In what war was the battle of Sinop. Crimean War: Battle of Sinop

Sinop naval battle, a heroic episode in Russian history. The feat of Russian sailors was glorified by the establishment of the Order of Nakhimov in 1944. In 1952, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Sinop battle, the Kalashnikovskaya embankment in Leningrad was renamed Sinopskaya embankment. The event was marked by the day of military glory on December 1 (FZ No. 32-F3 of March 13, 1995)

The USSR, as well as Russia, unequivocally considered this a heroic episode in Russian history, but this radically contradicted what was said about the Sinop battle of the classics of Marxism-Engelsism. Especially ambiguous was the situation of those who were engaged in ideological work. For example, military political workers who conducted patriotic propaganda and propaganda of the "only true doctrine", knowing what the founders of the "only true doctrine" said about the exploits of Nakhimov.

Here is what the historian S.F. Naida writes about the course of the battle. Cit. Naida S.F., Prominent Russian naval commander Admiral P.S. Nakhimov, M. "Knowledge", ser. 1, No. 71, 1952 (electronic text can be found .)

At 9:30 a.m., a signal went up on the flagship: "Prepare for battle and go to the Sinop raid." The squadron quickly weighed anchor and, with raised national flags, rushed at the enemy. On the move, at the signal of Nakhimov, the squadron formed up in two columns. The formation of two columns, established by Nakhimov, was tactically very reasonable. He halved the stay of the squadron under enemy fire when ships entered the Sinop raid and accelerated the deployment of the squadron to battle according to the intended disposition. This provided a quick onslaught on the enemy and fewer losses from enemy fire. This maneuver was a brilliant success.

In the first column there were 3 ships - the 84-gun ships "Empress Maria" (flagship), "Chesma" and the 120-gun ship "Konstantin"; in the second - also 3 ships: the 120-gun ship "Paris" (whose commander was the captain of the 1st rank Istomin, the future hero of the defense of Sevastopol), the 120-gun ship "Three Saints" and the 84-gun ship "Rostislav". The frigates "Kagul", which had 44 guns, and "Kulevchi", which had 52 guns, remained on Nakhimov's instructions to guard the exit from the Sinop Bay in order to prevent a possible escape during the battle of Turkish ships.

Around noon, the squadron approached the entrance to the bay. Everyone was waiting for a signal from the flagship. A little time passed, one flask pierced. At this time, the first cannon shot was heard from the Turkish ship, and after it the famous battle of Sinop began.

Nakhimov's flagship "Empress Maria", firing back from enemy ships, steadily moved forward and gave up anchor only when it reached its goal - the flagship of the Turks "Aunn Allah". He set fire to the enemy ship and forced it to throw itself ashore, and then also destroyed the Turkish frigate Fazli Allah. Despite the fact that in the battle the flagship "Empress Maria" received 60 holes and other damage, she turned to assist the second column of ships. Nakhimov coolly led the battle. The calmness and endurance of the squadron commander gave everyone confidence in victory.

The ship "Konstantin" on the way to the place indicated by the disposition was showered with a hail of cannonballs, knipels 4 and buckshot. However, she stubbornly pushed forward and anchored for battle shortly after the flagship. With battle fire on the starboard side of the Turkish battery and two frigates, he first blew up one frigate and with the fire of his guns silenced the coastal battery for a while, then opened destructive fire on another Turkish frigate and corvette. Soon the frigate and corvette were hit and washed ashore. The ship "Chesma" after the victory over the Turkish frigate aptly smashed the coastal batteries.

The ship "Paris", on which there was a second flagship, Rear Admiral Novosilsky, anchored exactly according to the disposition and sank three Turkish ships with well-aimed fire from her cannons, and then fired annihilating fire at the coastal battery.

The actions of the ship "Paris" received special approval from Nakhimov. The ship "Three Saints", despite severe damage, with the fire of its guns forced the enemy frigate to throw itself ashore and continued to fire until the end of the battle. The ship "Rostislav" sank the corvette with the fire of its guns and destroyed the battery.

Russian sailors fought the enemy selflessly, with extraordinary tenacity, put out fires, immediately took the place of the dead and wounded. On the Konstantin, in the midst of the battle, the deck was smashed by an exploding bomb and a fire started. The rapidly spreading fire threatened to explode the kruyt chamber (the place where gunpowder is stored). Midshipman Kolokoltsev, neglecting the danger, tightly closing the doors and hatches of the crew chamber, put out the fire with composure and thereby saved the ship from an explosion.

By 5 pm on November 18, 1853, the battle ended with the complete destruction of the Turkish squadron and the entire coastal defense of the enemy. Only one enemy steamer - the Taif, under the command of an English officer, using its superiority in speed against the frigates Kagul and Kulevchi, abandoned the Turks and fled to Constantinople.

In the battle of Sinop, 13 enemy warships and 4 merchant ships were destroyed, up to 3 thousand Turks were killed and many were taken prisoner. Among those captured was the head of the Turkish squadron, Vice Admiral Osman Pasha, along with the commanders of some ships.

The Russian squadron did not lose a single ship. The loss in people was: 38 people were killed, 235 people were wounded and shell-shocked.

In full accordance with this description, the feat of the Russian fleet is approved as being awarded, in particular, for "for success in developing, conducting and supporting operations, combat operations of groupings of forces (troops) of the Navy independently and as part of groupings of troops (forces) , as a result of which the offensive actions of the enemy were successfully repelled and significant losses were inflicted on him"

Naturally, such a crushing victory could not but "please" those who supported Turkey in the war against Russia.

Debates began in the English Parliament in connection with the victory of the Russians at Sinope. The English and French press launched a furious campaign against Russia, seeking to justify the opening of hostilities against the Russians.

To frantic campaign in the English and French press joined the classics of Marxism-Engelsism. The tenth volume of the second edition of the "Works" (see text) is a broadcast of this campaign to the American press. Here is how Marx speaks of the battle of Sinop

Finally, the mystery that shrouded the battle of Sinop dissipated. Judging by the published reports on the balance of power between Russia and Turkey at Sinop, the Russians, compared with the Turkish forces, had more than 3 double-deck steam vessels, one three-deck and 680 guns. The Sinop events, therefore, added nothing to the power of Russia and did not take anything away from the power of Turkey; rather the opposite happened. Here we see a fact that has no precedent even in the history of the English fleet: frigates line up with battleships of the line and commanders throw torches into powder magazines, sacrificing themselves on the altar of the fatherland. Turkey's main naval forces remained intact; she did not lose a single ship of the line, not a single steamer. Little of. According to the latest news, one of the best three-deck ships of the Russian fleet, the Rostislav, with 120 guns, was sunk by the Turks. This loss, hitherto hushed up under the plausible pretext that the Rostislav sank not during the battle, but immediately after it, and now openly recognized by the Russians, significantly balances the losses of the Turkish fleet. If a three-deck ship really sank, then it can be assumed that other Russian ships also received very serious damage during the battle, and that in the end the victory at Sinop more weakened the Russian fleet than the Turkish one. As soon as the Egyptian pasha learned about the Sinop catastrophe, he immediately gave the order to arm 6 frigates, 5 corvettes and 3 brigs in order to compensate for the losses of the Turkish fleet's materiel.
The Egyptian steam frigate Pervaz Bahri, disabled and captured after a five-hour battle by the Russian much larger steam frigate Vladimir, was riddled with shells to such an extent that it was hardly brought to Sevastopol, where it immediately sank. It was possible to introduce the Pervaz Bahri into the Sevastopol Bay only thanks to the help of the chief mechanic, the Englishman Bell, to whom Admiral Kornilov promised to immediately grant freedom if he successfully coped with this task. Upon arrival in Sevastopol, Bell not only was not released, but, together with his assistants - mechanics and stokers - was taken under strict arrest and put on a meager ration of 3d a day, and they were told that they would have to walk 80 miles in inland at this harsh time of the year. Prince Menshikov, who commands in Sevastopol, received the approval of the tsar and his ministers, who remained deaf to the ideas of the English consul in Odessa and the English ambassador in St. Petersburg.

Surely someone is lying here. Either the Stalinist historian Naida or Marx. According to the description of the battle given by Naida, it can be determined that there were eight Russian ships participating in the battle, and seventeen Turkish ships were destroyed. Therefore, according to Naida, the advantage was on the side of the Turks. Marx talks about superiority the Russians, compared with the Turkish forces, had more than 3 steam double-deck ships, one three-deck and 680 guns. And the battle of Sinop, according to Marx, is not a feat of Russian sailors, but perfidious and cowardly slaughter, destroying the weakest enemy. Here is how Marx writes in the article "The Western Powers and Turkey"

To the vast array of diplomatic documents already made public, there was added a note dated December 12 of the Four Powers, handed to the Porte jointly by the respective ambassadors in Constantinople, as well as a new circular of M. Drouin de Luis, signed in Paris on December 30, to the French diplomatic agents. If you carefully read the note of the four powers, you can understand why such unrest began in Constantinople when it became known that the note had been accepted by the Porte, why an insurrectionary movement arose on December 21 and why the Turkish ministry had to solemnly declare that the resumption of peace negotiations would not entail any termination hostilities, nor their suspension. Indeed, exactly nine days after the announcement of perfidious and cowardly Sinop massacre reached Constantinople and was greeted throughout the Ottoman Empire with a single cry of vengeance, the four powers coolly urge - and the ambassadors of Great Britain and France even force - Porto to enter into negotiations with the king on the following basis: all previous treaties will be renewed; the firmans relating to religious privileges granted by the Sultan to his Christian subjects will be supplemented by new guarantees granted to each of the powers, and consequently to the king; The Porte will appoint a commissioner to conclude a truce; she would permit Russia to build a church and a hospital in Jerusalem, and pledge herself to the powers (and consequently to the tsar) to improve her internal administrative system. Not only will the Porta not receive any compensation for the heavy damage caused to it by the piratical actions of the Muscovites, but, on the contrary, the chains that Russia forced Turkey to wear for a quarter of a century will be forged anew, and the prisoner will be shackled even stronger than before. The Porte must surrender to the mercy of the autocrat, humbly guaranteeing him the firmans of the religious privileges of her Christian subjects, and solemnly vouching for her internal administrative system. Thus, it must submit simultaneously to the protectorate of the king in religious matters and to his dictate in matters of civil government. As compensation for such a surrender, the Porte is promised "to evacuate the Danubian Principalities as soon as possible", the seizure of which Lord Clanricard called "an act of piracy", and they also assure her that the preamble of the treaty of July 13, 1841, which turned out to be such a "reliable guarantee" against Russia, will be formally confirmed.
Although in their unheard-of villainy the contemptible "powers" have reached the highest limit, forcing the Porte, a few days after Sinope, to negotiate on such a basis, yet they will not get rid of their difficulties in such a vile way. The tsar has already gone too far, he will not tolerate the slightest encroachment on the part of any of the European powers on the protectorate right he defends over the Christian subjects of Turkey.

