Systemic crisis and collapse of the CPSU and the Union of the Republics. The formation of a multi-party system

The collapse of the USSR, decorated by the Belovezhsky Agreement of the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, B. N. Yeltsin, L. M. Kravchuk and S. S. Shushkevi-than December 8, 1991, is one of the most significant events of the world history of the XX century. This is perhaps the only assessment that is made by most historians and politicians. All other issues related to the analysis of the causes and the value of the collapse of the USSR remain the subject of sharp discussion.

Causes of the collapse of the USSR. In March 1990, at the All-Union referendum, most citizens spoke in favor of maintaining the SSR Union and the need for reform it. By the summer of 1991, a new Union Agreement was prepared, which gave a chance to update a federal state. But the unity could not be preserved. USSR broke up. Why? We give the most common explanations that researchers offer:

The USSR was created in 1922. as a federal state. However, over time, he increasingly turned into a state, essentially unitary, manageable from the center and the leveling differences between the republics, subjects of federal relations. Problems of interrestline I. interethnic relationships ignored over the years, the difficulties were drunk deep into, were not solved. During the years of restructuring, when interethnic conflicts acquired an explosive, extremely dangerous nature, decision-making was postponed until 1990-1991. The accumulation of contradictions made the decay inevitable;

The USSR was created on the basis of the recognition of the right of nations for self-determination, the Federation was built not on the territorial, but a national-territorial principle. In constitutions 1924, 1936 and 1977. The norms on the sovereignty of the republics entering into the USSR. In the conditions of the growing crisis, these norms became a catalyst for centrifugal processes;

The Unified People's Communications Complex in the USSR ensured the economic integration of the republics. However, as economic difficulties are increasing, economic relations began to break down, the republic showed tendencies to self-insulation, and the center was not ready for such developments;

Sovetskaya political system It was based on the rigid centralization of power, the real carrier of which was not so much a state as the communist party. The Crisis of the CPSU, loss of the leadership role, its disintegration was inevitable to decay the country;

The unity and integrity of the Union was largely provided by his ideological unity. The crisis of the communist value system created a spiritual vacuum that was filled with nationalist ideas;

The political, economic, ideological crisis, who experienced the USSR in the last years of its existence, led to the weakening of the Center and the strengthening of the republics, their political elites. The national elites were in economic, political, personal reasons are interested not so much in the preservation of the USSR, as in his decay. The "parade of sovereignty" 1990 clearly showed the mood and intention of national party-state elites.

The value of the collapse of the USSR. The value of such large-scale events is determined by time. Since the decay of the USSR, only 10 years old, historians and politicians, citizens of states arising in the place of the USSR are in power of emotions and are not yet ready for suspended, reasonable conclusions. We should be noted that apparently: the collapse of the USSR led to the emergence of independent sovereign states; The geopolitical situation in Europe and all over the world has radically changed; The rupture of economic relations was one of the main reasons for the deep economic crisis in Russia and other countries - the heirs of the USSR; There were serious problems associated with the fate of the Russians remaining outside of Russia, national minorities in general.

The formation of a new Russian statehood. The process of the formation of a new Russian statehood began adopting the Supreme Council of the RSFSR Declaration on the sovereignty of Russia (1990) and the elections of the first russian president (June 12, 1991). With the collapse of the USSR (December 1991), the status of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state became legal and actual reality. The period of the formation of Russian statehood was completed on December 12, 1993, when the Constitution of the Russian Federation was adopted on a popular referendum and the Soviet political system was finally dismantled. The birth of a modern Russian state was a dramatic, extremely painful and complex process.

<... >- Speech will go About crisis in the CPSU. What, in your opinion, is he expressed? - Crisis is obvious. Some republican organizations have disappeared from the CPSU, others wrapped a pitiful existence, the third retained themselves, show activity, but are puzzled by issues that they do not have answers. A significant part of the Communists is confused, more than two million people only over the past year and a half left the ranks of the party, several currents arose within the party.<... >- But Mikhail Sergeevich more than once, sometimes with noticeable irritation, said that we could not have been the concept of restructuring. - And he is absolutely right. We could not have the concept of restructuring the country, its economy, state bodies, legal system, etc. of the injury, which were subjected to these parties to the life of our society over the past 70 years, hesitated such a buzz of ugly problems that systematically understand them, yes It was still not possible to arrange any opportunity or the time.<... >- What happened in this case prevented ... the crisis [parties]? - prevented Stalin. "Stalin died almost a horror years ago ..." It's so, but "there are the dead you have to kill," one French writer said apt. Stalin still breathes. Historians are no longer the first year and quite successfully fill the "white spots" of our history associated with mass repression, NEP, Leninsky testament, collectivization, a gitler and much more.<... >Stalin killed the memory of the party ... According to unverified data, in the office of the Central Committee of the CPSU, it seems two, and in Agitprope - even three staff members. I personally since 1952 looking for a hardware worker of any level with experience until 1936 - I did not find it.<... >- Do you have from what you said that the main wine for breaking the restructuring of the party, for the crisis lies with the device? - In no case. The device is innocent, I do not accidentally emphasize: "The former leadership of the former orgotel". Those who want to honestly understand the true role of the apparatus must remember that Stalin approved in the hardware work a purely military principle of uniqueness and official subordination, which is needed by the army, as much destructive for the party.<... >

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1988-1990 was a kind of boom party construction. Then the real multipartyness began to germinate. During the election campaigns, 1989-1990 "Folk Fronts" made efforts to develop territorial organizations as a support for expanding the mass base in the form of constant rally activists, initiative election groups and various shapes amateur folk control.

