Samuel Phillips Huntington (1927-2008)

Samuel Phillips Huntington is one of the most influential American scientists in the field of political science and international relations. He received his BA from Yale University (in 1946) and his MA from the University of Chicago (in 1948). S. Huntington defended his doctoral dissertation at Harvard University in 1951, at the age of 24, where he later engaged in research and taught (with some interruptions) until the end of his life. He was Director of the Center for International Studies at Harvard University (1978-1989) and Director of the Harvard Academy of International and Regional Studies (1996-2004).

At the beginning of his scientific career, he gained fame, first of all, as a researcher of civilian control of the armed forces, having published in 1957 the book "The Soldier and the State: Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations" 319. He is the founder and editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy magazine. Born in New York, his father was a journalist, his mother was a writer.

From 1959 to 1962, S. Huntington worked as executive director of the Institute for War and Peace at Columbia University. In 1977-1978 he was the coordinator of the planning department at the US National Security Council (during the presidency of J. Carter).

S. Huntington is the author of numerous works in the field of political modernization, international relations, the theory of democracy and immigration. In his credit, the book "Political Order in Changing Societies" (1968); American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (1981), Who Are We? Changing American International Identity ”(2004).

The concept of the "clash of civilizations", which he created, which describes the dynamics of modern international relations through the prism of conflicts on a civilizational basis, has gained wide recognition. Your view of geopolitical social political issues S. Huntington first outlined in 1993 in the article "Clash of Civilizations?" ... It was published in the journal Foreign Policy and almost immediately appeared in Russian in the journal Political Studies of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. It caused a worldwide resonance and formed the basis of the book "The Clash of Civilizations and the Rethinking of the World Order", which has become a world scientific bestseller.

If F. Fukuyama suggested considering the complete victory of liberal ideology as the main factor determining modern world politics, S. Huntington considered this approach overly optimistic. In his opinion, at the end of the 20th century, the geopolitical alignment of forces is determined by ideologies that go beyond the traditional confrontation between liberalism and authoritarianism. The main opposing forces are civilizations that unite groups of countries with similar mental values.

Following A. Toynbee, S. Huntington asserts that "human history is the history of civilizations." In the modern world, there is a clash of seven or eight civilizations: Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, Latin American and possibly African.

The map of the ethnocultural division of civilizations, built according to Huntington's concept, is as follows:

• 1 - western culture; 2 - Latin American culture;
• 3 - Japanese culture; 4 - Xing culture; 5 - Indian cultures; b - Islamic culture; 7 - Orthodox culture;
• 8 - Buddhist culture; 9 - african culture

Within a civilization, there is usually a pivotal country that organizes a single policy for the entire group of countries with similar cultural norms (for example, the United States in modern Western civilization). Each civilization seeks to expand its influence, or at least preserve its identity from pressure from other civilizations. Instead of the ideological confrontation of the 20th century, intercultural conflicts will play the main role in the 21st century.

In the 16th - first half of the 20th centuries, the main dominant force was Western civilization, which determined the international climate. However, in the second half of the 20th century, the world first becomes bipolar (confrontation between the West and the USSR), and then multipolarity is gradually formed. Western civilization is gradually losing its leadership, but the independence of the Far Eastern civilizations and the civilization of Islam is growing. In the modern world, the main thing has become the division into "the West and all the rest", and the most aggressive anti-Western struggle is being waged by the Islamic civilization. Conflicts escalate along fault lines where protracted wars take place (such as in the Middle East). In this new world, the West, according to S. Huntington, must abandon claims to the universality of its values ​​and attempts to impose them by force in non-European countries.

S. Huntington suggested that a confrontation between the Islamic world and the Western world is inevitable in the near future, which will resemble the Soviet-American confrontation during cold war... These constructions of his gained particular popularity in the West after the tragic events of September 11, 2001.

Another well-known theoretical development of S. Huntington is the concept of “waves of democratization” that manifested themselves in different periods in different groups of countries. The first wave arose under the influence of the American and French revolutions and was the longest - from 1828 to 1926, after which it began to decline (in 1922-1942) under the influence of the establishment and strengthening of totalitarian regimes (primarily in Italy and Germany). The second, shorter wave of democratization, according to S. Huntington's periodization, took place in 1943-1962 (the creation of democratic institutions in Europe, Asia, Africa), and its rollback took place in 1958-1991 (the establishment of authoritarianism in many Latin American countries and dictatorial regimes in African countries that have freed themselves from colonial rule). The third wave of democratization dates back to 1975-1991 (marked by the fall of dictatorships in Portugal, Spain, a number of Asian and Latin American countries, and the collapse of the communist camp in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the USSR). The number of democratic states has increased significantly. However, later this wave of democratization began to be replaced by a reverse (reverse) wave 324.

Samuel Phillips Huntington (Samuel Phillips Huntington, April 18, 1927, New York, USA - December 24, 2008, Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, USA) is an American sociologist and political scientist.

He is the author of the concept of ethnocultural division of civilizations, promulgated by him in the article "Clash of Civilizations", published in 1993 in the magazine "Foreign Affers", and then in 1996 in the book "Clash of Civilizations".

He graduated from Yale University, in 1948 - a master's degree from the University of Chicago, defended his doctoral dissertation at Harvard University, where he taught until the end of his life. At the beginning of his scientific career, he gained fame, first of all, as a researcher of civilian control over the armed forces and the theory of modernization. Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Foreign Policy magazine.

In 1973 he worked as Deputy Director of the Center for International Relations; 1977-1978 - coordinator of the planning department at the US National Security Council; in 1978-1989 - director of the Center for International Relations.

Books (3)

Who are we?

Challenges to American National Identity.

A new book by Samuel Huntington is devoted to the analysis of the key for modern public conscience problems - identity definitions.

The priority of national self-awareness is especially important for the country that is commonly called the "melting pot of peoples" - the United States of America. However, disintegration processes are gaining momentum in the United States today, casting doubt on the very fact of the continued existence of the phenomenon of American identity.

America, as Professor Huntington convincingly proves, is at a turning point - and the future not only of the United States, but of the entire world system as a whole depends on which direction the pendulum ultimately swings in.

Political order in changing societies

A study by Samuel Huntington, a leading American political scientist, focuses on the political and social characteristics processes of modernization of traditional societies.

The author examines in detail the types of historically formed political institutions, the role of political leaders, social structure changing societies, the importance of political parties in modern society.

Samuel Huntington

[Article by the Director of the Institute strategic research at Harvard University S. Huntington "The Clash of Civilizations?" (1993) - one of the most cited in political science. It builds up approaches to the theory of world politics after the Cold War. What will the new phase of world development lead to, when interaction between different civilizations intensifies and at the same time the differences between them deepen? The author does not give an answer to this question, but the terrorist attacks in America on September 11, 2001 and the events that followed them testify to the exceptional urgency of the problems raised.]

THE MODEL OF THE FUTURE CONFLICT

World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals immediately unleashed on us a stream of versions regarding its future appearance: the end of history, a return to traditional rivalry between nation-states, the decline of nation-states under the pressure of multidirectional tendencies - towards tribalism and globalism - etc. Each from these versions captures certain aspects of the emerging reality. But the most essential, axial aspect of the problem is being lost.

I believe that in the emerging world, the main source of conflicts will no longer be ideology or economics. The most important boundaries dividing humanity and the predominant sources of conflict will be culturally determined. The nation-state will remain the main actor in international affairs, but the most significant conflicts in global politics will unfold between nations and groups belonging to different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will become the dominant factor in world politics. Fault lines between civilizations are the lines of future fronts.

