Causes and course of the Patriotic War of 1812 briefly. Patriotic War (briefly)

The rallying of all sections of the people of Russia in the war with Napoleon was the key to the triumph of Russian weapons over a powerful enemy and the growth of the country's authority.

Causes of the war

• The desire of Napoleon 1 to establish world hegemony, which was impossible without the complete defeat and subjugation of England and Russia.
• Aggravation of contradictions between Russia and France, caused by:

- Russia's failure to comply with the conditions of the continental blockade, which did not meet its national interests;

- support by Napoleon of anti-Russian sentiments in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which advocated the re-creation of the Commonwealth within the old borders, which carried a threat to the territorial integrity of Russia;

- the loss of Russia as a result of the conquests of France, the former influence in Central Europe, as well as the actions of Napoleon aimed at undermining its international authority;

- France's incitement of Turkey and Iran to war with Russia;

- the growth of personal hostility between Alexander 1 and Napoleon before the start of the Patriotic War of 1812;

- the growing dissatisfaction of the Russian nobility with the results of Alexander's foreign policy.

Russia's plans to restore monarchical regimes and the old order in countries occupied by Napoleon or under his control.

Preparation of the parties and the balance of forces in the Patriotic War of 1812

Military plans of the parties. Napoleon wanted to defeat the Russian army in a border battle and impose a enslaving peace treaty on Russia, which provided for the rejection of a number of territories from it and entry into an anti-English political alliance with France.

The Russian troops, according to the plan of General K.L.

diplomatic training. Napoleon created a powerful anti-Russian coalition, which included Austria, Prussia, the Netherlands, Italy, the Duchy of Warsaw, and the German states. True, a powerful popular uprising broke out in Spain, diverting significant French military forces to its suppression.

Russia, forced under Napoleon's pressure to declare war on Sweden in 1808, which had broken the continental blockade, managed to win on 1809 and annex Finland to itself under the Treaty of Friedrichsham. According to the Bucharest peace with Turkey (1812), she also secured her southern flank. In addition, a secret treaty of mutual assistance was concluded with Sweden on the eve of the Napoleonic invasion, and Turkey took a neutral position during the war years, which can also be attributed to the success of Russian diplomacy. However, apart from England, Russia had no allies at the beginning of the war.

The ratio of the armed forces. The French army was one of the strongest in Europe, including because Napoleon had an effect on medieval recruitment and introduced universal military service with a 5-year service. The "Great Army" of Napoleon, who invaded Russia, in addition to the French emperor, was led by talented commanders Lan, Ney, Murat, Oudinot, Macdonald and others. It "counted up to 670 thousand people and was multinational in its composition. Only half of them were French. Possessing rich combat experience, having hardened soldiers in its ranks, including the "old guard", at the same time it lost some of the qualities of the times of defending the gains of the revolution and the struggle for independence, turning into an army of conquerors.

Russia had during the war of 1812 an army of 590 thousand people. But she could only oppose Napoleon with about 300 thousand soldiers dispersed into three main groups along her western borders (the army of Barclay de Tolly, who also held the post of Minister of War, P.I. Bagration and A.P. Tormasov). But the fighting qualities of the Russian soldiers who stood up to defend their homeland turned out to be better than those of the invaders. Alexander I himself was the commander-in-chief of the Russian army at the beginning of the war.

The course of hostilities in the Patriotic War of 1812

First stage(From the beginning of the invasion to the Battle of Borodino). June 12, 1812 Napoleon's troops crossed the river. Neman. Their main task was to prevent the unification of the armies of Barclay de Tolly and Bagration and to defeat them separately. Retreating fighting and maneuvering, the Russian armies with great difficulty managed to unite near Smolensk, but under the threat of encirclement, after bloody battles on August 6, they were forced to leave the destroyed and burning city. Already at this stage of the war, Alexander 1, trying to make up for the lack of troops and taking into account the rise in patriotic sentiments of society and the people, issued orders to create a people's militia, to launch a partisan war. Yielding to public opinion, he signed an order to appoint M.K. Kutuzov, whom he personally disliked, as commander-in-chief of the Russian army.

Thus, the first stage was characterized by the superiority of the aggressor forces, the occupation of Russian territories. In addition to Moscow, the Napoleonic corps moved to Kyiv, where they were stopped by Tormasov, and to Riga. But Napoleon did not achieve a decisive victory, because his plans were thwarted. In addition, the war, even without the manifestos of Alexander 1, began to acquire a nationwide, "domestic" character.

Second phase(from Borodino to the battle for Maloyaroslavets). On August 2b, 1812, the famous Battle of Borodino began, during which the French troops fiercely attacked, and the Russians courageously defended themselves.

Both sides suffered heavy losses. Subsequently, Napoleon assessed it as the most "terrible" of all the battles he had given and believed that "the French showed themselves worthy of victory in it, and the Russians acquired the right to be invincible." The main goal of Napoleon - the defeat of the Russian army - was again not achieved, but the Russians, not having the strength to continue the battle, retreated from the battlefield in the morning. -> After a meeting in Fili near Moscow, the army leadership decided to leave Moscow. The population began to leave the city, fires broke out in Moscow, military depots were destroyed or taken out, and partisans acted in the vicinity.

As a result of skillful maneuver Russian army left the persecution of the French and settled down for rest and replenishment in a camp near Tfutino south of Moscow, covering the Tula arms factories and the grain southern provinces devastated by the war. Napoleon, while in Moscow, tried to make peace with Russia, but Alexander 1 showed firmness of spirit and rejected all his proposals. It was dangerous to remain in devastated Moscow, fermentation began in the "Great Army", and on October 7 Napoleon moved his army to Kaluga.

On October 12, Kutuzov’s troops met him at Maloyaroslavets and, after a fierce battle, forced him to retreat to the Smolensk road devastated by the war. From that moment on, the strategic initiative passed to the Russian army. In addition, in the words of Leo Tolstoy, the "club of the people's war" actively earned - partisan detachments, created both by landowners and peasants, and by the Russian command, dealt tangible blows to the enemy.

Third stage(from Maloyaroslavets to the defeat of the "Great Army" and the liberation of the territory of Russia). Moving to the West, losing people from clashes with flying cavalry units, disease and hunger, Napoleon brought only 50 thousand people to Smolensk. The Kutuzov army was on a parallel course, and all the time threatened to cut off the path to retreat. In the battles near the village of Krasnoe and on the Berezina River, the French army was actually defeated. Napoleon handed over command of the remnants of his troops to Murat, and he hurried to Paris.

Reasons for victory in the Patriotic War of 1812

The national liberation, popular character of the war, which manifested itself:

- in the steadfastness and courage of Russian soldiers and officers who selflessly defended their Fatherland;

- in the deployment of a partisan movement that caused significant damage to the enemy;

- in the nationwide patriotic upsurge of the country, the readiness of representatives of all classes for self-sacrifice

• The high level of military art of Russian military leaders
• Significant economic potential of Russia, which made it possible to create a large and armed army
• The loss by the French army of its best fighting qualities, the unwillingness and inability of Napoleon to find support among the peasant masses due to its liberation from serfdom.
• A certain contribution to the Russian victory was made by England and Spain, who diverted Napoleon's significant forces for the war with Spain at sea.

Foreign campaign 1813-1814. and the post-war world order after the Patriotic War of 1812

The end of the war. The liberation of Russia gave her guarantees against the new aggression of Napoleon. The modern non-estate army of a new type, universal conscription, the presence of trained, experienced, experienced reservists allowed France to form new corps.

Therefore, in January 1813. Russian troops entered the territory of Central Europe. Prussia came over to Russia, and then Austria. Napoleon fought with the passion of the doomed and inflicted a series of defeats on the allies. But in the decisive battle near Leipzig (October 1813), which received the name "Battle of the Nations", he was defeated. At the beginning of 1814 Allies crossed the frontiers of France. Soon Napoleon was exiled to the island of Elba.

post-war world.

Congress of Vienna. In September 1814 Delegations of the victorious countries gathered in Vienna both to resolve disputed territorial issues and to discuss the future of Europe. The sharp disagreements that arose were relegated to the background when, in March 1815. Napoleon on short term returned to power (“one hundred days”). The reconstituted coalition defeated his troops at the Battle of Waterloo (June 1815), and territorial disputes were resolved as follows: Saxony passed to Prussia, and the main part of the Duchy of Warsaw with its capital - to Russia. In the countries of Europe, the former monarchical regimes were restored, but serfdom, swept away in a number of countries (including Prussia) during the Napoleonic Wars, were not restored.

Holy Union was founded in September 1815. It included all the monarchies of Europe, but Russia, Prussia and Austria played a key role. The aims of the union were:

• in the protection of the state borders established by the Congress of Vienna, declared unshakable.
• in the defense of the so-called legitimate monarchies and the suppression of revolutionary national liberation movements.

Conclusions:

As a result of the war of 1812, many people died, and the Russian economy and culture suffered enormous damage.

Victory in the war rallied Russian society, caused the rise of national self-consciousness, led to the development of a social movement and social thought, including the opposition. The Decembrists called themselves "children of 1812".

On the other hand, it strengthened the ruling circles of the country in the idea of ​​the strength and even superiority of the social system in Russia, and, consequently, the needlessness of reforms, and thereby strengthened the conservative trend in domestic politics.

Russian troops passed through Paris with victories along with the armies of the allies, which unusually raised the international prestige of Russia, turned it into a powerful military power, which gave rise to social movements under Nicholas I.

Due to new acquisitions expanded the population. But, having included in its composition the lands of "Greater Poland", for many years it acquired a very painful Polish problem, due to the ongoing struggle of the Polish people for national independence.

Good day, dear reader! The Patriotic War of 1812 must be summarized very skillfully, for although this small segment history, but it is densely saturated with events, and besides them there are many ensuing consequences that need to be understood.

The topic is quite complicated, and partly because of this, it often pops up in the exams of the OGE and the Unified State Examination in history. After reading this work, you will receive the necessary knowledge base on this section of history and will be able to easily parry questions and score points. What, intrigued? - Then let's start.

A little background

During the revolution in France, Napoleon Bonaparte or Napoleon 1 came to power. Alexander 1 was on the Russian throne at that time. France at that time had ambitious plans and wanted to significantly expand its lands and colonies to increase economic growth and build up political power.

Napoleon Bonaparte

At the first steps, she did it very well, almost all over Europe the heads of state were replaced and replaced by those who were loyal to Napoleon, most often they were his own relatives. All of them together paid money and were in complete economic dependence on France.

However, England, being a strong country, actively opposed the attempt of the French to establish a monopoly in all areas of geopolitical relations, which caused a conflict between them. In parallel with England, Austria also did not want a violation of sovereignty, and Russia was in alliance with it. As a result, everything, as it often happens, came to hostilities.

The beginning was laid in the Battle of Shengraben - November 16, 1805, from which France did not receive special dividends, but on December 2, 1805. the battle of Austerlitz took place, which turned out to be an excellent example of Napoleon's talent as a commander, and as a result, the allied forces were defeated, France benefited, and Napoleon 1 rode into France on horseback. He was showered with stormy applause, recognized as a genius. But all these battles were far from Russia, so this is not yet a patriotic war. In addition, the Peace of Tilsit was concluded with France on June 7, 1807, a lull began.

Origins of the war

So, before proceeding directly to hostilities, we will discuss the reasons for the start armed conflict and plans of the parties.

Firstly, Napoleon's monstrous desire for world domination did not decrease over 5 years, rather, on the contrary, it became more obsessive, and Russia at that time was a superpower, so why not get even with it?

Secondly, Russia violated the agreements of the Tilsit Peace in every possible way, and in particular, it tried to sabotage the continental blockade against England, which, by the way, was main reason France's interest in signing this agreement. In addition, Russia also tried to counteract the expansion of Napoleon's hegemony and power, which of course disgusted him.

As a result, in 1810, active preparation of the parties for the battle began.

Side Plans

This is worth discussing briefly.

Napoleon wanted to capture the main industrial part of Russia up to Moscow, after which he signed an agreement with the emperor and subsequently seize power in the country. The basic plan was simple: not to allow the Russian army to connect, to win in numbers. It is necessary to decide the outcome in several pitched battles.

