

As soon as the march of the Nazi invaders to Prague ended, the unbridled fascists committed new acts of aggression: on March 22, 1939, Germany occupied Klaipeda, which belonged to Lithuania. On March 23, Germany imposed a onerous economic agreement on Romania, which placed the country's economy under German control. On March 21, the German government, in an ultimatum form, demanded from Poland the consent to transfer Danzig (Gdansk) to Germany and provide it with an extraterritorial highway and railway, cutting the "Polish corridor". On April 28, Germany, as a threat, annulled the German-Polish non-aggression pact of January 26, 1934, making it clear that from now on she does not exclude war against Poland.

To top it off, Germany, following the violation of the Munich Agreement, dealt another slap in the face to the British government and to Chamberlain personally, terminating the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 on April 28. Germany then laid claim to its former colonies, taken from it by England and France under the Treaty of Versailles.

The impunity of Hitler's aggression prompted fascist Italy to do the same. On December 22, 1938, she terminated the Convention on Mutual Respect for the Territorial Integrity of States in Central Europe and the consultative pact with France, concluded on January 7, 1935, and after that presented territorial claims to France, on April 7, 1939, Italian troops invaded Albania and soon captured her. The international situation was heating up more and more.

In such conditions, fraught with a military threat, the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b) was held. In the political report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the congress, which was delivered by I. V. Stalin, a description of the current situation was given. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks branded the fascist aggressors and revealed the essence of the Munich policy of the Western powers, carried out under the guise of "non-intervention" and "appeasement" of aggression. “The policy of non-intervention,” the report said, “means condoning aggression, unleashing a war ... The policy of non-intervention shows a desire, a desire not to prevent the aggressors from doing their dirty work, not to prevent, say, Japan from getting involved in a war with China, and even better with the Soviet Union, not to prevent, say, Germany from getting bogged down in European affairs, getting involved in a war with the Soviet Union, allowing all participants in the war ... to weaken and exhaust each other

61 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 427-428.

friend, and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, to appear on the stage with fresh strength, to speak, of course, "in the interests of peace" and dictate their conditions to the weakened participants in the war. And cheap and cute!

SOVIET-ENGLISH-FRENCH NEGOTIATIONS IN SPRING AND SUMMER 1939

The systematic connivance of fascist aggression on the part of the governments of England and France, as well as the United States, the refusal of England and France to cooperate with the USSR, the violation by France of its allied duty to Czechoslovakia could not but cause the Soviet government to doubt the readiness of the Western powers to oppose the fascist aggressors. The Soviet government took into account, of course, the sad experience of Munich and the policy of "non-intervention" in Spain. But it did not want to miss a single chance to organize a collective rebuff to the aggressors.

On March 18, 1939, in connection with information about the German threat to Romania, the Soviet government proposed to convene a conference of the most interested states - the USSR, Great Britain, France, Romania, Poland and Turkey in order to determine the position regarding the new German aggression. This proposal was made through the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the British Ambassador. It came in response to the ambassador's question about the position of the USSR in the event of violence against Romania by the Nazi Reich, followed with exceptional speed, on the same day when this question was asked by the ambassador.

But the British government replied that it considered the convening of the conference "premature". The British government was clearly trying to induce the USSR to speak out in defense of Rumania and thus get involved in a conflict with Germany, but did not want to convene a conference itself or take any collective measures.

The well-known American journalist and historian W. Shearer, who never had sympathy for the USSR, admits, however, that the governments of England and France “by their refusal to accept the Soviet proposal to immediately convene a conference with the aim of creating an anti-Hitler coalition, deliberately ignored the opportunity to win Russia over to their side. » 63 .

62 USSR in the struggle for peace on the eve of the Second World War (September 1938-August 1939): Documents and materials. M., 1971, p. 246, 247 (hereinafter referred to as the USSR in the struggle for peace...).

63 Shirer W. The Collapse of the Third Republic. An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940. New York, 1970, p. 424.

Still, to leave the Soviet initiative without consequences was obviously considered tactically inconvenient. Therefore, on March 21, 1939, the British government sent a new proposal to Moscow to sign a declaration with the participation of England, the USSR, France and Poland, providing for immediate consultation of its participants on measures for joint resistance to aggression against any European state 64 . The Soviet government considered this measure not effective enough. However, the very next day they agreed.

However, on April 1, the very initiator of the proposal - the British government - suddenly announced that it considered the question of a declaration to be out of the question. It is easy to understand that such a discouraging statement did not inspire hope for the possibility of an agreement with England on a joint rebuff to the aggressor.

The subsequent proposals made to the Soviet Union from the British side were also not encouraging. On April 14, 1939, the British government invited the Soviet government to make a public statement that “in the event of an act of aggression against any European neighbor of the Soviet Union, which would resist (aggression.- Ed.), it will be possible to count on the help of the Soviet government, if it is desired, what kind of help will be provided in the way that will be found most convenient” 65 .

This proposal did not provide for any obligations of England and France in the event of a direct German attack on the USSR, although in relation to each other both Western powers were already bound by obligations of mutual assistance.

Moreover, the proposed version of the declaration contained something provocative. According to the British draft, the Soviet Union was supposed to provide "aid", i.e., obviously, it was obliged to fight against the aggressor in the event of an attack on any of the European neighbors of the USSR, provided that Soviet assistance "turned out to be desirable." The European neighbors of the USSR were Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania. The last two states had guarantees from England and France, and, consequently, by providing them with assistance, the Soviet country could count on fighting against the aggressor in alliance with the other two great powers. However, in the event of a fascist attack on Finland, Estonia or Latvia, the British proposal did not give the Soviet Union any reason to count on support from England and France. Meanwhile, for the USSR, Germany's attack on the Baltic countries, due to their geographical position, was no less dangerous than her attack on Poland and Romania. By binding the Soviet Union with an obligation to help the Baltic states

64 USSR in the struggle for peace..., p. 264; DBFP, Third Series, vol. 4, p. 436.

65 USSR in the struggle for peace..., p. 331, 333; DBFP, Third Series, vol. 5, p. 206.

Accordingly, the English proposal left England and France hands free. The British proposal provided for an extreme inequality of obligations: a great deal was assigned to the Soviet Union, while much less was assigned to the Western powers.

Had the Anglo-French-Soviet agreement, on the basis proposed by the British, taken place, it would have indicated to Hitler the strategic direction of his aggression which he should take in order to force the Soviet Union to fight in isolation. This direction was the Baltic one - from the sea or from East Prussia through Lithuania to Latvia, Estonia, and also through Finland, in both cases with access to the approaches to Leningrad.

Particularly noteworthy is the clause of the English project: “... if it (i.e., Soviet assistance.- Ed.) will be desirable...” From these words it is clear that in the event of aggression against one of the European neighbors of the Soviet Union, he will be obliged to fight if the neighbor says that Soviet assistance is desirable to him. But the USSR should have refrained from opposing the aggressor if a neighboring state decides that assistance to it is undesirable. In other words, the Soviet Union would have been tied up in the event of a German attack on its neighbors, but the neighbors would retain complete freedom of action: they could not accept the help of the USSR, but, for example, surrender into the hands of Hitler, as the boyar-bourgeois Romania and bourgeois Finland, allowing German troops into their territories.

