Yeltsin's resignation: a courageous act or a belated step.

MOSCOW, December 26 - RIA Novosti. Experts and politicians who worked together with the first President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin, 15 years after his resignation, still call this act courageous and unprecedented in the history of Russia, but some of them consider the decision belated.

Despite the fact that Yeltsin left at the peak of the country's difficult situation, analysts note his merits, including the creation of the Constitution, although they recall major defeats in the international arena.

Boris Yeltsin on December 31, 1999 at 12.00 Moscow time announced his resignation from the post of President of the Russian Federation, a few minutes before the New Year, before the televised address to the Russians, federal channels showed this recording. Yeltsin explained that he was leaving "not for health reasons, but for the totality of all problems," and asked for forgiveness from the citizens of Russia. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was appointed acting president, and immediately after Yeltsin's announcement of his own resignation, he addressed the citizens with a New Year's address. On the same day, Putin signed a decree guaranteeing the first president protection from prosecution, as well as significant material benefits for him and his family.

How it was

Already after his resignation, Yeltsin described in his book "Presidential Marathon" how this decision was made. From the outset, no one knew about his decision to leave office before the deadline, except for Prime Minister Putin, with whom the first conversation on this topic took place on December 14. However, Putin did not know at that time that the first president of Russia would leave his post on December 31.

The first to be informed by Yeltsin in his entourage were the head of the administration, Alexander Voloshin, and the former head, Valentin Yumashev. Of the relatives, the daughter Tatyana was the first to learn about the impending resignation.

As the widow of the first president of Russia, Naina Yeltsina, told RIA Novosti earlier in an interview, she learned about this decision on the morning of December 31, 1999, before Yeltsin left for the Kremlin. “He said in the hallway, before getting into the car. I threw myself on his neck, was delighted. I could hardly hold back my tears. And at 12 noon, when he already made a televised address, our whole family found out. — joy. We are all over these almost ten years, from the 91st to the 99th year, immensely tired, "she said.

According to her, the impetus for such a step could be the results of the elections to the State Duma of the third convocation, in which the new Unity party, supported by Putin, showed a good result. Apparently, therefore, as the president's widow suggests, Yeltsin decided that it was time to make way for the new leader and left.

brilliant move

According to Sergey Bespalov, Associate Professor of the Humanities Department of the Federal State Institution of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration Sergey Bespalov, Yeltsin's resignation is a politically brilliant move, because at the end of 1999, the victory of Vladimir Putin, who at that time held the post of Prime Minister, was already most likely to win the presidential election, although he was opposed by a fairly strong bloc of Yevgeny Primakov and Yuri Luzhkov. "By his resignation, Yeltsin made Putin's victory in the presidential election absolutely predetermined," the expert said.

Bespalov noted that human point voluntary relinquishment of power is a very courageous act, because, no matter how much they say that in last years power belonged not to Yeltsin, but to his entourage, but all the same, all these people used power exactly as much as the president allowed. “If we remember the history of our country at all, we will see that this act is simply unprecedented,” Bespalov said.

The expert added that Yeltsin very actively reshuffled his entourage, often replacing some people with others, but for the last two or three years of his tenure in power, he formed a very effective team. “It’s just that in the conditions of an extremely unfavorable economic situation, on the one hand, on the other hand, a very low rating, this environment could not carry out reforms. If we talk about the first term of Putin’s presidency, with which many associate his main achievements in the economy, then his inner circle at that time, these were Alexander Voloshin, Mikhail Kasyanov, Vladislav Surkov, that is, all the people who were in the corresponding position with Yeltsin," Bespalov said.

He recalled that many administrative reforms were formulated back in 1998-1999, it was just necessary to wait for favorable conditions for their implementation. The expert also added that if we talk about the legacy of the first president of Russia, then the 1993 Constitution should be noted. "This is his brainchild. He was the initiator, under his direct leadership the Constitution was developed ... We see that so far minor changes have been made," Bespalov emphasized.

At the same time, according to him, if we talk about foreign policy, then there was almost large quantity failures. The expert explained that Yeltsin's inexperience in foreign policy cost Russia dearly, but here it must be understood that if a person more competent in these matters were at the helm, then in a situation of a colossal external debt, a very unfavorable economic situation, the formation of Russian statehood, it would be extremely difficult.

Better late than never

Director General of the Center for Political Information Alexei Mukhin also noted that Yeltsin's resignation was an act of a strong man, but this decision came too late.

"Relinquishing supreme power is an extremely strong act for any politician... Boris Yeltsin's decision can be respected. Another thing is that it is three years late," the political scientist believes.

He explained that the right move would have been if Yeltsin had left in 1996, when his popularity was lost and the country was not yet in a serious economic and political crisis. At the same time, according to Mukhin, Yeltsin's departure gave the country a chance for a new development.

Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov believes that the decision "I'm tired, I'm leaving" "was ripe and overripe, and then it was inevitable." "It was obvious to everyone that Yeltsin had completely outlived his usefulness, that he was not able to govern the country ... He promised people that if prices rise, he will fall on the rails. And in the end he put half the country on the rails," Zyuganov said.

In his opinion, this decision was not so much unauthorized as taken under the pressure of circumstances.

The right step before the crisis

In his address to the citizens of Russia on December 31, 1999, Yeltsin admitted that he was too naive in some ways, and some problems were too complicated for him, and asked for forgiveness for unfulfilled hopes. Yeltsin added that he should not interfere with the natural course of history and "hold on to power for another six months when the country has a strong man worthy of being president."

Boris Nemtsov, co-chairman of the RPR-PARNAS party, who held the post of deputy chairman of the Russian government in 1997-1998, called Yeltsin's absolutely correct and courageous act, who "although he loved power, but did not cling to it."

“Obviously, he was already seriously ill, he could not fully manage as president. Therefore, this, of course, is the right step,” Nemtsov said, adding that it was a courageous act of a citizen.

Irina Khakamada, a member of the Presidential Council for Human Rights (HRC), noted that if Yeltsin had not taken such a step, the destruction of many state institutions would have begun due to a serious internal political crisis. “I think the step was right, because a serious internal political crisis was brewing. If he hadn’t done this, then, probably, the destruction of reforms and institutions within Russia would have begun,” Khakamada said.

She added that the first Russian president was not afraid to include new people in the system. “For example, the impeachment, which was headed by Yavlinsky in parliament. After the failure of the impeachment, he invited Yavlinsky to work for him,” Khakamada recalled.

According to Nikolai Mironov, director general of the Institute for Priority Regional Projects, Yeltsin's resignation is far from being Yeltsin's first bold act. “He created a coalition government when he called Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov to pull the country out of the crisis... And the resignation, when the president understood that the ratings were low, he did not enjoy any popularity, his image was bad in the international arena, showed his strength, since he was able to leave and transfer it (power) to another person," he said.

