Breakdown or rebellion? In terms of his psychotype, Yeltsin differed from the rest of the members of the Politburo. He is a man of non-speech culture, he was uncomfortable among craftsmen and talkers who had long settled down in Moscow. He wanted to dominate. But Yeltsin was not at the huge table of the secretariat of the Central Committee

Option 1.

A 1. The main value Battle of Stalingrad is that in the course of it:

1. 
   For the first time, Hitler's plan of "blitzkrieg" was thwarted
2. 
   A radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War began
3. 
   Hitler's army was finally defeated
4. 
   An anti-Hitler coalition was formed

1. 
   Liberation of Orel and Belgorod
2. 
   The defeat of the Nazis near Moscow
3. 
   Beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad
4. 
   Lifting the blockade of Leningrad

1. 
   Defense of the Brest Fortress
2. 
   Tehran conference
3. 
   Forcing the Dnieper
4. 
   Encirclement of German troops

1. 
   Liberation of Kyiv by Soviet troops
2. 
   
3. 
   The offensive of the Red Army near Stalingrad
4. 
   Lifting the blockade of Leningrad

We, the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Premier of the Soviet

Union, met ... in the capital of our ally Iran and ... came to a full agreement

regarding the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south.
5. A radical change during the Great Patriotic War IO - 9

Option 2.

A 1. The main significance of the Battle of Kursk is that during it:

1. 
   Hitler's plan "Barbarossa" was thwarted
2. 
   The USSR temporarily seized the strategic initiative
3. 
   Soviet troops reached the state border of the USSR
4. 
   

1. 
   Breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad
2. 
   Capture of Paulus's army
3. 
   Beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad
4. 
   Collapse of the Anti-Comintern Pact

1. 
   Tehran conference
2. 
   Creation of the Road of Life
3. 
   Biggest tank battle
4. 
   The surrender of the army of Field Marshal Paulus.

1. 
   Opening a second front
2. 
   An occupation fascist troops Poland
3. 
   The beginning of the counter-offensive of the Red Army near Moscow
4. 
   Lifting the blockade of Leningrad

The Red Army crossed the largest water barrier ... and liberated ... the most important

industrial centers of the south of our country ... Thus, our troops hacked into the entire

enemy defense from Zaporozhye to the Sea of ​​Azov ...

Option 1.

A 1. What is collaborationism?

1. 
   Forced exile, link
2. 
   Combining all forces to repulse the enemy
3. 
   Partisan movement
4. 
   Conscious and voluntary cooperation with the enemy in his interests and to the detriment of his state or allied countries

1. 
   Lithuanians
2. 
   Latvians
3. 
   Jews
4. 
   Volga Germans

1. 
   Accusations against entire peoples of complicity with the Nazi invaders
2. 
   Decisions of the Tehran Conference
3. 
   Mass uprisings against Soviet power
4. 
   A strong crop failure that led to human casualties

1. 
   Strengthened cultural ties between neighboring peoples
2. 
   The economic development of the peoples subjected to resettlement accelerated
3. 
   The authority of the government was undermined
4. 
   A radical turning point in the course of the war began

I am reporting on the results of the operation to evict Chechens and Ingush ... By February 29, evicted

and loaded into ... wagons 478,479 people ... Today, a train was sent with former leaders

6. The peoples of the USSR in the fight against German fascism IO - 9

Option 2.

A 1. What kind of autonomy was eliminated during the Great Patriotic War?

1. 
   Estonians 2. Kazakhs 3. Jews 4. Chechens and Ingush

We were brought to the Volga, where many Germans from the ASSR had already gathered. Then they loaded onto the ship

and we sailed on it to Guryev ... Then we were transferred to freight cars, and we proceeded to

Aus railway station. After they were arranged on the collective farm "Rostarbeiter" in the village.

Peremenovka, Borodulikha district, Semipalatinsk region.

1. 
   In 1939 2. In 1941 3. In 1944 4. In 1945

1. 
   The unreliability of these peoples
2. 
   The need to evacuate people to the rear
3. 
   Impending natural disaster
4. 
   The need to replenish the ranks of the Red Army

1. 
   The economy of these areas suffered
2. 
   Increased combat capability of the Red Army
3. 
   A fundamental turning point in the course of the war was completed
4. 
   Strengthened friendship between the peoples of the USSR

or another area?

5. A radical change during the Great Patriotic War IO - 9

Keys

Option 1. Option 2.

A 1. 2 A 1. 4

A 2.1 A 2.3

A 3. 4 A 3. 3

A 4.1 A 4.2

B 1. Tehran B 1. Forcing the Dnieper

6. The peoples of the USSR in the fight against German fascism IO - 9

Keys

Option 1. Option 2.

A 1.4 A 1.4

A 2. 4 A 2. 2

A 3.1 A 3.1

A 4. 3 A 4. 1

B 1. 1944 B 1. Deportation

7. USSR at the final stage II World War II - 9

Keys

Option 1 Option 2

A 1. 2 A 1. 3

A 2. 2 A 2. 3

A 3. 4 A 3. 3

A 4.1 A 4.4

C 1. 1 C 2 B 3 A C 1. 1 A 2 B 3 C

7. USSR at the final stage II World War II - 9

Option 1.

A 1. What event happened during Operation Bagration?

1. 
   Defense of the Brest Fortress
2. 
   Liberation of Belarus
3. 
   Creation of the Road of Life
4. 
   Forcing the Dnieper

1. 
   Creation of the Anti-Comintern Pact
2. 
   The rise of patriotic feelings of the Soviet people
3. 
   The weakness of the German military machine
4. 
   Allied provision of substantial financial assistance to the USSR

1. 
   In Bulgaria 2. In Yugoslavia 3. In Italy 4. In France

1. 
   A bipolar political system peace
2. 
   The United States became the only superpower in the world
3. 
   collapsed world system colonialism
4. 
   The sphere of influence of the USSR in the world narrowed

Year Event

1. 
   January 1944 A. End of World War II
2. 
   July-August 1945 B. Potsdam Conference
3. 
   September 1945 V. Complete elimination of the blockade of Leningrad

7. USSR at the final stage II World War II - 9

Option 2.

A 1. Indicate the event that took place during the Berlin military operation:

1. 
   Opening of the Second Front by the Allies
2. 
   The surrender of the army of General Paulus
3. 
   Meeting on the Elbe of the Anglo-American and Soviet armies
4. 
   Exit of the Red Army to the state border of the USSR

1. 
   Opening of the second front in 1944
2. 
   Death of Hitler
3. 
   Fortitude and heroism of the Soviet people
4. 
   Mistakes of the German command

Human:

1. 
   12 2. 20 3. 27 4. 31

1. 
   The borders of European states remained unchanged
2. 
   The Versailles-Washington system of international relations was formed
3. 
   The USSR became the only superpower in the world
4. 
   The authority of the USSR grew

Year Event

1. 
   June 1944 A. Opening of the second front
2. 
   February 1945 B. Yalta Conference
3. 
   September 1945 B. Japanese surrender

8. Final test on the topic: “The Great Patriotic War. 1941 - 1945" IO - 9

Option 1.

A 1. Indicate the names of the outstanding commanders of the Great Patriotic War:

1. 
   Skobelev, Rumyantsev 2. Tukhachevsky, Frunze 3. Stalin, Budyonny 4. Zhukov, Vasilevsky

1. 
   Headquarters of the Supreme High Command 2. Council of Fronts 3. Military Committee 4. Comintern

1. 
   Near Moscow 2. Near Leningrad 3. Near Kursk 4. Near Smolensk

The Red Army was brilliantly completed.

