Germany. Eastern shaft

The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1933-1945

Their aces were rightfully considered the best in the world.

Their fighters dominated the battlefield.

Their bombers wiped entire cities off the face of the earth.

And the legendary "things" terrified the enemy troops.

The Air Force of the Third Reich - the famed Luftwaffe - was as important a part of the blitzkrieg as the tank forces. The resounding victories of the Wehrmacht would have been impossible in principle without air support and air cover.

Until now, military experts are trying to understand how the country, which was forbidden to have combat aircraft after the First World War, succeeded not only in as soon as possible to build a modern and efficient air force, but also to maintain air supremacy for many years, despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy.

This book, published by the British Air Office in 1948, literally "hot on the heels" of the war that had just ended, was the first attempt to comprehend her combat experience. This is a detailed and highly competent analysis of the history, organization and combat operations of the Luftwaffe on all fronts - Eastern, Western, Mediterranean and African. This is a fascinating tale of the meteoric rise and disastrous fall of the Third Reich air force.

Sections of this page:

Summer Campaign on the Eastern Front

Contrary to expectations, the summer campaign of the Soviet troops began on June 10 with a major offensive on the Finnish border in Karelia along the coast of the Gulf of Finland, which resulted in the capture of Vyborg on June 20. At first, the Germans did not try to strengthen the Luftwaffe grouping in this direction, not wanting to weaken the main front in order to support the Finns, but the rapid deterioration of the situation forced them to transfer 50 dive bombers and single-engine fighters from Narva to Finland.

When the main offensive of the Soviet troops began on June 23, German aviation north of the Pripyat marshes was already somewhat weakened by the events on the coast of the Gulf of Finland, which was aggravated by the withdrawal of another 50 fighters to Germany to strengthen the Reich air defense system, weakened by the transfer of significant forces to Normandy. By July 3, the advancing Soviet troops already occupied Vitebsk, Mogilev and Minsk. It was necessary to urgently strengthen the central direction, and literally every aircraft that could be removed from other fronts was hastily transferred here.

40 fighters from among those transferred to the Reich air defense were immediately returned, about the same number were transferred to the north from the 4th Air Fleet, but the need for attack aircraft was most felt for operations against the advancing Soviet columns. Accordingly, the already weakened Italian front was forced to give up another 85 FV-190, having lost (and irretrievably) the last striking forces that could be thrown to support the ground forces. 40 aircraft were transferred from Normandy, despite the critical situation that developed there after the capture of the bridgehead by the Allies (however, they did not play a big role there), and another 70 aircraft from the 4th Air Fleet. Thus, to relieve pressure on the central sector of the front, which was already beginning to fall apart, by the beginning of July, about 270 aircraft were sent.

These forces were clearly not enough to stop the flight. During the day of July 12, Soviet troops in the Baltic advanced more than 30 km; On July 13 they occupied Vilnius; it was followed by Pinsk and Grodno. South of the Pripyat marshes, the retreat was also in full swing. During the period from 24 to 28 July, the Germans left Brest, Lublin, Lvov and Przemysl. The defeat was so complete that all possible forces were transferred to this sector, even despite the risk of exposing the Carpathian and Balkan directions in Romania. In an attempt to plug the gap, the 4th Air Fleet was taken away last strength direct support of ground troops. There was nothing more to throw into battle.

Thus, by the end of July, the distribution of Luftwaffe forces on the Eastern Front had undergone noticeable changes, and the losses incurred during July far exceeded the reinforcements received, as a result of which the number of aircraft on the main front from the Baltic to the Black Sea was reduced to about 1750 aircraft:

Moreover, the constant changes in airfields, caused not only by the transfer of units from other sectors of the fronts, but also by constant retreats and relocations, led to severe disorganization and a serious deterioration in the state of technology. As a result, despite the significant strengthening of the central direction, the average aviation activity did not exceed 500-600 sorties per day, which was completely insufficient to ease the pressure on the battered and exhausted ground forces.

It was at this moment that the situation in the Balkans suddenly escalated. The weakness of the Luftwaffe in Romania was already shown by Allied air raids from Italy on the Ploiesti oil fields on July 9 and 15, against which no more than 50 sorties were made in total (of which half were made by Romanian units), and on July 22 the activity of fighter aircraft was even lower. Thus, the transfer of fighters from the southern direction to Poland and Galicia has already begun to affect.

However, the greatest concern among the Germans at this moment was the political situation. By the end of July, it became clear that it was hardly worth counting on Turkey's neutrality any longer. The expected actions of Turkey required the Luftwaffe to take early action. The Directorate of the II Air Corps, relieved of duties in France, was sent to Bulgaria on July 31 solely for the purpose of organizing defense and ensuring security, since there were no longer enough large forces for offensive operations.

The front line roughly corresponds to the situation at the time the Soviet offensive began (see also Map 21). The 5th Air Fleet (Vostok) continued to control aviation operations in Finland and Northern Norway, and the 1st Air Fleet covered the Baltic. The zone of responsibility of the 6th air fleet completely included the Polish and Belarusian direction up to the Carpathians, and the 4th air fleet occupied the section from Galicia to the Black Sea along the line of the Prut River. In the Balkans, operations in Yugoslavia, Albania and Northern Greece were still the responsibility of a separate Luftwaffe Command "South-East".

An alarming lull set in on the southern sector of the front, interrupted on August 23 by a coup in Romania, which coincided with the forcing of the Prut River by Soviet troops. The Germans, taken by surprise, immediately sent additional aviation forces to the new threatened area. 40 Yu-87s were transferred to the Ziliste airfield from Estonia, and 30 FV-190 fighters arrived from the other side of the Carpathians. Attempts were made to airlift reinforcements to Bucharest, but since most of the airfields, including Baneas, were now in Roman hands, and Otopeni, held by the Germans, became unusable after the American bombardment, the results were insignificant and did not affect the situation. An attempt to bring in airborne troops from Yugoslavia had to be canceled on 25 August due to bad weather, a shortage of trained crews, and a lack of sufficient serviceable Me-323s. Thus, the attempt to retake Bucharest by airborne forces failed, and similar operations against Ploiesti and Focsani had to be cancelled. The last attempt to restore the situation in the capital by bombing Bucharest on the same day did not produce any results.

It was clear that the situation was rapidly spiraling out of control, and any attempt to stop the Soviet offensive with limited resources would be futile. Constanta was occupied on the 29th, Ploiesti on the 30th, and on August 31, Soviet troops entered Bucharest. It only remained to save what could still be saved from complete destruction, and to withdraw all the remaining units of German aviation as soon as possible, mainly to Hungary, destroying airfield facilities, equipment and supplies before retreating. For the units withdrawn to Bulgaria, the respite was short-lived. Already on September 6, Bulgaria declared war on Germany, and the Balkans had to be abandoned less than two weeks after the start of the disaster.

By mid-September, the front line was restored in the eastern and southeastern directions (this time on the borders of Yugoslavia), and in early October the Luftwaffe forces in the Banat region in the northern part of this area were included in the zone of responsibility of the 4th Air Fleet. However, one can hardly speak of a significant strengthening, and the reorganization did not compensate for the weaknesses of the Luftwaffe in southbound, for which reinforcements were still not expected. In addition, it was precisely at this time that in the East, as in the West, a shortage of fuel began to be felt, and the intensity of military operations was sharply reduced. Due to the tense situation with fuel in the area of ​​​​responsibility of the 4th air fleet fighting conducted extremely economically and with small forces. The consequences of such a decision can be judged at least from the fact that during the day of September 11, German aviation made only 250 sorties on the entire Eastern Front against 2000-2500 sorties of Soviet aviation. The advantage of Soviet aviation was so overwhelming that the actions of the Luftwaffe in the Balkans, as, indeed, in other areas Eastern Front could no longer influence the overall development of the situation.

Meanwhile, the collapse in the northern and central sectors of the front continued. On September 4, an armistice was signed in Finland, on October 9, Soviet troops reached the coast of the Baltic Sea, and on October 13, Riga fell. Soon Soviet troops entered East Prussia. Belgrade was taken in the Balkans on the 20th.

By this time, the 1st Air Fleet was blockaded in Courland, and the 6th Air Fleet occupied the entire front from the Baltic coast of East Prussia to Slovakia. The 4th Air Fleet is responsible for operations on the outskirts of Austria through Hungary and Yugoslavia. The 1st Air Corps, which repels the attack on Budapest in Hungary, and the Luftwaffe South-East Command in northern Yugoslavia are subordinate to him.

By this time, the pace of the Soviet advance in Poland and the Balkans had temporarily slowed down, and the main air battles were taking place in the Baltic states and East Prussia, where the 1st Air Fleet was eventually cut off and blocked in Latvia. However, the lack of fuel chained to the ground almost the entire long-range bomber aircraft, depriving the exhausted german armies air support, with the exception of the ongoing minor activities of four squadrons specially assigned to operations against railway lines. Despite the measures taken, the activity of other types of aviation also had to be reduced, and on average no more than 500 sorties were made per day, of which 125–150 were in the area south of the Carpathians.

