Recipes for cold crumble soup with kvass, classic recipe 25 minutes 80 kcal...
Among those who were nobody, but became everything during the Yeltsin era, 43-year-old Anatoly Chubais undoubtedly belongs to one of the first places.
In less than two years, unknown to anyone (except for a narrow circle of first-wave democrats), the Leningrad economist rose from an associate professor at a provincial institute to the first deputy chairman of the Leningrad City Executive Committee, then a minister, and then a deputy prime minister. And since then he has invariably remained “at the top”, while being perhaps the most unpopular politician in the country: few people “unite” such different “colors” of the spectrum in a negative attitude towards themselves. Chubais is categorically rejected by the right-wing centrists from YABLOKO, and the Social Democrats, and the Communists, and the “statists”, and the left radicals. True, there are exceptions: for example, among the capital’s intelligentsia, on the contrary, it is customary to admire Chubais and rally to his defense from any attacks.
“He will walk knee-deep in blood and not vomit,” it was once said about Chubais. Indeed, the First Deputy Prime Minister has no sympathy for the possible victims of his economic experiments. But it seems that Chubais is happy with the role of the notorious “villain” of the Russian political theater: he can calmly do what he considers necessary, without worrying about the reaction of public opinion. It can't get any worse: there are very few Russian politicians who wouldn't dream of fighting Chubais in the second round of some significant election.
In recent years, he has achieved what he wanted: he sought power and got it. Today he can control the destinies of other people, being completely independent of them thanks to the authoritarian state machine built with his active participation.
To understand his present (which, for the most part, was widely reported), we need to look into his past, which is much less known.
Assistant professor
Anatoly Chubais traces his “origin” to the Leningrad Engineering and Economic Institute, which he graduated in 1978. The institute was not very prestigious: in those years it, for the most part, served as a refuge for boys and girls, according to various reasons those who did not intend to enroll in the Faculty of Economics of the University. Those who taught Chubais at the institute recall an efficient and diligent student, however, clearly determined to have a career - if not a scientific one, then an administrative one. Everything went more or less smoothly: after defending his diploma, Chubais remained at the department, working first as an engineer, then as an assistant, and after defending his dissertation on R&D management as an associate professor (since 1982). At the same time, with his active participation, a kind of “circle” of economists began to form.
In October 1979, during agricultural work at the Boksitogorsky state farm, three economist peers met: Anatoly Chubais, Grigory Glazkov and Yuri Yarmagaev. And they begin, traditional for the intellectuals of that time (especially those who gathered for physical labor) discussions about global problems of the universe. Next, we will quote Chubais’s half-joking “diary”, dating back to those times, and handed over to Yuri Yarmagaev in 1987 “to write the history of the first market movement in Russia.”
November 1979: first debate about NEP, Bukharin and “calico industrialization”.
End of 1980: the birth of the idea of a permanent seminar and its implementation.
Mid 1981 – late 1982: expansion of contacts (Odessa, Moscow). There are no major scientific results in sight.
End of 1982: Anatoly Chubais meets Sergei Vasiliev.
Spring 1983: Anatoly Chubais meets Yegor Gaidar in Moscow.
November 1983: The idea for an information seminar is born.
Autumn 1984: Grigory Glazkov leaves for graduate school, Mikhail Dmitriev and Sergei Ignatiev join.
May 1985: Chubais’s proposals to the OK CPSU on restructuring the economic mechanism.
November 1985: Gaidar’s first visit to Leningrad, speaking at a seminar, meeting the entire cast.
May 1986: work of the entire group at the OK CPSU on proposals for economic reform.
September 1986: unjustified calm...
Most of the names mentioned today do not need to be deciphered. So, Sergey Vasiliev will become a deputy of the Leningrad City Council, then - the head of the working center for economic reforms under the Government of Russia, then - deputy minister of economics, then - deputy head of the government apparatus. Sergei Ignatiev will become Gaidar’s adviser when he was acting. Prime Minister, and then - Deputy Minister, Mikhail Dmitriev - Deputy of Russia, and then - First Deputy Minister of Labor and social relations. Grigory Glazkov will gradually move away from the group, concentrating on working abroad. But the “second wave” will join the work of the group, where there are no less famous names - Muscovites Pyotr Aven and Alexander Shokhin, the late Mikhail Manevich (later vice-governor of St. Petersburg), Dmitry Vasiliev (current head of the Federal Central Clinical Hospital), Andrei Illarionov, Alfred Koch. .. They all communicated regularly, visited each other, exchanged ideas - and hardly imagined that they would be able to implement them.
Remembering Anatoly Chubais of that time, almost everyone agrees on one thing: it was obvious that he was a man with colossal ambitions. He never doubted anything, he practically did not listen to other people’s opinions if they differed from his own, he was “charged” for his future career and methodically built its steps. At the same time, many of his views were, as Yuri Yarmagaev recalls, quite “party”: back in the mid-80s, the future builder of capitalism in Russia Chubais (and not in public, but in the kitchen) assured his friends that capitalism does not and cannot be of the future, that socialism is the greatest achievement of humanity and it is only necessary to cleanse it of Stalinist layers. And one more quality appeared immediately: open contempt for democracy, as a “bourgeois relic.” Everything that needs to be done must be done only by force and only “from above.”
"Perestroika"
As soon as free winds blew, Chubais was one of the first to catch them and quickly became one of the most prominent figures in the Perestroika club - a legendary organization from which, like Gogol’s “Overcoat,” came the vast majority of future St. Petersburg politicians: deputies of Russia and the Leningrad City Council , ministers and senior officials. Together with the once famous (and now half-forgotten) Pyotr Filippov, Chubais gave lectures at the club about market economy, about joint stock companies, leasing, forms of ownership - to which the technocrats gathered in Perestroika, who had never heard most of these terms before, eagerly listened.
Chubais’s popularity began to grow - and at one time, when it was supposed to elect the leaders of not only enterprises, but also scientific institutes, they even tried to elect him as director of the Leningrad ISEP (Institute of Socio-Economic Problems), but to no avail.
In parallel with the study of other theories of market economics, Associate Professor Chubais tried to comprehend it in practice - by participating in the cooperative movement. But in a very peculiar way: for example, employees of one of the St. Petersburg defense industry enterprises remember how Chubais’ “team” proposed conducting a study to increase the profitability of the enterprise, received a considerable advance - and then began to “pull the bagpipe.” After repeated reminders, the “researchers” brought obvious hack work, but the plant management chose to give up on this and formally “close” the work, resigning itself to wasted money.
