Summary of the lesson on literary reading in grade 3 on the topic "I.A. Krylov" Chizh and ...
The defeat of France, the main ally of Great Britain in Europe, as well as Belgium and Holland meant the collapse and defeat of the anti-German coalition of European states that had taken shape at the beginning of the Second World War. Western countries were unable to resist fascist aggression, despite the fact that the economic potential of England and France exceeded the economic potential of Germany. The Allies were superior in the number of armed forces and, with the exception of aviation, in the number of weapons. However, the short-sighted policies and vicious strategy of the Anglo-French ruling circles doomed the coalition of the Western allies to defeat.
In the pre-war period, the ruling circles of England and France pursued a course of reviving the military potential of Germany and encouraging the aggression of the Hitlerite Reich. This policy, which contradicted the national interests of European states, corresponded to the designs of international reaction, which sought to create a united front against the Soviet Union.
The outbreak of war did not change the anti-Soviet orientation of the foreign policy of England and France. They, as in the pre-war period, were ready to come to an agreement with Hitler's Germany.
At the same time, the ruling circles of the Western powers became convinced that the growing power of Germany threatened their own interests. They were forced to increasingly reckon with the likelihood that Hitlerite Germany, even before the attack on the Soviet Union, would try to establish undivided hegemony in Europe. Having declared war on Germany, but without taking active hostilities against it, the ruling circles Western countries only demonstrated their determination to fight the enemy and at the same time showed that they would not protest against the aggression of Germany in the eastern direction. Politicians in Britain and France hoped that they would be able to avoid the continuation of the war in the West and resolve the internal imperialist contradictions at the expense of the USSR.
The policy of concessions to the aggressor, the rejection of the collective security system in Europe with the participation of the Soviet Union, the open betrayal of Czechoslovakia and then Poland, the anti-Soviet course of the Western powers - all this blocked the path to the formation of a broad coalition of states against the countries of the fascist bloc and was one of the reasons for the defeat of the Anglo -French union.
Small European states saw that they could become a bargaining chip in the big game of the imperialist powers and become directly dependent on Germany or England and France. This largely explains the failure of the aspirations of Anglo-French diplomacy to create an anti-German and anti-Italian grouping in the Balkans, the indecisiveness of the Norwegian government to counter the aggressor, Sweden's refusal to join the Western bloc, the stubborn reluctance of Belgium and Holland to work out, together with Britain and France, a common plan of struggle against Hitler's attack ... Under attack Nazi troops, Belgium and Holland decided to join military efforts with England and France. But the loosely knit coalition of the Western powers collapsed before the organizational forms and principles of joint military operations were found.
The Anglo-French military alliance, which constituted the core of the anti-German coalition, turned out to be fragile. It was weakened by the contradictions that existed between the allies, both in the field of economics and in politics.
In the pre-war years, British diplomacy, using the economic and political weakening of France, achieved Britain's leadership position in the Anglo-French alliance. “The French ruling class, representing subordinate imperialism,” noted W. Rast, a prominent figure in the British Communist Party, “was forced to adapt its policy to the interests of England” (277).
England's strategy was based on the need to ensure the defense of the mother country and the vast British colonial empire. The ruling circles of England have always believed that this requires a powerful navy and relatively limited land forces. British strategists believed that England's insular position also excluded, or at least made it difficult for enemy troops to invade.
In accordance with its long-standing traditions, England in the war with fascist Germany sought to shift the burden of conducting hostilities on the continent onto the shoulders of its allies. The British government pledged to provide aid to France with aviation and a limited number of expeditionary forces. At the first setbacks, England hastened to evacuate its troops from France and reduced the strength of its aviation, which participated in battles on the continent. Thus, England is largely responsible for the catastrophe of 1940, which befell France in the metropolis.
One of the reasons for the defeat of the Anglo-French coalition was the reactionary domestic politics the ruling classes of England and France. Influential circles of the British and French bourgeoisie saw in the fascist regime a reliable force for suppressing the working masses and strengthening the rule of the monopolies. Their political sympathies were on the side of Nazi Germany. They strove for an agreement with the fascist countries. Supporters of collusion with Hitler in England were representatives of monopoly capital and the aristocracy.
The capitulatory policy of the ruling classes was especially vividly manifested in France.
As noted by the prominent figure of the French Communist Party E. Fajon, “unworthy rulers sacrificed national defense and collective security for the sake of a reactionary privileged and defeatist-minded caste” (278).
The French bourgeoisie feared the people, feared the strengthening of the forces that, in 1936, ensured the victory of the popular front. The desire to end the democratic movement of the working people, suppress the revolutionary actions of the working class, outlaw the Communist Party and establish "strong power" in the country determined the sympathy of most of the French bourgeoisie for the dictatorial fascist regimes in Germany and Italy. The French reaction saw Hitler as a European gendarme who could suppress the revolutionary movement of the masses, and therefore, in their class interests, considered it expedient to come to an agreement with Germany. Representatives of the reactionary bourgeoisie, blinded by their class hatred of the working people, held leading positions in state bodies. They worshiped Nazism and considered the war with the Hitlerite Reich senseless and harmful. Fascist ideology was widespread among the officer corps of the French armed forces. Former Minister of Education J. Zey wrote: “Too many officers, some of whom held prominent posts, harbored an irreconcilable hatred of the democratic regime and secretly admired Hitler’s fascism or Mussolini’s fascism” (279).
Fear of the revolutionary movement of the popular masses and admiration for fascism were the source of defeatist sentiments and views in the ruling classes of France (280). In the conditions of the outbreak of war, the Daladier government, and then the Reynaud government, unleashed a blow not on Hitler's agents and spies, but on the working class of France and its revolutionary vanguard, the Communist Party. On the 70th anniversary of the Paris Commune, Maurice Thorez and Jacques Duclos wrote in the underground newspaper L'Humanite: “Fear of the working class forced the capitalists in 1871 to throw themselves into the arms of Bismarck. And the same fear of the French people in 1940 made ruling classes France to throw herself into Hitler's arms ”(281).
The war showed that the political leaders of England and France, hoping for an agreement with Germany on an anti-Soviet basis, were unable to provide a comprehensive preparation of their countries for an armed confrontation with the fascist states. The allies were not able to effectively use the fairly large amount of quite modern weapons that industry provided.
The war revealed serious miscalculations in the development of the Allied armed forces. In the pre-war period, England did not pay due attention to the deployment of the ground army, hoping to create infantry formations during the war, at its final stage. France, having spent colossal funds on the construction of the super-powerful Maginot Line, failed to create a strong aviation and mechanized troops. The French army lacked new types of weapons, especially anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons.
The passive-wait-and-see nature of the allies' strategy, largely engendered by their course of directing aggression against the Soviet Union, doomed the troops to passive actions and in advance placed the strategic initiative in the hands of the enemy. The political leadership of England and France has not set decisive strategic goals since the beginning of the war with Germany, believing that defense is a prerequisite and the main condition for victory. In their strategic plans, the Allies proceeded from the assumption that the insular position of England and the strong defense of France, based on the powerful fortifications of the Maginot Line, would deprive Germany of the opportunity to take active actions in the west. England and France were betting on a protracted war, during which they would be able to choose a favorable moment to go on the offensive against an enemy weakened by a long war. "Our high command," writes the French historian E. Bonnef, "completely gave the initiative to the enemy, who could freely choose the time and place most suitable for the offensive" (282).