The coming conflict between civilizations is the final phase of the evolution of global conflicts in the modern world. For a century and a half after the Peace of Westphalia, which shaped the modern international system, in the western area, conflicts unfolded mainly between sovereigns - kings, emperors, absolute and constitutional monarchs, who sought to expand their bureaucratic apparatus, increase armies, strengthen economic power, and most importantly - add new land to their possessions. This process gave birth to nation-states, and, starting with the Great French Revolution, the main lines of conflict began to run not so much between rulers as between nations. In 1793, in the words of RR Palmer, "wars between kings stopped and wars between nations began."

This model persisted throughout the 19th century. It was ended by the First World War. And then, as a result of the Russian revolution and the response to it, the conflict of nations gave way to a conflict of ideologies. The parties to this conflict were first communism, Nazism and liberal democracy, and then communism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War, this conflict was embodied in a struggle between two superpowers, neither of which was a nation-state in the classical European sense. Their self-identification was formulated in ideological categories.

Conflicts between rulers, nation-states, and ideologies were mainly those of Western civilization. W. Lind called them "the civil wars of the West." This is as true of the Cold War as it is of the World Wars, as well as the wars of the XVII, XVIII, 19th century... With the end of the Cold War, the western phase of development is also coming to an end international politics... At the center is the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations. At this new stage, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer act as objects of history - the target of Western colonial policy, but along with the West begin to move and create history themselves.

THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATIONS

During the Cold War, the world was divided into "first", "second" and "third". But then this division lost its meaning. Now it is much more appropriate to group countries based not on their political or economic systems, not on the level of economic development, but on the basis of cultural and civilizational criteria.

What is meant when it comes to civilization? Civilization is a kind of cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, peoples, religious communities all have their own distinct cultures, reflecting different levels of cultural heterogeneity. A village in southern Italy in its culture may differ from the same village in northern Italic, but at the same time they remain precisely Italian villages, they cannot be confused with German ones. In turn, European countries have common cultural traits that distinguish them from the Chinese or Arab world.

Here we get to the heart of the matter. For the Western world, the Arab region and China are not part of a broader cultural community. They represent civilizations. We can define civilization as a cultural community of the highest rank, as the broadest level of cultural identity of people. The next step is already what distinguishes the human race from other types of living beings. Civilizations are determined by the presence of common features of the objective order, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, as well as the subjective self-identification of people. There are different levels of self-identification: this is how a resident of Rome can describe himself as a Roman, Italian, Catholic, Christian, European, or a person of the Western world. Civilization is the broadest level of community with which it relates itself. The cultural self-identification of people can change, and as a result, the composition and boundaries of a particular civilization change.

Civilization can embrace a large mass of people - for example, China, about which L. Pai once said: "This is a civilization that pretends to be a country."

But it can be very small in number - like the civilization of the English-speaking inhabitants of the Caribbean islands. Civilization can include several nation-states, as in the case of Western, Latin American or Arab civilizations, or one and only - as in the case of Japan. It is obvious that civilizations can mix, overlap one another, include subcivilizations. Western civilization exists in two main varieties: European and North American, while Islamic is subdivided into Arab, Turkish and Malay. Despite all this, civilizations represent certain wholes. The boundaries between them are rarely clear-cut, but they are real. Civilizations are dynamic: they have rise and fall, they disintegrate and merge. And, as every student of history knows, civilizations disappear, they are drawn into the sands of time.

It is generally accepted in the West that nation-states are the main actors in the international arena. But they have played this role for only a few centuries. Much of human history is the history of civilizations. According to A. Toynbee's estimates, the history of mankind has known 21 civilizations. Only six of them exist in the modern world.

WHY IS A COLLISION OF CIVILIZATIONS INEVITABLE?

Identity at the level of civilization will become more and more important, and the face of the world will largely be formed in the course of the interaction of seven or eight large civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Orthodox Slavic, Latin American, and possibly African civilizations. The most significant conflicts of the future will unfold along the fault lines between civilizations. Why?

First, the differences between civilizations are not just real. They are the most essential. Civilizations are dissimilar in their history, language, culture, traditions and, most importantly, religion. People of different civilizations have different views of the relationship between God and man, individual and group, citizen and state, parents and children, husband and wife, have different ideas about the relative importance of rights and obligations, freedom and coercion, equality and hierarchy. These differences have developed over the centuries. They will not disappear for the foreseeable future. They are more fundamental than the differences between political ideologies and political regimes... Of course, differences do not necessarily imply conflict, and conflict does not necessarily imply violence. However, over the centuries, the most protracted and bloody conflicts were generated precisely by differences between civilizations.

Secondly, the world is getting closer. Interaction between peoples of different civilizations is increasing. This leads to the growth of civilizational self-awareness, to a deepening understanding of the differences between civilizations and communities within the framework of civilization. North African immigration to France aroused hostility among the French, and at the same time strengthened goodwill towards other immigrants - "good Catholics and Europeans from Poland." Americans react much more painfully to Japanese investments than to much larger investments from Canada and European countries. Everything happens according to the scenario described by D. Horwitz: “In the eastern regions of Nigeria, a man of nationality, for it can be for-ouerry, or for-onicha. But in Lagos it will be just for. In London he will be Nigerian. And in New York - African. " Interaction between representatives of different civilizations strengthens their civilizational self-awareness, and this, in turn, exacerbates the disagreements and hostility that go deep into history or, at least, perceived in this way.

Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change all over the world erode the traditional identification of people with their place of residence, while the role of the nation-state as a source of identification is also weakening. The resulting gaps are largely filled by religion, often in the form of fundamentalist movements. Similar movements have developed not only in Islam, but also in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism. In most countries and denominations, fundamentalism is supported by educated young people, highly qualified specialists from the middle classes, persons of the liberal professions, and businessmen. As G. Weigel noted, "the desecularization of the world is one of the dominant social phenomena of the late XX century." The revival of religion, or, in the words of J. Kepel, "revenge of God", creates the basis for identification and involvement with a community that transcends national boundaries - for the unification of civilizations.

Fourth, the growth of civilizational self-awareness is dictated by the dividing role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at the peak of its power, and on the other, and perhaps this is precisely why, among non-Western civilizations, there is a return to its own roots. More and more often one hears about Japan's "return to Asia", about the end of the influence of Nehru's ideas and the "Hinduization" of India, about the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism to "re-Islamize" the Middle East, and, more recently, disputes about the Westernization or Russification of Boris's country. Yeltsin. At the height of its power, the West is faced with non-Western countries that have the drive, will, and resources to give the world a non-Western face.

In the past, elites in non-Western countries tended to consist of people most closely associated with the West, educated at Oxford, Sorbonne, or Sandhurst and adopting Western values ​​and lifestyles. The population of these countries, as a rule, retained an inextricable connection with their original culture. But now everything has changed. In many non-Western countries, there is an intensive process of de-Westernization of elites and their return to their own cultural roots. And at the same time, Western, mainly American customs, lifestyle and culture are gaining popularity among the general population.

Fifth, cultural differences and differences are less susceptible to change than economic and political ones, and therefore they are more difficult to resolve or reduce to a compromise. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor, and the poor can become rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians, and Azerbaijanis cannot become Armenians.

