Question 01. What is main reason the fact that both the Soviet leadership and the leaders Western countries passed in the first half of the 1970s. to the policy of detente?

Answer. The nuclear potentials of both superpowers have become equal and, most importantly, have reached dimensions at which, in the event of a war, there could not be not only winners, but also survivors on planet Earth. It became clear that III World War will turn into self-destruction for humanity.

Question 02. What is the "Brezhnev doctrine"? When and in connection with what did it start to be realized?

Answer. This is the name of what was formulated by Western politicians and public figures description of the foreign policy of the USSR in the 60s - 80s. The doctrine was that the USSR intervened in the internal affairs of the countries of the socialist bloc in order to ensure stability political course, built on the basis of real socialism and aimed at close cooperation with the USSR. A striking example of the implementation of this doctrine in practice was the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia. Actually, in 1968 this concept appeared in the West.

Question 03. What is your assessment of the actions of the Soviet leadership in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968?

Answer. The actions of the USSR in this situation were quite understandable and even predictable. Many strong countries acted in this way, which in the course of a regional or global confrontation they wanted with all their might to preserve the "allied", in fact subordinate states (one can still recall Athens at the head of its own maritime union). At the same time, such actions are unlikely to deserve approval. However, the actions of the leadership of Czechoslovakia, which in no way prepared for such an obvious reaction of the "ally" and could not in any way resist, are worthy of much more condemnation.

Question 04. Why did the USSR not go to the introduction of its troops into Poland in a similar situation in 1981?

Answer. A state of emergency was declared in Poland, that is, the leadership of this country itself suppressed anti-Soviet sentiments, achieved the results that the USSR would like to achieve - the introduction of troops was no longer needed.

Question 05. When and in connection with what ended the period of detente in international tension? What was the reason for this?

Answer. It ended with an introduction Soviet troops to Afghanistan in 1979. After this action, the USSR began new round arms race.

Question 06. Give an assessment of the nature of relations between the USSR and socialist, capitalist, developing countries in the mid-1960s - mid-1980s.

Answer. The foreign policy of the USSR after the removal from power of N.S. Khrushchev did not undergo such cardinal changes as the internal one. Some of its corrections followed from the very logic of development. international relations, new conditions. With the countries of the socialist camp, the USSR behaved like subordinates, although, for example, confrontation continued with China. The capitalist countries remained ideological opponents, and detente in international relations did not mean an end to the confrontation as a whole. The new thing was that these same countries became buyers of fossil fuels from the USSR, without their money the country of the Soviets now could not do. The developing countries remained the object of rivalry between the USA and the USSR, this rivalry often escalated into local conflicts. It was in these countries that the most negative aspects of the confrontation between the superpowers were manifested.

The "Brezhnev Doctrine" was first presented in the newspaper "Pravda" in 1968, distant for us. The main essence of the doctrine gave it a second name - "the doctrine of limited sovereignty."

In order to understand the essence of this direction, it is necessary to return to the period after the Second World War, which significantly changed the balance of power in Europe. After Soviet Union defeated fascism, he, no doubt, began to dictate certain conditions in the world space. This was manifested primarily in the spread of socialism to the west of Europe and in the strengthening of the positions of the pro-communist forces in the parliaments of such states as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, etc. Only Yugoslavia recovered in time from the communist dominance and quickly turned the vector towards the developed capitalist countries. Countries of Eastern Europe for greater control, they were united into a new military alliance - the OVD - the Warsaw Pact Organization, which arose in 1955. This made it possible to further polarize the world political arena: two clear warring parties appeared, the capitalist and socialist camp. The leaders of the Soviet Union have always set the tone for the socialist camp. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, whose foreign policy also bore the imprint of his personality, was no exception. This was a qualitatively new course, which differed from the direction of previous politicians, since it was built taking into account the mistakes of Stalin and Khrushchev.

What are the features of the course? Brezhnev's foreign policy was primarily aimed at maneuvering and self-elimination from hot world conflicts. Brezhnev was by nature a patient and rather cautious politician, in addition, at the end of his reign, after suffering a stroke, he tried not to get involved in major disputes between the giants of this world. In most cases, Leonid Ilyich only agreed with obvious, uncompromising solutions aimed at appeasement. And those party members who last years stood behind Brezhnev, did not dare to go out to the world level in foreign policy - they preferred to "do things" within their country. The Brezhnev doctrine had one more feature - collectivity in decision-making. In most cases, it was a solid props, since all decisions were made by the leader, but for the world community it was a decision of a number of countries. Of course, outwardly it looked much more democratic, but it is worth remembering that all these countries were members of the Warsaw Pact Organization, which means they were puppets in the hands of the Soviet Union.