1. 
   A radical change during the Great Patriotic War
2. 
   The final stage of the second world war
3. 
   The beginning of the Great Patriotic War
4. 
   Brusilov breakthrough

1. 
   All Gulag prisoners were sent to the front
2. 
   The industry of the USSR was reorganized in a military way
3. 
   The Allies opened a second front
4. 
   Japan pulled out of the war

1. 
   The offensive initiative finally passed to the Red Army
2. 
   A radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War has ended
3. 
   Hitler's plan for a blitzkrieg was thwarted
4. 
   The army of General Paulus was captured

"Citadel", "Tiger", Prokhorovka?

1. 
   Moscow 2. Stalingrad 3. Kursk 4. In Belarus

1. 
   Stalingrad battle 2. Battle of Kursk 3. Moscow battle 4. "ten Stalinist blows"

1. 
   Denazification 2. Deportation 3. Demilitarization 4. Denunciation

1. 
   Hitler's calculation for the collapse of the multinational Soviet state was not justified
2. 
   The USSR created nuclear weapons
3. 
   The second front opened only in 1944.
4. 
   Italy and Romania refused to enter the war on the side of Germany

1. 
   Stalin's threat to send troops to the territory of Great Britain
2. 
   Threat to Great Britain and the USA coming from the countries-participants of the Anti-Comintern Pact
3. 
   Exit of the Red Army to the state border of the USSR
4. 
   Japanese attack on the USSR

1. 
   Germany lost its independence
2. 
   The international prestige of the USSR grew
3. 
   Fascist regimes survived in Japan and Bulgaria
4. 
   The USSR lost part of the territories in the east and west

the column corresponds to one element of the right one:

Document Title, Main Content

military plan A. The implementation of the offensive of the German troops of the Center group

1. 
   ""Barbarossa in the direction of Orel-Tula-Moscow
2. 
   "Ost" B. Plan for the colonization and Germanization of the occupied territories
3. 
   "Typhoon" V. Conducting a strategic offensive operation of the German

D. Waging a "blitzkrieg" against the Soviet Union

B 2. Determine the sequence of events:

A. Soviet-Finnish War

B. Yalta Conference

V. attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR

D. Tehran Conference

8. Final test

German imperialism began preparations for an armed attack on the Soviet Union long before it was carried out. The political plan of aggression had long matured in the minds of the fascist leaders, who relentlessly and consistently strove to expand Germany's "living space" and had managed to enslave many European states by that time. And here's how it happened.

Plans for a "German Empire in the East"

The task of forcibly seizing the European part of the USSR in order to form a German empire in continental Europe, Hitler put forward as early as 1927 in his book Mein Kampf, which openly called for a campaign to the East, an attack on the Soviet Union. “If today we are talking about new lands and territories in Europe,” he wrote, “we turn our gaze primarily to Russia.” At the same time, the long-standing claims of Kaiser Germany on the territory of its eastern neighbors were flavored with ardent anti-communism and racist ideology, such as the fact that "destiny itself points its finger at Bolshevik Russia." “The new living space in the East,” declared the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, “opens up a field of activity that has never been larger and more tempting in German history.” To implement Hitler's long-cherished plans for the formation of a German empire in the East by military defeat of the USSR, the "all-destroying" Wehrmacht was created - the most powerful army in the entire capitalist world, generously equipped with the latest military equipment for that time.

Already in the mid-30s, as can be judged from archival materials, as well as official diaries and memoirs of Wehrmacht figures, the political and military leadership of Germany in resolving issues of domestic and foreign policy proceeded from option "A", which meant an armed invasion of the USSR .

Those who planned the policy of aggression and determined the solution of the political and economic problems connected with it, naturally experienced a great need for intelligence information. The role of intelligence in the process of strategic planning and decision-making at the state level has grown tremendously. All services of "total espionage" were ordered to speed up the collection of information about the Red Army and the Soviet defense industry in every possible way, to check the data obtained earlier. They were called upon to start creating all the necessary prerequisites for reconnaissance support for the main directions of the future eastern campaign.

The dominant role in this belonged to the Abwehr, who was primarily interested in the strategic military capabilities of our country. Through intelligence channels, the state of defense of the border areas was carefully ascertained, as well as the deployment of military-industrial enterprises, airfields, power plants, transport hubs, railway stations, sea and river ports, bridges, arsenals and warehouses, which, with the outbreak of hostilities, were to become objects of bombing and sabotage .

Since the second half of the 1930s, the Soviet Union has been declared the main opponent of the secret services of fascist Germany. Even the attack on Poland, and then the military campaign in Northern Europe, did not weaken the intelligence interest in our country and did not in the least affect the activity of the Nazi secret services, which continued to be quite high.

Despite the fact that on August 23, 1939, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed, and at the end of September of the same year, the Friendship and Border Treaty between the USSR and Germany was concluded, Hitler considered the military defeat to be his most important task, as before. a socialist state, the conquest of a new "living space" for the Germans up to the Urals.

With the capture of Poland in 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union become neighbors. The presence of a common land border and the fact that the German and our armies were face to face, naturally, made it easier for the Abwehr and the SD to carry out reconnaissance operations against the USSR, allowing them to work by the “close method”. On the side of the Nazi secret services, there was also the undoubted advantage that during the two years of hostilities in Western Europe that preceded the attack on the Soviet Union, they completely fit into the military adventures of the leaders of the Third Reich, accumulated considerable experience in subversive actions in foreign territories, created cadres of professional intelligence officers of the "new school" finally adapted their organizations and tactics of action to wartime conditions. To a certain extent, the expansion of the SD’s capabilities to work against the USSR was also facilitated by the fact that, with the occupation of Poland, the Nazis managed to seize part of the archives of Polish intelligence. At the disposal of Schellenberg, who accompanied Himmler, who ensured the safety of Hitler during his trip to Warsaw, was an extensive card file of the Polish intelligence network abroad, including those located in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. Measures were taken to establish the whereabouts of agents and reorient them to act in the interests of Nazi Germany.

“From the beginning of the Polish campaign,” writes G. Buchheit, “the Soviet Union fell into the orbit of close attention of the Abwehr. Prior to this, the USSR was more of a political factor, and everything that was connected with it or the communist movement as a whole was considered the competence of the SD. After the capture of Poland, military intelligence, despite the strict border control by the Russians and the language barrier, managed to achieve certain results.

Previously, intelligence operations against the Soviet Union, associated with undercover penetration into the country, were carried out, according to former leaders of the Abwehr, "irregularly, from time to time, when a real opportunity opened up for this", not associated with great risk and definitely promising success. According to P. Leverkün, it was extremely rare for German military intelligence to send their proxies and secret agents from Germany to the USSR at that time. It was much easier to cross the Polish border.

By the end of the 1930s, the main areas of activity of the Abwehr were clearly outlined, which became an important part of the military machine of Nazi Germany, the starting point for espionage and sabotage operations against the USSR. He was given the task of quickly refreshing the available information about the progress of arming the Red Army and the measures taken by the command to deploy troops in the event of a military threat, about the deployment of headquarters and large formations. Since the difficulties of collecting this kind of information were aggravated, as the Abwehr claimed, by the severe frosts that prevailed in the USSR in the winter of 1939/40, at first German military intelligence was practically unable to find out, at least approximately, the number of Red Army units and their deployment before only on the territory of Belarus, which was considered by the Wehrmacht command as the main theater of future military operations, where, as the Nazis were sure, they would be able to defeat and destroy the main forces of the Soviet troops.

But the untwisted intelligence mechanism was gaining momentum. According to former representatives of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command, in a relatively short period of time - from the end of the Polish campaign to June 1940 - the Abwehr managed, using its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union, to update some information about the combat capability of the Red Army. Part of the information obtained concerned the military-industrial facilities and economic centers of the USSR, the increased interest in which was caused by the need to create favorable conditions for solving the problem of the second stage of hostilities, when the war, as the Nazi elite planned, was supposed to move from the phase of the destruction of the Red Army to the phase of economic suppression of the country. Even before the winter of 1941, this assumed the capture during the pursuit of the remnants of the retreating Red Army, or at least the destruction of the main vital industrial and economic centers (Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass, the oil regions of the North Caucasus), necessary to recreate the defeated armed forces. However, according to eyewitness accounts, Admiral Canaris was able to provide only limited and sometimes inaccurate information, because “Abwehr agents were invariably neutralized in the SSSL. According to the confessions of the leaders of the Abwehr, the representations of German military intelligence in Krakow, Ljubljana and Koenigsberg, with all their efforts, “failed to penetrate deep into Russia.”