On the same day, April 14, the French government proposed to the Soviet Union to agree to an addition to the Franco-Soviet treaty of May 2, 1935, according to which the USSR would undertake to come to the aid of France if she were at war with Germany due to assistance provided to Poland and Romania 66 . This proposal also had serious shortcomings. It did not apply to the case of aggression against the Baltic states and direct German attack on the USSR. Under the influence of London, the French government soon

Politics of European countries. Both sides of the close military conflict (Nazi Germany and democratic England and France) needed the support of the USSR. Western countries needed Soviet military assistance, it was important for Germany to neutralize the USSR, to gain time. In 1939, the USSR was simultaneously negotiating with Western countries and tacit agreements with Germany.

The main task of foreign policy The USSR of that period was the creation of a system of collective security against fascism. The proposals of the USSR to Western countries in 1939 on the conclusion of agreements on mutual assistance, the creation of a system of collective security in order to prevent war did not meet with support. This was due to the fact that the Stalinist totalitarian regime aroused fears in the West. Yes, and the USSR set unacceptable conditions for the West on the freedom of action of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia and Poland.

For the USSR, it was necessary to delay the inevitable, as it became clear, war.

Germany's proposals for rapprochement represented a certain way out, Germany turned to the USSR with such proposals, because. Hitler was afraid of a war on 2 fronts and considered the USSR a serious adversary.

In August - September 1939, the Soviet - German agreement was signed. It consisted of 3 parts: non-aggression pact; an agreement on friendship, military-political cooperation; secret protocol on the delimitation of spheres of influence. It was, as the researchers say, an agreement between two leaders. Hitler and Stalin single-handedly decided all issues.

For Hitler, the treaty was needed to capture Poland, to restore the borders of Germany in 1914.

For Stalin, the treaty was supposed to limit the advance of German troops to the east in the war between Germany and Poland and annex Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Bessarabia, and others. The treaty with Germany also removed the Japanese threat. The main goal of this treaty for Stalin was to push the warring imperialist groups against each other and keep peace for the Soviet country.

How can estimate this treaty? For a long time, the treaty was interpreted unilaterally as the correct foreign policy step of the Soviet government. Modern researchers evaluate this treaty as a political mistake with grave consequences. The best solution to the problem was not chosen.

Consequences of the treaty: from a moral point of view, the treaty caused damage to the USSR in world public opinion. The change in policy towards fascist Germany seemed unnatural to the world community. And in the Soviet country, people did not understand the changes in relations with Germany.

What did the Soviet country achieve as a result of the treaty? The USSR avoided a war on 2 fronts; Japan's confidence in Germany as an ally was undermined and caused Japan's independent actions (neutrality pact with the Soviet Union in April 1941); a blow was dealt to plans to create an anti-Soviet united front (Germany, France, England); the war dragged on for 2 years. It is necessary to note the negative consequences of this agreement. More on this in the lecture.

In 1939-1940. the Soviet-Finnish war took place. The Soviet Union tried to annex Finland. But they failed to conquer Finland. This war showed the entire unpreparedness of the USSR for war. The losses of the Red Army amounted to 130 thousand killed. The Finns lost 29 thousand people.

In 1939-40. Soviet control was established over the Baltic republics.

When we raise the question of Could World War II have been avoided?, then we answer - yes, the war could have been avoided if the countries of Western Europe, together with the USSR, created a system of collective security against fascism. This was not done. They failed to overcome ideological prejudices.

The Second World War started September 1, 1939 and ended September 2, 1945 victory for the anti-fascist coalition. 61 states participated in the war, 80% of the world's population.

The Great Patriotic War is integral part World War II. It began on June 22, 1941 and ended on May 9, 1945. It lasted 1418 days.

Main periods Great Patriotic war. First- June 1941 - November 1942, the period of failures of the Red Army. Home feature this period was a strategic defense. More than 30 major operations were carried out (Moscow battle). Heavy defeats of the Red Army. Disruption of the plan lightning war. Heroic struggle of the Soviet people.

Second period- November 1942 - the end of 1943. A radical change in the course of the war. 26 major operations were carried out, of which 23 were offensive (Battle of Kursk). The strategic initiative passes to the USSR.

Third period - January 1944 - May 9, 1945 Strategic initiative from the USSR. The territory of the USSR and European countries were liberated. 34 major offensive operations. The surrender of Germany and its allies in Europe. On June 6, 1944, a second front was opened in Normandy. The participation of the USSR in the World War lasted for a period Soviet-Japanese War (August 9 - September 2, 1945).

Reasons for failure The first stage of the war for the Soviet country consisted of the following: Germany for 2 years (1939-1941) was able to prepare well for the war. On the eve of the war, the economic power of Germany and the USSR was approximately equal. But Germany was already making extensive use of the resources of the conquered countries of Europe. The German economy was already war-oriented, mass production of all types of military equipment and weapons was established. In addition, all the military equipment of the occupied countries fell into the hands of Germany.

The position of the USSR worsened, because. he was not ready for war and in the very first months he suffered huge territorial, economic and human losses: 40% of the population lived in the territories occupied by November 1941, 63% of coal was produced, 68% of cast iron, 58% of steel, etc. .d., 38% - livestock, 41% - the country's railways. Soviet losses not only reduced the economic capabilities of the USSR, but also increased the resources of the enemy - material and human. 8 million prisoners of war and civilians were driven to work in Germany. For comparison, 12 million people were evacuated to the east of the country. 1/3 of the number of foreign workers in Germany were Soviet citizens.

The fascist army had 2 years of experience in waging war with the massive use of aircraft, tanks and other military equipment. The Red Army had no such experience.

The Soviet Union did not have time to sufficiently develop military production, and although in 1940 a third of the budget was allocated for the defense of the country, this was clearly not enough, and the quality of military production was low. The military industry has only mastered the production of new types of aircraft, tanks, artillery, without having established their mass production.

The rearmament of the army was not completed. Even in the border districts, new tanks accounted for only 18%, new aircraft -21%. Besides new technology only mastered by personnel.

There is also such a point of view that the USSR and Germany were equal in terms of the main types of weapons and there was no great qualitative superiority of German technology.

The main problem was that the military-political leadership could not properly dispose of the available forces of the Red Army. Major political mistakes and miscalculations of a military-strategic nature were made.

It should be noted a miscalculation in determining a possible attack by fascist Germany; miscalculation with the definition of the main blow of the enemy; incorrect assessment by the Soviet command of the initial period of the war; the general strategy of the war was also not correctly defined, it was believed that the enemy would be stopped at the border and the Red Army would immediately go on the offensive and beat the enemy on foreign territory. Therefore, the troops did not teach how to defend themselves, did not build powerful defensive structures on the new border; the troops of the border districts were not fully equipped, there was not enough military equipment.

