Preparation for the war of the USSR. Consider the preparation for war on the part of the USSR. We cannot say that the Red Army was not preparing for war, since the approach of war was felt in the political situation that had developed by the end of the 1930s and its inevitability was determined by the actions of Germany and its allies.

Therefore, the USSR was preparing for war, preparing very intensely: a second industrial and economic base was being created at an accelerated pace in the regions of the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia, with special attention paid to the development of the defense industry: defense spending in the state budget of the USSR for 1941 increased to 43.4 % against 32.6% in 1940. Particular attention was paid to tank building, the aviation industry and the production of ammunition.

At the beginning of 1941, Soviet factories produced about two thousand new model fighters (Yak-1, LaGG-3, MiG-3), 458 Pe-2 dive bombers, 249 Il-2 attack aircraft. In 1941, it was possible to increase the production of ammunition by more than 3 times compared to 1940. From January to June 1941, the production of ammunition for the most important types increased by 66%. The production of new types of KV and T-34 tanks proceeded rapidly, so that by June 22, 1941 their number on the western borders reached 1475 units (2) . An increase in the mobilization readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces was facilitated by the holding of a training camp in early June 1941, according to which 755,000 reservists were called to military units.

The deployment of all types and branches of troops continued, their structure improved, new units and formations were created. So, in February March 1941, the formation of 20 mechanized corps began, and in April anti-tank artillery brigades of the High Command reserve.

In addition, it was planned to create 106 air regiments armed with new equipment. In the middle, the number of air regiments increased by more than 80% compared to the beginning of 1939. By the middle of 1941, the total strength of the Red Army had reached more than 5 million people and was 2.8 times greater than in 1939 (2) . These facts show that the upcoming war and preparations for it occupied an increasingly significant place in the socio-economic sphere of the country.

So the USSR was preparing for war. The question is, what kind of war? In 1941, there were 5 military districts on the territory of the USSR that bordered on foreign states on the European territory of the USSR: Baltic Special Military District (PribOVO), later transformed into the North-Western Front; Western Special Military District (ZOVO), hereinafter Western Front; Kyiv Special Military District (KOVO), hereinafter referred to as the Southwestern Front; Odessa Military District (OdVO), later - 9th Army; Leningrad Military District (LVO), hereinafter - the Northern Front (3). By June 1941, the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces was over 5 million people: Ground troops and Air Defense Forces over 4.5 million; Air Force - 476 thousand; Navy - 344 thousand. The army was armed with over 67 thousand guns and mortars, 1860 tanks of new types (1475 on the Western border), the total number of tanks, taking into account high-speed, multi-tower, floating, etc., amounted to more than 10 thousand units (of which 8 thousand were on the Western border). Long-range aviation was armed with Il-4 (DB-3F) and Pe-8 aircraft (about 800 aircraft in total). The rest of the aviation was armed with about 10,000 aircraft (of which 2,739 were new types). The Navy was armed with 276 warships of the main types, including 212 submarines (4). Let us consider the dispersal of these forces among the armies.

By the beginning of the war, the Red Army had 28 combined arms armies.

Of these, the 1st and 2nd Red Banner armies, as well as the 15th and 16th armies, guarded the Far Eastern borders of the USSR throughout the war, and we will not consider them.

In the Red Army, 2 strategic echelons were formed. Consider the first strategic echelon. On the territory of PribOVO, the 8th, 11th and 27th armies were formed. The 8th Army was created in October 1939 on the basis of the Novgorod Army Operational Group; in August 1940, she was included in PribOVO. By the beginning of the war, the 8th Army included: 10th and 11th rifle corps (sk), 12th mechanized corps (mk), 9th anti-tank brigade; commander - Major General P.P. Sobennikov. The 11th Army was formed in 1939 in the Belarusian Special Military District (later ZOVO), participated in the 9th campaign of Soviet troops in the West. Belarus. in 1940 it was included in the PribOVO; it consisted of: 16th and 29th sk, 3rd mk, 23rd, 126th, 128th rifle divisions (sd), 42nd and 46th fortified areas (UR); commander - Lieutenant General V. I. Morozov. The 27th Army was formed in May 1941 in PribOVO; it consisted of: the 22nd and 24th sk, the 16th and 29th sd, the 3rd rifle brigade (sbr), the commander was Major General N. E. Berzarin.

The 3rd, 4th, 10th, and 13th armies were formed on the territory of the ZOVO. The 3rd Army was created in 1939 in the Belarusian Special Military District on the basis of the Vitebsk Army Group of Forces, in September 1939 it participated in the campaign of the Red Army in the West. Belarus.

It consisted of 4 sc, 11 microns, 58 UR; commander - Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov. The 4th Army was formed in August 1939 in the Belarusian Special Military District on the basis of the Bobruisk Army Group, in September 1939 it participated in a campaign in the West. Belarus; it consisted of: 28 sk, 14 microns, 62 UR; Commander Major General A. A. Korobkov. The 10th Army was formed in 1939 in the Belarusian Special Military District, in September 1939 it participated in the campaign of the Red Army in the West. Belarus.

It consisted of: 1st and 5th sk, 6th and 13th MK, 6th cavalry corps (kk), 155th sd, 66th UR; commander - Major General K. D. Golubev. The 13th Army was formed in May-June 1941 in the ZOVO, it united formations and units located in the Minsk region.

It consisted of: 21st sk, 50th sd, 8th anti-tank defense artillery brigade; Commander Lieutenant General P. M. Filatov. On the territory of the Kyiv OVO, 5,6,12 and 26 armies were formed. The 5th Army was created in 1939 in KOVO; it included the 15th and 27th sk, the 9th and 22nd MK, the 2nd and 9th UR; commander - Major General M. I. Potapov. 6th Army - formed in August 1939 in KOVO, in September 1939 it participated in the campaign of the Red Army in the West. Ukraine; composition: 6th and 37th sk, 4th and 15th MK, 5th and 6th UR; commander - Lieutenant General N. N. Muzychenko. 12th Army - formed in 1939 in KOVO, in September 1939 participated in the campaign of the Red Army in the West. Ukraine; composition: 13th and 17th sk, 16th MK, 10th, 11th and 12th UR; Commander Major General P. G. Monday. 26th Army - formed in July 1940 in KOVO; composition: 8th sc, 8th MK, 8th UR; commander - Lieutenant General F. Ya. Kostenko.

