Armor of the Mongols of the 13th century. The Mongols and the size of the army of the Mongol Empire

Two Genghis Khans Stalin and Hitler had the same main goal, which they once and for all set for themselves - the conquest of world domination. With maniacal perseverance, they walked towards her, regardless of anything. This is what ultimately killed them both. Hitler

Descendants of Genghis Khan Historians have noticed that ancient manuscripts in Europe are kept in fragments. As if someone deliberately tore out the pages, and with them - Time. Or he filled the texts with paint so that they were not readable. The ancient era left many more documents than

Descendants of Genghis Khan Historians have long noticed that old manuscripts in Europe are kept in fragments. As if someone deliberately tore out the pages of Time. Or filled them with paint so that they were not readable. The ancient era left many more documents than

A wide strip of steppes and deserts from the Gobi to the Sahara runs through Asia and Africa, separating the territories of European civilization from China and India, the centers of Asian culture. On these steppes, to some extent, the peculiar economic life of the nomads has been preserved to this day.
This steppe expanse, with a huge scale of operational lines, with original forms labor, leaves an original Asian imprint on.
The most typical representatives of the Asian method of warfare were the Mongols in the thirteenth century, when they were united by one of the greatest conquerors, Genghis Khan.

The Mongols were typical nomads; the only work they knew was the work of a watchman, a shepherd of countless flocks moving across the Asian expanse from north to south and back, depending on the seasons. The riches of the nomad are all with him, all in reality: these are mainly cattle and small valuable movables / silver, carpets, silks collected in his yurt.

There are no walls, fortifications, doors, fences and locks that would protect the nomad from attack. Protection, and then only relative, is given by a wide horizon, the emptiness of the surroundings. If the peasants, due to the bulkiness of the products of their labor and the impossibility of concealing them, always gravitate towards a firm power, which alone can create sufficiently secure conditions for their labor, then the nomads, whose entire property can so easily change the owner, are a particularly favorable element for a despotic forms of concentration of power.

General military service, which appears as a necessity in the high economic development of the state, is the same necessity at the infantile stages of the organization of labor. A nomadic people, in which everyone capable of bearing arms would not be immediately ready to defend his herd with weapons in his hands, could not exist. Genghis Khan, in order to have a fighter in every adult Mongol, even forbade the Mongols to take other Mongols as servants.

These nomads, natural riders, brought up in admiration for the authority of the leader, very skilled in small wars, with general military service included in their customs, were excellent material for creating, in the Middle Ages, an army of excellent numbers and discipline. This superiority became clear when brilliant organizers - Genghis Khan or Tamerlane - were at the head.

Technique and organization.

Just as Mohammed managed to weld urban merchants and Bedouins of the desert into one whole in Islam, so the great organizers of the Mongols were able to combine the natural qualities of a nomadic shepherd with everything that the urban culture of that time could give military art.
The onslaught of the Arabs threw many cultural elements into the depths of Asia. These elements, as well as everything that Chinese science and technology could give, were introduced by Genghis Khan to the Mongol military art.

There were Chinese scientists in the headquarters of Genghis Khan; writing was implanted among the people and the army. The patronage that Genghis Khan gave to trade reached a level that testifies, if not to the importance of the bourgeois urban element in this era, then to a clear desire to develop and create one.
Genghis Khan paid great attention to the creation of safe trade main routes, distributed special military detachments along them, organized stage hotels at each crossing, arranged a post office; questions of justice and vigorous struggle against robbers were in the first place. When cities were taken, craftsmen and artists were withdrawn from the general massacre and moved to newly created centers.

The army was organized according to the decimal system. Special attention was paid to the selection of chiefs. The authority of the chief was supported by such measures as a separate tent for the commander of the ten, an increase in his salary by 10 times against an ordinary soldier, the creation at his disposal of a reserve of horses and weapons for his subordinates; in the event of a rebellion against the appointed chief - not even the Roman decimation, but the total destruction of the rebels.

Firm discipline made it possible to demand, in necessary cases, the execution of extensive fortification work. Near the enemy, the army fortified its bivouac for the night. The guard service was excellently organized and was based on the allocation - sometimes several hundred miles ahead of guard cavalry detachments and on frequent patrols - day and night - of all the surroundings.

Siege art of the Mongol armies

Siege art shows that at the time of their heyday the Mongols were in completely different relations with technology than later, when Crimean Tatars they felt powerless against any wooden Moscow prison and were frightened of the “fiery battle”.

Fashin, digging, underground passages, filling ditches, arranging gentle slopes on strong walls, earthen bags, Greek fire, bridges, dams, floods, the use of wall-beating machines, gunpowder for explosions - all this was well known to the Mongols.

During the siege of Chernigov, the Russian chronicler notes with surprise that the catapults of the Mongols threw stones weighing over 10 pounds over several hundred steps. European artillery achieved such a wall-to-wall effect only to beginning of the XVI century. And these stones were delivered from somewhere far away.
During operations in Hungary, we meet with the Mongols a battery of 7 catapults, which worked in maneuver warfare, while forcing a river crossing. Many strong cities in Central Asia and Russia, which, according to medieval concepts, could only be taken by hunger, were taken by storm by the Mongols after 5 days of siege work.

Mongolian strategy.

Great tactical superiority makes war easy and profitable. Even Alexander the Great delivered the final blow to the Persians, mainly at the expense of the means that gave him the conquest of the rich coast of Asia Minor.

Father conquered Spain in order to obtain funds to fight Rome. Julius Caesar, capturing Gaul, said - the war must feed the war; and, indeed, the riches of Gaul not only enabled him to conquer this country without burdening the budget of Rome, but also provided him with a material basis for the subsequent civil war.

This view of war as a profitable business, as an expansion of the base, as an accumulation of forces, in Asia was already the basis of strategy. The Chinese medieval writer points out, as the main feature that determines a good commander, the ability to support an army at the expense of the enemy.
Whereas European strategic thought, in the person of Bülow and Clausewitz, proceeding from the need to overcome rebuff, from the great defensive capability of neighbors, came to the idea of ​​a basis that feeds the war from the rear, about the climax, the limit of any offensive, about the weakening force of the offensive, the Asian strategy I saw an element of strength in the spatial duration of the offensive.

The more the attacker advanced in Asia, the more he captured herds and all sorts of movable wealth; with low defensive capability, the losses of the advancing from the rebuff encountered were less than the increase in the strength of the advancing army from the local elements drawn in and co-opted by it. The military elements of the neighbors were half destroyed, and half were placed in the ranks of the attacker and quickly assimilated with the situation that had arisen.

The Asian offensive was an avalanche that grew with every step of the movement. ”In the army of Batu, the grandson of Genghis Khan, who conquered Russia in the 13th century, the percentage of the Mongols was negligible - probably did not exceed five; the percentage of fighters from the tribes conquered by Genghis ten years before the invasion probably did not exceed thirty. About two-thirds were Turkic tribes, on which the invasion had just before fallen east of the Volga, and the wreckage of which had been carried with it. In the same way, in the future, Russian squads also made up a significant part of the Golden Horde militia.

The Asian strategy, with a huge scale of distances, in an era dominated by predominantly pack transport, was not able to organize a correct supply from the rear; the idea of ​​transferring the base to the areas that lay ahead, only fragmentarily flickering in the European strategy, was the main one for Genghis Khan.
The base ahead can only be created by politically disintegrating the enemy; extensive use of means located behind the enemy's front is possible only if we find like-minded people in his rear. Hence the Asian strategy called for a far-sighted and insidious policy; all means were good to ensure military success.

The war was preceded by extensive political intelligence; did not skimp on bribery or promises; all the possibilities of opposing some dynastic interests to others, some groups against others were used. Apparently, a major campaign was undertaken only when there was a conviction that there were deep cracks in the state organism of a neighbor.

The need to satisfy the army with a small supply of food that could be taken with them, and mainly with local funds, left a certain imprint on the Mongol strategy. The Mongols could only feed their horses with pasture. The poorer the latter was, the faster and on a wider front it was necessary to strive to absorb space.
All the profound knowledge possessed by the nomads about the seasons when, under different latitudes, the grass reaches its greatest nutritional value, about the relative abundance of grass and water in various directions, had to be used by the Mongol strategy in order to make possible these movements of the masses, which undoubtedly included over a hundred thousand horses. Other stoppages of operations were directly dictated by the need to work up the bodies of the horses, which had weakened after passing through the hungry area.