In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was: "Whose side are you on?" And a person could choose - on whose side he was, as well as change the positions once chosen. In the conflict of civilizations, the question is posed differently: "Who are you?" It is about what is given and is not subject to change. And, as we know from the experience of Bosnia, the Caucasus, Sudan, if you give an inappropriate answer to this question, you can immediately get a bullet in the forehead. Religion divides people even more sharply than ethnicity. A person can be half-French and half-Arab, and even a citizen of both of these countries. It is much more difficult to be half Catholic and half Muslim.

Finally, economic regionalism is on the rise. The share of intraregional trade increased between 1980 and 1989 from 51 to 59% in Europe, from 33 to 37% in South East Asia, and from 32 to 36% in North America. Apparently, the role of regional economic ties will grow. On the one hand, the success of economic regionalism strengthens the consciousness of belonging to the same civilization. On the other hand, economic regionalism can be successful only if it is rooted in a common civilization. The European Community rests on the common foundations of European culture and Western Christianity. The success of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area) depends on the continuing convergence of cultures in Mexico, Canada and America. On the other hand, Japan is experiencing difficulties in creating the same economic community in Southeast Asia, since Japan is a unique society and civilization. As powerful as Japan's trade and financial ties with the rest of Southeast Asia are, cultural differences between them impede progress along the path of regional economic integration along the lines of Western Europe or North America.

The common culture, on the contrary, clearly contributes to the rapid growth of economic ties between the People's Republic of China, on the one hand, and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and overseas Chinese communities in other Asian countries, on the other. With the end of the Cold War, shared culture is rapidly replacing ideological differences. Mainland China and Taiwan are getting closer and closer. If common culture is a prerequisite for economic integration, then the center of the future of East Asian economic bloc will most likely be in China. As a matter of fact, this block is already taking shape. Here is what M. Weidenbaum writes about this: “Although the region is dominated by Japan, a new center of industry, trade and financial capital in Asia is rapidly emerging on the basis of China. This strategic space has a strong technological and manufacturing potential (Taiwan), a workforce with outstanding organizational, marketing and service skills (Hong Kong), a dense communications network (Singapore), strong financial capital (all three countries), as well as vast land, natural and human resources (mainland China) ... This influential community, largely based on the development of a traditional clan base, stretches from Guangzhou to Singapore and from Kuala Lumpur to Manila. This is the backbone of the East Asian economy ”(1).

Cultural and religious similarities also underlie the Organization for Economic Cooperation, which unites 10 non-Arab Muslim countries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. This organization was created in the 60s by three countries: Turkey, Pakistan and Iran. An important impetus to its revitalization and expansion was given by the realization by the leaders of some of its member countries of the fact that the way to the European Community is closed for them. Likewise, CARICOM, the Central American Common Market and MERCOSUR share a common cultural foundation. But attempts to create a broader economic community that would unite the countries of the Caribbean and Central America have not been crowned with success - they have not yet succeeded in building bridges between English and Latin culture.

When defining their own identity in ethnic or religious terms, people tend to view the relationship between themselves and people of a different ethnicity and confession as the relationship of "we" and "they". The end of ideologized states in Eastern Europe and on the territory the former USSR allowed to come to the fore the traditional forms of ethnic identity and contradictions. Differences in culture and religion give rise to divisions on a wide range of political issues, be it human rights or emigration, commerce or the environment. Geographic proximity stimulates mutual territorial claims from Bosnia to Mindanao. But most importantly, the attempts of the West to spread their values: democracy and liberalism - as common to all mankind, to maintain military superiority and to assert their economic interests are meeting the resistance of other civilizations. Governments and political groups are less likely to succeed in mobilizing populations and forming coalitions based on ideologies, and they are increasingly trying to gain support by appealing to a common religion and civilization.

Thus, the conflict of civilizations unfolds on two levels. At the micro level, groups along the fault lines between civilizations fight, often bloody, for land and power over each other. At the macro level, countries belonging to different civilizations compete for influence in the military and economic sphere, are fighting for control over international organizations and third countries, trying to assert their own political and religious values.

LINE OF FAILURE BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS

If during the Cold War the main centers of crises and bloodshed were concentrated along political and ideological borders, now they are moving along the fault line between civilizations. The Cold War began when the Iron Curtain divided Europe politically and ideologically. The Cold War ended with the disappearance of the Iron Curtain. But as soon as the ideological division of Europe was liquidated, its cultural division into Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodoxy and Islam, on the other, was revived. Perhaps the most important dividing line in Europe is, according to W. Wallis, the eastern border of Western Christianity, formed by 1.500. It runs along the current borders between Russia and Finland, between the Baltic countries and Russia, cuts Belarus and Ukraine, turns to the west , separating Transylvania from the rest of Romania, and then, passing through Yugoslavia, almost exactly coincides with the line that now separates Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia. In the Balkans, this line, of course, coincides with the historical border between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires... To the north and west of this line are Protestants and Catholics. They share a common experience of European history: feudalism, Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, Great French Revolution, Industrial Revolution. Their economic position is generally much better than that of the people living to the east. They can now look forward to closer cooperation within the framework of a single European economy and the consolidation of democratic political systems. To the east and south of this line live Orthodox Christians and Muslims. Historically, they belonged to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires, and they heard only an echo of the historical events that determined the fate of the West. Economically, they lag behind the West, and seem to be less prepared to build sustainable democratic political systems. And now the “velvet curtain” of culture has replaced the “iron curtain” of ideology as the main demarcation line in Europe. The events in Yugoslavia have shown that this is not only a line of cultural differences, but at times bloody conflicts.

For 13 centuries, the conflict has been stretching along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations. The advance of the Arabs and Moors to the West and North, which began with the emergence of Islam, was completed only in 732. During the 11th-13th centuries, the crusaders, with varying success, tried to bring Christianity to the Holy Land and establish Christian rule there. In the XIV-XVII centuries, the Ottoman Turks seized the initiative. They extended their rule to the Middle East and the Balkans, captured Constantinople and twice besieged Vienna. But in the XIX - early XX century. the power of the Ottoman Turks began to decline. Most of North Africa and the Middle East came under the control of England, France and Italy.

After the end of the Second World War, it was the turn of the West to retreat. Colonial empires have disappeared. First, Arab nationalism, and then Islamic fundamentalism, declared themselves. The West fell into a heavy dependence on the Gulf countries, which supplied it with energy resources - Muslim countries rich in oil, rich in money, and if they wished, then in weapons. There have been several wars between the Arabs and Israel, initiated by the West. Throughout the 1950s, France fought almost continuously a bloody war in Algeria. In 1956, British and French forces invaded Egypt. In 1958, the Americans entered Lebanon. Subsequently, they repeatedly returned there, and also attacked Libya and participated in numerous military clashes with Iran. In response, Arab and Islamic terrorists, backed by at least three Middle Eastern governments, used the weapons of the weak to blow up Western aircraft, buildings and take hostages. The state of war between the West and Arab countries reached its climax in 1990, when the United States sent a large army to the Persian Gulf - to protect some Arab countries from the aggression of others. Since the end of this war, NATO plans are being drawn up with a view to the potential danger and instability along the “southern borders”.