The sharp increase in intelligence activity against the Soviet Union dates back to the moment of the capitulation of France, when, in the opinion of the top Nazi leadership, the rear of the future war was reliably provided and Germany had at its disposal enough material and human resources to continue hostilities. After all, as you know, after the end of the war with France, Germany was not weakened in military and economic terms. Its armed forces retained their combat readiness, and the military industry, which had the opportunity to put the economic potential of 12 captured states of Europe at its service, worked at full capacity. But the matter is not only and not so much in the capitulation of France. In essence, all the criminal acts of aggression of Hitlerite Germany before June 22, 1941, connected with the forcible subjugation of other countries to its domination, were nothing more than a preparatory stage for an armed attack on the Soviet Union. Hitler wanted to ensure for his troops the most advantageous strategic positions that would allow him to confidently and without great risk begin the fight against the Soviet country. To do this, he annexed Austria, dismembered Czechoslovakia, attacked Poland, then tried to disable France in order to provide himself with a reliable rear. In short, Hitler decided to take advantage of the favorable outcome of the war in the West and, without making a long pause, suddenly move the already wound up military machine, accustomed to easy victories for two years, towards the Soviet Union, in order, as the Nazis hoped, to achieve decisive success in a short campaign. The content of Hitler's conversation with Keitel and Jodl immediately after the end of the French campaign of 1940 is known, in which he stated: “Now we have shown what we are capable of. Believe me, a campaign against Russia will be a simple child's game in comparison with this.

Hitler's generals, guided by the instructions of the Fuhrer, given at a secret meeting on November 23, 1939, began to develop appropriate strategic plans.

In the summer of 1940 and at the beginning of 1941, preparations for armed aggression against the USSR acquired a particularly wide scope, becoming complex in the full sense of the word. It covered the economic, diplomatic and ideological spheres, and especially the military and intelligence ones.

This is understandable: the Soviet Union was the main obstacle for German imperialism on the way to extending its unlimited domination to other countries and peoples. Hitler understood that the guarantee of establishing dominion over Europe, which he aspired to, depended decisively on the outcome of the German-Soviet war.

A complete picture of the planning and preparation of aggression against the USSR was revealed later, when the materials of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, memoirs of political and military figures, heads of intelligence services, as well as documents from secret archives were published.

German blitz plan

As already mentioned, according to the instructions of the leader of the Nazi Party, Hitler and his accomplices, armed aggression against the USSR was to be a special “war for living space in the East”, during which they did not even think to reckon with the civilian population. In this aggressive war, stakes were openly placed on the physical extermination of the majority of Soviet people. The criminal intentions of the German imperialists in relation to the Soviet people were recorded in the so-called "master plan" "Ost", the author of which was the main imperial security department.

In May 1940, the plan, which grew with each new discussion with additional ideas and details, was presented to Hitler “as the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht” and approved by him as a directive that obliged the German command to prevent the planned withdrawal of Soviet troops during military operations and achieve complete depletion of the military and military-industrial potential of the USSR. Thus, the issue of unleashing armed aggression against the Soviet Union had already been resolved in the highest spheres of the Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht generals by this time and moved into the field of practical preparations for the invasion, in which intelligence was called upon to play the most important role.

A clearly smoothed mechanism for planning military operations and working out specific options for their conduct was launched again in July 1940. In accordance with Hitler's order, and taking into account the guidelines developed by the RSHA, as well as intelligence information provided by the Abwehr and the SD, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal Brauchitsch, undertook the final polishing of a detailed strategic and tactical plan for attacking the Soviet Union, which was being worked on in a situation the strictest secrecy. Subsequently, this plan, developed by the RSHA with the active participation of the central apparatus of the Abwehr and its groups at the headquarters of the branches of the armed forces, was subjected to scrupulous study and clarification at the highest military authorities. At the end of July 1940, Hitler gathered all his top generals at the Berghof. At this meeting, the goals of the war were clearly defined and the timing of the troops' march was determined. Summing up the results of this meeting, Hitler said: “Russia must be destroyed. Deadline - spring 1941. The operation will only make sense if we defeat the country with one blow. Thus, the aggression against the Soviet Union was planned and prepared as a lightning-fast military campaign, which, as Hitler emphasized, could be victoriously completed thanks to the factor of surprise.

In the same place, in Berghof, the Fuhrer's directive was brought to the leaders of the Abwehr and the SD: using undercover channels, to probe the possibility of obtaining the consent of Finland and Turkey to become Germany's allies. To encourage these countries to enter the war, Hitler was ready to cede some territories of the USSR to them "after the victorious conclusion of the campaign" in the East.

There is a lot of documentary evidence of how intensive the preparation of Nazi Germany for the war with the Soviet Union was. “At the end of September 1940,” said General Zukertor, who occupied important post in the Wehrmacht - I personally had the opportunity to make sure that preparations for an attack on the USSR were in full swing. I then visited the Chief of Staff of Army Group C, commanded by Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb. At the same time, by pure chance, a huge map fell into my field of vision with a plan for the deployment of German troops in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Soviet border and their attack on the Soviet Union. The location of the German units and the objectives of each offensive were indicated there.

No less weighty are the confessions made on this score by General Pickenbrock: “I must say that already from August - September 1940, the flow of reconnaissance tasks for the Abwehr in the Soviet Union began to noticeably increase from August - September 1940 ... These tasks, of course, were connected with the preparation of the war against Russia. The Wehrmacht Intelligence and Counterintelligence Directorate, Pikenbrock argued, “already from September 6, 1940, with all its might, prepared an attack on the SSSL in all areas of espionage and subversion.

Evidence of the active participation of the Abwehr in the planning and preparation of armed aggression against the Soviet Union was also cited in the testimony of General Franz von Bentivenyi given by him at the Nuremberg trials. According to Bentivegni's testimony, in August 1940, Canaris warned him strictly confidentially that Hitler had begun to implement the plan of a campaign to the East, that the formations of German troops were gradually being secretly transferred from the west to the eastern borders and were deployed at the starting positions of the upcoming invasion of Russia. Informing about this, the head of the Abwehr proposed to immediately begin creating the prerequisites for the widespread deployment of intelligence work on the territory of the USSR, paying special attention to the importance of collecting information that would allow predicting the possible pace of quantitative and qualitative buildup of the Red Army, as well as the actual timing of the reorientation and practical translation Soviet industry to solve military problems.

General Pickenbrock testified at the same trial in Nuremberg that at the end of December 1940, together with Admiral Canaris, he was at the next report from Field Marshal Keitel in Brechsgaden. At the end of the report, the Chief of Staff of the Operational Command of the Wehrmacht High Command, Colonel General Jodl, invited them to his office and announced that in the summer of 1941 Germany would start a war with Russia. A few days later, Canaris warned Pickenbrock that the attack on the USSR was scheduled for May 15th. In January 1941, Canaris, at a meeting of the heads of departments of the Abwehr, specified the date for the speech of the German troops.

In the archives where captured materials of Nazi Germany are stored, reports were found by the head of the Abwehr II department, General Lahousen, addressed personally to Canaris, from which it follows that this department, like other Abwehr units, was inextricably linked with the preparation of fascist aggression against our country.

The role of German intelligence in the Barbarossa plan

After a single point of view was developed on all the main issues of waging war against the USSR and the most important decisions were made in this regard, on December 18, 1940, Hitler signed the famous Directive No. 21 on the attack on the Soviet Union (Plan Barbarossa). Preparations for aggression were ordered to be completed by May 15, 1941. The directive was so secret that only nine copies were printed. Only a relatively small group of generals and officers of the high command and heads of intelligence agencies were privy to the secret strategic plans for the war. The directive contained an order for the German armed forces to be ready "even before the end of the war with England, to defeat Russia with a quick blow." Hitler was firmly convinced that he could crush the Soviet Union as a result of one fleeting operation.