The concentration of forces for a short time on the battlefield was impossible if the point of collision was located in a place poor in resources. Exploration of local resources was mandatory before each campaign. Overcoming space in large masses, even within one's own limits, required careful preparation. It was necessary to put forward forward detachments that would guard the pasture in the intended direction and drive away the nomads who did not take part in the campaign.

Tamerlane, planning an invasion of China from the west, 8 years before the campaign prepares for himself on the border with him, in the city of Ashir, a stage: several thousand families with 40 thousand horses were sent there; plowings were expanded, the city was fortified, extensive food supplies began to be collected in it. During the campaign itself, Tamerlane sent seed grain for the army; the harvest on the fields cultivated for the first time in the rear was supposed to facilitate the return of the army from the campaign.

The tactics of the Mongols are very similar to the tactics of the Arabs. The same development of throwing combat, the same desire to divide the battle formation into separate parts, to wage battle from the depths.
In large battles there is a distinct division into three lines; but each line was divided, and, thus, the theoretical requirement of Tamerlane - to have 9 echelons in depth - may not have gone far from practice.

On the battlefield, the Mongols sought to encircle the enemy in order to give a decisive advantage to throwing weapons. This environment was easily obtained from a wide marching movement; the width of the latter allowed the Mongols to spread exaggerated rumors about the size of the advancing army.

The cavalry of the Mongols was divided into heavy and light. Light horse fighters were called Cossacks. The latter fought very successfully on foot. Tamerlane also had infantry; foot soldiers were among the best paid soldiers and played a significant role in sieges, as well as in the struggle in the highlands. When passing through vast spaces, the infantry temporarily mounted on horses.

Source - Svechin A.A. The evolution of military art, v.1. M.-L., 1927, p. 141-148

“... the Mongol troops proper as part of the army of the Mongol Empire were divided into two categories of troops: the so-called “Mongolian troops” and “tammachi troops.” “... these were the personal troops of the owners of destinies and Tarkhanates. Ethnically, they were - originally - from the Mongols, usually either having lost their clan, or assigned to new owners in the form of an award by Genghis Khan.

... Of course, as new lands and tribes were conquered, the ethnic composition of the Tammachi changed - first at the expense of nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples (Turks, Khitan, Tungus-Manchurian peoples), and then settled ones.

“At first, the army of Genghis Khan consisted entirely of cavalry, where all Mongolian men from 15 to 70 years old were mobilized. With the advent of contingents from non-Mongolian peoples, references to infantry periodically appear in the sources. […] under Genghis Khan and his first successors, infantry units were relatively few in number, performed episodic auxiliary functions and were not included in the regular Mongolian army, since they had the status of a militia.

... An intermediate state - between the allied units as part of the Mongol army and various kinds of feudal militias (auxiliary units) from the troops of the conquered (or surrendered) lands, on the one hand, and hashar, on the other - was in military formations created on the basis of forcibly recruited people in the conquered territories. If they were created during the conquest of these territories, then such units were used in the form of the first line, which was mercilessly spent in the most dangerous areas, thereby saving the manpower of the Mongols themselves. They were formed on the basis of a decimal system with commanding staff of the Mongols […] In addition to those forcibly mobilized, criminals also fell into such units […] all these forced and exiled were widely used as consumables in the capture of cities, being under strict supervision ... "

“After the conquest of a country by the Mongols […] detachments were recruited from its population to carry out garrison service under the command of the Mongol governors…

In addition to parts of the regular Mongol cavalry (not only from the Mongols proper, but also from other peoples), which were organized according to the Mongolian decimal system, the militias of local feudal lords, allies of the Mongols, parts of the garrison service and infantry militias, the armed forces The Mongol Empire also included special military-technical units. […] artillery, engineering and naval forces, with their own command and control structure.”

4.2 Fighting qualities of the Mongol warriors

“Notable properties of the Mongols in terms of their individual training are their outstanding abilities, unanimously noted by all sources, to conduct battle as horse archers ...

Other important components of the fighting qualities of the Mongols were their endurance, unpretentiousness in food and water[...] Data natural properties Mongols who grew up in difficult natural conditions were also strengthened by a conscious policy to maintain the Spartan spirit[...] the very life of an ordinary Mongol, generation after generation surviving under the threat of starvation, developed in the survivors exceptional abilities for hunting - the only permanent means of obtaining protein food with extremely unstable to the natural conditions of Mongolia nomadic pastoralism.

Very remarkable properties of the Mongol warriors were perseverance in achieving the goal, internal discipline and the ability to act in a group ... "

“It is impossible not to note such a motivation of ordinary warriors in their military qualities as an interest in prey. […]generations of Mongols were brought up in conditions of extreme poverty and therefore any booty in their eyes was a very worthy goal. Its section was even institutionalized as part of the military law of the Mongols. So, all the booty, minus the khan's share, was at the complete disposal of the Mongol warrior, moreover, in accordance with his merits in battle.

“Not the least of the qualities of the Mongol warrior was his courage in battle, sometimes reaching contempt for death ...”

“... it can be summarized - the natural accuracy of shooting from a horse […] cohesion and the ability to act in a team during battue hunts, high moral and physical qualities(fearlessness, dexterity, etc.) - all this formed an exceptionally accurate and disciplined equestrian archer-warrior.

4.3 Discipline

Until now, even in solid historical works, one can come across an absurd, from the point of view of common sense, assertion that mutual responsibility was used in the Mongol army and a whole dozen were executed for the desertion of one.

For example: “... the phrase that if one person runs, then the whole dozen will be executed, and if a dozen runs, then a hundred will be executed, has become something of a spell, and almost everyone who analyzes the invasion considers it his duty to bring it. I just don’t want to repeat myself, but you can’t say anything new on this topic.”

“Mutual responsibility (if one fled from the battle, a dozen were executed, if ten did not follow the order, a hundred were executed) and the most severe punishments for the slightest disobedience turned the tribes into a disciplined army.”

“... a very cruel order was established: if during the hostilities one or two out of ten people fled, then the whole ten were executed. They did the same in the event that one or two boldly entered into battle, and the rest did not follow them ... "

Let's assume that there really was such a practice in the Mongolian army. Then it turns out that the Mongol warriors were the only ones in history who during the battle had to look not only forward - at the enemy, but also to the sides - suddenly one of the comrades would run. And if someone really tries to desert, then what should his colleagues do? Try to catch up with him, that is, also leave the battlefield in order to return or, if he wants to return, then to kill? And suddenly the chase will be unsuccessful and the coward will be able to escape. Then the rest will have only one way out - to run after him, because when they return to their unit, inevitable death awaits them.

What is the basis of this myth? On a misunderstood text by Plano Carpini. Here is the text: “If one out of ten people runs, or two, or three, or even more, then they are all killed, and if all ten run, and not another hundred run, then everyone is killed; and, to put it briefly, if they do not retreat together, then all those who flee are killed. As you can see, the author clearly and unequivocally says: “all those who run are killed”, and nothing more.

So, in the Mongolian army they were executed for fleeing from the battlefield, as well as for:

failure to appear at the assembly point in case of mobilization;

unauthorized transfer from one unit to another;

plundering an enemy without an order;

voluntary resignation.

At the same time, for the crimes of his subordinates, the unit commander was punished on an equal basis with them. (That's who was forced to constantly monitor the rank and file of the Mongolian army.)

As for other crimes, then: “For repeated misconduct - beating with bamboo sticks; for the third offense - punishment with batogs; for the fourth offense - they are sentenced to death. This applied to privates, foremen and centurions. For thousands and temniks, the most common punishment was expulsion from the army, that is, in modern terms - resignation.

4.4 Basic tactics

“... the tactics of the Mongols in the field battle was to identify the weak points of the enemy’s position (visual reconnaissance and probing attacks), followed by the concentration of forces against the place chosen for the attack and the simultaneous maneuver to enter the rear of the enemy with an enveloping march of cavalry masses along distant arcs. After this stage of preparation, the Mongols would begin skirmishing, bombarding a chosen point in the enemy's position with alternating units of their mounted archers. Moreover, the Mongols preferred to do this by shelling from afar, with volleys of their horse archers.