Outwardly, such decisions were supported by an excellent ideological background. The Brezhnev doctrine was built on the rallying of the peoples of the countries of Eastern Europe, who had to clearly understand: the foreign policy of the Union is the policy of proletarian internationalism, and therefore - equality, sovereignty and independence. Therefore, all the actions carried out by the Soviet state were considered fully justified, because they were carried out within the framework of achieving this very equality, sovereignty and independence. And it does not matter that sometimes for the implementation of certain events it was necessary to use military force as was done in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Another pillar on which the Brezhnev doctrine was built is the change in the chronological framework of the achievement of communism. Rather, communism itself, to which they had been going since the time of V.I. Lenin, was now referred to as developed socialism, and his achievement was prolonged ahead for hundreds of years. This made it possible to hide many failures and shortcomings in terms of the economy, which no longer promised the Soviet people a bright future in ten to twenty years. And for a long time of striving for socialism, L.I.Brezhnev proposed to live in peace and harmony with countries of various types of development, for example, capitalist ones. This led to Brezhnev's tolerance for developed countries Europe, active rapprochement with some of them.

The Brezhnev doctrine at the moment has laid bare its entire caricatured essence, but in the seventies of the last century it was a competent and correct strategic step, which made it possible to avoid military conflicts in the future and direct foreign policy Union into a peaceful channel.

Abbreviated:

"BREZHNEV'S DOCTRINE", in Western historiography, is the name of the policy of limiting the sovereignty of the countries of the socialist camp, carried out by the USSR from the late 1960s to the 1980s. Its main provisions were formulated by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L.I.Brezhnev at the 5th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party in November 1968. The doctrine, recognizing the presence of weak links in the socialist camp, the possibility of restoring capitalism, declared everyone socialist countries preserving the integrity of the socialist camp (including with the help of military force). The "Brezhnev Doctrine" was a response to the events in Czechoslovakia that interrupted the onset of the Prague Spring

The events of 1968 revealed close interweaving of inter-party and geopolitical interests... The way out of the crisis was seen as "the all-round strengthening of the unity of the socialist camp," which in those years was increasingly called the "socialist community." Although the theoretical basis of relations between the countries of the "commonwealth" during these years remained "proletarian internationalism", its content was expanded and became part of the policy aimed at consolidation of the post-war order of Europe.

The development of the principle of "proletarian internationalism" in the late 1960s - early 1980s was implemented in the doctrine "limited sovereignty" , which was called in the West the "Brezhnev doctrine". It proceeded from the fact that in the chain of countries of the "socialist community", due to deviations from the "general laws of socialist construction", the emergence of individual "weak links" was allowed. It is in these "weak links" that the potential for the restoration of capitalism could arise and, consequently, the threat to the independence and sovereignty of such countries from imperialism. Thus, an equal sign was put between the collapse of socialism and the loss of sovereignty. According to this logic, the unity of the "socialist community" could be violated, which posed a danger to the entire socialist bloc as a whole. From this followed the provision that the sovereignty of any socialist state is the common property and "the concern of all socialist countries."

Therefore, in a calm atmosphere, it was a question of "supervising" the observance of the "general laws of socialism" by the socialist countries, in other words, adherence to the Soviet model. Objectively, this led to her conservation and replication of crisis phenomena on the scale of the entire "community"... If there was a threat to the "cause of socialism" in a particular country, the entire community should act as a united front and provide that country with fraternal assistance. "Help" was provided due to the collective responsibility for the fate of socialism "of all members of the socialist community, primarily the USSR." Who exactly determined the danger to the "fate of socialism" in this or that country was kept silent. In addition, it remained unclear whether a request for assistance from the leadership of the "in distress" country was mandatory or not. At the same time, it was stated that the policy of "non-intervention" in this situation directly contradicted the interests of the defense of the "fraternal states."

The main provisions of the "doctrine of limited sovereignty" began to be especially actively promoted as the crisis in Czechoslovakia intensified, and after 1968 to justify military intervention in this country. This political line was also characterized by an increase in the economic dependence of the countries of the "socialist community" on the USSR, constant political patronage over them. The instrument of maintaining "limited sovereignty" was the threat of force or its use.