In the late 1990 - the first half of 1991, the first parties were formed: the Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation (SDPR), the Republican Party of the Russian Federation (RPRF), the Free Labor Party (PST), the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union, Russian Christian Democratic Movement (RCDD) , Democratic Union, Peasant Party of the Russian Federation and a number of others. According to the approximate estimates of experts, the number of political organizations who took the name of the "Party" was in the USSR for January 1990 about 40 years. These parties received their leaders in the winter-spring of 1991, when preparations began on the election of the President of the Russian Federation, the first echelon factions have developed in the Supreme The Council of the Russian Federation, which reproduced in one form or another, the party core of these organizations. There is a certain return logic in the formation of parties when the manual is initially developing, which is then looking for potential members and voters.

Adoption in October 1990 of the USSR Law "On public associations"Stimulated the next stage of the formation of parties. This stage began in August 1991.

It is important to note that by the end of 1993, the elections and the formation of the authorities occurred not on a multi-party basis. Their analysis even in the first approximation identifies many elementary misses from the elementary process organizers (including developers of the relevant procedure) and its immediate participants competing for deputy mandates.

After the election B. State Duma And the adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, article 13 of which recognizes a political diversity, multiparty, party, seemingly obtained a real opportunity to influence public life through their representatives. However, as practice has shown, this opportunity was practically reduced to "no" in the absence of parties due to the loose organizational structure to influence the behavior of their deputies' members. In reality, political parties were often isolated from the mechanism of government decisions, having received a minimal opportunity to develop and implement alternative public development programs.

Thus, the emergence of many parties in Russia has not yet indicated multi-party system. It can only be about its formation and legislative design. A serious obstacle on this path is the absence of consensus in society about basic values, ideals and public development goals. And the normal functioning of multipartyness is possible only on the basis of recognition and support of such values \u200b\u200bthe main political forces societies. It is impossible to imagine alternation in the power of parties protruding with the diametrically opposite worldview and political positions: today the party of the socialist orientation is ruled by the state of social ownership of the means of production with all the consequences of the consequences, tomorrow, a party comes to replace the opposite orientation, which recognizes only private property, also With all the ensuing consequences.

"The most necessary now to overcome the crisis is to restore the procedure in the country," said M. Gorbachev at the IV Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR on December 17, 1990 - it rests on the issue of power. There will be solid power, discipline, monitoring the execution of decisions, then we will be able to establish a normal food supply, throw the Arcan on criminals, stop the interethnic hostility. " The statement by the President of the USSR irrefutably testified that there was a powerful pressure of conservative party-administrative powers. It was also clear that the people cannot be detached by one discipline. There was a more disturbing performance on December 20, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR E.Shevardnadze: "There is a dictatorship - I declare it with full responsibility."

Since the second half of the 80s, the actual split of the CPSU on supporters and opponents of "Perestroika" has become more and more noticeable. In order to enhance the democratic processes of the socio-political life, the CPSU Central Committee decides on convening in the summer of 1988 XIX party conference. (Persecution, XVIII All-Union Part Conference, took place in February 1941) it took place in sharp, critical discussions on the methods of restructuring of the Soviet society. In conclusion, a resolution "On publicity" was adopted, in which it was noted: "Three years of restructuring convincingly confirmed that the situation of publicity in the activities of party, Soviet, public organizations, funds mass mediaThe deployment of real criticism and self-criticism, the approval of openness and truthfulness in politics allowed the party, to better understand their past and real, to identify the factors of braking, awaken powerful patriotic forces to the active and purposeful work for the benefit of the country, socialism. " At the same time, the resolution was also noted that they still have an attempt to restrain publicity in the activities of party, Soviet and public organizations, teams, media. On its ways, departmental and local barriers are often erected. The desire to make the public domain, those or other disadvantages, abuses, the facts of bureaucracy and a competence, other negative phenomena are based on administrative resistance. The number of letters of workers from various kinds of complaints into party bodies and the media is not reduced. Until now, there is a prosecution and even criticism. " Thus, there was a clear contradiction of the provisions provided, but difficult to realize the possibilities of publicity, even though the role of censorship was reduced to a minimum.

The manifestation of the democratization of the Soviet society was the campaign on election to the Councils of People's Deputies in the spring of 1989, during which discussion clubs were formed, "Public Initiatives", various folk fronts, political parties, independent trade unions, organizing committees, etc. At the same time, the alternativeness of candidates in The deputies were limited to the nomination of 1/3 of candidates from the CPSU, trade unions and other public organizations.

On May 25, 1989, I opened a congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, which developed a fierce struggle of opinions on the restructuring of the Soviet society. The intransigence of ideas led to the formation of such deputy groups as Soyuz, Reform, Interregional Deputy, Agrarian Deputies, from VLKSM, Trade Unions, Women's Organizations, and others. Appeared and bright personality with extraordinary thinking: Popov, Yu.Afanasyev, A.Saharov, A. Sobchak, etc.

The election political debates, and the election results in the summer of 1989 showed the growing crisis of confidence not only by party and administrative management in the center and on the ground, but also to the entire socialist-communist system as a whole.

