Offensive in the Ardennes(code name German Watch am Rhein- "Watch on the Rhine") - the operation of German troops on the Western Front during Second World War. Carried out December 16 - January 29 in Ardennes(southwest Belgium) in order to change the situation on the Western Front by defeating the Anglo-American armed forces in Belgium and Netherlands, if possible, to persuade the United States and England to separate negotiations on peace and a cessation of hostilities in the West, thereby freeing up forces for the Eastern Front.

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✪ The famous German offensive in the Ardennes, 1944, Many parts of the USA are utterly defeated, newsreel

✪ Did the Americans defeat Hitler?

✪ Ardennes breakthrough 1

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background

In June 1944, the Allies opened a second front in Europe by landing their troops in Normandy ... By December 1944, the 1st American Army took up positions in the northern part of the Ardennes between the cities of Saint-Vith and Liege. Some of its units and units of the 9th Army fought in the Hürtgen forest and on the river Ruhr, on this sector of the front, where they wedged into German territory and created a bridgehead 50 km wide and 40 km deep. In the Ardennes, on the Belgian-German border, the 8th American Corps from the 3rd Army was located. South of the Ardennes, other units of the 3rd Army wedged into the " Siegfried's line", creating a foothold on the east bank of the river Saar. Here there was a concentration of troops to resume the offensive on the Saar region. To the right of the 3rd Army, the 7th Army occupied the front, which stretched from the Saar River to eastbound resting against the Rhine in the area Karlsruhe. Parts of the 7th Army in late November - early December liberated the northern regions Alsace and Lorraine and went to the borders of Germany and the Upper Rhine. The 1st French Army on November 22 liberated Strasbourg, and west of Reina in Alsace, the Germans had troops only in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe city Colmar. The allies were preparing for a new offensive.

American intelligence much was known about the plans of the German offensive back in november 1944, since she used the system for deciphering German radio messages " Ultra", moreover, due to aerial reconnaissance they knew about the movements of German troops and their concentration east of the Ardennes [ ] . Army intelligence of the 3rd Army informed the higher command, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces Dwight Eisenhower who noted in his memoirs:

Thus, the American command prepared in advance to repel the enemy offensive, placing large mobile groupings of its troops north and south of the Ardennes, and in the Ardennes themselves, they deliberately weakened the defense, leaving the 28th and 106th infantry divisions there. Everything happened exactly as the American commanders expected - the German troops went on the offensive in the Ardennes, where the allies deliberately weakened the defense, and when the Germans broke through almost 100 km to the west, the American troops attacked them with their mobile groups of the 1st and 3rd armies from the flanks - from the north and south, putting the Germans at risk of encirclement. For the Germans, such an offensive in the form of a “wedge”, when they are simultaneously attacked from the north and south by the enemy’s mobile forces, will end “ boiler". On December 16, 1944, at the beginning of the operation, German troops managed to break through the front of the Anglo-American troops in a sector of 80 km and capture 30,000 American soldiers and officers.

By December 26, 1944, the Wehrmacht offensive in the Ardennes was stopped due to increased enemy resistance, shortages of fuel and ammunition, and increased activity of allied aviation. A few days later, American troops, reinforced by redeployment from other sectors of the front, launched a counterattack by the 3rd American Army in the direction of the city of Bastogne. The German command transferred two SS tank corps from the 6th SS Panzer Army (comprising three divisions) to this sector. During the week, bloody battles were fought outside the city with no visible result for both sides. On January 8, 1945, seeing the futility of a further offensive in the Ardennes and in view of the sharply aggravated situation in the Budapest region, Hitler ordered the withdrawal of the 6th Panzer Army to the deep rear and ordered to ensure the accelerated completion of its formations with personnel and military equipment (for example, only 1 SS Panzer Division lost about 45% of tanks and self-propelled guns in three weeks of fighting). The offensive of the Wehrmacht in the Ardennes eventually ended in defeat.

This is clearly shown on two maps of the Ardennes operation (see below), the first map shows the offensive of the Wehrmacht from December 16 to 25, and the second map shows the Allied counteroffensive from December 25, 1944 to the end of January 1945, partial encirclement, retreat and defeat of German troops. According to Eisenhower: "the German command made a serious mistake by launching an offensive in the Ardennes - it was an offensive of the desperate".

balance of power

Allies

Troops involved in the Battle of the Ardennes:

• 21st Army Group (B. Montgomery) - located in the Ardennes (Belgium)
  • 1st American Army (C. Hodges) - temporarily subordinate to 21st Army Group
  • 30th British Corps (B. Horrocks) from 2nd british army(M. Dempsey)
• 12th Army Group (O. Bradley) - located in the Ardennes (Belgium and Luxembourg)

and partly in Lorraine

• • US 3rd Army (J. Patton)

The Allied Command had significant reserves with which they could stop any German attempts to break through in the Ardennes, and in any other place. The rest of the allied troops were located on the Western Front as follows: North of the Ardennes were:

• • 2nd British Army
  • 1st Canadian Army
  • US 9th Army

South of the Ardennes were:

• 6th Army Group (J. Davers) - located in Alsace and Lorraine and participated in the Alsace-Lorraine and later Colmar operations
  • US 7th Army (A. Patch)
  • 1st French Army (J. de Lattre de Tassigny)

In France, newly arrived American divisions formed

• • The 15th American Army, which was formed in early 1945 and sent to the front.

The border between the 21st and 12th Army Groups ran along the 50th parallel of northern latitude. The border between the 12th and 6th Army Groups about 15 km west of the city Saarbrücken. 1st US Army temporarily subordinated to Field Marshal's 21st Army Group Montgomery, since it turned out to be north of the Ardennes ledge and its communication with the 21st Army Group turned out to be much better than with the 12th Army Group, which turned out to be to the south. So the general Eisenhower decided that the operational command of the 1st Army was transferred to Montgomery.

Germany

• Army Group B (V. Model) - directly opposite the Ardennes.
  • 7th Army(E. Brandenberger)
  • 5th Panzer Army ( H. Manteuffel)
  • 6th Panzer Army SS (J. Dietrich)
• Army Group G (P. Hausser) - south of the Ardennes.
• Army Group H (J. Blaskowitz) - north of the Ardennes.
  • 1st Parachute Army (Germany)

The balance of forces of the parties

Beginning of the German offensive: December 16 - 25, 1944

The offensive of the German troops (6th Panzer Army SS, 5th Tank Army and 7th Field Army, united in Army Group "B" under the command of Field Marshal V. Model) started in the morning December 16 g., and to December 25 the Germans advanced 90 km deep into the defense. The first target of the Germans, of course, were the bridges across the river. Maas, which separated Ardennes from the rest of Belgium and without the capture of which a further offensive was impossible due to the geographical features of the area. Then they planned to attack Antwerp, through the port of which the supply of the 21st Army Group passed and to the capital of Belgium - Brussels. The German command most of all relied on its heavy armored vehicles (Tiger and King Tiger tanks) and non-flying weather - due to constant snowfalls and heavy cloud cover, the Allied aircraft could not operate for several days and this temporarily nullified the Allied air superiority. The Germans hoped to make up for the lack of fuel by capturing captured fuel from the allies in warehouses in cities Liege and Namur. The bridges over the Meuse were defended by parts of the 30th British Corps and were mined by sappers and ready to be blown up in case there was a threat of their capture by the Germans. To support the Ardennes operation was supposed to be a secret sabotage operation, codenamed "Vulture". Here is how the American journalist Ralph Ingersoll, who was in the army and personally participated in repelling the Ardennes offensive, describes the beginning of the German offensive:

« The Germans seemed to have everything - surprise, speed, firepower and high morale. Looking at the map on the morning of December 17, it seemed impossible to stop them - they broke through our line of defense on a front of fifty miles and poured into this gap like water into a blown dam. And from them, along all roads leading to the west, the Americans ran headlong ...»

At the same time, Chief of the German General Staff ground forces Guderian noted:

“So, on December 16, the offensive began, the 5th Panzer Army deeply wedged into the enemy’s defenses. The advanced tank formations of the ground forces - the 116th and 2nd tank divisions - went directly to the river. Maas. Separate units of the 2nd Panzer Division even reached the river. Rhine. The 6th Panzer Army was not so successful. Accumulation of troops on narrow, icy mountain roads, delays in bringing the second echelon into battle in the sector of the 5th Panzer Army, insufficiently quick use of initial success - all this led to the fact that the army lost the momentum of the offensive - the most necessary condition for conducting any major operation. In addition, the 7th Army ran into difficulties, as a result of which it was necessary to turn the armored units of Manteuffel to the south in order to prevent the threat from the flank. After that, there could be no question of a major breakthrough. Already on December 22, it was necessary to recognize the need to limit the purpose of the operation. On this day, the commanders thinking on a large scale should remember the expected attack on Eastern Front, whose position depended on the timely end of the largely failed offensive on the Western Front. However, not only Hitler, but also the high command of the armed forces, and especially the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces, in these fateful days thought only of the Western Front. The tragedy of our military command became even more obvious after the failure of the offensive in the Ardennes, before the end of the war. On December 24, it was clear to every sane soldier that the offensive had finally failed. It was necessary to switch all our efforts to the east immediately, if it was not already too late. From my headquarters, which had been transferred to the Maybachlager near Zossen, I followed closely the course of the offensive in the west. In the interest of my people, I wished it to be a complete success. But when already on December 23 it became clear that it was impossible to achieve a major success, I decided to go to the Fuhrer's main headquarters and demand an end to the dangerous tension and the immediate transfer of all forces to the Eastern Front ... "

The reaction of the Allied command and their actions

Among those Allied reserves that could be used almost immediately was the 18th Airborne Corps, under the command of General Ridgway, stationed near Reims. The corps included the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions, units already tested in battle. Shortly before this, they had fought heavy battles in Holland and had not yet fully recovered. By order Eisenhower The 18th Corps was immediately redeployed to the Ardennes.

« The American 11th Armored Division had recently arrived in theater and the 17th Airborne Division was in the UK ready to go to the Continent, the 87th Infantry Division could also be brought into the threatened area within a reasonable timeframe. In the English sector, far to the north, Montgomery was preparing for a new offensive. By this time, he had one full-strength corps not involved in operations. We were confident that, with such reserves, for any offensive undertaken by the Germans, we could eventually respond effectively.» .