Alexander and his advisers approached this issue more carefully. Firstly, there could be no compromise or agreement with Napoleon, fight to the end. Secondly, an active defense strategy has been chosen.

The beginning of the war

It is necessary to know that the conflict consisted of two stages: defense, exhausting the enemy by luring him deep into the country and a counteroffensive with subsequent expulsion from his territory.

June 12, 1812 - Napoleon, dominating his troops, crossed the Neman and invaded Russia, and the Patriotic War began. The Russian armies retreated and did not accept the battle, they tried to establish communication.

The further course of events can be described as minor skirmishes between the partisans and the French, looting by the aggressors, and further advancement. In the end, the mood in the Russian ranks began to deteriorate, the soldiers were thirsty for blood and demanded a general battle. Later it will be given, but for now, until July 22, the desire to unite the armies continued, and just on that day, near Smolensk, the 1st and 2nd armies united.

battle of Borodino

The battle of Borodino can rightly be called the most controversial event of this conflict. To this day, historians argue about who won, the prevailing opinion can be called a compromise to some extent, although it is difficult to disagree with him - there was a draw.

Before moving on to the battle itself, let's analyze the tactical plans of the parties.

Napoleon wanted to sweep away the Russian army with a powerful blow of his fist, to take it in quantity. To do this, it was necessary to move quickly and confidently attack. Breakthrough and encirclement of defense - best characteristic this plan.

Kutuzov, namely he was the commander in chief, perfectly understood that nothing could be done against the ardor of Bonaparte, so he only had to defend himself. It was decided to create artificial fortifications in the form of ditches and embankments and repel attacks in waves. Protection was located in three directions. M.B. Barclay de Tolly commanded on the right flank, P.I. Bagration’s army on the left, and the artillery of General N.N. Raevsky was in the center.

The battle began from the left flank, at first the French were doing well. Then the fighting moved to the center, where the main blow was concentrated. However, the Russian soldiers stood not for life but for death and held firm. Of course, they could not completely stop Napoleon, the ardor of his subordinates could not be appeased, but after 16 hours the attacking potential dried up, the forces left, and rest was needed.

After 12 hours, it was already possible to sum up the results, since the battle was over. The French were never able to break through, defense tactics triumphed. The losses were colossal. Most importantly, the morale of the Russian soldiers increased, while the opponents, on the contrary, fell.

Was Moscow given to the French for nothing? - No, not for nothing, but to make such a decision, which will predetermine the further course of all hostilities, was by right not easy.

Military Council in Fili © Alexey Danilovich Kivshenko

In the village of Fili, west of Moscow, a military council was convened to decide the future of the former capital. There were fierce disputes, but Kutuzov's point of view won, which said that it was necessary to leave the devastated Moscow to the enemy without any resources, in order to then, being prepared, finish off the enemy who did not have any supplies. This scene is most vividly described in Leo Tolstoy's epic novel War and Peace.

Although Napoleon entered burned Moscow, he did not receive any dividends from this, but only spent the strength of his army, a terrible fate awaits him, cold Russian winters are coming.

Exile of Napoleon

After realizing the mistake, the French army began a massive retreat, but it was too late. The Russians were located in untrodden directions, thereby maintaining the blockade of the enemy. Napoleon fled the way he came, the road burned to the ground. What can I say, Russia - big country, it was far to go, and even small partisan raids constantly bothered. A mass desertion began, and the retreat of the enemy began to look like a disorderly flight. Napoleon himself subsequently, leaving his army, secretly fled. Kutuzov's order on December 21 and the tsar's manifesto on December 25, 1812 marked the end of the Patriotic War.

Conclusion

The results of the war were as follows. During the war, Russia suffered substantial economic damage, estimated at 1 billion rubles, and about 300 thousand soldiers were also killed. In addition to this, many Russians poured into Europe, which provoked the subsequent uprising of the Decembrists. However, the usurper was defeated, an even greater status was gained, as the victorious country, and ties were established with some European powers.

It is worth adding that all issues following the war with Napoleon were resolved at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The results are so extensive that they deserve a separate analysis.

By the way, in our training courses, the whole topic of the Napoleonic Wars is analyzed on first-class illustrative material and with all the nuances. .

The Patriotic War of 1812 (fr. Campagne de Russie pendant l "année 1812) is a war between Russia and Napoleonic France in Russia in 1812.

The reasons for the war were Russia's refusal to actively support the continental blockade, in which Napoleon saw the main weapon against Great Britain, as well as Napoleon's policy towards European states, carried out without taking into account the interests of Russia.

At the first stage of the war (from June to September 1812), the Russian army fought back from the borders of Russia to Moscow, giving the battle of Borodino before Moscow.

At the second stage of the war (from October to December 1812), the Napoleonic army first maneuvered, trying to leave for winter quarters in areas not devastated by the war, and then retreated to the borders of Russia, pursued by the Russian army, hunger and frost.

The war ended with the almost complete destruction of the Napoleonic army, the liberation of the territory of Russia and the transfer of hostilities to the lands of the Duchy of Warsaw and Germany in 1813 (see War of the Sixth Coalition). Among the reasons for the defeat of Napoleon's army, the Russian historian N. Troitsky names the popular participation in the war and the heroism of the Russian army, the unpreparedness of the French army for military operations in large spaces and in the natural and climatic conditions of Russia, military leadership talents of the Russian commander in chief M. I. Kutuzov and other generals.

Background to the conflict

After the defeat of the Russian troops in the battle of Friedland, on July 7, 1807, Emperor Alexander I concluded the Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon, according to which he pledged to join the continental blockade of Great Britain, which was contrary to the economic and political interests of Russia. According to the Russian nobility and the army, the terms of the peace treaty were humiliating and shameful for the country. The Russian government used the Treaty of Tilsit and the years that followed to build up strength for the upcoming fight against Napoleon.

As a result of the Treaty of Tilsit and the Congress of Erfurt, Russia in 1808 took away Finland from Sweden and made a number of other territorial acquisitions; Napoleon untied her hands to conquer all of Europe. French troops, after a series of annexations, carried out mainly at the expense of Austrian possessions (see War of the Fifth Coalition), moved close to the borders Russian Empire.

Causes of the war

From the French side

After 1807, Great Britain remained the main and, in fact, the only enemy of Napoleon. Great Britain seized French colonies in America and India and interfered with French trade. Given that England dominated the sea, Napoleon's only real weapon in the fight against her was a continental blockade, the effectiveness of which depended on the willingness of other European states to comply with sanctions. Napoleon insistently demanded that Alexander I implement the continental blockade more consistently, but ran into Russia's unwillingness to break off relations with its main trading partner.

In 1810, the Russian government introduced free trade with neutral countries, which allowed Russia to trade with Britain through intermediaries, and adopted a protective tariff that increased customs rates, mainly on imported French goods. This angered the French government.

Napoleon, not being a hereditary monarch, wanted to confirm the legitimacy of his coronation through marriage with a representative of one of the great monarchical houses of Europe. In 1808, a marriage proposal was made to the Russian royal house between Napoleon and the sister of Alexander I, Grand Duchess Catherine. The proposal was rejected under the pretext of Catherine's engagement to the Prince of Saxe-Coburg. In 1810, Napoleon was denied a second time, this time regarding marriage to another Grand Duchess - 14-year-old Anna (later Queen of the Netherlands). In the same 1810, Napoleon married Princess Marie-Louise of Austria, daughter of Emperor Franz II of Austria. According to the historian E. V. Tarle, the "Austrian marriage" for Napoleon "was the biggest support for the rear, in case you have to fight again with Russia." Alexander I's double refusal to Napoleon and Napoleon's marriage to an Austrian princess caused a crisis of confidence in Russian-French relations and worsened them dramatically.

At the beginning of 1811, Russia, constantly fearing the restoration of Poland, pulled together several divisions to the borders of the Duchy of Warsaw, which was perceived by Napoleon as a military threat in relation to the Duchy.

In 1811, Napoleon told his ambassador in Warsaw, Abbé de Pradt: “In five years I will be the master of the whole world. Only Russia remains - I will crush it ... ".

From Russia

According to traditional ideas in Russian science, Russian landowners and merchants suffered from the consequences of the continental blockade, to which Russia joined under the terms of the Tilsit Peace of 1807, and, as a result, public finance Russia. If before the conclusion of the Tilsit Treaty in 1801-1806, Russia annually exported 2.2 million quarters of grain, then after - in 1807-1810 - the export amounted to 600 thousand quarters. The reduction in exports led to a sharp drop in the price of bread. A pood of bread, which in 1804 cost 40 silver kopecks, was sold in 1810 for 22 kopecks. At the same time, the export of gold in exchange for luxury goods from France accelerated. All this led to a decrease in the value of the ruble and the depreciation of Russian paper money. The Russian government was forced to take measures to protect the country's economy. In 1810, it introduced free trade with neutral countries (which allowed Russia to trade with Britain through intermediaries) and increased customs rates on imported luxury goods and wines, that is, just for French exports.

However, a number of researchers argue that the well-being of the main tax-paying estates, including the merchants and the peasantry, did not undergo significant changes during the blockade. This can be judged, in particular, by the dynamics of arrears in payments to the budget, which shows that these classes even found the opportunity to pay increased taxes during the period under review. The same authors argue that the restriction on the import of foreign goods stimulated the development of domestic industry. An anonymous contemporary of those events characterizes the consequences of this forced protectionism in the following way: “Cloth factories could never have arisen. Scraps, silk fabrics, canvas, linen and other fabrics that have barely begun to multiply, as they are suppressed by English needlework. With difficulty, they began to recover after the suppression of bargaining with them. Calico and print factories had the same fate. In addition, the goods, the receipt of which was hindered by the blockade of England, were not essential items: sugar and coffee were not yet in widespread use, salt, which is also often indicated among the missing goods, was produced in excess in Russia itself and imported from abroad. borders only in the Baltic provinces. The decrease in customs duties observed during the blockade had no great influence on the domestic budget, since duties were not its significant item, and even at the time of reaching their maximum value in 1803, when they amounted to 13.1 million rubles, they accounted for only 12.9% of budget revenues. Therefore, according to this point of view, the continental blockade of England was for Alexander I only a pretext for breaking off relations with France.

In 1807, from the Polish lands, which, according to the second and third partitions of Poland, were part of Prussia and Austria, Napoleon created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Napoleon supported the dreams of the Duchy of Warsaw to recreate an independent Poland to the borders of the former Commonwealth, which was possible only after part of its territory was torn away from Russia. In 1810, Napoleon took possession of the Duke of Oldenburg, a relative of Alexander I, which caused outrage in St. Petersburg. Alexander I demanded that the Duchy of Warsaw be transferred as compensation for the seized possessions to the Duke of Oldenburg or liquidated as an independent entity.

Contrary to the terms of the Tilsit Agreement, Napoleon continued to occupy the territory of Prussia with his troops, Alexander I demanded that they be withdrawn from there.

From the end of 1810, the coming war between the French and Russian empires began to be discussed in European diplomatic circles. By the autumn of 1811, the Russian ambassador in Paris, Prince Kurakin, was reporting to St. Petersburg on signs of an imminent war.

Diplomacy and intelligence on the eve of the war

December 17, 1811 in Paris between Napoleon and Austrian Empire in the person of Ambassador Schwarzenberg, agreements were reached, on the basis of which the Franco-Austrian military alliance was concluded. Austria undertook to put up a 30,000-strong corps against Russia under the command of Napoleon, and Napoleon agreed to return to Austria the Illyrian provinces, which he had taken from her according to the Schönbrunn Peace of 1809. Austria received these provinces only after the end of Napoleon's war with Russia, and, moreover, Austria undertook to cede Galicia to Poland.

On February 24, 1812, Napoleon also concluded an alliance treaty with Prussia. The Prussians agreed to provide 20 thousand soldiers and provide the French army with the necessary supplies, in exchange for this the Prussian king demanded something from the recaptured Russian lands (Courland, Livonia, Estonia).