The unpreparedness of the army led to the fact that in the first 6 months of the war 3.9 million soldiers were taken prisoner (for the entire war - 5.7 million). All this was caused by a situation of fear, mass repressions. Up to 70% of the command staff of the army was repressed. Before the war, more commanders died from repression than during the war.

The repression led to a huge turnover of personnel. The level of military education of the new commanders did not meet the requirements of the times. Many officers in the army were afraid to take the initiative, to make serious decisions, because in case of failure they could be accused of deliberate sabotage.

Thus, a negative role in the failures of the first period of the war was played by subjective factors, the main sources of errors and miscalculations lay in the system of power that developed in the 30s in the USSR.

Since July 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was created, headed by I.V. Stalin, the chiefs of the General Staff were G.K. Zhukov (until July 1941), B.M. Shaposhnikov (until May 1942), A.M. Vasilevsky (until February 1945), A.I. Antonov (until March 1946)

It is necessary to represent the general course of the war, its stages.

It should be noted that even in these difficult years, the authorities systematically deceived the people, concealed information about the true situation at the front, continued repressions, and the principle of achieving goals at any cost was in effect.

During the Great Patriotic War, spontaneous de-Stalinization began, democratization in society began, the self-consciousness of the people grew, and initiative from below developed. The people came to the defense not of the political regime of Stalin, but of the Motherland.

In the second world war 50 million people died. From 1/3 to 1/2 (according to various estimates) of all losses in the Second World War fell on the USSR - over 25 million. people, of which - about half, about 12 million - died in battle, and more than 50%, about 13 million - died in fascist dungeons, incl. - 4 million prisoners of war. Siberia lost 10% of its population during the war years.

Germany lost 13.6 million people in the war; USA - 400 thousand; England - 375 thousand

The Soviet Union won the war. But the victory came at the cost of huge sacrifices. The country, being in the group of countries of the winners, was ruined. Western countries soon overcame the consequences of the war in the economy, population, etc. and continued to develop further. The USSR never returned to its pre-war economic trajectory, which had a negative impact on the post-war development of the country.

The war changed the people, their psychology, way of life, population structure, type of life, style of behavior.

In the conditions of war and the front, conditions were created for the manifestation of initiative and independence. Military life shaped the freedom of thought, the freedom to evaluate the actions of the top party and Soviet leadership. The process of spontaneous de-Stalinization began.

The Soviet Union remained a totalitarian state. This aggravated the tragedy, but did not detract from the greatness of the feat of the Soviet people.

The tragic paradox of history was that the people who entered the war with the inhuman, aggressive Nazi regime, themselves lived under the conditions of the Stalinist despotic regime, which brought suffering to millions of people. But the choice that was made by the people in 1941 was not a choice in defense of the Stalinist regime. It was a choice in defense of the independence of the Motherland.

Dramatic changes also took place in the foreign policy of the USSR. In the mid-1930s, realizing the danger of fascism, Soviet leaders tried to improve relations with Western democratic powers and create a system of collective security in Europe. In 1934, representatives of 30 states approached the Soviet government with an invitation to join the League of Nations. The Soviet government agreed, and the representative of the USSR was included in the League of Nations as its permanent member. The Soviet leadership understood that joining the League of Nations would help the USSR to establish diplomatic relations with other powers. In 1935, mutual assistance treaties were concluded with France and Czechoslovakia. However, the military convention with France was never signed, and after the Munich Agreement, the USSR found itself in political isolation. Moreover, the USSR faced the threat of war with Japan, in the summer of 1938. Japanese troops invaded the Soviet Far East near Lake Khasan.

Germany left the League of Nations in 1933, and in 1935, breaking its obligations under the Treaty of Versailles, introduced universal military duty and returned the Saarland. In 1936, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact, German troops entered the demilitarized Rhineland. In 1938, the Anschluss of Austria was carried out. Hitler's aggression also threatened Czechoslovakia. Therefore, the USSR came out in defense of its territorial integrity, relying on the 1935 treaty, the Soviet government offered its assistance and moved 30 divisions, aircraft and tanks to the western border. However, the government of E. Benes refused it and complied with the demand of A. Hitler to transfer to Germany the Sudetenland, populated mainly by Germans. After the Munich Agreement, in 1939 Germany occupied the whole of Czechoslovakia, seized the Memel region from Lithuania. With weapons captured in Czechoslovakia, Hitler could equip up to 40 of his divisions, and the Skoda factories produced as many weapons as the whole of Great Britain. The balance of power in Europe was rapidly changing.

In response, Britain and France were forced to speed up their military programs, agree on mutual assistance and provide guarantees to certain European countries against possible aggression. However, a significant part of the ruling elites of England and France, even after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, still expected a German-Soviet conflict.

March 10, 1939 At the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin, having severely criticized the policy of England and France, unexpectedly declared that it was these powers that were the main warmongers. Nevertheless, in an effort to take advantage of the beginning "enlightenment" of public opinion in the West regarding the fascist threat and at the same time put pressure on Germany, the Soviet Union sought to create a collective security system. The Soviet government proposed that Britain and France conclude a Tripartite Pact of Mutual Assistance in the event of aggression. In Moscow from June 15 to August 2, 1939. 12 meetings of representatives of the USSR, France and Great Britain were held. True, the representatives of the Western delegations could not make decisions on their own, since they were not endowed with the appropriate powers and did not have any plan for organizing military cooperation. The unwillingness of Western representatives to assume certain obligations, as well as the extreme "modesty" of the proposals of the British, were revealed: if the USSR was ready to put up 136 divisions against the aggressor, then Great Britain - only 6. In addition, Poland refused to allow Soviet troops and joint actions to pass through its territory against Germany were extremely difficult. Under these conditions, the USSR turned out to be most interested in reaching any agreements and thereby ensuring its security. May 3, 1939 People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov - a supporter of an alliance with Western democracies and a Jew by nationality - was replaced by V. M. Molotov. On May 30, the German leadership made it clear that it was ready to improve relations with the USSR. On May 23, Hitler finally approved the plan for an armed struggle against France and England on the western front, therefore he was interested in a temporary alliance with the USSR. Moreover, unlike the leaders of England and France, he was ready to make real concessions. Stalin made the decision to start negotiations with Germany and improve relations with her at the end of July. However, he did not give up contacts with Western democracies either. Intelligence reports about the deployment of German troops against Poland, which should be completed between August 15 and 20, further intensified Soviet diplomacy.

Convinced of the failure of negotiations with Britain and France, Moscow went to meet Germany's persistent proposals to speed up the conclusion of Soviet-German relations. The decisiveness and strength of the Fuhrer, which represented such a striking contrast with the conciliatory policy of the Western powers, was in the eyes of Stalin the most important argument in favor of an alliance with Germany. In addition, thanks to the efforts of Soviet intelligence, Stalin, since March 1939. knew about the plans of fascist Germany to attack Poland and launch a war with France and England. On the night of August 20, a trade and credit agreement was signed in Berlin. On August 21, the head of the Soviet delegation, K. E. Voroshilov, interrupted negotiations with the French and British military missions for an indefinite period. On the same day, consent was given for the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to come to Moscow to sign a non-aggression pact.