“On the 4th, the Germans kicked one place of the 17th airborne, which, according to reports, lost up to forty percent of its personnel during the attack in one of the battalions. Whoever and whenever reports such losses, it is clear that he knows nothing about military affairs. Even reports of 10% casualties are seldom verified, reports can only be true if troops have fled or abandoned their weapons. I found Miley, commander of the 17th Airborne, in Bastogne. While I was there, the cannonade came from both sides, the enemy shells exploded in the air, the fire of the muzzles of our cannons spewed fire, and in the darkness gathering over the snow-covered fields it all seemed beautiful, although not very encouraging. On January 4, 1945, I made one important note in my diary before the date - a statement that I had never made before, writing: "We still have a chance to lose this war" ... ".

At the same time, despite the Allied offensive that had begun, British Prime Minister W. Churchill was also concerned about the heavy fighting on the Western Front and sent telegrams to Stalin regarding the plans of the Soviet army to attack on the Eastern Front.

“I have just returned from visiting General Eisenhower's headquarters and Field Marshal Montgomery's headquarters separately. The battle in Belgium is very difficult, but I believe that we are the masters of the situation. The diversionary offensive that the Germans are undertaking in Alsace also causes difficulties in relations with the French and tends to pin down American forces. I still remain of the opinion that the strength and equipment of the allied armies, including the air force, will make von Rundstedt regret his bold and well-organized attempt to split our front and, if possible, capture the port of Antwerp, which is now of vital importance.».

« There is very heavy fighting going on in the West, and at any time big decisions may be required from the High Command. You yourself know from your own experience how disturbing is the situation when one has to defend a very wide front after a temporary loss of initiative. It is highly desirable and necessary for General Eisenhower to know in general terms what you intend to do, since this, of course, will affect all of his and our major decisions. According to the message received, our emissary Air Chief Marshal Tedder was in Cairo last night, weather-bound. His trip was greatly delayed through no fault of yours. If he has not yet arrived to you, I will be grateful if you can let me know if we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front or somewhere else during January and at any other points that you may you wish to mention. I will not pass on this highly classified information to anyone, with the exception of Field Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only on condition that it is kept in the strictest confidence. I consider the matter urgent."

“We are preparing for the offensive, but the weather is not favorable for our offensive. However, taking into account the position of our allies on the Western Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to finish the preparations at an accelerated pace and, regardless of the weather, open wide offensive operations against the Germans along the entire central front no later than the second half of January. You can be sure that we will do everything that is possible to do in order to assist our glorious allied forces.

"one. I am very grateful to you for your exciting message. I forwarded it to General Eisenhower for his personal information only. May your noble undertaking be full of good fortune. 2. The battle in the West is not going so badly. It is very possible that the Huns will be driven out of their salient with very heavy losses. We and the Americans throw everything we can into the fight. The news you have given me will greatly encourage General Eisenhower, as it will give him confidence that the Germans will have to divide their reserves between our two flaming fronts.

However, the fact of the deliberate destruction of prisoners at Malmedy was not confirmed by convincing evidence: in particular, the death sentence of Joachim Peiper, who took the blame for the actions of his subordinates, was canceled on the basis of evidence of his torture and perjury during the investigation.

Losses

Estimates of losses as a result of the Battle of the Bulge are very different. According to the US Department of Defense, American forces lost 89,500 casualties, including 19,000 killed, 47,500 wounded, and 23,000 captured and missing. The official report of the US State Department of the US Army contains lists of 108,347 victims, including 19,246 killed, 62,489 wounded and 26,612 captured and missing. The Battle of the Bulge was the bloodiest battle fought by American forces in both World War II and US history. At the same time, the losses of the British amounted to only 1,408 people, incl. 200 killed, 969 wounded and 239 missing.

This ratio of losses caused serious disagreement in the leadership of the Allied armies. For example, US Army Generals Bradley and Patton threatened to resign if Montgomery continued to lead. Especially criticism of the US generals intensified after Montgomery's press conference on January 7, 1945, at which Montgomery appropriated the success of the entire operation and added that it was the British troops who saved the Americans from the threat of encirclement. Eisenhower took great pains to extinguish this conflict, which could end in a conflict between the leaders of the armies of all the Allies. Montgomery noted: “so great were the feelings against me on the part of the American generals that everything I said should have been misinterpreted”. Eisenhower also commented on the conflict in his memoirs: “American commanders are offended by Montgomery. They believe that he belittles them, and they were not slow to openly express mutual ridicule and contempt to him..

German losses on the Western Front for the period December 16, 1944 - January 25, 1945, according to various sources, range from 60,000 to 125,000 total human losses (killed, wounded, captured and missing).

For a better understanding of the scale of losses for the US Army in the Battle of the Bulge, it is enough to cite data from other battles. US Army losses throughout North African campaign- 2,715 dead, 15,506 wounded; Landing in Normandy- 6,603 total losses (including 2,500 dead); Norman operation- 124,394 total losses (including 20,668 dead); epic Battle for Iwo Jima- 6,821 dead, 19,217 wounded; attack on Pearl Harbor- 2,341 dead, 1,143 wounded; Battle of Gettysburg- 46,286 total losses on both sides (including 7,863 dead). Also, the losses suffered by the Americans in the Battle of the Bulge are generally comparable to the total losses of the US Army in entire wars: Korean War- 37,904 servicemen dead, captured and missing, and 80,000 wounded; War in Vietnam- 58,220 servicemen dead, captured and missing, and 153,000 wounded.

results

By January 29, the Allies completely eliminated the Ardennes "ledge" and began invasion of Germany. The German counter-offensive ended in failure, failing to complete its assigned tasks. The Wehrmacht lost in battles more than a third of armored vehicles and almost all of the aircraft involved in the offensive operation, a large number of resources, used up fuel and ammunition, which the Wehrmacht lacked at the end of the war. All this could be needed to defend the western borders of Germany, or could be used by the German command on other fronts.

Despite the fact that the German command did not achieve the set results, the Ardennes operation delayed the offensive of the Anglo-American troops on Reine by 6 weeks: The Allies planned to attack on December 18, 1944, but had to postpone it to January 29, 1945.

Memory

December 29, 1944 was opened Luxembourg American cemetery, where most of the American soldiers who died during the operation are buried [ ] .

On July 16, 1950, the grand opening of the memorial complex dedicated to the fallen American soldiers took place in Bastogne. The first stone of the memorial was laid on July 4, 1946. In the competition for architectural projects, announced in the autumn of 1946, the Liege architect Georges Dedoyar won.

They say that once at a time it is not necessary and history speaks of the correctness of this expression. In the winter of 1944, Dolph Hitler decided to repeat the "feat" of the German armed forces that hit the Allies in 1940 from the Ardennes direction.

Operation preparation

On September 16, 1944, Hitler issued an order demanding "fanatical determination" from all troops in the West. The Americans approached the German border, and south of Aachen even crossed it. “From our side, any large-scale operations cannot be carried out. The only thing left for us is to hold our positions or die.”

It seemed that the Fuhrer was calling only for the defense of the fatherland, but this was a ploy to mislead the enemy, who, as Hitler feared, had a spy in his headquarters. After the meeting, the Fuhrer invited Keitel, Jodl and the Luftwaffe representative, General Kreipe, to his office.

While they were wondering what surprise the Fuhrer was preparing for them, the owner of the office entered - stooped, pale, visibly passed after the third mini-heart attack. His eyes were watery and cloudy, his jaw dropped.

Jodl briefly reported on the situation: Germany has no reliable allies - some have defected, others are going to do it. Although there are over 9 million under arms in the Wehrmacht, over the past three months the losses have amounted to 1.2 million, almost half of them on the Western Front. There was a relative calm in the East.

The Soviet offensive appears to have fizzled out. " But in the West we are going through a serious test in the Ardennes,” Jodl concluded. It was a hilly region in Belgium and Luxembourg, the path taken by German troops to victory in World War I.

At the word "Ardennes" Hitler started up, raised his hand and shouted: "Stop!" There was silence. Finally he spoke:

“I have made an important decision. I'm going on the offensive. Here in the Ardennes!” The Fuhrer struck the map with his fist. "Across the river Meuse and further - to Antwerp!"

Everyone stared at him in amazement. Hitler's shoulders straightened, his eyes sparkled, signs of anxiety and illness disappeared. It was the dynamic Hitler of 1940.

In the next few days, he was a model of the former energy, insisted on preparing a plan for a decisive counteroffensive. He issued orders for the creation of a new tank army and outlined ways to deliver 250,000 troops and a thousand tanks to the Ardennes in absolute secrecy.

On October 8, a new meeting was held at Hitler's headquarters. The conversation was about how to force the Western allies to conclude a separate peace with Germany.

The successes of the Russians, Hitler declared, alarmed the British and Americans, for it was not in their interests to rejoice at these successes. Consequently, their potential desire for a separate peace with the Reich is not in doubt - it only needs to be strengthened. When asked how to do this, Hitler replied that a successful counter-offensive of German troops in the West could solve this problem ...

On October 11, Hitler demanded from the chief of staff of the operational leadership, Jodl, to ensure, above all, the suddenness of the planned actions. On October 12, Rundstedt (since September 1944 he again commanded the Wehrmacht troops in the West) was ordered to concentrate new reserves to repel the Allied offensive in the direction of the Rhine. And the secret plan was attached to the order under the code name "Watch on the Rhine."

It specifically emphasized the defensive nature of the planned actions, allegedly aimed at preventing the Allies from advancing towards the Rhine in the Ruhr direction. Why "supposedly"? D

but because the plan "Watch on the Rhine" was intended to strategically deceive the Allies. Giving Allied intelligence the opportunity to get acquainted with the "secret plan", Hitler hoped to mislead the Allied command about his real intentions.
On November 10, Hitler signed the directive for the offensive. It said:
"Achieving the goal of the operation - the destruction of enemy forces north of the line Antwerp, Brussels, Luxembourg - would mark a turning point in the war in the West, and thus, perhaps, in the war as a whole."
In early December, at a meeting of the commanders of the troops that were part of the shock group, Hitler drew attention to the special significance of the offensive: success should be tantamount to the events at Dunkirk.

And he expressed his confidence in the implementation of a new and this time fatal for the allies of Dunkirk. The stake was placed on turning the course of the war in favor of Germany.