Before the start of the campaign, Napoleon studied the political, military and economic situation in Russia. The French were widely deployed intelligence. Since 1810, spies have been infiltrating Russia under the guise of artists, monks, travelers, merchants, and retired Russian officers. Intelligence used the French and other foreigners - tutors, doctors, teachers, servants. Polish intelligence was also active, led by the chief of staff of the troops of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, General Fischer. Even Prussia, officially friendly to Russia, had informers at its embassy in St. Petersburg. Shortly before the war, the French managed to get hold of the engraving boards of the "stolist" Russian map. Her inscriptions were translated into French, and it was this card that the French generals used during the war. Ambassadors of France to Russia L. Caulaincourt and J.-A. Lauriston were "residents No. 1 of French intelligence." The command of the French army knew the composition and strength of the Russian troops.

In preparation for the war, Russia was also active in diplomacy and intelligence. As a result of secret negotiations in the spring of 1812, the Austrians made it clear that they would not be zealous for the good of Napoleon and their army would not go far from the Austro-Russian border.

Swedish crown prince (former Napoleonic marshal) Bernadotte was made two proposals. Napoleon offered Finland to the Swedes if they opposed Russia, and Alexander offered Norway if they opposed Napoleon. Bernadotte, having weighed both proposals, leaned towards Alexander - not only because Norway was richer than Finland, but also because the sea protected Sweden from Napoleon, and nothing from Russia. In January 1812, Napoleon occupied Swedish Pomerania, pushing Sweden towards an alliance with Russia. On March 24 (April 5) of the same year, Bernadotte concluded an alliance treaty with Russia.

On May 22, 1812, the commander-in-chief of the Moldavian army, Kutuzov, ended the five-year war for Moldavia and made peace with Turkey. In the south of Russia, the Danube army of Admiral Chichagov was released as a barrier against Austria, forced to be in alliance with Napoleon.

Napoleon later said that he should have abandoned the war with Russia already at the moment when he learned that neither Turkey nor Sweden would fight Russia.

As a result of the successful actions of Russian intelligence, the command of the Russian army knew in detail the state of the Great Army. Every 1st and 15th day of the month, the French Minister of War submitted to the emperor the so-called "State Report" of the entire French army with all changes in the number of its individual units, with all changes in its cantonment, taking into account new appointments to command posts, etc. Through an agent in the French headquarters, this report immediately got to Colonel A. I. Chernyshev, seconded to the Russian embassy in Paris, and from him to St. Petersburg.

On the side of France

By 1811, the French empire, with its vassal states, had a population of 71 million out of 172 million that inhabited Europe. At the initial stage, Napoleon was able to gather in a campaign against Russia, according to various sources, from 400 to 450 thousand soldiers, of which the French themselves made up half (see the Great Army). There is evidence (in particular, General Bertezen (fr.) Russian) that the actual strength of the 1st line of the Great Army was only about half of its payroll, that is, no more than 235 thousand people, and that the commanders, when submitting reports concealed the true composition of their units. It is noteworthy that the then data of Russian intelligence also gave this number. 16 different nationalities took part in the campaign: the most numerous were Germans and Poles. On the basis of allied agreements with France, Austria and Prussia allocated 30 and 20 thousand troops, respectively. After the invasion, units of up to 20 thousand were added to the Great Army, formed from the inhabitants of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

Napoleon had reserves: from 130 to 220 thousand soldiers in the garrisons of Central Europe (of which 70 thousand were in the 9th (Victor) and 11th (Augereau) reserve corps in Prussia) and 100 thousand of the French National Guard, which, by law, did not could fight outside the country.

In anticipation of a military clash, the French command along the Vistula River from Warsaw to Danzig created large artillery and food depots. Danzig became the largest center for supplying troops, in which by January 1812 there was a supply of food for 50 days for 400 thousand people and 50 thousand horses.

Napoleon concentrated the main forces in 3 groups, which, according to the plan, were supposed to surround and destroy the parts of the army of Barclay and Bagration. The left (218 thousand people) was headed by Napoleon himself, the central (82 thousand people) - by his stepson, Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais, the right (78 thousand people) - by the younger brother in the Bonaparte family, King of Westphalia Jerome Bonaparte . In addition to the main forces, Jacques Macdonald's corps of 32.5 thousand people was located on the left flank against Wittgenstein. , and in the south - the right flank - the allied corps of Karl Schwarzenberg, numbering 34 thousand people.

The strengths of the Great Army were its large numbers, good material and technical support, combat experience, and belief in the invincibility of the army. The weak side was its very motley national composition.

On the side of Russia

Army strength

The population of Russia in 1811 was more than 40 million people. The blow of Napoleon's army was taken over by the troops stationed on the western border: the 1st Army of Barclay de Tolly and the 2nd Army of Bagration, a total of 153 thousand soldiers and 758 guns. Even further south in Volhynia (north-west of present-day Ukraine), the 3rd Army of Tormasov (up to 45 thousand, 168 guns) was located, which served as a barrier from Austria. In Moldova, the Danube army of Admiral Chichagov (55 thousand, 202 guns) stood against Turkey. In Finland, the corps of the Russian general Steingel (19 thousand, 102 guns) stood against Sweden. In the Riga area there was a separate Essen corps (up to 18 thousand), up to 4 reserve corps were located further from the border.

Irregular Cossack troops numbered 117 thousand light cavalry according to the lists, but in reality 20-25 thousand Cossacks took part in the war.

Armament

Arms factories produced annually 1200-1300 guns and more than 150 thousand pounds of bombs and nuclei (cf .: French factories produced 900-1000 guns). At the Tula, Sestroretsk and Izhevsk arms factories, from 43 to 96 thousand guns were manufactured per year, in addition, the arsenals could repair almost the same number of weapons, while in all French ones - about 100 thousand guns per year. Russian weapons of that time were of relatively high quality and, according to tactical and technical data, were not inferior to French ones. However, the capacity of its own Russian production not enough to meet all the needs of the army. Some regiments and even divisions were armed with English or Austrian guns. The Russian infantry was armed mainly with smoothbore guns; only some shooters had rifled fittings or screw guns. The artillery had 6- and 12-pounder guns, as well as unicorns, which fired grenades weighing ½ and ¼ pounds. The predominant type of field artillery was the 6-pounder, as was the case in most European countries at the time.

By the beginning of the war, a stock of several hundred guns was concentrated in the warehouses of the Russian army, as well as up to 175 thousand guns, 296 thousand artillery and 44 million gun charges. Artillery depots supplying the Russian army were located along 3 lines:

Vilna - Dinaburg - Nesvizh - Bobruisk - Polonne - Kyiv

Pskov - Porkhov - Shostka - Bryansk - Smolensk

Novgorod - Moscow - Kaluga

According to technical and military data, the Russian army did not lag behind the French army. The weak side of the Russian army was the theft of “commission agents” and quartermaster ranks, the embezzlement of many regimental, company and other ranks, cashing in on allowances, which abuses, according to the figurative remark of a contemporary, were “half legalized”.

Army management reform

In March 1811, in Russia, under the leadership of Minister of War Barclay de Tolly, a reform of the army administration began - a "Commission for the drafting of military regulations and codes" was created. The commission took into account the experience different countries- Austrian military regulations of 1807-1809, Prussian military regulations of 1807-1810, much attention was paid to the latest regulations and instructions of the French army.

According to the new charter, the command of the army was entrusted to the commander in chief, who also controlled it through the main headquarters. The main headquarters of the army was divided into four departments: the chief of the main headquarters; engineering; artillery; quartermaster. The chiefs of departments of the main headquarters were directly subordinate to the commander-in-chief. Among them, the chief of the main staff was predominant. The chief of staff was the second person in the army, through him all the orders of the commander in chief were transmitted, he took command of the army in the event of illness or death of the commander in chief. The department of the chief of the main staff consisted of two parts: the quartermaster and the army on duty. The quartermaster general led the operational part of the army, the general on duty was in charge of issues related to the combat, rear, military-sanitary, military-police and naval services.

The Ministry of War in February 1812 formed the 1st and 2nd Western armies from the troops located on the western border. In March, printed copies of the charter were sent to the armies, and the formation of their headquarters began.

Allies

On July 18, 1812, Russia and Great Britain signed the Treaty of Erebru, which ended the sluggish Anglo-Russian war that began after Russia joined the continental blockade. The peace of Erebro restored friendly and trade relations based on the principle of "most favored nation", provided for mutual assistance in the event of an attack by a third power. The English army was involved in fighting the French in Spain. Spain, having connected 200-300 thousand French soldiers with partisan resistance, indirectly provided assistance to Russia. On July 8 (20), 1812, in Velikiye Luki, the plenipotentiary representative of the Russian government, R. A. Koshelev, signed an alliance agreement with the representative of the Spanish Supreme Junta, Zea de Bermudez.

Strategic plans of the parties before the start of hostilities

The goals of the Russian campaign for Napoleon were:

first of all, the tightening of the continental blockade of England;

revival in opposition to the Russian Empire of the Polish independent state with the inclusion of the territories of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine (initially Napoleon even defined the war as the Second Polish War);

the conclusion of a military alliance with Russia for a possible joint campaign in India.

Expecting that Alexander would be the first to attack the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Napoleon planned to quickly end the war by defeating the Russian army in a general battle on the Polish-Lithuanian territory in the region of Vilna or Warsaw, where the population was anti-Russian. Napoleon's calculation was simple - the defeat of the Russian army in one or two battles would force Alexander I to accept his conditions.

On the eve of the Russian campaign, Napoleon declared to Metternich: “The triumph will be the lot of the more patient. I will open the campaign by crossing the Neman. I will finish it in Smolensk and Minsk. I will stop there." Unlike the policy pursued in Europe, Napoleon did not set the task of changing political structure Russia (in particular, he was not going to free the peasants from serfdom).

After analyzing the secret reports of the beginning of 1812, the historian O. V. Sokolov concluded that Napoleon expected to quickly end the campaign by winning a big border battle. The retreat of the Russian army deep into Russia caught him by surprise, forcing him to linger in indecision in Vilna for 18 days: the emperor had never allowed such hesitation before.

In the years that were written, sometimes decades later, grandiose plans for the conquest of Moscow began to be attributed to Napoleon in his memoirs. So, they say that in a conversation with the French ambassador in Warsaw Pradt on the eve of the invasion, Napoleon said: “I am going to Moscow and in one or two battles I will finish everything. Emperor Alexander will be on his knees asking for peace. I will burn Tula and disarm Russia." Another quote from Napoleon is also cited: “If I take Kyiv, I will take Russia by the feet; if I take possession of Petersburg, I will take her by the head; having occupied Moscow, I will strike her in the heart.

Strategic plans for a war with France - both defensive and offensive in nature (the latter included the capture of the Duchy of Warsaw and, possibly, Silesia, as well as Prussia (in other plans, Prussia was considered as a likely ally) - began to be developed in the Russian Empire from February 1810; on this moment more than 30 different names of authors are known (only a few of whom, however, were directly involved in the development of strategic plans) and more than 40 documents of varying degrees of detail.

The Russian command long before the start of the war foresaw the possibility of a long organized retreat in order to avoid the risk of losing the army in a decisive battle. The general principles of the retreat strategy were developed by the Prussian military theorist D.G. Byulov; in August 1810, Ludwig von Wolzogen's plan, drawn up a year earlier at the suggestion of Eugene of Württemberg, was submitted for consideration to Prince P.M. Volkonsky, which recommended the creation of a system of fortified strongholds and a strategy for the retreat of two armies in divergent directions. In May 1811, Emperor Alexander I explained his attitude to the upcoming battle to the French Ambassador to Russia, Armand Caulaincourt:

If Emperor Napoleon starts a war against me, then it is possible and even likely that he will beat us if we accept the battle, but this will not give him peace yet. ... We have an immense space behind us, and we will keep a well-organized army. ... If the lot of arms decides the case against me, then I would rather retreat to Kamchatka than give up my provinces and sign agreements in my capital that are only a respite. The Frenchman is brave, but long hardships and a bad climate tire and discourage him. Our climate and our winter will fight for us.