The goal of the campaign was formulated as follows: "In the north, a quick exit to Moscow - the capture of the capital in political and economic terms is of decisive importance." “The capture of this city,” the Barbarossa plan emphasized, “means a decisive success both from a political and economic point of view, not to mention the fact that the Russians in this case will lose the most important railway junction.” The Nazis hoped that with the fall of Moscow they would be able to paralyze the functioning of the apparatus of state power, deprive it of the possibility of restoring the defeated armed forces and, thus, the fate of the bloody battle would be decided - the Soviet Union would capitulate to Germany, and the war would quickly end.

Alfred Rosenberg, the chief ideologue of the Nazi Party and the newly appointed "Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories," wrote of the finale of the war: in order to secure the possibility of freely administering German world politics and guarantee the danger of the Reich ... Therefore, a war with the aim of creating an indivisible Russia is excluded. The task of Germany, said the head of the Nazi punitive apparatus Reichsführer SS Himmler, "is not only the division of Russia into small states, but also the expansion of the German sphere of influence far beyond the Urals."

Following Directive No. 21 and in pursuance of it, detailed instructions were issued to the "total espionage" services, which were charged with the duty, first of all, to maximize the collection of intelligence data about the USSR. Their main interest was concentrated around finding out the production capacities of the defense industry for the deployment of military production and the development of new, advanced models of military equipment and the timing of their adoption. They were also given the task of ensuring the planting of “strongholds” on Soviet territory along the path of the upcoming advance of the German troops by bringing their agents into the country by the time of the attack on the Soviet Union.

In the winter and spring of 1941, preparations for the invasion reached a climax. By this time, all the main links of the military and intelligence departments of fascist Germany were involved in it. Brauchitsch and Halder held continuous meetings. The commanders-in-chief of the army groups, their chiefs of staff, and the leaders of the Abwehr were invited here every now and then. Representatives of the Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian armies visited one after another. The headquarters coordinated and refined plans for military operations. On February 20, 1941, a discussion of the operational plans of the army groups took place at the General Staff of the Ground Forces, which were found to be quite acceptable. General Halder wrote that day in his official diary: "Our joint discussion was crowned with the best results."

In February - March 1941, numerous exercises and military maneuvers took place at the headquarters of army groups, at which possible options for the actions of the troops and the order of organizing their supply were gradually played out. A large military game with the participation of the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, General Halder, the commanders and chiefs of staff of the armies, was held at the headquarters of Army Group A (South) in Saint-Germain near Paris; the actions of Guderian's tank group were played separately. After completion, the plans of army groups and individual armies were reported to Hitler on March 17, 1941. "The attack on Russia," said the Fuhrer, considering these plans, "will begin as soon as our concentration and deployment is over. It will take about a week ... It will be a massive offensive of the highest class. Perhaps the most powerful of all that history has ever known. The case with Napoleon will not be repeated ... "

Exercising unremitting control over the planning of offensive operations of army groups and armies, the General Staff constantly demanded that the Abwehr provide information on the quantitative and qualitative indicators characterizing the Armed Forces of the USSR, on the state of the Soviet economy, transport system, investment in defense industries, composition and equipment of military equipment groupings of the Red Army on the western borders, the nature of the fortifications in the border districts. The aerial photographic reconnaissance department of the Air Force headquarters systematically surveyed the border areas of the USSR. However, despite the efforts made by Admiral Canaris and the head of the department of the Foreign Armies of the East, Colonel Kinzel, to activate the German intelligence network abroad, they failed to ensure the flow of accurate and reliable information to the extent that the General Staff would suit. In the diary of General Halder, there are often notes indicating the lack of clarity in the overall picture of the deployment of Soviet troops, the lack of reliable information about the fortifications, etc. General Blumentritt, who was then close to the Wehrmacht high command, complained that in preparation for During the war, it was very difficult to form any accurate picture of Soviet Russia and its armed forces.

The role of German intelligence in ensuring the surprise attack on the USSR

As in the development of the infamous Barbarossa plan, so in its implementation, the German General Staff and the services of "total espionage" relentlessly followed Hitler's "fundamental concept". The Fuhrer expressed the essence of this concept before the invasion of the territory of the USSR in the following words: “One single blow must destroy the enemy. Air raids, unheard of in their massiveness, sabotage, terror, acts of sabotage, assassination attempts, assassinations of leaders, crushing attacks on all weak points of the enemy defense suddenly in one and the same second ... I will stop at nothing. No so-called international law will prevent me from using the advantage that is given to me.

Thus, the main orientation of the Nazi elite in preparing for the war against the USSR included an indispensable requirement that the blow be delivered in conditions of strategic surprise, which would put the Soviet troops in a critical situation.

It was supposed in a relatively short time to pull up from the west and concentrate along the entire border of the USSR an army of almost five million with a huge number of tanks, guns, vehicles and other latest military equipment. The General Staff, in accordance with Hitler's directive, already on July 6, 1940, began an intensive transfer of troops and equipment from west to east.

The statistics that later became known showed that if on July 21, 1940 there were 15 divisions in Poland and East Prussia, then by October 7 there were already 30 of them, and a week later, that is, on October 15, General Halder wrote in his service diary: “Now we have 40, and soon there will be 100 divisions on the Russian border.” From January 1941, the scale of the transfer increased sharply, and in March-April, echelons from German troops and equipment went to the Soviet borders in a continuous stream. Since May, the Wehrmacht command began to send up to 100 echelons per day to the eastern borders according to the military schedule. Only from France to Poland it was necessary to redeploy several armies numbering about 500 thousand people. By mid-June, the deployment of the German invasion army was practically over. Fascist Germany, which had been preparing for a long time to strike at the Soviet Union, by this moment had concentrated enormous armed forces near the western borders, which had taken their starting positions for the attack. In total, they included 190 fully equipped divisions (together with satellites), 3,500 tanks, 4,000 aircraft, 50,000 guns and mortars. On the territory of Poland, the construction of roads and bridges began, warehouses were erected, supplies were prepared, the communications system and air defense were improved.

In order to be able to attack the Soviet Union suddenly, it was important to do everything covertly, in deep secrecy, and for this, as planned, resort to the use of a whole range of tricks and methods of disguise inherent in the aggressor. A strictly limited circle of people was privy to the plans for an attack on the USSR, carefully guarded by the Nazi counterintelligence. By a special directive, Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht headquarters and the leaders of the secret services, primarily the Abwehr and the SD, to provide cover for the German advance to the east and, as far as possible, make it invisible. In pursuance of this directive, the headquarters of the operational leadership, back in early September 1940, issued a document with the following content, addressed to the leadership of the Abwehr:

"Supreme Command Headquarters of the Fuhrer 6. 9. 1940

Headquarters of operational management 7 copies.

Department of Defense of the country, copy. No. 4

No. 33264/40 Top secret

For command only

In the coming weeks, the concentration of troops in the east will increase significantly. By the end of October, it is necessary to achieve the position indicated on the attached map. The regroupings at (the borders of) Russia should by no means give the impression that we are preparing an offensive to the east. At the same time, Russia must understand that there are strong and combat-ready German troops in the General Government, in the eastern provinces and in the protectorate, and draw the conclusion from this that we are ready at any moment with sufficiently powerful forces to defend our interests in the Balkans in the event of a Russian intervention.

In the work of our own intelligence, as well as in possible responses to Russian requests, one should be guided by the following basic fundamental provisions.

1. Mask, if possible, the total number of German troops in the east by spreading rumors and news about the supposedly intensive replacement of military formations taking place in this area. Movements of troops should be justified by their transfer to training camps, reorganization, etc.