The expert noted that Yeltsin made many large-scale steps during his entire time in power, which radically changed the life of the country, but his departure from politics was no less significant. "He did not try to sit out until the last minute, because he still had time, but he limited himself to eight years of presidency and left, and never returned to politics," Mironov said.

Boris Yeltsin is a man whose name will always be inextricably linked with recent history Russia. Someone will remember him as the first president, someone will invariably see in him, first of all, a talented reformer and democrat, and someone will remember the voucher privatization, the military campaign in Chechnya, the default and call him a "traitor".

Like any outstanding politician, Boris Nikolayevich will always have supporters and opponents, but today, in the framework of this biography, we will try to refrain from judgments and judgments and will only appeal with reliable facts. What kind of person was the first president of the Russian Federation? What was his life like before his political career? Our article today will help you find out the answers to these and many other questions.

The early years, childhood and family of Boris Yeltsin

The official biography of Boris Yeltsin says that he was born in the maternity hospital of the village of Butka (Sverdlovsk region, Talitsky district). The very same family of Boris Nikolaevich lived nearby - in the village of Basmanovo. That is why in various sources, both one and the other toponym can be found as the birthplace of the future president.

As for Boris Yeltsin's parents, they were both simple villagers. Father, Nikolai Ignatievich, worked in construction, but in the 30s he was repressed as a kulak element, serving his sentence on the Volga-Don. After the amnesty, he returned to his native village, where he started everything from scratch as a simple builder, then rose to the head of a construction plant. Mom, Claudia Vasilievna (nee Starygina), worked as a dressmaker for most of her life.

When Boris was not yet ten years old, the family moved to the city of Berezniki, not far from Perm. AT new school he became the head of the class, but it was difficult to call him a particularly exemplary student. As Yeltsin's teachers noted, he was always a fighter and a fidget. Perhaps it was these qualities that led Boris Nikolaevich to the first serious problem in his life. During the boyish games, the guy picked up an unexploded German grenade in the grass and tried to take it apart. The consequence of the game was the loss of two fingers on the left hand.

Related to this fact is the fact that Yeltsin did not serve in the army. After school, he immediately entered the Ural Polytechnic Institute, where he mastered the specialty "civil engineer".

The absence of several fingers did not prevent Boris Nikolaevich from receiving the title of master of sports in volleyball as a student.

Political career of Boris Yeltsin

After graduating from high school in 1955, Boris Yeltsin went to work at the Sverdlovsk Construction Trust. Here he joined the CPSU, which allowed him to quickly advance in the service.

As chief engineer, and then director of the Sverdlovsk house-building plant. Yeltsin attended district party congresses. In 1963, as part of one of the meetings, Yeltsin was enrolled as a member of the Kirov District Committee of the CPSU, and later - in the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU. In the party position, Boris Nikolaevich was mainly involved in supervising housing construction issues, but very soon Yeltsin's political career began to rapidly gain momentum.

In 1975, our today's hero was elected secretary of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU, and a year later - the first secretary, that is, in fact, the main person of the Sverdlovsk region. His predecessor and patron described the young Yeltsin as a power-hungry and ambitious man, but added that he would “break into a cake, but he will complete any task.” Yeltsin served in this post for nine years.

During his leadership in the Sverdlovsk region, many issues related to food supply were successfully resolved. Coupons for milk and some other goods were abolished, new poultry farms and farms were opened. It was Yeltsin who launched the construction of the Sverdlovsk metro, as well as several cultural and sports complexes. Work in the party brought him the rank of colonel.

Yeltsin's speech at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU (1986)

After successful work in the Sverdlovsk region, Yeltsin was recommended to the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU for the post of first secretary. Having received the position, he began a personnel purge and initiated large-scale inspections, to the point that he himself traveled by public transport and inspected grocery warehouses.

On October 21, 1987, he sharply criticized the communist system at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU: he criticized the slow pace of perestroika, announced the formation of a personality cult of Mikhail Gorbachev, and asked not to include him in the Politburo. Under a flurry of counter criticism, he apologized, and on November 3 filed an application addressed to Gorbachev, asking him to keep him in office.

A week later, he was admitted to the hospital with a heart attack, but party colleagues believed he had attempted suicide. Two days later, he was already present at the meeting of the Plenum, where he was removed from the post of first secretary of the Moscow City Committee.

Yeltsin asks for political rehabilitation

In 1988 he was appointed deputy head of the Construction Committee.

On March 26, 1989, Yeltsin became a people's deputy in Moscow, receiving 91% of the votes. At the same time, his competitor was the protege of the government, Yevgeny Brakov, the head of ZIL. In May 1990, the politician headed the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. "Political weight" to Yeltsin was added by the resonant signing of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the RSFSR, which legally secured the priority of Russian laws over Soviet ones. On the day of its adoption, June 12, today we celebrate the Day of Russia.

At the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU in 1990, Yeltsin announced his resignation from the party. This congress was the last.

Yeltsin leaves the CPSU (1990)

On June 12, 1991, the non-partisan Yeltsin, with 57% of the vote and with the support of the Democratic Russia party, was elected president of the RSFSR. His competitors were Nikolai Ryzhkov (CPSU) Vladimir Zhirinovsky (LDPSS).

On December 8, 1991, after the isolation of the President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev and his actual removal from power, Boris Yeltsin, as the leader of the RSFSR, signed an agreement on the collapse of the USSR in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, which was also signed by the leaders of Belarus and Ukraine. From that moment Boris Yeltsin became the leader of independent Russia.

Presidency of Boris Yeltsin. First years of independence

The collapse of the USSR provoked many problems, which Boris Yeltsin had to deal with. The first years of Russia's independence were marked by numerous problematic phenomena in the economy, a sharp impoverishment of the population, as well as the beginning of several bloody military conflicts in the Russian Federation and abroad. So, for a long time, Tatarstan declared its desire to secede from the Russian Federation, then the government of the Chechen Republic declared a similar desire.

Interview with President Boris Yeltsin (1991)

In the first case, all topical issues were resolved peacefully, but in the second case, the unwillingness of the former Union Autonomous Republic to remain part of the Russian Federation laid the foundation for military operations in the Caucasus.

Due to multiple problems, Yeltsin's rating fell rapidly (to 3%), but in 1996 he still managed to remain in the presidency for a second term. He then competed with Grigory Yavlinsky, Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Gennady Zyuganov. In the second round, Yeltsin "met" with Zyuganov and won with 53% of the vote.