This passage refers to the note of the four European powers of England, France, Austria and Prussia, who offered Turkey mediation for a peaceful settlement of the conflict with Russia. The demand for Russia was the withdrawal of troops from the Danubian principalities, and Turkey had to satisfy Russia's demands for special rights for Orthodox Christians. This solution of the problem did not suit the war party at all, which sought to draw the European powers into the war against Russia. This passage shows the relation of the war party to the proposed treaty, and Marx's attitude to the war party.

The battle of Sinop, called a perfidious and cowardly massacre, is presented as an unexpected aggressive act of Russia, which destroyed a peaceful Turkish squadron and several merchant ships in the Sinop bay. Domestic military history thinks differently. The Turkish squadron, breaking away from the storm in the Sinop Bay, was preparing for an attack on the coast of the Caucasus, and the attack on the Turkish fleet was justified by this threat. Moreover, it was undertaken after the declaration of war. Therefore, she was neither treacherous nor cowardly. Here is what Naida S.F. writes about this. in a book about Nakhimov.

On September 14, 1853, Turkey announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia. Britain and France took the side of Turkey. True to their policy of raking in the heat with the wrong hands, they provoked Turkey in every possible way to go to war with Russia. The Anglo-French fleet entered the Sea of ​​Marmara through the Dardanelles and then arrived in Constantinople. It was an open challenge to Russia.

The hostilities of the Turks began on October 11 with an attack on the ships of the Danube Flotilla in the Galati region, and on the night of October 15-16, on the post of St. Nicholas on the Caucasian coastline. On the part of Russia, a manifesto declaring war on Turkey was signed on October 20, 1853.

Therefore, by October 18, 1853, Russia was already at war with Turkey, so the attack on the Turkish squadron cannot be called a treacherous attack.

On November 1, Nakhimov received the manifesto declaring war on Turkey by Russia at sea. From Sevastopol, the manifesto was delivered to him by the Bessarabia steamer.

On November 3, Nakhimov handed over to the ships of his squadron a manifesto declaring war and with it his order, in which he stated the following: “The Turkish fleet went to sea with the intention of occupying the port of Sukhum-Kale belonging to us (general was sent from Sevastopol with 6 ships to search for the fleet Adjutant Kornilov). The intention of the enemy cannot be fulfilled otherwise than by passing us by or giving us battle. In the first case, I hope for the vigilant supervision of Messrs. commanders and officers, in the second, with God's help and confidence in my commanders and officers and teams, I hope to accept the battle with honor and prevent the enemy from fulfilling his audacious intention.

The purpose of the Turkish squadron was to attack the Caucasian coast and capture the fortress of Sukhum-Kale, but the squadron was forced to take refuge in the Sinop Bay in order to wait out the strong autumn storms. The attack of superior enemy forces in the Sinop Bay was called cowardly. Marx considered the Russian sailors who attacked the strongest enemy and defended the Caucasian coast from the attack of the Turkish squadron as cowards and scoundrels.

“By destroying the Turkish squadron, you have adorned the annals of the Russian fleet with a new victory, which will forever remain memorable in maritime history.” Emperor Nicholas I "Destruction of the Turkish fleet in Sinop by a squadron under...

“By destroying the Turkish squadron, you have adorned the annals of the Russian fleet with a new victory, which will forever remain memorable in maritime history.”

Emperor Nicholas I

"The destruction of the Turkish fleet in Sinop by a squadron under my command cannot but leave a glorious page in the history of the Black Sea Fleet."

P. S. Nakhimov

December 1 is the Day of military glory of Russia. This is the day of the victory of the Russian squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov over the Turkish squadron at Cape Sinop.

The battle took place in the harbor of the city of Sinop on the Black Sea coast of Turkey on November 18 (30), 1853. The Turkish squadron was defeated within a few hours. The battle at Cape Sinop was one of the major battles of the Crimean (Eastern) War, which began as a conflict between Russia and Turkey. In addition, it went down in history as the last major battle of the sailing fleets. Russia gained a serious advantage over the armed forces of the Ottoman Empire and dominance in the Black Sea (before the intervention of the great Western powers).

This naval battle became an example of the brilliant preparation of the Black Sea Fleet, led by one of the best representatives of the school of Russian military art. Sinop impressed all of Europe with the perfection of the Russian fleet, fully justified the many years of hard educational work of Admirals Lazarev and Nakhimov.

A. P. Bogolyubov. Destruction of the Turkish fleet in the battle of Sinop

background

In 1853 another war between Russia and Turkey began. It led to a global conflict involving the leading world powers. The Anglo-French squadron entered the Dardanelles. Fronts were opened on the Danube and in Transcaucasia. Petersburg, which counted on a quick victory over the Porte, a decisive advancement of Russian interests in the Balkans and a successful solution to the problem of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, received the threat of war with the great powers, with vague prospects. There was a threat that the Ottomans, followed by the British and French, would be able to provide effective assistance to the highlanders of Shamil. This led to a new large-scale war in the Caucasus and a serious threat to Russia from the south.

In the Caucasus, Russia did not have enough troops to simultaneously hold back the advance of the Turkish army and fight the highlanders. In addition, the Turkish squadron supplied the troops on the Caucasian coast with weapons and ammunition. Therefore, the Black Sea Fleet received two main tasks:

1. hastily transport reinforcements from the Crimea to the Caucasus;
2. strike at enemy sea lanes. Prevent the Ottomans from landing a large landing force on the eastern coast of the Black Sea in the region of Sukhum-Kale (Sukhumi) and Poti to help the highlanders.

Pavel Stepanovich completed both tasks.

On September 13, in Sevastopol, they received an emergency order to transfer an infantry division with artillery to Anakria (Anaklia). At that time, the Black Sea Fleet was restless. There were rumors about the performance on the side of the Ottomans of the Anglo-French squadron. Nakhimov immediately took over the operation. In four days he prepared the ships and placed troops on them in perfect order: 16 battalions with two batteries (more than 16 thousand people), and all the necessary weapons and equipment. On September 17, the squadron went to sea and on the morning of September 24 came to Anakria. By evening, the unloading was completed. The operation was recognized as brilliant, among the sailors bi soldiers there were only a few patients.

Having solved the first problem, Pavel Stepanovich proceeded to the second. It was necessary to disrupt the enemy landing operation. A 20,000 Turkish corps was concentrated in Batumi, which was to be transferred by a large transport flotilla (up to 250 ships). The landing was to be covered by Osman Pasha's squadron.

At this time, the commander of the Crimean army and the Black Sea Fleet was Prince Alexander Menshikov. He sent a squadron of Nakhimov and Kornilov to search for the enemy. On November 5 (17), V. A. Kornilov met the Ottoman 10-gun steamer Pervaz-Bahre, sailing from Sinop. Steam frigate "Vladimir" (11 guns) under the flag of the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet Kornilov attacked the enemy. The commander of the "Vladimir" captain-lieutenant Grigory Butakov directly led the battle. He used the high maneuverability of his ship and noticed the weakness of the enemy - the absence of guns at the stern of the Turkish steamer. Throughout the battle, he tried to hold on so as not to fall under the fire of the Ottomans. The three-hour battle ended with a Russian victory. It was the first steamship battle in history. Then Vladimir Kornilov returned to Sevastopol and ordered Rear Admiral F. M. Novosilsky to find Nakhimov and reinforce him with the battleships Rostislav and Svyatoslav, and the brig Eney. Novosilsky met with Nakhimov and, having completed the assignment, returned to Sevastopol.

Nakhimov with a detachment from the end of October cruised between Sukhum and part of the Anatolian coast, where Sinop was the main port. The Vice Admiral, after meeting with Novosiltsev, had five 84-gun ships: Empress Maria, Chesma, Rostislav, Svyatoslav and Brave, as well as the frigate Insidious and the brig Eney. On November 2 (14), Nakhimov issued an order to the squadron, where he notified the commanders that in the event of a meeting with an enemy that "is superior in strength to us, I will attack him, being completely sure that each of us will do our job."

Every day they waited for the appearance of the enemy. In addition, there was the possibility of meeting with British ships. But there was no Ottoman squadron. We met only Novosilsky, who brought two ships, replacing those battered by the storm and sent to Sevastopol. On November 8, a severe storm broke out, and the vice admiral was forced to send 4 more ships for repairs. The situation was critical. The strong wind continued after the November 8 storm.

On November 11, Nakhimov approached Sinop and immediately sent a brig with the news that an Ottoman squadron was stationed in the bay. Despite the significant enemy forces, which were protected by 6 coastal batteries, Nakhimov decided to block the Sinop Bay and wait for reinforcements. He asked Menshikov to send the ships "Svyatoslav" and "Brave", the frigate "Kovarna" and the steamer "Bessarabia" sent for repair. The admiral also expressed bewilderment why he was not sent the frigate Kulevchi, which is idle in Sevastopol, and send two more additional steamers necessary for cruising. Nakhimov was ready to fight if the Turks made a breakthrough. However, the Turkish command, although at that time had an advantage in strength, did not dare to enter into a general battle or simply go for a breakthrough. When Nakhimov reported that the Ottoman forces in Sinop, according to his observations, were higher than previously thought, Menshikov sent reinforcements - a squadron of Novosilsky, and then a detachment of Kornilov's ships.

The battle of the steam frigate "Vladimir" with the Turkish-Egyptian military steamer "Pervaz-Bakhri" on November 5, 1853. A. P. Bogolyubov

Side forces

Reinforcements arrived just in time. On November 16 (28), 1853, Nakhimov’s detachment was reinforced by the squadron of Rear Admiral Fyodor Novosilsky: 120-gun battleships Paris, Grand Duke Konstantin and Three Saints, frigates Cahul and Kulevchi. As a result, under the command of Nakhimov there were already 6 battleships: the 84-gun Empress Maria, Chesma and Rostislav, the 120-gun Paris, Grand Duke Konstantin and Three Saints, the 60-gun frigate " Kulevchi" and 44-gun "Cahul". Nakhimov had 716 guns, from each side the squadron could fire a salvo weighing 378 pounds 13 pounds. 76 guns were bombing, firing explosive bombs, which had great destructive power. Thus, the advantage was on the side of the Russian fleet. In addition, Kornilov hurried to the aid of Nakhimov with three steam frigates.