August 23, 1939 after three hours of negotiations in Moscow, the so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was signed. A secret additional protocol was attached to the non-aggression pact, which provided for "the delimitation of spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe." The sphere of influence included Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia and Eastern Poland.

The agreement with Hitler made it possible to delay the entry of the USSR into the war. Moreover, it made it possible not only to keep the Soviet borders intact, but also to significantly expand them. The latter was important not only because of the desire to return the territories that belonged to the Russian Empire, but also because of ideological considerations. By that time, Stalin realized that due to the decline of the revolutionary movement in the West, the strategic goal of the communists - the expansion of the sphere of socialism - could be achieved not as a result of internal processes in European countries, but only thanks to the military-political power of the USSR. Thus, the treaty with Germany seemed to promise a double benefit that outweighed the ideological inconveniences and riskiness of an agreement with the fascist aggressor.

Assessment of the pact 23 August 1939 and, in general, the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and fascist Germany that he initiated is the subject of heated discussions. The supporters of the pact base themselves mainly on the danger of the emergence of a united anti-Soviet front, or at least on the threat of a war on two fronts. Against Germany in the West and in the East against Japan.

However, these arguments are unconvincing. In 1939 In any case, Germany could not start a war against the USSR, since it did not have common borders on which it was possible to deploy troops and launch an attack. Moreover, she was completely unprepared for the "big" war. The defeat of the Japanese troops on the Khalkhin Gol River, which Stalin learned about on the eve of the signing of the pact, forced the eastern neighbor to be more careful. Thus, the USSR was practically insured against a war on two fronts. The possibility of creating a united anti-Soviet front was unlikely; this did not happen even in 1917-1920.

Gain in time, 22 months from the start of World War II to the start of the Great Patriotic War, fascist Germany was able to use incomparably more effectively than the leadership of the USSR, whose attention was riveted not so much to work to strengthen defense capabilities, but to the implementation of foreign policy expansion and bloody war with little Finland. With some exceptions, the territories that became part of the territory were never mastered militarily, and the vast majority of them were lost already in the first days of the war.

At the same time, the possibilities of continuing negotiations with France and England were not yet exhausted. On August 21, the French representative, General J. Doumenc, received the authority to sign a military convention with Russia. By not signing a pact with Germany, the USSR would not only retain its prestige in the world, but would also insure itself against the factor of a surprise attack. In addition, Hitler would have limited freedom of hands in Europe. Of course, this would not bring immediate benefits to the USSR. The "Munich sentiments" were too strong in the leadership of England and France. And the Stalinist regime, which only recently completed the extermination of the color of the command staff of its army and tried with all its might to at least slightly delay the outbreak of war and at the same time expand the sphere of its domination, chose another logical step for itself - rapprochement with fascist Germany, which actually received more significant benefits. Retribution did not follow immediately.

Topic 15. World War II and the post-war structure of the world

1.

International relations on the eve of World War II. Reasons for the instability of the system of international relations. The impact of the world economic crisis of 1929-1933. to intensify rivalry among the major powers. Threat to world stability from fascist states. The foreign policy program of the Nazi Party of Germany. Causes of World War II. Beginning of World War II.

2. USSR on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War

The policy of creating a system of collective security. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and secret protocols on the delimitation of spheres of influence. German attack on Poland. The entry of Soviet troops into Western Ukraine and Belarus. War with Finland.

The main stages of the Great Patriotic War. Plan Barbarossa. Failures of the Red Army in initial period wars and their causes. Restructuring the life of the country on a military footing. Defensive battles in the summer and autumn of 1941. The defeat of the fascist troops near Moscow was a decisive military-political event in the first year of the war. Order No. 227 of July 28, 1942 "Not one step back." Defense of Stalingrad. Battles in the Caucasus. A radical turning point in the course of the war and its victorious end. World historical significance and lessons of the Great Patriotic War.

3. International relations after World War II. Cold War: confrontation between socialist and capitalist systems

Results of the Second World War. Nuremberg Tribunal. Creation of the UN, its composition, structure and functions. Causes cold war. Fulton speech by W. Churchill. "Iron curtain". "The Truman Doctrine". Marshall plan. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the beginning of the nuclear age. Creation of hostile military-political blocs of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Arms race.

1. World War II as a Manifestation of the Crisis of Modern Civilization

The birth of fascism. The world on the eve of World War II

Fascism was a reflection and result of the development of the main contradictions of Western civilization. His ideology absorbed (bringing to the grotesque) the ideas of racism and social equality, technocratic and statist concepts. An eclectic intertwining of various ideas and theories resulted in the form of accessible populist doctrine and demagogic politics. National Socialist labor party Germany grew out of the Free Workers' Committee for a Good Peace, a circle founded in 1915 by workers Anton Drexler. At the beginning of 1919, other organizations of the National Socialist persuasion were created in Germany. In November 1921, a fascist party was created in Italy, with 300,000 members, 40% of them workers. Recognizing this political force, the king of Italy ordered in 1922 the leader of this party Benito Mussolini

According to the same scenario, the Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933. Party leader Adolf Gitler(1889-1945) receives the position of Reich Chancellor from the hands of the President of Germany Paul von Hindenburg (1847-1934).

From the first steps, the fascists proved themselves to be irreconcilable anti-communists, anti-Semites, good organizers, capable of reaching out to all segments of the population, and revanchists. Their activities could hardly have been so rapidly successful without the support of the revanchist monopoly circles in their countries. The presence of their direct ties with the Nazis is beyond doubt, if only because next to the dock in Nuremberg in 1945 were the leaders of the criminal regime and the largest economic magnates of Nazi Germany (G. Schacht, G. Krupp). It can be argued that financial resources monopolies contributed to the fascisization of countries, the strengthening of fascism, designed not only to destroy the communist regime in the USSR (anti-communist idea), inferior peoples (the idea of ​​racism), but also to redraw the map of the world, destroying the Versailles system of post-war organization (revanchist idea).

The phenomenon of fascisization of a number of European countries has even more clearly demonstrated the critical state of the entire Western civilization. In essence, this political and ideological trend represented an alternative to its foundations by curtailing democracy, market relations and replacing them with a policy of etatism, building a society of social equality for the chosen peoples, cultivating collectivist forms of life, inhumane treatment of non-Aryans, etc. True, fascism did not imply total annihilation Western civilization. Perhaps this to a certain extent explains the relatively loyal attitude of the ruling circles of democratic countries towards this formidable phenomenon for a long time. In addition, fascism can be attributed to one of the varieties of totalitarianism. Western political scientists have proposed a definition of totalitarianism based on several criteria that have received recognition and further development in political science. Totalitarianism characterized by: 1) the presence of an official ideology, covering the most vital areas of human life and society and supported by the overwhelming majority of citizens. This ideology is based on the rejection of the hitherto existing order and pursues the task of rallying society to create a new way of life, not excluding the use of violent methods; 2) the dominance of a mass party built on a strictly hierarchical principle of government, as a rule, with a leader at the head. Party - performing the functions of control over the bureaucratic state apparatus or dissolving in it; 3) the presence of a developed system of police control, penetrating all public aspects of the life of the country; 4) the almost complete control of the party over the media; 5) full control of the party over law enforcement agencies, primarily the army; 6) management of the central government of the economic life of the country.