Many crises in the political and economic system countries were preserved in the future. Yeltsin was ill a lot and rarely appeared in public. He gave key government positions to Anatoly Chubais, Vladimir Potanin, and Boris Berezovsky, who supported his election campaign. Due to the combination of all factors, on December 31, 1999, Boris Nikolayevich was forced to resign. His successor was

For a person who survived the "dashing nineties", this period is associated with crime, queues, and the popularization of American culture. And also with the image of the president conducting the German orchestra and dancing "Kalinka-Malinka". It was a time of unlimited freedom, wild capitalism and a reassessment of values. There is no exact periodization, but we can assume that the era of bandits and general devastation ended when Yeltsin stepped down as president.

early years

He was originally from the Sverdlovsk region. He was born on February 1, 1931. The childhood of the future politician passed in the city of Berezniki: here his father worked at the construction site of a chemical plant. After leaving school, Boris Yeltsin entered the Ural Polytechnic Institute. Received a degree in civil engineering. In his student years he went in for sports, played for the city volleyball team.

Sverdlovsk regional committee

In the mid-fifties, the career of Boris Yeltsin began. He mastered several construction specialties. Joined the party. In 1975, he took the post of secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional committee. By his order, a high-rise building was erected in the city, which the locals call differently: “Wisdom Tooth”, “White House”, “Party Member”. Yeltsin also organized the construction of a highway that connects Sverdlov with the northern part of the region. Thanks to his active work, the inhabitants of the barracks found housing in apartment buildings.

Moscow city committee

Boris Yeltsin held the post of secretary of the Moscow City Committee since 1985. With his arrival, the purge of the party apparatus of Moscow began. He deprived the positions of many officials in the MGU CPSU. Under Yeltsin, a ban was introduced on the demolition of buildings of historical significance.

People's Deputy of the USSR

Yeltsin did not win the 1989 elections. But one of the deputies refused the mandate in his favor. The first Russian president was one of the most scandalous personalities in Russian politics. In 1989, he was invited to the United States, and, according to the media, he performed in a drunken state. However, this story was perceived as a provocation against Yeltsin, whose views differed from the official ideology. In 1990, the future president was in a plane accident. Hints appeared in the newspapers that this catastrophe was organized by the KGB. In May of the same year, Yeltsin was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet, in which the notes in the press played a significant role.

August coup

In June 1991, the first national elections were held in Russia. Yeltsin collected 57% of the votes. Two months later, an event occurred that millions of residents of the post-Soviet space associate with the riots in Moscow and the endless "Swan Lake" on television. Yeltsin played a leading role here, turning the Russian House of Soviets into a center of resistance. So there was no huge multinational state. We will not go into the details of the economic and ideological crises that engulfed the country at the end of the millennium. Let's move on to the main part of today's story - to that significant day when Yeltsin stepped down from the presidency.

Courageous act

When did Yeltsin step down as president? At the peak of the difficult situation in Russia. Many politicians and experts even today call Yeltsin's act unprecedented and courageous. Although some believe that this step was somewhat belated.

Yeltsin's policies are criticized by many, Special attention giving miscalculations in the international arena. At the same time, researchers note numerous merits, including the creation of the Constitution.

When Yeltsin stepped down as president

The first president gave the impression of an eccentric personality. The way Boris Yeltsin stepped down as president was perceived by ordinary citizens as a surprise, a whim. On December 31, the country celebrated as usual. This day for every former citizen of the USSR is associated with Olivier salad, Soviet champagne and the President's speech. It is, as a rule, predictable, of little content. But not the last New Year's speech of the first Russian President. This performance amazed the whole world, and later gave rise to many legends. So, Boris Nikolayevich was later credited with the words "I'm leaving, I'm tired." He didn't say them.

When did Yeltsin step down as president of Russia? A few minutes before the start of the new millennium. Citizens tuned in for a carefree celebration, for cheerful conversations and watching New Year's programs. But it was not there. The night from December 31 to January 1 was devoted to talk about Boris Nikolayevich and his successor. TV crews edited a whole film dedicated to the life and work of this outstanding personality with amazing speed. There were no traditional shows with the participation of pop stars this New Year's Eve. Only politics.

Presidential Marathon

Famous politicians and public figures love to write memoirs. More precisely, to order books about yourself from professional writers. Boris Nikolaevich was no exception. In 2000, the book “Presidential Marathon” was published, which contains the answer to the question “Why did Yeltsin leave the presidency?”.

There is a version that he did not plan to participate in the 1996 elections. By that time, it had lost its former popularity, in which the Chechen campaign played an important role. His main opponent was the communist leader Zyuganov. Perhaps that is why he decided to run for a second term. President Yeltsin needed a successor. But back to the events of 1999.

Boris Yeltsin, according to the book "Presidential Marathon", informed Alexander Voloshin and his daughter Tatyana about his decision. My wife found out about it only on the morning of December 31st. Yeltsin told Naina Iosifovna about his upcoming resignation from the post of President of the Russian Federation a few minutes before he got into the official car and left for the Kremlin. By the way, the relatives of Boris Nikolaevich were immensely happy. During the nine years of his presidency, as Yeltsin's widow later said, they were quite tired.

Elections to the Duma were held the day before. The new Unity party, led by the then little-known but sympathetic Putin, showed good results. This was the impetus for the adoption important decision. But why December 31st? Why did Yeltsin step down as President of the Russian Federation? last hours outgoing year?

brilliant move

By his resignation, Boris Yeltsin predetermined the victory of Vladimir Putin in the upcoming presidential elections. According to most political experts, it was a brilliant move. In addition, Yeltsin relinquished power voluntarily. And this step could be regarded as a courageous act. After all, none of the Russian and Soviet rulers has ever given up power of their own free will. It was an unprecedented event in national history.

In the last years of his reign, Yeltsin often replaced some people with others. The scene in which the President of Russia pronounces with a formidable look the phrase “Not so sat down!”, After which his subordinates in a hurry take the “right” places, has become legendary. Despite unexpected actions that seemed strange to many, Yeltsin managed to form an effective team.

Six months before he delivered the New Year's speech, which later went down in history, State Duma deputies attempted to remove him from presidential duties. A committee was set up to prepare the document. It contained accusations of the collapse of the USSR, the unleashing of the Chechen war, the genocide of the peoples of Russia. In December it was close to zero. Prime Minister Putin, meanwhile, was gaining great popularity.

Yeltsin resigned from the presidency suddenly, on New Year's Eve. Thus, he caught his opponents by surprise. Putin was appointed acting, who on that significant night delivered his first New Year's address to Russian citizens. The Prime Minister on the same day signed a decree that guaranteed Boris Yeltsin protection from prosecutions.

Yeltsin's last address was solemn and emotional. Having uttered the final phrase, he fell silent, and, as the cameraman later claimed, tears were pouring down his face. The Russians were in extreme agitation. They didn't know what lay ahead of them. And a new era was waiting for them - the era of a strong ruler who is unlikely to ever deliver such a speech.