The Turkish squadron included: there were 7 frigates, 3 corvettes, several auxiliary ships and a detachment of 3 steam frigates. Altogether, the Turks had 476 naval guns, supported by 44 coastal guns. The Ottoman squadron was led by the Turkish Vice Admiral Osman Pasha. The second flagship was Rear Admiral Hussein Pasha. An English adviser, Captain A. Slade, was with the squadron. The detachment of steamships was commanded by Vice Admiral Mustafa Pasha. The Turks had their advantages, the main of which were parking in a fortified base and the presence of steamboats, while the Russians had only sailing ships.

Admiral Osman Pasha, knowing that the Russian squadron was guarding him at the exit from the bay, sent an alarm message to Istanbul, asking for help, significantly exaggerating Nakhimov's forces. However, the Turks were late, the message was transmitted to the British on November 17 (29), a day before the attack of the Russian fleet. Even if Lord Stratford-Radcliffe, who at that time actually led the policy of the Porte, had ordered the British squadron to go to the aid of Osman Pasha, the help would still be late. In addition, the British ambassador in Istanbul did not have the right to start a war with the Russian Empire, the admiral could refuse.

Nakhimov's idea

The Russian admiral, as soon as the reinforcements arrived, decided not to wait, to immediately enter the Sinop Bay and attack the enemy. In essence, Nakhimov took a risk, albeit a well-calculated one. The Ottomans had good ship and coastal guns, and with appropriate leadership, the Turkish forces could inflict serious damage on the Russian squadron. However, the once formidable Ottoman navy was in decline, both in combat training and leadership.

The Turkish command itself played along with Nakhimov, placing the ships extremely inconvenient for defense. Firstly, the Ottoman squadron was located like a fan, a concave arc. As a result, the ships closed the firing sector of part of the coastal batteries. Secondly, the ships were located near the embankment itself, which did not give them the opportunity to maneuver and fire with two sides. Thus, the Turkish squadron and coastal batteries could not fully resist the Russian fleet.

Nakhimov's plan was imbued with determination and initiative. The Russian squadron in the ranks of two wake columns (the ships followed one after the other along the course line) received an order to break through to the Sinop roadstead and strike at enemy ships and batteries. The first column was commanded by Nakhimov. It included the ships "Empress Maria" (flagship), "Grand Duke Konstantin" and "Chesma". The second column was led by Novosilsky. It included "Paris" (2nd flagship), "Three Saints" and "Rostislav". The movement in two columns was supposed to reduce the time it took the ships to pass under the fire of the Turkish squadron and coastal batteries. In addition, it was facilitated by the deployment of Russian ships in battle formation when anchored. In the rearguard were frigates, which were supposed to stop the enemy's attempts to escape. The goals of all ships were also distributed in advance.

At the same time, ship commanders had a certain independence in choosing targets, depending on the specific situation, while implementing the principle of mutual support. “In conclusion, I will express the idea,” Nakhimov wrote in the order, “that all preliminary instructions under changed circumstances can make it difficult for a commander who knows his business, and therefore I leave everyone to act completely independently at their own discretion, but by all means do their duty.”

The Black Sea Admiral Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov, who played an outstanding role in the Battle of Sinop, was a bold successor to these glorious traditions.

In order to correctly assess the progressive direction of Nakhimov's views, one must take into account that these words were spoken in the most cruel era of serfdom, the Arakcheev regime and the Nikolaev reaction, when they looked at the soldier and sailor as if they were a living machine, when an official, soulless attitude towards the people was the main principle of the state management.

In such a gloomy era, Nakhimov respected and appreciated the sailors, took care of them and taught this to the officers of the fleet.

Nakhimov passionately loved the naval service and strove to make every person who came to the fleet like it. An ardent follower of the best traditions of Ushakov, Nakhimov was a model of honesty, disinterestedness and selfless love for the fleet for sailors and officers. The sailors who served under Nakhimov were ready to follow him into fire and into water.

Commanding the Silistria, Nakhimov actively participated in the hostilities off the coast of the Caucasus. It was here, off the coast of the Caucasus, that the Black Sea sailors in the 30-40s of the 19th century received combat training, which served them greatly during the Battle of Sinop and the heroic defense of Sevastopol.

In the struggle for the annexation of the Caucasus, whose peoples historically and economically gravitated towards Russia, the troops of tsarist Russia had to meet strong opposition from capitalist England, which sought to turn the Caucasus with its richest natural resources into its colony. England supported Turkey and Persia in every possible way in their struggle for the Caucasian lands.

Deploying subversive activities in the Caucasus, the British and Turks pinned great hopes on the spread of Muridism there.

Muridism, a reactionary, anti-popular religious and political movement, began to spread among the Caucasian highlanders as early as the end of the 18th century, when the ruling circles of England and Turkey tried, under the banner of "ghazavat", that is, the "holy" war of Muslims against the "infidels", to unite the Caucasian Muslims for war with Russia. In the 40s of the 19th century, the main forces of Muridism were headed by Shamil. As Marx pointed out, Shamil corresponded with the Turkish sultan, who promised him the title of king of the Transcaucasus after the capture of Tiflis. Marx also noted that the English squadron was supposed to enter into contact with the Circassians, and the Turkish fleet was supposed to deliver weapons to them.

The main efforts of the Anglo-Turkish agents in the northwestern Caucasus were aimed at eliminating the Black Sea coastline, which consisted of twelve small fortifications built by Russian troops in 1830-1839. on the eastern coast of the Black Sea from Anapa to Sukhumi.

In the winter of 1840, the highlanders, incited by England, taking advantage of the small number of garrisons left by the Russian command in the forts of Velyaminovskiy and Psezuap, captured these points; On February 16, Fort Psezuape was taken, and on March 4, Fort Velyaminovskiy.

During the defense of this fortification, Arkhip Osipov, an ordinary Tenginsky regiment, performed a patriotic feat. When the highlanders broke into the fortification, Osipov went inside the powder magazine and blew it up, destroying several hundred highlanders along with him. The village of Arkhipovo-Osipovka, located in the valley of the Vulan River, 1 km from the Black Sea coast, in the middle between Tuapse and Gelendzhik, was named after the infantry hero.

In Vladikavkaz (now Dzaudzhikau), where the Tenginsky regiment came to stay, a monument was erected to Osipov. For the first time in the history of the Russian army and navy, the name of a hero-soldier was entered forever in the lists of the unit. When Osipov's name was called at roll call, the next private of the 1st company of the Tenginsky regiment, following him on the list, answered: "He died for the glory of Russian weapons at the Mikhailovsky fortification."

The tradition of entering forever into the lists of the most distinguished heroes was subsequently continued by the Soviet Army and Navy.

In April 1840, the squadron of the Black Sea Fleet received the task of landing troops and, together with the ground forces, liberating the forts Psezuape and Velyaminovskiy, captured by the highlanders. A major role in this landing was played by the commander of the flagship Silistria, the future leader of the Sinop battle P. S. Nakhimov.

The participation of the Black Sea sailors in the Caucasian landings improved the artillery art of the Russian sailors, which was fully manifested in the historical Battle of Sinop.

The military activity of P. S. Nakhimov in the Caucasian campaign of 1840 was highly appreciated by Vice Admiral M. P. Lazarev, who wrote in his report to Menshikov on June 19, 1840: “Commander of the 41st naval crew and the ship Silistria, captain 1st rank Nakhimov, commander of the 38th crew, captain 2nd rank Kornilov, who constantly distinguished himself by exemplary service, commanded during the occupation of Tuapse and Psezuap, the first - the left, and the second - the right flank of the rowboats, during the landing of the landing troops at both of these points, fulfilling the order he had made with speed and with perfect order, unanimous participation contributed to the happy end of the landing expedition when occupying two points on the eastern coast of the Black Sea ... ".

Near the Caucasian shores, in the difficult conditions of the then little-known coast, the Black Sea sailors showed the art of interacting with the ground forces; P. S. Nakhimov showed himself to be a master of this important type of combat activity of the fleet.

In September 1845, Nakhimov received the rank of rear admiral and at the same time was appointed commander of the 1st brigade of the 4th naval division.

In September 1853, to reinforce the troops of the Separate Caucasian Corps, the Black Sea Fleet was instructed to transfer by sea from Sevastopol to the Caucasian coast - to Sukhumi and Anakria - the 13th Infantry Division with attached to it. artillery, convoy with ammunition, food and other equipment. The implementation of this military enterprise was entrusted to Nakhimov.

Under the flag of Vice-Admiral Nakhimov, the Black Sea Fleet, consisting of 34 ships and vessels of various classes, despite adverse weather, made the transition from Sevastopol to Sukhumi and Anakria in seven days. The landing of an entire division took Nakhimov only eight hours. 16393 people were transported, 2 light batteries, 824 horses, ammunition, food, hospital equipment and more.

The success of this transportation testified to the exceptionally high combat training of the Black Sea squadron, especially if we take into account that the landing of people, the unloading of artillery, ammunition and horses was carried out on an unequipped coast, in autumn stormy weather and with very primitive loading and unloading means.

Transportation of ground troops by sea is one of the most complex activities of the fleet. As you know, the Americans, even 45 years later, did not know how to hold such events. So, for example, during the landing of American troops in Cuba in 1898, during the Spanish-American War, it turned out that not only the military units were incorrectly divided into ships, but the cargo was also incorrectly distributed. Field guns and pontoons were placed at the very bottom of the holds; above them was a store of provisions. As a result, the pontoons could only be obtained on the third day of unloading, and the guns began to be unloaded only on the fourth day.

The Black Sea squadron during operations off the coast of the Caucasus received excellent hardening, went through a harsh school of combat training, which was brilliantly manifested in the battle of Sinop.

On the eve of the Crimean War, in October 1853, Nakhimov was appointed commander of the squadron of the Black Sea Fleet.

By the beginning of the 50s of the XIX century, the aggravation of the Anglo-Russian contradictions in the Eastern question began to manifest itself especially strongly. In October 1853, the Crimean War broke out. Turkey opened hostilities. England, France, Sardinia also opposed Russia.

England played a leading role in unleashing the war. England and France sought to disarm Russia in the Black Sea and, using Turkey on their side, to achieve dominance in the Middle East. The British bourgeoisie, in search of new markets, sought to oust Russia from the Transcaucasus, the North Caucasus and the Middle East. In addition, the Anglo-French ruling circles intended to wrest Poland, Lithuania, Finland, part of the Ukraine from Russia and establish themselves on the Russian Pacific shores.