The area was in need of significant reorganization. In mid-October, Oberst General Dessloh, who had not spent long in the West in the position of commander of the 3rd Air Fleet after the removal of Sperrle, was again appointed to the post of commander of the 4th Air Fleet. At the same time, all the forces of the Luftwaffe South-East Command were placed at his disposal. These forces were now based in the area of ​​the city of Pec and operated against the Soviet troops advancing along the Danube from Belgrade, but they were weakened during the evacuation from southern Yugoslavia, from Albania and from northern Greece. The rest of the forces, which most 4th Air Fleet, were now under the command of the 1st Air Corps in the area of ​​​​the city of Kecskemet and covered the approaches to Budapest. Thanks to the reorganization, any of the sectors could easily be strengthened at the expense of the other, but nevertheless it was clear that all the forces available were far from sufficient even with a normal supply of fuel.

Until the end of the year, relative calm was established, and the front line, now running from the Carpathians to East Prussia, changed little. At the end of October, heavy fighting broke out in the Kecskemét area, and all the forces of the 1st Air Corps were thrown into these battles against the Soviet tank columns advancing on Budapest. This situation continued throughout November, and although the Soviet advance was halted at Lake Balaton, the threat to Budapest from the north and south increased. The calm in the north allowed the 4th Air Fleet to be slightly strengthened, the number of which was increased to 500-600 aircraft (compared to only 200 machines in July), of which 200 were attack aircraft. Coinciding with the arrival of reinforcements, a slight improvement in the supply of fuel allowed for a partial recovery of forces, and by mid-November activity on this sector of the front increased to 400 sorties per day. However, no matter what the Luftwaffe did, they could not stop the Soviet advance on Budapest, and on December 9 the Red Army reached the Danube north of the city.

The six months from June to December 1944 were the time of unparalleled catastrophes of German weapons both in the East and in the West. In the East, the last gains so easily won in 1941 were lost, and there was not the slightest glimmer of hope like von Rundstedt's offensive in the West, although plans were already being prepared for a major counter-offensive in early 1945. On all fronts, the Germans faced the complete superiority of the enemy in people and equipment. The deplorable inability of the Luftwaffe to influence the situation was fully manifested. Numerous Soviet aviation outnumbered by 5-6 to 1 the most powerful forces that the Luftwaffe could put against them, and it was quite clear that the Luftwaffe again, as in 1943, could not play a big role either in the East or in the West. They again did not have reserves, and the battles in the West and the defense of the Reich from the air attack "ate" the entire annual increase in the number of fighters. Now the situation was hopeless, and although in 1945 the Germans threw all possible forces into the last battle in the East, they were no longer able to prevent the impending catastrophe.

Vladimir Viktorovich Volk - expert of the Center for Scientific Political Thought and Ideology

Photo: One of the countless battles on the Mius Front. July 1943 near the village of Stepanovka

Anyone who has ever been to Taganrog, Matveev-Kurgan, Kuibyshevo, Rostov region, Snezhnoye and Torez, Donetsk, Krasny Luch and Vakhrushevo, Lugansk regions, knows that the first thing guests are taken to is the legendary Mius heights. Here in each locality at different times on folk remedies unique memorial complexes were built - the pride of local residents.

For a long time, the events of the Mius Front were rarely written and spoken about, there was not a word about them in history textbooks, as well as about the battles near Rzhev and Vyazma, and the archives for long period were closed. This silence is associated with the colossal loss of life - about 830 thousand people - the battle, which ranks fourth in terms of the number of losses of the Red Army. In terms of its significance, bloodshed and the scale of losses, the breakthrough of the Mius Front is comparable to the Battle of Kursk. And the impregnability of this defensive line, which ran from Taganrog to Krasny Luch, can be compared with the Mannerheim and Maginot lines. By the way, the title of "city of military glory" was given to Taganrog precisely for the Mius Front.

The small Mius River, overgrown with forests, which originates from the village of Fashchevka, which is almost near Debaltseve, and flows into the Sea of ​​​​Azov, first became a solid obstacle for the Nazi troops during their southern offensive operation.

Mius River

During the fighting from September 29 to November 4, 1941, the Nazi troops lost about 50 thousand soldiers and officers, over 250 tanks, more than 170 guns, about 1200 vehicles with military supplies. In defensive battles, the 383rd and 395th Mining Rifle Divisions, formed mainly from local workers, especially distinguished themselves.

In early November 1941, the front stopped at the Mius and the Seversky Donets. The constant counterattacks of our troops fettered big forces enemy on the southern wing during the crucial period of the battle near Moscow. The most terrible in Primiusye, the old-timers from the inhabitants of Ryazhenny and Matveev-Kurgan, always considered 1942, when in just a few days all the snow-covered beams, fields and hills around became red-black from the blood and overcoats of our soldiers. This despite the fact that under the snow in these fields, thousands of those who died in the unsuccessful December and January attempts to storm the German fortifications were already lying uncleaned. All the slopes of the Mius hills in the spring of 1942 were littered with corpses. And these dead lay there, before the eyes of local residents, for several months. Those who saw this picture as a child admitted that they had never seen anything worse before or after ...

In February 1942, Marshal Timoshenko decided to launch an offensive. The troops of the Southern Front near Rostov were to cut off the German ledge between Matveev Kurgan and Sambek and liberate Taganrog. Three such “attempts to break through” were made in a few days: near Matveev Kurgan, near the village of Kurlatskoye and near the Soleny barrow in the Neklinovsky district. According to official figures alone, more than twelve thousand people died during the operation. Twenty thousand were injured or frostbitten.

Under Matveyev Kurgan, during the assault on Volkovaya Gora and other heights from March 8 to March 10, 1942, 20 thousand people were killed and wounded. During the three days of the offensive from July 30 to August 1, 1943, 18,000 people were put out of action west of the village of Kuibyshevo. Search engines are still working there. They raise sunken Soviet tanks, find the unburied remains of soldiers. The Taganrog offensive operation in March 1942 remained a dark, terrible and unknown page in the history of the war. Nothing is written about her either in military encyclopedias or in history books. The few surviving participants in those tragic battles did not like to remember her either. The sacrifices were too great...

In the summer of 1942, due to strategic and tactical errors in the actions of the command of the South-Western Front during the Kharkov offensive operation, at the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to break through the Mius defenses and reach the Volga and the foothills of the Caucasus Range. The troops of the Southern Front were forced to withdraw beyond the Don. Hitler called the line along the Mius "the new state border of Germany - inviolable and inviolable." And after the defeat of the Nazis in Stalingrad, the Mius line was supposed to become, according to the plan of the Nazis, the front of revenge for this defeat.

On the right bank of the Mius, along its entire length and a hundred kilometers deep, three lines of defense were created during the three years of the war. The first passed directly at the river bank, had a depth of 6–8, and in some directions 10–12 km. It was followed by a well-prepared second lane in terms of engineering. The third is along Kalmius (where the line of contact between the punitive troops of Ukraine and the Novorossiya militias passes today). The total length of trenches, trenches and communications only at the forefront along the coast exceeded the distance from Mius to Berlin. Each of the three lines of defense had its own systems of hundreds of pillboxes and bunkers. Minefields were widely used with a density of 1500-1800 mines per kilometer of front and with a depth of fields up to 200 meters. Every square kilometer was littered with machine-gun emplacements under armored caps.

The Nazis used the advantages of the right bank of the river, rich in cliffs, ravines, rocks and heights. The defense system included the mound Saur-Mogila - the dominant height near the village of Saurovka in the Shakhtyorsky district of the Donetsk region. Almost all the main heights near Taganrog, Matveev-Kurgan, Kuibyshevo, Krasny Luch were under the control of the Nazis. An interesting clarification - the old-timers of the region claim that the Ukrainian punishers, trying to capture Primiusye last summer, followed the old German routes ... Accident or heredity?

The July offensive operation of the Southwestern and Southern fronts on the Seversky Donets and on the Mius did not bring success to the Red Army. The Donbass grouping of the enemy retained their former positions. However, this operation had strategic consequences in other sectors of the Soviet-German front. The Soviet troops did not allow the German command to transfer part of the forces from the Donbass region to the Kursk salient, reinforcing strike groups during the offensive operation "Citadel". Moreover, the German command had to remove up to five tank divisions from the Kursk direction, as well as significant aviation forces, and redeploy them to hold positions on the Seversky Donets and Mius. This weakened the Belgorod-Kharkov group of the Wehrmacht and created more favorable conditions for the operation "Rumyantsev" by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts. Thus, the troops of the South-Western and Southern solved the main problem - they did not allow the German command to use all the operational reserves of Army Group South in Operation Citadel and attracted significant enemy forces from the Kursk Bulge.

In the period from August 3 to 10, 1943, the 3rd Panzer Division, the SS Panzer Divisions "Reich" and "Totenkopf" were sent to the Mius Front from the 6th Army, and the SS Panzer Division from the 1st Panzer Army "Viking". Almost simultaneously, the 23rd Panzer and 16th Motorized Divisions were deployed from the Mius River to the Izyumsko-Barvenkovskoe direction, closer to the northern flank of the Donbass grouping. By mid-August, the 1st Panzer and 6th Armies, defending in the Donbass, numbered 27 divisions.