Yeltsin's resignation

The deed was almost done from the point of view of the federals: "the mortal enemy of Russia" - Chechnya, this "fiend" - it should be destroyed. Putin's rating has soared to the skies, who just did not glorify him, no matter what names were given to put the name of the new prime minister next to Peter the Great; both Suvorov and Kutuzov and the reformer Pyotr Stolypin came in handy, and to diversify the series - flights in a dream and in reality ... But best of all, Vladimir Vladimirovich looked on a tatami carpet or on descents from the mountains skiing... Of course, all this is to contrast with Yeltsin - how could the viewer imagine Yeltsin in a kimono, fighting with someone, or descending from the mountains at high speeds, or flying in a fighter plane! But at the same time, Chechnya was the main target and at the same time the prize. Everyone agreed on the idea of ​​its destruction - both friends and sworn enemies. Chernomyrdin: “Putin undertook to complete what Stalin started”(deportation in 1944)... "You can't understand Russia with your heart!" - What stupid words that are repeated in every way different people almost 200 years!

But there was NO. And what if the president, offended by the “rating” of his prime minister, suddenly, in one second, throws him out, forgetting even to thank him (for what?). This strong BUT literally drilled into the heads of the conspirators. The second stage of a big strategic game began to drive out the seasoned bison, albeit sick, weak, and still dangerous. Especially since the Prime Minister has already quite clearly agreed with the participants in his ascension to power (bypassing, however, Berezovsky, but - no big deal). It was necessary to achieve Yeltsin's departure before the beginning of 2000. Initially, the date was scheduled for November 18, but the old man became stubborn. The influence of the all-powerful daughter did not help either. Yeltsin sought (the old sly one - she was clever!) "joint leadership", leaving in force all his "presidential prerogatives" (presidential palaces, hunting lodges, country villas, honors, salaries, servants, etc.). Everything was acceptable, except for the incomprehensible "joint leadership." Finally, this obstacle was removed on the basis of an agreement that all the "people" appointed by Yeltsin would fulfill their "tsar's duties" for as long as they were able to fulfill them.

And so, on December 31, 1999, Yeltsin resigned as President of the Russian Federation. Putin is becoming about. The President and, more importantly, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the country - then this post seemed more important than any position. From now on, Putin has become both the boss and the hostage at the same time of the very forces that brought him to power. And above all - the Chief of the General Staff of the empty General Kvashnin, who shamefully lost the first Chechen war. Those minimal changes - whether in politics or personnel changes - were entirely due to the fact that Putin was subordinating the Armed Forces. Hence - an unusually high level of influence on him by the side of General Kvashnin, who occupied a central place in the ingenious combination of Yeltsin's "leaving". And this is despite Kvashnin's friendly relations with Berezovsky, the main conductor of Putin's rise to power. But here is already an area political psychology...

Prime Minister Putin, according to the Yeltsin Constitution, received the post of acting. President. Many observers believed that the "Caucasian roots of the presidential resignation" were obvious. In the context of the war with Chechnya, which now (after all the campaigns from Chechnya to Dagestan, blowing up houses, etc.) was powerfully supported by Russian society, Putin - a completely unknown person before - can easily become the elected president. Yeltsin's "unexpected" departure (of course, he was afraid to start and wage another war) sharply increased the chances of Prime Minister Putin to become the next head of Russia. But his high rating, directly related to the situation in Chechnya, could be shaken if serious complications appeared in the militant republic in terms of its pacification. And such a turn was not ruled out: in April-May 2000, the cold was replaced by heat, the snow melted in the passes, and the militants, especially in the mountains, could regain the mobility they had lost in winter. Of course, the postponement of the presidential elections from June to March - as a result of Yeltsin's resignation, which left behind dangerous April and May - certainly gave Putin a powerful head start, although it is unlikely that the Kremlin calculated these moments. Moreover, in this case It was, of course, not only about Putin – simultaneously with his rise from under a possible hail of criticism, Moscow’s tough policy in the North Caucasus, including its attitude towards Kvashnin himself, the infamous commander on the battlefield, was also removed.

Fixing the course towards a military solution as a prerequisite for a political settlement in Chechnya, the “presidential castling” enjoyed the unconditional support of the majority of society, “ since all efforts to pacify the rebellious republic only with the help of the "carrot" ended in complete failure. As a result of Moscow's condoning policy both inside and outside of Russia, Chechnya has turned into a base of outrageous bandits and terrorists, dangerous to everyone and everything,"- A. Umnov wrote, - playing along with the mood of the Kremlin, already Putin's, courtiers. So these "wise men" brought the theoretical basis for a course of extermination war against the Chechen people.

The failure of the Kremlin's policy towards Chechnya was, of course, not due to the "carrot policy", as Umnov claims. There were much more serious reasons here - the desire of powerful political and military punitive circles to avenge the shameful humiliations inflicted earlier and destroy this republic. The other side is the motives of profit given by war. Umnov kept silent about this, as, indeed, many others touching on the topic of war and conflicts in Chechnya. They kept silent about many other important aspects related to the first and second wars in Chechnya, preferring naked rhetoric and propaganda to the truth.

And famine was really brewing in the country. Not the one that Gaidar wrote about, but the real one, harsh and cruel. Those who worked for months did not receive wages, and they were negligible, unemployment went off scale for 20%; hundreds of thousands of homeless people rummaging through garbage cans, an increase in homeless people comparable to the era civil war 1918–1921 But, one way or another, the second Kremlin-Chechen war arose, it was carried out exceptionally cruelly, tens of thousands of civilians of the republic died, its cities and villages were destroyed. Hundreds of thousands of refugees, without hope for the future, rotted in the camps, tens of thousands were scattered around the world. The socio-cultural development of the people was thrown back decades. The damage is colossal, about 150-200 billion dollars. This war, like the first, was started by Yeltsin, but ended by Vladimir Putin. This war undoubtedly had a decisive influence on the rise of Putin as a national leader.

Here the following circumstance should be kept in mind. In the period after the presidential elections, from July 1996 and the end of the first Chechen campaign, there was a growing discussion in society about the need to revise the Constitution in terms of increasing the role of parliament and government and "compressing" the immense presidential rights, powers and prerogatives. A slow movement began to restore the elements of a parliamentary republic with its ramified democratic institutions. But this movement was quickly stopped by the new president, relying on both houses of parliament completely controlled by his officials, by reducing the rights of the provinces, the Kremlin's tight control over financial flows, and the defeat of independent TV and the media.

The existence of Parliament ( State Duma and the Federation Council), which did little to streamline power, citing its constitutional impotence, was evidence of the obvious unpreparedness of the leaders of this parliament and its factions for serious public and political activity, a sign of a leadership crisis. Hence, the objective tendency to revise the “power scheme”, based on the discontent of the people and business circles, could not be realized, since these initiatives were not supported in parliament. In this case, it could well have been realized at that time non-parliamentary resolution of the political-state crisis, including through a military coup, which not only could not be ruled out, as analysts unanimously asserted, but it became quite probable (as far as I could judge from the information I had then).

The "looseness" of power, the lack of a fundamental concept of development and value orientations, a moral vacuum allowed the aggressively radical layer of businessmen and politicians, despite the lack of public support, to carry out any political course in both domestic and international relations.