In turn, Russian tsarism sought to seize the Black Sea straits and gain access to the Mediterranean Sea. Russia's desire to access the Mediterranean and to expand foreign trade was partly due to the economic development of the country. In addition, Russia needed to protect its Black Sea borders. The weakening of Turkey in the war with Russia objectively contributed to the liberation movement of the Balkan peoples who fought against the Turkish yoke.

The United States actively contributed to the incitement of the Crimean War. Marx noted: “The pressure of the American Union on the Areopagus of the five great powers, who until now were the rulers of the fate of the globe, is a new force that is destined to contribute to the fall of the exclusive system created by the Vienna treatises.”

England and France did not immediately enter the war. At first, according to traditional English policy, they waged war with the hands of others, in this case the hands of Turkey, while remaining behind the scenes themselves.

Stalin described the essence of British politics, pointing out that “... the English bourgeoisie does not like to fight with its own hands. She always preferred to wage war by proxy. And sometimes she really managed to find fools who were ready to drag chestnuts out of the fire for her.

The provocative behavior of British diplomacy hastened the start of the war. Back in September 1853, the Anglo-French fleet entered the Sea of ​​Marmara through the Dardanelles to reinforce the Turkish fleet, repeatedly beaten by the Russians during previous wars, and to provoke the Turkish government into opening hostilities against Russia. Turkey, which broke off diplomatic relations with Russia back in May 1853, on October 11, instigated by England and France, attacked the ships of the Russian Danube flotilla in the Isacci region. On the night of October 15-16, the post of St. Nicholas, located on the Caucasian coast, south of Poti, was attacked by the Turks.

In autumn, in Sevastopol, it became known about the intentions of the British to organize an offensive by the Turks from the Transcaucasus. For this purpose, the transfer of Turkish troops and supplies by sea from the Bosporus to the eastern coast of the Black Sea was being prepared. Additionally, it became known that Turkish ships received an order to attack Russian ships when they met at sea.

In this regard, the Russian Black Sea Fleet was entrusted with the task of monitoring the actions of the enemy in the Black Sea and, if necessary, by force of arms to prevent the transfer of Turkish troops to the Caucasus.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet was ordered - “1) not to attack Turkish coastal cities and harbors; 2) if the Turkish fleet goes to sea, try to destroy it; 3) try to cut off communication between Constantinople and Votum, and if foreign escorts would take it into their heads to prevent our attacks on Turkish ships, then look at them as an enemy "

At that time, the squadron of the best warships of the Black Sea Fleet, which in fact were its main combat core, was commanded by Nakhimov. Another squadron of the Black Sea Fleet was commanded by Rear Admiral Novosilsky. Novosilsky's squadron was in full combat readiness on the Sevastopol roadstead, and Nakhimov, having sent several frigates and brigs to monitor the Bosphorus, from October 11, cruised with his squadron along the eastern shores of the Black Sea, between Crimea and Anatolia.

It was the season of ferocious Black Sea autumn storms. Overcoming the raging sea, Nakhimov's squadron observed the communication routes between Constantinople, the Anatolian ports and Batum. On November 1, 1853, Nakhimov received the news delivered by the Bessarabia steamer and the Kovarna frigate about the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey.

In his orders to the squadron to declare war on Russia by Turkey and to put the ships on alert, Nakhimov gives his subordinates a number of important instructions. “... without spreading in instructions,” Nakhimov wrote, “I will express my opinion that, in my opinion, in maritime affairs, a close distance from the enemy and mutual assistance to each other is the best tactic ...”.

Preparing for a battle with the enemy, Nakhimov wrote in an order for the squadron: ".. in the event of a meeting with an enemy that exceeds our strength, I will attack him, being absolutely sure that each of us will do his job ...".

On November 4, 1853, the first military clash in this campaign took place on the Black Sea. The steamer of the Nakhimov squadron "Bessarabia" noticed the Turkish steamer "Medjari-Tejaret" near Cape Kerempe, sailing from Sinop. After a short chase, the Turkish steamer was captured. This was the first time in naval history that one armed steamer was captured by another.

The next day, November 5, Russian sailors captured another Turkish ship. The large Turkish steamship-frigate "Pervaz-Bakhri" was intercepted by the steamship-frigate (i.e., a frigate that had somewhat lighter sailing equipment and a steam engine) "Vladimir", which was cruising, and as a result of a stubborn battle, was taken prisoner. This was the first battle of steam ships in the history of naval art; Russian sailors emerged victorious from it. A great merit in this belongs to the founder of the tactics of the steam fleet, later the famous admiral, and at that time captain-lieutenant G. I. Butakov, who commanded the steamship-frigate "Vladimir" in this battle.

On November 6, Nakhimov went to Sinop, as he received information from the captured Turks from the Medjari-Tejaret that the Turkish squadron, marching to the Caucasus, took refuge from the storm in the Sinop Bay.

On November 8, in the evening, Nakhimov was already at Sinop, on the roadstead of which he first managed to find 4 Turkish ships.

A fierce storm that rose at night, which was then replaced by thick fog, did not allow Nakhimov to immediately start hostilities, especially since the ships of the Nakhimov squadron were badly damaged by the storm - two ships and one frigate had to be sent to Sevastopol for repairs.

Having sent the Bessarabia steamer with a report to Sevastopol, Nakhimov, with his detachment of three ships and a brig, remained to block the enemy fleet at Sinop, waiting for better meteorological conditions.

On November 11, when the weather improved, Nakhimov came close to Sinop Bay to clarify the strength of the Turkish squadron. It turned out that on the roads of Sinop there were not 4, as was found at the beginning, but 12 Turkish warships, 2 brigs and 2 transports.

Nakhimov immediately sent the brig "Eney" to Sevastopol with a request to quickly send the ships "Svyatoslav" and "Brave" sent for repair to Sinop, as well as the frigate "Kulevchi", which had been delayed in Sevastopol. Nakhimov himself, with the forces of the three ships he had, proceeded to blockade the Turkish squadron.

The Russian ships blocking Sinop kept at the very entrance to the bay in order to stop any attempt by the Turks to break into the sea. This maneuver - to keep close to the coast under sail in severe stormy conditions - required great maritime skill and knowledge of the matter; Russian sailors clearly proved that they perfectly master these qualities.

The Turks did not dare to go to sea; the Turkish squadron preferred to remain on the Sinop roadstead under the protection of coastal batteries.

On November 16, Novosilsky's squadron, consisting of 3 ships and a frigate, approached Sinop. The second frigate, the Kulevchi, approached on November 17. After that, Nakhimov had three 120-gun ships: "Paris", "Grand Duke Konstantin" and "Three Saints", three 84-gun ships: "Empress Maria", "Chesma" and "Rostislav" and two frigates: 44-gun "Kagulom" and 56-gun "Kulevchi". In total, Russian ships had 710 guns. Of this number, 76 guns were bombing. As you know, the bombing guns of the XIX century. were improved Russian "unicorns" of Shuvalov-Martynov of the 18th century, but qualitatively they were still new guns that fired explosive bombs of great destructive power.

The Turkish squadron consisted of 7 frigates, 2 corvettes, 1 sloop, 2 ships and 2 transports. In addition to these warships, two merchant brigs and a schooner stood on the Sinop roadstead.

The Sinop Bay with depths from 13 to 46 m is one of the largest and safest bays on the Anatolian coast of the Black Sea. A large peninsula, far out into the sea, protects the bay from strong winds. The city of Sinop, spread out in the middle of the peninsula, was covered from the sea by six coastal batteries, which served as reliable protection for the Turkish squadron.

Nakhimov decided to attack the enemy. On the morning of November 17, on the ship Empress Maria, which was carrying the admiral's flag, Nakhimov gathered the second flagship of Rear Admiral Novosilsky and the ship commanders and briefed them on the attack plan. Nakhimov's plan provided for a tactical deployment phase, the organization of two tactical groupings to strike and the allocation of a maneuverable reserve to pursue enemy steam ships. In order to reduce the time spent under enemy fire, both columns had to approach the battlefield at the same time, with flagships in front, who determined the combat distance to the enemy, and anchored using the spring method, according to the disposition.

Nakhimov refused to deliver a series of successive attacks on the enemy and from the very beginning he intended to bring all his ships into battle. Separate tasks were assigned to the ships of the squadron. The terminal ships of both columns "Rostislav" and "Chesma" had to perform an extremely responsible role - to fight the enemy's coastal batteries on the flanks. The frigates "Cahul" and "Kulevchi" as the fastest were supposed to remain under sail during the battle and oppose enemy ships. At the same time, Nakhimov, as before, in his orders emphasized that each ship was obliged to act independently, depending on the prevailing situation, and to help each other.

At 11 o’clock in the morning, Nakhimov’s order was already being read on the ships of the squadron, ending with the words: “... Russia expects glorious deeds from the Black Sea Fleet, it depends on us to live up to expectations!”

Nakhimov decided to destroy the numerous enemy, well-armed and protected by coastal fortifications, who were waiting for reinforcements from Constantinople.

The morning of November 18, 1853 came - the day of the Sinop battle. A strong southeast wind was blowing, and it was raining.

At ten o'clock, a signal went up on the Russian admiral's ship: "Prepare for battle and go to the Sinop raid." In a short time, the ships prepared for battle. At 10 am, the teams were given lunch.

Noon, which Nakhimov did not miss to mark with a signal, as if it were an ordinary everyday day, and not the moment of the highest pre-battle tension, found the Russian ships built in two columns, going under full sail to the enemy raid. Russian naval flags fluttered proudly. The right column was headed by the ship "Empress Maria", on which was Admiral Nakhimov; at the head of the left column on the ship "Paris" was Novosilsky. At 12 o'clock. 28 min. the first shot was fired from the Turkish flagship frigate "Auni-Allah", and at the same moment the ship "Empress Maria" opened fire ...

Thus began the famous Sinop battle, which had not only tactical but also strategic significance, since the Turkish squadron, defending from the storm in Sinop, had to go to capture Sukhum and assist the highlanders. Engels wrote about this: “In November, the entire Turkish and Egyptian fleet went to the Black Sea to divert the attention of the Russian admirals from the expedition, which was intended to land on the Caucasian coast with weapons and ammunition for the rebellious highlanders.”

The intention of the enemy to attack Sukhumi was also emphasized by Nakhimov in his order of November 3, 1853. This is also mentioned in the magazine of the ship "Three Saints" for 1853. Thus, the Sinop battle was an anti-landing event, exemplarily organized and carried out by Nakhimov.