A well-known German specialist in sabotage, Otto Skorzeny, was called to Hitler.

In the presence of Keitel and Jodl, he gave Skorzeny a special task: to lead a special detachment of saboteurs from the personnel of the 150th SS Panzer Brigade, dressed in the uniform of the Allied troops (2 thousand people), and in the course of the offensive, penetrate behind enemy lines in captured vehicles, call there panic, destroy headquarters and communication centers, capture and hold bridges across the Meuse River until the main forces approach.

On the prepared plan of the counteroffensive, Hitler wrote: "Unchangeable".

What was the situation on the Western Front at that time?

By mid-December 1944, German troops occupied the "Siegfried Line" with three army groups. On the right wing of the front, Army Group X was defending: (25th field and 1st parachute armies). Army Group B deployed in the center of the front: the 15th and 7th field armies, the 6th SS Panzer Army and the 5th Panzer Army.

On the left wing of the front, Army Group G (1st Army) and Army Group Upper Rhine (19th Army) were on the defensive. In total, the Wehrmacht had 73 divisions on the Western Front, including 11 tank divisions, 29 divisions of the Volkssturm - the people's militia and 3 tank brigades.

The Anglo-American troops at the "Siegfried Line" were located in the following order. On the right wing of the front, in a strip 280 km wide, the 6th Army Group operated: the American 7th and the French 1st armies. The troops of the French 1st Army north of Strasbourg were the first to reach the Rhine on November 19. At the end of November, 75 thousand members of the French Resistance fought as part of this army.

In the center of the front, in a strip 370 km wide, the American 12th Army Group defended: 3rd, 1st and 9th armies. In the Ardennes, in a strip 115 km wide, the 8th Army Corps of the American 1st Army (three infantry divisions) was on the defensive. There was an armored division in the reserve of the corps.
On the left wing of the front, in a strip 220 km wide, the British 21st Army Group deployed: the Canadian 1st and the British 2nd armies.

In total, the British and Americans had Western Europe 63 divisions: 40 American, 15 Canadian and British, and 8 French, including 15 armored divisions and 10 armored brigades (4,000 tanks) and nearly 8,000 aircraft.
Of the German divisions, "many had no combat experience or were understrength." In terms of the number of personnel, the German infantry division was no less than two times inferior to the allied divisions.
Subsequently, assessing the combat capability of the strike force created by the command of the Wehrmacht, Rundstadt said:

"With a high proportion of tank divisions, there were few tanks in them - they existed mainly on paper."

General Manteuffel, who commanded the 5th Panzer Army, which was part of the shock group, claimed after the war that in reality there were no more than 800 tanks in both tank armies.

The idea of ​​the German high command was as follows: taking advantage of the lull on the Western Front, deliver a crushing blow in the direction of Liege, at the junction of the Anglo-American armies, defeat the American 1st Army, cross the Meuse, go to the Antwerp area, press the American 9th Army to the sea. 1st, British 2nd and Canadian 1st armies - to arrange a second Dunkirk for the Anglo-American allies, but unlike in 1940, do not give them the opportunity to evacuate to England, and in the end - force the allies to conclude a separate peace with Germany.

“If several strong blows follow, then at any moment it may happen that this artificially supported front will collapse with a tremendous crash.”

The main blow was planned to be delivered in the Ardennes region - at the weakest point in the defense of the American troops. This direction led to the dismemberment of the Anglo-American troops and their defeat in parts. Confidence in success was based on the fact that the Allied command clearly underestimated the enemy, believing that “the German army is in a state of complete decline.

Walter Model

The following should be kept in mind.

In the history of the world there has not yet been a coalition of such foreign elements pursuing such different goals as our opponents have created... Anyone who closely follows the development of events cannot but see that the contradictions between our enemies are growing stronger every day.

If we now inflict several powerful blows on them, then at any moment it may happen that this "single", artificially supported front will suddenly collapse with a deafening roar, like thunder.

balance of power

The surprise of the attack often compensates for the lack of forces and means. This happened in the West in December 1944.

It was the carelessness of the allies that helped the German high command achieve surprise.
They did not expect that the Germans would conduct an offensive in the Ardennes in the winter. It is believed that Eisenhower least of all feared for the Ardennes sector, believing that advancing through difficult terrain is extremely difficult, especially in winter.

But he himself recalled something else:

“Although when comparing the forces involved on both sides in the Battle of the Ardennes and Kasserine, the latter seems to be just a skirmish, nevertheless, there are some similarities between them.

Here and there it was the advance of the desperate; here and there the enemy took advantage of heavily fortified defensive positions to concentrate forces to attack the Allied communications in the hope of forcing them to abandon their plans for continuous offensive operations.

No matter how sudden the time and force of this blow were for us, we were not mistaken either about the place of its delivery, or about the inevitability of such a step on the part of the enemy. Moreover, with regard to the overall response to these actions of the enemy, then in this case, Bradley and I had a long agreed plan of response.

Therefore, the security of this site was much lower, General Omar Bradley wrote:

“If someone goes on the offensive, he does so with the aim of either destroying the enemy’s troops or capturing the terrain. In the latter case, he either wants to use the advantageous terrain himself, or to prevent the enemy from using it.

None of these goals could be achieved in the Ardennes. Nowhere were our troops so stretched out as on this wooded sector of the front; nowhere on the Allied front was there another area devoid of industrial resources, communications and natural boundaries worthy of attention to the extent of the Ardennes ... "

The puncture was that the Anglo-American generals underestimated the German arrogance.

For an offensive with limited goals, which Bradley is talking about, the Ardennes section was completely unsuitable, but the Germans’ idea was grander - Rundstedt planned to split the Allied strategic front in the Ardennes region and go to the Belgian port of Antwerp, hoping thereby to catch two birds with one stone - cut off and encircle the troops of the 21st British Army Group and deprive the allies of the port through which the main flows of cargo went.

In the highest headquarters, they did not believe at all in the possibility of any German offensive. Therefore, there was no prepared defense in the Ardennes.

This was used by the command of the Wehrmacht.

German intelligence established that the Anglo-American allies did not have large reserves in the Ardennes direction. The wooded rugged terrain of the Ardennes region made it possible to covertly concentrate the strike force.
All orders were given only through liaison officers. False regroupings were made in order to create the impression that troops were being concentrated north of the Ardennes to cover the Ruhr.

This goal has been achieved. Throughout November, Eisenhower's staff "stubbornly held the erroneous view that the Germans were preparing to repel an Allied attack in the direction of the Ruhr."

American reconnaissance maps showed only 4 German infantry and 2 panzer divisions in the Ardennes, and they were also marked as moving north. In reality, in the Ardennes, by the beginning of the offensive, a strike force consisting of 21 divisions, up to 970 tanks and assault guns and 800 aircraft, was concentrated

The combat composition as a whole looked like this

On December 16, 1944, the German armies participating in the offensive had the following composition (from north to south):

6.SS-Panzerarmee (total 9 divisions, including 4 tank divisions)
LXVII.AK (272.VD, 326.VD)
I.SS-PzK (277.VD, 12.SS-PzD, 1.SS-PzD, 3.FjD, 12.VD)
II.SS-PzK (2.SS-PzD, 9.SS-PzD)
5.Panzerarmee (total 7 divisions, including 3 tank divisions)
LXVI.AK (18.VD, 62.VD)
LVIII.PzK (116.PzD, 560.VD)
XXXXVII.PzK (2.PzD, 26.VD, PzLehr-D)
7.Armee (four divisions in total; LII Corps did not participate in the offensive)
LXXXV.AK (5.FjD, 352.VD)
LXXX.AK (276.VD, 212.VD)
A total of 20 divisions, including 7 tank divisions. From December 16, 1944 to January 2, 1945, the following were transferred from the OKW Reserve and from the neighboring 15th Army to the advancing group:

December 16 Führer-Begleit-Brig.
December 20-22 15.PzGrD, 79.VD, F?hrer-Gren-Brig.
December 24 9.PzD
by December 27 9.VD, 167.VD, 3.PzGrD
Total - six divisions and two brigades. In total, from December 16 to January 2, the Germans used 27 calculated divisions in the offensive, including 10 tank and motorized divisions.

On December 15, the 12th American Army Group had the following composition (the corps and divisions involved in repelling the German attack were highlighted):

94th ID, 11th ArmD
9th Army (total 7 divisions, including 2 armored)
30th ID
XIII Corps (84th ID, 102nd ID, 7th ArmD)
XIX Corps (29th ID, 2nd ArmD)
XVI Corps (75th ID)
1st Army (total 14 divisions, including 3 armored)
VII Corps (1st ID, 9th ID, 83rd ID, 104th ID, 3rd ArmD, 5th ArmD)
V Corps (2nd ID, 8th ID, 78th ID, 99th ID)
VIII Corps (4th ID, 28th ID, 106th ID, 9th ArmD)
3rd Army (total 11 divisions, including 3 armored)
42nd ID
III Corps (26th ID, 6th ArmD)
XX Corps (5th ID, 90th ID, 95th ID, 10th ArmD)
XII Corps (35th ID, 80th ID, 87thID, 4th ArmD)
Total 34 divisions, including 9 armored.

On the American side, the sector of the German offensive was defended by the VIII Army Corps as part of the 106th ID, 28th ID, 9th ArmD, 4th ID. During the fighting, the Americans reinforced their grouping with seven tank divisions (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 11th), thirteen infantry divisions (1st, 2nd, 5th, 9th, 26th, 30th, 35th, 75th, 80th, 83rd, 84th, 87th, 99th) and two airborne divisions (82nd & 101st).

In total, 26 divisions, including eight armored ones, took part in repulsing the German offensive. True, some of the American divisions during the fighting were withdrawn to the rear or transferred to inactive sectors of the front. On December 26, the 10th Panzer was transferred to the XX Corps, in the Saar region, on December 31, the 9th Panzer was withdrawn to the reserve of the main command.

Explanation of abbreviated names of compounds:

ID Infantry Division
ArmD Armored Division armored division

PzD Panzer-Division tank division
PzGrenD Panzer-Grenadier-Division tank-grenadier (=motorized) division
FjD Fallschirmj?ger-Division parachute division
VD Volksgrenadier-Division Volksgrenadier Division
PzLehrD Panzer-Lehr-Division "training" tank division

Führer-Begleit-Brigade Führer Escort Brigade (Panzer)
Führer-Grenadier-Brigade Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade (tanks and I)

Arden offensive of the Wehrmacht

The German offensive began on December 16 with the forces of the 6th SS Panzer Army, the 5th Panzer Army and the 7th Field Army, united in Army Group B (commanded by Field Marshal V. Model).