Anatoly Chubais did not participate in either the first (1989) or the second (1990) elections in Leningrad. He needed something else: the support of future deputies, so that with their help he could break into administrative structures. Even during the times of unprecedented popularity of the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” and long before many democrats became adherents of “strong executive power,” Chubais and his team believed in the “executive vertical.” All of them were not democrats, as they say, by definition, since they clearly understood (let’s give their pragmatism their due): what they wanted economic reforms can only be implemented through authoritarian methods. And that’s why from the very beginning they were aimed at the executive branch and did not hide it.
"Following a rigid course..."
In the sixth issue of the popular at that time, but now half-forgotten magazine “The 20th Century and the World” for 1990, an extremely interesting document. Then many (including the author) did not pay attention to him: you never know what they write?
The document was a fragment of an “analytical note on the concept of transition to a market economy in the USSR,” prepared by Chubais’ group in March 1990 and published under the characteristic title “Hard Course...”. The authors' purpose was, as they stated, to study possible consequences accelerated transition of the USSR to a market economy (the “Great Leap Forward” concept).
A careful reading of the note is extremely entertaining. In fact, we have before us one of the first “manifestos” of radical reformers, proving that much of what followed (when the authors of the note had the opportunity to put their concepts into practice) was not an accidental mistake, inevitable when wandering in a chaotic search for the right path, but deliberately planned line.
Thus, it is in vain that radical reformers will later be accused of neglecting social consequences liberal reforms: As it turns out, they had a great idea about everything. We read in the “note”: “...among the immediate social consequences of accelerated market reform are general decline standard of living, growing differentiation of prices and incomes of the population, the emergence of mass unemployment.” In turn, this will lead to severe social stratification and the emergence of “a high probability of economic strikes in basic industries and political strikes in large cities.”
The main slogans of these strikes, the authors predict, will be to prevent prices from rising, to maintain high level employment, increasing wages in line with rising prices and avoiding high income differentiation. How is it proposed to respond to such social resistance to the planned measures - to adjust the course in accordance with the wishes of citizens? No matter how it is: according to the authors, in these conditions it is very important for the government to take the “right tone” towards society: no apologies or hesitations!
Thus, it is necessary to provide for “tightening measures in relation to those forces that encroach on the main backbone of reform measures - for example, the dissolution of official trade unions if they oppose government measures, as well as the creation of parallel trade unions.”
It is very important, argue Chubais and his team, “to differentiate measures regarding the labor movement - to close, for example, one mine out of three, while maintaining normal conditions payment" (let the Kuzbass miners read these words). Finally, “measures of direct suppression against representatives of the party and economic activists are absolutely necessary.” However, the authors are ready to preserve, as they put it, “political outlets - pluralism and transparency in everything that does not concern economic reform" (highlighted by me. – B.V.). And one more wonderful passage: “the population must clearly understand that the government does not guarantee a place of work and a standard of living, but only guarantees life itself.” No comments are even required here.
Turning to a specific reform scenario, Chubais and his team foresee: reform “risks meeting discontent and even resistance from the majority political forces And social groups society." Well, we will have to temporarily abandon “the previous “perestroika” programs and promises,” perhaps dissolve the newly elected first democratic Councils, since even Councils with a predominance of democrats are “populist-minded,” and deputies are not ready to support tough and unpopular measures. And even more so – the anti-democratic measures that reformers consider necessary to use.
The Chubais group calls the “fundamental contradiction” of the planned economic reform (the clarity and cynicism of the wording is striking - do not forget that this is March 1990, and not March, say, 1993) the contradiction between the goals of the reform and the means of its implementation, among which “not last place will be taken by measures of an anti-democratic nature”: a ban on strikes, control over information, limitation of powers or dissolution of representative bodies. To carry out the reform, the government will need “free hands” - and the reformers confidently propose that the government mercilessly suppress any possible “ideological” resistance. Fearing that a diverse party press will be organized, where government policies will be “subject to merciless criticism, undermining the legitimacy of the reform,” they fearlessly note: “it is possible that the adoption of laws on the press and political parties will have to be delayed.” In addition, Chubais’s group believes, “in the very near future, reform ideologists from the country’s political leadership need to put all central funds under their control.” mass media" Realizing that “direct censorship of publications and broadcasts about the reform will most likely have a negative effect,” the reformers point out: “the main lever of management should be personnel policy.” How they looked into the water...
Lensovet
On April 3, 1990, the “Democratic Elections-90” bloc won the Lensovet elections, and soon Anatoly Chubais appeared in the corridors of the Mariinsky Palace. Quite quickly, he got used to it and learned to “carry” himself around the building, feeling that his own person was very significant: it was his group that was tasked with developing the “fixed idea” of the Leningrad democrats - the creation of a free economic zone in the city.
The organization of an economic paradise in a single city (with exemption from all taxes, after which entrepreneurs had to flock to the zone in herds) was very popular for some time. Despite the fact that there were already cards and empty shelves around. But the expectation of some miracle that would solve all the problems was generally extremely characteristic of that era, and Chubais cheerfully set about searching for it. And along with him - the mentioned Sergei Vasiliev, Mikhail Manevich, Sergei Ignatiev and others.
Six months later, it became clear that the work was going unsatisfactorily - on October 6, 1990, the session of the Leningrad City Council stated this with its decision. And... three days later, on October 9, Anatoly Chubais was approved by the same session as First Deputy Chairman of the Leningrad City Executive Committee Alexander Shchelkanov and Chairman of the Committee on Economic Reform! Paradox? Not quite: as deputies of the Leningrad City Council recall, in terms of personnel, the Leningrad democrats had an almost complete vacuum! The old economic guard was clearly not valued - they were all considered reactionaries and retrogrades, few economists from “their own” had already received parliamentary mandates - and practically, there was no one who could be recommended for this post. And Chubais was the undoubted leader of a large group of young economists and at the same time had obvious organizational skills. Who else was to be appointed? In addition, Chubais was not given a specific job (where decisions had to be made every day so that the city economy, transport, and trade would not stop), but rather a paper one. If he fails, it’s not scary.
Chubais “lived up” to expectations: the idea of a free economic zone completely failed. More precisely, it quietly faded away. One of the hypotheses is that Yeltsin cooled down on this idea after being elected president (before that he supported it), the other is that the developers were unable to offer anything concrete. And perhaps the best way to characterize the usefulness of this stage of Chubais’s work is that during the entire existence of the Leningrad City Council, the session only once made an unprecedented decision: to stop funding one of the committees of the city mayor’s office. It was a committee for organizing a free economic zone...
It must be said that the attitude towards Chubais the economist and his concepts even then among specialists was quite skeptical.