On the first shot from the Turkish flagship, all Turkish ships opened fire and, somewhat late, the enemy coastal batteries. The poor organization of service in the Turkish coastal defense (from the Russian ships it was visible how the Turkish gunners fled from the neighboring village to the batteries, hurrying to take their places at the guns) allowed the Nakhimov ships to pass the enemy batteries located on the cape without much damage; only the longitudinal fire of two batteries - No. 5 and No. 6, located in the depths of the bay - served as some obstacle to the advance of Russian ships.

The fight flared up. Following the "Maria" and "Paris", strictly observing the distance, the rest of the Russian ships entered the raid, sequentially taking their places according to the disposition. Each ship, having anchored and started the spring, chose an object for itself and acted independently.

The Russian ships, as envisaged by the Nakhimov plan of attack, approached the Turks at a distance of no more than 300-350 meters. The first flurry of Turkish fire hit the Empress Maria. While the ship was approaching the appointed place, most of the spars and standing rigging were killed by cannonballs. Despite these damages, Nakhimov's ship, having opened crushing fire on enemy ships, anchored not far from the enemy admiral's frigate "Auni-Allah" and fired at it from all its guns. The Turkish flagship could not withstand the well-aimed fire of the Russian gunners - he riveted the anchor chain and threw himself ashore. The same fate befell the 44-gun frigate "Fazli-Allah", on which Nakhimov suffered destructive fire after the flight of "Auni-Allah". Embraced in flames, "Fazli-Allah" threw himself ashore after his admiral's ship.

Other Russian ships were no less successful. Pupils and associates of Nakhimov destroyed the enemy, sowing horror and confusion in his ranks.

The crew of the ship "Grand Duke Konstantin", skillfully operating with bombing guns, 20 minutes after the fire was opened, blew up the Turkish 60-gun frigate "Navek-Bakhri". Soon, the 24-gun corvette Nejmi-Feshan was hit by well-aimed fire from Konstantin.

The ship "Chesma", acting mainly against coastal batteries No. 3 and No. 4, razed them to the ground.

The ship "Paris" opened fire with all sides on battery No. 5, on the 22-gun corvette "Gyuli-Sefid" and on the 56-gun frigate "Damiad". Istomin - the commander of the "Paris" - did not miss the opportunity to hit the longitudinal fire so destructive for sailing ships (i.e., artillery fire along the entire length of the enemy ship) and the wrecked flagship frigate "Auni-Allah" when the latter drifted ashore past " Paris." The corvette "Gyuli-Sefid" took off into the air, the frigate "Damiad" threw itself ashore. Then the heroic crew of the "Paris" transferred their fire to the 64-gun frigate "Nizamie"; catching fire, "Nizamiye" washed ashore after "Damiad". After that, "Paris" transferred his fire to battery No. 5, located in the depths of the bay.

The fighting of the Paris team was excellent, and Nakhimov decided to thank her. But it turned out that during the battle all the signal halyards were killed on the Maria, and there was nothing to raise the signal on.

Go on the boat, - Nakhimov ordered his flag officer, - pass it on in words.

The ship "Three Saints", following the "Paris" in a column, chose the frigates "Kaidi-Zefer" and "Nizamiye" as its objects, but when one of the first Turkish cores broke its spring and the ship turned to the wind, the Turkish coastal battery No. 6 longitudinal fire caused him great damage in the spars, that is, in the wooden part intended for setting sails. The crew of the ship "Three saints" under strong enemy fire brought in longboats (large rowing boats) verp (an anchor) and, turning the stern of their ship, again concentrated fire on the frigate "Kaidi-Zefer" and other ships. The Turkish frigate was forced to withdraw from the battle and throw itself ashore.

Russian sailors and officers behaved heroically in battle. The sailor Dehta, the commander of the ship "Three Saints", held the fuse at the gun that had just fired, and although two sailors standing next to him were killed by a Turkish cannonball, Dehta remained at the combat post. Midshipman Varnitsky from the ship "Three Saints", while on a longboat for the delivery of a Verp, was wounded in the cheek, but did not leave his place and brought the matter to an end. On the ship "Rostislav" midshipman Kolokoltsev with several sailors put out a fire near the ammunition storage room, preventing the ship from exploding. The senior navigation officer of the Paris battleship Rodionov, helping to correct the ship's artillery fire, indicated with his hand the direction of the enemy battery. At that moment he was wounded in the face. Wiping the blood with one hand, Rodionov continued to indicate the direction of the Turkish battery with the other hand. Rodionov remained at his combat post until he fell, struck down by an enemy cannonball that tore off his arm.

The end Russian ship of the left column "Rostislav" at first became against battery No. 6 and 24 of the Feyzi-Meabud cannon corvette, at the same time helping "Paris" to fight against the frigate "Nizamie". However, when battery No. 6 aimed at the ship "Three Saints" and the cores of its guns began to fall on the Russian ship, the commander of "Rostislav", remembering Nakhimov's admonition that "mutual assistance to each other is the best tactic", and that under changed circumstances everyone should " act completely independently at his own discretion, ”transferred all his fire to battery No. 6 and the Feyzi-Meabud corvette. The battery was damaged, and the corvette washed ashore.

Less than two hours after the start of the battle, the Turkish squadron ceased to exist. Burning wreckage of ships and their mutilated hulls stuck to the shore - that's all that was left of the Turkish squadron after a duel with the Russians.

Only one Turkish 20-gun steamer Taif escaped this fate, which at the very beginning of the battle took to its heels. On the Taif was the Englishman Slade, an English adviser to the head of the Turkish squadron, Vice Admiral Osman Pasha, who held the post of assistant commander of the fleet in Turkey. Saving his own skin, Slade abandoned the Turkish squadron to the mercy of fate. Jumping out from behind the line of the Turkish squadron, Taif, under the cover of thick powder smoke that covered the bay, went out to the open sea. The frigates "Kagul" and "Kulevchi", prudently left by Nakhimov, were chasing the "Taif", but the steamer, using its advantage in speed, began to move away from the sailboats.

At this time, Kornilov approached the battlefield with three steamships - "Odessa", "Crimea" and "Khersones", hurrying to the aid of Nakhimov from Sevastopol.

It was at 13:00. 30 minutes, when the Sinop battle was in full swing. Kornilov, who at that time was the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, ordered his ships to pursue the Taif, but only the Odessa steamer managed to get close to the Taif at a distance of artillery fire and come into combat contact with it. However, despite the fact that the Taif had two dozen inch bomb guns and two dozen other guns, and the Odessa had only one bomb gun capable of firing, the Taif, the enemy's three times strongest steamer, did not take the fight. Having fired several volleys at the Russian steamer and taking advantage of the advantage in the course, the Taif again cowardly eluded the Russian ships. The only survivor of the Turkish squadron "Taif" and brought to Constantinople the news of the Sinop defeat.

The destruction of the coastal batteries No. 5 and No. 6 by the fire of "Paris" and "Rostislav" at about four o'clock in the afternoon, the battle of Sinop ended.

Evening came. A northeasterly wind was blowing, and at times it was raining. The evening sky, covered with clouds, was illuminated by a crimson glow from the burning city and the burning remnants of the Turkish squadron. A huge flame engulfed the horizon over Sinop.

In the Battle of Sinop, the Russians lost 38 men killed and 235 wounded. The Turks lost over 4 thousand killed, many Turkish sailors were captured, and among them were two ship commanders and the commander of the Turkish squadron, Vice Admiral Osman Pasha.

Russian sailors began to prepare for their return to Sevastopol. It was necessary to hurry: the ships were severely damaged, it was far from their native port, and the journey lay ahead in autumn stormy weather.

Having corrected the damage received in battle, Nakhimov's squadron left Sinop and, after a two-day transition through a stormy sea, arrived in Sevastopol on November 22.

The meeting of the Nakhimov squadron was very solemn. The entire population of the city, as on the day of a big holiday, welcoming the winners, went to Primorsky Boulevard, Grafskaya pier and the shores of the Sevastopol Bay.

November 23, 1853 Nakhimov gave the order for the squadron. “.I want to personally,” he wrote, “congratulate the commanders, officers and teams on the victory and thank them for their noble assistance to my assumptions and announce that with such subordinates I will proudly meet with any enemy European fleet.”

An analysis of the battle at Sinop allows us to draw the following conclusions.

Nakhimov in the battle of Sinop carried out a talented maneuver of breaking sailing ships into the enemy bay. For the first time in history, Nakhimov used with great efficiency the latest artillery technology of his time - bombing guns, and this played an important role in the complete defeat of the Turkish squadron.

Russian sailors showed a clear combat organization, skillfully fighting simultaneously against the ships of the enemy squadron and coastal batteries of the enemy.

Nakhimov brought his ships into the bay perpendicular to the location of the enemy ships. He distributed his six ships along the entire length of the Turkish ships. Being firmly convinced that the squadron personnel subordinate to him would quickly complete the intended maneuver, Nakhimov was not afraid of longitudinal fire from Turkish ships.

In the Battle of Sinop, the Nakhimov sailors accomplished a feat worthy of a Chesme victory.

The victory at Sinop showed the whole world the steadfastness and heroism of Russian sailors. The Battle of Sinop glorified Russian naval art at the last stage of the existence of the sailing fleet. He once again showed the superiority of Russian national naval art over the naval art of foreign fleets.

It is also important to note that the victory at Sinop thwarted Turkey's aggressive plans aimed at capturing Sukhumi.

The memory of the Sinop heroes has been preserved to this day, the people have composed many tales and songs about the Sinop victory.

The news of the Sinop victory was painfully received in the diplomatic circles of England and France. The English were furious at this news; in their opinion, the Russians “did it badly” by attacking the Turkish squadron in the Sinop Bay; the English ambassador, Lord Seymour, even declared that the Russian naval victory was "an insult to the English fleet." A somewhat more reserved position was taken by French diplomacy. At first, the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, Castelbajac, even congratulated Nicholas I on his victory, and only a few days later the French government made it clear that the national pride of the French was also offended by the defeat of the Turkish fleet.

Fearing the dominance of the Russian fleet after the Sinop victory, England and France on January 6, 1854 brought their squadrons into the Black Sea.

It is known that, in principle, the question of the war between England and France against Russia was predetermined by the British and French governments even earlier; the stop was only behind the establishment of methods and terms for the denouement of the planned war. The British and French were interested in the fact that the period of single combat between Turkey and Russia lasted as long as possible. This, according to their plans, was to weaken both sides, after which the Anglo-French capitalists could negotiate a higher price from Turkey for their "intercession".