On the territory of the Odessa Military District, the 9th Army was formed in June 1941. Its composition: 14th, 35th and 48th sc, 2nd kk, 2nd and 8th mk, 80th, 81st, 82nd, 84th and 86th UR ; commander - Colonel General Ya. T. Cherevichenko.

On the territory of the Leningrad Military District, 7.14 and 23 armies were formed. 7th Army - formed in the 2nd half of 1940 in the LVO. Its composition: 54th, 71st, 168th and 237th rifle divisions and 26th SD; commander - Lieutenant General F. D. Gorelenko. The 14th Army was formed in October 1939 in the LVO; composition: 42nd sk, 14th and 52nd rifle divisions, 1st tank division, 23rd UR, 1st mixed air division; Commander Lieutenant General F. A. Frolov. 23rd Army - formed in May 1941 in the Leningrad Military District; composition: 19th and 50th sk, 10th mk, 27th and 28th UR; Commander Lieutenant General P. S. Pshennikov (4.7). From the above data it can be seen that at the beginning of the war, huge forces were concentrated near the westernmost border of the Soviet Union. At first glance, all Soviet armies look the same, but, considering their qualitative composition, we see serious differences between different armies.

For further analysis, we need to go back in time to the Finnish Winter War.

A few months before the war, several Soviet armies were deployed: the 14th Army (two rifle divisions), the 9th Army (three rifle divisions), the 8th Army (four rifle divisions) and the 7th Army (10th mechanized corps, three tank brigades, 10th, 19th, 34th and 50th rifle corps, a separate brigade, eleven separate artillery regiments, army aviation). Among the armies that participated in the Finnish War, the 7th army clearly stood out.

Knowing that the Soviet Union was preparing an aggressive war against Finland, we can rightfully call the 7th shock army and say that the honor of delivering the main blow will belong to it. This can be confirmed if you look at the command staff of this army: the commander - K. A. Meretskov, who commands the LVO, then becomes the chief of the General Staff, and even later receives the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union; the artillery headquarters of the 7th Army is commanded by L. A. Govorov, his name speaks for itself: hardly anyone now does not know the war hero Marshal of the Soviet Union L. A. Govorov.

In this way we can define a shock army. To do this, let's look at the German Wehrmacht. There are pronounced mechanisms of aggression in it - tank groups; from ordinary armies they are distinguished by the presence a large number tanks.

Thus, we see that the main feature by which we can call any Soviet army a shock army is the presence of a mechanized corps in it (for 1941, this is about 1000 tanks). Thus, analyzing the armies of the first strategic echelon according to this factor, we see that all armies, except for the 27th and 13th on the western border and the 7th and 14th in the LVO, can be called shock. Moreover, among these armies, the 10th, 5th and 6th armies stand out, having two MKs each, and the heavy-duty 9th Army, which has three sk, two MKs (i.e., surpassing all the rest in the number of infantry and mechanized troops army 1.5 times) and one kk. The 9th Army stood out among the rest and its commanders: by the rank of colonel general, not a single army except the 9th had a commander of such a high rank (in all the Armed Forces of the USSR - 8 colonel generals). And the very personality of Colonel-General Ya. T. Cherevichenko deserves attention.

Suffice it to say that during the Civil War he commanded a cavalry regiment (Zhukov at the same time was only a squadron) (4). The power of the 9th Army is impressive.

If it were fully equipped, then it would include more than 3,000 tanks (approximately the entire German Wehrmacht), but when compared with Germany, it turns out that the quality of the tanks of the 9th Army is much better: the commander of the 2nd Cavalry Corps of the 9th Army Major General P. A. Belov testifies that even the cavalry of the 9th Army should have received T-34 tanks (8). Thus, the 9th Army at the beginning of the war turned out to be the most powerful of all the Soviet Armies. But its location is very strange: the 9th Army is located on the territory of the OdVO, i.e. on the border with Romania.

Why is the most powerful of the armies on the Romanian border? Is Romania preparing for an attack on the USSR, and the 9th Army must repel the blow? Another question arises: why in June 1941 on the western borders of the USSR were concentrated armies of the first strategic echelon, most of which can be called shock? For what purpose are they brought close to the border, because with such an arrangement it would be very difficult for them to defend their native land? But besides the first strategic echelon, the Red Army also had a second strategic echelon.

Consider it - 12 by armies. 19th Army - formed in June 1941 in the North Caucasian District; composition: 25th and 34th sk, 26th mk, 38th sd; commander-lieutenant general I. S. Konev. The 20th Army was formed in June 1941 in the Oryol Military District; composition: 61st and 69th sk, 7th mk, 18th sd; commander - Lieutenant General F. N. Remezov. 21st Army - formed in June 1941 in the Volga Military District; composition: 63rd and 66th sk, 25th mk; commander - Lieutenant General V. F. Gerasimenko. 22nd Army - formed in June 1941 in the Ural Military District; composition: 51st and 62nd sc; commander - Lieutenant General F. A. Ermakov. The 24th Army was formed in June 1941 in the Siberian Military District; composition: 52nd and 53rd sc; commander - Lieutenant General S. A. Kalinin. 16th Army - formed in July 1940 in the Trans-Baikal Military District, at the beginning of the war it moved to the western border of the USSR; composition: 32nd sk, 5th MK, a number of artillery units; commander-lieutenant general M. F. Lukin (4.7). Thus, we see that the second strategic echelon consisted of six armies, of which four have mechanized corps in their composition, i.e. four of the six armies of the second echelon can be called shock.

Why are six more armies created in addition to the first echelon, and, what is more strange, why are they pulling up to the border? We have considered land armies, and now we turn to the Navy. At the beginning of the war, the USSR Navy consisted of 4 fleets: Northern, Red Banner, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific.

The Northern Fleet included 8 destroyers, 7 patrol ships, 2 minesweepers, 14 submarine hunters, 15 submarines; on the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas there was the 23rd UR, which included two machine-gun battalions and an artillery regiment; The Air Force of the Northern Fleet consisted of 116 aircraft (half were obsolete seaplanes). Rear Admiral A. G. Golovko commanded the fleet.