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Gennady Matishov, in his interview, claims that the Mius-Front pulled over and crushed parts that, perhaps, the Wehrmacht did not have enough for success in the battles near Moscow, Leningrad, and on the Kursk Bulge. In 1943, the July offensive of the Southern Front forced the Germans to transfer three tank divisions from the Kursk Bulge to the Mius Front. This helped us win near Kursk. Few people know that on July 30-31, 1943, in the battle near Mius, the elite SS tank corps lost more people and equipment than near Prokhorovka two weeks earlier. We learned to fight in battles. On the Mius Front, for one dead German soldier, there were seven or eight of ours. For many years in the domestic literature they were silent about this, they hid information about the losses incurred then.

Malinovsky and Grechko, commanders of large formations in the south of the country, who were ministers of defense of the USSR in 1957-1976, preferred not to recall the unsuccessful episodes of their military biography.

The Mius pool is three years of stubborn, bloody and unsuccessful battles. Our command clearly imagined that it would not be easy to defeat the opposing enemy. The troops had to advance in extremely difficult conditions - they had to overcome numerous water lines, operate on terrain favorable to the defender, break through powerfully fortified positions from huge amount fire weapons.

The main offensive of the troops of the Southern Front was launched on August 18, 1943. Previously, a 70-minute artillery preparation was carried out, in which 1,500 artillery pieces and mortars took part. After artillery preparation, units of the 5th shock army began to advance. Tanks attacked, sappers walked in front of them, who showed passages in minefields, because due to dust and smoke, the view was difficult and the tankers did not see the flags set by the sappers. The infantry followed the tanks. From the air, the attack was supported by "Ilys" - attack aircraft of the 7th Aviation Corps. The Mius Front was broken through to a depth of 8–9 kilometers.

On August 19, near the village of Kuibyshevo, the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps under the command of Lieutenant General I.T. Tanaschishin advanced 20 kilometers beyond the front line. Their tanks approached Amvrosievka. In the following days, as a result of German counterattacks, the Soviet troops retreated slightly. On August 22-26, the German command transferred a tank division from the Crimea. Having gathered units from neighboring sectors of the front, the Germans tried to surround the attackers with flank attacks. On the night of August 24, Soviet troops went on the attack and occupied the villages of Artemovka, Krinichki, and the Semyonovsky farm. The road to Taganrog was occupied, which deprived the German troops of the opportunity to transfer reserves.

One of the most important stages of the Mius breakthrough - the assault on the dominant height of Saur-Mogila, was launched on August 28. Parts of the 96th Guards Rifle Division, commanded by Guards Colonel Semyon Samuilovich Levin, took part in it. At the top was the central observation post of the sixth German army. On the slopes of the mound, armored caps with fire weapons, dugouts with several rolls and bunkers were dug into the ground. The firing positions of the all-round defense were located in several tiers. Flamethrower tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled artillery mounts, artillery pieces and mortars were also used for defense. On August 29, after an artillery raid, Soviet troops almost captured the summit, but the German counterattack pushed the attackers back. The height was finally taken on the morning of 31 August. During these battles, 18 thousand Soviet soldiers died in just a few days. One of the many songs about the Mius Front and the Saur Grave contains the following lines:

• "Listen to the winds over Saur-Mogila,
  And you will understand who saved this earth,
  Whose courage in battles freed,
  Donbass not submitted to the enemy.

After the war, a memorial was built on top of the mound, which was destroyed last year by a new generation of fascists.

According to the estimates of Gennady Matishov, the Red Army lost more than 830 thousand people on the Mius Front, of which 280 thousand were killed. This is approximately 25-30 divisions, or 3% of the total losses of our army killed during the entire war. For the south of Russia, according to Matishov, Matveev-Kurgan means no less than Mamaev in Stalingrad, and Kuibyshevo, Ryazhenoe, Sinyavskoye, Sambek, and many Primius villages deserve the honorary title of "City of Military Glory".

On the territory of Russia, the DPR and the LPR, there are more than a hundred memorials and military graves associated with the battles on the Mius Front. However, most of them were created Soviet time when much of those events was not known. In May 2015, near the village of Kuibyshevo, Rostov Region, the memorial to the soldiers-guards "Breakthrough" was solemnly opened. The search engines propose to build worship crosses on all the key heights of the Mius Front, of which there are 12, indicating all the formations and units that participated in the battles. According to one of the local legends, in the early seventies, the Red Ray was one of the contenders for the title of hero city. Officials and local historians sought such a right and even built a unique memorial and museum of military glory on the Mius River, where every year on May 9 local residents, young and old, gather. Nobody organizes them, they do it at the call of their hearts, raising flowers and wreaths to the top of the mountain near the village of Yanovka. Flowers are laid at the memorial to the victims of fascism at the Bogdan mine, into the pit of which the Nazi executioners dumped more than two and a half thousand unsubdued Soviet people.

Not far from the village of Knyaginovka, searchers erected a monument to the military commissar of the reconnaissance company of the 383rd rifle division, Spartak Zhelezny, and the local partisan Nina Gnilitskaya, heroes of the Soviet Union. In a mass grave, along with them, two dozen Soviet soldiers of Ossetian nationality who took an unequal battle with the Nazis were buried.

Is this a foreign land for the Russians? Are hundreds of thousands of victims of the Mius Front, brought on the altar of our common Victory, cheaper than zeros in the bank accounts of the oligarchs and can be forgotten in favor of the powers that be, who are solving their own problems?

The most important battles during the period of a radical change during the Great Patriotic War, according to the authors of the book "Mius Front in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1942, 1943"

November 2, 1943. 864th day of the war

November 3, 1943. 865th day of the war

The Kyiv offensive operation of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front began, which lasted until November 13, 1943 (see the map - Kyiv offensive and defensive operations of 1943 (112 KB)).

On the morning of November 3, the 38th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front launched an offensive against Kyiv from the Lyutezh bridgehead. The Soviet units broke through the first position of the enemy's defense and slowly continued to move forward. The fighting was carried out mainly in the forests, which stretch for many kilometers near Kyiv. The enemy offered strong resistance. Already on the first day of the offensive, he brought his 20th motorized division into battle against parts of the 38th Army.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, attaching great importance to the offensive that had begun from the Lyutezhsky bridgehead, on the evening of November 3 ordered the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front “not to delay the operation launched on the right wing of the front, since every extra day only gives the enemy an advantage, allowing him to concentrate his forces, using good roads, while our roads destroyed by the enemy make it difficult and restrict maneuver. The headquarters demanded that Kyiv be captured no later than November 5-6. The directive stated that the Kyiv bridgehead was the most important and most advantageous bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper River, which was of exceptional importance for the expulsion of the Germans from the Right-Bank Ukraine.

November 4, 1943. 866th day of the war

Kyiv offensive operation. On the morning of November 4, the fighting took on an exceptionally tense character. The second echelon and army reserves were brought into the battle. The 1st Czechoslovak separate brigade, commanded by Colonel Ludwik Svoboda, entered the struggle for the liberation of Kyiv. However, the advancing troops could not achieve decisive success. On this day, the weather worsened, drizzling rain began to fall. Poor visibility made it difficult to fire artillery and completely ruled out the use of aviation. The roads became almost impassable. In order to quickly complete the breakthrough of the enemy defenses, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front was forced on November 4 to bring the 3rd Guards Tank Army into battle. In the middle of the day, its tank corps overtook the infantry and advanced 8 kilometers deep. Breaking the resistance of the Nazi troops, they continued their movement after dark. The tanks went on the attack with headlights on, sirens blaring, heavy cannon and machine gun fire. The night tank attack had a stunning effect on the enemy.

November 5, 1943. 867th day of the war

Kyiv offensive operation. By the morning of November 5, the 3rd Guards Tank Army of P. S. Rybalko had deeply bypassed the enemy troops defending Kyiv from the west and entered the Svyatoshino region, cutting off the Kyiv-Zhitomir highway. On the same day, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps of V.K. Baranov was introduced into the battle. At the same time, units of the 38th Army, advancing 25 kilometers by the end of November 5, started a battle on the outskirts of Kyiv. The German command, fearing the encirclement of its troops in Kyiv, began their withdrawal from the Ukrainian capital. At the same time, it began to transfer forces to Kyiv from the region of Veliky Bukrin.

November 6, 1943. 868th day of the war

Kyiv offensive operation. Throughout the night of November 6, street fighting went on in Kyiv. At midnight, units of the 51st Rifle Corps of the 38th Army broke through into the city center, onto Kirov Street. By 4 o'clock in the morning on November 6, the troops of the 38th Army completely liquidated the enemy's resistance in Kyiv. On the evening of November 6, Moscow saluted the Soviet troops who had liberated the capital of Soviet Ukraine.