In the light of these facts, the true meaning of the numerous steps of the Anglo-French diplomats, allegedly aimed at appeasing the Russian-Turkish conflict, the essence of their proposals to mediate a truce between Russia and Turkey, etc. becomes clear. Hiding behind the mask of "peacekeepers", pretending to be friends of Russia, the British and French, in fact, during the whole of 1853, stubbornly provoked the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey.

But the rapid outbreak of hostilities was especially embarrassing for the French Emperor Napoleon III. Frightened by the revolution of 1848, he was afraid of the specter of a new revolutionary explosion, a frequent companion of protracted wars. Napoleon III wanted a short and victorious war, which, in his opinion, could defuse the political atmosphere in France, as it would cause a wave of patriotic frenzy and distract the masses from "revolutionary passions" for a while. It is precisely this that explains why the French government has always taken a vacillating position.

According to the strategic plan of the Turks, the main attention was paid to the Caucasian theater of operations. An advance from Batumi, which was then under the rule of the Turks, to the north of the Caucasus, with the support of the Caucasian mountaineers, provoked by Anglo-Turkish agents, would give the Turks the opportunity to cut off the Russian South Caucasian army from the land. At the same time, the landing by the Turkish squadron and the unloading of equipment for the Caucasian Turkish army and mountaineers in the Sukhumi region should have been of decisive importance. With this turn of events, the British and French might not have been in a hurry to enter the war.

But the defeat of the Turkish squadron in the Sinop Bay disrupted all the calculations of Russia's opponents. The Caucasian "enterprise" of the Turks suffered serious damage. Turkey has lost a fleet in the Black Sea; the Russian fleet became dominant in the Black Sea theater. Russia could no longer fear a landing on the Caucasian coast since Turkey lost the opportunity to take major offensive actions in the Caucasus.

All this gave the Russian command the opportunity to win the time it needed so much. The importance of this factor was emphasized by Marx and Engels. They wrote: “All Russia needs is a delay, enough time to recruit a new army, distribute it throughout the empire, concentrate it and suspend the war with Turkey until it copes with the Caucasian highlanders.”

However, such a pause was in no way part of the plans of the British and French. If earlier they based their calculations on the mutual attrition of Turkey and Russia during hostilities, now they had to rush into the war so that this war would not get an undesirable protracted nature for them. .

The battle of Sinop made significant adjustments to international relations. Nicholas I, by the course of events, was drawn into the war not so much against Turkey, but against much more dangerous opponents for Russia - England and France. In the words of V. I. Lenin, a “boring war” began, in which no one wanted to act decisively. It was a continuation of the policy of delay and delay in the diplomacy of all the great powers, only ". .. other (namely: violent) "means"".

On the side of Turkey, in addition to England and France, later came out and Sardinia.

On March 15-16, 1854, England and France officially declared war on Russia, and on April 10, 1854, an Anglo-French squadron of 19 battleships and 10 steam-frigates bombarded Odessa and tried to land troops to capture the city. This attempt was repulsed by the Odessa coastal batteries.

During the summer campaign of 1854, the Anglo-French fleet made robbery raids on the Russian coast of the Baltic, appearing near Kronstadt and Sveaborg. English ships made several pirate attacks on Russian fishing villages in the North. In the Far East, on August 13-24, 1854, the British tried to land troops and take possession of Petropavlovsk-on-Kamchatka, but their attempt failed. The small garrison of Petropavlovsk heroically drove off the enemy, who, having suffered heavy losses, was forced to leave.

Having failed in their adventurous attempts in the Baltic, the North and the Far East, the Anglo-French command concentrated all its efforts on the Black Sea theater.

Even before that, the British and French landed a 50,000-strong army near Varna. At this time, Turkey was conducting intense battles on the Danube against the Russians, who were besieging the fortress of Silistria. “And yet, during this decisive siege,” Engels said, “20,000 English and 30,000 French soldiers -“ the color of both armies ”- stood at a distance of only a few transitions from this fortress, complacently lit their pipes and complacently prepared to receive cholera ... There is no second such an example in military history that the army, which could so easily come to the rescue, so cowardly left its allies to their fate.

On August 24, 1854, a huge enemy fleet, consisting of 89 warships and 300 transport ships, withdrew from Varna and, with a 62,000-strong Anglo-French-Turkish landing army on board, appeared off the coast of Crimea 8 days later. The enemy fleet for the most part consisted of steam-powered ships of the line and frigates armed with long-range artillery of the latest design.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet was two times smaller in number than the combined fleet of the enemy and was almost five times inferior to it in the number of steam ships. If the British and French had the fiftieth paddle and screw steamers, the Russians had only 11 paddle steamers and not a single propeller. Russian sailing ships were unable to fight on the high seas with such an enemy.

The backwardness of the economy of feudal Russia, the feudal system of which hampered the development of the country's productive forces, the lack of a regular supply of troops, impassability (a hay cart transported for the needs of the army from Melitopol to Simferopol was completely eaten by the horse that carried it) were the main reasons for Russia's unpreparedness for a big war The mediocrity of the high command - Nicholas I, Menshikov, Gorchakov, embezzlement - made the situation of the outbreak of war even more difficult for Russia.

The Russian army by this time numbered about a million people. Of this number, only 35,000 people were on the Crimean coast, of which 10,000 were in Sevastopol. Tsarist Russia could not send more soldiers to Crimea because of peasant unrest in the country. Popular unrest in Tambov, Voronezh, Kyiv and other provinces forced the government of Nicholas I to keep significant armed forces inside the country. In addition, in the Baltic, the North and the Far East, troops were needed to repel the aggressive aspirations of the British and French.

It would seem that with such a balance of forces of the warring parties, the denouement should have happened quickly and not in favor of Russia. But the unparalleled heroism of ordinary Russian people, who stood up to defend their native land and went into battle under the command of such advanced Russian officers as Nakhimov, Kornilov, Izilmetyev, Khrulev, Khrushchev and others, frustrated all the calculations of the enemy. It must also be borne in mind that the advanced officers of the fleet and army strove to achieve high combat training of personnel, sought various innovations in certain branches of military art; this, of course, had a positive effect in the very first battles with the Anglo-French troops.

As already mentioned, the balance of forces at sea at the time of the appearance of the enemy combined fleet off the coast of Crimea was far from in favor of the Russians. Sevastopol itself remained almost unprotected from land because of the myopia, carelessness and mediocrity of the Nikolaev generals. Therefore, the Anglo-French troops, which outnumbered the Russian units in terms of numbers and technical equipment, managed to land an expeditionary army on the Crimean peninsula, in the Evpatoria region.

The first battle took place at Alma on September 8, 1854. The outcome of the battle was decided in favor of the enemy due to the significant superiority in the strength of his weapons: all English soldiers were armed with rifled guns that fired at 1100-1200 steps, while the Russian troops had a total of 72 rifled guns. The vast majority of Russian soldiers had only antediluvian flintlock smoothbore guns that fired no further than 300 paces. Nevertheless, in the battle of Alma, the enemy met a crushing rebuff from the Russians and refused to pursue them further; Russian troops retreated in good order.

The battle of Alma had no effect on the overall strategic situation and had only tactical significance.

After the battle of Alma, the Anglo-French troops did not dare to immediately attack Sevastopol from the north side. They moved to the Inkerman-Balaklava region and began a long siege of Sevastopol from the south and southeast. The base of the British was Balaklava, the base of the French was Kamysheva Bay.

After the Battle of Alma, the army of Menshikov, who feared that the Anglo-French would not cut off the communications of the Crimea with the rest of Russia, without stopping in Sevastopol, withdrew through the northern side to Bakhchisaray.

At this time, literally before the eyes of the enemy, when the enemy was already on the outskirts of the city, Russian soldiers and sailors, under the leadership of Kornilov and Nakhimov, began to turn defenseless Sevastopol into a stronghold.

On September 14, 1854, Nakhimov, appointed chief of defense of the southern side of Sevastopol (Kornilov was appointed chief of defense of the northern side), gave the order to flood the ships of the Black Sea Fleet in order to block the entry of enemy ships into the bay, and to strengthen the Sevastopol bastions with guns taken from the sunken ships.

The sailors perceived this order of Nakhimov as the gravest grief. It was hard for Nakhimov and his associates to destroy their offspring - the Black Sea Fleet, glorified in battles with the enemy.

On September 10, the first seven ships were sunk. (The rest of the ships were sunk later, at the end of February 1855). The Chernomorians went to the bastions. The heroic defense of Sevastopol began, which, in the words of Engels, had no analogue in history.

About how great was the energy of the defenders of Sevastopol, says this fact. In 20 days, that is, from September 15 to October 4, 170 guns taken from sunken ships were installed at the coastal positions of Sevastopol under the leadership of Nakhimov and Kornilov. The sailors, accustomed to hard work on sailing ships, managed in an insignificantly short time to create a powerful defensive line around the city, which allowed them to put up stubborn resistance to the significantly superior and well-armed enemy for 11 months.

All the fortifications and batteries of the defensive line, with very few exceptions, were armed with guns mounted on naval gun carriages. Separate parts of the defensive position - the bastions - were occupied by ship crews in full force along with their officers. Sinop heroes began to fight valiantly on land, defending their native Sevastopol.

At the initiative of Nakhimov, the usual ship order was introduced on the coastal bastions. Just like on a ship, people kept watch, time was measured with bottles, etc. These little things of ordinary ship life had a very beneficial effect on sailors. Remaining in the circle of their former comrades, obeying the same orders and having their former bosses, the sailors very soon got used to the new service on the shore.

On October 5, 1854, during the first big bombardment of Sevastopol on the bastion of Malakhov Kurgan, one of the heroic leaders of the defense of Sevastopol, Kornilov, was mortally wounded. In fact, only Nakhimov, the hero of Sinop, remained the head of the defense of Sevastopol.

The old sailor, naval commander Nakhimov, who, as a result of the current military situation, became the commander of the defense of the city on land, applied in new conditions for him all the many years of experience that he had acquired at sea. And I must say that he turned out to be the same exemplary leader for the soldiers, as he always was for the sailors.

The entire civilian population of Sevastopol knew him by sight. Wherever the greatest danger or difficulty arose, Nakhimov invariably appeared. His fearlessness, tireless energy, fair exactingness, combined with cordiality and simplicity, attracted the hearts of people to him. He was a national hero of Sevastopol, the soul of its defense.