The military confrontation between the West and the Islamic world has been going on for a whole century, and there is no hint of its softening. Rather, on the contrary, it can worsen even more. The Gulf War made many Arabs feel proud - Saddam Hussein attacked Israel and resisted the West. But it also gave rise to feelings of humiliation and resentment caused by the military presence of the West in the Persian Gulf, its military superiority and its obvious inability to determine its own destiny. In addition, many Arab countries - not only oil exporters - have reached a level of economic and social development that is incompatible with autocratic forms of government. Attempts to introduce democracy there are becoming more and more persistent. The political systems of some Arab countries have acquired a certain degree of openness. But this is mainly to the benefit of Islamic fundamentalists. In short, in the Arab world, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces... This may be a transitory phenomenon, but it undoubtedly complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West.

This relationship is complicated by demographic factors as well. Rapid population growth in Arab countries, especially in North Africa, is increasing emigration to Western Europe. In turn, the influx of emigrants, taking place against the background of the gradual elimination of internal borders between Western European countries, caused a sharp political rejection. In Italy, France and Germany, racist sentiments are becoming more and more open, and since 1990, there has been a steady increase in political backlash and violence against Arab and Turkish emigrants.

Both sides see a conflict of civilizations in the interaction between the Islamic and Western worlds. “The West is likely to face a confrontation with the Muslim world,” writes the Indian Muslim journalist M. Akbar. "The very fact of the wide spread of the Islamic world from the Maghreb to Pakistan will lead to the struggle for a new world order." B. Lewis comes to similar conclusions: “Before us is a mood and movement of a completely different level, beyond the control of politicians and governments that want to use them. This is neither more nor less a conflict of civilizations - perhaps an irrational, but historically conditioned reaction of our ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian tradition, our secular present and the global expansion of both ”(2).

Throughout history, the Arab-Islamic civilization has been in constant antagonistic interaction with the pagan, animistic, and now predominantly Christian black population of the South. In the past, this antagonism was embodied in the image of an Arab slave trader and a black slave. It now manifests itself in the protracted civil war between the Arab and black populations in Sudan, in the armed struggle between insurgents (supported by Libya) and the government in Chad, in the strained relations between Orthodox Christians and Muslims at Cape Horn, as well as in political conflicts reaching bloody clashes between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. The process of modernization and spread of Christianity on the African continent is likely to increase the likelihood of violence along this fault line. A symptom of the aggravation of the situation was the speech of Pope John Paul II in February 1993 in Khartoum. In it, he attacked the actions of the Sudanese Islamist government against the Christian minority in Sudan.

On the northern borders of the Islamic region, the conflict is unfolding mainly between the Orthodox and Muslim populations. Mention should be made here of the massacres in Bosnia and Sarajevo, the ongoing struggle between Serbs and Albanians, strained relations between Bulgarians and the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, bloody clashes between Ossetians and Ingush, Armenians and Azerbaijanis, conflicts between Russians and Muslims in Central Asia, the deployment of Russian troops in Central Asia and the Caucasus in order to protect the interests of Russia. Religion is fueling a resurgent ethnic identity, all of which heightens Russian fears about the security of their southern borders. A. Roosevelt felt this concern. Here is what he writes: “A significant part of the history of Russia is filled with the border struggle between the Slavs and the Turks. This struggle began with the founding of the Russian state over a thousand years ago. In the millennial struggle of the Slavs with their eastern neighbors, it is the key to understanding not only Russian history, but also Russian character. To understand the current Russian realities, one must not forget about the Turkic ethnic group, which has absorbed the attention of Russians for many centuries ”(3).

The conflict of civilizations has deep roots in other regions of Asia as well. The deep historical struggle between Muslims and Hindus is expressed today not only in the rivalry between Pakistan and India, but also in the intensification of religious enmity within India between increasingly militant Hindu groups and a significant Muslim minority. In December 1992, after the destruction of the Ayodha Mosque, the question arose of whether India would remain secular and democratic, or turn into a Hindu state. In East Asia, China has territorial claims to nearly all of its neighbors. He mercilessly dealt with the Buddhists in Tibet, and now he is ready to deal with the Turkic-Islamic minority just as decisively. Since the end of the Cold War, the tensions between China and the United States have emerged with particular force in areas such as human rights, trade and the problem of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and there is no hope of mitigating them. As Deng Xiaoping said in 1991, "The new cold war between China and America continues."

Deng Xiaoping's statement can be attributed to the increasingly complicated relations between Japan and the United States. Cultural differences exacerbate the economic conflict between these countries. Each side accuses the other of racism, but at least from the US, the rejection is not racial but cultural. It is difficult to imagine two societies that are more distant from each other in fundamental values, attitudes and behaviors. The economic disagreements between the United States and Europe are no less serious, but they are not so politically prominent and emotionally colored, because the contradictions between American and European cultures are much less dramatic than between American and Japanese civilizations.

The level of potential for violence in the interaction of different civilizations can vary. Economic competition prevails in the relationship between the American and European subcivilizations, as in the relationship between the West in general and Japan. At the same time, in Eurasia, sprawling ethnic conflicts, reaching the level of "ethnic cleansing", are by no means uncommon. Most often they occur between groups belonging to different civilizations, and in this case they take the most extreme forms. The historically formed borders between the civilizations of the Eurasian continent are now once again blazing in the flames of conflict. These conflicts reach particular intensity along the borders of the Islamic world, which stretches like a crescent in the space between North Africa and Central Asia. But violence is also practiced in conflicts between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma, and Catholics in the Philippines, on the other. The borders of the Islamic world are everywhere covered with blood.

COMBINING CIVILIZATIONS: THE SYNDROME OF "BROTHERLANDS"

Groups or countries belonging to one civilization, being involved in a war with people of another civilization, naturally try to enlist the support of representatives of their civilization. After the end of the Cold War, a new world order is taking shape, and as it is formed, belonging to one civilization or, as H. D. S. Greenway put it, the “syndrome of fraternal countries” is replacing political ideology and traditional considerations of maintaining the balance of power as the main the principle of cooperation and coalitions. The gradual emergence of this syndrome is evidenced by all recent conflicts - in the Persian Gulf, in the Caucasus, in Bosnia. True, none of these conflicts was a full-scale war between civilizations, but each included elements of the internal consolidation of civilizations. As conflicts develop, this factor seems to be gaining more and more greater importance... His current role is a harbinger of things to come.

First. During the conflict in the Persian Gulf, one Arab country invaded another, and then entered into a fight with a coalition of Arab, Western and other countries. Although only a few Muslim governments openly sided with Saddam Hussein, he was unofficially supported by the ruling elites of many Arab countries, and he gained immense popularity among wide sections of the Arab population. Islamic fundamentalists by and large supported Iraq, not the governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, behind which stood the West. Fueling Arab nationalism, Saddam Hussein openly appealed to Islam. He and his supporters tried to present this war as a war between civilizations. "It is not the world fighting against Iraq," said Safar Al Hawali, the dean of the Islamism department at Um al-Qur University in Mecca, in a well-known speech. "It is the West fighting against Islam." Stepping over the rivalry between Iran and Iraq, Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khomeini called for a holy war against the West: "The fight against American aggression, greed, plans and policies will be considered jihad, and everyone who dies in this war will be numbered among the martyrs." ... "This war," said King Hussein of Jordan, "is being waged against all Arabs and Muslims, not just Iraq."

The rallying of a significant part of the Arab elite and the population in their support for Saddam Hussein forced the Arab governments, which had initially joined the anti-Iraqi coalition, to limit their actions and soften public statements. Arab governments distanced themselves or opposed further attempts by the West to put pressure on Iraq, including the imposition of a no-fly zone in the summer of 1992 and the bombing of Iraq in January 1993. In 1990, the anti-Iraqi coalition included the West, the Soviet Union, Turkey and Arab countries. In 1993, practically only the West and Kuwait remained in it.