Finally, in the party itself, there was a split. In January 1990, a conference 162 partclubs from the 13th republics of the country formed a democratic platform in the CPSU. In February (1990), the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was decided to refuse the legislatively fixed monopoly on power. III Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (March 1990) canceled the 6th article of the Constitution.

At the same time, on the III congress of people's deputies, the question of the presidency was raised, a year ago, nominated by A.D. Sakharov, but rejected by communists. On March 15, 1990, MS Gorbachev (60% of the votes of deputies) was elected first president of the SSR. Other applicants - Prime Minister N.I. Järzkov and Minister of Internal Affairs V.V. Bakatin - removed his candidates for Gorbachev.

In accordance with the amendments to the Constitution, the President of the USSR was the head of the Soviet state and ended with broad powers. He was given the right to impose a veto to the laws taken by the Supreme Council of the country, to declare a military or emergency position in separate locations. According to the main law of the USSR, the election of the president must be nationwide.

Searches for exiting options from the economic crisis in the early 90s

The course for accelerating decisions to achieve the new qualitative state of the Soviet society showed its inconsistency and the need for a deeper restructuring of all spheres of society. In December 1990, at the congress of people's deputies, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.I. Järzhkov said that the perestroika ideas of the mid-80s suffered defeat.

There are three ways to further develop the country. Democrats demanded the denationalization of the means of production, the adoption of antimonopoly legislation, legal consolidation of the property of citizens, the results of their labor. The basis for the development of the economy, they considered market relations.

Communists During the preparations for the XXVIII Parts, the "Labor Personal Platform in the CPSU", which in its economic part focused on the traditional socialist methods for saturation of the goods market without creating the capital market and work force; adjustment of planned business methods; protection of public property and social equality; Priority of moral incentives to increase labor productivity.

Centralists who belonged to Gorbachev and his like-minded people (N. Zhkov, Minister of Finance of the USSR V.Pavlov, Academicians L.Abalkin, A. Aganbegian, and others), made a project for a program statement "to humane democratic socialism", based on the discussion At the XXVIII CPSU Congress. As emergency measures to exit crisis, it was offered:

"First. Development this year (ie 1990 ) the new agreement on the Union of the Republics ...

Second. In the socio-economic field for one and a half or two years to implement:

Normalization consumer marketFirst of all, food ... (somehow strangely sounds the words "emergency measures", which are everyday for the maternity owner);

Stabilization of cash circulation by conducting financial and credit reforms, distribution among the population of shares, sales of excessive reserves of material resources, accommodation for housing, increasing interest on the contributions of the population, the implementation of loans for the future sale of goods, information to minimum of the state budget deficit;

Additional financing of urgent socio-economic problems due to a reasonable reduction in defense costs, ineffective capital investments, the costs of maintaining the management apparatus, streamlining foreign economic relations. "

This was followed by ordinary promises: "Increasing the volume of housing construction", "Allocation of additional allocations for health care", "Association of emergency to the areas of environmental and natural disaster"(Although there were already 4 years since the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant), etc.

The third measure is "the decisive strengthening of the discipline and law and order, strengthening the fight against crime and the prevention of offenses" and could not be "emergency" at all.

Thus, the party congress once again declared the "defense" of the entire Soviet society from the impoverishment, demonstrated financial "laundry", the strictness of the socialist "order". The congress noted that "the transition to the market has no alternative", but " market economy»There must be adjustable. No doubt, the helm remained the "guiding and guideline strength of the Soviet society" - the CPSU, which considered one of the policy measures in the fight "for the effective economy" "to give the opportunity to every rural resident or those who would like to live and work on the village, acquire their house and coup. " So, not the land wishing to live and work on it, and the merciful permission of the authorities will acquire an accidental economy.

At the end of July 1990, Gorbachev and Yeltsin agreed to develop an economic program, an alternative government, under the leadership of Academician S.Shatlin and Deputy Chairman of the Ministerial Council of the RSFSR. The established draft represented the economic basis for the transition of the entire national economic complex to the market for 500 days. However, the project was rejected by the political opponents of the Democrats.

In early 1991, the Council of the USSR was transformed into the Cabinet of Ministers, at the head of which V.Pavlov was delivered, who held the post of Minister of Finance in the Government of N. Zhkova. A folding coalition with democrats was rejected.

The five-year search (1985-1990) of exit from the economic crisis has shown the futility of the existing socio-economic system, the need for an operational transition to a market development model. However, the political struggle between democrats and conservatives, as well as the indecision of the "Centrists" even more aggravated the crisis. Reducing the growth rates of industrial production economic recession; Finance came out of control; Budget deficit, internal public debt and the amount of money supply increased; Foreign economic solvency of the USSR fell; The consumer market was almost completely suppressed by the normalized distribution of food and essential items, the black market was blooming and speculation; unrelated organs government controlled Could not stop the empirical process of chaotic actions. Social tensions increased, although in 1991, 127 billion rubles were issued in circulation, as much as for the previous 25 years.

Consolidation of supporters of socialism

On April 20, 1990, the Politburo approved the text of the letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU "For consolidation on a basis basis" and decided to organize its discussion in party organizations. Politburo proposed "to dissociate from antsocialist, anti-party ideological positions, in the necessary cases to adopt and organizational measures regarding the leaders of the fractions, the split flows up to the exception from the CPSU." Dictates of the party elite automatically distributed to all directions of the life of the Soviet society.