Excessive obedience of society, reaching the point of servility, is a favorable field for retaining power by its most limited representatives, making senseless the cunning plans of opponents, since the ruling bureaucracy frankly refuses to play by law and law. This, of course, the opposition cannot afford, otherwise it will immediately be destroyed physically. Hence, a more than probable dead end leading to an increase in the political crisis, which is realized, no doubt, through the crisis of the state as a federation, including through the rapid growth of regional and ethnic contradictions, so skillfully nurtured by the federal center itself.

The completion of the first democratic and peaceful stage of the transformation of Russia with a coup in the Kremlin and the establishment of the tsarist model of the state structure of Russia led to the fact that the citizens of Russia lost "freedom" which has been replaced by a surrogate democracy. From the point of view of Kremlin politicians and theorists, they confirmed their understanding of it in practice: “Freedom is just a type of slavery chosen by the people after the overthrow of another tyranny.” It doesn't matter what type of slavery it is, – they are just two varieties - from direct forms of slavery to modern, sophisticated, ideological, when this slavery appears outwardly in the form democratic freedom, since the rights and freedoms are formally proclaimed and allegedly "secured" by law and even ... by the ruler himself.

The problem, however, is that plutocracy provides direct application of the law only in cases where she has a personal interest in it. If she is not interested, the “interpretation of the law” begins. But, one way or another, the types of slavery in the thousand-year history of states are rather limited: one type is like the classical one that existed in ancient China, Egypt, Rome, the states North America up to the middle of the 19th century. (semi-slavery - in Russia until 1861); the other - existed in England until the middle of the 19th century, was well described by classical economists long before Engels, in connection with the analysis of the problem of primitive accumulation of capital and the situation of factory workers or peasants forcibly driven from the lands. A similar type of slavery began to take shape in the post-communist republics of the Union, and primarily in Russia, where the initial accumulation of capital took place according to the schemes of the English version of the 17th century, with its wild morals, murders, regional and ethnic-religious wars, the expulsion of entire sections of the population from their homes, dooming them to starvation and extinction, open battles between different groups gangs– "businessmen" and "bankers", dissatisfied"gift policy" implemented by the federal authorities...

At the same time, from a formal point of view, a person is free, “protected” by the constitution, laws, all the rhetoric about “human rights”, but is really subordinate to the financial and industrial oligarchy and its government, or rather, to a special committee of the plutocracy, called the "government" and fictitiously dealing with public affairs. One tyranny, type of slavery– imposed in frank and violent forms by the tyrant himself; another, "democratic",– voluntarily adopted by the people themselves, in accordance with the electoral laws and the constitution, which are allegedly adopted by the parliament expressing the will of the people ... But the point is the same – brutal suppression of the people, their will, interests, merciless economic exploitation in the interests of a pack of businessmen, the highest government and administrative nomenclature in the capital and provinces, military police detachments and an army of propagandists, including in the media, whose officials, by tradition, are called " journalists"...

"Special" application supreme power in Russia led to private capital is used by the state to stifle competition, while creating the illusion of a free market and the rules of competition. As a result big business “eats up” both the big state and production itself, turns the state into a kind of “internal division” of the criminal business, “dumping” it to perform “unpleasant” tasks(including the "neutralization" of honest entrepreneurs).

Sometimes the ruling elite goes on a “counteroffensive”, gets rid of some criminal tycoons (“foreigners”, or who have become “foreigners” for it) in favor of “their own”, using state supervisory authorities for this. It is becoming a general pattern that the economy is in a permanent stagnation mode and is moving downhill, and the barely glimmering life in it is fueled by an ever-decreasing flow of financial injections from international organizations and proceeds from the sale of state enterprises and the export of oil, gas, metals, timber. The national economy as a whole, as an integral national economic complex, no longer exists. She, like shagreen skin, “shrinks”, throwing millions of unemployed people out onto the street ...

The situation has changed little since 1999, when incredibly high oil prices on world markets improved the state of the country's finances. However, this unexpected money was not used for structural transformations - the intensive development of industrial sectors, mechanical engineering, Agriculture, improving the standard of living of the population. Big capital is at the same time not a lesser source of violence against society (but rather a greater one) than an all-powerful state, if this big capital is not strictly subordinated to society through laws, if laws cease to apply to big capital ... People are very naive. They often believe that if they are no longer persecuted for any critical word expressed against the authorities or high officials, this is democracy. Officials see "democracy" even in the "right of children to homelessness", in the "right" to starve to death.

Recall that the right to dissent was achieved in the last period of the existence of the USSR - in 1986-1990, long before the onset of the "Yeltsin era" and the creation of the Yeltsin regime, in the "Gorbachev era". But the most significant thing is that if in the conditions of a total state there is a frank administrative coercion of the individual, then in the conditions of the domination of big business, generated by Yeltsin's non-state, this is administrative coercion was replaced by a frank socio-economic and police-criminal violence . If earlier (in the pre-Khrushchev period) they were afraid that they would be imprisoned for criticizing the authorities, under Yeltsinism people began to fear not only the authorities, but also the owners of enterprises, banks, some firms where they work and which contain their meager savings; they are frankly afraid of security detachments of businessmen, illegal fighters of organized crime, who keep the population in fear (thus part of the functions of the Yeltsin state was shifted to organized crime), numerous informants (the same people as the state and big business). People are most afraid that they may lose their jobs and, accordingly, a piece of bread. Big business instills more fear in the little man than the once great state with its all-powerful KGB and party committees. The country is ruled by an administrative-bureaucratic and private-state-Yeltsin financial oligarchy. It was she who decided who should be in power, who should be destroyed, who should be pushed aside, but left alive for the time being ...

A system has formed criminocracy, that is, a political and economic regime with a criminal-bureaucratic democratic framework and procedures. Yeltsin's political regime is a system of state and public institutions, administrative and legal practices, views and worldviews that ensure the functioning of the state mechanism in accordance with the will and interests of the criminocracy. The Russian state of the Yeltsin era in the late 1990s. - a criminal-democratic state with its specific political regime, which combined the radical liberal, opportunistic, collaborative, cosmopolitan elements of Russian society and criminals in the widest range...

Yesterday's shopkeepers and underground traveling salesmen, guild crooks and petty bazaar merchants, party and state officials bribe-takers, hacks of the word, communist informers-publicists and commentators on party decisions, unsuccessful "scientists" who are stuck on the titles of "MNS" and "SNS" calling themselves the titles of "great scientist", "famous economist", "brilliant financier", yesterday's petty bank clerks-bureaucrats, walking around in patched trousers and stale shirts, cunning "economic leaders" - blockers of the planned economy - under Yeltsin became national "heroes", "leaders", as the press lovingly calls these arrogant and cynical figures, whose pathological lies, combined with mental impotence, are so obvious that they cause outright disgust in a society accustomed to everything, and in the outside world - the same outright contempt (contempt for the people, too, who tolerate such people; it is no coincidence that in the West they again started talking about the “inferiority” of the people).