Comparing the West’s decisiveness in the case of Iraq with its failure to protect Bosnian Muslims from the Serbs and to impose sanctions against Israel for non-compliance with UN resolutions, Muslims accuse the West of double standards. But a world where a clash of civilizations is taking place is inevitably a world with a double morality: one is used in relation to “fraternal countries”, and the other is used in relation to all the rest.

Second. The “brotherly countries” syndrome also manifests itself in conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The military successes of the Armenians in 1992-1993 pushed Turkey to strengthen the support of Azerbaijan, which is related to it in religious, ethnic and linguistic terms. “The people of Turkey have the same feelings as the Azerbaijanis,” a senior Turkish official said in 1992. - We were under pressure. Our newspapers are full of photographs depicting the atrocities of the Armenians. We are asked the question: are we really going to continue to pursue a policy of neutrality? Probably, we should show Armenia that there is a great Turkey in this region ”. Turkish President Turgut Ozal agreed with this, noting that Armenia should be a little intimidated. In 1993, he repeated the threat: "Turkey will still show its fangs!" The Turkish Air Force is conducting reconnaissance flights along the Armenian border. Turkey is delaying food supplies and air flights to Armenia. Turkey and Iran announced that they will not allow dismemberment of Azerbaijan. In the last years of its existence Soviet government supported Azerbaijan, where the communists were still in power. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, political motives were replaced by religious ones. Now Russian troops are fighting on the side of the Armenians, and Azerbaijan accuses the Russian government of making a 180-degree turn and now supporting Christian Armenia.

Third. If you look at the war in the former Yugoslavia, here the Western public showed sympathy and support for the Bosnian Muslims, as well as horror and disgust at the atrocities committed by the Serbs. At the same time, she was relatively unconcerned about the attacks on Muslims by the Croats and the dismemberment of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the early stages of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Germany showed unusual diplomatic initiative and pressure, persuading the other 11 EU member states to follow its example and recognize Slovenia and Croatia. In an effort to strengthen the positions of these two Catholic countries, the Vatican recognized Slovenia and Croatia even before the European Community did. The United States followed the European example. Thus, the leading countries of European civilization rallied to support their fellow believers. And then there were reports that Croatia was receiving large amounts of weapons from Central Europe and other Western countries. On the other hand, Boris Yeltsin's government tried to adhere to a policy of the middle, so as not to spoil relations with Orthodox Serbs and at the same time not to oppose Russia to the West. Nevertheless, Russian conservatives and nationalists, among whom there were many MPs, attacked the government for lack of support for the Serbs. By early 1993, several hundred Russian citizens were serving in the Serb forces and Russian weapons were reportedly supplied to Serbia.

Islamic governments and political groups, in turn, stigmatize the West for failing to defend Bosnian Muslims. Iranian leaders are calling on Muslims around the world to help Bosnia. Contrary to the UN embargo, Iran is supplying Bosnia with soldiers and weapons. Iranian-backed Lebanese groups are sending militants to train and organize the Bosnian military. In 1993, up to 4,000 Muslims from over twenty Islamic countries were reported to have fought in Bosnia. The governments of Saudi Arabia and elsewhere are under increasing pressure from fundamentalist groups to demand stronger support for Bosnia. By the end of 1992, Saudi Arabia was reported to have essentially financed the supply of arms and food to Bosnian Muslims. This significantly increased their combat effectiveness in the face of the Serbs.

In the 1930s, the Spanish Civil War prompted the intervention of countries that were politically fascist, communist and democratic. Today, in the 90s, the conflict in Yugoslavia provokes the intervention of countries that are divided into Muslim, Orthodox and Western Christian. This parallel did not go unnoticed. “The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina became the emotional equivalent of fighting fascism during the Spanish Civil War,” said one observer from Saudi Arabia. “Those who die in this war are considered martyrs who gave their lives to save the Muslim brothers.”

Conflicts and violence are also possible between countries belonging to the same civilization, as well as within these countries. But they are usually not as intense and pervasive as conflicts between civilizations. Belonging to the same civilization reduces the likelihood of violence in those cases when, were it not for this circumstance, it would certainly have reached it. In 1991-92, many were worried about the possibility of a military clash between Russia and Ukraine over the disputed territories - primarily the Crimea - as well as the Black Sea Fleet, nuclear arsenals and economic problems. But if belonging to the same civilization means something, the likelihood of an armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine is not very high. These are two Slavic, mostly Orthodox peoples, who have had close ties for centuries. And therefore, in early 1993, despite all the reasons for the conflict, the leaders of both countries successfully negotiated, eliminating differences. At this time, on the territory of the former Soviet Union, there were serious battles between Muslims and Christians; tensions, reaching the point of direct confrontation, determined the relationship between Western and Orthodox Christians in the Baltics; - but between the Russians and the Ukrainians, it never came to violence.

Until now, the cohesion of civilizations has taken limited forms, but the process is developing, and it has significant potential for the future. As conflicts continue in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia, positions different countries and the discrepancies between them were increasingly determined by civilizational affiliation. Populist politicians, religious leaders and media mass media found a powerful weapon in this, providing them with the support of the broad masses of the population and allowing them to exert pressure on wavering governments. In the near future, the greatest threat of escalation into large-scale wars will be borne by those local conflicts that, like the conflicts in Bosnia and the Caucasus, have developed along the fault lines between civilizations. The next world war, if it breaks out, will be a war between civilizations.

WEST AGAINST THE REST OF THE WORLD

In relation to other civilizations, the West is now at the height of its power. The second superpower, in the past its opponent, has disappeared from the political map of the world. A military conflict between Western countries is unthinkable, the military power of the West is unmatched. Apart from Japan, the West has no economic rivals. He dominates in the political sphere, in the sphere of security, and together with Japan - in the sphere of economics. World political and security problems are effectively resolved under the leadership of the United States, Great Britain and France, world economic problems - under the leadership of the United States, Germany and Japan. All these countries have the closest relations with each other, not allowing smaller countries, almost all the countries of the non-Western world, into their circle. The decisions taken by the UN Security Council or the International Monetary Fund and reflecting the interests of the West are presented to the world community as meeting the urgent needs of the world community. The very expression "world community" has become a euphemism, replacing the expression "free world". It is designed to give global legitimacy to actions that reflect the interests of the United States and other Western countries (4). Through the IMF and other international economic organizations, the West realizes its economic interests and imposes on other countries economic policy at its sole discretion. In non-Western countries, the IMF undoubtedly enjoys the support of finance ministers and others, but the vast majority of the population has the most unflattering opinion of him. G. Arbatov described the IMF officials as "neo-Bolsheviks who gladly take money from other people, impose on them undemocratic and alien rules of economic and political behavior and deprive them of economic freedom."

The West dominates the UN Security Council, and its decisions, only occasionally softened by a Chinese veto, provided the West with a legitimate reason to use force on behalf of the UN to expel Iraq from Kuwait and destroy its sophisticated weapons, as well as the ability to produce such weapons. weapons. Unprecedented was the demand put forward by the United States, Great Britain and France on behalf of the Security Council for Libya to surrender the suspects in the explosion of the Panamerican airline. When Libya refused to comply with this demand, sanctions were imposed on it. Having defeated the most powerful of the Arab armies, the West did not hesitate to put all its weight on the Arab world. In fact, the West is using international organizations, military power and financial resources to rule the world, asserting its supremacy, defending Western interests and asserting Western political and economic values.