Nakhimov's personal courage inspired the defenders of Sevastopol to new exploits. And the Sevastopol residents performed many feats. Sailors and soldiers Rybakov, Bolotnikov, Eliseev, Zaika, Dymchenko, Kuzmenko, Koshka, Petrenko, Lubinsky, Shevchenko and many, many other ordinary Russian people, with their fearlessness, high service to military duty, wrote many glorious pages in the heroic history of the defense of Sevastopol. So, for example, boatswain Petrenko, in hand-to-hand combat with a group of enemy soldiers, put them to flight and brought 6 French guns with him to the bastion. Lubyansky and his comrade grabbed the bomb that had fallen on the deck of the Yagudiel ship with their hands and threw it overboard before it had time to explode. Sailor Koshka almost every night made his way into the enemy's trenches and always returned with trophies; sometimes he brought with him a captured Englishman, sometimes a Frenchman, sometimes he brought several guns, etc. The sailor Shevchenko covered the commander with his body ... All the exploits of the valiant defenders of Sevastopol cannot be listed!

Sinoptsy - as the participants in the Sinop battle were called - were tirelessly on the front lines of defense, on the hottest bastions. So, for example, captain of the 1st rank Yergomyshev, who commanded the 120-gun ship "Grand Duke Konstantin" in the Sinop battle, during the Sevastopol defense commanded the artillery of the 3rd bastion with batteries adjoining it; sailor - Sinopets Kuznetsov was an active defender of the Malakhov Kurgan, on which during the June bombardment he was seriously shell-shocked; with him on the Malakhov Kurgan was the twice wounded sailor Shikov. No less heroic were the sailors of the Sevastopol bastions Gordeev, Yurovsky, Litvin, Gorbunov and many other sailors who went ashore to defend their native Sevastopol. In fierce battles with the invaders, they increased the fighting traditions of the Sinop battle.

The fight was too unequal. On March 8, the former commander of the battleship "Paris", the hero of Sinope, Rear Admiral Istomin, was killed on Malakhov Kurgan, and on June 28, Nakhimov himself was mortally wounded on the same Malakhov Kurgan.

After the death of Nakhimov, the people of Sevastopol steadfastly held out for another two months. The garrison was then ordered to withdraw to the north side. After a 349-day defense that amazed the whole world with its heroism, the central and southern parts of the city were abandoned.

Having occupied the ruins of the central and southern parts of the city, the British and French achieved negligible results. The Russian army in the Crimea did not give the enemy the opportunity to develop any active operations; besides, the enemy, who suffered colossal losses, did not have sufficient forces for this.

The situation on other fronts also did not please the Anglo-French command. On September 17, 1855, the Russian troops of the Caucasian Front stormed the heavily fortified Turkish fortress of Kars, which was considered impregnable.

Nevertheless, the loss in this war for Russia was already a foregone conclusion. The Nikolaev empire, this "colossus with feet of clay", could not withstand a long war. The war further shattered the foundations of feudal-serfdom Russia, and socio-economic contradictions aggravated even more. Peasant unrest grew in the country; there were signs of a revolutionary situation (1859-1861). Nicholas I, frightened by the specter of recent revolutions in Europe, was in a hurry to sign peace on any terms.

In turn, in the camp of Russia's opponents, voices for the speedy conclusion of peace were also increasingly heard. The aggravated Anglo-French-Turkish contradictions, the heavy losses of the coalition troops near Sevastopol were an important factor contributing to this desire.

The dissatisfaction of the French population with the protracted war seriously frightened Napoleon III, who was afraid of a new revolutionary explosion. The government of Napoleon III began peace negotiations with Russia. Under the then prevailing conditions, England was also unable to continue the war and count on any effective successes.

The Anglo-French army remained in the central and southern parts of Sevastopol until March 30, 1856, and left only after the conclusion of the Paris Peace Treaty.

The feudal-serf system of tsarist Russia, with its appalling economic backwardness, was the most important reason for the military weakness of the Romanov Empire and predetermined the unsuccessful outcome of the war.

The immediate result of the war was that "The tsarist government, weakened by a military defeat during the Crimean campaign and intimidated by peasant" riots "against the landlords, was forced to abolish serfdom in 1861."

According to one of the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty, Russia was deprived of the opportunity to keep a navy in the Black Sea. However, taking advantage of the favorable international situation, Russia in the early 70s. 19th century again began to recreate the fleet on the Black Sea.

The heroism of Russian sailors in the Crimean War, in the battle of Sinop and in the defense of Sevastopol, raised the prestige of the Russian people in the eyes of the entire world public opinion. The halo of Sinop glory inspired respect for the Russian navy.

A hundred years have passed since the battle of Sipop.

During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders, the glory of Sevastopol once again thundered all over the world, when Soviet people, worthy descendants of the Sinop and Sevastopol heroes, defended the city from the Nazi hordes for 250 days, multiplying the heroic deeds of Sevastopol during the Crimean war.

On March 9, 1944, the Soviet government established an order and a medal in honor of PS Nakhimov. The most distinguished sailors and officers were awarded medals and orders of Nakhimov for military prowess and glorious military deeds.

By decision of the Soviet government, the Nakhimov Schools were organized, where the children of Soviet soldiers are brought up - sailors and partisans of the Patriotic War who died in battles with the Nazi invaders.

The village of Volochek, where PS Nakhimov was born, was renamed Nakhimovskoye; the school has been named after him. A new monument to Admiral Nakhimov is being built in Sevastopol.

Near Sinop in 1853, according to the recall of the hero of the Sevastopol defense V A. Kornilov, there was "a glorious battle, higher than Chesma and Navarin." Under Sinop, the best traditions of heroism and patriotism, shown by Russian sailors in the naval battles that preceded Sinop, were multiplied. In the battles that followed after Sinop, Russian sailors steadily followed the best traditions of their grandfathers and great-grandfathers - the heroes of Sinop and Sevastopol.

The glorious heroic traditions of the older generation of Russian sailors are highly honored by the Soviet people. New generations of Soviet sailors are brought up on these traditions, who showed valor and patriotism, selfless devotion to their beloved socialist Motherland in battles with the enemies of the Soviet people.

« Everyone's life belongs to the Fatherland, and not daring, but only true courage benefits him».
Admiral P. Nakhimov

The Sinop naval battle took place on November 18 (30), 1853 between the Russian squadron under the command of Admiral P.S. Nakhimov and the Turkish squadron under the command of Osman Pasha, during the Crimean War of 1853 - 1856. The battle took place in the harbor of the city of Sinop. The battle was won by the Russian squadron. It was the last major battle of the era of the sailing fleet.

Crimean War 1853–1856 entered Russian history as a symbol of one of the most difficult defeats, but at the same time she gave the clearest examples of unprecedented courage that was shown by Russian soldiers and sailors. And this war began with one of the most outstanding victories of the Russian fleet. It was the defeat of the Turkish fleet in the battle of Sinop. The large Turkish fleet was defeated in a few hours. However, the same battle served as a pretext for Great Britain and France to declare war on Russia and turned the Crimean War into one of the most difficult trials for the people and government.

background

Even on the eve of the war with Turkey, Vice Admiral F.S. Nakhimov with a squadron, which included 84-gun battleships "Empress Maria", "Chesma" and "Rostislav", was sent by Prince Menshikov to cruise to the shores of Anatolia. The reason for this was the information that the Turks in Sinop were preparing forces for landing troops near Sukhum and Poti. And in fact, approaching Sinop, Nakhimov saw in the bay a large detachment of Turkish ships under the protection of six coastal batteries. Then he decided to closely block the port, so that later, upon the arrival of reinforcements from Sevastopol, attack the enemy fleet. 1853, November 16 - the squadron of Rear Admiral F.M. joined the ships of Nakhimov. Novosilsky - 120-gun battleships "Paris", "Grand Duke Konstantin" and "Three Saints", as well as the frigates "Cahul" and "Kulevchi".

Squadron commanders: 1) P.S. Nakhimov; 2) Osman Pasha

Battle plan

Admiral Nakhimov decided to attack the enemy fleet with two columns: in the first, closest to the Turks, Nakhimov's ships, in the second, Novosilsky's. The frigates needed to watch the Turkish ships under sail in order to prevent the possibility of their breakthrough. Consular houses and the city in general decided to spare as much as possible, concentrating artillery fire only on ships and batteries. For the first time it was supposed to use 68-pound bomb guns.

The course of the battle

The battle of Sinop began on November 18, 1853 at 12:30 and lasted until 17:00. First, the Turkish naval artillery and coastal batteries subjected the attacking Russian squadron, which was entering the Sinop raid, to fierce fire. The enemy fired from a fairly close distance, but Nakhimov's ships responded to the heavy enemy shelling only by taking advantageous positions. It was then that the complete superiority of the Russian artillery became clear.

The Turks fired mainly on the spars and sails, which they sought to impede the advance of Russian ships in the raid and force Nakhimov to abandon the attack.

The battleship "Empress Maria" was bombarded with shells, most of its spars and standing rigging were broken, only one guy remained intact at the main mast. But the Russian flagship moved forward and, acting with battle fire on Turkish ships, anchored against the enemy flagship 44-gun frigate Auni-Allah. After a half-hour battle, Auni-Allah, unable to withstand the crushing fire of Russian guns, threw herself ashore. Then the Russian battleship turned its fire on the 44-gun frigate Fazli-Allah, which soon caught fire and also washed ashore. After that, the actions of the flagship "Empress Maria" focused on the coastal enemy battery No. 5.

The battleship "Grand Duke Konstantin", anchoring, opened heavy fire on battery No. 4 and the 60-gun frigates "Navek-Bakhri" and "Nesimi-Zefer". The first was blown up 20 minutes later, showering battery No. 4 with debris and the bodies of the dead Turks, which after that almost ceased to operate; the second was thrown ashore by the wind when its anchor chain was broken by a cannonball.

The battleship "Chesma" demolished batteries No. 3 and No. 4 with the fire of its guns. The battleship "Paris", while at anchor, opened battle fire on battery No. 5, the Gyuli-Sefid corvette with twenty-two guns and a 56-gun frigate " Damiad". Then, blowing up the corvette and throwing the frigate ashore, he began to hit the 64-gun frigate "Nizamie", whose fore and mizzen masts were shot down by bombing fire, and the ship itself drifted to the shore, where it soon caught fire. Then "Paris" again began to fire at the battery number 5.

The battleship "Three Saints" entered into battle with the frigates "Kaidi-Zefer" and "Nizamie". The spring was broken by the first enemy shots, and the ship, turning to the wind, was subjected to well-aimed longitudinal fire from battery No. 6, while its mast was badly damaged. But, turning the stern again, he very successfully began to act on the Kaidi-Zefer and other Turkish ships, forcing them to move ashore. The battleship Rostislav, covering the Three Saints, concentrated fire on battery No. 6 and on the 24-gun corvette Feyze-Meabud and was able to throw the corvette ashore.