A similar characterization of totalitarianism is applicable both to the regime that has developed in Germany, Italy and other fascist countries, and in many respects to the Stalinist regime that has developed in the 30s in the USSR. It is also possible that such a similarity of various guises of totalitarianism made it difficult for politicians who were at the head of democratic countries in that dramatic period of modern history to realize the danger posed by this monstrous phenomenon.

Already in 1935, Germany refused to comply with the military articles of the Treaty of Versailles, followed by the occupation of the Rhine demilitarized zone, withdrawal from the League of Nations, Italian assistance in the occupation of Ethiopia (1935-1936), intervention in Spain (1936-1939), Anschluss (or accession) of Austria (1938), the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia (1938-1939) in accordance with the Munich Agreement, etc. Finally, in April 1939, Germany unilaterally terminates the Anglo-German naval agreement and the non-aggression pact with Poland, so the casus arose belli (cause for war).

The Second World War

Foreign policy of countries before the war. Finally, the Versailles system fell before the outbreak of World War II, for which Germany was quite thoroughly prepared. So, from 1934 to 1939, military production in the country increased 22 times, the number of troops - 35 times, Germany came in second place in the world in terms of industrial production etc.

Currently, researchers do not have a unified view of the geopolitical state of the world on the eve of World War II. Some historians (Marxists) continue to insist on a two-polis characterization. In their opinion, there were two socio-political systems in the world (socialism and capitalism), and within the framework of the capitalist system of world relations there were two centers of a future war (Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia). A significant part of historians believe that on the eve of the Second world war there were three political systems: bourgeois-democratic, socialist and fascist-militarist. The interaction of these systems, the alignment of forces between them could ensure peace or disrupt it. A possible bloc between the bourgeois-democratic and socialist systems was a real alternative to the Second World War. However, a peaceful alliance did not work out. The bourgeois-democratic countries did not agree to create a bloc before the start of the war, because their leadership continued to regard Soviet totalitarianism as the greatest threat to the foundations of civilization (the result of revolutionary changes in the USSR, including the 1930s) than its fascist antipode, which openly proclaimed a crusade against communism. The attempt of the USSR to create a system of collective security in Europe ended with the signing of agreements with France and Czechoslovakia (1935). But even these treaties were not put into effect during the period of German occupation of Czechoslovakia due to the "appeasement policy" opposed to them, pursued at that time by most European countries in relation to Germany.

Germany, in October 1936, formalized a military-political alliance with Italy (“Berlin-Rome Axis”), and a month later the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed between Japan and Germany, to which Italy joined a year later (November 6, 1937). The creation of a revanchist alliance forced the countries of the bourgeois-democratic camp to become more active. However, only in March 1939 did Britain and France begin negotiations with the USSR on joint actions against Germany. But the agreement was never signed. Despite the polarity of interpretations of the reasons for the failed union of anti-fascist states, some of which shift the blame for the unbridled aggressor onto the capitalist countries, others attribute it to the policy of the USSR leadership, etc., one thing is obvious - the skillful use by fascist politicians of the contradictions between anti-fascist countries, which led to to grave consequences for the whole world.

Beginning of World War II. The immediate pretext for the attack on Poland was a rather frank provocation by Germany on their joint border (Gliwitz), after which, on September 1, 1939, 57 German divisions (1.5 million people), about 2500 tanks, 2000 aircraft invaded the territory of Poland . The Second World War began.

England and France declared war on Germany already on September 3, without providing, however, real assistance to Poland. From September 3 to September 10, Australia, New Zealand, India, Canada entered the war against Germany; The United States declared neutrality, Japan declared non-intervention in the European war.

First stage of the war. Thus, World War II began as a war between the bourgeois-democratic and fascist-militarist blocs. The first stage of the war dates from September 1, 1939 - June 21, 1941, at the beginning of which german army until September 17, it occupied part of Poland, reaching the line (the cities of Lvov, Vladimir-Volynsky, Brest-Litovsk), marked by one of the mentioned secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

Until May 10, 1940, England and France did not practically conduct military operations with the enemy, therefore this period was called " strange war". Germany took advantage of the passivity of the allies, expanding its aggression, occupying Denmark and Norway in April 1940 and going on the offensive from the shores of the North Sea to the Maginot Line on May 10 of the same year. During May, the governments of Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland capitulated. And already on June 22, 1940, France was forced to sign an armistice with Germany in Compiègne. As a result of the actual surrender of France, a collaborationist state was created in its south, headed by Marshal A. Peten(1856-1951) and the administrative center in the city of Vichy (the so-called "Vichy regime"). France resisting was led by a general Charles de Gaulle ( 1890-1970).

On May 10, there were changes in the leadership of Great Britain; Winston Churchill(1874-1965), whose anti-German, anti-fascist and, of course, anti-Soviet sentiments were well known. The period of the "strange war" is over.

From August 1940 to May 1941, the German command organized systematic air raids on the cities of England, trying to force its leadership to withdraw from the war. As a result, during this time, about 190 thousand high-explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped on England, and by June 1941, a third of the tonnage of its merchant fleet was sunk at sea. Germany also increased its pressure on the countries of South-Eastern Europe. The accession to the Berlin Pact (the agreement of Germany, Italy and Japan of September 27, 1940) of the Bulgarian pro-fascist government ensured the success of the aggression against Greece and Yugoslavia in April 1941.

Italy in 1940 developed military operations in Africa, advancing on the colonial possessions of England and France (East Africa, Sudan, Somalia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia). However, in December 1940, the British forced the Italian troops to surrender. Germany rushed to the aid of an ally.

The policy of the USSR at the first stage of the war did not receive a unified assessment. A significant part of Russian and foreign researchers tend to interpret it as an accomplice in relation to Germany, which is based on the agreement between the USSR and Germany within the framework of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, as well as the fairly close military-political, trade cooperation between the two countries until the beginning of Germany's aggression against the USSR. In our opinion, in such an assessment, a strategic approach at the pan-European, global level prevails to a greater extent. At the same time, the point of view, which draws attention to the benefits received by the USSR from cooperation with Germany at the first stage of the Second World War, somewhat corrects this unambiguous assessment, allowing us to speak about the well-known strengthening of the USSR within the time it won to prepare to repel imminent aggression, which ultimately ensured the subsequent great victory over fascism of the entire anti-fascist camp.