This, at least, is how non-Western countries see the world today, and there is a significant amount of truth in their view. Differences in the scale of power and the struggle for military, economic and political power are thus one of the sources of conflict between the West and other civilizations. Another source of conflict is differences in culture, in basic values ​​and beliefs. V.S. Neipaul argued that Western civilization is universal and suitable for all peoples. On a superficial level, much of Western culture has indeed permeated the rest of the world. But at a deep level, Western perceptions and ideas are fundamentally different from those inherent in other civilizations. In Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist and Orthodox cultures, such Western ideas as individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, freedom, rule of law, democracy, free market, separation of the church from the state are almost not found response. Western efforts to promote these ideas often provoke hostile reactions against "human rights imperialism" and help to reinforce the original values ​​of their own culture. This is evidenced, in particular, by the support of religious fundamentalism by the youth of non-Western countries. And the very thesis about the possibility of a "universal civilization" is a Western idea. It is in direct conflict with the particularism of most Asian cultures, with their emphasis on the differences that separate people from others. Indeed, as a comparative study of the significance of a hundred value attitudes in various societies has shown, “values ​​of paramount importance in the West are much less important in the rest of the world” (5). In the political realm, these differences are most evident in the attempts of the United States and other Western countries to impose Western ideas of democracy and human rights on the peoples of other countries. Modern democratic form reign has historically developed in the West. If it has established itself here and there in non-Western countries, it is only as a result of Western colonialism or pressure.

Apparently, the central axis of world politics in the future will be the conflict between the “West and the rest of the world”, as K. Mahbubani put it, and the reaction of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values ​​(6). This kind of reaction usually takes one of three forms, or a combination of them.

First, and this is the most extreme option, non-Western countries can follow the example of North Korea or Burma and take a course of isolation - to protect their countries from Western penetration and decay and essentially withdraw from participation in the life of the Western-dominated world community. But such a policy comes at too high a price, and few countries have fully adopted it.

The second opportunity is to try to join the West and accept its values ​​and institutions. In the language of international relations theory, this is called "jumping on the bandwagon."

The third possibility is to try to create a counterbalance to the West by developing economic and military power and cooperating with other non-Western countries against the West. At the same time, it is possible to preserve the original national values ​​and institutions - in other words, modernize, but not Westernize.

FUNCTIONAL COUNTRIES

In the future, when belonging to a certain civilization will become the basis of people's self-identification, countries in whose population several civilizational groups, such as the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, are represented, will be doomed to disintegration. But there are also internally divided countries - relatively homogeneous in the cultural sense, but in which there is no agreement on the question of which civilization they belong to. Their governments, as a rule, want to "jump on the bandwagon" and join the West, but the history, culture and traditions of these countries have nothing to do with the West.

The most striking and typical example of a country split from within is Turkey. Turkish leadership of the late XX century. remains faithful to the tradition of Ataturk and ranks his country among the modern, secularized nation-states of the Western type. It made Turkey an ally of the West in NATO and during the Gulf War, it is seeking the country's admission to the European Community. At the same time, certain elements of Turkish society support the revival of Islamic traditions and argue that, at its core, Turkey is a Middle Eastern Muslim state. Moreover, while the political elite of Turkey considers their country to be a Western society, the political elite of the West does not recognize this. Turkey is not accepted into the EU, and the real reason for this, according to President Ozal, "is that we are Muslims and they are Christians, but they do not say this openly." Where should Turkey go, which has rejected Mecca and itself rejected by Brussels? It is possible that the answer reads: "Tashkent". The collapse of the USSR opens up for Turkey a unique opportunity become the leader of a resurgent Turkic civilization spanning seven countries from the coast of Greece to China. Encouraged by the West, Turkey is making every effort to build this new identity for itself.

Mexico has found itself in a similar position in the last decade. While Turkey abandoned its historic opposition to Europe and tried to join it, Mexico, which previously identified itself through opposition to the United States, is now trying to emulate that country and seek to enter the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Mexican politicians are tackling the daunting task of redefining Mexico's identity, and to this end are pursuing fundamental economic reforms that will eventually lead to fundamental political transformations. In 1991, the first adviser to President Carlos Salinas described to me in detail the transformations being carried out by the Salinas government. When he finished, I said, “Your words made a strong impression on me. It looks like, in principle, you would like to transform Mexico from a Latin American country to a North American country. " He looked at me in surprise and exclaimed: “Quite right! This is what we are trying to do, but, of course, no one speaks about it openly! " This observation shows that in Mexico, as in Turkey, influential social forces oppose the new definition of national identity. In Turkey politicians European orientation forced to make gestures towards Islam (Ozal makes the Hajj to Mecca). Likewise, North American-oriented Mexican leaders are forced to make gestures towards those who regard Mexico as a Latin American country (Salinas-sponsored Ibero-American Summit in Guadalajara).

Historically, internal divisions have affected Turkey the most. For the United States, the closest internally divided country is Mexico. Globally, Russia remains the most significant split country. The question of whether Russia is part of the West, or whether it is at the head of its own special Orthodox-Slavic civilization, has been raised repeatedly throughout Russian history. After the victory of the communists, the problem became even more confused: having adopted Western ideology, the communists adapted it to Russian conditions and then, on behalf of this ideology, challenged the West. Communist rule removed from the agenda the historical dispute between Westernizers and Slavophiles. But after the discrediting of communism, the Russian people again faced this problem.

President Yeltsin borrows Western principles and goals in an effort to turn Russia into a "normal" country in the Western world. However, both the ruling elite and the broad masses Russian society disagree on this point. One of the moderate opponents of the westernization of Russia, S. Stankevich, believes that Russia should abandon the course of "Atlanticism", which will make it a European country, part of the world economic system and number eight in the current Seven of developed countries, that it should not rely on Germany and The United States is the leading country in the Atlantic Alliance. While rejecting purely “Eurasian” politics, Stankevich nonetheless believes that Russia should prioritize the protection of Russians living abroad. He emphasizes the Turkic and Muslim ties of Russia and insists “on a more acceptable redistribution of Russian resources, a revision of priorities, ties and interests in favor of Asia - towards the East. People of this persuasion criticize Yeltsin for subordinating Russia's interests to the West, for reducing its defensive power, for refusing to support traditional allies - for example, Serbia, and for the path he has chosen to conduct economic and political reforms, causing untold suffering to the people. A manifestation of this tendency is the revival of interest in the ideas of P. Savitsky, who wrote back in the 1920s that Russia is “a unique Eurasian civilization” (7). There are also harsher voices, sometimes overtly nationalistic, anti-Western and anti-Semitic. They call for a revival of Russia's military power and for closer ties with China and Muslim countries. The people of Russia are not less split than the political elite. A public opinion poll in the European part of the country in the spring of 1992 showed that 40% of the population had a positive attitude towards the West, and 36% had a negative attitude. In the early 90s, as throughout almost its entire history, Russia remains an internally split country.