This is what Oksana Dmitrieva, a State Duma deputy from St. Petersburg, professor and doctor of economic sciences, told me at one time: “Radical reformers - Gaidar, Chubais and others - all the time offer a “magic wand.” Once you find her, everything is resolved as if by itself. Let's lower prices, issue and distribute vouchers, defeat inflation - and we don't need to do anything else. But that doesn't happen! Our paths with Chubais, Andrei Illarionov, Dmitry Vasiliev and others diverged in 1990, when Mr. Chubais’s great idea about a free economic zone appeared. It immediately became clear to me that there was no concept there, but numerous beautiful words They're leading in the wrong direction. And then the discrepancy appeared in the attitude towards economic reform in general - in my opinion, these issues need very careful professional study. But both then and now, this entire company mainly emanates slogans - and reform cannot be based on slogans, it requires a specific calculation and analysis of all possible consequences. But this “team of reformers” simply does not have professionalism, because professionalism first of all presupposes professional work...”
Apart from his work on the “zone,” during his stay in the St. Petersburg executive branch, Anatoly Chubais was not remembered for almost anything from a professional point of view. With those on whom he depended, he was modest, polite, at first he was even embarrassed to use an official car (his old Zaporozhets often parked until late at the Mariinsky Palace, where both the Leningrad City Council and the Executive Committee were then located), although he quickly got used to it. Chubais revealed himself only in rare moments of economic discussions in a narrow circle. As one of the sociologists who worked at that time in the Leningrad City Council recalled, and who more than once discussed specific economic problems with him, Chubais’s ideas were simple: “... as quickly as possible, “throw out” as much property as possible onto the market, give it to anyone, just to rather, time will “settle” everything, the market will “settle everything”, the main thing is to collect money, send it to Moscow and burn it there, because there is too much money. What will happen to people, what social consequences may occur - it doesn’t matter who survives - he will survive, I don’t care social sphere in general, now you can’t allow yourself to be distracted by these thoughts, you need to suppress pity in yourself... Chubais, says my interlocutor, was, in essence, primitive - but the impression was created that he was proud of this primitivism and somehow “turned on ", feeling like this " Iron Felix", cold-bloodedly experimenting on insignificant people."
However, Chubais did solve one problem. It was while working on the executive committee that he created his image and assembled his team. According to Yuri Yarmagaev, Chubais cared extraordinarily about his image: a brilliant actor, he always flawlessly played the necessary role in front of a television camera or in front of a journalist's voice recorder. Despite the failure of the free zone idea, Chubais “lit up” with its help as best he could: at one time there was even a special radio program dedicated to it. As for the team, one after another he “pulled” into bureaucratic positions on his committee: graduate students, junior researchers and senior engineers, and these people personally owed everything to him. The factor of personal loyalty meant an extraordinary amount, and Chubais did not spare time for his team; he accustomed them to machine work, to the paper cycle, to pushing through the necessary decisions - and succeeded in this. Subsequently, it is they who will become his support when Chubais himself gains real power - and on a much larger scale than in St. Petersburg.
Anatoly Chubais worked in the executive committee of the Leningrad City Council until the summer of 1991 - until Anatoly Sobchak, with whom he then had not very friendly relations, became mayor. In the city hall that was formed instead of the executive committee, there was no longer a place for Chubais, and he received an almost decorative post as the chief economic adviser to the mayor, which he held until November 1991. In other words, before being appointed chairman of the State Property Committee.
Privatizer
It's a pity that at one time foreign word“voucher” was never replaced with the original one Russian word"Chubaisor". Because when nine-tenths of Russians remember Chubais, the first thing they remember is the voucherization of the entire country and the two Volga cars promised to each.
Why was a man from St. Petersburg in general, and Chubais in particular, chosen then to play the role of the main privatizer of all Rus'? The key role, of course, was played by a long-standing acquaintance with Yegor Gaidar, who, in order to carry out the planned “landslide” privatization, needed, firstly, “his own”, secondly, decisive, and thirdly, indifferent to the inevitable social consequences administrator. Chubais satisfied all these requirements. In addition, he had administrative experience (after all, he was in a fairly high position in St. Petersburg). Summoned to a “presentation” to Yeltsin, the president liked him - and was appointed to the post of chairman of the State Property Committee, which was not even considered particularly prestigious at that time. Moreover, there were empty shelves outside, and price liberalization was ahead. Some time will pass, and everyone will understand what power this post with a modest name actually gives - but it will be too late: up to this day, Chubais has only once for several months (in brief era Vladimir Polevanov) will release the GKI system from its sphere of influence.
The history of Russian privatization has been described many times (though most of its chroniclers can hardly be called disinterested persons), and there are diametrically opposed opinions about how effective privatization “according to Chubais” turned out to be. Some believe that privatization is almost the only completed task begun by the reformers, and it was the professional Chubais who built a well-oiled machine that made it possible to create a class of owners in the country in the shortest possible time. Others have a different opinion: for example, Alexander Solzhenitsyn noted that not a single citizen of Russia received the share of state property due to him with his voucher. And according to the already mentioned Oksana Dmitrieva, “for the sale of most of Russia’s fixed assets for five billion dollars (despite the fact that its minimum value was estimated tens of times higher), it is unclear into which hands you do not need either special professionalism or a well-oiled machine. There was an ordinary dump, a quiet sale: selling, for example, the Bratsk Aluminum Plant at the price of two days' production - is that “high professionalism”? Professionalism was needed in order to sell at a high price or to ensure an influx of investment later. But the privatizers set themselves not economic, but purely political, as they later admitted, goals - for example, to show the West how decisively we are carrying out reforms...”
But let's return to Chubais: his main feature In his post as “Minister of Privatization” (and then – the main feature of Chubais as a politician in general) became legal nihilism. His logic was impeccable in its own way: if some law interferes with the desired goal (bad because it interferes with it), the law must be ignored. Either bypass it or break it. As long as the necessary but illegal decision is challenged, the work will continue. Even if they cancel it, we will make the same decision under a different name... In fact, all Russian privatization was carried out within the framework of this particular ideology. And it began with the actual abolition of the law on registered privatization accounts.
Today, few people remember that initially it was planned not to issue impersonal vouchers to all Russian citizens, but to open personalized privatization accounts for them. Chubais instantly realized that this system is not only quite difficult to implement from the technical side (opening 150 million bank accounts), but it does not allow solving the key task, from the point of view of liberal reformers: to create a future support for the authoritarian political regime, in which only it is possible to carry out liberal reforms. The authorities had to help those who would later, with the help of this wealth, prevent a change of power, to become large owners.