At the same time, the blows were delivered massively and in successive waves, which made it possible at a distance, harmlessly for oneself, to shower the enemy with arrows and darts. This method of defeating and holding down the movement of the enemy by shooting from afar was to a certain extent an anticipation of the fire battle of subsequent eras.

“High efficiency of shooting was achieved by good training of shooters, high speed flight of arrows and frequency of shots. It must be assumed that the shooting was not carried out randomly, but in volleys with a very small interval between them ... "

“During this first phase, the ranks of the Mongol horsemen were in constant motion, rolling on the enemy, slipping along the line and returning to their original position. And so on until the enemy falters.

“To achieve the goals of the bypass maneuver, it was prepared using a number of additional techniques. For example, through luring the enemy to a pre-calculated place - i.e. reception of the famous false waste of the Mongols ... "

"Another way to prepare a detour is to allocate maneuverable groups that bypass the enemy in advance in wide arcs and go out to designated places and at specified times."

“The development of the idea of ​​separating bypass maneuverable groups led to the emergence of a tactical reserve among the Mongols, which could be used either as an ambush unit (in this it is similar to a maneuverable group that goes behind enemy lines in advance), or as reinforcements for the main units at the right time of the battle.”

“After discovering the weakness of the enemy’s position or its disorder, the last phase begins - on the weakened enemy, who is either already running or retreating without order, detachments of mounted warriors with enough protective armor and striking weapons are thrown to finally turn him into a fleeing crowd that is being driven in the direction of the Mongol cavalry that had previously left for the rear. The rout ends with their joint beating of the enemy, surrounded and having lost all organization, who has become simply a crowd crushed from all sides.

“In the tactics of the Mongols, considerable attention was paid to outposts. It consisted of a rearguard and side detachments. Their number was different - from small patrols to quite significant (several thousand people). For the march formation, patrols and patrols were practiced ... The patrols were divided into detachments numbering from a hundred to a thousand people.

"Protection of the rear has always been organized, and separate units have always been allocated for it."

4.5 Organization of intelligence and diplomacy

“The military component of the policy of the Mongols cannot be considered in isolation from its other components. If purely military operations can be called "direct", in the sense of their direct action, then diplomacy, intelligence and propaganda of action are indirect. Together with military means, they were the most powerful tools for achieving the goals of Mongolian policy, in addition to military measures proper.

... at the existing level of development of the state apparatus, the intelligence of the Mongols did not have specialized and independent structures in it. “Intelligence functions were entrusted to proxies of the head of state, most often they were combined with diplomatic duties.

... scouts were ambassadors, messengers, and merchants. They acted most often openly, secret scouts were rather rare, at least the references to them in the sources are rare, while reports of reconnaissance missions of Mongolian ambassadors and merchants are quite common in the notes of contemporaries. Another important channel for obtaining intelligence information was "well-wishers", that is, people who, for their own personal reasons, wanted to help the enemies of their country or its authorities.

4.6 Tactical and strategic intelligence

“The functions of the cavalry reconnaissance and avant-garde detachments were as follows: guard service - the allocation, sometimes hundreds of kilometers ahead, patrol cavalry detachments of a small number; patrols by detachments numbering several hundred - frequent and constant, day and night, of all the surroundings; interaction with long-range (strategic) reconnaissance to verify their information on the ground during hostilities.

“In order for the strategy of the Mongols to work, an exceptionally clear coordination of the forces of their individual corps was needed. This could only be achieved with a good knowledge of the terrain over which their routes passed. This could only be achieved by careful, pre-planned and accurately conducted strategic intelligence.

“... in addition to reconnaissance - outposts, the Mongols had long-range reconnaissance used in military planning of campaigns. After all, the collection of such information about the availability of roads, cities, conditions for feeding and keeping horses on the road, the deployment of enemy troops are all elements of strategic intelligence.[...] a significant part of the data was received from prisoners whom the Mongols captured on their way. Voluntarily or under torture, they supplied the Mongols with information about their own countries.

“Muslim merchants played an important role, with whom Genghis Khan established close and mutually beneficial cooperation very early. Their knowledge of the political situation was accurate - both the fortunes and the very life of merchants depended on it. Geographical knowledge was especially important to the Mongols, since Muslim cartography was at the most advanced level.

“The general leadership of military affairs among the Mongols belonged exclusively to the kaan, while he held military councils with the top leadership of the empire ...”

“...important issues discussed at the military councils were the condition of the horse stock, its feeding and repair during the war, which involved long horse crossings. The Mongols had standard dates for the start and end of hostilities, due to the optimal timing of the fattening of horse stock, especially after periods of long and difficult marches.

... Other issues discussed were the timing of campaigns (due to the Mongolian system of horse breeding), the allocation of forces to carry out tasks, the distribution of these forces among operational formations (corps), the definition of routes (following, foraging, meeting points with each other), the appointment of commanders.

“The traditional move was to impose a field battle on the main enemy forces in circumstances convenient for the Mongols. There could have been several battles, in which case the Mongols sought to defeat the enemy separately. After the defeat of the enemy, the army was disbanded in raid detachments to plunder and take the population into captivity. In addition to the purely military advantages of such a strategy (based on the confidence of the Mongols in the strength of their troops) - the destruction of the main enemy forces until he managed to find opposition to the tactics of the Mongols, it made it possible to minimize the time of supplying the army at the expense of its own reserves, and after the victory made it possible to constantly receive defenseless population everything you need. Its implementation was possible after the distribution of troops into several operational groups. Their number was determined by the choice of routes and the possibility of supplying fodder to the horse masses of the Mongols. The place and time of their meeting to strike at the main forces of the enemy were precisely coordinated, the actions of the groups were clearly coordinated.

“This strategy, of course, had options - first of all, it was designed for the active resistance of the enemy entering the field battle with the Mongols. But there were cases when the enemy preferred passive resistance, locking his forces in cities and fortresses. In such cases, the Mongols either changed their strategy (to successive sieges with all the forces of cities / fortresses, destroying the enemy forces in them separately, while having a local full advantage in forces), or forced the enemy to enter the field or capitulate.

... Detailed strategic plans, clearly defining the order and stages of actions, inevitably led to the appointment of specific forces and means: unit commanders were formed and appointed, strategic reconnaissance and material support measures were carried out. The main formation was the operational group (for a private operation) or grouping (for a major operation, military campaign or autonomous raid) of the troops of the Mongolian army.

4.8 Attrition and terror strategies

“To achieve their goals, the Mongols did not always have to give field battles and take cities and fortresses - they could use a strategy of attrition. ... this could be done - in the absence of active military opposition, for example, when enemy troops were entrenched in cities, where part of the population also left the countryside. Then the Mongol troops were divided into "batteries" and were engaged in robbery and ruin of the rural districts of cities. The result was the destruction and captivity of the remaining peasant population, theft and extermination of livestock, the destruction of crops and crops, the destruction of irrigation facilities. Even the peasants who escaped destruction and captivity died of hunger and disease, and the next year there was no one to sow. It was enough to repeat such actions so that entire regions turned into the desert forever.

“Usually, a few years of waging such a war of attrition was enough to bring a state with a large peasant population to the brink of destruction, without even destroying the cities.”

“Terror by the Mongols was often used for quite pragmatic purposes, as part of their “active measures” - intimidation and spreading rumors about terrorist actions gave results no less than direct military operations. In the sources one can often read that the inhabitants of the next city surrender at the first demand of the Mongols, especially if shortly before that the Mongols cut down the city in the neighborhood.

“Terror was also a means of diplomatic pressure - after “cutting down” one area, it was much easier for the Mongol ambassadors to “negotiate” with its neighbors, or rather, to force them to fulfill their demands. True, the total extermination of the cities taken had not only these goals, there were others - revenge for losses, or simply the impossibility of leaving an unnecessary population behind, since, for example, during long-range raids, the Mongols did not need full ... "

4.9 Combat command and communications

“Oral orders were the usual way of transmitting orders […] However, this worked only in more or less calm conditions, and in cases of need for operational decisions, other methods of control were also used. This was mainly needed in the heat of battle, that is, for lower-level commanders directly in command on the battlefield. During the battle, they gave orders to their subordinates with the help of the sounds of drums and whistling arrows, or indicated the direction of movement with their whip. The commanders are more high rank they gave commands, being on an elevated place and making conditional movements with their banner or bunchuk ...