The truth is that this marginal layer of Russian society (which calls itself “elitist”), which has now occupied the political, administrative, business and cultural niches of society, is entirely oriented towards the ersatz-civilizational model of development, or should leave the political and business scene , or it will lead to the final death of the state, as happened with the USSR. Power itself has been devalued, and the status of a statesman and a high-ranking official has been equated to a street urkagan (the same manners, style, slang and behavior; even well-known cultural figures from the TV screen are not ashamed to utter obscene expressions; writers and journalists openly use obscene words, swearing, and this also - in the order of things in the Yeltsin, and later - in the Putin state). Representatives of the highest authorities adopted the methods, forms and means characteristic of the classical criminal communities formed under Yeltsin.

Official corruption is a traditional disease of the Russian state. It was maintained on a rather "modest" scale both under Stalin and in subsequent decades, until the mid-1980s. The rise of corruption became a notable phenomenon under Gorbachev. Criticizing from the "proletarian" positions these shortcomings (down with the privileges!) of the "Big System", Yeltsin removed Gorbachev and signed the death sentence of the USSR (that is, fighting for power, he destroyed the state).

But at the same time, he also gigantically increased the privileges of the nomenklatura, the radical lumpen leaders - this is evidenced by the same inexorable modern history. This type of leader has never had and, apparently, in principle cannot have positive development programs, they are masters in the matter of destruction. Corruption has increased enormously, it has become systemic, penetrating all the pores of the emerging bourgeois society and power structures at all levels.

Therefore, the process of disintegration of the emerging institutions will continue as long as the Yeltsin political regime, which was formed by the marginal strata and their "leaders", is preserved. The top strata of the marginal Yeltsinists have become colossally rich, they have seized gigantic fortunes - banks, major industrial corporations, transferred to their ownership free of charge, military-industrial enterprises, raw materials complexes and pipelines, leading media in the country, including electronic ones. "Their" companies control export-import operations, air transportation, various areas service and production. The pro-Yeltsin stratum and the top bureaucracy became fabulously rich in the course of Chechen war and no less - in the matter of "economic restoration of the Chechen Republic » in the 90s. Some through the privatization of state property, others - using the methods of "cloak and dagger", an environment of anarchy and general corruption of the state bureaucracy. They were very little worried about even such "secondary" issues as the possibility of an apical coup and a change in "pilot".

The particularly dangerous nature of such political regime was that his appearance gave impetus to the creation of asocial society(non-social state), completely devoid of human properties and therefore capable of approving any adventures both in foreign policy and in domestic activities, and incapable of self-defense, self-organization. Actually - this is a sign of the collapse of the state, the "dispersal" of power. Who will pick her up? And how will it work? Will he take a contemplative position, leaving unchanged the corporate institutions created under Yeltsin to serve his interests, the nouveau riche who divided the country, empty legislative institutions and law enforcement, judicial and security bodies subject to the Kremlin? Will carry out redecorating when every trifle will pass for " great reform? Or will it be able to really take the path of a serious "overhaul" of a decaying state? Which of the three paths will he take?

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"I don't want to disturb him"
On the last day of 1999, December 31, at exactly 9:30 a.m., a meeting between Yeltsin and Putin began in the Kremlin. As expected, as news agencies reported, during this meeting, the president and the prime minister were to discuss "the financial, economic and political results of the year, the situation in the North Caucasus, as well as the prospects for relations between the executive and legislature"(referring to the results of the Duma elections that have just passed) ...
However, two and a half hours later, in a televised address to the Russians, Yeltsin announced that he was resigning ahead of schedule.
Explaining this decision, which was completely unexpected for the vast majority of his fellow citizens, he said that he had thought about it "long and painfully". Not because he held on to power: the commonplace assertion that he would hold on to it by any means is, in Yeltsin's words, "a lie." He just wanted everything to happen, as required by the Constitution, so that the presidential elections would be held on time in June 2000.
This would be very important for Russia, Yeltsin said, we are creating the most important precedent for a civilized voluntary transfer of power, transferring it from one president of Russia to another, newly elected.
And yet, according to Yeltsin, he decided to leave ahead of schedule:
I realized that I needed to do this. Russia must enter the new millennium with new politicians, with new faces, with new smart, strong, energetic people, and we, who have been in power for many years, must leave.
Here Yeltsin was let down by speechwriters who helped him in drafting the text: in reality, the new century and the new millennium were to begin only a year later, in 2001. But it hurt too, apparently, I wanted everything to sound more beautiful, more dramatic.
Further, Yeltsin was to admit at what exact moment he finally decided to give way to Putin. This happened after the Duma elections:
After seeing with what confidence and faith people voted in the Duma elections for a new generation of politicians, I realized the main work of my life I had done, Russia will never return to the past, Russia will always move forward now. And I should not interfere with this natural course of history, to hold on to power for half a year, when the country has a strong man worthy of being president, and with whom today almost every Russian pins his hopes for the future. Why should I interfere with him, why wait another six months?! No, it's not for me, it's just not for me.
Today, as we know, a "strong man" stopped Russia's movement in the direction "only forward", in many ways returns it "to the past." Yeltsin was wrong in his hopes...
At the end of his speech, the President apologized to the Russians:
I want to ask your forgiveness for the fact that many of our dreams did not come true, for what seemed simple to us, but turned out to be excruciatingly difficult. I apologize for not justifying some of the hopes of those people who believed that in one fell swoop, in one spurt, we could jump from the gray, stagnant totalitarian past into a bright, rich, civilized future. I myself believed in it. One push didn't work. In some ways I turned out to be too naive, somewhere the problems turned out to be too complicated ... I'm leaving, I did everything I could ... I'm being replaced by a new generation, a generation of those who can do more and better.
Yeltsin announced that he had signed a decree assigning the duties of the President of Russia to the Prime Minister, who would perform these duties for three months before new elections. He said that he had always been confident "in the amazing wisdom of the Russians," and therefore he had no doubts about what choice they would make at the end of March 2000.

Why did he leave
People close to Yeltsin argue that, first of all, he was concerned about transferring power to a person under whom Russia would continue to move in the same direction in which he moved it (in fact, Yeltsin himself said this in his last address to the Russians ). Until he found such a person and made sure that there were no serious obstacles in his path to the presidency, he did not leave the presidency, although he could have left earlier than December 31. Fears on this score in his entourage were: spring, summer, early autumn of 1999, Yeltsin spent in a state of extraordinary psychological stress. As they say, because of all kinds of conflicts, attacks to which he was subjected (only the story of impeachment was worth something!), "everything was bubbling inside him."
The main impetus that prompted Yeltsin to resign early was, I repeat, the December elections to the Duma, the successful performance of Unity. This was mentioned in passing in his farewell televised address. The success of the newborn political movement, Yeltsin believed, meant that the road to the Kremlin was open for his successor, whose name was already firmly associated with Unity. For him it was a kind of inner liberation: "That's it, I found a man! We won!" And his mood changed. Yeltsin gained confidence: with Putin, he "hit the top ten." There was peace of mind.