Caught by surprise, the American troops were completely confused and could not put up serious resistance in the first days. A disorderly retreat began, turning into a stampede in a number of sectors.

Eisenhower wrote:

"General Bradley arrived at my headquarters on December 16, 1944, to discuss the possibilities of overcoming the severe shortage of infantry replacements.

As soon as he entered my office, a staff officer appeared to report a slight penetration of the enemy into our defenses on the front of the 8th Corps of General Middleton and on the right flank of the 5th Corps of General Gerow in the Ardennes. The officer plotted these areas on my operational map, and Bradley and I began to analyze the possible consequences of enemy activity.

I was convinced that this offensive was not of a local nature; it would be illogical for the enemy to attempt a small offensive in the Ardennes, unless, of course, it was his diversion to draw our attention to this area while he would strike a strong blow somewhere else.

We ruled out such a possibility. In other sectors of the front, either we were so strong that the Germans could not hope for the success of their offensive, or there were not enough important objects that he would want to take possession of.

In addition, we became aware that last days the number of German troops in the Ardennes gradually increased. It was through this area that the Germans launched a major offensive in 1940, as a result of which the British troops were expelled from the continent, and France was withdrawn from the war. Then the offensive was led by the same von Rundstedt, who this time was the commander here.

It is possible that he hoped to repeat the success he had achieved here more than four years earlier. We always thought that before admitting their final defeat in the West, the Germans would try to launch a desperate counter-offensive there. It seemed entirely possible to me and Bradley that this was the kind of operation they had started here."

" On the morning of December 17, 1944, it became clear that the Germans had launched a major offensive.

They broke through our defenses on the front of the 106th and 28th divisions. Conflicting reports began to arrive at the headquarters, but it was obvious that the enemy, using a significant number of tank formations, was rapidly advancing in westbound. All our intelligence services continued to work tirelessly, and we soon had a fairly complete picture of the strength of the German strike.

For the offensive, von Rundstedt concentrated three armies - the 5th and 6th tank and 7th combined arms - they included ten tank and motorized infantry divisions, and in general the enemy group consisted of twenty-four divisions with support.

We received some of this information a little later in the course of the battle, but by the evening of December 17, our reconnaissance discovered seventeen divisions. Thus, it is likely that at least twenty divisions participated in the operation.

In two important respects, the enemy achieved a certain amount of surprise. The first of these was the timing of the attack. Considering the heavy defeats we inflicted on the enemy in the late summer and autumn of 1944, and the extraordinary measures he had to take to form new formations, we believed that he could not prepare for a major offensive in such a short time.

The second surprise for us was the strength with which he launched the offensive. The mobile reserve was the 6th Panzer Army, a fresh and powerful formation recently arrived at the front from Germany, the trace of which we had lost some time ago; however, we have already pretty battered the 7th and 5th tank armies in previous battles.

The Allies decided to immediately pull up their reserves. Among those Allied reserves that could be used almost immediately was the 18th Airborne Corps, under the command of General Ridgway, stationed near Reims.

American tankers watch from their M4 Sherman tank overflying C-47 Skytrain transport aircraft.

The corps included the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions, units already tested in battle.
Shortly before this, they had fought heavy battles in Holland and had not yet fully recovered. By order of Eisenhower, the 18th Corps was immediately redeployed to the Ardennes.

Eisenhower wrote:

“Recently, the US 11th Armored Division had arrived in theater and the 17th Airborne Division was in the United Kingdom ready to go to the continent, the 87th Infantry Division could also be delivered to the threatened area within an acceptable time frame. In the English sector, far to the north, Montgomery was preparing for a new offensive.

By this time, he had one full-strength corps not involved in operations. We were confident that with such reserves, any offensive undertaken by the Germans, we could eventually respond effectively.

The 101st Airborne Division held the defense in the city of Bastogne - the German 5th Panzer Army repeatedly attacked from different directions, but could not take Bastogne. The defense of this city seriously hampered the advance of the Germans, since seven main roads in the Ardennes, which were necessary for the supply of the Germans, intersected there.

The 7th American Panzer Division held the city of Saint-Vith for 5 days near the Belgian-German border on the northern section of the Ardennes salient. This small town was also the crossroads of important roads in the Ardennes - according to the plan, the Germans expected to take it at 18:00 on the evening of December 17, but this was only possible on December 21.

Such delays for the Germans were unacceptable. The American troops retreated and left the city, but the defense of the city of Saint-Vith also greatly slowed down the German advance. But the allies held Bastogne. The defense of both cities slowed down the pace of the German offensive, and made it possible for the Allies to transfer additional troops to the Ardennes.

Eisenhower wrote:

"The courageous actions of the 7th Armored Division near St. Vith deserve special attention. When this division moved south, the situation was still far from clear. It went with the goal of supporting the left flank of the 8th Corps and ultimately ended up in a semicircle encirclement at Saint-Vit, about fifteen miles south of Monschau.

St. Vith was an important nodal point in this area, and the enemy advanced units, trying to break out to the west, sought to capture it at any cost. Here, the remnants of the 106th and 28th divisions joined the 7th armored division, and together they stubbornly repelled the incessant enemy attacks. The actions of this division not only frustrated the German efforts in the north, but also prevented a quick encirclement of our positions at Monschau.

As a result, the continuous and strong pressure of the Germans on the 7th division began to threaten it. complete environment. The German offensive by several divisions forced her to retreat west on December 20, to the area north of Saint-Vit. The next day, the 7th Armored Division was ordered to withdraw some further distance, in order, together with other units, to take up defensive positions, which were now erected on the north side of the resulting salient.

However, the stubborn defense of this division in the previous days not only seriously disrupted the advance plan of the enemy advance units, but also provided exceptional assistance to the 2nd division in an important sector at Monschau, until the 1st division under the command of Brigadier General Clift Addrus and Major General Louis Craig's 9th Division. When these three battle-tested divisions took up the defense there, the security of our troops on the north side of the salient was practically assured.

View of the ruins of the Belgian town of St. Vith during the Ardennes operation.

On December 19, 1944, General Eisenhower called a meeting at Verdun to discuss the circumstances resulting from the German counteroffensive.

A week before these events, on December 12, General Patton discussed the possibility of a German breakthrough from the left flank of his army in the sector of the First Army, as a result of which a plan was developed for the 3rd Army counteroffensive in case of such an enemy action.

But the Germans did not have enough resources.

Otto Skorzeny wrote:

"Unusual chaos reigned on the roads. I Panzer Corps, which was in front, received no support, and by December 18 it ran out of fuel. There was no question of reaching the bridges across the Meuse."

"In order for all of us to receive information important for coordinating our efforts, I want to instruct General Eisenhower to send a fully competent officer from his headquarters to Moscow to discuss with you the state of affairs with Eisenhower on the western front and the question of interaction with the eastern front.

We will maintain complete secrecy. I hope that you will meet with this officer on General Eisenhower's staff and arrange for an exchange of information with him that will be mutually beneficial. The situation in Belgium is not bad, but we have entered a period where we need to talk about the next phase.

Please respond promptly to this proposal due to the extreme urgency of the matter."

"Churchill-Stalin

I do not consider the situation in the West to be bad, but it is quite obvious that Eisenhower cannot solve his problem without knowing what your plans are. President Roosevelt, with whom I have already exchanged opinions, has made a proposal to send you a fully competent staff officer to get acquainted with your considerations, which we need for guidance.

Of course, it is very important for us to know the main outlines and terms of your operations. Our confidence in the offensives to be undertaken by the Russian army is such that we have never asked you a single question before, and we are now convinced that the answer will be reassuring; but we think, for reasons of secrecy, that you will be more inclined to inform a completely reliable officer than to report it in any other way."

The German offensive began to stall.

The offensive of the Wehrmacht bogged down near the Belgian city of Celles on the morning of December 25, 1944, just 6 km from the Meuse River and the bridge in the city of Dinan. Ironically, it was the last locality on the way to the Meuse. Here was the "point" of the Ardennes ledge, that is, the westernmost point of the German offensive in the Ardennes.

Here the German 2nd Panzer Division, advancing in the vanguard of the 5th Panzer Army, was surrounded near the town of Sell. The 2nd German Panzer Division was surrounded by the 2nd American and 11th British Panzer Divisions.

It was a rare case in history that two enemy divisions with the same numbers clashed in battle.

By December 25, 1944, as a strategic operation, the German offensive in the Ardennes ended in complete failure. They did not even fulfill tactical tasks - they could not capture the bridges over the Meuse River, and did not even reach the river itself. This was mainly due to the problems of supplying German troops with fuel and ammunition.

Despite Hitler's orders to continue the offensive, the German troops began to withdraw.

Eisenhower wrote:

"The scope of the fighting did not decrease until December 26, and from all the intelligence reports that came in it was clear that the Germans were going to make at least one more major effort to break through our defenses in this area.

In the south, Bradley launched his counteroffensive on the morning of 22 December. His troops advanced extremely slowly, and their maneuver was hampered by heavy snowdrifts. The initial strike was carried out by the forces of the 3rd Corps, consisting of the 4th Armored, 80th and 26th Infantry Divisions. The fighting took on a protracted character, which was clearly not to the liking of General Patton.

The slow pace of advance did not give any chance of a sudden breakthrough of the enemy defenses. General Patton called me several times to express his disappointment with the course of the fighting. At a meeting at Verdun on the morning of December 19, he hinted at a quick success and even predicted that he would enter Bastogne on the move. I answered him that as long as his troops were advancing, I was quite satisfied. I expected that due to bad weather, the fighting would turn out that way and that Patton would meet only with the defending divisions of the German 7th Army.

On December 23, the weather suddenly improved, and we had the opportunity to use aircraft over the areas [of hostilities. From that day on, the battle-tested aircraft crews of our tactical air force began again bombing the most vulnerable places in the German system of lines of communication, striking enemy columns on the roads, seeking out and reporting to us every significant movement of enemy forces.

The Germans, taken prisoner after the start of the air action, spoke with horror of the destruction caused by the Allied bombing, and invariably complained bitterly about the helplessness of the Luftwaffe.