To control more distant units and deliver information, messengers and distant patrols were used, which sent messengers to the main forces. […] the system for exchanging urgent information was so developed and had such a large number of service personnel that the Mongols needed to introduce an identification system, for which they adopted from their neighbors their old methods of identifying and confirming the credentials of messengers - credential tags and paizi. The system of oral passwords and identification calls was, of course, original and original among all Central Asian nomads.

4.10 Guard and signal service and military camps

“Mongol […] troops were stationed in the field, in camps and bivouacs specially arranged for them.” “... the organization of bivouacs and camps […] obeyed a well-thought-out system, with a clear placement of command and rank and file, the arrangement of horses and their foraging, taking measures to quickly raise the camp in case of alarm (even at night) with the allocation of duty, prepared for battle, horses and warriors."

4.11 Supply and material support of troops

“In direct connection with the definition of strategy and planning, the Mongols had the organization of supply and support for troops on the campaign - soldiers and horses. Knowledge of the features of feeding horse masses dictated the routes and timing of their movement. The poorer the pasture was, the wider the space had to be covered.

“Another important element in the provision of troops was the appointment of separate routes for separate routes of the army corps. So, in addition to splitting the forces of the enemy, who had to fight simultaneously everywhere, having at all points less forces than the Mongols, the task of feeding the army was solved. Although the Mongols professed the principle that “troops feed on war,” separate routes for the cavalry corps made it possible to more fully develop local resources so that the tumens did not intersect in one place. The routes of the corps were planned in advance with the definition of collection points.

“... the resources of the enemies were half destroyed, and half poured into the Mongol army, strengthening it. Therefore, the losses of the advancing Mongols were, on average, less than the growth of forces from the injected local resources - people, horses, provisions, fodder. The lack of proper transportation (so necessary for the armies of the new time) was solved in two ways: by counting on the captured (the Mongols did not have to worry about the fate of the population, they took everything they needed) and by preparing a food base in advance in the future rear (long-range reconnaissance followed the growth of grasses in the steppe) .

... the picture of the supply of food and fodder to the Mongol troops on the campaign is as follows. As long as the Mongols do not go beyond their territories (both in the steppe and in settled areas under their control), they use their flocks and herds of livestock and the results of stalking. Before leaving their territories, they take with them a limited amount of provisions sufficient to reach the enemy's land (the provision consisted of the personal reserves of each soldier and the general army reserves). After the invasion of the territory of the enemy, the Mongols received supplies at his expense. Forage for the horse train was obtained both from preliminary stocks and along the route, which was ensured by the preliminary selection of separate corps routes with their own lane for obtaining local feed.

4.12 Armament

First of all, consider the bow - the main individual weapon of the Mongols, without which all their military victories would have been impossible:

“According to the sources, bows were of two types, both composite and reflexive. The first type is "Chinese-Central Asian": with a straight handle, rounded protruding shoulders, long straight or slightly curved horns. Bows of this type reached a length of 120-150 cm. The second type is "Middle Eastern": length - 80-110 cm, with slightly or not protruding, very steep and rounded shoulders and rather short horns, slightly or strongly curved.

Bows of both types had a base of five pieces, glued from two or three layers of wood, a layer of tendons glued in a stretched state from the outside of the shoulders, two thin horn strips glued to the shoulders from the inside, a curved bone plate with ends expanding like a shovel, which was glued to the inside of the hilt and adjoining sections of the shoulders, sometimes a pair of oblong bone plates glued to the sides of the hilt. The horns of bows of the first type were glued on the sides with two pairs of bone plates with cutouts for the bowstring; in bows of the second type, the horns had one bone sticker with a recess for the bowstring; such a voluminous detail was glued to the wooden base of the horn from above.

“Mongolian throwing weapons were almost perfect. At this time, bows with a frontal horn overlay appeared, shaped like a wide flattened oar of a kayak. Such details are called "oar-shaped". The distribution of these bows in the Middle Ages, many archaeologists directly connect with the Mongols, often even calling them "Mongolian". Kibit worked differently for the new weapon. The paddle-like lining, while increasing the resistance of the central part of the weapon to breaking, at the same time did not reduce its relative flexibility. The pad often cut into the handle of the bow, which provided better grip and higher strength of the weapon itself.

Kibit onions (its length for the finished product reached 150-160 cm) was assembled from different tree species. From the inside, it was additionally reinforced with plates cut from the hollow horns of artiodactyls boiled to a soft state - a goat, a tour, a bull. On the outer side of the bow, along its entire length, tendons taken from the back of a deer, elk or bull were glued to a wooden base, which, like rubber, had the ability to stretch and then contract again when force was applied. The process of sticking the tendons was of particular importance, because the combat capabilities of the bow depended to a large extent on it. […] The finished bow was then pasted over with birch bark, pulled together into a ring and dried ... "

About the force of tension - the main characteristic of any, including the Mongolian, bow, eyewitness accounts have been preserved: "[The force required to pull the bowstring] of the bow is certainly more than one [unit] shi."

The problem is that what was the value of shi in the 13th century. we don't know. So, for example, G.K. Panchenko gives three possible options for the amount of shea: 59.68 kg; 66.41 kg; 71.6 kg. And here is what other authors think about this: “According to Chinese sources, the pulling force of the Mongolian bow was at least 10 dou (66 kg) […] H. Martin determines the strength of Mongolian bows at 166 pounds (75 kg) […] Yu. Chambers estimates the strength of the Mongolian bows at 46-73 kg ... "; “The Mongolian bow was complex, reinforced with horn overlays, and received a gain of 40-70 kg.”

To pull the bowstring of the Mongolian bow, a method was used that was later called “Mongolian”. Capturing and pulling the bowstring was done with the bent first phalanx of the thumb. The index finger helped the thumb, holding it from above by the nail with the first two phalanges. The arrow was located between the thumb and forefinger. This method was difficult to perform, but when using it, the tension of the bowstring required less effort compared to other methods. The bowstring released when fired could injure the inside of the fold of the thumb. To prevent this from happening, thumb put on a special safety ring made of hard materials- metal, bones, horns.

Here is how the shooting process itself took place: “... the force of the combat tension is such that “sports” aiming was completely excluded - with a long choice of target, a long hold on the bow on weight, carefully pulling the bowstring with the arrow shank to the corner of the eye. The whole process was carried out at the pace of a blow to the jaw: he threw up the bow, pulled it with an oppositely directed jerk of both hands (“to break”), and fired an arrow.

“Unlike modern sports shooting, archers in antiquity practically did not perform optical aiming, that is, they did not visually combine the target, the tip of the arrow and the eye[...] the archer shot based on long experience, estimating the distance, taking into account the strength of the wind, the properties of the bow and arrows, goals. Therefore, he could (with a normally high “qualification”) shoot without aiming (in our understanding, aiming took place in his brain, and not through his eyes), in the dark, in motion, without looking at the target at all. These fantastic abilities today were achieved, I repeat, by many years of constant hard training.

Now a few words about such necessary components of archery as a bowstring and arrows.

The Mongols for the manufacture of bowstrings in most cases used a twisted and processed strip of rawhide and, in addition, horsehair and tendons were used.

The arrows used by the Mongols were relatively short (0.7-0.8 m), heavy (150-200 gr.) and thick (ca. 1 cm in diameter). (The shorter the arrow, the greater the speed of its flight and the farther, but less accurately it flies. Heavy arrows fly a shorter distance, slower and less accurate than light ones, but retain their destructive power longer.)

For plumage of their arrows, the Mongols used the feathers of different birds, it is important that the feather is strong enough, long and wide. ( Big square plumage allows the arrow to more easily stabilize in flight, but dampens speed more, thereby reducing the firing range.) In most cases, the Mongols used three feathers, which were glued or tied close to the blunt end of the arrow. (The closer the plumage is to the bowstring, the higher the shooting accuracy, but the lower the shooting flight speed.)

All arrowheads used by the Mongols were stalked according to the method of attachment. They were hammered into the butt or inserted into the split of the arrow shaft and secured with winding and pasting.

Arrowheads were of two groups: flat and faceted.