Among the British and French strategists, the conviction reigned in the insuperability of defense and the inevitability of the emergence of strong, stable fronts in a war. Before the outbreak of World War II, B. Liddell Garth argued: "The difficulties of the" knockout "have greatly increased due to the current superiority of the defense over the offensive ... The soldier's dreams of" lightning war»Have less and less prospects for their implementation. If the German General Staff has not yet lost a sense of reality, then the possibility of a serious German offensive in the West becomes more than doubtful ”(283).
British and French strategists failed to correctly assess the role of new trends in the development of military affairs. They blindly believed in the inviolability of the experience of the First World War and did not see that the massive use of high-speed tanks and motorized infantry in close cooperation with aviation, the creation of new means of communication opened up great opportunities to conduct broad offensive operations. The French military theorist General Ely noted: "... our doctrine on the conduct of hostilities and the methods of applying this doctrine during the entire campaign did not correspond to the new forms of warfare imposed on us by the enemy, and served as one of the reasons that determined the speed of our defeat" (284 ).
The French command, which was responsible for coalition operational-strategic planning in the land theater, made a mistake in determining the direction of the enemy's main attack. The dislocation of the main forces of the allied armies, the distribution of their reserves, and with the beginning of the war, the advancement of troops to Belgium only worsened the operational-strategic position of the allies. In the course of hostilities, the French command failed to carry out a timely maneuver with its reserves in order to stop the enemy grouping that had broken through. In a report to the Minister of War on the reasons for the defeat of the army, General Gamelin on May 18, 1940 wrote: “The appearance of German tank divisions, their unexpected ability to break through defenses on a broad front were the main strategic factor of these days. The massive use of tanks by the Germans paralyzed all attempts to close the gap, each time breaking the links of the chain created to hold the enemy. Defensive measures could not be carried out quickly due to the lack of a sufficient number of mechanized units and formations ”(285).
From the very first days of hostilities, the allied command showed clearly insufficient ability to lead troops in a complex operational-strategic situation. Communication with the troops was lost. Tanks were used scattered, aviation failed to provide effective support to ground forces and suppress enemy tank columns.
In the campaign in Western Europe, the fascist German command managed to implement the blitzkrieg strategy, conducting two interconnected short-term strategic operations. The success of the blitzkrieg was ensured by careful preparation of each of them and a surprise attack on the enemy, operational-strategic camouflage, and the massive use of tanks and aircraft.
In accordance with the concept of the campaign, the covert deployment of the German armed forces was carried out. The main attention was paid to the creation of a powerful strategic invasion echelon, to which the maximum available forces and means were allocated. Almost all the tanks were concentrated in the direction of the main attack in the Ardennes. Tank and motorized divisions were reduced to corps and groups, which were the core of future army tank formations. Aviation to support army groups was united into large operational formations - air fleets.
The main striking force of the advancing group of the Germans in France were tank troops. Having broken through the defensive line, German tanks entered the enemy's retreat path and captured important lines, making it impossible to organize a defensive front. Motorized and infantry formations followed the tanks, consolidating the success and creating barriers on the flanks of the breakthrough. The Nazi command provided powerful air support to the rapidly advancing mobile groupings.
The massive use of tanks and aircraft made it possible to increase the depth of the operation and achieve high rates of offensive. In six days of fighting, German mobile formations passed 250 km from the breakthrough section on the Meuse to the English Channel. General Beaufre notes: "The massive use of tanks was decisive in these events, it excluded any prolonged resistance and allowed the enemy to make a deep breakthrough, which led to a wide encirclement of our troops and the capture of several thousand prisoners" (286).
In the operations of the Wehrmacht to defeat the allies in Europe, the methods of the combat use of aviation were further developed. Sudden strikes on enemy airfields and air battles with enemy aircraft ensured the Luftwaffe's air supremacy.
The command of the fascist German forces widely used aviation to support ground forces both during the breakthrough of the enemy's defenses and during the actions of strike groups in the operational depth. The close interaction of German aviation with tank and motorized formations largely determined the strategic success of the Wehrmacht.
The hostilities of the Wehrmacht in Holland, Belgium and France exposed the vulnerable aspects of German fascist policy and strategy. The inconsistency of the calculations of the fascist political and military leadership that with the defeat of France peace with England and the end of the war in the West was clearly revealed, which, in the opinion of Hitler's strategists, was an important condition for the implementation of aggression against the Soviet Union. The calculations of the fascist clique that the popular masses of the countries occupied by Germany, as well as England, would refuse to continue the struggle after the defeat of the allied armies, failed. The growing general hatred of fascism and the determination of the working people to fight for the national independence of their states created and strengthened the basis for active opposition to Nazism. The leaders of the Third Reich underestimated the depths of the imperialist contradictions between Germany, on the one hand, and Britain and the United States of America, on the other. The Churchill government, in spite of the difficult situation in which Britain found itself, could not agree to conclude peace with Germany, since this would lead to the loss of the dominant position of British imperialism in the system of capitalist states. England, relying on the resources of the vast colonial empire and the growing military support of the United States, continued the war with Nazi Germany. The strategic task of the Wehrmacht - to completely secure its European rear for the period of the campaign to the east - turned out to be unfulfilled.
The operational-strategic plans of the fascist command and the course of the Wehrmacht's military operations in Western Europe showed that the military leadership of Germany showed a steady tendency to overestimate its capabilities and weapons and underestimate the enemy's forces. The victory over France turned the heads of the fascist rulers. They were inclined to attribute it to the "unsurpassed" qualities of the Wehrmacht and the "genius" of the military leadership, primarily Hitler himself. The experience of military operations acquired in France became absolute, and the forms and methods of conducting operations in the West were recognized as universal, suitable for use in any conditions and against any enemy.
The successes of Nazi Germany in the "lightning war" against the forces of the Anglo-French coalition changed the political situation in Europe. Having quickly liberated its armed forces in Western Europe, the Reich began direct preparations for new aggressive campaigns. The threat of German aggression in the Balkans and the Near and Middle East was clearly visible.
At the same time, there were changes in the attitude of the masses to the war. The ruling classes were unable to block the path of Hitlerism to Scandinavia and Western Europe, despite the fact that most Western states had sufficient material resources, had modern armies, and many soldiers and officers fought bravely against the invaders. The national catastrophe of these states could have been prevented if at the very beginning the capitulatory policy of the governments had been suppressed and an effective program of struggle against the fascist aggressor had been adopted. The communist parties put forward just such a program. But they were repressed and driven underground. The bourgeoisie deprived the communists of the opportunity to act as the interests of the people and nation demanded.
The government circles of Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland, France have shown their inability to organize a rebuff to fascist aggression, their political course has suffered complete bankruptcy. The forces entered into action, which have always been irreconcilable to fascism. The communist parties and the progressive organizations adjoining them, despite the most difficult conditions, took the lead in the struggle of the masses, which were destined to make a decisive contribution to the movement of Resistance to the fascist regime.
The year is 1939. After german troops crossed the Polish border, France, following its treaty obligations, declared war on Germany on September 3, taking up positions on the Maginot Line. The British entered the conflict a little earlier, but nevertheless, neither one nor the other side, while active fighting and the columns of the Wehrmacht and the Panzerwaffe advanced deep into Polish territory without making any effort. Why? The explanation is quite simple. Did England and France want to give Poland to Germany? Obviously not, despite the Munich Agreement and so on. But everything happened so rapidly that neither the military nor the political machines of these countries had time to orient themselves in space and time.