November 7, 1943. 869th day of the war

Kyiv offensive operation. On November 7, formations of the 3rd Guards Tank Army liberated Fastov, a large railway junction that connected the enemy grouping, defending southwest of Kyiv, with troops operating in the Krivoy Rog and Kirovograd region.

November 8, 1943. 870th day of the war

Kyiv offensive operation. On November 8, strong counterattacks of German troops began on the front from Fastov to the Dnieper. The enemy sought to capture Fastov again and at the same time break through along the right bank of the Dnieper, go to the Kyiv region and to the rear of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The fighting was exceptionally stubborn. Separate settlements several times passed from hand to hand.

November 9, 1943. 871st day of the war

November 10, 1943. 872nd day of the war

Gomel-Rechitsa operation. The Gomel-Rechitsa offensive operation of the troops of the Belorussian Front began, which lasted until November 30, 1943 (see map - Gomel-Rechitsa offensive operation (35 KB)) .

The German troops of Army Group Center (4th, 9th and 2nd Armies) were operating in front of the Belorussian Front, trying to prevent the breakthrough of the Eastern Wall. The 11th army of I. I. Fedyuninsky, together with the troops of V. Ya. Kolpakchi, continuously attacked the enemy north of Gomel, riveting his attention to this area. And the main blow by the Soviet troops was prepared from the Loev bridgehead. Frontal reserves were transferred to the Loevsky bridgehead - the 1st Don Guards Tank Corps of M.F. Panov, the 9th Tank Corps of B.S. Bakharov, the cavalry corps of V.V. Kryukov and M.P. Konstantinov, the artillery corps of the breakthrough N V. Ignatova. The 48th Army continued to cross its main forces to the western bank of the Dnieper, improving the starting position for an attack on Rechitsa. On November 10, Soviet troops went on the offensive and broke through the enemy defenses on the very first day.

November 11, 1943. 873rd day of the war

Gomel-Rechitsa operation. On the second day of the operation, tank and cavalry corps entered the gap. They rapidly moved forward, destroying the enemy units that tried to resist. The troops of the 48th Army successfully operated along the western bank of the Dnieper to Rechitsa.

November 12, 1943. 874th day of the war

Kyiv offensive operation. The Soviet troops, repelling the enemy's counterattacks, firmly held Fastov in their hands and at the same time continued to develop the offensive in a westerly direction. On November 12, the regional center of Ukraine, Zhitomir, was liberated. Our units went to the front Chernobyl - Malin - Zhytomyr - Fastov - Tripoli.

November 13, 1943. 875th day of the war

Kyiv offensive operation. The Kyiv offensive operation, which took place from November 3 to November 13, 1943, ended. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the course of a swift offensive liberated the capital of Ukraine - Kyiv and formed a strategic bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper, which played an important role in further operations to liberate Right-Bank Ukraine.

The duration of the operation was 11 days. The width of the combat front is 320-500 km. The depth of advance of the Soviet troops is 150 km. The average daily advance rate is 12-14 km. The number of troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front at the beginning of the operation was 671,000 people. Human losses in the operation: irretrievable - 6491 people (1.0%), sanitary - 24078 people, total - 30569 people, average daily - 2779 people.

November 14, 1943. 876th day of the war

November 15, 1943. 877th day of the war

November 16, 1943. 878th day of the war

November 17, 1943. 879th day of the war

November 18, 1943. 880th day of the war

Gomel-Rechitsa operation. On the night of November 18, the 65th army of P.I. Batov cut the Gomel-Kalinkovichi railway. P. I. Batov turned two rifle divisions and two tank brigades of Panov's corps, which had escaped forward, to the rear of the Germans defending in Rechitsa. As a result of this strike, on November 18, the city was liberated.

Developing success, the 48th Army crossed the Berezina with part of its forces at its confluence with the Dnieper and entrenched itself on the bridgehead south of Zhlobin. Pursuing the enemy, the troops of the 61st Army of P. A. Belov were approaching Mozyr. The enemy defense was broken through by the troops of the left wing of the Belorussian Front over a distance of 120 kilometers.

November 19, 1943. 881st day of the war

November 20, 1943. 882nd day of the war

November 21, 1943. 883rd day of the war

November 22, 1943. 884th day of the war

November 23, 1943. 885th day of the war

November 24, 1943. 886th day of the war

November 25, 1943. 887th day of the war

Gomel-Rechitsa operation. The troops of the right wing of the Belorussian Front reached the Dnieper near Novy Bykhov. By the evening of November 25, Soviet troops approached Gomel from three sides and started fighting on the streets of the city. The fighting continued all night.

Troops of the 48th Army crossed the river. Berezina and captured a bridgehead on its western bank. At night, enemy troops began to withdraw from the interfluve of the Sozh and Dnieper rivers.

November 26, 1943. 888th day of the war

Gomel-Rechitsa operation. The attack grouping of the Belorussian Front went into the deep rear of the enemy troops defending in the Gomel region, the successful actions of Gorbatov's 3rd Army, which delivered a sudden blow from the right in the direction of Bykhov, and strong pressure on the enemy in the center by units of the 63rd and 11th armies forced Gomel grouping of the enemy to a hasty retreat. November 26 Gomel was completely liberated from the enemy. On the same day in the evening, Moscow, on behalf of the Motherland, saluted the valiant troops who liberated Gomel.

November 27, 1943. 889th day of the war

November 28, 1943. 890th day of the war

From November 28 to December 1, 1943, the Tehran Conference of the leaders of the USSR, USA, Great Britain was held.

November 29, 1943. 891st day of the war

November 30, 1943. 892nd day of the war

Gomel-Rechitsa operation. The Gomel-Rechitsa operation, which took place from November 10 to 30, 1943, ended. The troops of the Belorussian Front broke through the enemy defenses and advanced, with the support of partisans, to a depth of 130 km, reached the line west of New Bykhov, Potapovka, Gamza, Prudok, south of Yelsk, created a threat to the southern flank of Army Group Center.

The duration of the operation was 21 days. The number of troops of the Belorussian Front at the beginning of the operation was 761,300 people. Human losses in the operation: irretrievable - 21650 people (2.8%), sanitary - 66556 people, total - 88206 people, average daily - 4200 people.

Sovinformburo. During November 30, between the SOZH and DNEPR rivers, northwest of GOMEL, our troops, overcoming enemy resistance and counterattacks, occupied several settlements; among them are REUT, DORKI, ROZOV, KIDNEYS, MIKHALEVKA, TALES.

Between the rivers DNEPR and BEREZINA, south of Zhlobin, our troops occupied several settlements with battles.

In the region of the lower reaches of the PRIPYAT river, our troops fought forward and occupied the settlements of ZAMOST'E, LOZKI, KRYSHICHI, YUREVICHI, GRYDA, GUTA, ZARAKITNOE, KNUROVKA.

By order of the Supreme High Command, our troops left the city of KOROSTEN and took up more advantageous defense lines.

In the Cherkasy region, our troops fought to expand the bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper and improved their positions.

South-west of KREMENCHUG, as a result of stubborn battles, our troops captured the heavily fortified strongholds of the enemy TABURISCHE, ZAKHARIEVKA, RAZOROPOL, YANOV, BOLSHAYA MAKARIKHA.

Chronicle of the Great Patriotic War 1941: June July August September October November December 1942: January ... Wikipedia

Chronicle of the Great Patriotic War 1941: June July August September October November December 1942: January February March ... Wikipedia

After the Germans were thrown back from Moscow, the fighting went on in this place for almost a year and a half.
The whole earth is in barbed wire, shells, cartridges.
The village of Studenoe was with the Germans, and the village of Sloboda (1 km to the East) was with ours
239th Red Banner Rifle Division: From 01 to 01/05/1942, unsuccessful battles were fought for Sukhinichi, then the division received an order to go to the Meshchovsk area, meaning to advance on Serpeisk in the future (two companies were left to block Sukhinichi). Participation in the capture of Meshchovsk was not required, the division moved to Serpeisk. On the afternoon of 01/07/1942, Serpeisk was occupied and continued the offensive in a north-western direction. On 01/12/1942, she fought in the Kirsanovo, Pyatnitsa, Shershnevo, Krasny Holm area, developing a strike in the direction of the Chiplyaevo station (8 kilometers northwest of Bakhmutov). From 01/16/1942 she was subordinate to the commander of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps.