At 13.30, the Russian steam frigate Odessa appeared from behind the cape under the flag of Adjutant General Vice Admiral V.A. Kornilov, accompanied by steam frigates "Khersones" and "Crimea". These ships immediately entered into battle, which, however, was already approaching the end, because the forces of the Turks were very weakened. Batteries No. 5 and No. 6 were still firing at the Russian ships until 4 p.m., but Paris and Rostislav were able to destroy them. Meanwhile, the rest of the Turkish ships, lit, apparently, by their crews, took off into the air one after another. From which a fire spread in the city, which there was no one to extinguish.

At about 2 pm, the Turkish 22-gun steamer Taif, on which Mushaver Pasha was, was able to escape from the line of Turkish ships that were suffering a severe defeat, and fled. Moreover, out of the entire Turkish squadron, only this ship had two ten-inch bomb guns. Taking advantage of the speed advantage, Taif was able to get away from the Russian ships and report to Istanbul about the complete destruction of the Turkish squadron.

Side losses

In the battle of Sinop, the Turks lost 15 out of 16 ships and more than 3,000 people killed and wounded out of 4,500 who took part in the battle. About 200 people were taken prisoner, including the commander of the Turkish fleet, Osman Pasha, who was wounded in the leg, and the commanders of two ships. Russian losses amounted to 37 people killed and 233 wounded, 13 guns were hit and disabled on the ships, there were serious damages to the hull, rigging and sails.

Results

The defeat of the Turkish squadron in the Battle of Sinop significantly weakened the Turkish naval forces in the Black Sea, the dominance of which completely passed to the Russians. Plans for a Turkish landing on the coast of the Caucasus were also thwarted. This battle, moreover, was the last major battle in the history of the era of the sailing fleet. It was time for steamships. However, this same outstanding victory caused extreme discontent in England, frightened by such significant successes of the Russian fleet. The result of this was a soon-to-be-formed alliance against Russia of two great European powers - England and France. The war, which began as a Russian-Turkish war, in early 1854 turned into a fierce Crimean War.

After this battle, the head of the 5th Fleet Division P.S. Nakhimov was awarded the Order of St. George 2nd degree, but this time Menshikov refused to present him to the rank of admiral, because the intervention of the allied forces in the war was to be a direct consequence of the Sinop victory . And Nakhimov himself said: "The British will see that we are really dangerous to them at sea, and believe me, they will use their best efforts to destroy the Black Sea Fleet." Later, Nakhimov was awarded the rank of admiral. The captain of the battleship "Paris" V. I. Istomin was promoted to rear admiral.

The fears of the leadership of the Black Sea Fleet came true: the destruction of part of the city of Sinop actually served as a pretext for war. In September 1854, a huge allied Anglo-French army will land in the Crimea to destroy the fleet and its base - the city of Sevastopol.

Victory Day of the Russian squadron at Cape Sinop

When even a big victory is not at all a joy

Painting by I.K. Aivazovsky "The battle of Sinop" (1853) was written from the words of the participants in the battle.

View from Cape Kioi-Hisar, where battery No. 6 was located. From right to left, stern to the viewer, Russian ships "Rostislav", "Three Saints", "Paris". In the center, facing the viewer, is the flagship "Empress Maria", behind it one can see the masts of the "Grand Duke Konstantin" and "Chesma". The sails of the Russian ships have not been removed so as not to endanger the sailors. Behind the battle line of Turkish ships are transports, to the left you can see the Sinop fortress. To the right of the "Rostislav" on the horizon are three steamships of Kornilov, going to the aid of the Russian squadron.

December 1 - Day of military glory of Russia in honor of the victory of the Russian fleet near the city of Sinop in 1853 during the Crimean War. The battle in which the Russian squadron under the command of Vice Admiral P.S. Nakhimov defeated the Turkish squadron of Osman Pasha, happened on November 18 according to the old style or November 30 according to the modern calendar. It must be assumed that the legislators had good reasons for setting this victorious day for December 1st. But this is not the only and not even the main paradox of this significant event in the history of the Russian fleet.

The fact is that historians and naval experts still cannot come to a consensus on the significance of this battle. “Glorious battle, higher than Chesma and Navarin!” This is how V.A. wrote about the Sinop victory. Kornilov and not only him. Indeed, the defeat of the Turkish fleet disrupted the already prepared major Turkish offensive in the Caucasus. Others pointed out that the Russians had a great superiority in strength, in weapons, and also in moral terms, and saw no reason for such enthusiastic assessments. In England and France, which actively helped Turkey, they generally stated that this was not a battle, but a sea robbery.

Yes, and the creator of this victory - Vice Admiral P.S. Nakhimov was not so much pleased as worried. Unfortunately, Nakhimov's fears came true in the worst possible scenario. Having received news of the Battle of Sinop, England and France first sent their squadrons into the Black Sea, explaining this by the desire to protect Turkish ships and ports from attacks from the Russian side, and then declared war on Russia. Nakhimov considered himself the unwitting culprit of all these tragic events.

Now how was it

One of the main directions of Russia's foreign policy in the first half of the 19th century was the desire to secure freedom of access to the Mediterranean Sea and strengthen its position in the Balkans. This was most actively prevented by England and France, who saw this as a threat to their interests. England pushed Turkey by military means to regain the Crimea and the northern coast of the Black Sea. Yielding to these persuasions, in October 1853, Turkey declared war on Russia and immediately began preparing a major offensive in the Caucasus. The 20,000-strong Turkish army concentrated in the Batumi region was supposed to land in the Poti and Sukhumi regions, encircle and destroy the entire Russian army in the South Caucasus. An important role in the implementation of this operation was assigned to the Turkish squadron under the command of Osman Pasha, which marched from Constantinople to the shores of the Caucasus.

The squadron of Nakhimov, consisting of 3 battleships and one brig, discovered the ships of Osman Pasha on November 8 in the bay of the city of Sinop. Nakhimov decided to block the Turks and wait for reinforcements. The detachment of Rear Admiral F.M. Novosilsky, consisting of three battleships and two frigates, approached on November 16.

By the middle of the 19th century, Russian sailing ships had reached complete perfection in terms of size, speed, artillery and sailing weapons. The basis of their combat power was the bombing guns located on the lower battery deck. They fired bombs that exploded on impact, causing great destruction and fires. Such guns were extremely dangerous for wooden sailing ships. The Russian squadron had 716 guns, of which 76 were bombing.

Six Russian battleships were opposed by 7 Turkish frigates with 472 guns and 38 guns of six coastal batteries. Basically, the Turkish guns were of a smaller caliber, and there was not a single bomb among them. For clarity, we can say that in a salvo from one side, Russian ships threw out 400 pounds of metal, and Turkish - a little more than 150 pounds. Nevertheless, according to foreign experts, the position of the Turkish admiral was far from hopeless. He only needed to effectively use the advantages of his position and the coastal batteries covering him, which, firing with red-hot cannonballs, could very effectively hit wooden sailing ships even with a relatively small number of guns.

At 09:30 on November 18, 1853, the Russian squadron, consisting of two columns, went to the Sinop raid. In an order with very detailed instructions on the conduct of the battle, Nakhimov gave the commanders of the ships to act at their own discretion in the event of a change in the situation, but stressed that everyone must "by all means do their duty." At a meeting before the battle, it was decided to protect the city as much as possible, to shoot only at ships and coastal batteries.

In the right column, the leading ship was the Empress Maria under the flag of Nakhimov. The left column was headed by "Paris" under the flag of Novosilsky. At 12:30 the battle began. The Gyuli-Sefid corvette was the first to take off from the fire in the cruise chamber. Then, one after another, unable to withstand the fire of Russian guns, Turkish frigates left the battlefield and were thrown ashore. During the first 30 minutes of the battle, the ships of the first line were destroyed - four frigates and a corvette.

Then our ships shifted their fire to coastal batteries and soon suppressed battery No. 5. A few minutes later, the frigate Navek-Bakhri exploded, its burning fragments covered battery No. 4, which no longer fired. The steamer "Taif", having a strong artillery armament, could be of great help to his squadron, but he did not even enter the battle, but went to sea and headed for the Bosphorus.


I.K. Aivazovsky. "Sinop battle on November 18, 1853 (the night after the battle)".

The picture was painted in December 1853 according to the scheme, which he sketched on the spot on behalf of P.S. Nakhimov, Prince Viktor Baryatinsky; the artist also asked the eyewitness about the colors and shades of various details.

By 4 p.m., the battle had almost ended with the complete defeat of the Turkish squadron. Fires and explosions continued on Turkish ships until late at night. Not a single ship survived. According to Turkish data, more than 3 thousand people died during the battle. The flagship of the Turkish squadron Osman Pasha was seriously wounded in the leg and was taken prisoner. In this battle, the Turkish admiral showed great personal courage, and his subordinates showed courage and stamina, but this was not enough to win. The losses of the Russian squadron amounted to 37 killed and 229 wounded.

All ships except frigates were damaged. On Nakhimov's flagship "Empress Maria" they counted 60 holes in the hull and a lot of serious damage to the spars and rigging. Despite these damages and a strong storm, all ships arrived in Sevastopol on November 23.


N.P. Krasovsky. Return to Sevastopol of the squadron of the Black Sea Fleet after the Battle of Sinop. 1863.
For this battle, Nakhimov was awarded the Order of St. George 2nd class, a rare and highly prestigious military award. Almost all officers of the squadron received various awards and promotions. The glory of the winners thundered everywhere. The victory at Sinop, and then the heroic death on the bastion of Sevastopol immortalized the name of Nakhimov, our best maritime traditions are associated with him. Nakhimov became a folk hero.

The significance of this victory is clearly seen from the congratulatory letter of the commander of the detachment of Russian ships off the coast of the Caucasus, Rear Admiral P. Vukotich: “The destruction of the Sinop squadron, the great thunderstorm of the entire Caucasus, saved the Caucasus, especially Sukhum, Poti

And Redutkale, by conquering the latter, would have been taken as a prey by the Turks of Guria, Imereti and Mingrelia. (Basic regions of Georgia).

The main political result of the first months of the war and, above all, the Battle of Sinop, was the complete failure of the plans of England and France to wage war by proxy. The real organizers of the Crimean War were shown. Convinced of the complete inability of Turkey to wage war with Russia, England and France were forced to openly go to war with Russia.

Modern view of the Sinop Bay - the place of the battle
The battle of Sinop was the last major battle of the sailing fleet, but at the same time, it was also the first naval battle in which the effectiveness of bombing guns was demonstrated with such persuasiveness. This significantly accelerated the transition to the construction of an armored fleet.