There are 19 flat tips different types, differing in the shape of the pen and received geometric names from archaeologists, such as: asymmetric-rhombic, oval-winged, oval-stepped, sectoral, elongated-rhombic, ellipsoid, etc.

Faceted (armor-piercing) tips according to the cross section of the pen were divided into four types: square, rectangular, rhombic and triangular.

Judging by archaeological data, the vast majority of Mongolian arrows (95.4%) were equipped with flat arrowheads. (This indicates that the Mongols fired the main fire at the enemy and his horse, unprotected by armor.)

Now I will try to answer the question: did an arrow fired from a Mongolian bow pierce the armor?

Medieval Mongolian bows, of course, cannot be found now, however, the reenactors managed to make bows comparable in tension to the Mongolian ones, and conduct appropriate tests. So, a photograph of a 3-mm iron cuirass, pierced from a bow with a tension force of 67.5 kg, from a distance of 110m has been posted on the Internet. At the same time, at least a dozen holes can be clearly seen in the photo, judging by the configuration of which the arrows were with armor-piercing tips, square or rhombic in cross section. Of course, such a result was possible only if the arrow hit at an angle close to a straight one.

The fact that the arrows fired from the Mongol bows pierced the armor is also evidenced by the testimony of an eyewitness of the Mongol invasion to Europe: “... the deadly Tatar arrows shot straight at the target struck for sure. And there was no such shell, shield or helmet that was not pierced ... "

In addition to the bow, the Mongols used a spear with a hook for catching and pulling the enemy from a horse or a palm tree - a pole weapon with a single-edged straight blade approx. 0.5 m

In close combat, they used a sword, a saber, a mace - a metal pommel in the form of a flattened ball, complemented by ribs-blades on a handle approx. 0.5 m, ax with a narrow trapezoidal blade.

Darts and lassoes were also widely used.

Means of protection of the Mongol warrior of the XIII century. were a combination of a shield, helmet and shell.

The shield is round (diameter 0.5-0.7 m) with a metal umbon, woven from twigs or wooden, covered with leather.

A metal helmet of a spherical shape with a leather aventail, sometimes covering the entire face except for the eyes.

Two types of shells were used to protect the body. Khatangu deel - from soft materials and hudesutu huyagu - from hard ones.

Khatangu deel - made of leather or fabric, lined with felt and quilted with horsehair. There were two types: a bathrobe and a long-sleeved vest. There were also so-called reinforced khatangu deel, in which large iron plates were sewn or riveted on the inside of the soft base. rectangular shape.

The design of hudesutu huyagu could be either lamellar or laminar. Sometimes there were combined shells in which the stripes of the lamellar set alternated with continuous laminar ones.

Khudesutu khuyagu was of two main types: a corset cuirass and a robe.

The cuirass-corset consisted of a breastplate and a backplate that reached the top of the pelvis with shoulder straps made of belts or lamellar strips. This armor was usually complemented by rectangular lamellar pauldrons and cuisses. The shoulder pads reached the elbow, the legguards - to the middle of the thigh, or to the knee, or to the middle of the lower leg. A cuirass-corset without shoulder pads and gaiters or with gaiters without shoulder pads was also used.

The robe was cut from the front from top to bottom and fastened at the chest. He also had a slit from the hem to the sacrum. The length of the dressing gown was to the knees or to the middle of the lower leg. The robes were supplied with rectangular shoulder pads that reached the elbow. Short versions of the robe length to the sacrum were also used. These jackets had leaf-shaped shoulder pads and legguards rounded at the bottom.

Khudesutu khuyagu was often reinforced with protective details: a leather necklace with iron plaques, iron mirrors, bracers, and leggings.

Heavily armed warriors used a helmet and reinforced khatangu deel or khuyagu, wealthy warriors used a helmet, shield, khuyagu with protective details; horses were protected by armor, which consisted of several parts, connected by straps and covering the body of the horse to the knees of a lamellar or laminar structure. The horse's head was protected by a metal cap.

Lightly armed Mongolian warriors from protective weapons used khatanga deel or managed with everyday clothes; from offensive weapons - a bow with arrows, darts, lasso, swords (sabers).

4.13 Siege technology of the Mongols

“The reason for the success of the Mongols in taking the fortifications was the systematic nature of their approach and the gradual assimilation of practical knowledge about the methods of fighting the fortresses of settled peoples, obtained in the course of their advance from the Mongolian steppe outward. By the time of their campaigns to the west - to Central Asia and, further, to Europe - the army of the Mongols had already accumulated extensive experience in siege technologies, which increased gradually, from stage to stage. […] the Mongols mastered the art of besieging cities slowly, step by step, that is, from overcoming the defenses of a weak enemy to besieging stronger fortresses, from using primitive methods of taking fortress cities to the most advanced methods at that time. If we consider in detail the whole process of training the troops of Genghis Khan in these techniques and taking into service the entire arsenal of modern siege technologies, it turns out that this “instant” transition to an army equipped with the latest siege equipment at that time took at least 10 years.

Initially, the siege techniques of the Mongol army were very primitive - luring the enemy into the field in order to hit him there, in the conditions familiar to him, and then simply take a defenseless city or fortification; a sudden run-in, when the defenders simply did not have time to prepare a rebuff and found themselves attacked in unprotected places; a simple blockade to starvation or a general assault on the fortification. Gradually, the arsenal of methods for taking fortified points became richer - digging, using local rivers for dams or, on the contrary, diverting water from a besieged city, the beginning of the use of engineering methods to deal with fortifications. The option of a direct assault on the city, in the hope of using its numerical superiority and the enemy's fatigue from continuously lasting attacks, over time began to be used relatively rarely, as a last resort.

With the accumulation of experience in actions against settled states, the Mongols adopted more and more siege techniques, received additional technical means and began to creatively develop them, taking into account both their capabilities and the environment. The process of the formation of siege technologies among the Mongols can, apparently, be divided into several main stages ... "

"one. The initial stage of the development of siege art by the Mongols.

The first fortresses that the Mongols encountered were those of the Tangut. In 1205, the troops of Genghis Khan attacked the settled state of the Tangut Xi Xia for the first time. Their development of engineering technology was quite high, they improved Chinese achievements in relation to mountainous terrain. In addition, the Tanguts had more than a century of experience in wars with the Chinese, in which they besieged enemy cities. According to researchers, their system of defense and capture of fortresses was less perfect than that of the Jurchens and Chinese. “But oddly enough, it was precisely this circumstance that turned out to be beneficial for the Mongols, and doubly beneficial - it was easier for them to take the Tangut cities, and it was easier at first to master the simpler Tangut siege technique.”

“... the results of the Tangut campaigns for the development of siege technologies of the Mongols can be characterized as follows: the capture of small fortress cities has been worked out; the arsenal of siege techniques consists of sudden captures, assaults, blockades to starvation, flooding, and the first experiments in the use of captured stone-throwing and stone-breaking machines. The technical park of the Mongols was replenished with vortex stone throwers, various types of blids, arrow throwers, siege towers, assault ladders and individual hooks for climbing walls. All this was first trophy, and then produced by captured masters.

"2. Siege technologies of the Mongols in the first third of the 13th century.

2.1 Borrowings during the war with the Jin.

The Mongols were familiar with the fortifications of the Jurchens for a long time - from the time when they staged predatory raids on the lands of the Jin Empire. The Mongols were able to get acquainted with their siege technique for the first time in Xi Xia through prisoners - the Tanguts, during their wars with the Jin, accumulated a sufficient number of prisoners there.

"Types of Jurchen Throwing Weapons by the Beginning of the 13th Century. practically did not differ from the Chinese and consisted of various models of two main types: single- and multi-beam arrow throwers and tension stone throwers (blid).

... These tools were divided into stationary and mobile (on wheels), and all of them, in turn, were divided by power (depending on the number of tension elements - throwing poles)."

“The special means of long-range combat developed by the Jurchens in relation to Chinese inventions were the means of fire combat - fire arrows and fire projectiles. […] These arrows were thrown from the bow, and the lit gunpowder gave the arrow additional movement. Such arrows were used for long-range strikes and setting fire to buildings in a besieged city. The Jurchens also used tools for ejecting combustible mixtures such as "Greek fire" and similar to oil and powder-based flamethrowers, which were invented by the Chinese as early as the 8th century.