Re: 326th Roslavl Red Banner Rifle Division
« Reply #1: 02/28/2011 03:21:06 PM »
The new directive demanded that the 10th Army, by the end of December 27, go out with the main forces to the area of ​​​​the city of Kozelsk, by the same time mobile forward detachments capture a large railway junction and the city of Sukhinichi, and also conduct deep reconnaissance to the north-west in the directions of Baryatinskaya station, to the west to the city of Kirov and to the south of it to the city of Lyudinovo.
The 239th and 324th rifle divisions were already beyond the Oka and were approaching Kozelsk. To the left of them at the crossing was the 323rd rifle division, the 322nd and 328th divisions entered the battle for access to the left bank of the river in the Belev area. The 330th Rifle, 325th and 326th went behind the center of the army in the second echelon. On December 31, by order of the front commander, they took up defensive positions: the 325th in the Kozelsk region, the 326th in the Mekhovoe, Berezovka, Zvyagino regions, subsequently the 325th rifle division was ordered to advance on Meshchovsk, Mosalsk, i.e. to the north of Sukhinichey, the 326th rifle received the task of advancing on Baryatinsky along the Sukhinichi-Chiplyaevo railway.
At the stations of Matchino, Awakening and Tsekh, the 330th and 326th divisions captured large Soviet-made ammunition depots. On January 9, there were about 36 thousand shells and mines. This immediately made things easier for us. From the same warehouses, the 761st and 486th army artillery regiments that finally arrived, on January 25, to Sukhinichi, began to be supplied.
The commander of the 1099th regiment, Major F. D. Stepanov, decided to bypass Baryatinsky from the south with one battalion, and strike from the north, through Red Hill, with two battalions. The first attempt to occupy Baryatinsky on the move was not crowned with success. The enemy, already in Red Hill, put up stubborn resistance. It was January 10th. The fight dragged on until dark. A blizzard has risen. The battalion, advancing from the south, lost its way. The battalion commander Senior Lieutenant Romankevich figured out the mistake only when he left a little south-west of Baryatinsky. Communication with the regimental commander was lost. However, the battalion commander was not taken aback. By his decision, the battalion cut the country road to Studenovo and the railway going west to the Zanoznaya station. They quickly made snow trenches. Four fighters sent with reports from the battalion to the regiment, as it turned out later, were killed by the Nazis.
Having no information about this battalion, the division commander brought in the 1097th regiment from the south to act on Baryatinsky. By attacking two regiments, the station and the village of Baryatinskaya were liberated on the morning of January 11.
The battalion of Romankevich also played an important role here. The enemy, with all his convoys, rushed from Baryatinsky to the west, but suddenly, in the complete darkness of the night, he was met by fire from 12 machine guns of this battalion. Up to 300 Nazis were destroyed, many mortars and machine guns were captured, as well as a large convoy.
There was a large warehouse with Soviet ammunition at the station. They were abandoned by our troops during the retreat. During their retreat, the Nazis did not manage to destroy the warehouse. There were huge stocks of 76, 122, 152 and 85 mm shells, 82 mm mines, hand grenades and rifle cartridges. Subsequently, for several months, troops were supplied from this warehouse not only to our army, but also to neighboring ones (94).
Here, at the station, German warehouses with large stocks of grain and hay were captured. All this turned out to be very useful for us.
By the end of January 11, the 326th division occupied Staraya Sloboda, Perenezhye, and Baryatinsky.
As the 326th and 330th rifle divisions approached Baryatinsky and Kirov, information was received that many enemy transport planes with troops were landing daily at a large airfield nearby. This information has been fully confirmed. Throughout January, the enemy hastily transported military units by air from the west. From Germany, the Goering Guard Regiment, the Airborne Regiment, the 19th Airfield Battalion and the 13th Aircraft Construction Battalion arrived to protect the airfield. The last two battalions had previously been in France. The capture of prisoners confirmed the presence in the area also of units of the 34th and rear of the 216th infantry divisions.
The enemy sent a police battalion to cover the Zanoznaya and Borets stations. In Zanoznaya there was also a detachment formed from vacationers of the 216th Infantry Division with a total strength of two battalions. It had up to 800 people. Wedesheim's anti-aircraft artillery group was located at the airfield itself. It also included batteries of field artillery. In general, in the area of ​​​​Shemelinka, Zanoznaya, Shaikovka, Goroditsa, Studenovo there were enemy forces up to an infantry division.
The nearby airfield played a very important role in the actions of enemy aviation. It needed to be taken. I assigned this task to the 326th and 330th divisions. The main task of capturing the airfield was assigned to the 326th Rifle Division. The 330th Rifle Division, with an attack by two regiments from the south, assisted it in the successful completion of the task. Having advanced to their lines by the end of January 12, parts of the divisions captured the airfield from the east, north, south and partly from the west. On the approaches to it, the enemy put up stubborn resistance. During the fighting, the increased landing of new military teams from Yu-52 aircraft did not stop.
By the end of January 15, the airfield was almost completely surrounded. The enemy could retreat only to the northwest near the villages of Priyut and Degonka.
During January 16 and 17, our regiments again attacked the airfield, but the attack was not successful. The attackers suffered severely from enemy air raids, having no cover against it. The fighting for the airfield was fierce. In these battles, the soldiers of both divisions showed dedication, steadfastness, courage, courage and resourcefulness. After putting the units in order and regrouping, the 326th Division on the night of January 19 again launched an attack on the airfield. Intense fighting continued throughout the day. However, we could not take the airfield. Despite the shelling, which was carried out from open positions by our few artillery, the landing and take-off of enemy transport and combat aircraft continued, although he suffered considerable losses in aircraft. From January 12 until the end of the month, our artillery knocked out 18 large enemy aircraft. In prolonged battles for the airfield area, our units were unable to break the enemy's resistance, mainly due to the action of his combat aircraft, and suffered heavy losses. In the regiments of the 330th and 326th rifle divisions, 250-300 bayonets remained. Only for the period from January 9 to January 19, the 326th Rifle Division lost 2562 people killed and wounded. The offensive capabilities of both divisions were clearly exhausted.
At the same time, there was a threat of envelopment of units of the 330th and 326th rifle divisions from the flanks. This happened, firstly, in connection with the enemy going on the offensive from Lyudinovo and Zhizdra in the direction of Sukhinichi with simultaneous attempts to help this strike with attacks from the Milyatinsky Zavod, Chiplyaevo, Fomino 2nd, Fomino 1st area. In this regard, both regiments of the 330th Infantry Division had to be taken from the airfield and returned to the Kirov area.

Military operations in autumn 1943

By September 1943, the front of the Eastern Army was basically a solid line, and only one gap remained open between Army Groups South and Center. However, the strength of the newly created front left much to be desired. There were no significant reserves. The divisions were worn out in battle, their numbers and weapons indicated that they would not be able to withstand new severe tests. On huge sectors of the front, the positions were poorly equipped, the stretching of the front of individual formations did not allow the Germans to create a sufficient operational density of troops even in the main defense zone, not to mention the construction of a deeply echeloned and well-equipped defense system. The problem of the number of formations, which ran like a red thread through the entire Eastern campaign, began to become more and more acute. It became quite obvious that Hitler had set a task for the armed forces in the East that was beyond their power.

Under such conditions, the conclusion suggested itself that it was necessary once again before the start of a new Russian offensive to withdraw troops in an organized manner and occupy the least extended and well-prepared line of defense. First of all, it was necessary to withdraw troops from the Crimea, as well as from the arc protruding to the east along the Dnieper south of Kyiv. This was the only way to achieve some reduction in the front of individual formations and create at least a minimum of reserves. But Hitler did not agree to this for the political and economic reasons already partially indicated above. Although Hitler was constantly up to date with accurate reports and reports and knew how many people and weapons were in individual divisions, he overestimated their ability to resist, as well as underestimated the offensive capabilities of the Russians. In addition, he believed that such a wide water barrier as the Dnieper could be successfully defended even with insignificant forces.

On October 7, the Russians, having previously captured a small bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper in the area south of Kyiv, which the Germans failed to liquidate, went on the offensive. They concentrated their main effort at first between Kremenchug and Dnepropetrovsk, as well as in the area of ​​Zaporozhye and Melitopol. After heavy fighting, during which the German troops and command, realizing the decisive importance of holding the occupied lines firmly for the entire Eastern Campaign, strained all their forces and stubbornly repulsed the onslaught of superior Russian forces, the latter managed to break through the front of the 6th Army in the Melitopol region on October 23. They threw back the army behind the Dnieper in its lower reaches and cut off the Crimea, blocking the Perekop isthmus. At the same time, they landed in the eastern part of the Crimea on the Kerch Peninsula. However, both near Perekop and on the Kerch Peninsula, the advance of Russian troops was temporarily stopped. The Crimean peninsula continued to remain in the hands of the Germans.

On the front of the 1st Panzer Army, which took place in the sector from Chigorin to Nikopol, the Russians, having failed in an attempt to eliminate the German bridgehead in the Zaporozhye region, crossed the Dnieper between Dnepropetrovsk and Kremenchug and broke through the defenses of the German troops along the Dnieper on a wide front. With forces of up to about 100 divisions, including many tank units and formations, they struck in a westerly direction and reached Krivoy Rog. Army Group A, whose right wing was still holding the defense along the Dnieper in its lower reaches, turned around from Nikopol with its front to the west. Now the front line passed through Krivoy Rog and west of Kirovograd. Army Group South, having pulled back the troops of the right wing of the 8th Army after the 1st Panzer Army, at first continued to hold the old positions in the zone of this army. As a result, a new protrusion of the front was formed here, strongly elongated to the east.