The Red Banner Baltic Fleet consisted of 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, 2 leaders, 17 destroyers, 4 minelayers, 7 patrol ships, 30 minesweepers, 2 gunboats, 67 torpedo boats, 71 submarines; Fleet Air Force - 656 aircraft, including 172 bombers. Vice-Admiral V.F. Tributs (5) commanded the fleet. The Black Sea Fleet included 1 battleship, 5 cruisers (the Komintern cruiser was converted into a mine layer), 3 leaders, 14 destroyers, 47 submarines, 4 gunboats, 2 patrol ship, 1 minelayer, 15 minesweepers, 84 torpedo boats, 24 submarine hunters; Fleet Air Force - 625 aircraft (315 fighters, 107 bombers, 36 torpedo bombers, 167 reconnaissance aircraft); coastal defense: 26 batteries (93 guns of 100-305 mm caliber), 50 anti-aircraft batteries (186 guns, mostly 76 mm, 119 anti-aircraft machine guns). Vice-Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky commanded the fleet.

The Danube military flotilla was created in the summer of 1940. It consisted of 5 monitors, 22 armored boats, 7 minesweepers, 6 armed gliders; air defense of the flotilla - the 46th separate artillery division and the 96th fighter squadron; flotilla coastal defense - 6 batteries (24 guns from 45 to 152 mm) (6). The Pacific Fleet will not be considered.

But let's look at the Pinsk military flotilla.

After the completion of the liberation campaign in the summer of 1940, the USSR had a small section of the mouth of the Danube River. Immediately after that, the Dnieper military flotilla was disbanded, and its material part was distributed between two new flotillas: the Danube and Pinsk.

The Pinsk flotilla was formed in June 1940, and was operationally subordinate to the commander of the ZOVO. The flotilla consisted of 7 monitors, 15 armored boats, 4 gunboats, 1 mine layer, an aviation squadron, an anti-aircraft artillery battalion and a company of marines.

The flotilla was commanded by Rear Admiral D. D. Rogachev. The main base of the flotilla was the city of Pinsk, the rear base was the city of Kyiv. Thus, the Pinsk military flotilla stood on the Pripyat River (5). What did the Soviet Navy do on the eve of the war? They weren't idle at all. Here is the evidence: "the Soviet Baltic Fleet left the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland on the eve of the war" (9). But if you look at the map, you can clearly see that if the fleet left the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, then it would have only one way left - to the west.

It is unlikely that the Red Banner Baltic Fleet would organize global exercises at such an alarming time. Then why did the fleet leave the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland? Why was the Dnieper military flotilla disbanded in the summer of 1940, and its ships given to the Pinsk and Danube military flotillas? The Dnieper military flotilla could perfectly provide the defense of the territory of the Soviet Union. And could two new flotillas ensure the reliability of the defense to the same extent? No, they couldn't.

There can be no other answer, since the Danube military flotilla occupied such a small section of the mouth of the Danube that it could be seen through and through from the Romanian side; and the Pinsk military flotilla was located on the Pripyat River, and where its width did not exceed 50 meters, while the flotilla included 7 huge monitors - "river cruisers", and even deploying a monitor on Pripyat is a big problem.

So why was the Dnieper military flotilla disbanded, and why were the Pinsk and Danube flotillas created? Now let's turn to another strange event that occurred before the war - the destruction of the Soviet supply line and the strip of long-term fortifications (the so-called "Stalin Line"). This colossal defensive structure was created during the years of the first two five-year plans. Its construction was not advertised, like the construction of the French "Maginot Line" or the Finnish "Mannerheim Line", the construction of the "Stalin Line" was shrouded in mystery.

In the thirties, 13 fortified areas were built along the western border, which made up the "Stalin Line". But they were built not at the very border, like the Maginot Line, but in the depths of the territory. This is a very important factor, it means that the first artillery strike of the enemy will hit the void, and not the URs. The UR consisted of strong points, each of which was completely autonomous, and was able to defend itself.

The main combat unit of the UR was a bunker (long-term firing point). The power of the bunker can be judged from the publication in the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper on February 25, 1983: "DOT N 112 of the 53rd UR in the Mogilev-Podolsky region - it was a complex fortification underground structure, consisting of communication passages, caponiers, compartments, filtration devices It contained warehouses for weapons, ammunition, food, a medical unit, a dining room, water supply, a red corner, observation and command posts.

The armament of the bunker is a three-hole machine-gun point, in which there were three "Maxims" on stationary turrets, and two gun semi-caponiers with a 76 mm cannon in each. Often, the bunkers were interconnected by underground galleries. due to the construction of heavy artillery caponiers, in addition, the construction of another 8 URs began.But in the fall of 1939, at the time of the outbreak of the Second World War, at the time of the establishment of common borders with Germany, all construction work on the "Stalin Line" was stopped (10). In addition, the garrisons of the URs on the "Stalin Line" were first reduced and then completely disbanded.

Soviet factories stopped producing weapons and special equipment for fortifications. Existing URs were disarmed; weapons, ammunition, observation, communication and fire control devices were handed over to warehouses (11). Then the "Stalin Line" was completely destroyed, while the strip of fortifications on the new border had not yet been built.

Here is what Chief Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov, then Colonel General, says: "How could our leadership, without building the necessary defensive lines on the new western border of 1939, decide to liquidate and disarm the fortified areas on the former borders?" (12) . But the question of N. N. Voronov needs to be supplemented and expanded: why was it necessary to destroy the "Stalin line" at all, aren't two lines of defense better than one? Let us turn to other features of the Red Army on the eve of the war.

In April 1941, the formation of 5 airborne corps began (approximately over 50,000 people, 1,600 50 and 82 mm mortars, 45 mm anti-tank and 76 mm mountain guns, T-38 and T-40 tanks, flamethrowers). For the transportation of paratroopers, the R-5, U-2, DB-3 (decommissioned long-range bomber designed by Ilyushin), TB-3 (obsolete strategic bomber), PS-84, LI-2, various modifications of cargo gliders were used.

The level of training of Soviet paratroopers was very high. Suffice it to recall the landings of huge masses of air infantry during various exercises of the mid-late 30s, for example, the Kyiv maneuvers. Marshal G.K. Zhukov in the first volume of his "Memoirs and Reflections" has a photograph of the landing, in which the whole sky is white from parachute domes. In addition, in 1935, for the first time in the world, the T-27 tankette, which was located under the fuselage of the TB-3, was landed. Then, in subsequent years, light armored vehicles, field artillery guns, etc. were parachuted in the same way. Huge amounts of money were spent on airborne troops.