Throwing machines were given a fire supply - “fire jugs” - spherical clay vessels charged with gunpowder or a combustible mixture.

“Faced with […] the Jin defensive systems that were complex and perfect for that time, the Mongols nevertheless fought them quite confidently. This helped them:

firstly, the accumulated experience in the wars with the Tanguts;

secondly, the engineering and artillery units created during this time, with a large material base and well-trained staff, both of Mongolian and Tangut-Chinese and Muslim origin.

2.2 Muslim borrowings.

“... the main borrowing from the Muslims was counterweight type stone throwers and flamethrower equipment.

... The campaign against the Khorezmshah showed a significantly increased ability of the Mongols to take cities - this was facilitated by the confident development of the Chinese tradition by the Mongols (in all variants - Tangut, Jurchen and proper Chinese) and the appearance of even more powerful stone-throwing equipment through the Karakidans and Uighurs. In the campaign against the rich urban oases of Central Asia, the Mongols collected trophies, by force took away masters and artisans. Of course, there were also volunteers: even entire units of both catapulters and flamethrowers were transferred to the service. All this by the mid-1220s. significantly increased the ability of the Mongols to take fortifications and cities.

“A separate means in the siege art of the Mongols was the siege crowd. Khashar, or literally “crowd”, is a technique that has long been known in the East. It lies in the fact that the conquering army uses the driven population of the conquered area for heavy auxiliary work, most often siege. “However, the Mongols brought this technique to perfection.

... The use of hashar was especially important for earthworks - from undermining to creating siege ramparts. Such ramparts were often built by the Mongols and required a lot of labor in wood and earthworks.

… The hard work of a hashar is, in fact, technical means, muscular strength, aimed at performing elementary actions that were parts of general plan. In this sense, hashar is a technique, albeit a specific one. But hashar also became a tactic that the Mongols began to use very widely. It consists in the use of hashar as a human shield for catapults, for the attacking columns of the Mongols and for the action of rams ... "

“Another feature of the use of hashar by the Mongols was its use as a direct assault weapon, its first wave. This inhuman technique, in addition to the main goal - to force the defenders to spend the means of defense against the people of the hashar, while preserving the Mongols themselves - also gave an additional psychological effect of influencing the defenders. It was difficult, if not impossible, to resist the people driven into hashar…”

“The last thing I would like to note about siege engines is their high mobility in the Mongol army. This is not about wheeled stone throwers and siege wagons, but about the mobility of the engineering units of the Mongols. The Mongols did not carry cars with them on long trips - they did not need this, it was enough to take with them specialists and a certain amount of rare materials (sesame ropes, unique metal knots, rare ingredients of combustible mixtures, etc.). Everything else - wood, stone, metal, rawhide and hair, lime and free work force were on the spot, that is, near the besieged city. In the same place, simple metal parts for guns were forged by Mongolian blacksmiths, khashar prepared platforms for catapults and collected wood, shells for stone throwers were made. “... components mined locally and brought with them were assembled by masters of engineering and artillery units together. Thus, textbook pictures of long carts, with slowly stretching rows of catapults, rams and other weapons, are nothing more than the fantasies of writers of historical novels.

Is R.P. right? Khrapachevsky, when he writes that the Mongols did not transport stone throwers, but each time they made them on the spot near the besieged city? To verify this statement, consider the stone throwers used by the Mongols in more detail.

So, in his opinion, by the time of the invasion of Russia, the following throwing machines were in service with the Mongolian army (we will not consider arrow throwers / archballists, since it is impossible to destroy the wall with their help):

"vortex catapults" - circular stone throwers on a vertical support column;

blidy - stone-throwers with a throwing lever;

stone throwers of the "Chinese type" stationary and mobile (on wheels) of different power (depending on the number of tension elements - throwing poles);

Muslim stone throwers of the counterweight type.

However, upon closer examination, it turns out that all this diversity can be reduced to two main types. These will be, according to the European classification, perrier (“vortex catapults”, blinds, “Chinese type” stone throwers) and trebuchet (Muslim stone throwers).

Perrier consisted of two main parts: the support and the throwing arm. The support part could be one of three types:

one support pole;

two support pillars (triangular racks);

two truncated pyramids.

At the top of the supporting part, a flexible throwing arm was fixed on the axis. A sling was attached to the long thin end of the lever. To the short thick one - a transverse bar with tension ropes attached to it.

The shot was made as follows. The long end of the lever outweighed the short one and therefore was constantly in the lower position. The attendants secured it with a trigger and placed the projectile in the sling. After that, the tensioners simultaneously and sharply pulled the ropes down. As a result, the lever was bent, accumulating energy. Then the trigger was actuated, which released the lever. The long end of the lever quickly straightened, simultaneously rising up. With the lever position close to vertical, the sling turned around and the released projectile flew forward.

There were also more powerful perriers ("Chinese type" stone throwers), the throwing arm of which consisted of several poles tied (strung with hoops) into a bundle to increase power, and each of the tension ropes was pulled by two people.

Perrier, average in power, threw stones weighing approx. 8 kg for a distance of approx. 100 m. A powerful seven-pole perrier, whose team consisted of 250 people, was able to throw a stone weighing approx. 60 kg for a distance of approx. 80 m

The trebuchet had the following design. The base is a support frame, on which there were two vertical posts (support pillars), connected at the top with an axis through which the throwing arm was threaded. A counterweight was attached to the short thick end of the lever, which could be rigidly fixed at the end of the lever or movably connected with an axle. (A trebuchet with a fixed counterweight was easier and could be made faster. A trebuchet with a movable counterweight was more powerful, since the trajectory of the fall of the counterweight was steeper, which ensured more energy transfer through the lever. In addition, the movable counterweight braked sharply at the bottom point, creating additional momentum for a sling - at the top. In the movable counterweight, the load almost did not move during the fall, so the box for the counterweight served for a long time and it could be filled with available bulk materials - earth, sand, stones.) In addition to the sling, a rope was attached to the long thin end of the throwing lever for pulling the lever to the ground by means of a winch mounted on a support frame.

To fire a shot, the long part of the lever was pulled to the ground with a collar and secured with a trigger. The thick end with a counterweight, respectively, rose up. The sling was placed in a guide chute, located below between the supporting pillars. After the projectile was laid in the sling, the trigger was activated. The lever was released, the counterweight went down sharply under the action of gravity. The long end of the lever, slightly bending, quickly rose up and pulled the sling along with it. In the upper position of the lever, the sling turned around, throwing the projectile forward.

The optimal trebuchet had a lever 10-12 m long, a counterweight - approx. 10 tons and could throw stones weighing 100-150 kg at a distance of 150-200 m.

To destroy the log fortifications of Russian cities, heavy shells (stones) weighing at least 100 kg were needed. Perrier is clearly not suitable for this purpose. Consequently, the Mongols used trebuchet during the assault on Russian cities.

Now we will find out how difficult it was to make trebuchet and how long this process took: “Trebuche is made from an ordinary wooden beam and ropes with a minimum metal parts. This device does not have any complex and difficult to machine parts, which allows a team of average carpenters to cope with the construction. Therefore, it is inexpensive and does not require any stationary and specially equipped workshops for its manufacture. “According to the experience of modern reconstructions, the production of a large trebuchet requires about 300 man-days (using only tools available in the Middle Ages). A dozen carpenters cope with the assembly from ready-made blocks in 3-4 days. However, it is possible that medieval carpenters had longer working hours and were more skilled.”

Thus, it turns out that the Mongols most likely transported the trebuchet with them disassembled.

Everything is logical and understandable except for one circumstance. In order to destroy a section of the wall (to make a hole in it), it is necessary that the shells (stones) hit the same point several times. This can only be achieved if they are all approximately the same weight and shape. (A projectile / stone with a large weight or aerodynamic resistance will not reach the target, but with smaller ones it will fly over.) That is, the issue of accuracy is, first of all, the need to unify the projectile / stone, since you can aim only with the same shells / stones. Therefore, in order to ensure accurate shooting, it is necessary to take care of a large number of identical projectiles / stones in advance. How did the Mongols solve this problem?