Napoleon said: "Generals are always preparing for the last war." It can be said that the generals and politicians of England and France were also preparing for a war not so impetuous, when victory over the enemy is won within two or three weeks. They thought that they would have time to reflect, assess the situation, and then begin to make some decisions: to support Poland in the military-technical aspect, to strike Germany from the Rhineland or not.
The fact is that by the time the Polish campaign the Germans on the western border, on the so-called Siegfried Line, had a negligible number of troops. Almost all aviation and tanks were sent to Eastern front, to Poland, while France had enough potential to overturn the German line of defense and invade deep into German territory. It was a real risk for Hitler, but nevertheless he was sure that this would not happen.
One gets the impression that both sides, England and France, were biding their time. What? First, they wanted peace (this can be seen in the example of the Munich Agreement), they wanted to save the lives of their fellow citizens. By any means.
French soldiers during the "strange war" are photographed on the street of the town, December 1939
If we consider the situation after the fall of Poland. Why, after that, France did not bring its troops into the territory of Germany? I must say that Hitler was afraid of this input and after the start of the Polish campaign, literally a week and a half later, he began to transfer troops to the Western Front to the border line with France, which were released during the hostilities in Poland. That is, he was really afraid of a stab in the back. And now the war in Poland ended, the Polish government fled, the territory was divided with the Soviet Union, which greatly strengthened the capabilities of the USSR and, among other things, pushed back the western border.
What happened? As a matter of fact, nothing outwardly, as it might seem. In fact, the period from September 1939 to the spring of 1940 is a period of the most intensive diplomatic work of the opposing sides. England and France tried to negotiate with Hitler by any means so that the war in the Western European theater of operations would not be unleashed. Did they think about Hitler moving on the Soviet Union? It is quite obvious that no, because otherwise this colossal negotiation process simply would not have happened.
In 1939, France was the main force on the Western Front
In addition, if we go back to the beginning of 1939, then France, which, in fact, was the main force on the Western Front opposing Hitler, at that time not only was looking for allies, but was calculating with whom it could be united in the future conflict. with Germany. And I must say that, unlike the British, the French did not sweep away the alliance with the USSR. But everything, perhaps, was spoiled by the same notorious Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, when anti-communists again took the upper hand in the domestic political life of France, who had an indisputable argument and a trump card in all discussions and conflicts. After that, the French realized that they would not get any alliance with the Soviet Union. Naturally, they turned to the British.
US President Franklin Roosevelt addresses the nation on the occasion of the German attack on Poland, September 1939
It may seem strange to some, but in 1939 the French were much stronger militarily. They had a fairly large potential in the field of aviation, tanks, and a large group of troops. This begs the question: why did this strange pause occur without the conduct of hostilities? At that time, England lost its leading position in politics: one concession to Germany after another, the absence of a real military potential for conducting hostilities on European land pushed it to the background.
As for France, the position here was ambivalent. On the one hand, the French did not want to go to war with Germany, on the other hand, they had a certain confidence in own forces because their army was large enough and well armed. Again, certain reliance on the Maginot Line as a factor that can stop the German troops. And in the aggregate, all this - the fear of war and a certain self-confidence - pushed the French to negotiate with the Germans. The negotiations were intensive, and I must say that France was ready to make significant concessions in these negotiations. For example, to give Germany part of their colonies in Africa.
The French tried to negotiate with Mussolini. The British did the same. But in fact, this pause gave Germany the opportunity to increase its military-technical potential. And, interestingly, neither the French nor the British took advantage of this pause in terms of building up military "muscles", although, it would seem, almost a year is enough time to launch new tanks and aircraft into production to increase their potential.
"Strange War" was used by Germany to increase power
At the same time, Britain and France were conducting intensive negotiations with the United States, which during the "strange war" occupied the position of the main player. Why? The fact is that without the participation of America, France had practically no chances (it was simply ridiculous to talk about Britain's military potential at that time). And at a time when the "strange war" was going on, the British and French in every possible way begged the American government, in particular, President Franklin Roosevelt, to open an arms supply line, because without Lend-Lease for France and England to talk about a victory in a more or less protracted the war was impossible.
But here one obstacle arose in the form of American legislation, which had long imposed an arms embargo. This was the 1937 act, the so-called embargo act.
The fact is that in the Senate, in the US Congress, far from everyone shared the need to intervene in the European conflict, proceeding from the consideration that it would be okay. But this did not work out, and the most far-sighted politicians of the States understood this. Various schemes were proposed in the form of the sale of arms by the American government to some private intermediary companies, which, in turn, will sell it to England and France. But it all took certain time, and not a single plane, not a single tank left American territory during this period.
German soldiers at the entrance to the bunker on the Maginot Line, May 1940
As for Roosevelt's position, after Poland had already fallen, he asked to bring him calculations on the military-technical potential of the United States. The figures that were announced to the president turned out to be frightening. It turns out that at the time when the Second World War began, there were 50 thousand people under arms in the United States, that is, a total of somewhere on the order of five divisions, which could not be compared with the potential of Germany or France. Weapons and ammunition in the warehouses of the American army were stored for another 500 thousand people. Accordingly, Roosevelt was not ready to squander what little the United States had during the "strange war". And when England and France asked him for 10 thousand planes, they simply did not exist physically. Although the United States managed to make certain deliveries before the end of the campaign. And what is very funny, for the period of the "strange war" of 1939-1940, the US aviation consisted of 160 fighters, 52 bombers and only 250 pilots who could sit on the levers of the above machines. That is, at that time, of course, the United States could not talk about any active involvement in the armed conflict.
But the United States wanted and tried to play an important diplomatic role. And we must pay tribute to Roosevelt, who, denying any behind-the-scenes negotiations, did everything possible to bypass this embargo law. In the end he succeeded.
But the most important thing that America needed was to get out of the state of neutrality. Incidentally, in parallel with the name "strange war" in relation to the United States, there is also such a thing as "strange neutrality." Roosevelt, realizing that there was no escape, that a conflict was inevitable, and for all that, having refused all negotiations and peace initiatives in 1939, in 1940, in the first half of it, he returned to the idea of mediation, proposing his candidacy as organizer of negotiations. He sent Welles, the US Undersecretary of State, to Rome, Paris, London and Berlin. I started with Italy, which played a rather important role in this whole game. The French, like the Americans, already anticipating a conflict with Germany, also tried to achieve neutrality on the part of Mussolini. They offered the Italians colonies, which at that time were their bargaining chip. The British, on the other hand, refused to give up their colonies in exchange for anything.
During the "strange war" the US was the main player
However, Welles' visit to Italy was extremely unsuccessful, because when he visited Mussolini, he constantly dozed in his chair and opened his mouth only when he wanted to make one or another declaration. That is, the dialogue did not work out.
The visit to Paris was also unsuccessful, since the French perceived the actions of the United States, if not as a betrayal, then as a passive expectation of how it would all end.
Thus, neither the British nor the French wanted to fight. England lost its role as arbitrator in the European theater, and the United States had 50,000 armed men and 160 combat aircraft. Deladier, the French prime minister, then declared: “To achieve a peaceful solution, there is only one means - the great neutral country, the United States, must take responsibility for negotiations and organize international air force for police purposes ". Only in such a role did the French see the participation of the United States, without relying on their armed forces.