"The conservative part of the party and state apparatus, - was noted in the open letter of the group public figures- Takes fierce attempts to implement the day before the XXVIII CPSU Congress Anti-Purchasing Communication in the Party. " The conservatives crossed "from words to business," from the discussion to the Ordsvodami. The response to this was the formation of the Movement "Communists for Democracy", accuseding the management of the CPSU and the CP RSFSR in the revival of the "Equal" spirit - ideology and practices of class struggle.

The conservatism of the party leadership even more caused a negative response of Soviet society to all the Communists, based on this, the XXVIII CPSU Congress in July 1990 adopted a resolution "in defense of democratic rights, against the persecution of communists." "Congress," said in it, "expresses a friendly solidarity with the Communists, with all people who are exposed to political persecution and moral terror, and appeals to progressive forces with a call to protect the honor and dignity, the rights of each person."

"Reactionary conservative forces from the fall of 1990 began to consolidate ... - He stated the former secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU A.Yakovlev in the book" Flour Reading Being. Restructuring: Hope and Reality. " "They already had a very broad smile on his face ... a smile from anticipation of a possible victory." In front of the November holidays of 1990, the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.Kryukhkov demanded "to show power". On December 3, under pressure from the conservative forces, M.Gorbachev liberated V. Bakatina from the post of Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, appointing B. Pugo instead - Chairman of the Committee of Party Control under the CPSU Central Committee. On December 15, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Communist Party of the Communist Party of the RSFSR I. Polozkov called in the "Pravda" "immediately proceed to the creation of public committees for the protection of the Russian Renaissance and Socialism", consisting of those "whom the electoral maneuvers" Democrats "persistently remove the power levers ", I.e. It is from the party functionaries that "rolled" voters in elections to tips.

"At the Politburo at the end of 1990, they were invited unexpectedly, without Agenda, Kryuchkova, Sukhareva (the Prosecutor General of the USSR. - VP)and me, - recalled V. Bakatin. - It was a conversation about the situation in the country. Speed \u200b\u200bV.Kruchkov. To the question of what to do, offered to introduce the presidential board throughout the country. Many supported him. I came down. As I then spoke one comrade, I came out indecently. He said that I was scared for a party with such members of the Politburo, and was categorically against the introduction of a state of emergency in the country, Gorbachev was also against. "

The local party leaders demanded the introduction of a state of emergency in the country, more and more often insisting on the resignation of the Secretary General. Especially the acute situation was formed in April (1991) of the United Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Committee of the CPSU, where the demand for the resignation of M.Gorbachev sounded in full force. "Mikhail Sergeevich took the floor and said," I recalled the first secretary of the MGC CPSU Y. PRCOKOVEV, - that if the Central Committee considers that everything rests on Personally in Gorbachev and the trust of the party masses is loss, then he sets the question of his resignation. " There was a serious risk of splitting party. "Based on the highest interests of the country, the people, the party," the Plenum of the Central Committee decided to "remove the proposal to resign him from the post of the Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee with the post of resignation. Thus, the next "mine" of an explosive position in the country was neutralized.

Another attempt "to remove the country from the crisis" with rigid power methods was the requirement of special powers to the chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers V.Pavlov V. Podlovia Supreme Soviet of the USSR in June 1991. "Power" Ministers of hooks, Pugo and Yazov at a closed meeting of the USSR Suns paid attention to delegates on The crisis state in the army, since "all presidents of the republics require" that their citizens serve in their homeland, that according to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, it is equivalent to the collapse of the armed forces. The Minister of the Interior spoke of illegal armed formations and a large number of weapons. The Chairman of the KGB stated that "Fatherland is on the verge of disaster", tried to prove involvement in this CIA of the United States and suggested a "actions of emergency", without which "simply impossible to do." The catalyst for the decisive actions of conservatives was the Decree of Yeltsin on July 20 on departing, which prohibited the activities of party organizations at state-owned enterprises and in institutions.

The party initiative of Patriots was "Word to the People", published in the Soviet Russia newspaper on July 23, 1991, which has signed a group of public figures, including the Chairman of the Koltown Peasantry of V.STarodubtsev, Vice-President of the Scientific and Industry Union, one From the heads of the Association of the heads of state-owned enterprises of the USSR of the USSR, the commander-in-chief of the country's land forces, the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Country, General of the Army V. Vessennikov, Writers of Y. Bondarev, A. Prokhanov, V.Resputin, and others. "We are starting a national movement, calling for our ranks of those Who recognized a terrible attack that happened to the country. ... Russia, the only, beloved! She appears for help. "

Attempt of the GKCP state coup

The crisis is called. "I was sure, I remembered M.Gorbachev in the book" December-91. My position ", - that the decision was to be sought as part of the reform of the Union. And accordingly acted. By the beginning of August, the draft treaty was agreed and decided to sign it. " Before the release, the President of the USSR met with B. Helzin and N.Nazarbayev in Novo-Ogarev and talked about the upcoming elections to the advice and updating the leadership of the New Union. The trusting conversation was "recorded" by the KGB, and the hooks reported to his like-minded people.

On the morning of August 19, 1991, Soviet radio and television, TASS reported the introduction of a state of emergency in the USSR "Due to the impossibility of the state of health of the Gorbachev Mikhail Sergeyevich, the duties of the President of the SSSl. In the "statement of the Soviet leadership" of August 18, 1991, signed by G.Yanaeva, V.Pavlova, O. Baklanov said: "To manage the country and effective implementation of the emergency regime to form State Committee. According to the emergency position in the USSR (USSR GKCP) in the following composition: Baklanov OD - First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Defense of the USSR, Crochekov V.A. - Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Pavlov B.C. - Prime Minister of the USSR, Pugo B.K. - Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Starodubtsev V.A. - Chairman of the Peasant Union of the USSR, Tiazykov A.I. - President of the Association of State Enterprises and Industry, Construction, Transport and Communication and Communication of the USSR, Yazov D.T. - Minister of Defense of the USSR, Yanaev G.I. - and about. President of the SSL.