A critical situation also developed on the front of the 4th Panzer Army, which operated as part of Army Group South. This army, in the course of bloody battles that lasted almost four weeks, repulsed all the attacks of the enemy, who was trying to make a breakthrough in the Kyiv region. Only in a few sectors did the enemy manage to slightly push her troops. But after these battles, the army was bled and unable to continue resistance.

When, on November 3, the Russians, with up to 50 divisions, launched a decisive offensive from the bridgeheads they had captured on the right bank of the Dnieper, the 4th Panzer Army was unable to offer sufficient resistance to the Russian strike force. Kyiv fell on November 6th. The front of the German troops was broken, and the Russian tank and motorized units, almost without resistance, rushed to the west. On November 11, the advanced units of the advancing Russian troops approached Zhitomir.

At the same time, the Russians also went on the offensive on the front of the 2nd Army, which operated on the right flank of Army Group Center. Having struck south and north of Gomel, the Russians pushed the army back to the northwest. As a result, the gap that existed between the army groups widened even further. A desperate situation arose. If the Russians now began to build on the success they had achieved, then the fate of Army Groups "A" and "South", and at the same time the fate of the entire Eastern Front, would be finally decided. The situation could only be saved by striking the left flank of the Russian troops that had broken through. Having gathered all the forces that could be withdrawn from other sectors of the front, replacing them with temporary, hastily formed units from vacationers, as well as consolidated units of rear services, etc., and transferring here individual units from other theaters of military operations, the Germans managed to create in the area between Fastov and Zhytomyr the grouping necessary to carry out this task. This strike force launched a counteroffensive against the left flank of the Russian troops that had broken through and stopped their advance to the west. Although the Germans did not have enough forces to achieve a decisive success, they nevertheless managed to eliminate the mortal danger of a deep breakthrough of Russian formations and their entry into the operational space. By transferring part of the forces to the west, the Germans were able to detain the enemy approximately on the Fastov-Radomyshl-Korosten line. For this failure, the Russians tried to respond with a new offensive on the front of the 8th Army and Army Group A. In the course of heavy fighting, which dragged on until December 1943, they managed to achieve some local successes here: to seize a bridgehead in the Kherson region and capture Chigirin and Cherkassy. But the Germans still retained the integrity of their front. The serious danger that threatened the front in October-November had passed. However, despite this seemingly satisfactory development of events, the German troops, despite everything that was done to increase their combat effectiveness, became even weaker. The fact that in the course of its counteroffensive the 4th Panzer Army, despite the skillful leadership of the command, favorable conditions and selfless actions of the troops, failed to build on the initial tactical success and achieve victory on an operational scale, should have been a new alarm signal for the Germans. . The superior forces of the Russians, operating as part of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, threatened to break through the thin fabric of the German defense in any place they desired with a new blow.

Battles for the Dnieper in autumn 1943

The troops of Army Group Center, meanwhile, made a systematic withdrawal and also took up new defenses. The front line now ran along the Sozh and Pronya rivers and, continuing further north east of Orsha and Vitebsk, connected in the area east of Nevel with the front line of Army Group North. But the troops of the army group could not get at least a small respite on this new frontier. The large forces of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts operating here made frequent attacks on the German troops, trying to outflank them, in the sector of the 2nd Army and break through the weak front of the army group. However, the German troops, with the support of the small, but extremely operational aviation units of Colonel-General von Greim, successfully overcame numerous and sometimes very dangerous positions.

The situation that developed on the right flank of the 2nd Army, where the defeats suffered by the Army Group South, made itself felt especially strongly, took on the most critical character. Becoming more and more open, this flank forced the army command to allocate part of the forces to cover it. The Russians took advantage of the difficult situation in which the army found itself and went on the offensive in the direction of Gomel. In stubborn battles, the Germans at first managed to hold their positions and prevent the enemy from breaking through their front. However, in early November, when the front of the neighboring 4th Panzer Army (Army Group South) was broken through and the Russians began to advance in the direction of Korosten, the situation deteriorated significantly. Now the enemy launched an offensive also against the completely uncovered junction of Army Groups "South" and "Center". After fierce fighting, the Russians broke through the front of the 2nd Army, which threw its last reserves into battle, and, turning then to the northwest, began to advance towards Rechitsa and Mozyr. As a result, the formations operating on its right flank south of the Pripyat River were cut off from the army, and a threat was created to the main communications of the Germans, the Minsk-Mozyr railway. Communication with the 4th Panzer Army, maintained for quite a long time only by moving units, was completely lost. The enemy went deep into the rear of the troops of the right flank of the 2nd Army in the Ovruch area. The small southern grouping, cut off from the main forces of the army, was under the threat of encirclement, which it managed to avoid only as a result of a quick breakthrough in the north-western direction. The breakthrough was carried out successfully, and the grouping again connected with the main forces of the army in the area southeast of Mozyr. But the gap that existed between Army Groups Center and South widened to more than 100 km. A serious threat arose to the troops defending on the eastward ledge of the front in the Gomel region. Despite this, Hitler rejected a proposal to withdraw these troops to new positions. As a result, the situation became even more aggravated. On November 17, Rechitsa was surrendered, and after that the Russians went to the Mozyr-Zhlobin railway and thereby cut the last communication linking the troops defending Gomel with the main German forces.

Now the Russians went on the offensive and, in the sector of the front north of Gomel, in the Propoisk region, in the course of heavy fighting, they broke through the German defenses to a considerable depth. The advance of the enemy was stopped approximately only at the Chausy-Bykhov line. German troops operating in the Gomel region were under the threat of encirclement. The resulting situation forced the German command at the very last moment to withdraw its troops from the ledge of the front they occupied. By mid-December, the troops took up new positions along the Dnieper, and their position was somewhat strengthened. The gap formed during the fighting between the main forces of the Army Group and the 2nd Army was liquidated as a result of the counteroffensive undertaken here. Thus, by the end of the year, the troops of the right wing of Army Group Center again occupied a more or less strong position, and only the gap that existed at the junction of Army Groups Center and South in the area south of Mozyr was still not closed. From the beginning of winter, the Pripyat swamps became relatively passable, at least it was now possible to conduct military operations here, and this forced the Germans to allocate additional forces to cover the swamps.

In front of the central sector of the front of the army group, the Russians concentrated their main effort on the direction of Smolensk - Orsha - Minsk. Here they tried several times with large forces to launch an offensive with the aim of breaking through the front of the 4th Army on its right flank. Thanks to the exceptional stamina of the troops, the skillful actions of the commanders of units and formations, as well as the presence of a deeply echeloned and well-equipped defense here, the Germans managed to repulse all the attacks of the significantly superior enemy forces that they made until December 1943. The Russians suffered great damage here.

Less successful were the actions of the 3rd Panzer Army, which was defending on the right wing of the army group. In early October, the Russians broke through its front near Nevel in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe junction with the 16th Army (Army Group North). The inner flanks of both armies had to be turned back. It was not possible to close the ever-widening gap, and since Hitler this time again rejected the proposal to withdraw the troops located on the flanks of both armies and found themselves in danger of being captured, the danger was gradually created that the Russians would go behind the rear of the left wing of the 3rd Panzer Army from the north and northwest. Since both army groups did not have the strength to close the gap by counterattack, as Hitler repeatedly demanded, the pressure of the enemy against the open left flank of Army Group Center became more and more sensitive. Gradually, a great threat arose for the main communications of the 3rd Panzer Army, which passed through Polotsk. On December 13, the Russians launched a decisive offensive. They launched a series of attacks in converging directions from the east, north and northeast. The division, which was defending on the left flank of the army, was defeated; its remnants managed to break through the encirclement, but at the same time all the materiel was lost. The tank army was thrown back to Vitebsk, but here it managed to gain a foothold and hold a bridgehead on the right bank of the Western Dvina. All attacks of the enemy, who tried to break through the front of the army, were repulsed. The gap between Army Group Center and Army Group North, covered only by insignificant forces, continued to exist and posed a serious danger, since the Russians could use it to advance along the Western Dvina to the northwest in order to deeply envelop Army Group North ".

On the front of Army Group North, the Russians limited themselves to a slight increase in activity. However, this allowed them to pin down the significant forces of the army group, which, because of this, was unable to find the means to eliminate the crisis near Nevel, which also posed a serious danger to it.

The results of hostilities in 1943

1943 brought Germany equally disappointing results both in the Mediterranean and in the East. The last attempt by the Germans to seize once again the initiative in the East into their own hands failed amazingly quickly in the Kursk region. In subsequent offensive operations in the summer and autumn, the Russian army demonstrated its high fighting qualities and showed that it had not only significant manpower reserves, but also excellent military equipment. The active actions of the Russians were the cause of numerous crises, the catastrophic consequences of which the Germans managed to avoid only thanks to the tactical superiority they retained and the exceptional dedication of the German soldiers. However, there could be no doubt - and this has to be constantly emphasized - that serious signs of fatigue began to appear in the German troops, who had experienced tremendous strain for a number of years. As a result of huge losses in the officers, non-commissioned officers and specialists who made up the backbone of the German troops, their stamina became less and less strong, in connection with which the German command met with great anxiety each new enemy offensive.