Be that as it may, but the time was lost. Precious time. Then events began to develop according to a well-known scenario.
The "Strange War" ended in May 1940, when Hitler easily bypassed the Maginot Line. A land war began in France.
Strange War is a term attributed to the period from September 3, 1939 to May 10, 1940 in the Western European theater of operations or the Western Front.
Why a strange war?
This phrase emphasizes the nature of the conduct of hostilities during this period, or rather their almost complete absence, the warring parties did not take any active measures at all.
On the one hand, there were the forces of 48 divisions of the united armies of Britain and France, and on the other, 42 divisions of the troops of the Third Reich. Located behind the well-fortified defensive lines of Siegfried and Maginot, the opposing sides only occasionally poured fire on the enemy's side. This period can be considered a weakness or miscalculation of the strengths of Britain and France. They had more soldiers at their disposal than the German army, but they did absolutely nothing.
This made it possible for the army of the Third Reich to crank up campaigns to capture Denmark, Norway, divide Poland and prepare for a decisive invasion of France.
And now we should talk about the "strange war" in more detail, study all periods, key stages, prerequisites and results.
Prerequisites
In the plans of Adolf Hitler was the seizure of the territories of Europe, with the aim of settling these territories by the Germans - the highest race.
Hitler decided to start with the annexation of Austria, and then turned his gaze to Poland. First, he demanded that the Poles return the city of Danzig, while opening the "Polish corridor" for the Germans (the territory between main Germany and East Prussia). When the Poles refused to comply with the demands, Hitler tore up the Non-Aggression Pact.
On September 1, the German armies entered the territory of Poland - this was the beginning of the Second World War. On the same day, France declares war on Germany. Then Britain enters the war.
Forces of the parties
The military forces of France were significantly larger than those of Germany. France had significant air superiority, with the French having over 3,500 aircraft, most of which were the latest developments. The British Air Force soon joined them with 1,500 aircraft. And Germany had only about 1,200 aircraft at its disposal.
France also had large quantity tank divisions, and Germany did not have a single tank division on this front. The reason for this is the capture of Poland, where all the forces of the Panzerwaffe (tank forces of the Third Reich) were involved.
First stage
France was in a hurry to carry out extensive mobilization, however, due to the outdated mobilization system, the army could not undergo the required training. And also the French had rather outdated views on the very conduct of hostilities. The leadership believed that before a massive offensive, it was necessary to fire powerful artillery salvos (as was done during the First World War). But the problem is that the French artillery was in conservation and could not be prepared quickly.
Also, the French did not want to conduct any offensive action without the forces of Britain, which could only be deployed in October.
In turn, the German army was also in no hurry to read any offensive actions, in his address Hitler said: "We will lay the beginning of the war on the Western Front on the forces of the French and the British." At the same time, he gave the order to maintain defensive positions and in no way endanger German territory.
The beginning of "active" actions. Saar operation
The French offensive began on September 7, 1939. The French had a plan to invade Germany and then capture it. Germany at this time was strongly inferior to the forces of France, since the troops were occupied with the capture of Poland. For a week of hostilities, the French managed to break into enemy territory 32 km deep, while they captured more than 10 settlements. The Germans retreated without a fight, while accumulating their forces. The French infantry suffered heavy casualties from antipersonnel mines and the offensive was halted. The French did not even manage to reach the Siegfried Line (West Wall).
On September 12, it was decided to stop the offensive. And already on September 16 and 17, the Germans launched a counteroffensive and recaptured the previously lost territories. The French army returned to the Maginot defensive line. This is how the "strange war" began.
Plan "Gelb". The attack on France
On September 27, Adolf Hitler ordered to prepare a full-scale offensive against France, the goal of which is: "to bring England to her knees and defeat France." For this, an invasion plan was developed, which was named "Gelb". Behind him, the offensive was to begin on November 12. However, it was carried over 30 times.
On January 10, Hitler named the final day for the start of the operation - January 17. But on that day, the Belgians got documents containing information about the Gelb plan and the operation was canceled.
Operation in Norway and Denmark
Hitler was afraid by starting an operation in France to open the way for the British to attack Germany from Scandinavia. The operation was named "Weserubung" and was completed on March 7, 1940.
Germany offered the authorities of Denmark and Norway a peaceful occupation - the occupation of these territories in order to provide themselves with cover from the British and French. Denmark agreed without resistance.
Norway refused to surrender. On April 19, the Allied armies launched an offensive, but were driven back by the German army and were forced to evacuate. On June 10, the remaining units of the Norwegian army surrender, and the country surrenders.
The end of the "strange war"
Strange War ends with full-scale offensive German army on the territory of France on May 10, 1940. They bypassed the Maginot Line and soon occupied almost all of France.
As a result, the silence and inaction of France and England during this period led to the capture of Poland, Norway, Denmark and made it possible for the Germans to prepare an operation to capture France, which later led to her surrender. The reason for the defeat was the self-confidence of the Allied forces, as well as outdated battle tactics.
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The first period of S. century. (1337-1360) was characterized by the struggle of the parties for Flanders and Guienne. In the Slaysk naval battle of 1340, the British inflicted the French. the fleet was severely defeated and won supremacy at sea. In aug. 1346 at the Battle of Crecy, they achieved superiority on land, and in the course of 11 months. The siege took possession of the pestilence. fortress and port of Calais (1347). After almost 10 years of armistice (1347-55) England, the army launched a successful offensive to capture the southwest of France (Guienne and Gascony). In the battle of Poitier (1356), the French. the army was again defeated. The exorbitant taxes and levies imposed by the British, and the devastation that reigned in the country, caused the uprisings of the French. people - the Paris uprising led by Etienne Marseille 1357-58 and Jacquerie (1358). This forced France to sign a peace treaty in Bretigny (1360) on extremely difficult conditions - the transfer of lands to England south of the Loire to the Pyrenees.
Second period S. century. (136 9-8 0). In an effort to eliminate the conquests of England, King Charles V of France (reigned 1364-80) reorganized the army and ordered tax system... Franz. the knightly militia was partially replaced by mercenary infantry. detachments, created a field art-I and a new fleet. Commander-in-Chief. the army (constable) was appointed a talented military leader B. Dgogsk-len, who received broad powers. Using tactics of surprise attacks and par-tiz. wars, fr. army by the end of the 70s. gradually pushed back the English, the troops to the sea. To the success of the military. action was facilitated by the use of French. army of art. Having retained a number of ports on the coast of France (Bordeaux, Bayonne, Brest, Cherbourg, Calais) and part of the French. ter. between Bordeaux and Bayonne, England in connection with the aggravated situation inside the country (see Wat Tyler's revolt of 1381) concluded an armistice with France, in which the narcotics also began. unrest.
Third period S. century. (141 5-2 4). Taking advantage of the weakening of France caused by the exacerbation of internal. contradictions (internecine war of the feuds, groups - the Burgundians and Armagnacs, new uprisings of peasants and townspeople), England resumed the war. In 1415, at the battle of Agincourt, the British defeated the French, with the help of the Duke of Burgundy, who entered into an alliance with them, captured North. France, which forced France to sign a humiliating peace treaty on May 21, 1420 at Troyes. Under the terms of the treaty, France became part of the united Anglo-French. kingdoms. Angle, King Henry V was declared the ruler of France with the rights of regent, and after the death of the French. King Charles VI received the rights to the French. throne. However, in 1422, both Charles VI and Henry V suddenly died. As a result of the intensified struggle for the royal throne (1422-23), France found itself in a tragic position: dismembered, plundered by the invaders. The population of the ter., Occupied by the British, was crushed by taxes and indemnities. Therefore, for France, the war for the royal throne turned into national liberation. war.