At the same time, the unofficial activists of the GCCP: Boldin - Head of the President of the USSR, Shenin - Member of Politburo, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Varennikov - GSC ground Forces, Plekhanov - Head of the KGB Security Department, which are on August 18 around 17 hours. arrived at the country's country in Foros demanding; "Or you make a decree and stay here, or pass the authority to Vice President."

"I propose to convene the Supreme Council, the Congress and decide everything. Are you concerned about the current situation? ... I am the same opinion. Let's gather and we will decide, "the M. Gorbachev suggested.

On August 19, on August 19, it began with the statement by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A. Lukianov on disagreement with the content of the Union Agreement, which was to be signed in Moscow on August 20, 1991. Then began to transfer the documents of the GCCP: Decree of the Vice President Yanaev on the entry intoderation of the President of the USSR ; "Statement of the Soviet leadership", "Appeal to the Soviet people", "Appeal to the heads of state and governments and the Secretary General of the UN", "Resolution No. 1 of the GCCP", No. 2, No. 3. Gkchp tried to justify his actions, and in order to "safety And the protection "of the Soviet society stopped the production of most press bodies, introduced troops to Moscow and announced the curfew.

"No matter how reasons for these removal is justified (from the power of the President of the USSR ), we are dealing with the right, reactionary, anti-constitutional coup, "the President of the RSFSR B. Lotzin, Chairman of the RSFSR I.Silaev and I.O. Chairman of the Sun RSFSR R. Khasbulatov. They called on Russian citizens to "give a worthy answer to the offenders and demand to return the country to normal constitutional development."

Chairman of the USSR Alukjanov "In connection with the introduction of a decision on the introduction of the Supreme Council of the USSR, a decision on the introduction of a state of emergency in separate localities of the SSL decided to convene an extraordinary session of the sun Only on August 26, 1991

Tens of thousands of Muscovites came to the White House, surrounded by him by barricades, formed a living ring, firmly deciding to defend democracy at the cost of their lives. Mintings condemning the GCCP passed throughout the country. Most Republican, regional and regional committees of the CPSU supported the actions of the GCCP, the lower partnerships occupied the expectant position.

End of GKCP

After the death of three defenders of the White House of Dmitry Komarya, Vladimir Usova and Ilya Krychevsky on the night of August 21, troops began to withdraw from Moscow. In the morning the extraordinary session of the Supreme Council of Russia was convened, at which the reasons for the coup were analyzed, caused by the reaction of a part of the highest party-state leadership for a course of radical reforms and the loss of real unlimited and uncontrolled power. Deputies unanimously supported the actions of the President of Russia B.Leltsin.

Decisive actions of the President of the RSFSR B.Lezin and Russian People's Deputies, powerful support for the masses, the extract of most army units, the indecision of the gacchipists led to the failure of the state coup. On the night of August 22, 1991, the "team" of Vice-President of Russia A. Grotsky returned the President of the USSR from the Foros Cool.

On August 23, B. Lotzin issued a decree "On the suspension of the activities of the Communist Party of the RSFSL, which actually supported the activities of the GCCP. The archives of the party and the KGB were transferred to the maintenance of archival organizations of the RSFSR "together with the buildings they occupy, structures, staff numbers and a wage foundation."

On August 24, I did an important statement by M.Gorbachev: Due to the fact that the "Secretariat, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU did not oppose the state coup, the Central Committee failed to take the decisive position of condemnation and counteraction, did not raise the Communists to fight against the abrasion of constitutional legality ...

I do not consider it possible for myself. Then followed the decrees of the USSR President "On the Cabinet of Ministers of the SSL," On Property of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union "and" On Termination of Activities political parties and political movements In the Armed Forces of the USSR and government bodies and the state apparatus. " CPSU as a state structure ceased to function. Participants in the state conspiracy were arrested and placed in the chambers of the Moscow Investigative Isolator "Sailor Silence".

What pushed large party-state-owned figures to attempt the coup in the country? "The fact that the restructuring took us to," considered M.Gorbachev, "these people were unable to understand and accept."

"After all, suppressing the coup, we," warned M.Gorbachev in the book "The August Patch (causes and consequences)", "I repeat - just hit the dragon's head. The reaction forces and the power are preserved. They take steps to consolidation, counting on our inaction and viceness. " It was necessary to "speed up the movement along the path of democratic transformations" and first of all sign a new Union Agreement.

Analyzing the consequences of the "Team" adventures of Gorbachev, it is necessary to take into account the judgments of people surveyed by the All-Union Center for Studying Public Opinion on August 20, 1991. The coming to power of the GCCP will lead to an improvement in the economic situation - only 18% of Muscovites considered 50% of the opposite opinion. In Ukraine, pessimists were 59%, in Russia - 47, in Kazakhstan - 35%. Mass repressions from the GCCP expected 60% against 22% of respondents.