A way to solve this problem was vouchers - which Chubais came up with, “pushing through” the corresponding government decree in February 1992. The main advantage of vouchers was that they could be bought up cheaply, and they quickly became concentrated in the hands of those with large fortunes. Of course, the majority of future owners would be, as they say, not strangers to the reformers - they would be “nourished” in advance, given the opportunity to make money from lowering prices, from protectionist access to cheap raw materials and cheap government loans, from a “banking boom.” However, the law on registered privatization accounts stood in the way of this whole harmonious scheme. It was necessary to bypass him - and Chubais bypassed him.
The scheme he came up with was ingeniously simple and was based on the so-called “special powers” of Boris Yeltsin of the 1992 era: the president had the right to issue decrees that formally contradicted the laws, and if the Supreme Council did not cancel the decree within a week, it remained in force. So, first, Chubais signed a decree from the president on the introduction of vouchers, and then, according to the testimony of the former chairman of the Council of the Republic of the Russian Supreme Council, Vladimir Isakov, the decree sent to the Supreme Council was strangely “lost” in the Supreme Council Committee on Economic Reform until the week’s deadline had expired. The fact that the chairman of this Committee and a loyal supporter of Yeltsin, Sergei Krasavchenko, later became the first deputy head of the presidential administration can hardly be called a coincidence.
However, Chubais’s main achievement will be not so much vouchers as the construction of the “State Property Committee empire.”
At one time, in the summer of 1991, by adopting the first Russian law on privatization, the deputies of the Supreme Council, in fact, dug their own grave. After all, it was precisely this law that established that bodies with the unusual and seemingly modest name of “property committees” were given the monopoly right to dispose of gigantic state property. Which they - mostly through the efforts of Chubais - took advantage of. And before the people’s representatives had time to look around, a powerful vertical structure arose under their noses, exclusively in the corridors of which it was decided who and how much would become the owner of this or that piece of the once common property, who would receive a lease on a building, premises or land plot, according to what rules the enterprise will be privatized, who will get how many shares, and so on.
Theoretically, the system for disposing of state property was supposed to work according to the law and under the control of representative authorities. In practice, as we know, everything turned out somewhat differently – and not by accident. From the very beginning, Chubais formulated a key principle: the maximum removal of representative power from influence on the privatization processes. The privatization scheme had to work quickly, without discussion and debate, and with unquestioning execution of orders “from above” - therefore, the emphasis had to be on presidential decrees, government resolutions and orders and instructions of the State Property Committee, the issuance of which did not require much time and parliamentary discussions.
This principle, brilliantly implemented later, was proposed to Chubais by his Western consultants (to whom, as you know, the World Bank allocated $90 million back in 1992 for “organizational support for Russian privatization,” a considerable part of this amount also went to pay Russian experts). And I must say, the students from the GKI turned out to be very capable: since the fall of 1992, all Russian privatization was carried out not according to laws, but according to decrees and other decrees that replaced or abolished them regulatory documents executive power. Until the fall of 1993, at least formal obstacles to this remained, after which they disappeared: the will of its president, elevated to law, became law in Russia.
Having secured the desired regime, the Privatization System created by Chubais worked like a clock: it set rules for itself (as necessary, consecrating some of them with the presidential signature), and then praised itself for their impeccable implementation. The rules were written in such a way as to ensure the desired result (say, victory in a competition for a predetermined participant) or so that they could be easily circumvented. Thus, it is no secret that for many years commercial structures have been feeding around the privatization bodies, established, as they say, with the direct participation of employees of these bodies or their friends, and for a considerable fee they “prepare documents for privatization”, draw up plans, applications for investment competitions and things like that.
Were other methods and another system of privatization possible? More open, more honest, more dependent on public opinion, less susceptible to corruption? This question still does not have a clear answer, but something else is obvious: Chubais never sought to create such a system. He purposefully created exactly the system that operates today. Because it was she who provided him and his comrades with power, influence, and (what to hide) wealth. Even if we omit the “corruption” aspects (and the number of crimes in the field of privatization is amazing), privatization departments and their officials have always had enormous income, because a certain percentage of all privatization transactions legally went into their coffers. It is not for nothing that salaries in committees and property funds are almost a commercial secret.
And in conclusion brief history privatization according to Chubais, let's return to its legality. It seems quite reasonable to conclude that the shaky legal basis for Russian privatization (only two laws, one of which is completely violated, and the second partially, but there are thousands of decrees, resolutions, orders and instructions) was created deliberately. A simple example: formally, all Russian privatization after July 31, 1994 (the end of voucher privatization) is illegal, since the parliament never approved the state privatization program proposed by the State Property Committee. But this may have been Chubais’s intention: illegal privatization chained those who received property within its framework to the current government, stronger than any friendly relations. Once the regime collapses, it will be possible to take everything back completely legally, without causing protest from the West...
"Minister Administrator"
The purely “privatization” period of Chubais’s work ended at the end of 1994, when he was appointed first deputy prime minister. Since then, the “minister-administrator” (an apt definition from the wonderful fairy tale by Evgeniy Schwartz, literally “stuck” to Chubais due to the striking similarity of manners with the prototype) has become such a frequently mentioned figure in the Russian media that it would seem difficult to talk about him something relatively new. Nevertheless, a number of touches should be paid attention to - especially since the traditional chroniclers of Chubais (journalists who have long made it their profession to praise Anatoly Borisovich and are well known to their colleagues in the pen) try not to focus attention on this.
It is known that Chubais is the de facto leader of the “Democratic Choice of Russia” and this party actually rests on him - it was the “GKI empire” and associated structures that were once used to create the party, and then to support it. It is somewhat less known that at the beginning of 1995, when the Vyboross (let’s give them their due) actively protested against the war in Chechnya, member of the political council of the Far Eastern Republic Anatoly Chubais never spoke out against the war and did not leave the government in protest. He did exactly the opposite: he suspended his membership in the Far Eastern Republic, clearly demonstrating his complete loyalty to Yeltsin.
It is known that Chubais, who at one time had cool relations with Anatoly Sobchak, actively supported him during the gubernatorial elections in the summer of 1996. It is somewhat less known that after Sobchak’s defeat, Chubais, who was appointed head of the presidential administration, tried to prevent an immediate investigation into the financial abuses of the former mayor of St. Petersburg - especially since unpleasant questions could arise for those employees of Sobchak’s administration who, after his loss, ended up working in Moscow ( just name it former first Deputy Sobchak Vladimir Putin, who now heads the Main Control Directorate of the President). And the results of the work of the commission on the acceptance and transfer of cases were quietly released on the brakes. But Anatoly Chubais’s favor towards Anatoly Sobchak did not stop there: on October 31, 1996, Chubais officially turned to his friend, then-chairman of the State Property Committee Alfred Koch, with a request to forgive a 3-billion-dollar rent debt to the St. Petersburg UNESCO Center, of which Sobchak is president. “To find the possibility of a positive solution to the issue,” Chubais asked, “taking into account the state interests of Russia as a member of UNESCO.” Meanwhile, this center has nothing to do with UNESCO (which Chubais should have known) and is a purely public organization created by a group of private individuals for the purpose of “supporting UNESCO.” With the same success, you can organize a “Vatican support center”, and then start selling indulgences at a discount... And only the decisive opposition to such “kindness” of Anatoly Borisovich towards Anatoly Alexandrovich on the part of the St. Petersburg authorities helped prevent the “forgiveness” of the debt.