2. To create the impression that the main direction in our movements falls on the southern regions of the General Government, on the protectorate and Austria, and that the concentration of troops in the north is relatively small.

3. Overestimate the level and assessment of the state of armament of formations, especially tank divisions.

4. Distribute appropriately selected information to create the impression that after the end of the western campaign, air defense in the east direction has become much more effective and that the anti-aircraft defense of all important objects is being strengthened by captured French equipment.

5. Work to improve the network of highways and railways and airfields to explain the need for the development of the newly conquered eastern regions, referring to the fact that they are conducted at a normal pace and pursue mainly economic goals.

To what extent individual authentic data, for example, on the numbering of regiments, the number of garrisons, etc., can be transferred to the Abwehr for use in counterintelligence purposes, the main command of the ground forces decides.

For the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Yodl."

Hitler's directive, dated January 31, 1941, emphasized that the advance of concentrated troops to the border should take place at the last moment and be unexpected for the enemy. As in all previous military operations of Nazi Germany, this was done with the aim of taking the victim of aggression by surprise, depriving her of the opportunity to prepare to repel the attack.

The highly experienced Admiral Cana-ris, who knew all the moves and exits, all the springs and levers of the Nazi government apparatus, directed and coordinated the actions of various departments of the Reich to ensure secrecy and operational-strategic camouflage of the prepared armed aggression. It was the head of the intelligence and counterintelligence department of the Wehrmacht, turned into the main center of disinformation, who was instructed to comprehensively think over and resolve the issue of a mechanism for disseminating false information about the forces and means that should be used in order to hide the scale of the transfer of troops to the borders of the USSR, mislead the public opinion both inside Germany and outside it and thus divert attention from the criminal intentions of the Nazi elite.

As the International Military Tribunal later established, the Nazi elite considered ensuring the surprise of an armed attack on the Soviet Union as an indispensable condition for the rapid defeat of the Red Army directly on the western borders. Naturally, this area of ​​activity of the Abwehr became one of the most important on the eve of the outbreak of war.

A group of professionals from the intelligence and counterintelligence department of the Wehrmacht, in accordance with the order of the Supreme High Command of August 26, 1940, entrusting the Abwehr with the task of "carefully disguising the concentration and deployment of German troops on the German-Soviet border", based on the experience already gained, proposed a set of practical measures for disinformation . Since these measures affected many aspects of the life of the Reich, they were considered and approved by Hitler himself.

First of all, it was considered necessary to maintain the appearance of good neighborly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. All political actions carried out at that time to put together an anti-Soviet military bloc had to be kept in the strictest secrecy. In a decision taken at a meeting with Hitler on February 3, 1941, it was expressly stated that agreements with neighboring states participating in the operation could not be concluded as long as there was any need for disguise. German representatives in negotiations with the allies of aggression were forbidden to touch on the details of the Barbarossa plan. A limited number of people were involved in the preliminary activities for the implementation of this plan. At the same time, the protection of the borders with the USSR was strengthened. All residents suspected of sympathizing with the Soviet country were evicted from the German border strip. Counterintelligence work was widely deployed in the places of concentration of German troops. In Germany itself and in the countries occupied by it, all those who could potentially threaten the secrecy of military preparations by their actions were taken under the control of counterintelligence agencies. A special government order of April 2, 1940 categorically prohibited all types of communication with countries declared hostile to Nazi Germany. Movement between the Reich and the territory occupied by German troops was limited. A special permit was required for permanent or temporary exit from these territories to Germany and back. A number of regulations were issued aimed at tightening the passport regime, the conditions for the stay of foreigners in Germany, etc.

The coordinated and methodical implementation of these measures was intended to confuse people and, thus, set Soviet intelligence on the wrong track, making it difficult to "figure out the intention of the Germans to attack." Curious generalizing evidence on this subject is given in the memoirs of V. Schellenberg. “The hour of the great general offensive,” he wrote. - became noticeably closer. A lot of effort was required to mask our action against Russia. Particularly threatened places had to be protected from spies - marshalling yards and border crossings. In addition, it was necessary to block the information channels of the enemy; we only used them to spread misinformation, such as the transfer of troops and supplies to the west to prepare for the renewed Operation Sea Lion. How much the Soviets believed in this disinformation can be judged by the fact that as early as June 21, the Russian infantry battalions stationed in the Brest-Litovsk citadel were engaged in drill training to the music.

Hitler's secret directive on disinformation of the USSR

On February 15, 1941, Hitler issues a new top-secret "Directive on Disinformation", obliging the main headquarters of the German armed forces and the Abwehr to take additional measures to strengthen the camouflage of preparations for Operation Barbarossa in order to avoid revealing them to Soviet intelligence.

Justifying in this directive the significance of the disinformation campaign for delivering a surprise strike with powerful strategic reserves, Hitler indicated that it would go through two closely related stages.

At the first stage (approximately from February 15 to April 16, 1941), the main content of the campaign was to be a set of disinformation measures aimed at convincing Soviet intelligence that the regrouping of German forces was not connected with their concentration in the eastern part of the country, but represents the usual systematic "exchange" of troops. Everything was supposed to look like some formations were being withdrawn to the east for rest and study, and fresh troops stationed there were being pulled up with guns and equipment to the west in connection with the upcoming Operation Marita (invasion of Yugoslavia). To solve the problems of this stage, the main headquarters of the Wehrmacht was instructed, in particular, to determine how long the expected transportation of military units by rail could be given out as a normal exchange of troops in the area.

At the second stage (from April 1941 to the moment of the invasion of German troops into the territory of the USSR), the strategic deployment of the armed forces was to be portrayed as a disinformation maneuver, supposedly undertaken in order to lull the British vigilance, divert their attention from the ongoing preparations for the invasion of the British Isles . At this stage, the Abwehr had to decide how and using what channels to promote the false information to Soviet intelligence that the German navy and air force, which had recently refrained from participating in hostilities, were accumulating forces before a large-scale decisive attack on England. For this, as Colonel Stolze, former deputy head of the Abwehr II, testified, “it was planned to transfer a significant part of the German navy to ports on the French and German coasts. North Sea, as well as the concentration of air formations on French airfields. Immediately before the attack on the Soviet Union, it was supposed to start moving German ships towards England in order to create the appearance of the beginning of an operation to land on the British Isles. All this, taken together, should have confirmed the main thesis that in 1941 the main goal of the Nazi command was the defeat of England. Such actions as the adaptation of schools, theaters, institutions on the northwestern and northern coasts of France to accommodate troops and hospitals, the creation of naval bases in the ports of Palis and Bordeaux, and the eviction of residents of the cities of the northern coast of France were also calculated to mislead Soviet intelligence.

At the same time, the “Disinformation Directive” prescribed: “Despite the significant decrease in activity in the implementation of Operation Sea Lion, everything possible must be done to ensure that the conviction grows in one’s own troops that preparations for a landing in England are continuing, although the troops intended for this withdrawn to a certain point in the rear. It was also important, the directive stressed, to keep as long as possible misleading about the actual intentions even those troops selected for participation in hostilities directly on the Eastern Front.

At the beginning of May 1941, in Krampnitz, near Potsdam, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Operational Command of the Wehrmacht, General Warlimont, a special meeting was held to consider the extent to which the impending attack on the USSR was camouflaged and what should be done to enhance its effectiveness at the final stage. prepared aggression. This representative meeting was attended by senior officers of the headquarters of the operational leadership, the head of the Wehrmacht department, Colonel Rudolf, the leaders of the Abwehr Lahousen and Stolze, high-ranking officials from the command of the branches of the armed forces.