The scale of the war and its causes. World War II was the largest military conflict in human history. Military operations were conducted on the territory of 40 states of Europe, Asia and Africa, covering vast expanses of four oceans and adjacent seas. 61 states with a population of 1 billion were drawn into the orbit of the war 700 million people, that is, 4/5 of the world's population. It was put under the gun 110 million people. The Second World War lasted six years, accompanied by the death of a mass of people and numerous destructions.

According to its deepest origins, the second world war should be regarded as a surge in the global crisis of the system of international relations in the first half of the 20th century. The results of the First World War, embodied in Versailles-Washington system (1919-1922), as well as the victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia did not allow to restore a stable balance of power in the international arena. The world has split into a socialist and capitalist camp, and the last - on the triumphant victorious powers and humiliated losing countries. At these are the two largest and rapidly recovering economic powers: the USSR and Germany - were placed, as it were, outside the system of civilized states, in the position of international "pariahs". formed in their totalitarian regimes were united by the rejection of universal values, "bourgeois democracies" and Versailles-Washington system, striving for social (and national - in Germany) messianism. "Genetically" they were united by the fact that the global crisis in the sphere of international relations was an important prerequisite for the victory of the Bolshevik and fascist regimes, a in many respects - and a condition of their existence.

The difference between them consisted, in particular, in the fact that the victory of the Bolsheviks was directly facilitated by the First World War, and the Nazis - its results and the growth of the influence of the Communists. The formation of a totalitarian regime in Germany took only three years compared to two decades in the Soviet Union. Having quickly resolved their internal political problems, the Nazis relied on external expansion. A means of implementing their ideological doctrine, based on the thesis of the racial superiority of the "Aryans" over other peoples, as well as a way to solve internal socio-economic problems, A. Hitler openly declared war. Already in 1933, Germany withdrew from the League of Nations, in 1935 - introduced universal military service and tore up its obligations under the Treaty of Versailles, returned (through a plebiscite) the Saarland. In 1936, German troops entered the demilitarized Rhineland, in 1938 the Anschluss of Austria was carried out. Fascist Italy in 1935-1936 captured Ethiopia, and in 1936-1939. carried out an armed intervention together with Germany in the civil war in Spain, where for the first time they were opposed not only by the left-wing democratic world community, but also by the USSR.

The situation in Asia also escalated. In 1931-1932. Japan annexed Manchuria, and in 1937 launched a large-scale war against China and captured Beijing, Shanghai and other major centers of the country. Thus, in the interwar period there were up to 70 regional wars and local armed conflicts.

The weakness of the forces interested in maintaining the Versailles-Washington system contributed to the growth of international instability. The traditional Russo-French alliance that held Germany back disappeared after 1917, and isolationist sentiments prevailed in the United States. The Versailles system relied mainly on France and England. However, the desire of these countries to maintain the status quo in Europe was nullified both by the contradictions that existed between them and by the unwillingness of their ruling elites to take active steps to curb the aggressors. The passive and expectant position of England and France was explained not only by the relative instability of their internal situation, but, above all, by the desire to use Germany against the Bolshevik threat. That is why they pursued a policy of "appeasement", which actually encouraged the aggressive actions of Hitler. The apogee of this policy was the Munich Agreements (September 1938), which authorized the transfer of the most important industrial and military Sudetenland to Germany, thus leaving Czechoslovakia practically defenseless.

Munich was the largest strategic miscalculation of Western democracy, opening the way for the armed expansion of fascism and hastening the start of the "big war" in Europe. In March 1939, German troops occupied the Czech Republic and Moravia (a puppet state was created in Slovakia), and then the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda (Memel). In April, Italy invaded Albania. In Spain, the civil war ended with the victory of the fascist Franco regime. The German army grew and strengthened rapidly. With weapons captured in Czechoslovakia, Hitler could equip up to 40 of his divisions, and the Skoda factories produced as many weapons as the whole of Great Britain. The balance of power in Europe was rapidly changing.

In response, Britain and France were forced to speed up their military programs, agree on mutual assistance and provide guarantees to certain European countries against possible aggression. There was a smell of war in the air, but a significant part of the ruling elites of England and France still did not lose hope of directing Hitler's aspirations to the East and, after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, expected a German-Soviet conflict.

Meanwhile, Germany was not yet ready for a big war with the USSR, and Hitler chose the Western option. The Nazi expansion strategy provided that after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Poland would be captured until the autumn of 1939, in 1940-1941. it will be France's turn, and then England's. The ultimate goal was proclaimed the "unification" of Europe and the establishment of fascist domination on the American continent. Since fascist Italy and militarist Japan also had their own plans of conquest, an alliance of aggressors was formed between these two countries and Germany. Back in October 1936, the Italo-German cooperation protocol was signed, called the Berlin-Rome Axis. In November of the same year, Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. Italy joined a year later. The "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis" emerged. The aggressive bloc was created with the aim of preparing and unleashing a war for the redivision of the world.

The British and French governments were primarily responsible for the short-sighted policy of "appeasement". But not only them. The general underestimation of the fascist threat also had an effect (January 2, 1939, the American magazine The Times declared Hitler "man of the year"), and the not unfounded (in the long term) fear of communist expansion, and, finally, the well-known "national egoism » leading European nations. A public opinion poll conducted in October 1938 in France showed that 57% of those polled approved of the Munich Agreements, and only 37% opposed them.

Dramatic changes also took place in the foreign policy of the USSR. In the spring of 1939, the Soviet leadership made a sharp change in its foreign policy strategy, choosing a course towards rapprochement with Berlin. On August 23, after three hours of negotiations in Moscow, the so-called "Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact" was signed. A secret protocol was attached to the non-aggression pact, which provided for "the delimitation of spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe."

These documents radically changed not only Soviet foreign policy, but also the situation in Europe as a whole. Now the Stalinist leadership has become an ally of Germany in the division of Europe. Thus, the last obstacle to the start of a new global war for the redivision of the world was removed.

The nature of the fighting. World War II differed from the first in the very nature of military operations. If the first was primarily a positional war, in which the defense was stronger than the attack, then during the second, the use of tanks, aircraft, the motorization of armies and the strengthening of their firepower made it possible to break through the enemy's defenses. The war has become more maneuverable, and the fighting more dynamic, their geographical scope has grown.

For countries - fascist states that embarked on the path of aggression, the Second World War was an aggressive one. The expansionist policy of these countries led to the elimination of democratic orders in the occupied territories, the emergence of racial and national oppression. Therefore, all those peoples who waged a struggle against the aggressors waged a just, liberating war, regardless of what the motives of this struggle were for each of its participants. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that among the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition there was also a totalitarian state - the USSR. For the Soviet people, the anti-fascist war did not become a movement towards democracy; rather, on the contrary, the war contributed to the strengthening of totalitarianism. But this in no way detracts from the role that the peoples of the USSR played in the war, does not diminish their contribution to the defeat of fascism.

periodization war. Chronologically, World War II can be divided into three major periods. The first period lasted from September 1, 1939 to June 1942. It is characterized by the expanding scale of the war while maintaining the superiority of the aggressor forces. The second period lasted from June 1942 to January 1944 - this is the turning point in the course of the war, during which the initiative and superiority in forces gradually fell into the hands of the anti-Hitler coalition. Third - from January 1944 until September 2, 1945 - the final stage of the war, during which the superiority of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition was consolidated, their armies managed to defeat the enemy, and the crisis of the regimes of the aggressor states escalated into their collapse.