It is known that Chubais, to put it mildly, does not like YABLOKO leader Grigory Yavlinsky, and this feeling is completely mutual. After all, it was Chubais who, during the presidential campaign, launched (and the media controlled by the presidential team disseminated) the assertion that every vote cast for Yavlinsky allegedly “works for Zyuganov.” Somewhat less is known about their personal meeting between the two rounds of the presidential elections - in Yavlinsky’s office at the Epicenter. Then Chubais openly invited Yavlinsky to follow the path of Alexander Lebed and take the post of first deputy prime minister in exchange for Yeltsin’s support. And he even showed the signed decree of appointment. However, Yavlinsky refused, saying: “I will not accept any appointments before the elections.” “And after the elections, no one will offer anything,” Chubais replied. That's where they parted. True, in April 1997, on Yavlinsky’s 45th birthday, for some reason he received the most complimentary congratulations from Chubais...
It is known what a wonderful story happened in June 1996 with the famous Xerox box taken from the White House. Subsequently, MK will publish a transcript of a conversation allegedly between Chubais, Viktor Ilyushin and a certain Sergei, where the story with the box was commented on so unequivocally that if the recording was authentic, it would be necessary, at a minimum, to initiate a case against the participants in the discussion. Chubais, naturally, will declare all this “a lie” (the traditional reaction of the First Deputy Prime Minister to accusations), and that will be the end of it. It is somewhat less known that in a few months the authenticity of the tape (at least the recording of the voices of Chubais and Ilyushin on it) will be confirmed by an examination of the Prosecutor General's Office, which Yuri Skuratov will inform the deputies about. But the cart will remain in the same place...
Six myths about Chubais
Without a doubt, Chubais is one of the most mythologized figures in Russian politics. However, most of the myths about him were purposefully created by himself and are increasingly being questioned.
It is generally accepted that Chubais is a talented economist, a convinced democrat and a consistent liberal. However, Chubais never stood out as an economist and was never a democrat, always professing authoritarian ideas and adhering to the principle “the end justifies the means.” I have had to write more than once: hatred of democracy and representative bodies was “in the blood” of our radical reformers. They always clearly understood (let us give their pragmatism due credit): the economic reforms they desired, carried out contrary to the interests of the majority of society and leading to its impoverishment and social polarization, can only be implemented by authoritarian methods. Hence the love for Pinochet and Franco, admiration for the experience of Argentina and Peru (thank you, although they don’t cite Hitler’s Germany as an example).
As for liberalism, Chubais's actions are strikingly at odds with his statements. While speaking in words for low taxes, low government spending and fair rules of the market, in reality Chubais contributed to the establishment of high taxes, the creation of a gigantic state apparatus and the redistribution of property through unfair competition.
It is generally accepted that Chubais is a specialist in solving the most difficult problems, and he consistently completed everything he took on. However, Chubais failed many of the things he took on - from the creation of a free economic zone in Leningrad to the collection of taxes and the implementation of the budget in 1997 (remember that the sequester was never approved). The repayment of debts to public sector employees in 1997 (a point of particular pride for Chubais) is still called into question, judging by information from the regions - not to mention the fact that the debts arose as a result of policies pursued with the participation of Chubais. As for such “completed” cases as the privatization of most of Russia’s fixed assets at bargain prices or financial stabilization through non-payment of wages and the transfer of 3/4 of the economy to barter, their usefulness, to put it mildly, is debatable.
But perhaps we should recognize the creation of the stock market as a success? Yes, Chubais spent many years building an extensive system that made it possible to develop this market in the country, but its main economic consequence was a strong withdrawal of funds from the real sector of the economy. If in the GKO market, which Chubais was proud of as one of his main achievements, it was possible to get 200% of the annual profit without any problems, is it any wonder that no one wanted to invest in industry or agriculture? Well, we know well how the construction of the “GKO pyramid” ended. We just don’t know what kind of profits the domestic and foreign friends of our “reformers” received in this market, in other words, we don’t know the losses incurred by the state treasury as a result of the efforts of Anatoly Borisovich...
It is generally accepted that Chubais is an effective political manager who ensured Yeltsin’s victory in the 1996 elections. However, you do not need to be a brilliant manager in order to, having at your disposal the state budget and all national television channels, achieve victory over rivals who are cut off from both money and the media. At the same time, in December 1995, Chubais’s party did not get into parliament, receiving even fewer votes than Ampilov’s bloc, and in the fall of 1996, the presidential administration led by Chubais, with a colossal advantage in resources, was unable to beat the opposition during the “marathon” of gubernatorial elections.
It is generally accepted that Chubais is the main link between Russia and the West, and his presence in the government is a guarantee of the international support we need for domestic reforms and, consequently, the stability of the Russian economy. However, in fact, the presence or absence of Chubais in the government has virtually no impact on either the scale of Western assistance or financial indicators Russia. Suffice it to remember that the resignation of Chubais at the beginning of 1996 did not move the price of Russian shares one iota, and the last “collapse” on the Russian stock market and the flight of investors from the country occurred precisely at the moment when the president declared his intention to “not touch” Chubais until 2000. As for the attitude towards Chubais in the West, it has long been not as cloudless as it is portrayed in newspapers and television channels loyal to him. Especially after the “book scandal”: the author of the famous article in the Washington Post, Peter Redway, is by no means alone in his skepticism.
Finally, it is generally accepted that Chubais is a curse incarnate for the communists, for whom it was he who constantly blocked the path to success. However, nothing contributed more to the growth of the communists' popularity than the economic policies pursued by Chubais - from privatization to the “fight against inflation” by the state refusing to pay its obligations. In turn, it is the constant demands of the “Chubais head” coming from the Zyuganovites that are vital for Anatoly Borisovich to maintain his place at the throne.
And, perhaps, the only myth about Chubais that is not questioned is the myth of Chubais the administrator. Here his abilities are undeniable: as a bureaucrat, Anatoly Borisovich is very effective. However, this is the efficiency of a machine that will carry out the programmed program until it reaches its logical end. Or until it is turned off. The Tin Woodman, who never even received a rag heart.