The German High Command could stabilize the situation in the East only if the Germans were able to decisively eliminate the first attempt by the Western Allies to launch an invasion of the continent, definitely expected next year.

The Tehran Conference clearly showed that the Western Powers were completely unaware of the danger that could arise for the entire international situation after the defeat of Germany. They firmly adhered to the course of defeating Germany, and therefore, at that time, the Germans could not find any way out of the situation with the help of political means, even if Hitler had decided to take this step.

Thus, the task of the German Eastern Army remained the same - to weaken the forces of the Russians and to hold the lines located as far as possible to the east of the borders of Germany and the most important sources of raw materials that were still in the hands of the Germans. Unfortunately, as experience showed, it was difficult to hope that the political and military leadership would be able to convince Hitler of the need to find for this task a method of conducting combat operations that would best suit the forces and means of the Eastern Army.

The offensive of Russian troops in the winter of 1943-1944 on the southern sector of the front and their exit to the Carpathians

By the end of the autumn battles of 1943, German troops in the southern sector of the front occupied a weak defense, covered only in some areas by natural obstacles, in which there were many dangerous ledges and dents. Hitler, for reasons that have been repeatedly pointed out, all the time refused to level the front line and withdraw the troops back to more advantageous lines. The troops of the right wing of Army Groups "A" and "South" were still behind the Dnieper, holding a large bridgehead to the east of Nikopol, covering the manganese mines. Further, the front line went west through Krivoy Rog and again went to the Dnieper, covering a large Russian bridgehead at Cherkasy. Then the front again turned to the northwest, forming a large arc, passed east of Brusilov and Radomyshl and ended east of Korosten. Here, between Army Group South and Army Group Center, whose right flank was in the Mozyr area, there was a wide gap. The dividing line between Army Group A (6th Army and 1st Tank Army) and Army Group South (8th Army and 4th Tank Army) ran from Kirovograd to the west.

Thus, the southern sector of the front, with its salient in the Nikopol region and with the excessively extended defense zones of its formations, gave the enemy many opportunities for conducting offensive operations here. Of course, Hitler understood this too. But for some reason that was becoming more and more incomprehensible, he constantly overestimated his own strength and underestimated the strength of the enemy. This was probably due to political and economic considerations.

During the winter, troops of the 1st Russian Ukrainian Front inflicted a series of powerful blows on the southern sector of the German front. So, on Christmas Day 1943, they went on the offensive in the area west of Kyiv in the sector of the 4th Panzer Army. They managed to break through a gap in the German defenses in the Radomyshl area, quickly expand it and make a deep breakthrough. The Germans were forced to leave Brusilov, Korostyshev and Radomyshl. On January 1, 1944, the Russians approached Zhitomir. The resistance of the 4th Panzer Army was broken, and the Russian troops, expanding the breakthrough to the south and north, rushed in an unstoppable stream in a westerly direction. A few days later, having put forward large forces to cover their left flank, they reached the old Polish-Soviet border and crossed it. By mid-January, the enemy, almost without meeting any resistance, reached the line of Sarny - Shepetovka - Berdichev - Pogrebishchensky.

Due to the fact that the advancing Russian troops and their communications turned out to be excessively stretched, in early February the Germans managed, by taking a number of emergency measures to strengthen their defenses, to stop the enemy, who was striking in a westerly direction, at the turn east of Dubna, Lutsk and Kovel. However, the enemy troops, advancing on the left flank of the strike force, turned to the south-west and tried to encircle the 8th Army with a strike on Uman. The German reserves managed to stop the advance of these troops and, as a result of a skillfully executed counterattack, threw them back to the Zhashkov-Pogrebishchensky line.

The next blow the enemy brought down directly on the 8th Army. Despite the fact that as a result of the defeat of the 4th Panzer Army, a serious threat was created to the left flank of the 8th Army, to cover which almost all of its reserves were thrown, Hitler continued to keep the army on the Dnieper, wanting to maintain contact with the army group advanced far to the east. "BUT". Even the strikes of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts, which were carried out with the aim of probing the German front in January 1944 and which led to the loss by the Germans of Krivoy Rog on the right and Bila Tserkva on the left flanks, clearly showing the intentions of the Russians, did not force the Germans to accept the self-evident decision to withdraw the 8th Army. The reason that the only correct conclusion was not drawn from this situation should, obviously, be sought in the fact that the withdrawal of the 8th Army would inevitably entail the retreat of the entire Army Group "A" and the surrender to the enemy of the important areas of Krivoy Rog and Nikopol.

But since no such decision was made, the 8th Army was doomed to defeat. On January 28, the advanced units of the Russian troops, advancing from the north and southeast, united in the rear of the 8th Army in the Zvenigorodka region and surrounded its two corps. Having gathered into a fist all the tank units of the 8th Army and the 1st Tank Army, the Germans in early February made an attempt to free their encircled troops, which were initially supplied by air. The attempt failed. The advancing troops did not have enough strength to break through to the encircled corps. Despite this, both corps launched an excellently prepared offensive with the aim of breaking through to the southwest, while achieving significant success on the night of February 16-17. But the corps failed to fully connect with the tank formations advancing towards them. Only a few days later, about 30 thousand people, having lost almost all heavy weapons and equipment, left the encirclement, uniting with the main forces of the German troops. The disastrous method of operational leadership used by Hitler and expressed in the words "hold on at all costs" became his constant principle, which he very rarely changed, and even then only under the influence of his closest military assistants. This principle led the Germans to new heavy losses, which, with the right actions of the command, could have been avoided.

The Russians delivered their third blow on the front of the 1st Panzer and 6th armies. Their presence on the Krivoy Rog-Kherson arc, where they defended the iron and manganese mines, now, after the defeat of Army Group South, was completely meaningless from an operational point of view, but Hitler continued to keep them there. The superior forces of the Russian 3rd Ukrainian Front launched an offensive against the positions of the 1st Tank and 6th Armies from the north and south. Part of the German troops was trapped in the Nikopol area. Only at the very last moment did they manage to withdraw with heavy losses across the Ingulets River. On February 22, the Russians captured Krivoy Rog.

Exit of Russian troops to the Carpathians

The southern sector of the front still had a ledge on its right flank, which went far into the enemy's disposition. The front line began in the Kherson region, passed along the Dnieper, continued further along the Ingulets River to the northeast and, turning then to the northwest, went to Shepetovka, thus forming a large arc. To the north of Shepetovka, the solid front ended, and before the Pripyat swamps, the troops were located only in separate strongholds, carrying out security service at the turn east of Brody, Dubna, Lutsk and Kovel. At the first glance at the map, it becomes clear to anyone, not even a military specialist, that such a disposition of troops was fraught with great danger for the entire southern sector of the front. After all, the remnants of Army Group A, as if on purpose, were located in such a way that they could easily be bypassed from the north and surrounded. Only by the brutal pressure that Hitler exerted at that time on his military commanders, who directed military operations in the East, can one explain the fact that, in spite of all counterproposals and objections, and proceeding only from considerations of political and economic order, he was able to carry out his decision in life, leaving the troops of the southern sector of the front, in fact, to the mercy of fate. The Russians, of course, could not miss the opportunity so kindly provided to them to close the trap.

In early March, the 1st Ukrainian Front, now commanded by Marshal Zhukov, went on the offensive again. In the course of short battles, his troops broke through the weak defenses of the 4th Panzer Army and turned their main forces to the south in order to completely close the trap by means of a deep enveloping blow from the north. Despite the fact that in the area east of Ternopil, the Germans made an attempt to quickly gather their tank units into a fist and stop the offensive of the Russian troops with a counterattack, the latter, like an avalanche, moved uncontrollably south. Soon the railway line Ternopol - Proskurov was cut, the most important communication that provided the Germans with communication with Army Group A.

Meanwhile, on March 6, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal Konev also went on the offensive. They quickly broke through the front of the significantly weakened 8th Army, but were briefly stopped in the Gaisin area by a counterattack by one German tank group, which fought with exceptional dedication and stubbornness. By March 10, the Russians reached Uman. Without stopping, they continued to advance to the southwest and on March 13 they reached the Southern Bug in the Gaivoron region on a wide front, capturing small bridgeheads on the unprotected right bank of the river. The German troops, still defending in the Vinnitsa area, in the gap between the advancing troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts, were under the threat of encirclement from the adjacent wings of both fronts and were forced to quickly withdraw in a southwestern direction.

Both Russian strike groups, interacting with each other, continued their offensive to the southwest in order to encircle the troops of Army Group A, which were still far to the east. On March 20, the advanced units of the Russians reached the Dniester and crossed it in the area of ​​Soroka and Mogilev-Podolsky, thereby depriving the Germans of the opportunity to gain a foothold on this new, advantageous line for them.

The German command, with all the forces at its disposal, sought to prevent the rupture that threatened to materialize between Army Group South and Army Group A and to stop the Russian offensive, which even spatially approached its climax.