December 26 Patton finally managed to break into Bastogne, but he did it on narrow section forces of the left flank, which provided us with a very unreliable connection with the besieged garrison. However, after December 26, really heavy fighting unfolded around this city both for the garrison itself and for the troops that broke through to his rescue.

On December 26, not reaching six kilometers to the place of Rommel's historic crossing over the Meuse, the last advancing division of the Wehrmacht, the 2nd Panzer, was stopped in a fierce tank battle.

In case it had not stopped, the western coast of Mass was defended by four divisions of the 30th English Corps, transferred here shortly before. After the 26th, the Germans began to slowly evacuate the Ardennes salient. The crisis of the operation is over.

Already on December 22, the Americans were conducting private offensive operations in the south of the salient, and on January 3, a general offensive of the allies began from the north and from the south in the general direction of Houffalize. The Germans defended stubbornly. It took the Anglo-Americans three weeks to finally push them back to their original positions. The losses of both sides were, in terms of the scale of the second front, quite noticeable.

Third offensive and dispute at Allied headquarters

On the night of January 1, 1945, the forces of the 1st and 19th armies launched the third German offensive, the North Wind operation, but now - in order to regain the factor of surprise - already in Northern Alsace. During the three days of the offensive, the shock group of the 1st Army advanced up to 30 km.
On January 1, 1945, more than 900 German bombers made a massive raid on Allied airfields in Western Europe (Northern France, Belgium and Holland). 200 aircraft were destroyed on the ground. The Germans lost 93 aircraft in the process.
In addition, their aircraft from the fire of their own anti-aircraft artillery lost another 200 aircraft when they mistakenly flew over the V-2 launch pads.

This raid further complicated the strategic situation for the allied forces. On the same day, Eisenhower ordered the troops to leave Northern Alsace and Strasbourg. The commander of the French 1st Army learned about this important decision only after 30 hours, since the withdrawal was kept secret even from the French signal group.

The commander of the 1st French Army, de Lattre de Tassigny, decided, contrary to the order, not to withdraw the left flank of his army and take over the defense of Strasbourg. The head of the provisional government of France, de Gaulle, approved this initiative and on January 2 sent him an appropriate order. At a meeting at Versailles on January 3, Eisenhower was forced to yield to French pressure.

While a fierce battle was taking place in the Ardennes, no less heated battles were going on in the highest headquarters of the combined expeditionary forces. The tension between Eisenhower and Montgomery since the start of Operation Overlord had been growing ever stronger and now reached its climax. Eisenhower believed that the German divisions that had broken through the Allied front and were advancing in the emerging salient suffered considerable losses, and their communications were stretched out. He intended to deal them a swift and powerful blow.

He believed that the simultaneous offensive of the American 3rd Army from the southern flank and the American 1st Army, which was then under the command of Montgomery, from the northern flank would create the possibility of encircling the German tank armies that had broken through and destroying them in the resulting Ardennes ledge.

However, Montgomery, at a meeting with Eisenhower on December 28, stated that the Germans were still able to carry out a fairly strong counteroffensive on the northern border of the salient.

He proposed "to meet this possible strike with a prepared defense, to weaken the advancing enemy grouping, and then to defeat it with the counteroffensive of the American 1st Army."

His idea was to push the enemy back behind the Siegfried Line, while Eisenhower was in favor of encircling the German divisions that had broken through and destroying them.

Montgomery promised to launch an offensive with the American 1st Army on January 1. However, on December 30, Montgomery's chief of staff, General Guinan, arrived at Eisenhower's headquarters at Versailles. He said that his boss had decided to start the offensive no earlier than January 3rd. This frustrated all the plans of the Supreme Commander.

Eisenhower promptly wrote a scathing letter to Montgomery.

It stated that if the commander of the 21st Army Group did not comply with the decision agreed on December 28, he would be fired. But Monty persisted. On New Year's Eve, Guinan flew back to Versailles. He reported that Montgomery would not launch an offensive until he had repulsed the German attack he expected against the northern flank of the Allies.

Upon receiving this letter, Montgomery arrogantly asked: "And who will replace me?" “This has already been discussed,” General Guinan replied. They want Alex.

He was referring to the English Field Marshal Alexander, commander of the allied forces in Italy. Montgomery turned pale; he had forgotten about Alexander.

"What should I do?" - he asked. In response, the general handed him the text of the telegram: "Sign this."

Montgomery read the text and signed it. In this telegram to Eisenhower, he asked him to tear up his previous letter. Following the telegram, he sent a letter to Versailles. He wrote: “You can rely not on me and on all the forces entrusted to me one hundred percent. We will carry out your plan."

General Bradley, in accordance with Eisenhower's orders, had already launched the 3rd Army offensive in the zone of the 12th Army Group. Montgomery was inactive.

Moreover, he wrote a letter to Eisenhower, in which he demanded that the leadership of all ground operations be handed over to him, and that all efforts of the combined Allied forces be concentrated in the northern direction. He even prepared a draft directive for Eisenhower to sign.

On January 3, 1945, the Anglo-American troops moved from small counter-attacks to a full-scale offensive against German positions. Nevertheless, by the end of the German offensive in the Ardennes, the Allied forces continued to be in a critical situation.

German soldiers firing a 20 mm Flak 30 anti-aircraft gun at ground target. Western front, Ardennes operation.

American pilot Captain Lowell Smith (Lowell Smith) thanks the anti-aircraft gun crew during the Ardennes operation.

"Churchill-Stalin

I still remain of the opinion that the strength and equipment of the allied armies, including the air force, will make von Rundstedt regret his bold and well-organized attempt to split our front and, if possible, capture the port of Antwerp, which is now of vital importance ...

“Very heavy fighting is going on in the West, and at any time big decisions may be required from the High Command. You yourself know from your own experience how disturbing the situation is when a very wide front has to be defended after a temporary loss of initiative.

It is highly desirable and necessary for General Eisenhower to know in general terms what you intend to do, since this, of course, will affect all of his and our most important decisions. According to the message received, our emissary Air Chief Marshal Tedder was in Cairo last night, weather-bound.

I consider the matter urgent."

Help from the USSR

As early as December 21, the commander of the allied forces, General D. Eisenhower, insistently asked the governments of the United States and Britain to turn to the Soviet Union for military assistance.

January 6, 1945 Winston Churchill addressed the Supreme Commander of the USSR Armed Forces Joseph Stalin

"Churchill-Stalin

…3. I have just returned from visiting General Eisenhower's headquarters and Field Marshal Montgomery's headquarters separately. The battle in Belgium is very difficult, but they believe that we are masters of the situation. The diversionary offensive that the Germans are undertaking in Alsace also causes difficulties in relations with the French and tends to pin down American forces.

I still remain of the opinion that the size and equipment of the allied armies, including the air force, will make von Rundstedt regret his bold and well-organized attempt to split our front and, if possible, capture the port of Antwerp, which is now of vital importance ... "

“Very heavy fighting is going on in the West, and at any time big decisions may be required from the High Command. You yourself know from your own experience how disturbing it is to defend a very wide front after a temporary loss of initiative. General Eisenhower is very desirable and necessary know in general terms what you intend to do, as this will of course affect all his and our most important decisions According to the message received, our emissary, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, was in Cairo last night, being weather-bound.

His trip was greatly delayed through no fault of yours. If he has not yet arrived to you, I shall be grateful if you can let me know if we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front or somewhere else during January and at any other points that you may you wish to mention. I will not pass on this highly classified information to anyone, with the exception of Field Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only on condition that it is kept in the strictest confidence.

I consider the matter urgent."

"Stalin-Churchill

Received on the evening of January 7 your message of January 6, 1945. Unfortunately, Air Chief Marshal Tedder has not yet arrived in Moscow.

It is very important to use our superiority against the Germans in artillery and aviation. In these types, clear weather is required for aviation and the absence of low fogs that prevent artillery from conducting aimed fire. We are preparing to advance, but the weather is not favorable for our advance. However, taking into account the position of our allies on the western front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to complete the preparations at an accelerated pace and, regardless of the weather, open wide offensive operations against the Germans along the entire central front no later than the second half of January. You can be sure that we will do everything possible to do in order to assist our glorious allied forces.

"Churchill-Stalin

1. I am very grateful to you for your exciting message. I forwarded it to General Eisenhower for his personal information only. May your noble undertaking be full of good luck!

2. The battle in the West is not going so badly. It is quite possible that the Huns will be driven out of their salient with very heavy losses. This is a battle primarily fought by the Americans; and their troops fought splendidly, suffering heavy losses in the process.

We and the Americans are throwing everything we can into the fight. The news you have given me will greatly encourage General Eisenhower, as it will give him the confidence that the Germans will have to divide their reserves between our two flaming fronts. There will be no break in the battle in the West, according to the statements of the generals leading it."

January 12, 1945, 8 days ahead of schedule, Soviet troops went on the offensive on the entire Soviet-German front.

The German command was forced to finally abandon further attempts to attack in the West and begin the transfer of forces from there to the Soviet-German front. In the second half of January - early February 1945, 13 of the most combat-ready divisions were transferred to the Soviet-German front, including 6 tank and motorized (6th SS Panzer Army), 800 tanks and assault guns and other military equipment.

"Today I had a conversation with Marshal Tedder and the generals accompanying him. It seems to me that the mutual information turned out to be quite complete, which Marshal Tedder will probably report to you about. I must say that Marshal Tedder made a very good impression on me. Despite the unfavorable weather , the offensive of the Soviet troops is developing according to the planned plan. The troops of the entire central front have been set in motion - from the Carpathians to the Baltic Sea. The Germans are madly resisting, but forced to retreat. I hope that this circumstance will facilitate and accelerate the offensive planned by General Eisenhower on the western front. "

And Roosevelt:

“Today, January 15, I had a conversation with Marshal Tedder and the generals accompanying him. It seems to me that mutual information turned out to be quite complete. Comprehensive answers were given on both sides to the questions posed. I must say that Marshal Tedder makes the most favorable impression.

After four days of offensive operations on the Soviet-German front, I now have the opportunity to inform you that, despite the unfavorable weather, the offensive of the Soviet troops is developing satisfactorily. \
The entire central front, from the Carpathians to the Baltic Sea, is in motion to the west. Although the Germans resist fiercely, they are still forced to retreat. I have no doubt that the Germans will have to scatter their reserves between the two fronts, as a result of which they will be forced to abandon the offensive on the western front. I am glad that this circumstance will ease the position of the Allied forces in the west and speed up preparations for the offensive planned by General Eisenhower.