In the historical literature, there is a point of view according to which the war for the Soviet Union began long before the German attack. Its supporters believe that the annexation of the Baltic states, the war of conquest with Finland, the annexation of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and Bessarabia can also be described as episodes of the Second World War, which means that it was the direct participation of the USSR in the world conflict. These researchers raise the question of the legitimacy of the periodization of the events of 1939 - 1945. to the "Second World" "Great Patriotic war". In their opinion, everything that the Soviet leadership did in 1939-1945. - this is the nurturing and implementation of aggressive plans for a "historical" revenge, called, in accordance with the then ideology, the "expansion" of socialism. Only after June 22, 1941, the nature of the war for the Soviet Union changed - it became a people's, liberation war. Despite this, the participation of the USSR in the Second World War continued. As a result, the Soviet political elite really managed to expand its sphere of influence, extending it to some regions of Central and Eastern Europe.

WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS 1929-1933 HITLER'S RISE TO POWER AND THE BEGINNING OF THE FASCIST AGGRESSION

One of the essential features of the functioning of a market economy is cyclic repeatability economic phenomena. In this case, it is about cyclical crises, accompanying the history of capitalism early XIX in. up to the present time. Today, economists have at their disposal a sufficient body of material to answer the question about the nature of this formidable phenomenon and, what seems most important, to develop recommendations for its prevention.

Formation of state- monopoly capitalism

The rapid development of production under the influence of scientific and technological revolution at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. strengthened the process of its concentration and centralization, the process of formation of monopoly associations. The merging of industrial and banking capital led to the formation of the largest financial groups that occupied key positions in the main sectors of economic life. Almighty corporations were not slow to interfere in the domestic and foreign policy of their states, putting it under their control. The folding process has begun state-monopoly capitalism, acquired a special scope during the First and Second World Wars.

Monopolies, as the most powerful economic entities in the pursuit of profit, increasingly influenced the sphere of pricing. This led not only to the emergence of serious disproportions within the national economy of individual countries, but also intensified international economic contradictions. Thus, the economic crises of the XX century. are connected mainly not with hypothetical failures in the sphere of commodity and money circulation, but with the mercenary policy of the monopolies. This is what determined the peculiarities of the course of crises, their cyclical nature, scale, depth, length and consequences. So, in the first half of the XX century. crises are becoming more frequent than previous period, while the stages of recovery and growth are shorter. Before the First World War, two significant crises were noted: the already mentioned crisis of 1900-1901, the crisis of 1907, and the pre-crisis state of 1913-1914. In the interwar period, there were three major crises of general overproduction: 1920-1921, 1929-1933, 1937-1938. At the same time, at the stages of economic upswings in the 20-30s. in most countries, unemployment and inflation persisted, becoming permanent, chronic, which was not observed before.

The economic crisis of 1929-1933 the most protracted, deep and all-encompassing was the crisis of 1929-

1933, from which the United States and Germany suffered the most. Thus, industrial production in the United States has declined over the years by 46.2%, in Germany - by 40.2%, in France - by 30.9%, in England - by 16.2%. The crisis gripped all the countries of the world, and the indicators of the decline in production in the less developed countries were often deeper than those of the four economic leaders. For example, the index of industrial production in Czechoslovakia fell by 40%, in Poland - by 45%, in Yugoslavia - by 50%, etc. Unemployment reached unprecedented levels. So, according to official data, in 32 countries the number of unemployed during the three years of the crisis (1929-1932) increased from 5.9 million to 26.4 million, there was a massive ruin of farmers, etc.

The fight against the crisis, the search for new methods and forms of counteraction to it determined the general policy of the governments of all countries. At first, anti-crisis policy was guided by a well-known liberal approach. However, it soon became obvious that the doctrine of "non-intervention" of the state in economic life, based on the concept of market self-regulation, is unsuitable in modern conditions.

Exit options crisis

AT In connection with this, since the beginning of the 30s, the activity of the state in the economic and social spheres has noticeably increased,

the tendency towards the development of state-monopoly capitalism is clearly manifested. However, in various countries, the degree of state intervention was determined by the peculiarities of their historical development, the level and specifics of socio-economic and political relations. Nevertheless, it is possible to conditionally distinguish three main directions, three options within which this phenomenon developed. Its most striking expression is one of them ( liberal reformist) received in the anti-crisis policy of the "new course" of President F. Roosevelt in the United States; second (social reformist) - characteristic of the Scandinavian countries, France; the third (totalitarian) the variant of state regulation was most fully used in Germany.

American variant relied largely on the traditions of liberal economic doctrine, and therefore the emphasis was on indirect methods of influencing the economic and social spheres of life. Roosevelt's banking and financial reforms served as the starting point for subsequent reforms. With the help of a strong budgetary and monetary policy, the state carried out major investment measures aimed at achieving optimal rates of economic growth; eliminated social tension by financing programs to help the unemployed, organizing public works, etc. The state financing policy was complemented by a set of legal acts, skillful regulation of the tax system, protectionist measures, etc.

Despite the fact that the results of this direction were not felt immediately, but only after a sufficient long term, it turned out to be very acceptable in the foreseeable future. So, by the beginning of World War II, the United States had almost completely recovered from the consequences of the crisis, but so did Great Britain and a number of countries that applied the New Deal policy. It should be noted that this direction was chosen by countries with a higher level of economic development and strong democratic traditions.

Social reformist direction characterized by a combination of strengthening the regulatory role of the state and the "socialization" of the economy, i.e. the transition of individual enterprises and sectors of the economy to the state. So, in the 30s in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the public sector in the economy grew significantly. The social democratic governments of these countries placed foreign trade and the export of capital under state control, facilitated the conditions for crediting production by reducing the loan interest, financed capital construction, agricultural production, etc. These measures were supported by an equally strong social policy, which provided for a significant improvement in pensions , the creation of a system of state insurance, the publication of laws on the protection of motherhood and childhood, the development of labor legislation, and finally, state financing of housing construction.

Similar tendencies in state regulation appeared in France and Spain after the leftist anti-fascist forces came to power in them.

This direction was typical for countries where, for various reasons, the bourgeoisie did not have wide opportunities for socio-economic maneuvering, and at the same time the positions of the left parties were strong. It should be noted that this option also did not lead to immediate positive results. Moreover, not in all countries the reformers managed to maintain an optimal balance in their activities, i.e. meet the needs of various social groups of citizens, in a severe crisis. This created instability in the internal political situation, deprived the reforms of consistency, and sometimes even interrupted them, as happened in Spain and France with the victory of the right-wing forces. Nevertheless, the direction of state-monopoly capitalism turned out to be very promising, because today we have the phenomenon of "Swedish socialism" in the prosperous countries of Scandinavia.