In early October 1939, after the conquest of Poland, Hitler proposed to England and France to conclude peace on the condition that the allies would consider the capture of Poland not the result of the aggression of Nazi Germany, but the “natural fate” of the Polish state. Hitler's proposals were bluntly rejected. It is unlikely that Hitler could have expected another answer from England and France. His "peace" proposals were clearly intended for domestic consumption, that is, for the German people, so that he could see what an "honest and peace-loving" Fuhrer controls him.
The allies with their, to put it mildly, short-sighted policy allowed Hitler to unleash a world war. They declared war on Germany at a time when they themselves were not ready for it. Neither England, much less France, which suffered colossal human losses in the First World War, showed no desire to fight. Months of "strange war" dragged on. The Germans did not touch their opponents, and their opponents, after an indecisive attempt to test the fortress of the German Siegfried Line, decided to wait out the hard times behind the reinforced concrete fortifications of the French Maginot Line, which they considered impregnable.
Hitler immediately after the "peace proposals" to the allies gave the General Staff of the Wehrmacht his first instructions regarding the preparation of an offensive in the west. He understood that a long war with France and England would lead to the depletion of the available limited resources, and this, according to Hitler, would put Germany in the back from Russia, since Hitler believed that his treaty with Stalin would not preserve neutrality The USSR was not one minute longer than it would be in the interests of Stalin. Therefore, Hitler decided to force France to conclude peace by quickly going over to the offensive. He hoped that if France withdraws from the war, then England will be forced to accept the terms of Germany. Hitler did not want to delay his attack on France and had previously planned to start the operation in mid-November 1939, reasonably believing that time was working against Germany in all respects at that time. He was confident that in mid-November the German Wehrmacht had sufficient forces to defeat France. Germany possessed superiority over France in new types of weapons, which, according to Hitler, had crucial... He said: “... Our tank troops and air forces, not only as a means of attack, but also as a means of defense, have reached such a technical perfection now that there is no other country in the world. Their strategic potential in combat is ensured by proper organization and experienced leadership, which no other country has. " Hitler knew that France had superiority in old-style weapons, particularly heavy artillery. But that did not stop him. He believed that "in a mobile war, this weapon does not have any significant value." The Fuhrer was wrong! After 3-4 years, he learns what an artillery offensive is and what significance it can have for the outcome of a combat operation, not only of a local, but also of a strategic nature.
The German generals believed that one should not rush to attack France, since after the battles in Poland, German troops needed rest and replenishment. In addition, the Wehrmacht has not yet received the right amount ammunition and new technology... Nevertheless, the offensive was scheduled for the second week of November 1939, but was then postponed for three days due to poor weather for aviation flights and difficulties with road and rail transport. There were eleven such delays until mid-January 1940 alone. This was followed by a long break until early May, when an order was issued that determined the final date for the start of the offensive - May 10. The strategic pause, which lasted about six months, was actively used by Germany to strengthen its armed forces and prepare them for the upcoming battles. During this period, German troops received 680 new tanks, 1368 field guns, and 1500 aircraft. The size of the army was increased to 3.3 million people.
At the same time, west of the Rhine, the Allies did not particularly bother themselves with combat training, hoping for the inaccessibility of the Maginot line. Most of their time was spent on playing cards and football, the officers had the opportunity to leave the location of their units for some time.
Of course, the Allied Joint Command was planning not only defensive actions, but also strikes against Germany. For example, strikes were planned on Germany through Norway, Sweden and Finland, through Belgium, through Balkan countries... It was also planned to strike at Soviet oil production points in the Caucasus with the aim of depriving Germany of the possibility of using them. We mentioned this in the previous chapter. However, all these plans were immediately put to rest as soon as on May 10, 1940, Germany unleashed its blow on France.
The German plan for an offensive against France had two main options. The first option is actually a repetition of the old Schlieffen plan, which provided for the main attack on France through Holland and Belgium. Note: Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913) - Chief of the General Staff of Germany in 1905-1913. was the author of the plan for the strategic deployment of the German army to wage war on two fronts: against France and against Russia. According to his plan, the first blow should be delivered to France by the bulk of the troops (up to 85% of all ground forces) through neutral Belgium and Luxembourg with the aim of capturing Paris. After the defeat of France, the plan provided for the transfer of large forces to the east to defeat the Russian army.
With some changes, the Schlieffen plan was accepted for execution at the beginning of the First World War by Colonel General Helmut Moltke the Younger, who replaced von Schlieffen as chief of the General Staff. At the Battle of the Marne (September 1914), in a head-on battle, the German troops were defeated by the Anglo-French troops. For this defeat Moltke was dismissed from military service.
Despite such little inspiring backstory, the Schlieffen plan was adopted as a basis by the General Staff of the Ground Forces, under the leadership of Colonel General Franz Halder, in preparation for the attack on France in 1940.
The second version of the offensive was proposed by General (since 1942 Field Marshal) Erich von Manstein. He considered the version of the Schlieffen plan to be rather stereotyped and ineffective; the Anglo-French troops would be ready for action on this plan. In addition, and this is the main thing, on the territory of Belgium and Holland, where the German troops will have to operate, there are defensive structures, and the terrain is covered with hundreds of rivers, rivers and canals, which will not allow the successful use of the striking force and maneuverability of tank formations. Manstein proposed to strike the main blow south, through the Ardennes, where the enemy least expected an attack. According to Manstein's calculations, the rugged wooded area in the Ardennes will not pose significant difficulties for laying the column tracks of tank formations. General Guderian, who had experience in using tanks in different conditions terrain. When breaking through the Ardennes, the enemy front is split into two parts, followed by their destruction, and the fight against the defensive structures of the "Maginot Line" practically disappears. But there are no perfect plans, especially in war. In the event that the Allies inflicted a powerful counterattack on the tank columns that had broken through from both sides, that is, from both flanks, then there would be a danger of a general failure of the German offensive. The General Staff of the Ground Forces adhered to an option similar to the Schlieffen plan and at first Manstein's plan was rejected, although Hitler liked the boldness of the plan for a strike through the Ardennes. The caution and doubts of the General Staff in choosing an offensive option were also shared by the commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht ground forces, Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch. Perhaps Schiffen's offensive option would have remained the main one, but then chance intervened. Yes, it’s an unusual case. On January 10, 1940, the liaison officer flew from Münster to Bonn, carrying documents relating to the plan of the attack on France. Due to bad weather, he lost his bearings and made an emergency landing in Belgium. He did not manage to burn all the documents, and part of the documents of the plan fell into the hands of the Belgians, and then the Anglo-French allies. But even after this incident, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces and the chief of the general staff did not dare to change the offensive plan for a long time. Only after Manstein managed to meet with Hitler, the issue was resolved: the General Staff immediately received an order from the Fuehrer to completely revise the plan according to the version proposed by Manstein.