Disintegration of the Union of the USSR

The program of emergency measures for the conclusion of the country from the acute phase of the political crisis was proposed to the extraordinary congress of People's Deputies of the USSR on September 2, 1991 in the statement of the President of the USSR and the Supreme Heads of the Allied Republics. It was signed by 10 republics, and if we take into account Georgia, which took part in the development of the application, the well-known formula "10 + 1 \u003d 11" turned out.

The congress adopted the main positions of the upcoming actions: "The Union Agreement is needed. Economic contract is necessary. The provisions on the Unified Armed Forces were recorded, on compliance with international obligations, about the total coordinated foreign policy. " Thus, a union was proposed by the type of Confederation.

To carry out agreed and joint policies, the State Council was formed as part of the President of the USSR and senior officials of the republics. On December 9, the independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was recognized on it. October 18, eight republics - Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Russian Federation - signed an agreement on the economic community.

November 14 in Novo-Ogarev seven republics: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan announced the intention to create a union of sovereign states. The leaders of "seven" announced the intention to sign the Allied Treaty of the New Confederate State - SSG ~~ to the end of 1991. "I share this position," said the USSR President, but under one condition: the new state should have effective powerful functions and powers. " Agreed that the senior official in the CIS will be the president elected by citizens of the republics that are in the Union, for a period of five years, no more than two times.

"I don't think of the Union Treaty without Ukraine, I am convinced of this - I know the mood of the people of Ukraine," said M.Gorbachev on November 25 at a press conference on the results of the meeting of the State Council in Novo-Ogarev.

On December 1, more than 80% of the population of Ukraine expressed the independence of their republic, which has not yet meant the creation of "self-sufficient Ukraine". So, 64% of Kiev residents spoke for the preservation of the Union - naturally, "updated, new". But Ukraine refused to sign the proposed draft agreement. B. Lotzin unequivocally stated that without Ukraine will not sign an agreement and Russia.

Considering the critical situation, the President of the USSR sent on December 3 to appeal to the country's parliamentarians in which clarified the catastrophic consequences of the disintegration process. "Only the Union will save from the most terrible of threatening dangers - from the rupture and loss of centuries-old ultrasound, which history related whole peoples, families, people, in the expanses of one sixth of the Earth."

On December 7-8, 1991, events of principled importance occurred. The heads of states of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine in Belovezhskaya Pushcha under Brest concluded an agreement on the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), based on how B. Lucin declared that "allied structures are incapable of a fundamental update. On the contrary, the command system has led their recent life forces to preserve His Alliance. " The agreement proclaimed that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a subject of international law ceased to exist. The leaders of the three states - S. Shushkevich, B. Lucin and L. Kravchuk - invited to join the CIS of the Republic of the former USSR.

On December 21, 1991, a meeting of "Belovezhskaya Zubets", "Ashgabat Five" and representatives of Armenia, on which the CIS Declaration was adopted was held in Alma-Ata. By the end of the year, Azerbaijan and Moldova signed it. It said: "... With the formation of the Union of Independent States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceases to exist.

Member States of the Commonwealth guarantee in accordance with its constitutional procedures to implement international obligations arising from contracts and agreements of the former SSL Union.

On December 25, M.Gorbachev made a television and announced that he leaves the presidency of the USSR; "... Refusal to the contract on the union of sovereign states as a confederative, allied state is a serious political error of strategic order," said M. Gorbachev Chancellor FRG G. Thaw.

On December 26, in the Kremlin, which instead of the Red Cloth already realized the white-blue-red flag of Russia, one of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR - the Council of the Republics - adopted a declaration on the termination of the existence of the USSR. The international community recognized the independence of all the republics of the former SSR Union.

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Social and economic crisis of the late 1980s. In the USSR, as well as the crisis in national relations were closely related to the crisis of the party itself and its ideological retreat. The party could not find an adequate response to the diverse challenges of time, she could not rebuild his ranks and modernize his ideology, politics and structure. This led her to loss of influence, and then the authorities.

Already in the 60s - 70s. The CPSU as a political and ideological organization was in a state of deaf defense, avoiding any innovations, including in its economic Policy. This defense was replaced by the retreat, which occurred increasingly unorganized and hastily, and then passed into the collapse and destruction, which took place very quickly and immediately in many directions. At the same time, there was almost no resistance from either the leadership of the CPSU, nor from the party asset, nor from the ideological services of the party. It was a chaotic and almost spontaneous process, devoid of clear logic. Little understood and those who retreat, and those who came. It was the beginning of all that we call now " time time", Although then in the mid-80s. Many of us talked about him as a "restructuring". Countless documents, applications, resolutions, critical publications 1987-1991, which are stored in my archive, can clarify in the events of those critical years, since the processes in real reality corresponded to everything that was published in newspapers and magazines. Therefore, therefore, to more guided by its own observations and impressions.

In the spring of 1988, I got the opportunity to cooperate with many newspapers and magazines in Moscow, in the provinces and in the Union Republics of the USSR. The policy of "publicity" was gaining momentum, and it was directed mainly on criticizing the regime and crimes of Stalinism. I spoke with lectures and reports in many institutes, at military academies, in enterprises, schools, publishing houses and in some union ministries. White spots were erased in the history of the USSR and the CPSU, and interest in truthful and undistorted history was huge. However, then the criticism of the shortcomings, mistakes and crimes of the past often surrendered to the criticism of the entire Soviet past and the entire policy of the USSR and the CPSU - in all periods of their history.