For a country split from within to be able to regain its cultural identity, three conditions must be met. First, it is necessary that the political and economic elite of this country as a whole support and welcome such a step. Secondly, its people must agree, albeit reluctantly, to accept a new identity. Third, the dominant groups of the civilization into which the split country is trying to join must be ready to accept the "convert." In the case of Mexico, all three conditions are met. In the case of Turkey, the first two. And it is completely unclear what the situation is with Russia, which wants to join the West. The conflict between liberal democracy and Marxism-Leninism was a conflict of ideologies that, despite all the differences, at least outwardly set the same basic goals: freedom, equality and prosperity. But Russia, traditionalist, authoritarian, nationalistic, will strive for completely different goals. A Western democrat may well have waged an intellectual debate with a Soviet Marxist. But that would be unthinkable with a Russian traditionalist. And if the Russians, having ceased to be Marxists, do not accept liberal democracy and will begin to behave like Russians, and not like Western people, relations between Russia and the West may again become distant and hostile (8).

CONFUCIAN-ISLAMIC BLOC

The obstacles to the accession of non-Western countries to the West vary in depth and complexity. For the countries of Latin America and Eastern Europe, they are not so great. For the Orthodox countries of the former Soviet Union, it is much more significant. But the most serious obstacles are faced by Muslim, Confucian, Hindu and Buddhist peoples. Japan has succeeded in achieving a unique position of an associate member of the Western world: in some respects it is among the Western countries, but undoubtedly differs from them in its most important dimensions. Those countries that, for reasons of culture or power, do not want or cannot join the West, compete with it, building up their own economic, military and political power. They achieve this both through internal development and through cooperation with other non-Western countries. The most famous example of such cooperation is the Confucian-Islamic bloc, which developed as a challenge to Western interests, values ​​and power.

Almost without exception, Western countries are now reducing their military arsenals. Russia under Yeltsin's leadership is doing the same. And China, North Korea and a number of Middle Eastern countries are significantly increasing their military potential. To this end, they import weapons from Western and non-Western countries and develop their own military industry. As a result, a phenomenon emerged, which C. Crowthham called the phenomenon of "armed countries", and the "armed countries" are by no means the countries of the West. Another result is a rethinking of the concept of arms control. The idea of ​​arms control was put forward by the West. Throughout the Cold War, the primary goal of such control was to achieve a stable military balance between the United States and its allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its allies, on the other. In the post-Cold War era, the primary goal of arms control is to prevent non-Western countries from building up their military capabilities, which pose a potential threat to Western interests. To achieve this, the West uses international agreements, economic pressure, and control over the movement of weapons and military technology.

The conflict between the West and the Confucian-Islamic states to a large extent (though not exclusively) is centered around the problems of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles and other complex delivery systems for such weapons, as well as control systems, tracking systems and other electronic means of destruction of targets. The West proclaims the principle of nonproliferation as a universal and obligatory norm, and nonproliferation treaties and control as a means of implementing this norm. There is a system of various sanctions against those who contribute to the proliferation of modern weapons, and privileges for those who respect the principle of non-proliferation. Naturally, the focus is on countries that are hostile to the West or are potentially inclined to do so.

For their part, non-Western countries assert their right to acquire, manufacture and deploy any weapon they deem necessary for their own security. They have fully internalized the truth expressed by the Indian Minister of Defense when asked what lesson he learned from the Gulf War: "Do not mess with the United States if you do not have nuclear weapons." Nuclear, chemical and missile weapons are viewed - perhaps erroneously - as a potential counterbalance to the West's colossal conventional superiority. Of course, China already has nuclear weapons. Pakistan and India can place it on their territories. North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria are clearly trying to acquire it. A senior Iranian official said that all Muslim countries should have nuclear weapons, and in 1988 the Iranian president allegedly issued a decree calling for the production of "chemical, biological and radiological weapons, offensive and defensive."

An important role in the creation of anti-Western military potential is played by the expansion of China's military power and its ability to build it up in the future. Thanks to its successful economic development, China is constantly increasing its military spending and vigorously modernizing its army. It buys weapons from the countries of the former Soviet Union, is working on its own long-range ballistic missiles, and in 1992 conducted a one-megaton nuclear test explosion. Pursuing a policy of expanding its influence, China is developing air-refueling systems and acquiring aircraft carriers. China's military might and claims to dominance in the South China Sea are fueling an arms race in Southeast Asia. China is a major exporter of weapons and military technology. It supplies Libya and Iraq with raw materials that can be used to produce nuclear weapons and nerve gases. With his help, a reactor was built in Algeria, suitable for research and the production of nuclear weapons. China has sold nuclear technology to Iran, which, according to American experts, can only be used for the production of weapons. China has supplied parts of missiles with a 300-mile range to Pakistan. For some time now, a program for the production of nuclear weapons has been developed in North Korea - it is known that this country has sold the latest types of missiles and missile technology to Syria and Iran. As a rule, the flow of weapons and military technology goes from Southeast Asia towards the Middle East. But there is also some movement in the opposite direction. For example, China received Stinger missiles from Pakistan.

Thus, a Confucian-Islamic military bloc was formed. Its goal is to assist its members in acquiring the weapons and military technology needed to counterbalance the military power of the West. Whether it will be durable is unknown. But today it is, as D. McCurdy put it, "an alliance of traitors, led by the proliferators of nuclear weapons and their supporters." Between Islamic-Confucian countries and the West unfolds new round arms race. In the previous phase, each side developed and produced weapons with the aim of achieving balance or superiority over the other. Now, one side is developing and producing new types of weapons, while the other is trying to limit and prevent such a build-up of weapons, while reducing its own military potential.

CONCLUSIONS FOR THE WEST

This article does not at all claim that civilizational identity will replace all other forms of identity, that nation-states will disappear, each civilization will become politically unified and integral, and conflicts and struggle between different groups within civilizations will stop. I only put forward a hypothesis that 1) the contradictions between civilizations are important and real; 2) civilizational self-awareness is increasing; 3) the conflict between civilizations will replace ideological and other forms of conflict as the predominant form of global conflict; 4) international relations, which have historically been a game within the framework of Western civilization, will increasingly de-Westernize and turn into a game where non-Western civilizations will act not as passive objects, but as active actors; 5) effective international institutions in the field of politics, economics and security will develop within civilizations rather than between them; 6) conflicts between groups belonging to different civilizations will be more frequent, protracted and bloody than conflicts within one civilization; 7) armed conflicts between groups belonging to different civilizations will become the most likely and dangerous source of tension, a potential source of world wars; 8) relations between the West and the rest of the world will become the main axes of international politics; 9) the political elites of some split non-Western countries will try to include them among the Western ones, but in most cases they will have to face serious obstacles; 10) in the near future, the main focus of conflicts will be the relationship between the West and a number of Islamic-Confucian countries.

This is not a rationale for the desirability of a conflict between civilizations, but a conjectural picture of the future. But if my hypothesis is convincing, it is necessary to reflect on what this means for Western politics. A clear distinction must be made here between short-term gain and long-term settlement. If we proceed from the positions of short-term benefits, the interests of the West clearly require: 1) strengthening of cooperation and unity within the framework of its own civilization, primarily between Europe and North America; 2) integration into the West of the countries of Eastern Europe and Latin America, whose culture is close to the West; 3) maintaining and expanding cooperation with Russia and Japan; 4) prevention, growth of local intercivilizational conflicts into full-scale wars between civilizations; 5) limiting the growth of military power of Confucian and Islamic countries; 6) slowing down the decline in the military power of the West and maintaining its military superiority in East and South-West Asia; 7) the use of conflicts and disagreements between Confucian and Islamic countries; 8) support of representatives of other civilizations sympathetic to Western values ​​and interests; 9) strengthening international institutions reflecting and legitimizing Western interests and values, and attracting non-Western countries to participate in these institutions.