Of the defensive plans presented to the Russian Emperor Alexander I, the plan of General Pfuel was chosen. According to Pfuel's plan, it was supposed to conduct military operations with three armies, one of the armies was supposed to hold the enemy from the front, while the others were to act from the flank and rear. It was planned that if the French launched an offensive against the 1st Army, then it should withdraw and defend itself from the Drissa fortified camp, and at this time the 2nd Army would strike at the flank and rear of the advancing French. The active defensive actions of both armies on the lines of communication of the French were supposed to force the enemy to retreat, since, according to the author of the plan, he could not remain in the devastated territory for a long time. The 3rd Army, according to this plan, covered the flanks of the 2nd Army and the Kiev direction. During the course of the war, Pfuel's plan was rejected as impossible under the conditions of modern mobile warfare.

Other proposals were put forward regarding the strategy of warfare. In particular, the commander of the 2nd Western Army, General Bagration, proposed an offensive plan against Napoleon, which provided for the advancement of Russian troops in the spring of 1812 to the Vistula line with the capture of Warsaw. The tsar did not approve of this plan, since by that time Napoleon had already concentrated 220 thousand soldiers in fortifications along the Russian border.

Napoleon's offensive (June - September 1812)

On May 9, 1812, Napoleon left Saint Cloud for Dresden, where he met with the "allied" monarchs of Europe. From Dresden, the emperor went to the Grand Army on the Neman River, which separated Prussia and Russia. On June 22, Napoleon addressed an appeal to the troops, in which he accused Russia of violating the Tilsit agreement and called the attack on Russia the second Polish war. The appeal was included in the 2nd bulletin of the Grand Army - these propaganda issues were published throughout the war.

On the evening of June 11 (23), 1812, a patrol of the Life Guards of the Cossack Regiment, three miles up the Neman River, not far from Kovno (Lithuania), noticed suspicious movement on the opposite bank. When it got completely dark, a company of French sappers crossed the river from the elevated and wooded shore to the Russian shore in boats and ferries, and the first skirmish took place. After midnight on June 24, 1812, the crossing of French troops across the border Neman began along the four bridges above Kovno.

At 6 am on June 12 (24), 1812, the vanguard of the French troops entered the Russian fortress of Kovno. On the evening of June 24, Emperor Alexander I was at a ball at Bennigsen's in Vilna, where he was informed about Napoleon's invasion.

The crossing of 220 thousand soldiers of the Great Army near Kovno took 4 days. The river was crossed by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd infantry corps, guards and cavalry.

The first clash with the Russian army (the Russian rearguard with Murat's cavalry attacking him) occurred on June 25 near the village of Barbarishki (modern Babrishkes). The same skirmishes occurred at Rumshishki (modern Rumshiskes) and Popartsy (modern Papartsiai).

On June 17 (29)-June 18 (30), another grouping (67 thousand soldiers: 4th and 6th infantry corps, cavalry) crossed near Prena south of Kovno Neman under the command of Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais. Almost simultaneously on June 18 (30) even further south, near Grodno, the Neman crossed 4 corps (78-79 thousand soldiers: 5th, 7th, 8th infantry and 4th cavalry corps) under the general command of the King of Westphalia Jerome Bonaparte.

In the northern direction, near Tilsit, the Neman crossed the 10 Corps of Marshal MacDonald. In the southern direction from Warsaw through the Bug, a separate Austrian corps of General Schwarzenberg (30-34 thousand soldiers) began to invade.

On June 16 (28) Vilna was occupied. Napoleon, having arranged state affairs in occupied Lithuania, left the city after his troops only on July 4 (16).

From Neman to Smolensk

North direction

Napoleon directed the 10th Corps (32 thousand) of Marshal MacDonald to Petersburg. Previously, the corps was to occupy Riga, and then, connecting with the 2nd corps of Marshal Oudinot (28 thousand), move on. The basis of Macdonald's corps was the 20,000th Prussian corps under the command of General Gravert (later York).

Marshal MacDonald approached the fortifications of Riga, however, having no siege artillery, he stopped at the distant approaches to the city. The military governor of Riga, General Essen, burned the suburbs and locked himself in the city with a strong garrison (18 thousand). Trying to support Oudinot, MacDonald captured the abandoned city of Dinaburg on the Western Dvina River and stopped active operations, waiting for siege artillery from East Prussia. The Prussians of Macdonald's corps avoided active combat clashes in this alien war for them.

Marshal Oudinot, having occupied the city of Polotsk, decided to bypass from the north a separate corps of General Wittgenstein (25 thousand), allocated by the commander-in-chief of the 1st Army, Barclay de Tolly, during the retreat through Polotsk to defend the St. Petersburg direction. Fearing a connection between Oudinot and MacDonald, on July 18 (30) Wittgenstein attacked Oudinot’s corps, which was not expecting an attack and was weakened by the march near Klyastitsy, threw it back to Polotsk and tried to capture the city on August 5 (17)-August 6 (18), however, the corps of General Saint Syrah, timely sent by Napoleon to support Oudinot's corps, helped repel the attack and restore balance.

Marshals MacDonald and Oudinot were bogged down in low-level fighting, remaining in place.

Central (Moscow) direction

Parts of the 1st Western Army were scattered from the Baltic to Lida, the headquarters was in Vilna. The commander of the 1st Army was Infantry General Barclay de Tolly, his chief of staff was Major General A.P. Yermolov; quartermaster general - colonel of the quartermaster unit K. F. Tol.

In view of the rapid advance of Napoleon, the scattered Russian corps were in danger of being defeated piecemeal. Dokhturov's corps found itself in an operational encirclement, but was able to break out and arrive at the Sventsyany assembly point. The French cut off Dorokhov's cavalry detachment, which joined Bagration's army. After the 1st Army connected, Barclay de Tolly began to gradually retreat to Vilna and further to Drissa.

On June 26, the army left Vilna and on July 10 arrived at the Drissa fortified camp, in which, according to Pfuel's plan, the Russian army was supposed to wear down the enemy. The generals managed to convince the tsar of the absurdity of this plan, and on July 17 the army withdrew through Polotsk to Vitebsk, leaving Wittgenstein's 1st corps to defend St. Petersburg.

In Polotsk, the harm from the stay of Alexander I with the army became so obvious that in early July the closest confidants of the tsar (A. S. Shishkov, A. A. Arakcheev and A. D. Balashov) persuaded him to leave under the pretext of the need to be in the capital for preparation of reserves.

The 2nd Western Army (up to 45 thousand) at the beginning of the invasion was located near Grodno (in the west of Belarus), about 150 km from the 1st Army. The head of the 2nd Western Army was P.I. Bagration, the post of chief of staff was occupied by Major General E.F. Saint-Prix, Adjutant General of Alexander I; Quartermaster General - Major General M. S. Vistitsky 2nd.

Bagration tried to connect with the main 1st Army, but when he reached Lida (100 km from Vilna), he realized that the French would not allow this. The 2nd Army retreated to the south. The Cossacks of Ataman Platov, covering the rear of the retreating army, successfully detained the French in the battles near Grodno and near Mir. To cut off the 2nd Army from the main forces and destroy it, Napoleon sent Marshal Davout with a force of up to 50,000 soldiers. Davout moved from Vilna to Minsk, which he occupied on July 8. From the west, Jerome Bonaparte also advanced on Bagration with 4 corps. Bagration, with swift marches and successful rearguard battles, broke away from the troops of Jerome and through Novogrudok, Nesvizh and Slutsk, bypassing Minsk from the south, moved to Bobruisk.

On July 19, the 2nd Army was in Bobruisk on the Berezina River, while on July 21 Davout's corps was located in advanced units in Mogilev. Bagration, having approached the Dnieper 60 kilometers below Mogilev, sent Raevsky’s corps on July 23 in order to throw Davout away from Mogilev and reach the direct road to Vitebsk, where the Russian armies were supposed to join. As a result of the battle near Saltanovka, Raevsky delayed Davout's advance east to Smolensk, but the path to Vitebsk was closed. Bagration was able to force the Dnieper in the town of Novoe Bykhovo without interference on July 24-25 and headed for Smolensk. Davout did not have the strength to pursue the 2nd Army, while the grouping of Jerome Bonaparte (displaced from command by that time), hopelessly lagging behind the 2nd Army, was redirected by Napoleon to other directions.

On July 23, the 1st Army arrived in Vitebsk, where Barclay de Tolly wanted to wait for the 2nd Army. To prevent the advance of the French, he sent the 4th Corps of Osterman-Tolstoy towards the enemy's vanguard. On July 25-26, a battle took place near Ostrovno, 26 versts from Vitebsk. On July 27, Barclay de Tolly retreated from Vitebsk to Smolensk, having learned about the approach of Napoleon with the main forces and the impossibility for Bagration to break through to Vitebsk.

On August 3, the 1st and 2nd Russian armies joined near Smolensk, thus achieving the first strategic success. There was a small respite in the war, both sides put their troops in order, tired of incessant marches.

Upon reaching Vitebsk, Napoleon made a stop to rest the troops, upset after a 400 km offensive. On August 13, after long hesitation, Napoleon set out from Vitebsk to Smolensk.

South direction

The 7th Saxon Corps under the command of General Rainier (17-22 thousand) was supposed to cover the right flank of Napoleon's main forces from the 3rd Russian Army under the command of General Tormasov (46 thousand people with 164 guns). Rainier took up position along the Brest-Kobrin-Pinsk line, spraying a small corps over 170 km. On July 27, Tormasov surrounded Kobrin, the Saxon garrison under the command of Klengel (up to 5 thousand) was completely defeated. Brest and Pinsk were also cleared of the French garrisons.

Realizing that the weakened Rainier would not be able to keep Tormasov, Napoleon decided not to involve the Austrian Corps of General Schwarzenberg (30 thousand) in the main direction and left him in the south against Tormasov. Rainier, gathering his troops and linking up with Schwarzenberg, attacked Tormasov on August 12 at Gorodechna, forcing the Russians to retreat to Lutsk. The Saxons are mainly fighting in this direction, the Austrians are trying to limit themselves to artillery shelling and maneuvers.

Until the end of September, sluggish fighting was carried out in the south in a sparsely populated swampy area in the Lutsk region.

In addition to General Tormasov, in the southern direction was the 2nd Russian reserve corps of General Ertel, formed in Mozyr and providing support to the blockaded garrison of Bobruisk. For the blockade of Bobruisk, as well as to cover communications from Ertel, Napoleon left the Polish division of General Dombrovsky (8 thousand) from the 5th Polish Corps.

From Smolensk to Moscow

After the connection of the Russian armies, the generals began to insistently demand a general battle from the commander-in-chief Barclay de Tolly. Taking advantage of the scattered position of the French corps, Barclay de Tolly decided to defeat them one by one and marched on Rudnya on August 8, where Marshal Murat's cavalry was quartered.

However, Napoleon, taking advantage of the slow advance of the Russian army, gathered his corps into a fist and tried to get Barclay de Tolly in the rear, bypassing his left flank from the south, for which he forced the Dnieper River west of Smolensk. On the path of the vanguard of the French army was the 27th division of General Neverovsky, covering the left flank of the Russian army near Krasnoe. The stubborn resistance of Neverovsky gave time to transfer the corps of General Raevsky to Smolensk.

By August 16, Napoleon approached Smolensk with 180 thousand. Bagration instructed General Raevsky (15 thousand soldiers), in whose 7th Corps the remnants of Neverovsky's division had joined, to defend Smolensk. Barclay de Tolly was against the battle, which in his opinion was unnecessary, but at that time the actual two-management reigned in the Russian army. At 6 am on August 16, Napoleon began the assault on the city from the march. The stubborn battle for Smolensk continued until the morning of August 18, when Barclay de Tolly withdrew troops from the burning city in order to avoid a big battle with no chance of victory. Barclay had 76 thousand, another 34 thousand (Bagration's army) covered the withdrawal route of the Russian army to Dorogobuzh, which Napoleon could cut with a roundabout maneuver (similar to the one that failed near Smolensk).