But why? At the beginning of the war, all airborne units were used as rifle formations, only near Kyiv, Odessa and on the Kerch Peninsula, small tactical landings were used (4). Thus, we see that airborne troops are not needed in a defensive war, since their use as rifle formations is not beneficial due to lighter weapons.

So why, on the eve of the war, the formation of 5 airborne corps begins? At the beginning of the war, tank and mechanized units of the Red Army had 8259 tanks of the BT series (high-speed tank) (13). BT tanks were the most famous and most beloved tanks of the pre-war years by tankers. Tanks of the BT series were created on the basis of the tanks M. 1930 by the greatest tank designer J. Walter Christie.

In the Soviet Union, 2 chassis of the M. 1930 tank arrived at the beginning of 1931. After completion, the production of BT tanks began at the Kharkov plant named after the Comintern. As a result of the actions of the Soviet mech. troops on the autumn maneuvers of 1936 so shocked the British observers that they immediately contacted Christie and purchased one M. 1930 from him for 8000 pounds (13) . On the M. 1930 tanks, and then on the BT tanks, such revolutionary solutions were first applied as a candle suspension of each of the eight road wheels and a large angle of inclination of the frontal armored plate.

It should be noted that these innovations have become elementary truths in modern tank building (13) . The main distinguishing feature of the BT tanks was the combined course, allowing the tank to move both on tracks and on wheels. This, and the independent suspension of rubber-coated road wheels, allowed the tank to develop a record speed for those times (for vehicles of this class). For example, BT-7 could reach 53 km/h on tracks and 73 km/h on wheels.

A 45 mm tank gun was installed on the BT-5 and BT-7 tanks; it was a powerful weapon for a light tank. Booking BT was at the level of world standards of that time. From this we can conclude that on the basis of the M. 1930 in the Soviet Union in the 30s, a family of excellent combat vehicles was created. If it were not for one thing: BT tanks had extremely low cross-country ability on bad roads. During the thaw period, their cross-country ability was even lower than that of motor vehicles (14) . Thus, the tanks of the BT series could not be actively used on the European territory of the USSR. In addition, in 1938, the project of the A-20 tank (motorway) was developed in the design bureau, headed by M. I. Koshkin (later the creator of the T-34). The A-20 tank had a combat weight of 18 tons, a crew of 4, armor thickness up to 20 mm, armament remained the same as that of the BT-7, speed on wheels and tracks was 65 km / h. The A-20 tank, like the BT, had low maneuverability (14). So why did the Soviet Union have 8259 BT tanks and why was the A-20 being developed? In 1932, the world's first serial T-37 amphibious tanks appeared in the USSR, which were produced until 1936. Their further development was the T-38 amphibious tank, which has a speed of movement on water up to 6 km / h, and on land - 46 km / h. By the Decree of the Defense Committee of December 19, 1939, the T-40 floating tank was adopted, which has a more powerful engine, thicker armor, and more powerful weapons.

The T-40 tank was indispensable when crossing large water barriers, but in defensive battles wide application not found, and shortly after the start of the war, its production was discontinued.

What was the purpose of increasing and updating the fleet of amphibious tanks in the Soviet Union before the war? Let's turn to another interesting detail, this time to the armament of the Soviet aviation units, namely, the legendary IL-2 aircraft. In 1939, the first flight of the prototype TsKB-55 aircraft, the prototype of the famous attack aircraft, took place.

TsKB-55 was a two-seat variant with armor for the entire front, with an AM-38 engine and very powerful small arms and artillery weapons, consisting of 2 PTB-23 guns of 23 mm caliber, 2 ShKAS machine guns and 8 rockets RS-82 or RS-132. When the work on preparing the aircraft for serial production was almost completed, S.V. Ilyushin was offered to convert the attack aircraft into a single-seat version.

Instead of a cockpit, 18 gunners installed a 12-mm armored partition and a gas tank. The new aircraft was named TsKB-55P, and was put into service after state tests in 1941 under the symbol IL-2. He became the world's first armored attack aircraft.

But in the very first days of the war, a flaw was revealed that Ilyushin had foreseen from the very beginning: the aircraft's vulnerability to attacks by enemy fighters from behind. At the beginning of 1942, Ilyushin was asked to develop a two-seat version of the IL-2 aircraft and put it into mass production (15). Why was it necessary to first convert the IL-2 from a double to a single seat before the start of the war? We examined the preparations for the war of the USSR, now let's turn to Germany. 5.

End of work -

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Political situation on the eve of the war. Preparing Germany and the USSR for War

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Combat and political training in the Armed Forces was organized and carried out in accordance with the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, based on an assessment of the possible nature of a future war, and was aimed at ensuring the combat readiness of the troops to repel an attack by any aggressor.

The Central Committee of the Party, having analyzed the experience of the military operations of the Soviet Army near Lake Khasan, on the Khalkhin Gol River, in Finland, drew attention to the shortcomings in the combat training of the troops, in which its separation from the harsh requirements of the war was manifested.

New requirements for combat and political training of troops were established by the People's Commissar of Defense in Order No. 120 of May 16, 1940 and clarified in Order No. 30 of January 29, 1941, as well as in the directive of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Soviet Army "On the restructuring of the party -political work", published in August 1940. These documents focused on the main thing in the training of troops - the approximation of everyday training to the conditions of combat reality. "Teach the troops only what is needed in the war, and only in the way that is done in the war" - became the military slogan of the army.

Implementing this principle of training, commanders, commanders and political workers paid special attention to comprehensive combat training, starting with the training of a single fighter and small units; continuous and precise control in any combat conditions; practical development of interaction between military branches; development of endurance in personnel; improving the work of headquarters.

Rifle troops made marches in various training and combat situations, being in constant readiness for battle, they learned to act in a coordinated manner and maneuver on the battlefield, storm fortified positions, fight in the forest, overcome river barriers, and advance in cooperation with other branches of the military.

In April 1941, a wartime staff was introduced for rifle troops. The rifle division - the main combined arms formation of the Red Army - included three rifle and two artillery regiments, anti-tank and anti-aircraft divisions, reconnaissance and engineer battalions, a communications battalion, rear units and institutions. According to the wartime states, the division was supposed to have about 14 and a half thousand people, 78 field guns, 54 anti-tank 45-mm guns, 12 anti-aircraft guns, 66 mortars of 82-120 mm caliber, 16 light tanks, 13 armored vehicles, more than three thousand horses. Fully equipped divisions could represent a fairly mobile and formidable combat unit.