In the spring of 1989, I was elected by the People's Deputy of the USSR, and then the deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from the Voroshilovsky constituency of Moscow. The election campaign was unusual and very instructive. Almost immediately after these elections, I was restored in the ranks of the CPSU, from which I was excluded back in 1969 as the author of the book "To the court of history. Genesis and the consequences of Stalinism. " In the summer of 1990, at the XXVIII Congress of the Party, I was elected a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, addresses the composition of the ideological commission of the Central Committee. Within two years, I actively collaborated with all the main newspapers and journals of the CPSU, played at the party meetings, meetings of the secretaries of primary organizations, on party assets in Moscow and in the provinces, in ministries and departments, including the management of foreign intelligence in Yasenev. In 1990 - 1991 I received many letters from the CPSU members as an expression of support and explicit disapproval. I participated in the work of the ideological apparatus and plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU, talked with many prominent members of the party leadership. And could, thus, watch the life of the CPSU not from the side. It was the time of the deep crisis of the party, its explicit ideological retreat. However, none of the leaders of the party did not understand the severity of the crisis and did not have a clear plan for overcoming it. The concept of "new thinking" was proclaimed, but no "new thinking" did not appear. We have heard only common declarations and maxi: "So you can not live" or "Let's live together, helping each other." There was no clear political goal or a solid political will. Later, one of the nearest associates M. Gorbachev, Anatoly Lukyanov, wrote: "... 70 years of monopoly on power and the ideology we studied the party and its asset on the ground and in the center to lead a serious political struggle. Party ideologues were often faced with the unrelated university of junior and senior researchers. And this is despite the fact that there were neither an understanding of our history, nor contact with folk needs, nor the true knowledge of the capitalist reality, perceived by them only in bright shop windows and tourist impressions. Thus, there was not a strategic, verified and taking advantage of the entire Party to the restructuring program, but amateur shutters. And they were accompanied by real erosion, the erosion of socialist obstacles. This destructive process, naturally, met resistance - both in party organizations and the CPSU Central Committee.

There is some truth in this statement, but the share is not too big. Why did they suddenly rebel against the party ideologues "Junior and Senior Researchers", which were also members of the CPSU and spent a lot of time and strength to study Marxism-Leninism? Why exactly these people got mass support, including in the ranks of the CPSU, as well as in the elections? What was the resistance from the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee "Processes of Erosion of Socialism"? We all saw this erosion, but she did not see any serious resistance. "ATTANTANT SHATINGS" demonstrated us not any anonymous "party ideologues", but all the main figures in the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee. It is impossible to agree with the phrase about the "unfortunate on-line launcher of the younger and senior researchers." In ideological attacks on the party, prominent scientists, popular publicists participated on its ideology and history, famous writers And even such large politicians like Boris Yeltsin. In the ranks of critics, the CPSU could be seen as recent dissidents and recent workers of the ideological apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee. And most importantly, their criticism in very many cases was completely fair and convincing and responding to it just nothing.

Criticism in the address of the Central Committee of the CPSU and in the address of the party ideology grew as a snowball, and there was nothing to answer. Magazines "Communist" or "Party Life" could not counter the magazines "Light" or "New World", the newspaper "Pravda" and "Soviet Russia" could not compete with the Komsomol Pravda or the "literary newspaper." The ideological processes in society came out from under the control of party leaders, and the CPSU was not ready for an open struggle with opponents. Yes, and that it was possible to answer those who reported to the public unknown earlier facts about falsified trials 1936-1938, about the execution of 22 thousand Polish officers and prisoners of war in 1940 or the physical destruction of almost all members of the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Jews in 1952 .?! We learned the terrible details of hunger in Ukraine and in Kuban in 1933, the destruction of the part of the Don Cossacks in 1919, the suppression of peasant uprisings and uprising in Kronstadt in 1921

It was simply impossible to comprehend and evaluate the huge amount of negative information that fell on our consciousness. The ideological dams erected by decades were broken, and no one could stop the powerful streams of criticism. There is nothing surprising in the fact that all the increasing criticism of the Stalinism or the era of "stagnation" began to grow quickly into criticism political practice And the views of Lenin and Bolsheviks in general. In the autumn of 1989, the magazine "New World", whose edition approached two million copies, began the publication of the famous book of Alexander Solzhenitsyn "Archipelago Gulag". The most sharp condemnation of all terrible forms of terror and repression of the 30s - 40s. The author was not addressed to Stalin, which "just walked a foot in the specified stop" and which seemed to Solzhenitsyn "only blind and superficial executive force", and Lenin and the entire Bolsheviks party. But the criticism of Lenin and Leninism also walked in almost all other mass editions in parallel and regardless of Solzhenitsyn.

The overall scales of criticism of Lenin and Bolsheviks were not only very significant, but also unexpected for the CPSU and its ideologues. In 1990, the articles and other materials published in the main newspapers and magazines were taken into account, including the main republican and regional press bodies. Based on this accounting, the annals of journal and newspaper articles was compiled. According to these chronicles, in 1990, about 10 thousand articles and materials with criticism of Lenin and Leninism were published. According to the State Statistics Committee, only for the first half of the following, 1991 in the USSR, at least 17,000 materials accused of Lenin in a wide range of political and criminal offenses were published - from betrayal of the Motherland to the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. "

In the future, such accounting has become impossible, but it can be said with confidence that the number of such materials has only increased, since it was in 1991 and in 1992. Everywhere began the publication of a large number of new magazines and newspapers, which from the very beginning declared their anti-communist position.