Marshal Ney pursued the retreating army. On August 19, in a bloody battle near Valutina Gora, the Russian rear guard detained Marshal Ney, who suffered significant losses. Napoleon sent General Junot to go behind Russian lines by a detour, but he failed to complete the task, and the Russian army left in perfect order towards Moscow to Dorogobuzh. The battle for Smolensk, which destroyed a considerable city, marked the deployment of a nationwide war between the Russian people and the enemy, which was immediately felt by both ordinary French suppliers and Napoleon's marshals. Settlements on the route of the French army they were burned, the population left as far as possible. Immediately after the battle of Smolensk, Napoleon made a disguised offer of peace to Tsar Alexander I, while from a position of strength, but received no answer.

Reorganization of the management of the Russian army

Leaving the army, the emperor did not bother to appoint a common commander-in-chief. Relations between Bagration and Barclay de Tolly after the retreat from Smolensk became more and more tense every day. The lack of unity of command could lead to catastrophic consequences. To resolve the issue, an Extraordinary Committee was established, and on August 17, at its meeting, General of Infantry Kutuzov was unanimously approved as commander-in-chief. On August 17 (29) Kutuzov received the army in Tsarevo-Zaimishche. On this day, the French entered Vyazma. Kutuzov formed his headquarters using the headquarters of the Western armies. The cavalry general Bennigsen was appointed to the post of chief of the main headquarters of Kutuzov, Vistitsky became the quartermaster general of all armies, his assistant was Tol, the general on duty was Colonel P.S. Kaisarov.

Borodino

Continuing in general the strategic line of his predecessor, Kutuzov could not avoid a general battle for political and moral reasons. By September 3, the Russian army retreated to the village of Borodino. Further retreat meant the surrender of Moscow. Kutuzov decided to give a general battle. In order to buy time to prepare fortifications on the Borodino field, Kutuzov ordered General Gorchakov to detain the enemy near the village of Shevardino, where a pentagonal redoubt was erected. The battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt continued all day on September 5, only by midnight the Kompan division broke into its ramparts.

On August 26 (September 7), near the village of Borodino (125 km west of Moscow), the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 between the Russian and French armies took place. The numbers of the armies were comparable - 130-135 thousand for Napoleon against 110-130 thousand for Kutuzov. The Russian army did not have enough weapons - there were no guns to arm 31,000 militias from Moscow and Smolensk. The warriors were given lances, but Kutuzov did not use people as "cannon fodder" (the warriors performed auxiliary functions, for example, carried out the wounded).

In fact, the battle was an assault by French troops on the line of Russian fortifications (flashes, redoubts and lunettes). On both sides, both in defense and in attacking fortifications, artillery was widely used. Around noon, during the eighth attack of Bagration's flashes, Napoleon moved 45 thousand of his soldiers and 400 guns against 18 thousand soldiers and 300 guns of Bagration - on a front of 1.5 km, which in total on both sides gives 470 guns per 1 km of the front. As M. Adams notes, "Borodino marked the beginning of the era of artillery."

After a bloody 12-hour battle, the French, at the cost of 30-34 thousand killed and wounded, pushed the left flank and center of the Russian positions, but could not develop the offensive. The Russian army also suffered heavy losses (40-45 thousand killed and wounded). There were almost no prisoners on either side. On September 8, Kutuzov ordered a retreat to Mozhaisk with the firm intention of preserving the army.

Military Council in Fili

On September 1 (13), the Russian army encamped in front of Moscow: the right flank of the army was near the village of Fili, the center between the villages of Troitsky and Volynsky, the left flank in front of the village of Vorobyov. The rearguard of the army was located on the Setun River. The length of the front line was about four kilometers. Communication between parts of the army was greatly hampered by impassable ravines and the Karpovka River. Having examined this position from Poklonnaya Gora, the commander-in-chief and other military leaders recognized it as unacceptable for battle.

At 5 o'clock on the same day, the Military Council gathered in the house of the Filyov peasant A. Frolov, the exact number of participants in which is unknown. According to the memoirs of the participants in the war, the following generals were invited to the council: M. B. Barclay de Tolly, L. L. Bennigsen, D. S. Dokhturov, A. P. Ermolov, P. P. Konovnitsyn, A. I. Osterman -Tolstoy, N. N. Raevsky, F. P. Uvarov and Colonel K. F. Tol. General P. S. Kaisarov, on duty, was also present at the council. One question was discussed - to give a battle near Moscow, or to leave the city without a fight.

M. B. Barclay de Tolly pointed out the forced abandonment of Moscow to save the army: “Having saved Moscow, Russia will not survive the war, cruel, devastating. But having saved the army, the hopes of the fatherland are not yet destroyed. The final decision was made by M. I. Kutuzov: “As long as the army exists and is able to resist the enemy, until then we will retain the hope of successfully completing the war, but when the army is destroyed, Moscow and Russia will perish. I order you to retreat." Kutuzov interrupted the meeting and ordered to retreat through Moscow along the Ryazan road.

After the advice, Kutuzov, according to the recollections of those close to him, did not sleep well, walked for a long time and said the famous: “Well, I’ll bring the damned French ... they will eat horse meat.” Late in the evening of September 14, Napoleon entered the deserted Moscow.

Surrender of Moscow

On September 14, Napoleon occupied Moscow without a fight. Marshal Mortier was appointed military governor, Duronel was appointed commandant of the fortress and city, and Lesseps was appointed "quartermaster of the city of Moscow and the Moscow province" (civil authorities). Lesseps "chosen", and Napoleon approved 22 people from the Russian population, who received the name of the municipality, which had no power.

Already on the night of September 14-15, the city was engulfed in fire, which increased so much by the night of September 15-16 that Napoleon was forced to leave the Kremlin.

Up to 400 lower-class citizens were shot by a French court-martial on suspicion of arson.

There are several versions of the fire:

organized arson when leaving the city (usually associated with the name of the Governor-General of Moscow, Rostopchin);

arson by Russian scouts (several Russians were shot by the French on such charges) and criminals deliberately released from Moscow prisons by Rostopchin;

uncontrolled actions of the invaders, an accidental fire, the spread of which was facilitated by the general chaos in the abandoned city.

There were several sources of fire, so it is possible that all versions are true to some extent.

The fire raged until September 18 and destroyed most of Moscow. Of the 30 thousand houses that were in Moscow before the invasion, after Napoleon left the city, "hardly 5 thousand" remained.

Three Attempts by Napoleon to Bring Peace

Napoleon considered the capture of Moscow as the acquisition, first of all, of an important political, and not a military position. From here, Napoleon discusses the further plan of the military campaign, in particular, the campaign against St. Petersburg. This campaign was feared at the St. Petersburg court and in the royal family. But Napoleon's marshals objected, they considered this plan unfeasible - "to go towards winter, to the north" with a reduced army, having Kutuzov in the rear, is unthinkable. Napoleon did not defend this plan.

Also from Moscow, Napoleon attempts to make peace with Alexander I.

On September 18, Napoleon, through the head of the Orphanage, Major General Ivan Akinfievich Tutolmin, conveyed that he respects Alexander in the old way and would like to make peace. Napoleon, as before, was going to demand the rejection of Lithuania, the confirmation of the blockade and the military alliance with France.

September 20th. The next attempt was made two days later. A letter with an offer of peace was delivered to Alexander through I. A. Yakovlev (father of A. I. Herzen). There was no answer to Tutolmin's report and Napoleon's personal letter to Alexander.

On October 4, Napoleon sent General Loriston to Kutuzov in Tarutino for a pass to Alexander I with an offer of peace: "I need peace, I need it absolutely no matter what, save only honor." On October 5, a half-hour meeting between Loriston and Field Marshal Kutuzov took place, after which Prince Volkonsky was sent to Alexander I with a report on Napoleon's proposal, to which Napoleon did not wait for an answer from Alexander.

People's War against Napoleon

Initially, with the news of the offensive of the Napoleonic troops, this information was perceived ambiguously among the common people. Including serious collaborationist sentiments arose, mainly among serfs and courtyards. Rumors spread that Napoleon wanted to free the peasants, give them freedom and give them land. Already in the course of the military campaign, there were frequent attacks by peasant detachments on Russian government troops; in many areas, the serfs themselves caught the landowners hiding in the forests and brought them to the French camp.

The advance of the French army deep into Russia, the growth of violence against the population, the fires in Smolensk and Moscow, the fall of discipline in Napoleon's army and the transformation of a significant part of it into a gang of marauders and robbers led to growing resistance from the Russian population. A guerrilla war and the organization of the militia began.

Army partisan detachments

From June to August 1812, Napoleon's army, pursuing the retreating Russian armies, traveled about 1,200 kilometers from the Neman to Moscow. As a result, her communication lines were greatly stretched. The command of the Russian army decided to create flying partisan detachments for operations in the rear and on enemy communication lines, in order to prevent its supply. The most famous, but far from the only commanders of the flying detachments were Denis Davydov, Alexander Seslavin, Alexander Figner. Army partisan detachments received all-round support from the peasants.

Peasant partisan detachments

Russian soldiers who fled from captivity, volunteers from among the local population took the initiative to organize self-defense and form partisan detachments. Patriotism as a sense of belonging to a nation was alien to the peasants, but violence and looting by the Napoleonic troops sparked guerrilla warfare. Ermolai Chetvertakov, Semyon Shubin, Gerasim Kurin and Yegor Stulov, Vasilisa Kozhina, Samus, Praskovya and other commanders from among the peasants, nobles and townspeople, were able to form combat-ready partisan detachments. The guerrilla war was accompanied by unparalleled violence and atrocities on both sides. Only during their stay in Moscow, the French army lost more than 25 thousand people from the actions of the partisans.

The course of the war was significantly affected by the refusal of the peasants to supply the enemy with food and fodder. In the autumn of 1812, the head of the police of the Berezinsky subprefecture, Dombrovsky, wrote: “I am ordered to deliver everything, but there is nowhere to take it from ... There is a lot of bread in the fields that was not harvested due to the disobedience of the peasants.” The resistance of the peasants led to interruptions in the supply of the Great Army, the supply system of which was based largely on food procurement on the spot.

Formation of the militia

The partisans constituted, as it were, the first ring of encirclement around Moscow, occupied by the French. The second ring was made up of militias. As early as July 6, 1812, Alexander I issued a manifesto instructing the nobles to form a militia from their serfs, join it themselves and choose a commander over themselves. On the same day as the manifesto, an appeal was issued to "The Mother See of Our Moscow," containing an appeal to Muscovites to organize a militia. In total, during the war of 1812, more than 400 thousand militiamen were put up, of which three districts were formed: the 1st - for the defense of Moscow, the 2nd - for the defense of St. Petersburg and the 3rd - reserve. The militia warriors were reduced to foot and cavalry regiments and squads, divided into battalions, hundreds and tens.

After the surrender of Moscow, Kutuzov apparently avoided a major battle, the army was building up strength. During this time, the people collected 60 million rubles for the war. In the Russian provinces (Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Tula, Kaluga, Tver and others), a 205,000-strong militia was recruited, in Ukraine - 75,000. Only 90,000 guns were found to arm the militias, and about 50,000 guns were purchased in England. Partisans and militias surrounded Moscow in a dense ring, threatening to turn Napoleon's strategic encirclement into a tactical one.

Tarutino maneuver

On September 2 (14), while the French were entering Moscow (about 5 pm), Miloradovich's rear guard was leaving Moscow. Sebastiani's French cavalry stopped at Miloradovich's request and let the last Russian troops and carts through without a fight. On September 4 (16), the army retreated to Borovsky Perevoz and crossed to the right bank of the Moskva River. In addition to the army, more than 40,000 convoys and crews of Moscow residents crossed through the Borovsky ferry. Main apartment army settled in Kulakov. On September 5 (17), Kutuzov, moving along the right bank of the Pakhra, crossed the Kashirskaya road, reached Podolsk on the 6th, and the village of Krasnaya Pakhra on the old Kaluga road on the 9th. Until September 14 (26), Napoleon did not know where the Russian army was. The Cossacks, retreating along the Ryazan road, deceived and dragged along Murat's detachment for two crossings, to Bronnitsy. The French lost sight of the Russian army, and only the appearance of the Cossacks on the Mozhaisk road prompted Napoleon on the night of September 10 (22) to send Jozef Poniatowski's corps to Podolsk.

The location of the Russian army near Krasnaya Pakhra was covered by: Miloradovich's vanguard - near the village of Desna, Raevsky's corps - near the village of Lukovnya, between the Kaluga and Tula roads, Vasilchikov's cavalry - near Podolsk.