In 1939, 1940 and the first half of 1941, the troops received more than 105 thousand light, heavy and heavy machine guns, more than 100 thousand machine guns. This is despite the fact that the production of small arms and artillery weapons at that time decreased somewhat, because obsolete types were discontinued, and new ones, due to complexity and design features, were not so easy to put on stream.

G.K. Zhukov writes in his memoirs: “In mid-March 1941, S.K. Timoshenko and I asked permission from I.V. Stalin to call on the assigned staff of the reserve for rifle divisions in order to be able to retrain him in the spirit of modern requirements. At first our request was denied. We were told that the draft of the assigned reserve personnel in such numbers could give the Germans a pretext to provoke a war. However, at the end of March, it was decided to call up five hundred thousand soldiers and sergeants and send them to the border military districts for resupplying in order to bring the number of rifle divisions to at least 8 thousand people.

As a result, on the eve of the war in the border districts, out of one hundred and seventy divisions and two brigades, 19 divisions were equipped with up to 5-6 thousand people, 7 cavalry divisions had an average of 6 thousand people each, 144 divisions had a strength of 8-9 thousand people each. In the interior districts, most divisions were kept on a reduced staff, and many rifle divisions were just being formed and began combat training.

In the training of tankers, special importance was attached to teaching them independent actions in all types of combat, interaction with infantry, artillery and aviation. At the same time, the main place was given to the training of a single fighter and the formation of a crew. The basis for the fire training of tank units was the provision - to teach how to fire from a place (short stops) and on the move. As the former commander of the 9th mechanized corps, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky, already in the process of formation, comprehensive combat training of subunits, units and the entire formation as a whole was launched.

In the preparation of artillery, the main attention was paid to the conduct of centralized, controlled massive fire, interaction with infantry, tanks and aircraft. Artillerymen learned how to effectively prepare an attack, accompany infantry and tanks with massed fire, and fire in difficult meteorological and combat conditions.

Aviation was tasked with working out interaction with ground forces and the fleet in any conditions, as well as being able to conduct active fighting, both in large masses and in small independent groups of aircraft. Much attention was paid to flights in difficult meteorological conditions, the ability to find and hit targets at night.

To improve the flight skills of instructors, "star flights" were carried out. One of them took place in September 1927. It took place in difficult conditions and confirmed the high air skills of the instructors.

In connection with the entry into service of aviation of a more advanced material part, the retraining of flight personnel and the development new technology in many cases it took place directly in the regiments, without sending pilots and technicians to schools and courses.

The training of the personnel of the Navy was actively carried out. In 1940, the Main Military Council of the Navy adopted a special resolution in which it was planned to improve the training of naval personnel, aviation and coastal services. In particular, it was recognized as necessary to deepen the study of the experience of combat operations in the naval theaters of the Second World War, to eliminate seasonality in training, to prevent simplification in combat training, to study in more detail ways to combat the mine threat, to improve the work of commanders and Headquarters in organizing and implementing interaction between ships and ships. aviation and coastal defense facilities.

The restructuring of the combat training and indoctrination of troops, carried out on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, had a fruitful influence on the formation of high combat and moral-political qualities of the personnel of the army and navy.

The training of command personnel and the operational training of staffs were subordinated to the main task - the acquisition of solid skills in command and control. The goal was to prepare "a strong-willed commander with combat qualities that meet modern combat requirements." At live-fire exercises, command and staff field trips, staff training and military games, commanders and staffs acquired the skills of driving troops, learned to organize the interaction of troops and ensure their control in battle.

Here is what he writes about the training of the commanders of the armies in the prewar years. S.E. Lazarev in the article "The fate of the "marshal course" of the Academy of the General Staff" from the journal "Questions of History".

Among the Soviet higher military institutions that trained command personnel, the Academy of the General Staff of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army occupied a special place. It trained senior and senior officers of the armed forces and at the same time was the leading military educational institution for conducting scientific research in the field of ensuring the military security of the state and military development.

By the end of the second five-year plan, 13 military academies trained commanders with higher military and engineering education. But they were not designed to train senior military leaders, to whom new stage development of the Armed Forces of the USSR made much higher demands.

April 11, 1936 People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR K.E. Voroshilov signed an order on the formation of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. 5 departments were created - army operations, tactics of higher formations, organization and mobilization, military history and foreign languages. They were led by the most experienced and trained teachers, including those transferred from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze.

The General Staff constantly controlled the work of the academy, providing all kinds of assistance, periodically organizing reports and lectures for the students and the teaching staff of the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the General Staff and districts for topical issues military art and the building of the red army.

At the initiative of the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal Tukhachevsky, within the framework of the Academy of the General Staff in 1936-1937. strategic war game, where Mikhail Nikolaevich commanded the combined Polish-German forces (“for Hitler”), and the Commander of the Belarusian Military District, Army Commander 1st Rank Uborevich commanded the Western Front. The Soviet troops then won a complete victory. The former chief of staff of Hitler, the head of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army, Kuchinsky admitted, “that Tukhachevsky brought extraordinary passion into this game. He said that the Germans should have more forces.

So it was created in 1936. Military Academy The General Staff of the Red Army prepared the highest command and command staff of the operational-strategic level. Its first release came at a difficult and tragic time for the country - an aggravation international relations, tightening the internal regime, repression in the Armed Forces. But many of them managed to survive. In the 1940s, they received the rank of general and during the Great Patriotic War formed the core of the leadership of the Soviet armed forces. Some of them became commanders.

In 1935-1941. The leadership of the USSR carried out a number of major measures to increase the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces:

1) transfer of the Red Army in 1935-1939. on a staffing basis;

2) the introduction of universal conscription in 1939;

3) strategic mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces in 1939-1941. from the peacetime army to the wartime army (before the war), from 98 divisions to 303 divisions;

4) creation and concentration on the western borders in 1939-1941. cover armies of 186 divisions, unprecedented in the history of mankind for peacetime, taking into account 16 divisions of the second strategic echelon that arrived in the cover army before the war;

5) preparation of the Western theater for war - airfields, fortified areas, roads.

The legal newspaper reports: “... the reason why the Soviet-German war should begin this year (meaning 1941) is that the Red Army is growing stronger all the time, while the power of the German army, if the war with England drags on, will weakened. Therefore, it is more profitable for Hitler to try to break the Red Army before its reorganization is completed.