However, Chubais may not have wanted to receive it. After all, it would only prevent him from functioning.
The vicissitudes of the political fate of Anatoly Chubais in the four years that have passed since the publication of this article are well known. Having lost his position as first deputy prime minister after the resignation of the Chernomyrdin government in March 1998, in April he was appointed chairman of the board of RAO UES, and then Yeltsin’s special representative for relations with the IMF, responsible for obtaining Western loans. There is no need to remind you how it ended: the loan of $5 billion mysteriously disappeared (most likely, it went to banks close to the government and allowed them to save their assets before default), and then August 17th struck. It is known that Chubais was one of those who first assured his fellow citizens that receiving an IMF stabilization loan would save the ruble from devaluation and the country from inflation, and then made the decision to devalue the ruble and declare a default. After which he stated in an interview with Kommersant that “the authorities are obliged to lie”...
The rest is known - participation in the creation of the Union of Right Forces, declaring as “traitors” all those who disagree with the second Chechen war, statements that “the Russian army is being revived in Chechnya,” praises addressed to Putin and continuous calls for an increase in electricity tariffs - with the same insistence with which Cato the Elder called for the destruction of Carthage. Wherein Russian government As a rule, these requirements are readily satisfied!
Note: in “Soviet” times, only a person who had gone through all the “steps” could become at least the head of the main board of the Ministry of Energy (not to mention the position of deputy minister) - from a shift engineer at a power plant to the head of a regional energy system. At that time, it was well understood that only professionals could be trusted in the energy sector. Now, after RAO UES and most of its regional departments have been headed by people who were previously involved in either privatization or financial manipulation, it is difficult to be surprised that they “manage” the country’s energy sector so that expenses in it are government, and income is private, going into the right pocket.
It is worth recalling that back in 1998, the chairman of the board of the essentially state-owned company RAO UES received a monthly salary of 22 thousand US dollars. At the same time, RAO UES, which always complains about financial difficulties, has money not only for fantastic salaries for its management, but also for the purchase of television companies (for example, REN TV) and for continuous “PR” in the media. In terms of the number of paid articles in the media praising the wise leadership of RAO UES, only Railway Minister Nikolai Aksenenko and Kemerovo Governor Aman Tuleyev can compete with Chubais...
And one more thing: according to Chubais’s former comrade-in-arms, and now presidential adviser on economics Andrei Illarionov, Anatoly Borisovich is turning RAO UES into a “tool for discrimination against competitors,” while RAO management, hired to manage someone else’s property, considers it his own (stating, for example, that “will not give our property to shareholders”). Moreover, Illarionov believes, the entire program for reforming the electric power industry, developed by RAO UES, is nothing more than the confiscation of private property, and the true goal of Chubais’s actions is control over the regions of the country - through ownership of electrical networks... According to Illarionov, “ there is a plus in the fact that so many paid articles and programs appeared in support of Chubais’s plan - the price of the issue became clearer. We are talking about money - very big money and about power - very big power...”
Naturally, Andrei Illarionov himself does not consider Chubais a liberal. “Chubais has nothing to do with liberal economics,” he says, “no matter what he himself claims on this matter. Nothing that Chubais did or said can be interpreted in liberalist terms. He is neither a liberal nor a right-wing politician. Chubais today is an oligarch. He has been striving to become one for at least three years. He became one..."
But what is the reason for such political stability? Supporters and opponents of Chubais answer this question differently.
According to supporters of Anatoly Borisovich, it’s all about his personal qualities. Thus, Boris Nemtsov once called Chubais “a unique person in terms of efficiency and organizational talent, whom even those who hate him reckon with.” In addition, Chubais’s supporters always spoke of him as a highly moral person: yes, he often made unpopular decisions, but he never extracted any personal gain for himself. And no one dares to doubt his personal honesty. In addition, Chubais is endowed with such a quality as a sense of comradeship. It is known: everyone who ever ended up on his team and did not cheat on it could firmly count that in a difficult situation the boss would not “give them up”, would do everything to help them out of any troubles, and when changing their position, he would try or “outweigh” them. » take them with you, or provide them with a decent place of work.
But there is another point of view on the activities of the country’s current chief energy officer. According to this point of view, the main reason for Chubais’s “unsinkability” is that he is one of the most striking examples of politicians who are ready to behave with the president (both Yeltsin and Putin) like serfs with a master. “Strong move, Boris Nikolaevich.” "The president's brilliant decision." "The President's Enormous Liberal Potential." “We will accept any decision of the president”... The master is stern, but easy-going - he orders him to be flogged in the stable, but then he will give him a ruble. In general, “the stronger the punishment, the more dear to them the gentlemen”...
As RBC reported the day before, on February 12, at a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich, Rosatom and Rusnano Anatoly Chubais asked the state for more than 1.5 trillion. rub. for the modernization of Russia's energy sector.
Despite the fact that all participants in the meeting refused to comment on the news that appeared in the press, it nevertheless became public knowledge. And this public felt somehow uneasy due to the fact that Chubais was inspired by another “super profitable” idea: to take 1.5 trillion from the treasury. rub. for the development of “green” energy – its wind and solar sources, as well as small hydroelectric power stations.
The fact is that the people have not forgotten that all their previous projects, including the reform of RAO UES, failed miserably and at huge losses for the state budget. But since he got away with everything, to which good profits stuck, which allowed, for example, to build a personal castle in Peredelkino, he is full of desire to develop new trillions. Here he simply has some kind of pathological obsession.
In this regard, I remember how four years ago he “rolled his lips” with the same lust at the Russian Pension Fund. Then, without hesitation, he proposed making changes to pension legislation that would allow the Pension Fund to invest in nanotechnology.
Apparently, having decided that there would still not be enough for decent pensions for everyone, Anatoly Borisovich set his sights on one of the few money boxes remaining at the state’s disposal - the Pension Fund. It’s not that he hadn’t looked at her before, but he realized that the time had come to act like an adult, apparently after he assumed a new position - from the post of chairman of the board of Rusnano, he smoothly migrated to the chair of the head Management company Rusnano, which took over the asset management function. Well, where the assets are, there, as you yourself understand, is Chubais.
He promised to take money from the Pension Fund not forever, because... I was firmly convinced that by 2017 Rusnano would become a break-even company, and a year later there would be a qualitative breakthrough and investors and shareholders would receive their first dividends. But for this it was necessary to attract a little money, namely, 150 billion rubles by 2020. As you understand, for Anatoly Borisovich this is mere nonsense. But for some reason, investors, having heard this tempting offer, did not run to the queue. Apparently, they didn’t forget that a few recent years Rusnano's losses amounted to several billion rubles.