Finally, a different picture was observed in countries that applied totalitarian direction like Germany.

Fascism was a reflection and result of the development of the main contradictions of Western civilization. His ideology absorbed (bringing to the grotesque) the ideas of racism and social equality, technocratic and statist concepts. An eclectic intertwining of various ideas and theories resulted in the form of accessible populist doctrine and demagogic politics. The National Socialist German Workers' Party grew out of the Free Workers' Committee for a Good Peace, a circle founded in 1915 by workers Anton Drexler. AT At the beginning of 1919, other organizations of the National Socialist persuasion were created in Germany. In November 1921, a fascist party was created in Italy, with 300,000 members, 40% of them workers. Recognizing this political force, the king of Italy ordered in 1922 the leader of this party Benito Mussolini(1883-1945) to form a cabinet of ministers, which since 1925 becomes fascist.

According to the same scenario, the Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933. Party leader Adolf Gitler (1889-1945)

receives the position of Reich Chancellor from the hands of the President of Germany Paul von Hindenburg (1847-1934).

From the first steps, the fascists proved themselves to be irreconcilable anti-communists, anti-Semites, good organizers, capable of reaching out to all segments of the population, and revanchists. Their activities could hardly have been so rapidly successful without the support of the revanchist monopoly circles in their countries. The presence of their direct ties with the Nazis is beyond doubt, if only because next to the dock in Nuremberg in 1945 were the leaders of the criminal regime and the largest economic magnates of Nazi Germany (G. Schacht, G. Krupp). It can be argued that the financial resources of the monopolies contributed to the fascisization of countries, the strengthening of fascism, designed not only to destroy the communist regime in the USSR (anti-communist idea), inferior peoples (the idea of ​​racism), but also to redraw the map of the world, destroying the Versailles system of the post-war system (revanchist idea).

The phenomenon of fascisization of a number of European countries has even more clearly demonstrated the critical state of the entire Western civilization. In essence, this political and ideological trend represented an alternative to its foundations by curtailing democracy, market relations and replacing them with a policy of etatism, building a society of social equality for the chosen peoples, cultivating collectivist forms of life, inhumane treatment of non-Aryans, etc. True, fascism did not imply total destruction of Western civilization. Perhaps, to a certain extent, this explains the relatively loyal attitude of the ruling circles of democratic countries towards this formidable phenomenon for a long time. In addition, fascism can be attributed to one of the varieties of totalitarianism. Western political scientists have proposed a definition of totalitarianism based on several criteria that have received recognition and further development in political science. Totalitarianism characterized by:

1) the presence of an official ideology that covers the most vital areas of human life and society and is supported by the overwhelming majority of citizens. This ideology is based on the rejection of the hitherto existing order and pursues the task of rallying society to create a new way of life, not excluding the use of violent methods;

2) the dominance of a mass party built on a strictly hierarchical principle of government, as a rule, with a leader at the head. Party - performing the functions of control over the bureaucratic state apparatus or dissolving in it;

3) the presence of a developed system of police control, penetrating all public aspects of the life of the country;

4) the almost complete control of the party over the media;

5) full control of the party over law enforcement agencies, primarily the army;

6) management of the central government of the economic life of the country.

A similar characterization of totalitarianism is applicable both to the regime that has developed in Germany, Italy and other fascist countries, and in many respects to the Stalinist regime that has developed in the 30s in the USSR. It is also possible that such a similarity of various guises of totalitarianism made it difficult for politicians who were at the head of democratic countries in that dramatic period of modern history to realize the danger posed by this monstrous phenomenon.

Already in 1935, Germany refused to comply with the military articles of the Treaty of Versailles, which was followed by the occupation of the Rhine demilitarized zone, withdrawal from the League of Nations, Italy's assistance in the occupation of Ethiopia (1935-1936), intervention in Spain (1936-1939), Anschluss (or accession) of Austria (1938), the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia (1938-1939) in accordance with the Munich Agreement, etc. Finally, in April 1939, Germany unilaterally terminates the Anglo-German naval agreement and the non-aggression pact with Poland, so the casus arose belli (cause for war).

First of all, it should be noted that the liberal-reformist and social-reformist models were based on the system of market relations, while the totalitarian one essentially eliminated them as much as possible. This fundamentally different economic mechanism, characterized by super-centralization, took shape in the 1930s and 1940s. also in Italy, Japan, Spain (after the victory of General Franco(1892-1975) and some other countries. All of them tried not so much to solve the problem of getting out of the crisis as they pursued the more distant goal of an armed redistribution of the world. To be more precise, the super-task of redividing the world determined the path and methods of overcoming the crisis.

The main feature of the anti-crisis policy thus becomes total militarization National economy. To this end, the fascist states widely used, along with indirect methods, direct methods of intervention. Moreover, the latter, as a rule, with the development of state intervention,

became predominant. Suffice it to say that in these countries there is a constant increase in the public sector in the economy. In addition to the enterprises of the military industry itself, there was a nationalization of the raw materials industries, the fuel and energy base, transport, etc. Along with this, forced cartelization was carried out (the entry of individual enterprises into large monopoly associations closely connected with the state). On this basis, the share of state orders was constantly increasing, and elements of directive economic planning were developed.

As a result of this policy, unemployment disappeared in Germany a year later, from which countries that had chosen other models of state-monopoly capitalism continued to suffer. Economic growth rates, especially in heavy industries, went up sharply. This model gave an immediate positive effect that distinguishes it from other models. It should also be noted that after the end of the crisis of 1929-1933. most countries, with the exception of Germany and Japan, were in a state of fairly long depression, feeling the impact of recurrent crisis phenomena.

And yet, despite the excellent performance of economic growth, Germany was on the verge of an economic disaster: we should not forget that the basis of its prosperity was an artificially promoted military situation, the curtailment of the market based on the forced over-centralization of the national economy. The continuation of the policy of militarization of the national economy not only did not solve the problem of restoring optimal economic proportions, expanding the domestic and foreign markets, improving the financial system, harmonizing social relations, etc., but, on the contrary, drove these problems to a dead end. Only the unleashing of external aggression could postpone the inevitable economic catastrophe. Therefore, since 1935, Germany and other fascist countries have been more and more actively involved in military conflicts and, in the final analysis, start the largest-scale World War II in the history of mankind.

The militarization of the fascist countries caused an intensification of the process of the arms race in the world. In connection with this, in such countries as the USA, Britain, France and others, a tendency to strengthen state-monopoly capitalism appeared before the war. However, this did not change their economic mechanism according to the type of totalitarian model.

During the Second World War, as already noted, there was a rapid development of state-monopoly capitalism, and the intervention of states in economic life increased markedly. However, with its completion, a reverse process was observed, which indicates the extraordinary nature of this phenomenon. This can be confirmed by the refusal of a number of countries to use state-monopoly capitalism with a centralized economic mechanism and their return to a market system. Its effectiveness was confirmed by the presence of quite long periods rapid economic growth in these countries, dubbed the German, Japanese, Italian "economic miracle".