Putin's reaction
To be absolutely precise, Yeltsin decided to give up his seat to Putin ahead of schedule even before the Duma elections, shortly before them, when, in general, it became clear that Unity was achieving high results, coming in second place. In any case, he told Putin about this desire at their meeting in his country residence on December 14 (I remind you that the elections were held on the 19th). True, he did not specify exactly when he was going to leave the Kremlin.
Putin did not expect Yeltsin's early departure. And in general, such a decision to leave ahead of schedule was not typical for Boris Nikolayevich. But he made it, this decision. The main argument, I will say again, was the successful start of the recently created and quickly become "pro-Putin" "Unity".
And, besides, Yeltsin, of course, was simply tired... This is beyond doubt.
As for Putin, he must have been psychologically ready by this time to take Yeltsin's place, and, apparently, was glad that the tedious waiting period was over, the situation was becoming more definite. Although some external manifestations no one noticed his joy.
Moreover, he even seemed to be depressed by the approaching rather abrupt change in his fate. His first reaction was: "I think I'm not ready for this decision, Boris Nikolaevich." Such a reaction "discouraged" Yeltsin ...
Putin spoke about this conversation with the President at a meeting with Voloshin, Yumashev and Tatyana Dyachenko. According to his interlocutors, he was indeed quite depressed. However, all four came to the conclusion that the president's resignation would take place sometime in the spring of 2000, so it's too early to talk about it seriously. No one could have predicted that this would happen in the coming weeks.
The second "pre-retirement" meeting between Yeltsin and Putin took place on the morning of 29 December. As soon as the successor entered his office, the president, in his words, immediately felt that he, Putin, "was already different, more decisive, or something."
Yeltsin told his guest that he had decided to leave on December 31...

What did Yeltsin and Putin talk about?
What did Yeltsin and Putin talk about during the last two (before Yeltsin's departure) meetings? The myth is widespread and firmly driven into human heads, that main theme their conversations were the topic of domestic arrangements and security guarantees, the lack of jurisdiction of Yeltsin and members of his family after the president left. As if Yeltsin asked Putin for appropriate guarantees, and Putin promised to provide them. Informed people, those who can be completely trusted, claim that there were no such conversations: they say, it’s not the royal business to talk about such trifles; how everything should develop in the future for the ex-president was clear even without any talk, all this was implied by itself.
But it was as if in the conversations of the two husbands there was no incomparably more important topic about maintaining the course, that Putin, having become president, will continue to move along the road that Yeltsin paved. The only thing that seems to be related to this topic is Yeltsin's words addressed to Putin and already heard by everyone: "Take care of Russia!"
It is clear, however, that these words can be twisted any way you like.
There was also no discussion of personnel issues. Yumashev:
All the talk that Yeltsin allegedly asked to keep some officials in their posts, for example, Kasyanov, Voloshin, Rushailo, is complete nonsense. He did not ask for anyone: "Leave whoever you think is necessary."
After a decisive conversation and the president’s announcement that he had firmly decided to resign, Putin, with Yeltsin’s permission, spoke with the security forces and said that after the departure of his predecessor, he would leave them all in their places (which he did).
As for the decree on the domestic arrangement and immunity of the departed head of state, which, in fact, became the basis for the myth mentioned above, it arose by itself due to elementary practical necessity. There was no document that would regulate the details of the transfer of power from one president to another at that time. So after Yeltsin signed a decree on his own resignation, he could no longer be allocated any money for existence, or even give a car so that he could leave the Kremlin ... In this case, a simple and primitive order reigned: if there was no decree or even a verbal order from the current (or acting) head of state, not a single FSO vehicle will budge, not a single employee of this department will be involved in the protection of the departed leader ...
For this reason, this notorious decree appeared (later transformed into a law) on guarantees to the ex-president.
Naturally, this decree (and later the law) applied not only to Yeltsin, but also to any other Russian president who would leave his post in the future.
By the way, the conversation about the need to adopt such a law arose both before and in 1998 and in 1999, but everything somehow went into the sand until a real need arose for it.

Guarantees for the ex-president
On the same day, Putin signed a decree on guarantees to the president, who "has ceased exercising his powers," and members of his family. The decree listed the generally usual "legal, social and other" guarantees for such cases, lifelong financial support (75 percent of the monthly "remuneration" of the current president), state protection for the ex-president himself and members of his family living with him, medical services in the same volume as it was at the time of the president's resignation, lifelong use of one of the state dachas, the right to use government and other types of communications free of charge, maintain an apparatus of assistants at the expense of the budget, etc.
It was this decree, and then the corresponding law, that gave rise to many conversations, which subsequently gave birth to a rather stable "public opinion" that an unspoken agreement was concluded between Yeltsin and Putin: Yeltsin cedes his post to Putin in exchange for a firm promise that neither he nor the members his families will not be prosecuted for the "crimes" they committed while Yeltsin was president; they say, Yeltsin therefore settled on Putin as a successor, because he gave him such a promise in advance. How else can one explain that Putin signed the decree on guarantees immediately on the day of Yeltsin's resignation?
The conviction was firmly hammered into the minds of the townsfolk that the decree and the law guarantee both the ex-president himself and all members of his family complete immunity, that they cannot be held criminally or administratively liable, detained, arrested, searched, interrogated .. Meanwhile, they say, there are more than enough reasons for such attraction.
The belief that the president and his family stole millions and billions developed thanks to the efforts of Yeltsin's political opponents, who tirelessly broadcast in the press and on television about those very foreign accounts, about villas and palaces, allegedly acquired by Yeltsin's relatives abroad.