From Krasnaya Pakhra, by October 2, Kutuzov withdrew the army further south to the village of Tarutino, closer to Kaluga. Being on the old Kaluga road, the Russian army covered Tula, Kaluga, Bryansk and the grain-growing southern provinces, threatening the enemy rear between Moscow and Smolensk.

The English General R. Wilson, who was at the headquarters of the Russian army, pushed the Russian command to a decisive battle. Not yielding to pressure, Kutuzov, in a conversation with L. L. Benningsen, bluntly stated: “We will never, my dear, disagree with you. You think only of the good of England, but for me, if this island goes to the bottom of the sea today, I will not gasp.

In Moscow, Napoleon found himself in a trap, it was not possible to spend the winter in the city devastated by fire: foraging outside the city was not successful, the stretched communications of the French were very vulnerable, the army was beginning to decompose. Napoleon began to prepare for a retreat to winter quarters somewhere between the Dnieper and the Dvina.

On October 18, Russian troops attacked a French barrier near Tarutino under the command of Marshal Murat, who was following the Russian army. Having lost up to 4 thousand soldiers and 38 guns, Murat retreated. The battle of Tarutino became a landmark event, marking the transition of the initiative in the war to the Russian army.

Retreat of Napoleon (October - December 1812)

Napoleon's main army cut deep into Russia like a wedge. At the time when Napoleon entered Moscow, over his left flank in the north in the Polotsk region, the army of General Wittgenstein was hanging, held by the French corps of Marshals Saint-Cyr and Oudinot. The right flank of Napoleon was trampling near the borders of the Russian Empire in Belarus. The army of General Tormasov connected with its presence the Austrian corps of General Schwarzenberg and the 7th corps of General Rainier. The French garrisons along the Smolensk road guarded Napoleon's line of communication and rear.

Strategic plans of the parties after the retreat from Moscow

No documents have been preserved with the exact plans of Napoleon to continue the campaign. All plans are limited to vague phrases that the army will spend the winter somewhere between “Smolensk, Mogilev, Minsk and Vitebsk. … Moscow no longer represents a military position. I am going to look for another position, from where it will be more profitable to start a new campaign, the action of which I will direct to Petersburg or Kyiv.

Kutuzov assumed that Napoleon would most likely retreat to the south or along the Smolensk road. The southwestern direction increasingly figured in the testimony of prisoners and deserters. Kutuzov placed under surveillance all possible routes of withdrawal of the Napoleonic army from Moscow. At the same time, the defense of the northern borders of the Volyn, Kyiv, Chernigov and Kaluga provinces was strengthened.

In December 1812, Kutuzov submitted a report to Alexander I in which he gave a strategic overview of the campaign from the day the army retreated to the Tarutino camp to the expulsion of enemy troops from Russia. Regarding Napoleon’s plans after speaking from Moscow, Kutuzov wrote that he was going to “go along the Borovsky road to Kaluga, and would he have been able to defeat us at Maly Yaroslavets, knocking us over the Oka, settling in our richest provinces for winter quarters.” Kutuzov's far-sightedness was manifested in the fact that with his Tarutinsky maneuver he anticipated the movement of French troops to Smolensk through Kaluga.

From Moscow to Maloyaroslavets

On October 19, the French army (110 thousand) with a huge convoy began to leave Moscow along the Old Kaluga road. Napoleon planned to get to the nearest large food base in Smolensk through the area not devastated by the war - through Kaluga.

The road to Kaluga to Napoleon was blocked by Kutuzov's army, located near the village of Tarutino on the Old Kaluga road. Due to the lack of horses, the French artillery fleet was reduced, large cavalry formations practically disappeared. Not wanting to break through a fortified position with a weakened army, Napoleon turned in the area of ​​the village of Troitskoye (modern Troitsk) onto the New Kaluga Road (modern Kiev highway) in order to bypass Tarutino. However, Kutuzov transferred the army to Maloyaroslavets, cutting off the French retreat along the New Kaluga road.

On October 24, a battle took place near Maloyaroslavets. The city changed hands eight times. In the end, the French managed to capture Maloyaroslavets, but Kutuzov took a fortified position outside the city, which Napoleon did not dare to storm. Kutuzov's army by October 22 consisted of 97 thousand regular troops, 20 thousand Cossacks, 622 guns and more than 10 thousand militia warriors. Napoleon had at hand up to 70 thousand combat-ready soldiers, the cavalry practically disappeared, the artillery was much weaker than the Russian one. The course of the war was now dictated by the Russian army.

On October 26, Napoleon ordered a retreat north to Borovsk-Vereya-Mozhaisk. In the battles for Maloyaroslavets, the Russian army solved a major strategic task - it thwarted the plan for the French troops to break through to Ukraine and forced the enemy to retreat along the Old Smolensk road he had devastated. From Mozhaisk, the French army resumed its movement towards Smolensk along the same road along which it had advanced on Moscow.

From Maloyaroslavets to the Berezina

From Maloyaroslavets to the village of Krasnoe (45 km west of Smolensk), Napoleon was pursued by the vanguard of the Russian army under the command of General Miloradovich. From all sides, the retreating French were attacked by the Cossacks of General Platov and partisans, greatly complicating the supply of the army. The main army of Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov was moving south parallel to Napoleon.

On November 1, Napoleon passed Vyazma. On November 3, the Russian avant-garde badly battered the closing corps of the French in the battle of Vyazma.

On November 8, Napoleon entered Smolensk, where he spent 5 days, waiting for the stragglers. At the disposal of Napoleon in Smolensk, 40-45 thousand soldiers remained under arms with 127 guns, and about the same number of incapacitated soldiers who were wounded and lost their weapons. Parts of the French army, thinned on the march from Moscow, entered Smolensk for a whole week with the hope of rest and food. There were no large supplies of provisions in the city, and what they had was plundered by crowds of unruly soldiers. Napoleon ordered the shooting of the quartermaster of the army, Sioff, who faced the resistance of the peasants and failed to organize the collection of food. The second quartermaster, Villeblanche, was saved from execution only by the story of the elusive leader of the partisans, Praskovya, and the disobedience of the peasants.

On November 9, the combined forces of the partisan detachments of Denis Davydov, Seslavin, Figner and the cavalry detachment of Orlov-Denisov in 3300 people with 4 guns defeated the French brigade of General Augereau in the battle near Lyakhovo, 60 officers and about 1.5 thousand Napoleonic soldiers surrendered.

Napoleon's strategic position was deteriorating: Admiral Chichagov's Danube Army was approaching from the south, General Wittgenstein was advancing from the north, whose vanguard captured Vitebsk on November 7, depriving the French of food supplies accumulated there.

On November 14, Napoleon with the guard moved from Smolensk following the avant-garde corps. The Corps of Marshal Ney, who was in the rearguard, left Smolensk only on November 17th. The column of French troops was greatly stretched. This circumstance was taken advantage of by Kutuzov, who sent the vanguard under the command of Miloradovich to cut across the corps of Eugene Beauharnais, Davout and Ney in the area of ​​the village of Krasnoe. On November 15-18, as a result of the battles near the Red troops, Napoleon managed to break through, losing many soldiers and most of the artillery.

The Danube army of Admiral Chichagov (24 thousand) liberated Minsk on November 16, depriving Napoleon of the largest rear center. Moreover, on November 21, Chichagov's vanguard liberated the city of Borisov, where Napoleon planned to cross the Berezina River. The vanguard corps of Marshal Oudinot drove Chichagov from Borisov to the western bank of the Berezina, however, the Russian admiral with a strong army guarded possible crossing points.

On November 24, Napoleon approached the Berezina, breaking away from the armies of Wittgenstein and Kutuzov pursuing him.

From the Berezina to the Neman

On November 25, with a series of skillful maneuvers, Napoleon managed to divert Admiral Chichagov's attention to the city of Borisov and south of Borisov. Chichagov believed that Napoleon intended to cross in these places in order to take a short cut to the road to Minsk and then head to join the Austrian allies. In the meantime, the French built 2 bridges north of Borisov, along which on November 26-27 Napoleon crossed to the right (western) bank of the Berezina River, discarding the weak outposts of the Russians.

Realizing the delusion, Admiral Chichagov unsuccessfully attacked Napoleon with the main forces on November 28 on the right bank. On the left bank, the French rearguard, defending the crossing, was attacked by the approaching corps of General Wittgenstein. The main army of Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov lagged behind.

Without waiting for the crossing of the entire huge crowd of French stragglers, which consisted of the wounded, frostbite, lost weapons and civilians, Napoleon ordered the bridges to be burned on the morning of November 29. The main result of the battle on the Berezina was that Napoleon avoided complete defeat in the face of a significant superiority of Russian forces. In the memoirs of the French, the crossing of the Berezina occupies no less place than the largest Battle of Borodino.

Having lost 21 thousand people at the crossing, Napoleon, with 9 thousand soldiers remaining under arms, moved to Vilna, joining French divisions operating in other directions along the way. The army was accompanied by a large crowd of incompetent people, mostly soldiers from the allied states who had lost their weapons.

On December 5, Napoleon left the army for Murat and Ney and went to Paris to recruit new soldiers to replace those who died in Russia. On December 16, the last, 29th Bulletin of the Grand Army was published, in which Napoleon was forced to indirectly acknowledge the extent of the losses, at the same time writing them off as unusually severe frosts that had come prematurely. The bulletin caused a shock in French society.

In fact, unusually severe frosts hit only during the crossing of the Berezina. Continuing in the following days, they finally exterminated the French, already weakened by hunger. The better equipped Russian troops continued their pursuit despite the cold. The vanguard of Kutuzov's troops under the command of Ataman Platov approached Vilna the day after the French entered there. Unable to defend the city and having lost about 20 thousand people in Vilna, Ney and Murat continued their retreat to the Neman River, which separated Russia from Prussia and the Duchy of Warsaw.

The number of the Napoleonic army when moving into the interior of Russia (beige) and back (black stripes). The width of the stripes reflects the size of the army. At the bottom of the graph is the behavior of air temperature on the Réaumur scale after the departure of the Great Army from Moscow (from right to left).

On December 14, in Kovno, the pitiful remnants of the Great Army in the amount of 1,600 people crossed the Neman River to the Duchy of Warsaw, and then to Prussia. Later they were joined by the remnants of troops from other directions. The Patriotic War of 1812 ended with the almost complete annihilation of the invading Great Army.

The last stage of the war was commented by the impartial observer Clausewitz:

The Russians rarely outran the French, although they had many opportunities for this; when they managed to get ahead of the enemy, they released him every time; in all battles the French remained victorious; the Russians gave them the opportunity to do the impossible; but if we sum up, it turns out that the French army ceased to exist, and the whole campaign ended in complete success for the Russians, except that they failed to capture Napoleon himself and his closest collaborators ...

North direction

After the 2nd battle for Polotsk (October 18-20), which took place 2 months after the 1st, Marshal Saint-Cyr retreated south to Chashniki, dangerously bringing the advancing army of General Wittgenstein to Napoleon's rear line. During these days, Napoleon began his retreat from Moscow. Marshal Viktor's 9th Corps was immediately sent to help from Smolensk, arriving in September as Napoleon's reserve from Europe. The combined forces of the French reached 36 thousand soldiers, which roughly corresponded to the forces of Wittgenstein (30 thousand people). A counter battle took place on October 31 near Chashniki, as a result of which the French retreated to the south.

Vitebsk remained uncovered, a detachment from the army of General Wittgenstein stormed the city on November 7, capturing 300 soldiers of the garrison and food supplies prepared for the retreating army of Napoleon. On November 14, Marshal Viktor, near the village of Smolyany, tried to throw Wittgenstein back across the Dvina River, however, to no avail, and the parties maintained their positions until Napoleon approached the Berezina River. Marshal Victor then, linking up with the main army, retreated to the Berezina as Napoleon's rearguard, holding back Wittgenstein's pressure.