In the program of disinformation measures, designed to create the desired overall picture, a special place was occupied by the action with which Hitler managed to mislead the top Soviet leadership. As it became known, at the beginning of 1941, when, despite the precautions taken, the flow of signals emanating from various sources about the concentration of large formations of German troops in Poland increased especially strongly, J.V. Stalin, concerned about this, addressed a personal message to Hitler, in which he wrote that it seemed that Germany was going to fight against the Soviet Union. In response, Hitler sent a letter to I. V. Stalin, also of a personal nature and, as he emphasized in the text, "confidential." Hitler did not deny that large military formations were indeed concentrated in Poland. But at the same time, he argued, being sure that this revelation of his would not go further than Stalin, that the concentration of German troops on Polish territory pursued other goals and was in no way directed against Soviet country. And in general, he intends to strictly observe the concluded non-aggression pact, in which he vouches for his honor as head of state. In a “confidential” letter to Stalin, Hitler found an argument that, as Marshal G.K. Zhukov later said, Stalin apparently believed: the Fuhrer wrote that the territory of Western and Central Germany “is subjected to powerful British bombardments and is clearly visible from the air. Therefore, he was forced to withdraw large contingents of troops to the East ... ". And he did it as if with the aim of being able to covertly rearm and reorganize them there, in Poland, before a decisive attack on England.

In a word, everything was done to strengthen the Soviet leadership in the opinion that the concentration of large German troops on the German-Soviet border was just a distracting maneuver in connection with the measures under the Sea Lion plan and that before the defeat of England, at least until the middle 1942, Hitler will not be able to turn troops to the east. And, as we now know, the Nazis quite succeeded in this and cost our army and people dearly. As a result of the enormous blow planned by Hitler, which turned out to be completely unexpected for the Soviet leadership, only 1200 aircraft were destroyed on the very first day of the war, with the vast majority at the airfields. This blow could not but cause a certain nervous shock in our troops.

So, although the general meaning of the campaign was to disorientate public opinion and hide preparations for an armed attack behind the “smoke screen” created, the main camouflage actions developed in two directions.

The first was aimed at impressing the people and the army of their own country that Germany was really seriously preparing for a landing on the coast of the British Isles and generally intended to start a "big war" against England. (True, back in July 1940 and later, Hitler repeatedly expressed the idea among his close associates that the landing operation was a very risky undertaking and that it could be resorted to only if no other ways were found to crush England.) Moreover, although in practice Hitler abandoned this idea long ago, it continued to be used quite widely as a means of disinformation. And, as it later became known, not without success: the reality of the landing plans was believed both in Germany itself and abroad.

The second direction, as will be seen from the further presentation, contained a whole range of measures related to the dissemination of false information about the threat to the security of the Reich allegedly emanating from the Soviet Union.

Acceptance of Germany with preventive war

History convinces us that every aggressor government strives at all costs to misinform the world community, to create the appearance that it is being forced into direct military action by circumstances - the interests of self-defense. It is perhaps difficult to find a case when any state would openly and frankly admit that it decided on unprovoked aggression, on unleashing a war for the sake of conquering foreign territories. A feature of Hitler's military strategy was, first of all, that an armed attack on other countries was carried out without a declaration of war, but with the active use of provocations organized by intelligence, started with the sole purpose of obtaining a pretext for aggression. After all, the Hitlerite government claimed that the conflict with Poland was provoked by it, and the reason for the war, the Nazis declared a ridiculous desire "to prevent the encirclement of Germany." Along with the action we have described in Gliwice, the Nazis were preparing another similar provocation at the same time. As it turned out during the investigation into the case of a terrorist agent detained in Warsaw, sent by the SD, several scouts entered Poland from Germany in the second half of August 1939 with the task of killing peasants from the German national minority so that Berlin could blame the Poles for this .

To justify the capture by the Nazi troops in April 1940 of Denmark and Norway, the most clumsy version you can think of was launched: they tried to present this outright aggression as a "measure of protection" of these countries from the invasion of the British. At the same time, the Abwehr and SD, whose actions were based on the same patented method of the German attack, were asked not to give grounds for concluding that Germany was trying to create strongholds here for its future military operations.

“We will continue to tell the whole world,” Hitler declared, “that we were forced to capture a certain area in order to ensure order and security.” And in subsequent years, the Nazi leaders justified their aggressive policy in a similar way. It was exactly the same during the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union. Acting on a Hitler-approved disinformation program, Canaris launches a deliberate campaign to spread false rumors about an allegedly growing threat to the security of the Reich from the Soviet Union, whose armed forces are "ready to launch a preemptive strike against Germany." As if “it was precisely the military preparations of the USSR that confronted Hitler with the need to take measures to strengthen the defense in the East, forced him to resort to a“ radical response to the impending danger.

Since the disinformation campaign was of the utmost importance, everything connected with it was constantly in the center of attention of Hitler himself and the Wehrmacht High Command. To spread the necessary rumors, the mass media, diplomatic correspondence, as well as the agent network of Nazi intelligence abroad were widely used. Disinformation worked out in the depths of the Abwehr was supplied to German military missions in neutral countries and the military attachés of these countries in Berlin. The headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht specifically instructed the Abwehr to mislead the Soviet military attache in Berlin in order to divert his attention from the movements of German troops near the border of the Soviet Union.

The actions of the Nazi “total espionage” services were limited to “supporting” with concrete facts and making public the version of the preventive nature of the attack on the USSR, thereby contributing to the solution of the main task set by Hitler: to shift the responsibility for the bloody conflict to the Soviet government. For example, in the "weekly review" very popular at that time in Germany (weekly newsreels. - F. S.) employees of the propaganda department of the Wehrmacht invariably showed footage showing Soviet troops and the equipment of the Red Army. The Nazis made no secret of the fact that this measure was calculated to give the impression "how great is the danger coming from the East." Declaring that “today there are 150 Russian divisions on our border” and that “Moscow, by deploying its forces, violated the provisions of the friendship treaty by committing a“ vile betrayal ”, the Nazis, in confirmation, staged the statements of“ Soviet officers ”about the allegedly undertaken training“ planned Soviet offensive.

Summing up some of the results of the widely launched disinformation campaign on the eve and during the invasion, in which, along with the Abwehr, the main imperial security department also took an active part, the chief of the latter, Heydrich, reported on July 7, 1941: “According to reports, the idea that from the Soviet Union came a kind of "threat" to the Reich and that the Fuhrer struck again at the right time.

Now it is known for certain that the intensively carried out disorientation, combined with the secrecy of the transfer and concentration of troops, allowed the German command to achieve tangible results in ensuring the surprise invasion of the territory of the USSR and thereby guarantee itself obvious advantages in initial period war.

Summarizing the above, we can conclude that the top leaders of the Nazi regime, who did not take into account international legal norms and even showed complete disregard for them, resorted to various methods of masking their expansionist plans with the help of the Abwehr and the SD, did everything in order to shift responsibility for unleashing war on others. The explanation for this should, obviously, be sought primarily in the fact that although war at that time was considered a legitimate means of implementing politics, however, in world public consciousness, only a defensive war was recognized as justified. Aggressive war was outlawed by international law.

The second, no less significant circumstance, noted by Western authors so far, is that the leaders of the Third Reich were aware of the danger that the recognition of the aggressive nature of their own aspirations would adversely affect the morale of the soldiers of the Wehrmacht and allies. How could it be revealed to the world, to one's own people, that we are talking about the physical extermination of millions of people, the seizure of foreign lands and wealth. On the day of the sudden attack on our country, Hitler, as the Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, in the order-appeal "To the soldiers of the Eastern Front", who entered the war against the Soviet Union, inspired that the USSR pursued an aggressive policy and now Germany was forced to take retaliatory actions. “The main thing is,” Hitler told his accomplices on July 16, 1941, “not to tell the whole world about our goals. It's not needed. It is important that we ourselves know what we want.”

Information about the German attack on the USSR

It is now reliably known that the task that the political leadership of the Reich set for Nazi intelligence was to hide from outside world Nazi Germany's preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union - she failed to solve.