Events on Damansky Island

The Soviet-Chinese contradictions that began under Khrushchev turned into an open struggle for "spheres of influence" during the Vietnam War. China has all the time exerted influence on the leadership of the DRV, seeking to subordinate it to its military and ideological course. Having plunged, beginning in 1966, into the abyss of the "cultural revolution," China isolated itself internationally. At the end of the 1960s, the territorial demands of the PRC against the USSR sharply intensified, which led to constant border incidents. The site of the military conflict in March 1969 was Damansky Island, where the border had not yet been demarcated. On March 2 and 15, Chinese troops shot at point-blank border patrols, the total losses of the USSR amounted to 152 people. In response, the USSR used the Grad military installations, after which the provocations from the Chinese side stopped. The Soviet leadership was seriously concerned about the threat of a large-scale war with China and admitted the possibility of a Sino-American alliance against the USSR. The possibility of a war on two fronts put the Soviet Union in front of the need to develop a new foreign policy course.

The "Brezhnev Doctrine" was first presented in the newspaper "Pravda" in 1968, distant for us. The main essence of the doctrine gave it a second name - "the doctrine of limited sovereignty."

In order to understand the essence of this direction, it is necessary to return to the period after the Second World War, which significantly changed the balance of power in Europe. After the Soviet Union defeated fascism, it undoubtedly began to dictate certain conditions in the world space. This was manifested primarily in the spread of socialism to the west of Europe and in the strengthening of the positions of the pro-communist forces in the parliaments of such states as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, etc. Only Yugoslavia recovered in time from the communist dominance and quickly turned the vector towards the developed capitalist countries. The countries of Eastern Europe, for greater control, were united into a new military alliance - the ATS - an organization that emerged in 1955. This made it possible to further polarize the arena: two clear warring parties appeared, the capitalist and the socialist camp. The tone for the socialist camp was always set by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, whose foreign policy also bore the imprint of his personality, was no exception. This was a qualitatively new course, which differed from the direction of previous politicians, since it was built taking into account the mistakes of Stalin and Khrushchev.

What are the features of the course? Brezhnev was primarily aimed at maneuvering and self-elimination from hot world conflicts. Brezhnev was by nature a patient and rather cautious politician, in addition, at the end of his reign, after suffered a stroke, he tried not to get involved in major disputes between the giants of this world. In most cases, Leonid Ilyich only agreed with obvious, uncompromising solutions aimed at appeasement. And those party members who in recent years stood behind Brezhnev did not dare to go to the world level in foreign policy - they preferred to "do things" within their country. The Brezhnev doctrine had one more feature - collectivity in decision-making. In most cases, it was a complete props, since all decisions were made by the leader, and for this it was a decision of a number of countries. Of course, outwardly it looked much more democratic, but it is worth remembering that all these countries were participants and, therefore, puppets in the hands of the Soviet Union.

Outwardly, such decisions were supported by an excellent ideological background. The Brezhnev doctrine was built on the rallying of the peoples of the countries of Eastern Europe, who had to clearly understand: the foreign policy of the Union is the policy of proletarian internationalism, and therefore - equality, sovereignty and independence. Therefore, all the actions carried out by the Soviet state were considered fully justified, because they were carried out within the framework of achieving this very equality, sovereignty and independence. And it does not matter that sometimes military force had to be used to carry out certain events, as was done in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Another pillar on which the Brezhnev doctrine was built is the change in the chronological framework of the achievement of communism. Rather, communism itself, to which they had been moving since the time of V.I. Lenin, was now referred to as developed socialism, and its achievement was prolonged for hundreds of years. This made it possible to hide many failures and shortcomings in terms of the economy, which no longer promised the Soviet people a bright future in ten to twenty years. And for a long time, striving for socialism, L.I.Brezhnev proposed to live in peace and harmony with the countries of various types development, for example, capitalist. This led to Brezhnev's tolerance for Europe, an active rapprochement with some of them.

The Brezhnev doctrine at the moment has laid bare its entire caricatured essence, but in the seventies of the last century it was a competent and correct strategic step that allowed to avoid military conflicts in the future and direct the Union's foreign policy to a peaceful channel.

From the USSR to Russia. The story of an unfinished crisis. 1964-1994 Boffa Giuseppe

"Doctrine of Brezhnev"

"Doctrine of Brezhnev"

Just at the moment when the Czechoslovak and Chinese crises reached their climax, Brezhnev finally succeeded in convening a new international conference of communist parties in Moscow. The preparatory meetings began in February 1968, when the Prague Spring was just beginning. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the work was postponed. But the persistence of the Soviet side ultimately prevailed. The meeting was held in June 1969. Outwardly, it was successful, as Brezhnev later boasted. In reality, the situation was different. The communist movement split, and it was no longer possible to hide it. The Chinese did not come to Moscow. There were also no Vietnamese. There was hardly a single communist party from Asia. The Yugoslavs were absent. Cubans and Swedes were only in the role of observers. The Italian communists came but took a critical stand and rejected three quarters of the final document. Brezhnev nevertheless announced his intention to hold other meetings of this kind. But he did not succeed in all the subsequent 13 years that he remained in power. The Moscow meeting turned out to be the last world conference of communist parties.