By the beginning of May 1940, over three million German soldiers and officers were pulled up to the western borders of Germany. Of these, three army groups were created. The northernmost - Army Group B (commanded by General Fedor von Bock) - consisted of two armies stationed in the area from North Sea to Aachen. Army Group A (commanded by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt) consisted of four armies and a powerful armored group located in a relatively narrow zone between Aachen and Saarburg. Army Group C (commanded by Field Marshal Wilhelm Joseph von Leeb) consisted of two armies directly opposite the French defenses in eastern Lorraine and along the Rhine.
The ground forces supported two air fleets with a total of 3,824 aircraft. The general leadership of the operation was carried out by Hitler himself, and General Wilhelm Keitel was appointed chief of staff. The immediate command was carried out by Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, who had previously led the invasion of Poland.
(Deutsches Bundesarchiv / German Federal Archive)
The troops of the Anglo-French allies, together with the divisions of Belgium and Holland, totaled 3.78 million people. They also made up three army groups. The first, under the command of General Gustave Bayot, consisted of five armies, which occupied the section from the English Channel to Montmedy. The second group (commanded by General Gaston Pretelaa) had three armies located along the Maginot Line. The third group consisted of only one army (commanded by General Besançon) directly occupied the fortification of the Maginot line. The general command of the allied armies was carried out by General Maurice Gustave Gamelin.
The allied command, which accidentally took possession of Schiffen's version of the German plan, was going to act precisely against this plan, that is, to repel the main blow of the German troops in Holland and Belgium. With the outbreak of hostilities, the allied armies, according to the plan, should move to the territory of Belgium, where, together with the Belgian troops, take a defensive line on the Diel River. At the same time, Belgium adhered to neutrality and allowed the Anglo-French troops to enter its territory only in the event of an attack by Germany. Before the start of the German offensive, the balance of forces both in personnel and in military equipment (with the exception of aircraft) was generally in favor of the Allied forces. However, this could not predetermine the victory of the allies for the main reason: the French (both the government and the people) were not ready to fight. The morale of the French army did not at all correspond to the requirements of the upcoming confrontation with a powerful and mobile army of the enemy, determined only for victory. The striking success of the blitzkrieg demonstrated by the Wehrmacht in Poland and Norway raised the morale of German soldiers and officers. In addition, they had a plan of action that the Allies did not know about, and therefore were subjected to a surprise attack by German troops.
Starting with deceiving the enemy, that is, with the usual, generally accepted in strategy and operational art, the German command made a competent deployment of its troops in accordance with the intended objectives of the offensive. In the northern sector of the front, the Germans deployed 29 divisions against 58 Allied divisions (including the Dutch and Belgian ones). Here it was planned to deliver the first blow to the Dutch and Belgian troops, and while the Anglo-French units came up, the Germans would already be able to significantly advance deep into Belgium and Holland.
In the sector of the front, located opposite the Ardennes, no more than 80 km wide, the Germans concentrated 45 divisions, including seven tank divisions, which were opposed by 16 French divisions. In this main direction, the German command created a threefold superiority in forces and, above all, in tank formations. It should be noted that the German tank divisions were independent formations that had the ability to massively use tanks in combat operations. At the same time, French tanks were used mainly to support the infantry and did not have independent tactical tasks.
In Alsace-Lorraine, the Allies concentrated as many as 50 divisions to defend the Maginot Line. They were opposed by only 19 divisions of the von Leeb Army Group.
The indicated arrangement of troops of the Anglo-French allies doomed them to defeat in advance.
The German blitzkrieg in France began immediately, as soon as at dawn on June 10, 1940, the Wehrmacht troops crossed the borders of Holland and Belgium. The airborne units were the first to go into action. They not only used the positive experience of the German landing operations in Norway, they surpassed it. At dawn on June 10, parachute troops were dropped from aircraft in the areas of The Hague (the capital of Holland), Rotterdam, Murdijk and Dortrecht. The sudden appearance of German paratroopers, simultaneously with powerful German attacks from the front, paralyzed the interior of Holland and left the Dutch army in disarray. At the same time, the landing forces were deployed in the area of the Dutch border defenses 160 km east of Rotterdam. The landing was accompanied by powerful bombing strikes by German aviation.
A detachment of German airborne troops lands at Fort Eben-Emael.
At the beginning of the same day (June 10), a small detachment of German paratroopers (85 people in total) silently, using gliders, landed at the most important point of the Belgian defense - at Fort Eben-Emael, which was defended by a garrison of 1200 people. Using the surprise of the attack, the paratroopers captured the main objects of the fort and held them practically without loss until the main forces march. This daring landing operation significantly weakened the entire Belgian defense. The approaching German troops captured the fort, crossed two bridges over the Albert Canal and invaded Belgium. These two important bridges were captured by German paratroopers unexploded on the night of 10 June. Under pressure from German troops, the Belgian units retreated to the Diel River, where French and British troops had already begun to arrive.
Hitler giving great importance airborne troops, he himself planned amphibious operations in Belgium and Holland. Directly these operations were led by a young brave general by the name of Student. German officers then joked that the brilliant implementation of amphibious operations gave this general the right, in addition to the award received, to bear the surname, at least, Associate Professor.
Immediately after the invasion of Belgium and Holland, German aircraft launched powerful bombing strikes on French airfields. The Germans won air supremacy, and the Allied aviation was paralyzed. Panic and confusion gripped the population and troops of both countries. Taking advantage of this, the German Panzer Division broke through the Dutch border fortifications in their southern part and on the third day linked up with the airborne units in the Rotterdam area.
On May 14, the command of the Dutch army, considering the situation hopeless, entered into negotiations with the Germans for surrender. Holland surrendered the next day. Military historians believe that this was the result of a direct betrayal of the high command of the Dutch army, since the main front of Holland was not broken, and the possibilities of resistance were far from exhausted.
In Belgium, the Anglo-French troops, having a twofold superiority over the German forces, in the first days of hostilities offered stubborn resistance to the enemy. On May 13-14, 1940, fierce battles took place between General Hepner's 16th Panzer Corps, advancing in the first echelon of the 6th German Army, and the advanced units of General R. Priou's French Panzer Corps. These battles are considered the first major tank battles of the Second World War. The losses on both sides were heavy: the French lost 105 tanks, while the Germans lost 164 tanks.
The Anglo-French units went deeper and deeper into Belgium, stretching their communications. For their rear, the danger of a strike by German troops from the Ardennes region was growing more and more. Meanwhile, a whole armada of German tanks had accumulated in a small area near the Luxembourg border. Three tank corps were concentrated here, ready to attack through the Ardennes. While German panzer divisions advanced through the wooded hills of the Ardennes, the main Allied forces advanced into Belgium. On May 12, Guderian's Panzer Corps approached the Meuse River. In the sector of the breakthrough, the German forces were shown weak resistance by small Franco-Belgian forces. During May 13-15, German troops, under the cover of their aviation, crossed the Meuse and defeated the French divisions thrown against them. Having entered the operational space, the Wehrmacht's tank divisions rushed west to the English Channel. Motorized infantry followed behind them. Aviation constantly provided air support to the advancing ground forces.
With a blow through the Ardennes, the Germans bypassed the Allied grouping in Belgium from the south. For the northern group of allies in Belgium, there was a threat to be cut off from the south.
All three divisions of Guderian's Panzer Corps were the first to cross the Meuse in the Sedan area, and on May 14, repelling a belated French counterstrike, moved westward. By the end of the next day, Guderian's tanks broke through the last defensive line across the Meuse River and entered the operational space. The roads to the west opened before them, leading to the coast of the English Channel.