Soviet state security organs, border troops, military intelligence not only correctly assessed the military-strategic plans of Hitlerism, but also at the right time turned out to be aware of the concentration of Nazi troops on the western border, quite accurately determined the expected dates for the start of hostilities. Since the summer of 1940, they regularly provided the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government with information on the course of Nazi Germany's military preparations against the USSR. It is enough to refer at least to firmly established facts and authentic documents kept in the archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Committee of State Security and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR.

Let's look at them chronologically. Back in the middle of 1940, the information became available to Soviet foreign policy intelligence that the German Ministry of Railways, on the instructions of the Wehrmacht General Staff, was engaged in calculating the capacity and finding out other possibilities of railways in connection with the upcoming transfer of troops from the Western to the prepared Eastern theater military actions.

On August 9, 1940, it became known that "on the coast Baltic Sea underground structures and artillery fortifications are being built from Stettin and Swinemünde to Memel. Fortifications are built in the forests and are well camouflaged. In the port of Swinemünde, new berths equipped with the latest technology have been built, access roads and berths are hidden under water in concreted channels. Moorings for ships with a large draft are being built in the Memel Canal. At night, in Memel, German troops are drawn up to the Lithuanian border. German officers and soldiers and Germans living in Memel study Russian and practice Russian colloquial speech… » .

In October 1940, on the basis of materials received from Soviet intelligence agents "Sergeant" and "Corsican" (German anti-fascists who worked in the General Staff of the Air Force and the German Ministry of Economy), the authorities were informed about the military preparations of Germany. “...“ Corsican ”... - indicated in this message, - in a conversation with an officer of the headquarters of the high command, I learned that at the beginning of next year Germany would start a war against the Soviet Union ... The purpose of the war is to seize part of the European territory of the USSR from Leningrad to the Black Sea from the Soviet Union and the creation on this territory of a state entirely dependent on Germany ... An officer of the headquarters of the supreme command (department of military attaches), the son of the former minister of colonies ... told our source ... (a former Russian prince, connected with the military German and Russian circles) that, according to information, received by him at the headquarters of the high command, in about six months Germany will start a war against the Soviet Union.

On November 6, the state security organs of the USSR presented a generalized certificate of Germany's military preparations as of October 15, 1940. The certificate, in particular, stated that in total over 85 divisions were concentrated against the Soviet Union, that is, more than one third of the ground forces of the German army. Characteristically, it was emphasized in the certificate, that the bulk of infantry formations (up to 6 divisions) and all tank and motorized divisions are located in a dense grouping in the border zone with the USSR. In addition, 12-13 divisions (including two tank divisions) in Austria, 5-6 infantry divisions in the Czech Republic and Moravia and 6-8 infantry divisions in Norway.

On December 25, 1940, the military attache at the Soviet embassy in Berlin received an anonymous letter about the impending attack by fascist Germany on the USSR, outlining the plan of military operations. As subsequent events showed, this plan was close to reality.

At the same time, Soviet intelligence informed the government of the essential details of the "Plan Barbarossa", the proposed deployment of German military forces near the Soviet western borders. The information, simultaneously sent to the General Staff of the USSR, said: “Germany's action against the Soviet Union has been finally decided and will follow soon. The operational plan of the offensive provides for a lightning strike on Ukraine and further advance to the east ... "

Information about the preparation of the Germans for the war against the USSR

In February 1941, Soviet intelligence became aware of Hitler's intention to postpone the invasion of the British Isles until the end of the military campaign in the east. A few days later, information was obtained about a confidential meeting between the Romanian military fascist dictator Antonescu and a prominent German official Bering, during which the details of Romania's participation in anti-Soviet aggression were discussed.

Then, in February 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks sent a message received from Berlin from the "Corsican" that "the military economic department of the German statistical office received an order from the high command to draw up maps of the location of industrial enterprises of the USSR by regions » . The maps were supposed to serve as an orientation when choosing objects of aerial bombardment and sabotage operations.

At the beginning of March 1941, a Soviet intelligence agent in Berlin, through an official of the committee on the four-year plan, obtained information that a group of committee workers had been given the task to urgently draw up calculations of the stocks of raw materials and food that Germany could receive as a result of the occupation of the European part of the USSR. The same source said that the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Halder, was counting on unconditional success and lightning-fast occupation by the German troops of the Soviet Union and, above all, Ukraine, where, according to Halder, the good condition of the railways and highways would contribute to the success of the operation. Halder also considers the occupation of Baku and its oil fields to be an easy task, which the Germans supposedly will be able to quickly restore after the destruction from hostilities. According to Halder, the Red Army will not be able to provide adequate resistance to the lightning-fast offensive of the German troops and the Russians will not even have time to destroy the reserves. On March 6, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of Defense were informed about the materials presented.

On March 11, 1941, the data received by our counterintelligence from the British embassy in Moscow were brought to the attention of the authorities. According to these data, “On March 6, the British Ambassador Cripps called a press conference, which was attended by British and American correspondents Chollerton, Lovell, Cassidy, Duranty, Shapiro and Magidov. Warning those present that his information was confidential and not to be used for publication, Cripps made the following statement: “…Soviet-German relations are definitely deteriorating…Soviet-German war is inevitable. Many reliable diplomatic sources from Berlin report that Germany is planning an attack on the Soviet Union this year, probably in the summer. There is a group in the German General Staff advocating an immediate attack on the USSR. Until now, Hitler has been trying to avoid a war on two fronts, but if he is convinced that he cannot make a successful invasion of England, then he will attack the USSR, since in this case he will have only one front ...

Answering questions, Cripps stated that the German General Staff was convinced that Germany was able to capture the Ukraine and the Caucasus, up to Baku, in two to three weeks.

On March 22, 1941, Soviet intelligence reported to the government about Hitler's secret order to suspend the fulfillment of orders from the USSR.

On March 24, 1941, the Soviet state security authorities received from Berlin and submitted to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks a message with the following content: THE USSR. Plans are being drawn up to bombard the most important objects of the Soviet Union. First of all, it is supposed to bombard communication bridges in order to prevent the supply of reserves. A plan was developed for the bombing of Leningrad, Vyborg and Kyiv. The aviation headquarters regularly receives photographs of Soviet cities and other objects, in particular the city of Kyiv ...

Among the officers of the aviation headquarters there is an opinion that the military action against the USSR is supposedly dated for the end of April or the beginning of May. These dates are associated with the intention of the Germans to keep the harvest for themselves, hoping that the Soviet troops, during the retreat, will not be able to set fire to more green bread.

By March 25, 1941, data were collected on the transfer of 120 German divisions to the Soviet border area.

On March 26, 1941, the Soviet state security agencies intercepted a cipher telegram from the Turkish ambassador to the USSR, Haydar Aktay, to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, which reported: “Judging by the noteworthy report that the Swedish envoy in Berlin sent to his government and a copy of which I managed to get ... the Germans believe that the action against Russia has become an urgent need. This explains the significant strengthening of the German troops located on the Russian border. It has been finally established that over the past 2-3 weeks a significant concentration of troops has been carried out on the Russian border. Swedish engineers working in the vicinity of Warsaw personally stated that German motorized units were sent in large numbers to the Russian border every night. The political circles of Berlin believe that the attack on Russia will be carried out by ground forces, and on England - by large air formations and a submarine fleet; they even say that three army groups are being prepared for this task: the Warsaw group under the command of Marshal von Bock, the Königsberg group under the command of Marshal von Runstedt, the Krakow group under the command of Marshal von Leeb. In order to ensure a quick victory over the Soviet armies, a lightning offensive plan from the three above-mentioned points will be applied. The target of this offensive will be Ukraine; it is also possible that it will spread to the Ural Mountains.

In informing you of the above information, which is trustworthy, as well as other information that has recently been circulating here that the Germans are preparing to attack Russia, I ask you to keep it secret.

In April 1941, the agent "Starshina" reported from Berlin: "In the event of a war with the USSR, the German aviation headquarters scheduled a number of points on Soviet territory for bombing the first stage in order to disrupt the supply of reserves from east to west and disrupt supply routes going from south to north ... Military operations against the USSR are supposed to begin with the bombing of these points with the active participation of dive bombers.