As for the Soviet troops, you can be sure that, despite the existing difficulties, they will do everything possible to ensure that the blow they have taken against the Germans is as effective as possible.

"I am very grateful to you for your message, and I am very glad that Air Marshal Tedder made such a favorable impression on you. On behalf of His Majesty's Government and from the bottom of my heart, I want to express our gratitude and congratulations to you on the occasion of that gigantic offensive that You started on the eastern front.

You no doubt now know General Eisenhower's plans and to what extent they were delayed by Rundstedt's preventive offensive. I am sure that on our entire front the battles will go on uninterruptedly. The British 21st Army Group under Field Marshal Montgomery launched an offensive today in the area south of Roermond."

Roosevelt-Stalin

“I am very grateful for your encouraging message of January 15 about your conversation with Air Marshal Tedder and about the offensive of your troops on the Soviet-German front. The exploits performed by your heroic soldiers before, and the effectiveness they have already demonstrated in this offensive, give every reason hope for the speedy success of our troops on both fronts.The time needed to force the capitulation of our barbaric opponents will be sharply reduced by the skillful coordination of our joint efforts.

America, as you know, is making great efforts in the Pacific Ocean, seven thousand miles away, and I hope that the early collapse of Germany will allow sufficient forces to be transferred to the Pacific Ocean to quickly eliminate the Japanese threat to all our allies.

New Allied offensive

By January 15, 1945, parts of the 1st and 3rd American armies joined north of Bastogne in the area of ​​​​the cities of Houffalize and Noville, thereby eliminating more than half of the Ardennes ledge. The 12th Corps of the 3rd Army made a breakthrough across the Syur River at 03.30 am on January 18 without artillery preparation and caught the enemy by surprise. The 101st Airborne Division was transferred to the 6th Army Group.

They were needed to continue the attack on the Colmar pocket.

On January 23, the 1st Army liberated the city of Saint-Vith. The further offensive plan of the 12th Army Group assumed the assault on the Siegfried Line. On January 24, the remaining German units, totaling about 300,000 people, were completely surrounded in Belgium, but continued to resist.

Operation results

By January 29, the Allies completely eliminated the Ardennes "ledge" and began the invasion of Germany. German counteroffensive ended in failure

The Wehrmacht lost in battles more than a third of armored vehicles and almost all of the aircraft involved in the offensive operation, a large amount of resources, used up fuel and ammunition, which the Wehrmacht lacked at the end of the war. All this could be needed to defend the western borders of Germany, or could be used by the German command on other fronts.

Despite the fact that the German command did not achieve the set results, the Ardennes operation delayed the offensive of the Anglo-American troops on the Rhine for 6 weeks: the Allies planned the offensive for December 18, 1944, but had to postpone it to January 29, 1945.

A very curious film. It seems that nothing is filmed like that, but it clearly does not reach the film “The Longest Day” shot a little earlier or the later “Bridge Too Far”. In addition, I’ll say right away that the film “Battle in the Bulge” has very little in common with the real battle in the Bulge (unlike the two films mentioned above, which reflect the battles to which they are dedicated well).

The technicians in the "Ardennes" overtook a lot, did not stint, but only this one instead of German tanks (and it was meant exclusively, and no less, even Royal Tigers!) post-war Pattons M-48, but instead of American Shermans for some reason not the Shermans themselves (did they really cut everyone into metal?), and the light Chaffee M-24s. Which looks especially weird. Is it possible that the director wanted in such a veiled way to hint at the general inferiority of American tanks in comparison with German ones - that is, their fighting qualities correlated approximately like a 45-ton Patton with a 90-mm cannon and an 18-ton Chaffee with a short-barreled 75-mm gun? Very self-critical.

At the same time, they did not bother to make up the Pattons in any way, only painted crosses. Well, okay, not the first time

Absurdities in the film of course the sea, here are just a few.

The soldiers in the film die "beautifully" by all means throw their weapons up, wave their arms, scream heart-rendingly, fall to the ground and always roll back to the side.

Two American tankers managed to survive in the tower of the pseudo-Sherman-Chaffee, despite the fact that the shell literally blew this tower to shreds.

Well, the use of fuel barrels instead of anti-tank mines why is it that a rolling barrel, stumbling upon a tank, immediately explodes, and even the tank itself shatters to shreds after a couple of seconds?

At the same time, the atmosphere before the battle and at its beginning is well shown - at first the Americans are serene and relaxed, then in a panic they scurry about in all directions. Americans in general are beaten almost the entire movie. The Germans are at the same time serious, disciplined, they sing military marches, they train before the battle. True, for some reason, the commanders of German tanks always go on the attack, leaning out of the hatches to the waist, and they stick out in them even when the battle is in full swing - of course, they are killed by everyone and sundry. A strange idea about the behavior of a tank commander in battle

The behavior of the brave American warriors at the end of the film also deserves every attention: there is not a single coward or marauder in whom, sooner or later, incredible patriotism would not awaken and he would not turn into a superhero with the slogan “For the Motherland! For a dollar! or "Not a step back, behind New York!".

The end of the film for the Americans is a sort of standard cowboy, for the Germans pathos-anti-war-humanistic. Very touching.

And, yes, it was also a lot of fun how the German generals are preparing in their superbunker for an offensive well, the Spectrum organization is straight from the first James Bond films it seems that now Sean Connery will come and spoil all the raspberries for them :)

It is impossible not to note the German colonel one of the main characters a real colonel, a true Aryan, a Nordic character, persistent. Good role.

In general, the film is a mediocre funny agitation with a bunch of blunders, with a very nice picture in places and, in general, a good cast. lovers military history, with about three hours of free time, the film can pretty entertain at your leisure.

Among the numerous myths of the Second World War, the battle in the Ardennes at the end of the war is one of the most famous and at the same time mythophized.

In Soviet popular historiography, it is generally accepted that the Red Army launched an offensive that, by order of Stalin, began ahead of schedule at the request of the allies, saved from the defeat of the allies in the Ardennes.

Let's try to figure it out by analyzing the facts. First of all, we will try to find out whether there was a rout, and whether there was a request for help, respectively.

So the Ardennes operation (1944-1945) Battle of the Bulge English version of the name of this battle
The offensive in the Ardennes (codename German Wacht am Rhein - “Watch on the Rhine”) is an operation by German troops on the Western Front during World War II. It was carried out on December 16, 1944 - January 29, 1945 in the Ardennes (southwest of Belgium) with the aim of changing the situation on the Western Front, defeating the Anglo-American armed forces in Belgium and the Netherlands, and, if possible, persuade the United States and England to separate negotiations on peace and cessation of hostilities actions in the West, thereby freeing up forces for the Eastern Front.

On the initial stage Allied battles according to English version Wikipedia, there were 83 thousand soldiers and officers, 242 medium tanks, 182 self-propelled guns, 394 guns, 4 infantry and one mechanized division. Subsequently, they were reinforced by 20 infantry and 9 tank and mechanized divisions.

On December 23-24, 1944, the Allied forces included approximately 610,000 Americans, 55,000 British, 4,155 guns, 1,616 tanks and 6,000 aircraft.

The Germans at the beginning of the battle had 13 divisions, including 8 infantry and 5 tank and mechanized, 200,000 soldiers and officers, 340 tanks, 280 self-propelled guns, 1600 guns, and 955 multi-barreled mortars. Later they were reinforced by twelve infantry and 3 mechanized divisions, which included 100,000 soldiers and officers, 440 tanks and about the same number of self-propelled guns. From the air they were covered by 1600 aircraft.

Allied casualties: 89,500 Americans, 19,000 of them killed, 47,500 wounded and 23,000 missing or captured. Between 700 and 800 tanks and self-propelled guns and 647 aircraft were lost.

The British have 1408 of them 200 killed, 969 wounded and 239 missing or taken prisoner.

According to various sources, the Germans have from 67459 to 125000 losses, including those killed, wounded and missing or captured. Destroyed or damaged from 600 to 800 tanks and self-propelled guns and hundreds of aircraft.

The defense of the allies in the Ardennes was held by American divisions (about 83 thousand people), two of which had no combat experience, and two had previously suffered heavy losses and were withdrawn to a "calm area" to recuperate. On December 16, 1944, at the beginning of the operation, German troops managed to break through the front of the Anglo-American troops in a sector of 80 km and capture thousands of Allied soldiers and officers.

The offensive of the German troops (6th SS Panzer Army, 5th Panzer Army and 7th Field Army, united in Army Group "B" under the command of Field Marshal V. Model began in the morning of December 16, 1944, and by December 25 the Germans advanced 90 km deep into the defense.The first goal of the Germans, of course, were the bridges over the Meuse River, which separated the Ardennes from the rest of Belgium and without the capture of which a further offensive was impossible due to the geographical features of the terrain.Then they planned to attack Antwerp, through the port which was supplied to the 21st Army Group and to the capital of Belgium - Brussels. The German command most of all relied on its heavy armored vehicles (Tiger and Royal Tiger tanks) and non-flying weather - due to constant snowfalls and heavy cloud cover, the Allied aviation had several could not act for days and this temporarily nullified the superiority of the Allies in the air.The Germans expected to make up for the lack of fuel by capturing from the allies in warehouses in the cities of Liege and Namur. The bridges over the Meuse were defended by parts of the 30th British Corps and were mined by sappers and ready to be blown up in case there was a threat of their capture by the Germans.

By the end of December, the weather improved and the Allies immediately took advantage of this. Allied aircraft began to strike at the advancing German troops and bombed the supply lines of the German troops, who were experiencing an acute shortage of fuel, as they could not capture the fuel depots in Liège and Namur. They could not even reach the first goal of the operation - the capture of bridges across the Meuse River, since they did not reach the river. Meanwhile, American troops, reinforced by redeployment from other sectors of the front, launched a counterattack by the 3rd American Army from the south in the direction of the city of Bastogne, and the 1st American Army, together with the 30th British Corps, completely stopped the enemy advance. The 101st Airborne Division in Bastogne held back the onslaught of the enemy and was released by units of the 3rd American Army.