The more cautious commander of the tank group, Colonel-General Kleist, on the night of May 15, ordered Guderian to suspend the offensive and hold the captured bridgehead until the infantry approached. After Guderian set out his reasons for continuing the offensive, the order was slightly changed and Guderian was allowed to expand the bridgehead. Guderian used this permission to the limit and advanced the next day 80 km westward, reaching the Oise River. The rest of the armored formations also took part in the offensive, as a result of which the breakthrough along the front expanded to 100 km. Thus, columns of German tanks filled the roads in the rear of the allied armies still in Belgium.
The command of the allied armies turned out to be unprepared for quick action in a mobile war. Time was wasted on carrying out such a maneuver of forces, which could paralyze or at least significantly weaken the blow of the Germans from the Ardennes area. On May 19, the commander of the allied forces, General Maurice Gamelin, gave the order to strike in a southerly direction in order to break through the valley of the Somme River, along which German tank units were advancing. Performing such a maneuver would enable the Anglo-French troops to break out of the approaching encirclement. But on the same day, Gamelin was removed from command for allegedly capitulating intentions. General Maxim Veygand, who replaced him, immediately canceled Gamelin's order and began to look for a way out of the situation. Meanwhile, German tank forces were rapidly advancing westward to the sea. The high German command expressed fears for such a risky deep strategic penetration of essentially small forces: only a few tank divisions. Hitler, also worried about this circumstance, ordered the suspension of the offensive on the Oise River for two days so that the 12th Army could approach and cover the flank of the advancing tank forces. The French were so paralyzed that they could not take advantage of this suspension of the German offensive to organize any tangible blow to the enemy. Therefore, the two-day halt in the offensive practically did not lead to changes in the plan of the German army. However, Guderian, aiming only at the offensive, expressing his protest against stopping the offensive, demanded on May 17 to remove him from the command of the corps. He was not dismissed from his post and was allowed to continue to conduct "strong reconnaissance". Guderian interpreted this permission in his own way and continued the offensive even more impetuous than before. On May 20, his tanks broke into Amiens and reached the coast of the English Channel above Abbeville. Communications of the allied armies in Belgium with France were cut.
On May 22, after a further one-day delay on orders from above, Guderian continued his advance north towards the ports on the English Channel. Reinhardt's Panzer Corps, also part of Kleist's group, operated to the right of Guderian. On May 22, Guderian surrounded Boulogne, and the next day Calais. Reinhardt's tanks also reached the canal on the line Ayr, St. Omer, Gravelin and seized bridgeheads on the opposite bank of the canal. On May 23, Guderian came to Gravlin, beyond which Dunkirk was located 16 kilometers - the last port left in the hands of the British. However, the further offensive of German troops in the direction of Dunkirk was unexpectedly stopped by Hitler's orders. This order was given by Hitler on the morning of May 24 after a meeting with representatives of the high command. The commander of Army Group A von Rundstedt and the commander of the 12th Army von Kluge expressed doubts about the advisability of a further offensive until the situation in the Arras area was fully clarified, although Braunich and Halder were inclined to continue the tank offensive. The fact is that in the area of Arras, a small town in northeastern France, not far from the Belgian border, on May 21, 1940, an English tank unit consisting of no more than two tank battalions struck German troops advancing towards the coast. Although the blow was repulsed with little damage to the German forces, the actions of the British made a strong psychological impact on the German command. Hitler feared large losses of German troops, especially in tanks, which could be lost both from combat damage and from rugged wetlands in the combat area. He believed that tanks would still be needed for the upcoming major battles in the depths of France. Hitler could not even imagine that the French did not have powerful reserves.
Military historians, however, believe that not only these considerations of the German high command were the reason for stopping the advance of German troops in front of Dunkirk, at a distance of one throw of tank units. One of the reasons could be the confidence expressed by Goering that the British troops, essentially trapped in the Dunkirk area, would not be able to evacuate by sea, since the German air force would not allow this, and therefore lose people and tanks to storm Dunkirk no need. Some researchers consider it possible for such a reason as Hitler's desire to show humanity towards the stricken and demoralized English soldiers, to give them the opportunity to return to their homeland and by this decision to induce Great Britain to conclude peace.
But let's not go deep into assumptions, but turn to the facts. The German infantry, while stopping the tank offensive, stormed the fortifications in the Dunkirk area, but, meeting stubborn resistance from the allies, they did not achieve success. On May 27, German tank units again went on the offensive, but they could not immediately overcome the fortifications, which the British strengthened and defended staunchly, realizing the enormous danger hanging over them. From May 27 to June 4, 1940, a dramatic operation took place to rescue the Allied forces, and until the evacuation of British troops was completed, the defenders of Dunkirk managed to hold back the onslaught of German troops. The battle unfolded both on the ground and in the air. During the period from May 27 to June 4, British pilots made about three thousand sorties and shot down 140 German aircraft in air battles. The losses of the British aviation amounted to 106 aircraft. Every day, hundreds of a wide variety of watercraft arrived from England to the Dunkirk region: boats, yachts, passenger steamers, lighters, rescue boats and even sailboats. Under enemy fire, soldiers and officers, showing courage and high discipline, were loaded onto these boats and delivered to warships of different classes: from torpedo boats to minelayers and destroyers that transported exhausted people to the English coast of the Pas-de-Calais. Of the ships participating in the evacuation, more than two hundred were sunk and almost the same number were damaged. The British lost over 68 thousand people, as well as all military equipment and weapons. But the bulk of the allied troops - over 338 thousand people (of which 112 thousand were French and Belgians) were evacuated from Dunkirk. On May 28, the Belgian army surrendered. On June 4, about 40 thousand French surrendered, covering the evacuation, as they ran out of ammunition.
British Expeditionary Force soldiers return to their homeland after the Battle of Dunkirk, June 6, 1940.
During Operation Dinemo, more than 330,000 soldiers were evacuated.
By carrying out the Dunkirk operation, the British saved the backbone of their army. The German plan "Gelb" - the encirclement and capture of the Anglo-French troops in Flanders - was not carried out. The results of the Dunkirk operation are considered the only success of the Allies in the described period of the Second World War. And in general, during the month of hostilities, the Allies suffered a major defeat in Belgium and Holland: they lost half of their troops there. Now the French had only 71 divisions, whose morale was extremely low after the defeats experienced. They were opposed by almost 140 divisions of the Wehrmacht, ready for new victories.
On June 5, the second day after the Germans entered Dunkirk, the second and final stage of the Battle of France began. The Germans called it the "Roth Plan," and this plan called for the final defeat of the French armed forces. The tasks of the Rot plan were carried out by the troops of Army Group B (commanded by General von Bock), Army Group A (commanded by General von Rundstedt), and Army Group C (commanded by General von Leeb). German troops were stationed along the Somme and further east to the Swiss border. They were opposed by three groups of French armies: the 3rd Army Group (commanded by General Besson), the 4th Army Group (commanded by General Charles Junziger) and the 2nd Army Group (commanded by General Pretelaa). These troops took up defenses from the sea to Reims, then to the Meuse and Montmedy. The 2nd Army Group (General Pretelaa) was located behind the Maginot Line. At the same time, 17 divisions were left on the "Maginot Line", 22 divisions were allocated to create reserves for the armies and the main command. The lack of forces was obvious: only 27 divisions fought directly, each division defended itself on a front from 12 to 14 kilometers. The French did not have the opportunity to create a deeply echeloned defense.