Castles that weren't there
In fact, the only money Yeltsin earned, besides presidential and ex-presidential fees, was royalties from three of his books, translated in dozens of countries around the world. For the first "Confession on a given topic" published in 1989, he received about three million dollars. For the second and third "Notes of the President" (1994) and "Presidential Marathon" (2000), about one and a half million each. By the standards of an ordinary person, the money, of course, is considerable, but if measured with minimum requirements non-ordinary family, not so big. The main thing is honestly earned.
Neither the Yeltsins nor their daughters had any business, no luxurious real estate by the time the head of the family retired. Although all kinds of hack writers and telekillers generously endowed them with all this. The youngest daughter Tatyana, the most convenient object for dousing with mud, "gained" especially a lot. Suffice it to recall the story of "her" luxurious house on Nikolina Gora: the press described in detail the floor plans, all kinds of buildings on a huge plot ... At the end of 2001, Valentin Yumashev and Tatyana Dyachenko got married. It was just right for the newlyweds to move into this super-elite villa. However, in reality ... no villa existed. It was a banal "duck" sucked from the finger. Although, of course, many believed in it. Even some of the acquaintances who were first invited to visit Yumashev were sure that it was necessary to move in the direction of Nikolina Gora, and they were very surprised when they found out that they should not go there.
Much has been written abroad and in our country about Tatyana Dyachenko's "villa" on the Cote d'Azur in Antibes, photographs have been printed... Among the domestic "whistleblowers" was, for example, a very prolific publicist Professor Vladlen Sirotkin, the authors of Novaya Gazeta .. .
The story of the castle in Germany, in the town of Garmes, once belonged to one of the German princesses and allegedly acquired by Yeltsin's youngest daughter, was quite amusing. As soon as they didn’t show it both on ours and on foreign TV, and on the one hand, and on the other, and on the third ... Reporters wandered around, looked into local restaurants, showed the regulars a photo of Tatyana: “Did you see this girl at you in the village?" Some nodded: yes, they say, I saw it. Well, since I saw it, it means that it is so: Yeltsin's daughter bought an old castle! The excitement was such that some television companies rented apartments opposite the castle in the hope of catching the moment when the daughter of the Russian president appeared at its door, they sat in these "ambushes" for almost a year, but did not catch anything through the lens ... And an explanation of why local residents saw the character so interested in Teveshniks, it was the simplest: Tatyana, then Dyachenko, came there several times with friends to ski.
There were similar "ducks" about real estate in London, a luxurious mansion on Belgrave Street, where the Yumashevs allegedly live, and about other "stone chambers", which, as you know, "you cannot make money from the labors of the righteous" ...
There are, however, accusations that cannot be refuted. For example, that Tatyana Dyachenko, together with Anatoly Chubais, stole ten billion dollars provided by the International Monetary Fund. It is impossible to refute this for the reason that Chubais, everyone knows, in general "plundered the whole of Russia." Therefore, anyone who made acquaintance with him could well pocket several billion ...

No "paper" will give you a guarantee ...
In general, the version that Yeltsin, choosing his successor, sought to ensure that he and his family were protected from criminal prosecution "for the rest of their lives" (they had done too much) is a myth. There was no reason for such concern.
But even if Yeltsin and his relatives really had some serious sins, some disagreements with the criminal code, both the decree and the law on guarantees gave immunity only to the ex-president himself and no one else. To be convinced of this, it was enough to look into the mentioned documents.
But too lazy to look. It is more convenient to believe the rumors, publications of the yellow press: they say that Putin, under an unspoken agreement, granted immunity to the entire family of the resigning president ...
And then what real guarantees can a piece of paper give, especially in Russia? Every Russian, and even more so an experienced politician such as Yeltsin, knows perfectly well that through any decree, through any law in our country he crosses over with extraordinary ease. So it's ridiculous to say that Yeltsin left his post, the highest post in the state, in exchange for some kind of "paper" guarantees.

There was no real conversation...
Still, it is strange that during the last two meetings between the outgoing president and the incoming president, there was no serious discussion about the fate of Russia, about its future, about PRESERVING YELTSIN'S COURSE...
At their first meeting, on December 14, Yeltsin basically told his successor how he came to work in Moscow, how difficult it was for him to start this work in the capital ...
“I once also wanted to live my life in a completely different way,” Yeltsin admonished Putin like a father. I didn’t know that this would happen. But I had to ... I had to choose ... Now you have to choose.
Putin's answer was dutifully flattering:
"Russia really needs you, Boris Nikolaevich. You help me a lot. Just remember the summit in Istanbul. If I went to one situation, you would go to another. It is very important that we work together. Maybe it's better to leave on time?"
It won't be long before Putin forgets that Russia really needed Yeltsin...
The second conversation, on the 29th, was completely "technical", specific. Yeltsin explained to Putin how he planned to "build" New Year's Eve morning, how he would record a televised address, how he would sign decrees, hand over a nuclear briefcase to Putin, meet with the patriarch, with the security forces... That's all. Nothing particularly significant, nothing particularly serious, nothing particularly important for the future of the country.
Apparently, Yeltsin believed that by choosing Putin as his successor, he had already clearly defined the future of Russia and there was no need to fix it verbally.

Poll results
(December 25, 1999, January 8, January 30, 2000)
Yeltsin's unexpected early resignation, which he announced on December 31, favorably affected Putin's "presidential" rating, he jumped sharply: according to the Public Opinion Foundation, on the eve of the New Year, on December 25, this rating was 45 percent, and on January 8 it was already 55 .
Yeltsin's "help" from Putin was all the more noticeable because in December, in contrast to September-November, the prime minister's "presidential" rating did not show a particular upward trend.
In January, Putin began to have an absolute, unconditional advantage in pair voting, he had already "defeated" all his main rivals with a crushing score: Zyuganov 70:17, Primakov 71:15, Yavlinsky 75:7, Luzhkov 77:6.
For Putin's main rivals, Primakov and Luzhkov, things generally went badly. At the end of December 1999, the Public Opinion Foundation conducted a traditional poll on the topic: "Which of Russian politicians Public figures would you call the person of the year?" A year ago, at the end of 1998, the "people of the year" who took the first two places in the survey were the current associates (although I will not say that they are close friends) Evgeny Maksimovich and Yuri Mikhailovich. A year later Putin, naturally, became the absolute leader (his name was not on the list at all in 1998.) Yevgeny Maksimovich still managed to cling to second place, but with a completely indecent, more than five-fold lag behind the leader: Putin has 42 percent, Primakov has 8 The last silver medal winner, the mayor of the capital, moved to sixth place with a miserable two percent.
I believe that such polls increasingly strengthened the former prime minister, in the recent past, the main favorite of the public, in the opinion that he had absolutely nothing "shone" in the presidential elections, so there was nothing to "poke in", nothing to make the public laugh, nothing to damage his precious image in eminently solid, positive and reasonable figure. For what is the image of a person who has lost with a bang?
On February 4, Yevgeny Maksimovich, after long hesitation (“he hesitated” not only himself, but also everyone around him), finally left the race with a six percent rating (by this time Putin already had 57). As one of the TV presenters noted, "he was silent for a month, tormenting his supporters, raising the price of his decision."
Naturally, one of his main "killers", Mr. Dorenko, allowed himself on this occasion, as young people say, "to revel in full program", dance on the bones of the defeated Goliath.
I would not like to flatter myself unreasonably, he said on his personal broadcast, but it seems to me that Yevgeny Maksimovich heeded, among other things, my advice. As early as the end of October, I tried to persuade him to devote himself rather than to state, but to hip care. As you can see, Yevgeny Maksimovich is a stubborn person and thought about my proposal right up to February. Three plus months wasted (in the hip sense, I mean). But in the end he obeyed. And that's good.