The offensive of the Wehrmacht bogged down near the Belgian city of Celles on the morning of December 25, 1944, just 6 km from the Meuse River and the bridge in the city of Dinan. Ironically, this was the last settlement on the way to the Meuse. Here was the "point" of the Ardennes ledge, that is, the westernmost point of the German offensive in the Ardennes. Here the German 2nd Panzer Division, advancing in the vanguard of the 5th Panzer Army, was surrounded near the town of Sell. The 2nd German Panzer Division was surrounded by the 2nd American and 11th British Panzer Divisions.

By December 25, 1944, as a strategic operation, the German offensive in the Ardennes ended in complete failure. They did not even fulfill tactical tasks - they could not capture the bridges over the Meuse River, and did not even reach the river itself. This was mainly due to the problems of supplying German troops with fuel and ammunition. Despite Hitler's orders to continue the offensive, the German troops began to withdraw.

On January 3, 1945, the Anglo-American troops moved from small counterattacks to a full-scale offensive against German positions.

On December 24, 1944 (the day when the encirclement around Budapest had already closed), Guderian, then chief of the general staff, arrived at Hitler's Headquarters "Eagle's Nest", located in Zigenberg (Hesse). He intended to categorically demand the cancellation of the operation planned on the Western Front. He considered it an unnecessary waste of time and effort, which he so badly needed on the Eastern Front. He talked about the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Soviet troops, about a 15-fold superiority in ground weapons and almost 20-fold in the air. And these words were not some kind of exaggeration. Guderian himself knew that the Soviet command planned to launch a general offensive around January 12th. But these words did not touch Hitler. He replied indifferently: “This is the biggest deception of Genghis Khan. Who told you such nonsense?

Here is what Guderian recalled: So, on December 16, the offensive began, the 5th Panzer Army deeply wedged into the enemy’s defenses. The advanced tank formations of the ground forces - the 116th and 2nd tank divisions - went directly to the river. Maas. Separate units of the 2nd Panzer Division even reached the river. Rhine. The 6th Panzer Army was not so successful. Accumulation of troops on narrow, icy mountain roads, delays in bringing the second echelon into battle in the sector of the 5th Panzer Army, insufficiently quick use of initial success - all this led to the fact that the army lost the momentum of the offensive - the most necessary condition for conducting any major operation. In addition, the 7th Army ran into difficulties, as a result of which it was necessary to turn the armored units of Manteuffel to the south in order to forestall the threat from the flank. After that, there could be no question of a major breakthrough. Already on December 22, it was necessary to recognize the need to limit the purpose of the operation. On this day, a large-minded command should have remembered the expected offensive on the Eastern Front, the position of which depended on the timely completion of the already largely failed offensive on the Western Front. However, not only Hitler, but also the high command of the armed forces, and especially the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces, in these fateful days thought only of the Western Front. The tragedy of our military command became even more obvious after the failure of the offensive in the Ardennes before the end of the war.

On December 24, it was clear to every sane soldier that the offensive had finally failed. It was necessary to switch all our efforts to the east immediately, if it was not already too late.

In the early days of 1945, Hitler had a new solution. He planned to withdraw the 6th SS Panzer Army from the Ardennes, replenish it, and then transfer it to the Eastern Front. The German army command was not yet ready to admit the failure of the Ardennes offensive, but due to huge human and material losses, discontent began to spread among the generals.

General Tippelskirch wrote about this:
“During the retreat, we lost more tanks and assault guns than during the entire offensive. It was a very strong blow to the psychological mood in the units. The sight of SS units pulled up from the West was especially depressing. Even if they had to be replenished in order to be further used on another sector of the front, it still made an unfavorable impression on the army units, since now the main burden of the battle had to fall on their shoulders. This was a huge psychological miscalculation, which, however, never affected the front-line relations between SS officials and army employees.
It is significant that it was the Ardennes operation, unsuccessfully planned by Hitler, that became the starting point of his deep disappointment in his own Waffen-SS formations. The English historian Lidzel Hart noted in this regard: "This failure ruined the entire reputation of the Waffen-SS."

During the operational meeting, which was attended by the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring and the commander of Army Group West, Field Marshal Rundstedt, Hitler announced his intention to withdraw the 6th Panzer Army from the Western Front in order to create a powerful reserve on its basis. At that moment, not a word was uttered about her transfer to the Eastern Front, as Colonel-General Guderian demanded.

For a long time it was not possible to begin the withdrawal of this "reserve of the High Command of the Wehrmacht", since the Anglo-American troops attacked the 6th Panzer Army from almost all sides. In addition, her disappearance from the Western Front would have been immediately noted by Western reconnaissance aircraft. The transfer was also associated with another risk - the British and American aircraft, which dominated the air in this region, could inflict enormous damage on the retreating tank army. In those days, Western stormtroopers literally hunted every vehicle like hunting dogs after a hare. As on the Eastern Front, any movement was possible only at night, but even in these conditions they were associated with heavy losses. While the withdrawal of the 6th Panzer Army from the West was very slow, Hitler decided to transfer it after replenishment to the Eastern Front. The sector of the front where this armada was supposed to be was not yet determined.

But the events that were rapidly developing both on the Eastern and Western fronts very quickly influenced the choice of Hitler. On January 12, 1945, exactly as Guderian had indicated, the general offensive of the Red Army began. A day later, the Western allies began active operations. Hitler was in a state of shock.

On the night of January 19-20, 1945, Rundstedt received an order to prepare for as soon as possible bring out the 6th. tank army. At 7 p.m. on January 20, the withdrawal of the 1st SS Panzer Corps began, which was heading "to the East near Berlin."

In various sources, the figures for the number of troops participating in the Battle of the Arden are different, but at the same time they all say that in terms of the balance of forces and the sequence of events, there was no defeat in the Ardennes, although for the allies this blow by the Germans was unexpected and for the entire period of offensive actions in this battle, they suffered the greatest losses. Within 9 days, after the start of the German offensive, it was stopped. The forces of the allies many times exceeded the forces of the Wehrmacht, and every day this difference only increased, as the allies constantly increased their forces in Europe, and the Germans no longer had any reserves.

In total, by mid-December 1944, the Allies had 63 divisions on a front of 640 km (of which 15 were armored), including 40 American, about 10 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, almost 8 thousand aircraft (excluding transport aviation). In addition, four airborne divisions (two in the Reims area and two in England) were in the reserve of the commander-in-chief of the expeditionary forces.

Now back to the second question. Was there a request?

The canonical version of this request sounds like this on January 6, 1945, Winston Churchill addressed the Supreme Commander Joseph Stalin:
“I would be grateful if you could let me know if we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front or somewhere else during January...

Now let's turn to the primary sources. Below are the translations and original texts of Stalin's correspondence with Roosevelt and Churchill during this period.

In 1958, in Moscow, Gospolitizdat published a 2-volume edition of "Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" with a circulation of 150,000 copies, in which the correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR I V. Stalin with US President F. Roosevelt, US President G. Truman, with British Prime Minister W. Churchill and British Prime Minister C. Attlee during the so-called "Great Patriotic War"

I have just returned from visiting General Eisenhower's headquarters and Field Marshal Montgomery's headquarters separately. The battle in Belgium is very difficult, but they believe that we are masters of the situation. The diversionary offensive that the Germans are undertaking in Alsace also causes difficulties in relations with the French and tends to pin down American forces. I still remain of the opinion that the strength and equipment of the allied armies, including the air force, will make von Rundstedt regret his bold and well-organized attempt to split our front and, if possible, capture the port of Antwerp, which is now of vital importance.

PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET MESSAGE FROM Mr CHURCHILL TO MARSHAL STALIN
There is very heavy fighting going on in the West, and at any time big decisions may be required from the High Command. You yourselves know from your own experience how troubling the situation is when one has to defend a very wide front after a temporary loss of initiative. It is highly desirable and necessary for General Eisenhower to know in general terms what you intend to do, since this, of course, will affect all of his and our most important decisions. According to the message received, our emissary Air Chief Marshal Tedder was in Cairo last night, weather bound. His trip was greatly delayed through no fault of yours. If he has not yet arrived to you, I shall be grateful if you can let me know if we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front or somewhere else during January and at any other points that you may you wish to mention. I will not pass on this highly classified information to anyone, with the exception of Field Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only on condition that it is kept in the strictest confidence. I consider the matter urgent.
January 6, 1945.

PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET MESSAGE FROM Mr CHURCHILL TO MARSHAL STALIN
The battle in the West is very heavy and, at any time, large decisions may be called for from the Supreme Command. You know yourself from your own experience how very anxious the position is when a very broad front has to be defended after temporary loss of the initiative. It is General Eisenhower "s great desire and need to know in outline what you plan to do, as this obviously affects all his and our major decisions. Our Envoy, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, was last night reported weather-bound in Cairo. His journey has been much delayed through no fault of yours. any other points you may care to mention.
I shall not pass this most secret information to anyone except Field Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only under conditions of the utmost secrecy. I regard the matter as urgent.
January 6th, 1945
________________________________________

PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN TO THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL
Your message of January 6 reached me in the evening of January 7.
I am sorry to say that Air Marshal Tedder has not yet arrived in Moscow.
It is extremely important to take advantage of our superiority over the Germans in guns and aircraft. What we need for the purpose is clear flying weather and the absence of low mists that prevent aimed artillery fire. We are mounting an offensive, but at the moment the weather is unfavorable. Still, in view of our Allies" position on the Western Front, GHQ of the Supreme Command have decided to complete preparations at a rapid rate and, regardless of weather, to launch large-scale offensive operations along the entire Central Front not later than the second half of January Rest assured we shall do all in our power to support the valiant forces of our Allies.
January 7, 1945

So, the supporters of the legend about the request, for some reason, are bashfully silent that on January 5, in a letter to Stalin, Churchill writes that the Western allies have no doubts about the outcome of the battle in the Ardennes. In a letter dated January 6, he only asks about the plans of the Soviet command, which of course they wanted to know in order to plan their own operations.

As you know, the Vistula-Oder strategic offensive- the strategic offensive of the Soviet troops on the right flank of the Soviet-German front began on January 12, ended on February 3. That is, the operation began two weeks after the German offensive in the Ardennes ended and the German troops began to retreat under the blows of the Allies.

The withdrawal to the East of the most combat-ready German 6th Panzer Army, which had lost almost all of its tanks in the Ardennes, began only on January 20th.