In addition, Soviet airfields located along the western border of the USSR should be bombed first of all.

The Germans consider the ground service of aviation to be a weak point in the defense of the USSR and therefore hope to immediately disorganize its operations by intensive bombardment of airfields.

On April 10, 1941, the Soviet government was also sent an intelligence report on the content of Hitler's conversation with the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia, Paul, from which it followed that Hitler decided to start military operations against the USSR at the end of June 1941. In the same days, through the channels of military intelligence, a message was received from Richard Sorge, who documented the intentions of fascist Germany and the specific timing of its attack on the USSR.

At the beginning of May 1941, from the foreign agents of the Soviet military intelligence, it became known about the inspection of parts of the German troops located on the territory of the General Government and in East Prussia, and reconnaissance in the border zone by the highest ranks of the army. On May 5-7, Hitler, Goering and Raeder were present at the maneuvers of the German fleet in the Baltic Sea near Gdynia. In mid-May, Hitler arrived in Warsaw, accompanied by six senior officers of the German army, and on May 22 began inspecting troops in East Prussia.

On June 6, 1941, the state security organs of the USSR reported to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks intelligence data on the concentration of a four-million German army on the western border of the Soviet Union, and a few days later that a group of German troops stationed in East Prussia received an order to occupy by June 12 starting positions for the attack on the USSR.

On June 11, 1941, a Soviet intelligence officer, who was among the employees of the German embassy in Moscow, announced Berlin's secret order to prepare embassy personnel for evacuation within seven days and immediately begin destroying archival documents.

In mid-June 1941, with reference to information received from a reliable source working at the headquarters of the German aviation, the state security organs of the USSR informed the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks that “all German military measures to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR were completely completed and the strike can be expected at any time...

The objects of German air raids will primarily be: the Svir-3 power plant, Moscow factories producing individual parts for aircraft (electrical equipment, ball bearings, tires), as well as car repair shops ...

... Hungary will take an active part in the hostilities on the side of Germany. Part of the German aircraft, mainly fighters, is already on Hungarian airfields.

... Important German aircraft repair shops are located: in Königsberg, Gdynia, Graudenz, Breslau, Marienburg. Milic aircraft engine workshops in Poland, in Warsaw - Ochachi and especially important ones - in Heiligenkeil ... ". A source working in the German Ministry of Economy reports that the appointment of the heads of the military economic departments of the "future districts" of the occupied territory of the USSR has been made. The Ministry of Economy says that Rosenberg also spoke at a meeting of business executives intended for the "occupied" territory of the USSR, who stated that "the concept of the Soviet Union should be erased from the geographical map."

A week before the outbreak of the armed conflict, through the channels of Soviet intelligence, a sample of a phrase book distributed to German soldiers was received, the content of which betrayed the real aspirations of the leaders of the Reich. It contained, for example, such phrases: “Russ, give up”, “Who is the chairman of the collective farm? ..”, etc.

As can be seen from the above documents and facts, from the middle of 1940 to June 22, 1941, the Chekist authorities and military intelligence received through their channels extensive and reliable information about the upcoming aggression, in particular about the accumulation of strategic reserves for a surprise strike, and timely reported to the Central Committee about this. VKP(b) and the Soviet government. But it so happened that the information received through intelligence channels, as well as warnings coming from other sources, including from Churchill, did not inspire confidence in the political leadership of the country, and the biased position of I.V. Stalin prevented him from giving the current situation a correct assessment . which, as you know, predetermined the heavy losses of the Soviet people in the initial period of the war.

In the early 40s of the twentieth century, the main leadership of Germany tried to develop its own unique plan to take over the Soviet Union. The uniqueness of the idea was its time frame. It was assumed that the seizure would last no more than five months. To development this document approached very responsibly, not only Hitler himself worked on it, but also his inner circle. Everyone understood that if they did not quickly occupy the territory of a huge state and did not stabilize the situation in their favor, many adverse consequences could occur. Hitler clearly understood that he had already begun the Second World War and quite successfully, however, in order to achieve all the goals set, maximum resources, including mental ones, should be attracted. In the event of a failure in the plan, the Union can be provided with a variety of assistance by other countries that are not interested in the victory of Nazi Germany. Fuhrer understood that the defeat of the USSR would enable Germany's ally to completely untie his hands in Asia and prevent the insidious United States of America from interfering.
The European continent was firmly in Adolf's hands, but he wanted more. Moreover, he was well aware that the USSR was not a powerful enough country (yet) and I. Stalin would not be able to openly oppose Germany, but his interests were in Europe and in order to eliminate any inclinations, it was necessary to eliminate the opponent undesirably in the future.

Adolf Hitler planned to end the war against the Soviet Union before he could end the war against Great Britain. It was going to be the fastest company of all time to conquer vast territory in such a short time. The ground forces of Germany were planned to be sent to conduct combat operations. The Air Force will have to fully provide any necessary support in order to cover and protect its military. Any actions that are planned to take place on the territory of the Soviet Union must be fully coordinated with the command and must not interfere with the established interests of capturing Great Britain.
It was said that all large-scale actions aimed at carefully preparing a lightning capture against the USSR should be carefully disguised so that the enemy could not find out about them and not take any countermeasures.

Hitler's Biggest Mistakes

Many historians, who have been studying the situation with the development and implementation of a plan for the instant capture of the Union for several decades, come to one single thought - regarding the adventurism and senselessness of this idea. The commanding fascist generals also gave an assessment of the plan. They considered it the main, one might say fatal mistake - the Fuhrer's keen desire to occupy the territory of the country of the Soviets until the final end of the war with England.
Hitler wanted to start action in the fall of the fortieth year, but his military leaders were able to dissuade him from this crazy idea, citing a lot of convincing arguments. The events described suggest that Hitler had an obsessive obsession with establishing complete world domination and a crushing and intoxicating victory in Europe did not give him the opportunity to thoughtfully make some of the most important strategic decisions.
The second, most important, according to historians, mistake in the plan was that they constantly retreated from it. Hitler changed his instructions several times, which was why precious time was lost. Although he surrounded himself with excellent commanders, whose advice would help him achieve what he wanted and conquer the territory of the country of councils. However, they were opposed by the personal ambitions of the dictator, which were higher for the Fuhrer than common sense.
In addition, an important mistake of the Fuhrer is the involvement of only part of the combat-ready divisions. If all possible forces were involved, the consequences of the war could be completely different, and now history would be written completely different. At the time of the offensive, part of the combat-ready divisions were in Great Britain, as well as North Africa.

Hitler's main idea regarding the lightning speed of the work of the plan

He believed that important point is the ability to break ground forces with the help of active tank attacks. Adolf saw the purpose of the operation solely as the division of existing Russia into two parts along the Volga and Arkhangelsk. This would allow him to keep the main industrial region of the country in operation, but have full control over it, as well as create an unprecedented shield dividing the country into European and Asian parts.
In addition, the top priority was to deprive the Baltic Fleet of its bases, which would allow the Germans to exclude Russian participation in battles.
Complete secrecy was given regarding future actions of conquest. Only a certain circle of people were privy to this. They were charged with coordinating actions in preparation for the invasion without unnecessary dissemination of information. It got to the point that the whole country was closely involved in the preparation, and only a few knew exactly what was to happen and what tasks were assigned to the fascist army.

Outcome

The plan failed. In fact, this happened with the consent of Hitler, when he began to retreat from his intended goals. This is a huge plus for the entire Russian people, we don’t know how we would live now if the legendary plan for the instantaneous conquest of Russia, created in the fortieth year of the twentieth century, became successful and achieved all the goals set in it. One can only be glad that the commanders-in-chief of the German troops made several cardinal mistakes that did not allow him to achieve world domination and establish his ideology throughout the globe.