Indeed, the Sino-Soviet conflict and the armed invasion of Czechoslovakia had such a devastating effect on the international communist movement that the participants in the events themselves at that moment could not have imagined. The Soviet leaders failed to achieve any of the goals for which the conference was originally conceived. There was not even a hint of condemnation of Chinese policy in the final document, although many of those present primarily criticized it. Nothing was said about the events in Prague, despite the huge negative response that the intervention in Czechoslovakia received. The fact that these two facts had to be passed over in silence was the price paid by the USSR for ending the conference without dramatic splits between the parties participating in it. The sacrifice of ostentatious success was (and could not be done without) the solution of pressing political problems.

In August 1968, the Soviet invasion of Prague was met with a wave of protest with the support of almost all communist parties in the part of Europe that was not part of the Warsaw Bloc. This has never happened before. True, in the following months, the pressure exerted by the leaders of the USSR on all these small and large parties led to the fact that many of them muted the fire of their criticism. Many, but not all. Italians, Swedes, Dutch, partly Spaniards, who were then still either underground or in exile outside their country, did not agree to reconcile. Therefore, the gap did not last even after the conference in Moscow.

Less obvious, but no less serious, were the consequences in the countries that were allies of the USSR. On the eve of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev already had the experience of the Hungarian precedent in 1956, when Soviet troops were brought in to suppress the uprising in Budapest. However, in the case of Hungary, the then Soviet leaders, before making the fatal decision, consulted with the heads of all communist countries, including the Chinese and Yugoslavs, and received, albeit reluctantly, consent to this. This time, they did not even consult with the governments on behalf of which they allegedly spoke. Indeed, the invasion of Czechoslovakia was presented as a collective measure of the Warsaw Pact, so the Germans, Poles, Hungarians and Bulgarians joined in. But the government of Romania, which was also part of the Warsaw bloc, was not even informed, for it was clear that it would oppose the operation. Until the armed forces were brought into action, no foreign Political Party No matter how friendly she behaved towards the USSR, she did not receive any information, although earlier Brezhnev had given promises on this score.

The Soviet leadership was more concerned with how to formulate a universal justification for their actions, which would justify a possible Soviet intervention in the future under similar circumstances. That is why it was proclaimed in Moscow that it was the duty of the socialist countries to rush to help, even with arms in hand, where socialism was in danger. For the first time, it was entrusted to a Pravda journalist to formulate this thesis, who considered even the very hypothesis of a peaceful change of the regime unacceptable. The same idea was later adopted by Brezhnev, who viewed the totality of socialist countries as an international community, the boundaries of which should in no case change. This theory, presented by Moscow as an expression of the ideals of internationalism, was dubbed by the Western press as the “Brezhnev Doctrine” - the basis of the “limited sovereignty” of countries that called themselves socialist. Brezhnev protested against such definitions, but at the same time he invariably defended the USSR's right to indicate where and when socialism was in danger. As a result, the governments of countries that considered themselves socialist, but had certain points of divergence with Moscow, such as Romania and Yugoslavia, fearing an attack by Soviet troops, turned to the opinion of Western governments for their possible reaction to such a situation. Although at that moment nothing suggested that plans of this kind were hatching in Moscow (on the contrary, they tried to dispel the fears of both Bucharest and Belgrade).

To the Czechoslovak leaders brought as prisoners to Moscow, Brezhnev said very rudely, but very expressively: "We will not let you go." The phrase did not refer to their captivity at that time, but to the situation in their homeland, in Czechoslovakia: we will not allow you to leave our orbit, we will not allow you to change, we will not allow you to go to the other side. At the end of the 60s, an attempt to give this, as it were echoed with the previous internationalist ideals of the European labor movement, an ideological justification was really the real concern of the Soviet leadership. But the practical expression of this attempt was so clumsy that it rather emphasized how far the mentality of the leaders of the USSR was from the real values ​​of the culture of internationalism. And if at first even the distorted internationalist idea of ​​politics greatly contributed to the birth of this coalition of states, then as a result of the events that have taken place, relations within the bloc of allied countries and in countries sympathetic to them have undergone profound changes. Since the ruthless language of power began to be used instead of the internationalist idea, the position of the countries could not but change. Formal demonstrations of the bloc's unity seem to have continued and even seem to have become more frequent, but in practice the policy has become completely different.