On June 5, the German offensive began on the western sector of the front from the sea to Laon. During the first days, the French stubbornly resisted. But on June 7, Wehrmacht tank forces broke through the French defenses on their left flank. Here the tank division of General Erwin von Rommel distinguished itself. In Rommel's sector of advance, the French blew up all the highway bridges across the Somme, but left two railway bridges intact. Why did they do this? First, because they expected to use these bridges in the counter-offensive, which they still hoped to organize. Secondly, they were convinced that the Germans would not be able to advance across these bridges because the terrain was unsuitable for the passage of not only tanks, but even infantry. The point is that the single-track railroad track passed here along two narrow dams, which stretched for one and a half kilometers across the swampy river bank. But Rommel found an unusual way out. He captured the bridges before dawn and established himself on a small bridgehead on the opposite bank of the river. At Rommel's command, the soldiers quickly removed the rails and sleepers, after which, under enemy artillery fire, Rommel sent tanks and transport vehicles along the tracks prepared in such a way. The Panzer Division crossed over to the opposite bank of the Somme almost without stopping. A day later, Rommel broke through the enemy's defenses to a depth of 13 kilometers. Moving along the column paths and thus bypassing the French units defending the road junctions and settlements, Rommel's division cut the 10th French army in half with a deep breakthrough. Through the resulting gap, other German divisions rushed forward. On June 8, 1940, having completed a 65-kilometer roundabout maneuver and overcoming a hastily organized defense by the French, Rommel reached the River Seine south of Rouen. The crossings over this wide water barrier were captured before the French could organize the defense of the crossings. On June 10, Rommel's division turned sharply to the west and, having made an 80-kilometer throw, reached the coast in the evening of the same day. As a result, the retreat paths of the left wing of the French 10th Army were cut off. Surrounded in the Saint-Valery area, these troops, consisting of five divisions, were forced to surrender on June 12.
On June 9, the German offensive began in Champagne. Here the French resistance was quickly broken, and Guderian's panzer divisions moved towards Chalon-am-Marne and then east. On June 11, German troops crossed the Marne River in the Château-Thierry area. Fighting off the French counterattacks, Guderian continued the offensive with increasing speed in the direction of the Longre Plateau, located in the rear of the Maginot Line. Before the offensive, Guderian was appointed commander of Rundstedt's Panzer Group (two Panzer Corps). Having overcome at a high rate the Langres plateau, Guderian's divisions rushed to the southeast, to the Swiss border and bypassed from the west the French troops who were defended on the Maginot Line. On June 17, Guderian's head division broke into Potarlier, located on the Swiss border. Communications of the large French forces still on the Maginot Line were cut. Thus, the power of the expensive fortifications of the "Maginot Line" was virtually unclaimed in this war. But the line of French defensive fortifications on the border with Germany, Luxembourg and partly with Belgium, which was named after the French Minister of War André Maginot (1877-1932), who proposed its creation, was a fairly powerful defensive line. The Maginot Line was built in 1929-1934 and improved until 1940. Its length was about 400 km, depth - 6-8 km. The Maginot Line had about 5,600 permanent firing installations. It consisted of fortresses, barracks, hospitals and an underground Railway... In 1936-1940, to extend the "Maginot Line" to the North Sea, construction began on the "Daladier Line" with a length of 620 km, but due to the German attack, this line of defense was not completed. After the surrender of France, the garrison of the "Maginot Line" was forced to surrender. After the war, most of the buildings of the "Maginot Line" were transferred to warehouses for military property and for other purposes.
The defense of the French troops actually disintegrated on June 9, after the breakthrough of the Germans in the Rouen area. Already on June 8, the commander of the allied forces, Maxim Veygand, announced that the battle for the Somme was lost. The French army practically ceased its organized resistance and retreated indiscriminately to the south along with the influx of refugees. On June 10, Italy entered the war against France. But France by this moment was actually defeated, so the "help" that Mussolini wanted to provide to his friend and ally Hitler was not required. We put the word “help” in quotation marks because the Italian troops did not provide real help to the German troops, and the Germans in France in 1940 did not need any help. The offensive of the Italian troops was easily stopped by the small forces of the French.
On June 12, 1940, General Weygand declared in his report to the government that the war was lost. The French government moved to Bordeaux, and on June 14 German troops triumphantly entered Paris. Fearing responsibility for impending events, French Prime Minister Reynaud resigned. On June 17, Marshal Henri Petain (1856-1951) was appointed Prime Minister of France, who immediately offered the Germans an armistice. The terms of the armistice were discussed and on June 22, 1940, they were accepted by the German side in the same Compiegne forest and in the same railway carriage, where in November 1918 the armistice was signed between Germany defeated in the First World War and the states of the anti-German coalition, replaced by the Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919 year. Lovers of aphorisms would probably say that in in this case history repeated itself as a tragedy ...
The terms of the armistice provided for the cessation of military operations by France against Germany and the occupation of approximately 66% of the territory of France. There were large industrial enterprises, where before the war more than 90% of pig iron and steel were smelted out of their total volume in France. In the occupied areas, all power was transferred to the German command.
Adolf Hitler poses for a photo with the Eiffel Tower in the background the day after the official surrender of France, June 23, 1940.
On the left is Albert Speer, Reich Minister of Armaments and War Industry and Hitler's personal architect,
right - Arno Brecker, Hitler's favorite sculptor. (AP Photo / German War Department)
In the southern regions of France, power belonged to the government of Henri Pétain, who chose the city of Vichy as the seat of the government (as it was called by its place of residence) was completely dependent on Germany. For the Vichy government, Germany left power over the French overseas colonies in such a way as to keep them for the future. France was deprived of the regions of Alsace and Lorraine, which joined the German Reich.
The Petain government was a puppet and collaborationist, it actively collaborated with the German Nazis. By order of Pétain, millions of Frenchmen were sent to Germany for forced labor, echelons with Jews - French citizens - went straight to German death camps. We know the fate of millions of Jews, innocent people. And the fate of Pétain is as follows: in 1944 he fled to Germany, and in April 1945 he moved to Switzerland, but was soon arrested at the Franco-Swiss border. He was charged with voluntarily collaborating with the enemy. On August 15, 1945, Marshal Pétain was found guilty and sentenced to death penalty... Taking into account the old age of the convict, the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Pétain was imprisoned until his death on 23 July 1951.
Under the terms of the armistice, the French army was demobilized and disarmed. The Pétain government received the right to have an army to maintain internal order in the amount of no more than seven divisions. French prisoners of war were to remain in Germany until the signing of the peace treaty. The French navy should be concentrated in French ports and disarmed under the supervision of military specialists from Germany and Italy. The costs of maintaining the German occupation forces were borne by the French government.
So, in just 44 days, France suffered a complete defeat. During this time, German troops defeated the armed forces of France, Belgium and Holland. The French army lost 84 thousand people killed, over one and a half million people were taken prisoner. The Germans lost 27 thousand people killed, 18 thousand people were missing. For the victory over France, all the commanders of the German army groups received the rank of field marshals. The crushing defeat of France meant that one of the largest military powers capable of resisting Nazism in Europe was withdrawn from the war.
Original Russian Text © A.I. Kalanov, V.A. Kalanov,
"Knowledge is power"