The first thing that comes to mind is the use of a quarry located in the vicinity of the besieged city. Most likely, it was this method that the Mongols used when taking Kyiv: “The problem could be the remoteness from the city of stone deposits necessary for the manufacture of projectiles for throwing machines: the nearest rock outcrops suitable for mining are 50 km from Kyiv in a straight line (fortunately for the Mongols, stone could be delivered downstream of the Irpin and the Dnieper).

Thus, in order to use this method, the Mongols had to find a quarry within reach and, using hashar, ensure the manufacture and delivery of the appropriate shells. In principle, with the discipline and organization that Genghis Khan managed to instill in the Mongols, creating his own army, this was all quite achievable. But what if there is no quarry in the vicinity of the city? Maybe the Mongols carried stones with them from one city to another, just like dismantled trebuchet?

shelling duration - 4 days (at night, targets were illuminated using shells with a combustible mixture);

the number of trebuchet - 32 (how many stone throwers the Mongols used during the siege of Vladimir is unknown, so let's take it by analogy with Kyiv);

the average rate of fire of one trebuchet is 2 shots per hour.

It turned out about 6,000 shells. To transport such a number of stones, with a weight of one - 100 kg, approx. 1,500 sledges. For a hundred thousandth Mongolian army, the figure is quite real.

However, it is very possible that the Mongols needed much less unified stones. The fact is that: “... the shooting experience […] refuted the long-held opinion about the inaccuracy of firing large trebuchet and the impossibility of retargeting them. It was confirmed that when firing at the maximum range, the deviation from the ideal line does not exceed 2-3 m. Moreover, the heavier the shells, the smaller the deviation. It is guaranteed to hit a 5 by 5 m area from a distance of 160-180 m. The firing range can be predictably changed with an accuracy of 2-3 m, shortening or lengthening the sling, changing […] the weight of the projectile or the weight of the counterweight. Retargeting to the side can be done by turning the support frame with crowbars. Turning even a small degree gives a noticeable (and also predictable with elementary knowledge of geometry) shift of the shot to the side.

Consequently, a relatively small number of standardized shells were actually needed:

several for shooting;

several dozen to destroy the wall;

a small amount in reserve, in case the besieged still manage to patch up a hole in the wall.

However, the Mongols may also use a third, less common method. Here is what Shihab ad-Din Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Ali ibn Muhammad al-Munshi an-Nasawi (? - 1249/1250) wrote in 1241 in the “Biography of Sultan Jalal ad-Din Mankburna”: “When they [the Mongols] saw, that in Khorezm and in its region there are no stones for catapults, they found mulberry trees with thick trunks and large roots there in great abundance. They began to cut round pieces out of them, then soaked them in water, and they became heavy and hard like stones. [The Mongols] replaced them with stones for catapults.”

Of course, there were no mulberry trees in Russia. The most common trees in our middle lane This is pine and birch. In order to get a wooden projectile weighing approx. 100 kg was enough to take a freshly cut pine log with a diameter of 0.5 m and a length of 0.65 m.

Of course against stone walls such a projectile was useless, but Rus XIII in. the vast majority of city walls were made of wood. In addition: “... the main task of wall-blown stone throwers is not so much the demolition of walls as such (although breaking through a solid gap that provides free passage for infantry and cavalry is very desirable), but the destruction of shelters for defenders - battlements, parapets, hinged galleries and shields, hinged turrets -breteshes, casemates for ballistas, etc. For a successful assault using conventional ladders, it is enough to expose the top of the wall so that enemy soldiers do not have cover from light thrown weapons. “The warriors were located only on fences - platforms at the top of the wall, covered with a palisade or wooden parapet. Zaborolas were vulnerable to destruction even by not the heaviest stones, and incendiary projectiles also posed a serious threat to them. After that, the defenders left without cover were easily swept away from the wall by massive shelling from bows and light rapid-fire trebuchet.

Thus, with a high degree of certainty, it can be argued that the Mongols used trebuchet assembled on the spot from ready-made blocks to shell Russian cities. They brought shells for these stone throwers with them or made them from trees.

4.14 Numbers

600 000 - N.M. Ivanin;

500 - 600 000 - Yu.K. Runners;

500 000 - N.M. Karamzin;

300 - 500 000 - I.N. Berezin, N. Golitsyn, D.I. Ilovaisky, A.N. Olenin, S.M. Solovyov, D.I. Troitsky, N.G. Ustryalov;

300,000 - K.V. Bazilevich, A. Bryukner, E.A. Razin, A.A. Strokov, V.T. Pashuto, A.M. Ankudinova, V.A. Lyakhov;

170,000 - Ya. Halbay;

150,000 - J. Saunders;

130 - 150,000 - V.B. Koshcheev;

140 000 - A.N. Kirpichnikov;

139 000 - V.P. Kostyukov, N.Ts. Munkuev;

130 000 - R.P. Khrapachevsky;

120 - 140 000 - V.V. Kargalov, H. Ruess, A.Kh. Khalikov, I.Kh. Khaliullin, A.V. Shishov;

120 000 - A. Antonov, G.V. Vernadsky, L. Hartog;

60 - 100,000 - S.B. Zharko, A.V. Martynyuk;

60 - 80 000 - E.I. Susenkov;

55 - 65 000 - V.L. Egorov, E.S. Kulpin, D.V. Chernyshevsky;

60 000 - Zh. Sabitov, B.V. Sokolov;

50 - 60 000 - E.P. Myskov;

30 - 40 000 - I.B. Grekov, F.F. Shakhmagonov, L.N. Gumilyov;

30,000 - A.V. Venkov, S.V. Derkach, I.Ya. Korostovets.

Unfortunately, only a few historians try to substantiate their figures with any calculations. However, I managed to find several methods for calculating the number of soldiers in the Mongol army in 1237.

Let's start from the very simple method associated with the number of Genghisides participating in the campaign.

According to Rashid-ad-Din and Juvaini, the following Chingizid princes took part in Batu's campaign against Russia: Batu, Buri, Orda, Shiban, Tangut, Kadan, Kulkan, Monke, Budjik, Baydar, Mengu, Buchek and Guyuk. “Usually, the “Gengizid” khans commanded “tumens” on a campaign, that is, a detachment of 10 thousand horsemen. So it was, for example, during the campaign of the Mongol Khan Hulagu to Baghdad: an Armenian source lists "7 khan's sons, each with a tumen of troops." On Batu's campaign Eastern Europe 12-14 khans participated - “Genghisids”, who could lead 12-14 tumen troops, that is, again, 120-140 thousand soldiers.

Immediately striking is the mistake made by the author when listing Genghisides. The fact is that Monke and Mengu are the same person, however, just like Byudzhik and Buchek. Probably, this mistake is due to the fact that some sources give the names of these Chingizids in the Turkic pronunciation, while others - in the Mongolian.

In addition, the author's confidence that each Chingizid was given a tumen is doubtful.

Here is a more detailed opinion of a supporter of this point of view: “There is also direct evidence of an Armenian chronicler of the 13th century. Grigor Aknertsi (better known in historiography as the monk Magakia), in his "History of the people of shooters" reports on the practice of appointing a prince at the head of the tumen: "7 khan's sons, each with a tumen of the army." This evidence is especially important, since it refers to 1257-1258, when the last all-Mongol campaign to the West took place - the conquest of Baghdad and the remnants of the Caliphate by Hulagu and his army. And this army gathered by a special decision of the kurultai from the entire Mongol Empire, similar to the collection of an army for the Great Western Campaign led by Batu.

And here is the opposite point of view: “Based on the fact that the “princes” often had to independently conduct fairly large military operations, there is no doubt that some of them were the official commanders of the tumens. However, there is no reason to extend this assumption to all the khans participating in the campaign. In accordance with the organization of the Mongolian army, command posts in it were held not "by birth", but by ability. Probably, some of the most authoritative khans (Guyuk, Mengu, etc.) commanded the tumens, and the rest had at their disposal only their personal “thousands”, inherited by them ... "

It seems to me that evidence alone to assert the dependence of the size of the Mongol army on the number of Genghisides is clearly not enough.

The second point that causes distrust is the author's confidence that the tumen consisted of 10,000 warriors. There are also two opposing views on this matter.

At first, the opinion was in favor of: “... at the beginning of campaigns and wars, the Mongols collected and reviewed their troops and tried to bring the number of troops in all divisions to complete. Moreover, such a norm was directly stated in the “Great Yasa” […] During the period under review, discipline in the Mongolian army, including the discipline of mobilization, was still extremely high. And this means that the indicated norm of the "Yasa" on the obligation to complete the troops before the campaigns (during the collection of troops) was carried out. Therefore, the nominal number of units before the wars can be considered very close to the real one.