In the second half of the 1930s, military theorists and major military leaders of the capitalist countries not only recognized the achievements of the Soviet Armed Forces, but also borrowed a lot from their experience. The head of the Italian military mission, General Graziolini, who was present at the “big Russian maneuvers,” wrote: “The Red Army is organized and equipped in a modern way ...” In his opinion, the Russians have a “great passion for mobile troops,” “are fond of large mechanized formations and teachings with their use.

An interesting assessment of the Red Army was given by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the French Army, General Loiseau: "I ... saw a powerful, serious army, of very high quality both technically and morally."

A controversial topic in the consecration of the training of personnel of the Red Army on the eve of the war was the topic of repression.

An analysis of the personnel status of the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War and the impact on the combat readiness of the army of repression, which was associated with one of the main reasons for our failures at the beginning of the war, allows us to draw the following conclusions. Army personnel renewal 1937-1938 It was dictated, first of all, by the need to free the army from commanders and chiefs who held posts that did not correspond to their real military knowledge and hindered the development of the army. The documents at the disposal of the researchers, which make it possible to assess the scale of the purges, do not allow us to talk about the total "bleeding" of the officer corps of the Red Army, since the proportion of those who were actually innocently convicted or shot compared to the payroll of the command staff was relatively small. At least a third of those dismissed from the army in 1937-1938. commanders by 1940 returned back the ranks of the Red Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense controlled the process of reforming the army and immediately reacted to all deviations from its line of screening out insufficiently qualified, in the opinion of the leadership of the army and the country, commanders.

Here is what A. Reisenfeld writes about this: “Now it is fashionable to shout that the Soviet army did not know how to fight, that the generals were mediocre. And at the same time, it is vague to hint that, they say, in “democratic” states this cannot and could not happen. How, then, to understand the fact that the Anglo-French coalition, being at war with Germany for seven months, missed all the preparations of the Wehrmacht for active operations and was defeated within forty days?

At present, many facts are known that allow us to have a fairly complete picture of the state in which the USSR approached the fateful date of June 22, 1941.

The first thing to note is the impact of repression on the command staff of the Red Army and the Red Army. With light hand"Democratic" mass media walks a fantastic figure of 40,000 officers, allegedly shot in 1937-1938. In fact, the repressions affected a much smaller number of people. Moreover, after October 1938, more than 12,000 officers who were dismissed in 1937-1938 were reinstated in their positions and ranks, many of them released from imprisonment, with compensation paid and provided with the opportunity for treatment. It is characteristic that of these 12,000 people, only a few betrayed the Motherland during the war years.

Among the officers and generals released after 1938, there were such well-known military leaders as the future marshals of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky and K.A. Meretskov, brigade commander L.G. Petrovsky, who commanded the 21st Army in June-July 1941.

An analysis of the age composition in the link of division commanders shows that most of the commanders of this link in 1941 were 41-45 years old, which approximately corresponded to the age of the same level of officers in the mid-80s. Thus, there is no reason to say that in 1941 divisions were commanded by almost former company commanders. This situation, unfortunately, is typical for 1937-1938, but by 1941 it had changed radically.”

In general, the main reason for the low level of training of command personnel was the process of deployment of the Soviet armed forces. In 20 months, the size of the army and navy increased from 1400 people to 5373 thousand people! The number of combined-arms divisions increased from 98 to 303. In the absence of large contingents of trained reserve officers, one inevitably had to take such measures as training commanders at various accelerated courses.

But the highest echelon of the command staff really suffered serious losses in 1937-1938. This is especially true for officers of the general staff. Many officers and generals who had experience in the General Staff in the First World War died. And replace them with short time turned out to be impossible. Most of the outstanding staff workers of the period of the Great Patriotic War - A.M. Vasilevsky, A.I. Antonov, S.M. Shtemenko and others - had to gain experience in managing troops on own mistakes and defeats.

Separately, it must be said that, with rare exceptions, the complete unpreparedness of the Soviet troops stationed near the state border of the USSR to repel aggression was the result of the stubborn unwillingness of Stalin and part of his inner circle to take into account the most obvious facts of the Nazis' undisguised preparation for aggression. Due to the fact that the USSR complied with the terms of the Non-Aggression Pact.

The overwhelming majority of historians in all countries see the cause of the outbreak of war in the policy not of the Soviet Union, but of Hitler's Germany. Soviet domestic politics regarded as a more or less adequate response to the changes taking place in the international arena. However, there is a group of authors who adhere to a different point of view and explain the military preparation of the USSR as the desire of Stalin and his leadership to deliver a preemptive strike to Germany.

The accusation of the Soviet Union of preparing an attack on Germany in the summer of 1941 was first officially voiced in a statement made by the German ambassador Schulenburg to the Soviet government immediately after the start of the war. As for historical science, the myth that the German attack on the USSR was of a preemptive nature appeared immediately after the war in the works of former Wehrmacht generals, as well as officials of the Third Reich, who sought to justify their participation, often active, in the preparation and implementation of the Barbarossa plan. ". They stated that the USSR was determined to conquer all of Europe, and if Stalin had not attacked Germany in 1941, he certainly would have done it later. Germany in the speeches of these authors was portrayed as "the guardian of Europe", "a barrier against the spread of communist pan-Slavism."

In the Russian press, works in which the arguments of West German historians and memoirists were repeated appeared in the early 1990s. and caused a lively controversy, the impetus for which was the publication in Russian of the book by V. Suvorov (Rezun) entitled "Icebreaker", where this concept was presented in a harsh and aggressive form.

The main idea of ​​"Icebreaker" is to substantiate the assertion that Stalin's policy in the 30s was determined by the desire for world domination. Stalin contributed in every possible way to the outbreak of the Second World War, hoping to turn it into a revolutionary war. In 1941, the USSR had an aggressive plan like "Barbarossa", which was implemented in the deployment of strategic echelons, and the Red Army would certainly attack Germany (and the entire Western Europe), if Hitler had not slowed down the "offensive of world communism" on June 22.