The most interesting thing is that, presumably, the date of January 12, as the beginning of the Soviet offensive, was brought to the attention of Hitler by the head of intelligence of the Eastern Front of Germany, Reinhard Gehlen, through Guderian, long before the start of the Arden operation. That is why Guderian was against the Arden operation and the transfer of troops from the Eastern Front to the Western. On December 24, Guderian reported to Hitler's headquarters about the impending offensive of the Soviet troops and demanded that the Arden operation be stopped in order to transfer troops to the East.

Hitler rejected this proposal, considering the information of German intelligence about the forces of the Red Army a bluff. On December 31, Guderian, knowing full well that the Arden operation had failed, again demanded the transfer of troops to the east, but was again refused.

Those hundreds of thousands of German soldiers and officers, thousands of tanks, guns and aircraft could have ended up on the Eastern Front, if not for the Ardennes operation and our multimillion-dollar losses, and so huge, they would have been even greater.

As you know, the German troops on the Western Front for the period from June 1 to December 31, 1944 lost 634 thousand people - 57 thousand killed, 188 thousand wounded and 389 thousand captured and missing.

During the period of the Cold War, mutual insults and accusations, the myth of saving the allies in the Arden operation was born.

Operation Watch on the Rhine

By the end of 1944, fascist Germany was squeezed in a vise from the east and from the west, its military, economic and international position deteriorated sharply. To save the situation, Hitler wanted to repeat the von Kleist maneuver of the French campaign of 1940, which brought the German troops a quick victory.

The strike force consisting of the 6th SS Panzer Army, the 5th Panzer Army and the 7th Field Army, united in Army Group B under the command of Field Marshal V. Model, was to strike through the Ardennes hills covered with dense forests at the junction of Luxembourg, Germany and Belgium in the direction of Antwerp, cut off the entire British army group, as well as American troops in the Aachen region, from the Allied forces operating in France, and further defeat the Anglo-American forces in Belgium and the Netherlands.

Thus, the military-political leadership of Germany hoped to change the course of hostilities in Western Europe in favor of Germany and create the prerequisites for starting negotiations with the United States and Britain on a separate peace.

The German command hoped that this would make it possible to concentrate all forces on the Soviet-German front and achieve success in the war against the USSR. The operation was called "Watch on the Rhine".

Given the situation and the balance of power, Model, supported by Rundstedt, spoke out categorically against such an operation. Model proposed instead of breaking through the Ardennes to eliminate the ledge formed by the wedged American units. But it was impossible to argue with the Fuhrer. Hitler gave the order to start preparing the operation according to the plan approved by him.

Army Group B included: 6th SS Panzer Army under the command of SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer I. Dietrich (9 divisions, including selected tank divisions Leibstandarte, Reich, Hitler Youth and Hohenstauffen), 5 -I tank - General X. Manteuffel (7 divisions) and 7th - General E. Brandenberg (4 divisions). One division was in reserve. The grouping consisted of 250 thousand soldiers and officers, 900 tanks, 800 aircraft and 2600 guns and mortars.

To conduct a special sabotage operation behind enemy lines, a special military unit was formed under the command of O. Skorzeny. Its personnel were dressed in American and English form, had captured tanks and vehicles and was supposed to capture one or more bridges on the Meuse River. In addition, saboteur units were supposed to disrupt communications, spread false rumors, transmit false orders and cause as much chaos as possible in the Allied battle formations in order to prevent the transfer of Anglo-American troops from the north, it was planned to drop an airborne assault in the area north of Malmedy to the breakthrough site.

The command of the Wehrmacht tried to maximize the striking power of the troops intended for the offensive. The 5th Panzer Army was allocated 400 new Panther and T-IV tanks. However, despite all efforts, these forces were not enough to achieve the goals of the operation. Due to fierce fighting on the Soviet-German front, the German command was forced to limit itself to 21 divisions instead of the planned 25 divisions. The lack of fuel had an acute effect - the tanks were provided with them only for half the operation. The German command hoped to compensate for the lack of forces and means at the expense of surprise.

However, despite the fact that at the time of the offensive, the Germans on the 115-kilometer front were opposed by troops of only 4 divisions of the 1st Army of the 12th Army Group (commander - O. Bradley), numbering 83 thousand people, 424 tanks and self-propelled artillery guns and more than 300 guns, the overall superiority of the Anglo-American troops ultimately had a decisive influence on the outcome of the operation. Nevertheless, the Allied headquarters and troops were not even aware of the counteroffensive being prepared by the Germans, and the German military machine, straining its last efforts, was able to deliver a strong blow.

In the early morning of December 16, 1944, German troops, after massive shelling of American units, went on the offensive in the Ardennes. The divisions of the enemy's 8th Army Corps were taken by surprise. For several hours at the headquarters they could not recover from the surprise and determine the force of the blow. As a result, the American troops were unable to offer serious resistance, and the front was broken through. During the day, German tanks managed to penetrate more than 30 kilometers into the depths of the American defenses. The commander of the 1st US Army, General C. Hodges, realized the gravity of the threat only on the morning of December 17, when the Germans were already approaching his headquarters in Spa.

On the evening of December 16, the Supreme Commander of the United Expeditionary Forces in Western Europe, D. Eisenhower, ordered two armored divisions to be sent to the breakthrough site, and on December 17 he was forced to transfer two more airborne divisions from his reserve to the Ardennes.

Despite the surprise achieved and initial successes, the plans of the German offensive began to be violated already in the first days of the operation. The 6th Panzer Army, advancing on the right flank, was stopped by the stubbornly defending Americans at Montjoie. All attempts by the Germans to move forward were unsuccessful.

The 5th Panzer Army, advancing in the center, at first successfully moved forward. Having broken through the defenses of the Americans and having passed about 50 km, she came close to the Bastogne stronghold, but an attempt to immediately capture this important transport hub was repulsed. On the morning of December 19, units of the 101st Airborne Division from the Eisenhower Strategic Reserve approached Bastogne and took up a strong defense in it. In order not to stop the offensive, the Germans allocated the 26th Infantry Division and a tank battle group to besiege the city, and their main forces bypassed Bastogne on both sides and continued to move.

The 7th Army, which was supposed to cover the left flank of the advancing group, failed to break through the American defenses. The German airborne landing north of Malmedy, carried out on the night of December 17, ended in failure. The hopes for the actions of sabotage detachments also did not come true. It was not possible to capture the crossing over the Meuse.

The breakthrough of the Allied defenses on a broad front by the German troops caused great concern among the Anglo-American command. At a meeting of the allied commanders, which took place on December 19 in Verdun, it was decided to urgently prepare and conduct a counterattack on the flanks of the advancing German grouping. On December 20, Eisenhower, in order to improve leadership and control of troops, subordinated to the British commander Montgomery all the troops located north of the breakthrough site, including the 1st and 9th American armies. To defend the bridges across the Meuse, Montgomery transferred four divisions to the breakthrough site.

On December 18, the German command significantly adjusted the plan of operation. The previously planned strike from the area north of Aachen to the west was canceled. The 6th Panzer Army was ordered to strike in a southwestern direction and support the advance of the 5th Panzer Army. However, despite the concentration of efforts, the Germans failed to achieve decisive success. Most of the forces of the 5th Panzer Army were pinned down by the battles for Bastogne. Only some of its advanced units approached the Meuse in the Dinan area.

To ensure the advance of the advancing troops to the Meuse, Hitler allocated the 9th Panzer and 15th Motorized Divisions from the reserve of the Supreme Commander. However, the advanced units of the 5th Panzer Army could not advance further: the forces that advanced forward were not enough, the reserves necessary for the development of success were absent, and the tanks ran out of fuel. The situation on the Soviet-German front did not allow the German command to transfer additional troops to the West.

Under these conditions, General D. Patton's 3rd American Army received the task of launching a counterattack on the southern face of the front ledge. On December 21, the army went on the offensive. At first, due to weak air support, it developed slowly. Finally, on December 23, flying weather allowed aviation to operate at full strength. As of December 24, the US 9th Tactical Air Force had flown 1,150 fighter-bomber sorties, and the US 8th Strategic Air Force had launched 2,050 four-engine bombers at the enemy. At the same time, German aviation made an average of only about 450 sorties per day.

As a result of the measures taken by the allied command, the German troops lost the opportunity to develop an offensive against Antwerp. They suffered heavy losses. In some divisions, the number of soldiers in companies was reduced to 20-30 people. The actions of the Allied aviation paralyzed the supply of fuel and food.

On December 28, 1944, at a meeting at headquarters, Hitler stated that the offensive had failed. Therefore, he decided to temporarily abandon the continuation of the operation on this sector of the front and carry out new strikes south of the Ardennes in order to destroy the American troops stationed there.

On the night of January 1, 1945, German troops in the 1st and 19th armies struck in Northern Alsace. By January 5, they advanced southward up to 30 km and crossed the Rhine north of Strasbourg. The Germans were stopped, but the situation on the Western Front remained tense in early January. On January 6, 1945, the British Prime Minister W. Churchill, fearing new attacks by the German troops, turned to I. Stalin with a request that the Red Army launch a major offensive and thereby provide assistance to the allies. True to its allied obligations, the USSR came to the aid of the United States and England. On January 12, Soviet troops, 8 days ahead of schedule, launched an offensive in East Prussia and Poland, which thwarted all the plans of the Germans on the Western Front.

The German command was forced to abandon further attempts to attack in the west and begin the transfer of troops to the Soviet-German front. From January 12 to 31, the 6th SS Panzer Army and a number of formations were sent to the Eastern Front. On January 28, the German units, pursued by the Allied forces, rolled back to their previously occupied positions along the Siegfried Line and went on the defensive.

German troops during the Ardennes operation lost more than 50 thousand people killed and wounded. About 30 thousand were captured. German losses in weapons and materiel were also very heavy - 324 tanks and assault guns, more than a thousand vehicles and other military equipment.

Allied losses in the Ardennes amounted to about 77 thousand people, including almost 9 thousand killed, 47 thousand wounded and 21 thousand missing. During the fighting in the Ardennes, the Allies lost 783 tanks and tank destroyers, a large amount of equipment and equipment.

A German strike in the Ardennes thwarted Allied plans for major offensives in late 1944. However, the main goal of the counteroffensive was not achieved.