Now the opinion is against: “Tumens formally equaled ten thousand soldiers, but, despite the desire of Genghis Khan himself to streamline the structure of the army as much as possible, tumens remained the most fuzzy in quantitative terms army units. Ten thousand soldiers is an ideal tumen, but more often the tumens were smaller, especially when allies from among other nomads mechanically joined the registered Mongol thousands.

It's hard to say who is right. In any case, it is clear that this method of calculation is simple, but not reliable.

The second method of calculation is based on the information contained in Rashid ad-Din: “The Great Khan Ogedei issued a decree that each ulus provide its troops for the campaign. It is widely believed that there were four such uluses at that time, according to the number of the eldest sons of Genghis Khan: Jochi, Chagatai, Ogedei and Tului. But apart from these great uluses. There were also four small uluses allocated to the youngest son of Genghis, Kulkan, and Genghis brothers Jochi-Khasar, Khachiun and Temuge-Otchigin. Their uluses were located in the east of Mongolia, that is, at the greatest distance from the Russian principalities. Nevertheless, their participation in the Western campaign is evidenced by the mention among the commanders of Genghis' grand-nephew Argasun (Kharkasun).

The main part of the Mongol troops proper belonged to the Tului ulus. Rashid ad-Din puts their number at 101 thousand. In fact, there were 107 thousand of them. These troops formed the core of the Western army. It is known about the participation in the campaign of Burundai (Buruldai), who led the right wing of the Mongol army, which numbered 38 thousand.

Let's see what exactly Rashid-ad-Din wrote about Burundai: “When he died in the era of Ogedei-kaan, Buraldai was in charge of his place. During Mengu-kaan [this place was in charge] Balchik ... "

The era (reign time) of Ogedei - 1229 - 1241, the reign of Mengu - 1251 - 1259. The Western campaign took place in 1236 - 1241. and Burundai (Buruldai) participated in it. I'm not sure that on this basis it can be argued that the entire right wing of Tului's troops also participated in the Western campaign.

“From this number, it is necessary to subtract 2,000 suldus, which Ogedei gave to his son Kutan, as well as, possibly, a thousand Kabtaul bodyguards. Together with Burundai, the sons of Tului Mengu and Buchek were on the campaign. But it is unknown if they brought any other units with them. Therefore, the army of the Tuluev ulus in the Western campaign can be estimated at 35 thousand.

The uluses of Jochi, Chagatai and Kulkan account for 4 thousand troops each. Of the sons of Jochi on the campaign were Orda and Batu, who led both wings of the troops of their ulus, as well as Sheiban and Tangut. Since the war was waged in the interests of the rulers of this ulus and both military leaders participated in it, it can be argued that all 4,000 were thrown into battle. From other uluses, 1-2 thousand arrived each, since the son and grandson of Chagatai, Baidar and Buri, and Kulkan himself participated in the campaign.

“Ogedei's share was equal to that of his brothers. But, having become a great khan, he subjugated the 3 thousand left after the mother of Genghis Khan, and took 3 thousand from the troops of Tului. On the campaign, he sent the sons of Guyuk and Kadan (not Kutan), who could take with them 1-3 thousand of the 10 thousand troops of the ulus. The Eastern Mongol khans had together 9 thousand soldiers. In view of the remoteness of their uluses and the absence of non-Mongolian troops, we can assume that they put up no more than three thousand.

“Thus, there were actually 45-52 thousand Mongol troops in the campaign. These "thousands" were conditional. It is known that there were 10 thousand warriors in the four Dzhuchiev thousand.” In fact, Jochi in 4 "thousands" had not 10, but 13 thousand soldiers.

“But we must reckon with the need to leave part of the people to protect the camps. Therefore, the actual number of the Mongolian army can be determined at 50-60 thousand. This amounted to about a third of the Mongol army proper. A similar ratio can be applied to non-Mongolian troops, which will give another 80-90 thousand. In general, the size of the army of the Western campaign is determined at 130-150 thousand.

The question of the ratio of the Mongols and their allies in Batu's army remains controversial. Here is one of the opinions on this matter: “During the campaigns, the Mongols constantly included detachments of conquered peoples in their army, replenishing the Mongolian “hundreds” with them and even creating special corps from them. It is difficult to determine the specific weight of the Mongol detachments proper in this multi-tribal horde. Plano Carpini wrote that in the 40s. 13th century in the army of Batu Mongols, there were approximately ¼ (160 thousand Mongols and up to 450 thousand warriors from conquered peoples). It can be assumed that on the eve of the invasion of Eastern Europe, the Mongols were somewhat larger, up to 1/3, since subsequently a large number of Alans, Kypchaks and Bulgars joined the hordes of Batu. “... a similar ratio of 1/3 is also found in the monk Julian, who was in the Volga region during the pogrom of Bulgar and on the eve of the campaign against Russia.”

Not everyone agrees with this point of view: “The information of Plano Carpini and Julian that in the Mongolian army 2/3 - ¾ of the troops were conquered peoples is not taken into account here, since their sources were rumors and reports of refugees and deserters from the assault crowds who, out of the entire Tatar army, saw only this crowd and the detachments guarding it and could not correctly judge the ratio of different parts of the Batu horde.

There is another point of view on this issue: “... the approximate ratio between the Mongol and non-Mongol contingents in her [army of the Mongol Empire in the 1230s. - A.Sh.] the composition can be roughly taken as 2: 1."

The third calculation method is also based on the information of Rashid ad-Din: “... the 30,000-strong corps of Subedei-Kukdai (already operating on the western borders of the empire) and the military forces of the Jochi inheritance became the backbone of the Great Western Campaign. The Jochids could field more than 30 thousand soldiers - this follows from the data of Rashid ad-Din's "Memo about the emirs of the fogs and thousands and the troops of Genghis Khan", giving a figure of 13 thousand soldiers assigned by Genghis Khan to Jochi, and from the calculation of the mobilization potential destiny. The latter consisted of 9 thousand Mongolian wagons, which Genghis Khan gave to Jochi about 1218, as well as those nomads who lived in the western lands of the empire, which represented the eastern part of Desht-i-Kipchak. Based on 2 soldiers per wagon, this potential was more than 18 thousand people of the Mongolian troops. The lot of Jochi in 1235 could put up at least 3 tumens of only the Mongol troops in the Great Western Campaign, which with Subedei's corps was 6 tumens.

“Each of the three main houses of the Genghisids (except for the Jochids, who participated in the campaign as a whole) received a corps under the command, headed by one of the eldest sons of the clan; a younger representative of the family was paired with him. There were three pairs in total: Mengu and Buchek (Toluids), Guyuk and Kadan (Ugeteids), Burya and Baydar (Chagataids). Another detachment of Kulkan was assigned to the campaign ... "

“... the corps of Guyuk (or Buri) could not differ much in numbers from the similar corps of Mengu. The latter included two tumens, so Guyuk's and Buri's corps should be valued at (total) 4 tumens. In total, the all-imperial forces numbered about 7 tumen - 6 tumen under the command of Mengu, Guyuk and Buri, and probably 1 tumen of Kulkan. Thus, we obtain, taking into account the previously known number of corps of Subedei and Batu, that the entire outfit of forces for the Great Western Campaign as of 1235 amounted to 13 tumens, or 130 thousand people.

The fourth method is based on information from the “Secret Tale” and all the same Rashid ad-Din: “The Mongol army consisted of: 89 thousand, distributed to the relatives of Genghis Khan + possible 5,000 yurts (tumen troops) for Kulkan, who Chinggis Khan… most likely issued… an ulus of the same size as Tolui and Ogedei, actually equating it to the first four sons + Tumen of the Onguts. […] + Tumen of the Oirats + Tumen of the Kechiktins. As a result, it turned out 129 thousand people, and if we add demographic growth to this, then perhaps there were 135 thousand of them by the 1230s. It should be taken into account that the losses of the Mongols in the wars with the Jurchens, Tanguts and Khorezmshah, as well as the losses of the corps of Jebe and Subedei ... were compensated by a high population growth.