The point of view of V. Suvorov, his methods of working with sources caused fair criticism from historians different countries and political orientations as far from science. Nevertheless, there were historians in our country who supported the version that Stalin was preparing an attack on Germany. They saw proof that V. Suvorov was right in a declassified document of the General Staff of the Red Army dated May 15, 1941, called "Considerations on the Strategic Deployment Plan." Yu.N. Afanasiev, V.D. Danilov, M.I. Meltyukhov and B.V. Sokolov. “Could Stalin be the first to strike and thereby take on the soul the sin of unleashing a bloody massacre? Perhaps yes. - considers V.D. Danilov. Intention I.V. Stalin's first to start a war is bound in this case with the general nature of the "criminal regime", aggressive in its essence, that existed then in the USSR: ".. not so much the need to fight aggression as far-reaching plans and communist ambitions to eliminate the power of capitalism on the path to world revolution determined the activities of the political and military leadership in pre-thunderstorm situation in 1941,” writes V.D. Danilov. He is echoed by M.I. Meltyukhov, believing that the main foreign policy goal of the Soviet Union was "the achievement of world domination."

Controversy over the goals of Soviet military policy in 1939-1941. K. Bellamy also touches upon in his book, especially since he is personally acquainted with Suvorov. Analyzing his concept in the light of recent research and taking into account newly declassified documents (first of all, of course, the Soviet strategic plans of 1940-1941, which were still secret at the time the Icebreaker was written), Bellamy agrees in principle with that the intensive preparation of the Soviet Union for an offensive war is confirmed by a number of circumstantial evidence, as well as with the fact that the beginning of secret mobilization in the USSR must be recognized as the adoption on September 1, 1939 of the law on universal military service, which allowed Stalin to sharply increase the size of the Red Army.

This point of view, widely voiced in the pages of periodicals and on television, became the subject of discussion in scientific literature, where it was subjected to comprehensive analysis and criticism. First of all, attention was drawn to the unjustified identification in the works of these authors of the concepts of "offensive" and "aggression". So, for example, A.N. and L.A. The Mertsalovs stressed that it is customary in military science to distinguish between these concepts. As early as the beginning of the 19th century, major European military theorists A. Jomini and K. Clausewitz showed that the nature of war is determined by the goals of the belligerents, and not by the methods of action of their armies. In a just or unjust war of conquest or liberation, an army can both attack and defend. So offensive does not mean aggressive.

The arguments cited by supporters of the Suvorov "version" cannot serve as evidence of the USSR's intention to attack Germany in the summer of 1941. Carrying out a number of preparatory measures - the call of reservists, the transfer of four armies to the border districts - finds a completely logical explanation within the framework of the traditional concept. In particular, such an explanation was given by G.K. Zhukov.

The latest documents, which have long been known to researchers, indicate that Stalin and the General Staff of the Red Army not only saw an ever-increasing threat from Germany, but also took measures to prevent a possible collision. In this context, modern researchers are inclined to consider both measures to strengthen the troops of the border districts, as well as to speed up defensive construction, and intensive work to adjust operational plans.

In the course of the controversy around the statements of V. Suvorov, many other problems were further developed. In particular, O.V. Vishlev proposed an explanation for the untimely return of I.V. Stalin's order to put the troops on alert. The German command set itself the goal of giving the Soviet leadership the impression that a peaceful resolution of the conflict was possible, and, apparently, Stalin, if he did not count on this, then at least considered it likely that the start of hostilities would be preceded by a showdown at the diplomatic level. O.V. Vishlev, analyzing the data obtained by Soviet intelligence, as well as some documents from the German archives that were not previously included in scientific circulation, came to the conclusion that I.V. Stalin, apparently, believed the skillfully planted disinformation and expected an ultimatum from Germany. Published by O.V. Vishlev, German documents show that the German command proceeded, on the one hand, from the fact that the USSR was not going to attack Germany in the summer of 1941, and, on the other hand, planned to lure Soviet troops from the depths of the country closer to the border in order to defeat them in border battles. From this point of view, the disinformation campaign carried out by the Nazis was assessed by them as successful.

Based on all that has been said, we see that the Rezun-Suvorov concept cannot be true, since it is based on fictitious or falsified facts. In recent years, it has been analyzed in several studies by Russian authors and completely refuted.

What we know and what we don't know about the Great Patriotic War Yury Vsevolodovich Skorokhod

3. Readiness of the USSR for war

3. Readiness of the USSR for war

The media of today claims that, judging by the large losses of territory, population, weapons and military equipment in the first days of the war, the USSR was not ready for it, for which both its leadership and the state system were to blame. Let's see if that was the case.

From the first days of the existence of the Soviet state, the issue of waging war (which was then understood as the defense of its borders) was of paramount, if not the main, importance for it. Consider this question as of the end of the 30s.

The outcome of the war is determined by the economic, scientific, technical, moral and military potential of the country, its geopolitical position (permanent factors) and the conditions for waging war - its declaration or surprise attack and compliance with international conventions.

Economic and scientific and technical potentials. For 1928–1940 the country's income increased by more than five times, electricity generation by 9.7 times, coal mining by 4.7 times, oil production by 2.7 times, steel production by more than 4 times, and engineering products by 20 times. Such industrial giants as the Gorky Automobile Plant, the Stalingrad and Chelyabinsk Tractor Plants, the Ural Heavy Engineering Plant, etc. were built. In the Donbass, Siberia, the Urals and the Kola Peninsula, the extraction of non-ferrous metals and, above all, aluminum was developed. In the east of the country, in addition to the Donbass, a second coal-metallurgical complex was created, the Karaganda coal basin was also rapidly developing, and an oil-producing processing base was created between the Volga and the Urals. By the beginning of the war, the eastern regions were already producing about 20% of the country's total output.

Particular attention was paid to the development of the defense industry in the country. In 1936, the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry was separated from the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, which in 1939 was divided into the People's Commissariats of Arms, Aviation, Shipbuilding and Tank Industry. New design organizations were created for the development of weapons and military equipment, factories for their manufacture and testing grounds. From the repressed specialists of the defense profile, "separate" and "special" design bureaus were organized. At the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, a department of military research was established and an additional experimental base was organized. In Leningrad, in the area of ​​Srednyaya Rogatka (Moskovsky district), the construction of a unified experimental base for military and civil shipbuilding has begun, which meets the needs of designing the domestic ocean-going military, commercial, river and fishing fleets at the most modern technical level. Ultimately, domestic aviation, tank and chemical industries were created in the country, and the formation of jet technology began. Some "non-military" factories (especially shipbuilding ones) were transferred to the production of military products. A thorough analysis of the produced and developed weapons was carried out, on the basis of which the construction of some warships and airships was abandoned and, at this expense, the production of tanks, artillery and combat aircraft was increased. Characteristically, the rate of output of military products in the last pre-war years was 1.5 to 2 times higher than the rate of growth of industry as a whole.