Tired of waiting, Chubais decided to actively attack the Pension Fund. “If you take European or American analogues,” he said, “you will see that the No. 1 investor in the world is the Pension Fund. By diversifying his assets, he has the right to invest a small share of them in projects of the kind that we are creating.” - the “great schemer” got excited and, knowing that at that time it was legally prohibited, he offered a way out - you just need to improve the pension legislation. And, as we remember, Chubais is a great master of “improvement”!
And his impatience was understandable: pension money has long been keeping Gaidar-style reformers awake, proposing to more actively invest Pension Fund funds in Russian assets, including IN THE CAPITAL OF DOMESTIC BANKS. In general, the idea went to the masses. Well, how far it will go will probably be understood best by those who will retire in a year or two.
Chubas - (chubys, red imp) in the lower mythology of the Great Russians and Latgalians, a small malicious house spirit. Chubas was represented in the image of a pot-bellied red rat “with a face like a human.” He moves into houses at the behest of evil sorcerers, extinguishes the fire in the hearth, demanding a ransom of grain (“he will take everything from the barns, sweep it from the bottoms”) and animals (“what moos and bleats, clucks and barks, a cow and a dog - drive them into the gullies, chicken and goat - to my lair"), but not because he wants to eat, but then to make people starve. “He eats neither life nor meat, drinks neither beer nor kvass, but feeds on human misfortune.” Chubas first settles in one hut, but if he doesn’t survive, he can “empty the whole volost.”
There is a well-known cycle of tales about the victory of a wandering hero over Chubas; The hero (a blacksmith, a soldier or a “passer-by” without specifying his occupation) ends up in a house (in a village) where Chubas is rampaging: “Why, good people, are you sitting in a cold hut in the dark, eating dry crust?” “Chubaska stole the fire.” The hero decides to fight the demon and lights a candle at midnight. An enraged Chubaska appears and demands a ransom, threatening to put out the fire. “Try,” says the hero, “I suppose you can’t even handle a thimble.” Chubasa climbs into a thimble. , the hero covers it with a candle, “Nikolin has the image of a burning one,” and then crushes it with a hammer and throws it into the swamp (blacksmith) or loads it into a gun and shoots it “into the white light” (soldier) (Kikimors are children cursed by their parents, Chubas - “...). in miscarriage")".You won’t believe it, but after searching in dictionaries, I found this, understand it as you want (I’m just giving information):
Maklak
MAKLAKOV MAKLYUKOV MAKLYUK MAKLAK MAKLYAKMaklak - 1) reseller, intermediary for bargaining; 2) big bone, callus, hence the big-boned person. (F). Maklyuk (from requests from visitors) apparently comes from here.
Anatoly Chubais is a prominent political figure in Russia, whose activities are widely known and noted by the domestic and world community. He entered big politics in the early 90s at the time of the collapse of the USSR and went through a successful career path to the heights of power from a deputy to the country's finance minister. Many economic reforms are associated with the name of the politician, in particular global privatization in Russia, which even today Russians have a categorically negative attitude towards. But this did not prevent the economist from becoming the best finance minister in 1997, according to the world's leading financiers.
Chubais Anatoly Borisovich was born in the Belarusian city of Borisov in the family of a military man. His father Boris Matveevich was a retired colonel and veteran of the Great Patriotic War, who taught the philosophy of Marx and Lenin at the Leningrad Mining Institute, and his mother Raisa Khamovna was an economist by profession, but devoted her whole life to family and raising children. The future politician became the second child in the family - he has an older brother, Igor, who followed in his father’s footsteps and became a Doctor of Philosophy.
From childhood, Anatoly Borisovich knew all the delights of “garrison” life and was brought up in strictness. He repeatedly became an involuntary witness to loud discussions between his father and brother about politics and philosophy, which apparently influenced his choice of future profession. Chubais preferred the economic direction to philosophy, so even from school he focused on the exact sciences.
The future head of Rusnano entered first grade in Odessa in Ukraine, which was associated with his father’s service. Later he had the opportunity to study in Lvov, and only in the fifth grade did his family move to Leningrad, where Anatoly was sent to school No. 188 with military-political education. As an adult, the politician admitted that he hated his school and even tried to dismantle it into bricks, but the idea failed.
In 1972, Anatoly Chubais became a student at the Leningrad Engineering and Economics Institute at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering. In 1977, he graduated from the university with honors, and in 1983 he successfully defended his dissertation and became a candidate of economic sciences. He began his career path at his native university as an engineer, assistant and associate professor.
In parallel with this, the future politician joined the ranks of the CPSU and, with his like-minded people, created an informal circle of democratically minded Leningrad economists, with whom Chubais began to actively conduct economic seminars. The purpose of these meetings was to promote democratic ideas among the broad masses of the intelligentsia. At one of these seminars, the future politician met the future head of the government of the Russian Federation, which set the future direction of the economist’s career.
Policy
In the late 80s, Anatoly Chubais founded the Perestroika club, whose members included many famous economists who, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, held many positions in the Russian government. The “young reformers” were able to attract the attention of the future political elite of Leningrad, therefore, after the elections to the post of chairman of the Leningrad City Council, Chubais, as the leader of the democratic movement, was elected as his deputy, since his political views and ideas appealed to the leadership of the region.
In 1991, Anatoly Chubais was offered the position of chief adviser on economic development at the Leningrad City Hall, after which he created a working group to create economic strategy development of the Russian economy. Already in November of the same year, the economist became the head of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for State Property Management, and in 1992 he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Russia under the President.
In his new post, Anatoly Chubais and a team of economists developed a privatization program and carried out its technical preparation. The country's privatization campaign, which brought about 130,000 state-owned enterprises into private hands, is still widely discussed in society and considered categorically unsatisfactory. But this did not stop the politician from moving up the career ladder and occupying increasingly significant positions in the political arena.
At the end of 1993, Anatoly Chubais became a State Duma deputy from the Russia's Choice party, and in November of the same year he was appointed to the post of first deputy prime minister of the country. At the same time, he was also elected head of the Federal Commission on the Stock Market and Securities.
In 1996, the political economist led Boris Yeltsin’s election campaign in the presidential race, for which he created the Civil Society Foundation, which increased his rating Russian leader and led him to victory in the elections. For this, Yeltsin appointed Chubais as head of the presidential administration, and a few months later he awarded the rank of full state adviser of the Russian Federation, 1st class.
In 1997, the economist again became the first Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, at the same time he was appointed to the post of the country's Minister of Finance. But already in the spring of 1998 he resigned along with the entire Cabinet.