In the Baltics near Riga, a positional war was waged with rare Russian sorties against the corps of Marshal MacDonald. The Finnish corps of General Steingel (12 thousand) approached on September 20 to help the garrison of Riga, however, after a successful sortie on September 29 against the French siege artillery, Steingel was transferred to Wittgenstein in Polotsk to the theater of the main hostilities. On November 15, Marshal MacDonald, in turn, successfully attacked the Russian positions, almost destroying a large Russian detachment.

The 10th Corps of Marshal MacDonald began to retreat from Riga towards Prussia only on December 19, after the remnants of Napoleon's main army had left Russia. On December 26, MacDonald's troops had to engage in battle with the vanguard of General Wittgenstein. On December 30, the Russian General Dibich concluded an armistice agreement with the commander of the Prussian corps, General York, known at the place of signing as the Taurogen Convention. Thus, MacDonald lost his main forces, he had to hastily retreat through East Prussia.

South direction

On September 18, the 38,000-strong army of Admiral Chichagov approached the southern front near Lutsk from the Danube. The combined forces of Admiral Chichagov and General Tormasov (more than 60 thousand) attacked the Austrian General Schwarzenberg (40 thousand), forcing him to retreat to the Duchy of Warsaw in mid-October. Admiral Chichagov, who took over command, gave the troops a 2-week rest, after which on October 27 he moved from Brest-Litovsk to Minsk with 24,000 soldiers, leaving General Saken with a 27,000-strong corps against the Austrians.

General Schwarzenberg tried to pursue Chichagov, bypassing the positions of Sacken and hiding from his troops by the Saxon corps of General Rainier. Rainier was unable to keep the superior forces of Saken, and Schwarzenberg was forced to help him. With the joint forces of Rainier and Schwarzenberg, Saken was forced to retreat south of Brest-Litovsk, however, as a result, Chichagov's army broke into Napoleon's rear and occupied Minsk on November 16, and on November 21 approached the city of Borisov on the Berezina, where the retreating Napoleon planned to cross.

On November 27, Schwarzenberg, on the orders of Napoleon, moved to Minsk, but stopped in Slonim, from where on December 14 he retreated through Bialystok to the Duchy of Warsaw.

Results of the Patriotic War of 1812

Immediate results of the war

The main result of the Patriotic War of 1812 was the almost complete destruction of Napoleon's Great Army.

According to the calculations of the military historian Clausewitz, the army of the invasion of Russia, together with reinforcements during the war, consisted of 610 thousand soldiers, including 50 thousand soldiers of Austria and Prussia. According to the Prussian official Auerswald, by December 21, 1812, 255 generals, 5111 officers, 26,950 lower ranks passed through East Prussia from the Great Army, "all in a very miserable state." To these 30 thousand must be added approximately 6 thousand soldiers (who returned to the French army) from the corps of General Renier and Marshal MacDonald, who operated in the northern and southern directions. Many of those who returned to Königsberg, according to Count Segur, died from illnesses, having reached safe territory.

The surviving officers formed the backbone of Napoleon's new army, recruited in 1813.

Thus, Napoleon lost about 580 thousand soldiers in Russia. These losses, according to the calculations of T. Lenz, include 200 thousand killed, from 150 to 190 thousand prisoners, about 130 thousand deserters who fled to their homeland (mainly from among the Prussian, Austrian, Saxon and Westphalian troops, but there were also examples among the French soldiers), about 60 thousand more fugitives were sheltered by Russian peasants, townspeople and nobles. Of the 47,000 guards that entered Russia with the emperor, several hundred soldiers remained six months later. Over 1200 guns were lost in Russia.

The historian of the middle of the 19th century, Bogdanovich, calculated the replenishment of the Russian armies during the war according to the statements of the Military Scientific Archive of the General Staff. The total loss by December 1812 was 210 thousand soldiers. Of these, according to Bogdanovich, up to 40 thousand returned to service. The losses of the corps operating in secondary directions and the militias can be approximately the same 40 thousand people. In general, Bogdanovich estimated the losses of the Russian army at 210,000 soldiers and militias.

In January 1813, the "Foreign campaign of the Russian army" began - the fighting moved to the territory of Germany and France. In October 1813, Napoleon was defeated in the Battle of Leipzig, and in April 1814 he abdicated the throne of France (see War of the Sixth Coalition).

Reasons for Napoleon's defeat

Among the reasons for the defeat of Napoleon in his Russian campaign, the following are most often mentioned:

popular participation in the war and mass heroism of Russian soldiers and officers;

the length of the territory of Russia and harsh climatic conditions;

military leadership talent of the commander-in-chief of the Russian army Kutuzov and other generals.

The main reason for the defeat of Napoleon was a nationwide upsurge in defense of the fatherland. As D. Lieven shows, the people's war was not only spontaneous, but also ideologically justified "from above" (and even before the start of the war). In the unity of the Russian army with the people, one must look for the source of its power in 1812.

The refusal of the Russian army from the general battle on the border and the retreat deep into the vast territories of the Russian Empire led to "a change in plans that forced Napoleon to advance further, beyond the effective limits of his supply system." The stubborn resistance of the Russian troops and the ability of the Russian commanders-in-chief M. B. Barclay de Tolly and M. I. Kutuzov to save the army did not allow Napoleon to win the war by victory in one big battle.

As they moved away from the Neman, the Napoleonic army was forced to rely more and more on forage, and not on a system of pre-prepared stores. In the conditions of a large stretch of supply lines, the decisive role was played by the indiscipline of the French forage teams, staffed with low-quality recruits and conscripts, and the resistance of the Russian people to the enemy by hiding food and fodder, the armed struggle of partisans with French foragers and the interception of enemy convoys (the so-called asymmetric war) . The combination of these reasons led to the collapse of the French system of supplying troops with food and fodder, and ultimately to starvation and the transformation of most of the army into an incapacitated crowd, in which everyone dreamed only of personal salvation.

At the final stage of the war, in December immediately after the Berezina, this depressing picture was aggravated by frost below -20 ° C, which completely demoralized Napoleon's army. The Russian army completed the rout, which, in the words of Clausewitz, continuing the retreat, in the end again led the enemy to the border:

In Russia, one can play "cat and mouse" with one's opponent, and thus, continuing the retreat, in the end one can again bring the enemy to the border. This figurative expression ... mainly reflects the spatial factor and the benefits of gigantic stretches, which do not allow the attacker to cover the traversed space and strategically take possession of it by simply moving forward.

Long-term effects of the war

The defeat of Napoleon in Russia allowed the international coalition, in which Russia played the main role, to crush the French Empire. The victory over Napoleon as never before raised the international prestige of Russia, which played a decisive role at the Congress of Vienna and in the following decades exerted a decisive influence on the affairs of Europe. At the same time, the strengthening of Russia's foreign policy was not supported by the development of its internal structure. Although the victory inspired and rallied the entire Russian society, military successes did not lead to a change in the socio-economic structure of Russian life. Many peasants who were soldiers and militias in the Russian army marched victoriously through all of Europe and saw that serfdom had been abolished everywhere. The peasantry expected significant changes, which did not follow. Russian serfdom continued to exist after 1812. Some historians are inclined to believe that at that time there were not yet all the socio-economic conditions that would immediately lead to its collapse. However, the sharp upsurge in peasant uprisings and the formation of political opposition among the progressive nobility that followed immediately after the hostilities refute this view.

It is impossible not to pay attention to the fact that, in fact, the victory over Napoleonic France led to the restoration of reactionary regimes in Europe, the abolition of many democratic initiatives in social life. And feudal imperial Russia played a key role in all this. The Holy Alliance that arose shortly after the war, created on the initiative and under the auspices of Emperor Alexander I, began to actively suppress any manifestations of national independence, civil and religious freedom in European states.

The victory in the Patriotic War caused not only an upsurge in the national spirit, but also a desire for free thinking, which ultimately led to the Decembrist uprising in 1825. A. A. Bestuzhev wrote to Nicholas I from the Peter and Paul Fortress: “... Napoleon invaded Russia, and then the Russian people for the first time felt their strength; then a feeling of independence awakened in all hearts, first political, and later popular. This is the beginning of freethinking in Russia.”

Not only the Decembrists are linked with 1812 - the idea was expressed long ago: "without the twelfth year there would be no Pushkin." All Russian culture, national identity received a powerful impetus in the year of the Napoleonic invasion. According to A. I. Herzen, from the point of view of the creative activity of wide sections of society, “only 1812 opens the true history of Russia; everything that happened before is just a preface.

Many former prisoners of war from the Napoleonic Great Army after the Patriotic War of 1812 remained in Russia and took Russian citizenship. An example is several thousand "Orenburg French" registered as Cossacks of the Orenburg Army. V. D. Dandeville, the son of the former French officer Desiree d'Andeville, later became a Russian general and chief ataman of the Ural Cossack army. Many of the captured Poles who served in the Napoleonic army were enrolled in the Siberian Cossacks. Shortly after the end of the campaigns of 1812-1814. these Poles were granted the right to return to their homeland. But many of them, having already managed to marry Russians, did not want to use this right and remained in the Siberian Cossacks forever, later receiving the ranks of conscripts and even officers. Many of them, having a completely European education, were appointed teachers in the military Cossack school that opened soon after (the future cadet corps). Later, the descendants of these Poles completely merged with the rest of the population of the army, becoming completely Russian, both in appearance and language, and in faith and the Russian spirit. Only surviving surnames like: Svarovsky, Yanovsky, Kostyletsky, Yadrovsky, Legchinsky, Dabshinsky, Stabrovsky, Lyaskovsky, Edomsky, Zhagulsky and many others show that the ancestors of the Cossacks bearing these surnames were once Poles.

The Patriotic War of 1812 became part of the historical memory of the Russian people. According to the Russian historian, literary critic and publisher P. I. Bartenev: “One has only to read the description of the Patriotic War, so that the one who does not love Russia will love her, but the one who loves will love it even hotter, more sincerely and thank God that Russia is like that.”

During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, the memory of the heroes of 1812, among other things, helped overcome the decline in morale in the troops during defeats and retreats at the initial stage of the invasion of Nazi Germany and its European allies in the fascist bloc on the Soviet Union.

Memory of the War of 1812

On August 30, 1814, Emperor Alexander I issued the following manifesto: “December 25, the day of the Nativity of Christ, will henceforth also be the day of thanksgiving celebration under the name in the church circle: the Nativity of our Savior Jesus Christ and the remembrance of the deliverance of the Church and the Russian Power from the invasion of the Gauls and with them twenty languages ". Until 1917, the feast of the Nativity of Christ was celebrated in the Russian Empire as a national Victory Day.

The Patriotic War of 1812 occupies a significant place in the historical memory of the Russian and other peoples, it was reflected both in scientific research and in works of architecture and art, in other cultural events and phenomena, below are some examples:

Patriotic War of 1812 - subject largest number research compared to any other event in the thousand-year history of Russia before 1917. More than 15,000 books and articles have been written specifically about the war.

To commemorate the victory in the Patriotic War of 1812, many monuments and monuments were erected, of which the most famous are:

Cathedral of Christ the Savior (Moscow);

Ensemble of Palace Square with the Alexander Column (St. Petersburg).

The Winter Palace has a Military Gallery, which consists of 332 portraits of Russian generals who participated in the Patriotic War of 1812. Most of the portraits were made by the Englishman George Doe.

Every year on the first Sunday of September on the Borodino field, more than a thousand participants recreate episodes of the Battle of Borodino during the military-historical reconstruction.

One of the most famous works of world literature was the novel by L. N. Tolstoy "War and Peace".

Based on the novel by Tolstoy in the USSR, the film directed by S. Bondarchuk "War and Peace" was awarded an Oscar in 1968, large-scale battle scenes in it are still considered unsurpassed.

S. S. Prokofiev wrote the opera War and Peace on his own libretto together with Mira Mendelssohn-Prokofiev (1943; final version 1952; first production 1946, Leningrad).

100th anniversary of the Patriotic War

In 1912, on the centennial year of the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian government decided to search for the living participants in the war. In the vicinity of Tobolsk, Pavel Yakovlevich Tolstoguzov was found (illustrated), an alleged participant in the Battle of Borodino, who at that time was 117 years old.