moral potential. For its formation big influence had the Constitution adopted in 1936, which legislated the achievements of the country, equalized its citizens in rights and guaranteed them certain freedoms. Based on it, a return to the patriotic roots and ideas of the Russian national state was promoted. prepared the people for unity in conditions of peace and war. A new attitude was instilled in labor as a matter of "honor, valor and heroism" and in socialist property, as the basis of the well-being of every citizen. The masses were educated in the spirit of friendship of the peoples of the USSR, argued by historical examples It was shown that extreme nationalism is beneficial only to the exploiters of the masses of the people and is hostile to the latter.From the foregoing followed the slogan about the need to defend one's fatherland - the only socialist island in the world, surrounded on all sides by imperialist countries hostile to it. increased over time, primarily due to the improvement in the well-being of workers. At the end of 1934 the rationing system was abolished and the food situation improved every year. Unemployment was eliminated, the network of all-Union health resorts and educational institutions of all levels was expanded, etc. Since 1939, not only unjustified repressions ceased, but after the review of cases, a mass return of the rehabilitated began, only in 1939 there were 837 thousand of them.

Summing up what has been said, it can be argued that the ideological work launched in the country ensured the unity of the people in the most unfavorable conditions for the country, which ultimately made it possible to win the war.

The military potential of the country depends on the size of its population and its preparation for war, the quantity and quality of weapons and military equipment, the optimal structure armed forces and their mobilization readiness.

In terms of population, the USSR surpassed Germany with its satellites. The population was completely literate (moreover, most of it, born after the revolution, had a secondary education and was healthy, of the number of conscripts unsuitable for military service, there were no more than 7%). The size of the armed forces steadily increased and by the beginning of the war had been brought to 11.4 million people (while in Germany it was 9.6 million people).

During the thirties, the number of military educational institutions in the USSR increased by almost an order of magnitude. By the beginning of the war, there were 203 secondary military schools in the country. 19 military academies, 10 military faculties at civilian universities, 7 naval schools and over 10 NKVD schools. Schools for junior commanders were established under separate training regiments. The activities of military sports organizations (such as Osoviahim), which were popular with young people, were expanded, in which military training was purposefully carried out, “military science” was introduced in the 10th grade of secondary schools, most technical schools and universities, weapon. In September 1940, the next demobilization of privates, sergeants and foremen was not carried out.

In connection with the unjustified repressions of 1937-1938. in the armed forces, a problem arose with the personnel of the command and command staff of the Red Army and the Red Army of the Russian Federation at all levels. The problem was solved by conscription from the reserve, expanding the network of military educational institutions and organizing short-term courses for command personnel at large military units. In addition, after the review of cases, about 90 thousand unjustifiably repressed at all levels, up to the generals, were returned to the ranks of the Red Army and the Red Army.

Weapons intended for war were developed according to their own designs, built and manufactured at their own factories and from their own raw materials. Armament was available in sufficient quantity, but some of it was somewhat inferior in combat qualities to the German one. However, a significant number of samples of new weapons (in particular, tanks and aircraft), superior to the German ones, were under development, fine-tuning and mass production. Therefore, those 22 months during which Soviet government managed to avoid entering the war, were of strategic importance for the country.

In the last months of the pre-war period, following the experience of the Finnish-Soviet conflict (FSVK), a number of organizational and structural changes were made in the system of the country's armed forces. He was replaced by the People's Commissar of Defense and some other persons from among the leadership of the Red Army. The draft age for military service was reduced from 21 to 18 years, the military districts were reorganized, the formation of mechanized corps, interrupted in 1939, was resumed, new regulations and instructions were introduced, etc. .

The system of mobilization readiness was worked out in the USSR by the end of the 1920s and continued to be improved in the 1930s. The beginning of WWII required further development of the existing system, and in August 1940 the Main Military Council of the Red Army (S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, G.I. Kulik, L.Z. Mekhlis and G.A. Shchadenko) adopted the decision to develop a unified mobilization plan, the implementation of which was planned from May 1941. Due to the delay in agreeing with the industry, the work schedule was approved only at the end of 1940, and the plan as a whole, which received the MP-41 code, was submitted to the government and approved in February 1941 The development of documentation according to the plan began immediately and was planned for completion in the first half of 1941. According to the plan, it was planned to deploy 303 divisions (198 rifle, 61 tank, 37 motorized and 13 cavalry), 346 aviation regiments, 5 directorates of airborne corps, 10 separate anti-tank artillery brigades, 94 corps artillery regiments and 72 artillery regiments of the RGK. The total number of troops in the units listed above was to be 8.9 million people. The implementation of the above planned figures would allow the USSR, at the traditional start of the war (i.e., upon its declaration), to successfully complete the initial period of the war. Although, as of June 22, 1941, some of the indicated planned figures turned out to be underfulfilled, however, a scrupulous analysis of indicators carried out by domestic experts reflecting the material objectivity of the mobilization deployment of our troops in terms of small arms and artillery weapons, aircraft, tanks, Vehicle, ammunition, technical and special means, clothing and food indicates that these indicators were only slightly inferior to the corresponding indicators of the deployed German army. They testify that in the conditions of the "traditional" start of the war, the Soviet troops could provide proper resistance to the German troops (i.e., they were sufficient to initial period war) and were never as high as in 1941. They even surpassed the corresponding indicators of our troops during their brilliant victories in the second half of the Second World War.

The USSR owed its favorable geopolitical position to its glorious ancestors: Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Catherine II, and also I.V. Stalin, who provided in 1939–1940. accession to the country of a number of new naval bases in the Baltic, Karelian Isthmus, defending Leningrad, as well as exits to the Danube (only 200 km to Ploiesti, which supplied the Wehrmacht with oil products) and the Carpathians.

The USSR signed almost all international conventions relating to war and in its plans was guided by the rules stipulated in the signed conventions. The USSR did not sign the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, however, at the beginning of the Second World War, he undertook to comply with the rules specified in this convention.

From all of the above, it follows that in the 1930s the USSR carried out a huge comprehensive work to increase the country's defense capability, which ultimately ensured not only victory in the war, but also made it possible in the future to achieve a new redivision of the world that was beneficial to itself. However, the conditions of the war were not taken into account, which will be explained in the next section.