In 1998, Anatoly Chubais was elected head of the board of RAO UES of Russia. Here he was also marked by a large-scale reform, which included the restructuring of all holding structures and the transfer of most of their shares to private investors. Some members of the joint-stock company began to call Chubais “the worst manager in Russia” for such activities.
In 2008, the Russian energy company UES of Russia was liquidated, and Anatoly Borisovich was appointed general director of the Russian Nanotechnology Corporation state corporation. In 2011, under the leadership of Chubais, the state company was reorganized and re-registered as a public company Joint-Stock Company, and also became a leading innovative company in the Russian Federation.
Personal life
The personal life of Anatoly Chubais is as multi-part as his political career. The economist-politician got married for the first time back in student years. His first wife Lyudmila gave birth to two children - Alexei and Olga, who followed in their father's footsteps and became certified economists.
In the early 90s, while ascending to the political arena, Anatoly Borisovich married for the second time. His chosen one was the economist Maria Davydovna Vishnevskaya, who with her husband went through the thorny path of his career growth, but their marriage broke up, unable to withstand the difficult life situations. The couple lived together for 21 years and officially divorced in 2012.
The third wife of Anatoly Chubais was a famous TV presenter. Society sharply criticized the politician for trying to improve his personal life after 50 years, but the happy married couple was able to withstand all the tests and maintain a warm relationship to this day.
The head of Rusnano devotes his leisure time and free time from work to travel. He enjoys skiing and water tourism, which allows him to maintain a good physical fitness. Chubais loves to drive fast and listen to the hits of his youth, which include songs by the Beatles and Time Machines, and.
Income
According to the declaration of Anatoly Chubais for 2014, the head of Rusnano earned almost 207.5 million rubles, and his wife - 1 million 200 thousand. The spouses have 2 apartments in Moscow with an area of 256 sq.m., an apartment in St. Petersburg with an area of almost 125 sq.m., as well as an apartment in Portugal with an area of 133 sq.m. The joint “vehicle fleet” of the Chubais family consists of two BMW X5 and BMW 530 XI cars, and a Yamaha SXV70VT snowmobile.
The childhood and youth of Anatoly Chubais
Anatoly Chubais, born into a military family, learned all the “delights” of garrison life from childhood. Father, Boris Matveevich Chubais, became a retiree with the rank of colonel and taught students of the Leningrad Mining Institute the philosophy of Lenin and Marx. Mother, Raisa Khamovna Sagal, had an extraordinary mind, had a specialty in economics, however, she never worked, devoting herself to the family and raising her sons.The mother paid attention to the multifaceted development of the boy, as well as his brother Igor, who in the future became a Doctor of Philosophy, professor of the Department of Social Philosophy of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the RUDN University.
Even at school (the future politician became a first-grader in Odessa), Anatoly preferred exact sciences and came up with all sorts of clever inventions.
In the mid-60s, the family lived in Lviv, and in 1967, military service brought the father and the whole family to the city of palaces and museums. In Leningrad, Chubais studied at a school with military-patriotic education.
In the family of a Soviet officer, there were often discussions regarding political and philosophical topics, and young Anatoly was an involuntary witness to the debates taking place between his father and his older brother. This uniquely influenced the young man’s choice and he chose the economics university over the philosophical direction.
Student years and the beginning of Chubais’s career in politics
In 1972, Anatoly became a student at the Leningrad Engineering and Economic Institute named after Palmiro Togliatti. He chose the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering. The future ideologist and leader of Russian market reforms and privatization activities graduated from his first alma mater with honors in 1977.Chubais's work experience began within the walls of his native institute, where he worked as an engineer, assistant and associate professor. At the same time, he was writing a dissertation, which he successfully defended in 1983.
Chubais - March of the Nanists
In 1980, Anatoly decided to join the Communist Party. At that time, the democratic movement was actively developing in Leningrad. Leningrad economists organized an informal circle, the leader of which was Chubais, along with Grigory Glazkov and Yuri Yarmagaev. The fruit of their joint labor was scientific work"Improving the management of scientific and technological progress in production."
Members of the circle also included future Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Kudrin, President of the Banking House "St. Petersburg" Vladimir Kogan, the late Vice-Governor of St. Petersburg Mikhail Manevich, as well as older brother Igor.
Political career of Anatoly Chubais
In 1990, Anatoly Chubais took the post of deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Leningrad City Council, and a little later became first deputy. In 1991, the mayor of the city, Anatoly Sobchak, invited him to the position of chief economic adviser.Possessing the talent of a politician and brilliant analytical mind, Chubais was rapidly moving up the career ladder. In November 1991 he was appointed chairman State Committee Russia on state property management. And already in 1992, President Boris Yeltsin entrusted him with the post of Deputy Prime Minister. IN
During 1992, Chubais created a privatization program, as a result of which by the beginning of 1997, 127,000 enterprises had been privatized. Extraordinary meeting shareholders of RAO UES of Russia decided to elect Chubais to the Board of Directors. Also in 1998, he became chairman of the board.
Anatoly Chubais. Exclusive interview.
In politics, Anatoly Chubais is a prominent figure. He went through the path of a State Duma deputy from Russia's Choice, was the creator of the Civil Society Foundation, which predetermined the work of a group of analysts at Yeltsin's election headquarters.
Before the Duma elections in June 2003, he became one of the top three leaders of the Union of Right Forces, but the party suffered defeat. After resigning from the post of party chairman, he was a member of the federal political council, and in November 2008, the Right Cause political party accepted him into the Supreme Council.
Now Anatoly Borisovich Chubais is the head of Rusnano. His political successes and economic achievements are appreciated by the domestic and world community. The private American Institute for the Study of East and West Studies awarded him the 1994 Outstanding New Artist Award.
The English economic magazine Euromoney named him the best finance minister in the world. He has been awarded many Commendations from the President of Russia and is an Acting State Advisor of the Russian Federation, 1st class. Anatoly Chubais, honorary doctor of the University of Engineering and Economics, St. Petersburg.
Personal life, Anatoly Chubais today
From his first marriage, Anatoly Chubais had a son, Alexey, and a daughter, Olga. Both chose the economic direction. In 1989, the marriage broke up, however, financial support from ex-husband and his father remained worthy.In 1990, Chubais married Maria Vishnevskaya for the second time. His wife supported Anatoly during his rapid career growth and, as expected, was a support in both joy and sorrow.
Working in a hospice and interacting with terminally ill patients left an imprint on the woman’s mental health. This affected the personal life of the spouses. Treatment in the most prestigious clinics was unsuccessful. After 21 years of marriage they separated. All property remained to Maria Vishnevskaya.