200th anniversary of the Patriotic War

Internet project of the Russian State Library "Patriotic War of 1812: The Epoch in Documents, Memoirs, Illustrations". Provides access to full-text resources - electronic copies of publications related to that era and published in the 19th - early 20th centuries.

The Internet project of RIA Novosti "1812: War and Peace" became the winner of the Runet Prize - 2012.

From August 12 to October 19, 2012, a detachment of Don Cossacks on horses of the Don breed repeated Platov's campaign "to Paris" ("Campaign" Moscow - Paris ""). The purpose of the campaign was also to worship the graves of Russian soldiers along the way.

The War of 1812 (sometimes called the First Patriotic War) is one of the most iconic in Russian history. For a long time, she was considered the standard of manifestation of patriotism and heroism. And besides, all its participants received in the end not what they expected and what they deserved.

The last step to conquer the world

This is how Napoleon himself assessed his attack on Russia (he did not perceive the Western Hemisphere as part of the world). But the megalomania of the emperor of the French was only in words; in fact, he was quite pragmatic and did not start the war without good reasons:

1. Systematic violations by Russia of the continental blockade of England, to which she undertook to join under the Treaty of Tilsit.
2. The desire to put an end to the numerous anti-French coalitions in which Russia was a participant.
3. The desire to expand the zone of its direct influence in Europe at the expense of the former lands of the Commonwealth, which after its division went to Russia.
4. To ensure the possibility of a subsequent attack on India (for some reason, all the great conquerors of modern and recent times were sure that England could not live without this colony).

As you can see, Russia, without directly starting the war, openly provoked it. Russian troops have already fought against Napoleon, and in 1805-1807, when he did not make any claims to Russia.

Scorched Earth, Borodin Day and General Frost

The Patriotic War of 1812 began on June 12 (24), at night, when the Napoleonic troops began crossing the Neman. The first stage of the war was unsuccessful for the Russian army. Although it was only slightly outnumbered by the French (a little over 400,000 Russians against a little less than 600,000 French), General Foul's defense plan was no good.

Nevertheless, the army retreated with battles. The most significant were the battles near Saltanovka (11 (23) July) and (4-6 (16-18) August). Napoleon acted not only in the central (main) direction, but significant events did not happen in other areas. A huge achievement during the first stage of the war was the use of an officially unappreciated invention - the scorched earth tactics. Other military leaders reproached him for retreating (it almost came to obstruction), but Barclay's tactics turned out to be correct in the end.

On August 17 (29) the army was received by a new commander-in-chief -. On August 26-27 (September 7-8), the legendary battle of Borodino took place, but after it Kutuzov continued Barclay's tactics and retreated. On September 1 (13), a council was held in Fili, at which it was decided to leave Moscow.

This decision cost the capital a fire. But the army got the opportunity to arm itself at the expense of the Tula factories and receive reinforcements. The Tarutino maneuver made it possible to disorientate the enemy, who remained in devastated Moscow without reinforcements and supplies.

Napoleon made attempts to make peace, but Russia no longer needed it. In October, the French army was forced to withdraw from Moscow. The autumn turned out to be cold, the frost was dangerous for southerners who were not accustomed to the cold.

Napoleon expected to leave along the Kaluga road, but the battle near Maloyaroslavets (October 24) deprived him of this opportunity, and the army retreated along the "scorched earth" of the Smolensk road. In addition to Russian regular units, she was annoyed by Cossacks and partisans from among ordinary residents and the military (in 1812, the idea of ​​​​an organized and led by the state was born, so successfully applied in the Great Patriotic War).

Many consider the end of the war (November 25-27). But in fact, only on December 30 did all French troops leave Russia. Officially, the victory was celebrated on Christmas Day.

Winning with a trick

The result of the war was actually a turning point in the course of the Napoleonic wars. The great commander lost almost all the best fighters in Russia (including a significant part of the guard). In the Europe he conquered, a movement against the French began, and Prussia and Austria, which he defeated, became more active (which, together with Russia and England, formed a new anti-French coalition).

The war contributed to the unity of Russian society, the rise of the national idea. Class interests were less significant. The events of the war have long been used for educational purposes. Its participants became an ideal for future servicemen.

But there was also a downside. Many officers were convinced that life in the country of the "usurper and invader" is much more reasonable than in Russia. They remained patriots, but now love for the motherland was calling them to Senate Square...

The war of 1812, in short, became the most difficult and difficult for the Russian Empire. important event XIX century. In Russian historiography, it was called the Patriotic War of 1812.

How did it happen that France and Russia, who had friendly relations and were allies for many years, became adversaries and began hostilities against each other?

The main reason for all the military conflicts of that time with the participation of France, including the war of 1812, in short, were associated with the imperial manners of Napoleon Bonaparte. Having come to power thanks to the French Revolution, he did not hide his desire to spread the influence French Empire to as many countries as possible. Huge ambition, magnificent data of the commander and diplomat made Napoleon the ruler of almost all of Europe in a short time. Dissatisfied with this state of affairs, Russia withdrew from the alliance with France and joined England. So former allies became adversaries.

Then, during the unsuccessful wars of the allies with the troops of Napoleon, the Russian Empire was forced to agree to a peace agreement with France. Thus the Peace of Tilsit was signed. Its main condition was the maintenance by Russia of the continental blockade of England, which Napoleon wanted to weaken in this way. The authorities of the Russian Empire wanted to use this truce as an opportunity to build up forces, since everyone understood the need to continue the fight against Napoleon.

But the blockade threatened the Russian economy, and then the Russian authorities went to the trick. They began to trade with neutral countries, through which they continued to trade with England, using them as intermediaries. At the same time, Russia did not formally violate the terms of peace with France. She was furious, but she couldn't do anything.

War of 1812, briefly about the causes

There were many reasons why it became possible to conduct hostilities directly between France and Russia:

1. Failure by Russia to comply with the terms of the Tilsit peace treaty;

2. Refusal to marry the emperor of France, first the sisters of Alexander I Catherine, and then Anna;

3. France violated the agreements of the Tilsit peace, continuing the occupation of Prussia.

By 1812, war had become inevitable evidence for both countries. Both France and Russia hastily prepared for it, gathering allies around them. On the side of France were Austria and Prussia. Russia's allies are Great Britain, Sweden and Spain.

The course of hostilities

The war began on June 12, 1812 with the crossing of Napoleon's army across the border river Neman. The Russian troops were divided into three parts, since the exact place where the enemy crossed the border was not known. French troops crossed it in the area of ​​​​the army under the command of Barclay de Tolly. Seeing the huge numerical superiority of the enemy and trying to save his forces, he ordered a retreat. The armies of Barclay de Tolly and Bagration managed to unite near Smolensk. The first battle of this war took place there. The Russian troops failed to defend the city, and in August they continued their retreat inland.

After the failure of the Russian troops near Smolensk, the people joined the fight against Napoleon's army. Active partisan actions of the inhabitants of the country against the enemy began. The partisan movement provided great support to the army in the fight against the French troops.

In August, General M. Kutuzov became the commander-in-chief of the Russian troops. He approved the tactics of his predecessors and continued the organized retreat of the army to Moscow.

Near Moscow, near the village of Borodino, the most significant battle of this war took place, which completely debunked the myth of Napoleon's invincibility - the battle of Borodino. The forces of the two armies by that time were almost the same.

According to the results of the Battle of Borodino, neither side could call itself the winner, but the French troops were severely exhausted.

In September, by decision of Kutuzov, with whom Alexander I agreed, the Russian troops left Moscow. Frosts began to which the French were not accustomed. Virtually locked in Moscow, Napoleon's army was completely demoralized. The Russian troops, on the contrary, rested and received support with food, weapons and volunteers.

Napoleon decides to retreat, which soon turns into a flight. Russian troops force the French to retreat along the Smolensk road completely devastated by them.

In December 1812, the army under the command of Napoleon finally left the territory of Russia, and the war of 1812 ended with the complete victory of the Russian people.

Results

As a result of the war of 1812, many people died, and the Russian economy and culture suffered enormous damage.

The victory in the war rallied Russian society, caused a rise in national consciousness, led to the development of a social movement and social thought, including opposition. The Decembrists called themselves "children of 1812".

On the other hand, it strengthened the ruling circles of the country in the idea of ​​the strength and even superiority of the social system in Russia, and, consequently, the needlessness of reforms, and thereby strengthened the conservative trend in domestic politics.

Russian troops passed victoriously through all of Europe and triumphantly entered Paris together with the armies of the allies, which unusually raised Russia's international prestige and turned it into the most powerful military power.

Due to new acquisitions, the territory of Russia has expanded, its population has increased. But, having included in its composition the lands of "Greater Poland", for many years it acquired a very painful Polish problem, due to the ongoing struggle of the Polish people for national independence.

Holy Union - a conservative union of Russia, Prussia and Austria, created to maintain the established at the Congress of Vienna (1815) international order. The statement of mutual assistance of all Christian sovereigns, signed on September 14 (26), 1815, was later gradually joined by all the monarchs of continental Europe, except for the Pope and the Turkish Sultan. Not being in the exact sense of the word a formalized agreement of the powers that would impose certain obligations on them, the Holy Alliance, nevertheless, went down in the history of European diplomacy as "a cohesive organization with a sharply defined clerical-monarchist ideology, created on the basis of the suppression of revolutionary sentiments, wherever they didn't show up."

After the overthrow of Napoleon and the restoration of pan-European peace, among the powers that considered themselves completely satisfied with the distribution of "rewards" at the Congress of Vienna, a desire arose and strengthened to preserve the established international order, and the means for this seemed to be a permanent alliance of European sovereigns and the periodic convening of international congresses. But since the achievement of this was opposed by the national and revolutionary movements of the peoples striving for freer forms of political existence, this striving quickly acquired a reactionary character.

The initiator of the Holy Alliance was the Russian Emperor Alexander I, although when drawing up the act of the Holy Alliance, he still considered it possible to patronize liberalism and grant a constitution to the Kingdom of Poland. The idea of ​​the Union was born in him, on the one hand, under the influence of the idea - to become a peacemaker of Europe by creating such a Union that would eliminate even the possibility of military clashes between states, and on the other hand, under the influence of a mystical mood that took possession of him. The latter also explains the strangeness of the wording of the union treaty itself, which is not similar either in form or in content to international treatises, which made many specialists in international law see in it only a simple declaration of the monarchs who signed it.

Signed on September 14 (26), 1815 by three monarchs - Emperor Franz I of Austria, King Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia and Emperor Alexander I, at first in the first two did not cause anything but a hostile attitude towards himself.

The content of this act was in the highest degree vague and loose, and the most diverse practical conclusions could be drawn from it, but its general spirit did not contradict, but rather favored the reactionary mood of the then governments. Not to mention the confusion of ideas belonging to completely different categories, in it religion and morality completely displace law and politics from the areas indisputably belonging to these latter. Built on the legitimate principle of the divine origin of monarchical power, it establishes the patriarchal nature of relations between sovereigns and peoples, and the former are obliged to rule in the spirit of “love, truth and peace”, while the latter should only obey: the document does not at all address the rights of the people in relation to power. mentions.

Finally, obliging sovereigns to always “give each other allowance, reinforcement and assistance,” the act says nothing about exactly in what cases and in what form this obligation should be implemented, which made it possible to interpret it in the sense that assistance is obligatory in all in cases where subjects will show disobedience to their "legitimate" sovereigns.

This last exactly happened - the very Christian character of the Holy Alliance disappeared and only the suppression of the revolution, whatever its origin, was meant. All this explains the success of the Holy Alliance: soon all other European sovereigns and governments joined it, not excluding Switzerland with the German free cities; only the English prince-regent and the Pope did not subscribe to it, which did not prevent them from being guided by the same principles in their policy; only the Turkish sultan was not accepted as a member of the Holy Alliance as a non-Christian sovereign.

Marking the character of the era, the Holy Alliance was the main organ of the all-European reaction against liberal aspirations. Its practical significance was expressed in the decisions of a number of congresses (Aachen, Troppaus, Laibach and Verona), at which the principle of interference in the internal affairs of other states with the aim of forcibly suppressing all national and revolutionary movements and maintaining the existing system with its absolutist and clerical-aristocratic trends.