In criticism of Lenin and Bolsheviks, there was a lot of fair. But the abundance of extremely tendency and false materials was surprised, as well as the extreme rage of many authors. The public was ready to believe in any slander about Lenin. Many of the authors began to say that Lenin was a German or a British spy that he, of course, received 50 million gold rubles from the General Staff of Kaiserovskaya Germany to organize the revolution in Russia. According to some authors, even the attempt by the Ixocument of Fani Kaplan on Lenin in 1918, which served as a reason for the announcement by the Bolsheviks "Red Terror", was conscious and not even too well organized by the dramatization. From pages of different newspapers, the requirements of remove the name of Lenin from the names of the cities of the USSR, from the names of the streets and squares, to demolish monuments to Lenin and liquidate in Moscow Mausoleum V.I. Lenin, having burned Lenin's body on a wolf cemetery in Leningrad near the grave of his mother.

One of the first instruments that I had to do as a member of the CPSU Central Committee was the analysis and generalization of numerous letters and resolutions with protests against dismantling monuments to Lenin, as well as renaming streets, squares, enterprises and cities that Lenin's name was called. These letters and resolutions went from all over the country, but there were especially many of them from the Baltic States and Western Ukraine.

In Moscow and in some other cities, this wave of antillenic and anti-Soviet publications met some resistance. In the capital, Lenin Museum was closed, but continued to work and take visitors to Mausoleum V.I. Lenin. In 1991, a monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky was demolished, but Lenin's monuments were left in their places, including a monument on October Square. Leninsky and Leningradsky Avenues, Leningrad Highway, maintained their names, the main library of the country continued to call Lenin. At the referendum in Leningrad, a small majority of votes decided to return the name St. Petersburg to this city. However, the mayor of St. Petersburg Anatoly Sobchak was not able to deal with the demolition of numerous monuments to Lenin, which in this city there were about 200. Population Leningrad region I did not want to follow the example of Leningrad, and the region retained the previous name. The same thing happened in the Sverdlovsk region, where only the main city of the region returned his former name - Ekaterinburg. They did not want to change their name nor the Ulyanovsk region nor the city of Ulyanovsk. Leninsk, Leninogorsk, Kaliningrad, Dzerzhinsk, Kirov and some others have been preserved on the map of Russia.

Attack on Lenin and Leninism did not immediately earn the attack on the views and activities of K. Marx and F. Engels, i.e. on Marxism. However, already at the very beginning of 1990 in the article "New Milestones", S. Chernyshev wrote: "We are on the eve of the court over Marx. ... the trial has not yet begun, the accusation is not presented. As long as Marx is just coming out of fashion. Talk about him, refer to him becomes a bad tone. It is surrounded by a silence wall. Public opinion in the classic Stalinist style is preparing to authorize violence over his own idol. Naturally, the arguments on the merits are not interested in anyone. "

However, in mid-1990 and in 1991, a lot of articles appeared in our press, in which the views of K. Marx and F. Engels were subjected to the most decisive criticism. This campaign was still not so acute and massive as performances against Lenin and Leninism, although she touched upon all the main components of Marxism. Doubted the philosophical concept of Marxism - materialistic dialectic, as well as the most important provisions of historical materialism. A lot of critical comments were expressed about the Marxist political economy. However, the point of criticism was directed against the teachings of Marx and Engels on historical role proletariat, about the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism.

The magazine "Questions of the History of the CPSU" opened on its pages the discussion "Is needed today to K. Marx?". The magazine "Social Sciences" introduced from spring 1990. The heading "Will Marxism recruitment?". In the Novosibirsk magazine "Eco", the headlines were more specific: "Running Marx's hat from our head." Literary critic Yu. Burtin and Rector of the History and Archival Institute Yu. Afanasyev called Marxism "Despotic and Antiguman Utopia". Responsible employee of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the author of apologetic books about socialism A.S. Cygko now wrote about Marxism as "initially vicious" the theory of social development, "the generation of expansionist European culture." The economist Larisa Piyashev called on Soviet theorists to follow the example of Western Social Democrats and "snatch their Marxist root." It was very difficult to find elements of the scientific discussion in this polemical campaign. Not that was the atmosphere of the controversy, they were not the goals pursued by our home-grown anti-Marxists. According to V. Family and N. Fedorovsky fairly, "the discussion that unfolded around Marxism is most often in our days as a factor of political, not scientific life. The political dispute is evolving in its tough rules, many of which science are absolutely contraindicated. Especially if it is conducted in conditions of low political culture, characteristic of ideological struggle, which has developed in our country. In the situation of the rally elements, which prevails both on the streets and squares and at meetings of representative institutions, with a known bitterness and elements of the mass hysterium, not only in the inability, but also the reluctance to hear the opponent's validity of scientific arguments and conscientiousness in their use often lose their weight and Weakly perceived by the audience. Not logic, but the oddity and memorization of the argument, their ability to influence the mind, and on emotions "are put on the fore.

But who else, except the CPSU itself and its ideologues, was bewiered in that indeed very low political culture and in that omnibling, which in 1988 - 1991. demonstrated our society. The adherents of Marx and Lenin preferred in these years just to be silent, and only the adherents of Stalin were trying to answer, although their voice in defense of Stalinism sounded in the years of perestroika was not so loud. In any case, it was possible to state that the CPSU fully lost the ideological dispute developed in the country.