The 8th Army was reinforced and received an order, clinging to all lines convenient for defense, to counteract the Russian offensive. The headquarters of the 1st Panzer Army received the task of stopping the Russian offensive in the area south of Proskurov and Ternopol, which was developing in a southerly direction towards the Carpathians, using the forces of formations reassigned to it. But these measures were taken by the Germans too late and therefore only partially led to the desired results.

On March 21, the 1st Ukrainian Front, whose troops achieved the greatest operational successes, again went on the offensive from the Ternopil-Proskurov line. After heavy fighting, the Russians knocked down the barriers created with great difficulty by the 4th Panzer Army and threw them back in a general direction to the west. Encountering weak resistance here from the troops of the 1st Panzer Army, which, after reforming, were pulled up to the front, the Russians bypassed them north of the Dniester in the area of ​​​​Kamianets-Podolsky and Skala-Podolskaya and surrounded them with part of the forces, sending the main forces further through Kolomyia and Chernivtsi to the spurs Carpathians. The 1st Panzer Army, which was in the "cauldron" and somehow supplied by air, stubbornly resisted. In early April, she managed, interacting with units trying to free her from the west, to break through in the direction of Stanislav.

Interestingly, since the time of Stalingrad, "boilers" have already ceased to seem so terrible to the Germans. The German soldier and the German command realized that even surrounded, almost unsupplied troops have a lot of opportunities to avoid destruction or surrender. But this discovery did not at all remove the blame from the German High Command, which, by its directives, again and again put its troops in a position from which they could be freed only at the cost of unjustified and at the same time completely irreparable human and material losses.

The 8th Army was also able to delay the advance of superior enemy forces only for a very short time. Striking with large forces between Soroca and Rybnitsa across the Dniester, the Russians advanced southwest in the direction of Iasi and south between the Prut and Dniester and along both banks of the Dniester.

Following the capture of Krivoy Rog at the end of February, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front continued their offensive against Army Group A. Delivering the main blow to her left wing, the Russians tried to bypass the army group and press it to the Black Sea. As a result of the offensive of the concentrated Russian forces between the rivers Ingul and Ingulets, the 1st Panzer Army, even before the dissolution of its headquarters, fell into a very difficult situation. However, despite the fact that during the pursuit the Russians went through the Kinburn Peninsula to the rear of the German troops, the German command still managed to timely withdraw to the west through the Southern Bug both the right wing of the 1st Panzer Army and the entire 6th Army operating to the south, in the region of Kherson and Nikolaev. Meanwhile, the troops of the left wing of the 1st Panzer Army were still far advanced to the northwest in the area between Novoukrainka and Novoarkhangelsk. Here the enemy has not yet attacked. When the Russians, bypassing them from the west, crossed the Southern Bug and approached the Dniester, the Germans had to quickly withdraw these forces through the crossings near Voznesensk and Pervomaisk, which were still in their hands, and include them in the new front created beyond Tiligul.

At the end of March, the 6th Army, together with units of the former 1st Tank Army now subordinate to it, occupied a new defense behind Tiligul. In the Ananiev area, it joined up with the 8th Army, whose front was turned to the north and, crossing the Odessa-Lvov railway, reached the city of Iasi. Defending in the direction of the main Russian attack, the 8th Army tried to stop the enemy offensive, which had begun to gradually weaken. From the area west of Yass to the Carpathians, Romanian units operated, commanded by the headquarters of the 4th Romanian army. On the northeastern spurs of the Carpathians, the Hungarian troops defended themselves.

Completely unacceptable from a military point of view, Hitler's leadership of the fighting on the southern sector of the Eastern Front led the Germans to huge and unnecessary losses. It caused sharp disagreements between the Supreme High Command and the commanders of the troops operating there, Field Marshals von Manstein and von Kleist. Hitler unjustly blamed these eminent military leaders for all the failures that had taken place and replaced the first with Colonel-General Model, and the second with Colonel-General Schörner, hoping that the latter would more vigorously implement his decisions.

Army groups were again renamed. Army Group South became Army Group Northern Ukraine, and Army Group A became Southern Ukraine". They were given the task of finally stopping the offensive of the Russian troops at the turn: the mouth of the Dniester, the area east of Chisinau, north of Yass, the eastern spurs of the Carpathians, Kolomyia, the area west of Ternopil, Brody, Kovel. In pursuance of this directive, the southern wing of the German troops was withdrawn beyond the Dniester, and on April 9, Odessa was evacuated. In the northern part of the Carpathians, the Germans managed to push back the advanced Russian units to Kolomya, which advanced to the Yablunytsky Pass, but the Germans failed to release the Ternopil garrison, which had been surrounded for several months. On April 25, after fierce resistance from the units that were part of the garrison and fought to the last drop of blood, the enemy stormed the city.

Fight for Crimea

Let us now turn to what was happening at that time on the Crimean peninsula. The main forces of the German troops were already several hundred kilometers from it, and meanwhile the troops remaining there continued to chain significant Russian forces to themselves. The supply and evacuation of these troops could only be carried out by sea.

Even at a time when German troops could be withdrawn from the Crimea through the Isthmus of Perekop, a proposal was made to Hitler for the planned evacuation of the Crimea. But Hitler decided to defend the peninsula. The reasons that prompted him to do so remain unclear to this day. The peninsula, the narrow approaches to which could be easily blocked, was not a base from which, on occasion, it would be possible to strike against the open left flank of the Russian troops advancing to the west, and the forces of the 17th Army left on the peninsula were insufficient and unsuitable for conducting such offensive actions. In addition, while holding the Crimea, the Germans could not, of course, tie down such a large number of Russian troops that this would to some extent justify the forces and means spent on the defense of the peninsula. Obviously, the decisive factors in Hitler's decision were considerations related to the need to ensure the operation of the Romanian oil fields, since with the fall of the Crimea the threat of air attack on these areas increased significantly, as well as considerations related to the possibility of continuing to put pressure on Turkey, which supplied Germany with extremely the raw material she needs is chromium. With the entry of the Russians to the Carpathians, these considerations, of course, completely lost their significance, but it was not possible to convince Hitler of making a timely decision to evacuate the Crimea, until in early April the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front went on the offensive and with a swift blow threw off peninsula, the forces stationed there (4 German and 6 Romanian divisions).

On April 8, the Russians launched an offensive against the positions of the 17th Army simultaneously on the Kerch Peninsula, on the Perekop Isthmus and across the Sivash. In the Kerch region, during many days of fighting, the Russians somewhat pressed the German troops defending the isthmus. But since the Russians, meanwhile, managed to break through from the north and put all the troops in the eastern part of the peninsula at risk of encirclement, the troops defending the Kerch Peninsula had to retreat. In the north, the enemy, having pinned down the troops operating on the Perekop Isthmus, suddenly crossed the Sivash - a shallow bay of the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov, replete with islands, along which the Melitopol-Dzhankoy railway was also laid. Thus, bypassing the Perekop group of Germans from the flank, the Russians deprived the defense system of the peninsula of its strength. Due to the fact that it was impossible to create defenses on the islands with the insignificant forces available, the army command, not being able to contain the strongest onslaught of the enemy, was forced to decide on the immediate withdrawal of all units to the well-defended fortress of Sevastopol. Under the strong influence of enemy aircraft, in the conditions of superiority of the enemy in naval forces, the evacuation of the peninsula began. It was carried out with the help of a very small number of available marine vehicles. First of all, the rear services and units of the Germans, as well as the Romanian units, were evacuated. German divisions held the city and its environs, providing loading.

In the course of heavy fighting, which lasted about three weeks, the Russians pushed back the stubbornly resisting German divisions to the line of the old forts of the fortress. On May 7, having launched a night attack, the Russians captured this line. After fierce battles for the city, port and separate defensive structures of the fortress, the remnants of the German troops were thrown back to the Cape of Chersonesus. Here, repulsing the attacks of superior enemy forces and hoping for an early evacuation, they held out for another day, but the ships promised to them for evacuation were not sent. All hopes of rescuing these forces squeezed into a tiny space collapsed, and continuous Russian attacks from land and air strikes, together with devastating artillery fire, forced them to capitulate. The main forces of the 17th Army, as well as the remnants of the Romanian units and all military equipment, were lost.

The loss of the Crimea by the Germans, the advance of Russian troops in Romania and the threat of an invasion of Hungary - all this, of course, could not but affect Germany's allies. The unrest caused by the development of events in Romania and Hungary led to a further reduction in the already very insignificant contribution of the allies to the common cause. Hitler failed to achieve a serious increase in their ability to fight through political influence on these countries. The Romanians, having taken a number of measures to defend their territory from the Russians, apparently as a distraction, at the same time tried to establish contact with Soviet Russia and the Western powers behind the back of the dictator Antonescu.

In order to prevent the withdrawal of Hungary, whose troops were always unreliable, and which was now more busy arguing with Rumania over the remaining unresolved border issues than fighting against Russia, German troops suddenly occupied it, occupying the most important points of the country. The Hungarian regent Horthy was forced to form a new government. But the new government failed to achieve a serious intensification of the struggle against the Bolsheviks, who were already standing at the borders of Hungary.