In the long term, however, it is necessary to focus on other criteria. Western civilization is both Western and modern. Non-Western civilizations have tried to become modern without becoming Western. But so far only Japan has been able to achieve complete success in this. Non-Western civilizations will not abandon their attempts to acquire wealth, technology, skills, equipment, weapons - everything that is included in the concept of “being modern”. But at the same time, they will try to combine modernization with their traditional values ​​and culture. Their economic and military power will grow, the gap with the West will decrease. More and more, the West will have to reckon with these civilizations, which are close in power, but very different in their values ​​and interests. This will require maintaining its potential at a level that will protect the interests of the West in relations with other civilizations. But a deeper understanding of the fundamental religious and philosophical foundations of these civilizations will also be required from the West. He will have to understand how the people of these civilizations represent their own interests. It will be necessary to find elements of similarity between Western and other civilizations. For in the foreseeable future there will be no single universal civilization. On the contrary, the world will consist of different civilizations, and each of them will have to learn to coexist with all the others.

Notes (edit)

HUNTINGTON Samuel - Professor at Harvard University, Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies. J. Olin at Harvard University.

1. Weidenbaum M. Greater China: The Next Economic Superpower? - Washington University Center for the Study of American Business. Contemporary Issues. Series 57, Feb. 1993, p. 2-3.

2. Lewis B. The Roots of Muslim Rage. - "Atlantic Monthly". Vol.266, Sept. 1990; p.60; Time, June 15,1992, p. 24-28.

3. Roosevelt A. For Lust of Knowing. Boston, 1988, pp. 332-333.

4. Western leaders almost always refer to the fact that they are acting on behalf of the "world community." Significant, however, is the slip of the tongue that British Prime Minister J. Major escaped in December 1990 during an interview with the Good Morning America program. Major used the word "West" when talking about the actions taken against Saddam Hussein. And although he quickly recovered and later spoke of the "world community", he was right when he made a reservation.

5. New York Times, Dec. 25, 1990, p. 41; Cross-Cultural Studies of Individualism and Collectivism. - Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. 1989, vol. 37, p. 41-133.

6. Mahbubani K. The West and the Rest. - National Interest, Summer 1992, p. 3-13.

7. Stankevich S. Russia in Search of Itself. - National Interest, Summer 1992, p. 47-51; Schneider D.A. Russian Movement Rejects Western Tilt. - Christian Science Monitor, Febr. 5, 1993, p. 5-7.

8. As noted by O. Horris, Australia is also trying to become a split country from within. Although the country is a full member of the Western world, its current leadership is effectively proposing that it step back from the West, adopt a new identity as an Asian country, and develop close ties with its neighbors. Australia's future, they argue, is with the fast-growing economies of East Asia. However, as I said before, close economic cooperation usually presupposes a common cultural foundation. Among other things, in the case of Australia, it seems that all three of the conditions necessary for an internally divided country to join another civilization appear to be missing.

From the magazine "Polis" (http://www.politstudies.ru/), 1994, No. 1, pp. 33-48.

Samuel Huntington

Clash of civilizations

Samuel Huntington's book “The Clash of Civilizations” is the first test of the practical application of the new meanings embedded in the concept of “civilization” in the second half of the 20th century.

The basic concept of “civilized” was developed in the 17th century by French philosophers in the framework of the binary opposition “civilization - barbarism”. This served as the ontological basis for the expansion of European civilization and the practice of redistributing the world without taking into account the opinions and desires of any non-European cultures. The final rejection of the binary formula took place only in the middle of the 20th century after the Second World War. World War II was the final stage in the collapse of the British Empire, the last incarnation of the classic French formula of civilization (See, for example, B. Liddell Hart “Second World War”, SPb. TF, M: ACT, 1999).

In 1952, the work of American anthropologists of German origin A. Kroeber and K. Klukhon “Culture: a critical review of concepts and concepts” appeared, where they pointed out that the classical German postulate of the 19th century on the categorical separation of culture and civilization was deceptive. In its final form, the thesis that civilization is determined by culture - "a collection of cultural characteristics and phenomena" - belongs to the French historian F. Braudel ("On history", 1969).

In the 1980s, the success in the Cold War defined two points of departure for the ideologues of the Euro-Atlantic civilization:

The idea that the civilizational image of the “conditional West” has become in the world decisive for the modern world and that history in its classical format has been completed (F. Fukuyama);

The existence in the modern world of many civilizations, which still have to be introduced into the required civilizational image (S. Huntington).

The new formula of the “civilized” demanded a different practical solution in the system of civilizational relations. And the ideologists of the new practice were the Americans Z. Brzezzhinsky with the "Great Chess Board" and S. Huntington with the book presented. The former US Secretary of State, describing the geopolitical technologies at work, called Russia “a big black hole on the world map,” and Dr. Huntington attributed it to the Orthodox civilization and practically wrote it off as a passive form of cooperation.

In fact, the main difficulty of the problem posed was the classification and geography of civilizations. The whole practice of managing civilizations is reduced to the truth of the description of the "Great Game" field. The doctrines of Brzezinski and Huntington are present in modern politics and, having solved the very first problems very well, are obviously experiencing difficulties at the borders of the old religious wars and in the zone of destruction of the Soviet project.

At the border of the millennium, the concept of civilization is undergoing further changes. Within the framework of the thesis proposed by the Russian philosophers P. Shchedrovitsky and E. Ostrovsky at the end of the 90s, a departure from the geographical component is assumed, and the final transition from the formula "blood and soil" to the principle of "language and culture". Thus, the boundaries of the new structuring units of human civilization, as the authors of the Worlds called them, pass through the areas of distribution of languages ​​and corresponding ways of life, including Braudel's "collections of cultural characteristics and phenomena."

Nikolay Yutanov

FOREWORD

Summer 1993 magazine ForeignAffairs published my article, which was entitled “Clash of Civilizations?”. According to the editors ForeignAffairs, this article has generated more resonance in three years than any other article they have printed since the 1940s. And of course, it caused more excitement than anything I wrote earlier. Feedback and comments came from dozens of countries, from all continents. People were more or less amazed, intrigued, outraged, frightened and bewildered by my statement that the central and most dangerous aspect of nascent global politics would be conflict between groups of different civilizations. Apparently, it struck on the nerves of readers of all continents.

Taking into account the interest the article aroused, as well as the number of controversies around it and the distortion of the stated facts, I think it would be desirable to develop the issues raised in it. I would like to note that one of the constructive ways of posing a question is to put forward a hypothesis. The article, whose title contained a question mark ignored by everyone, was an attempt to do just that. This book aims to provide a more complete, more [ c.7] a deep and documented answer to the question posed in the article. Here I have made an attempt to refine, detail, supplement and, if possible, clarify the questions formulated earlier, as well as develop many other ideas and highlight topics that were not previously considered at all or touched upon in passing. In particular, we are talking about the concept of civilizations; on the issue of universal civilization; about the relationship between power and culture; about a shift in the balance of power among civilizations; about the cultural origins of non-Western societies; conflicts generated by Western universalism, Muslim militancy and Chinese ambitions; balancing and "adjusting" tactics as a reaction to the growing power of China; the causes and dynamics of fault line wars; about the future of the West and world civilizations. One of the important issues not covered in the article is the significant impact of population growth on instability and the balance of power. The second important aspect, not mentioned in the article, is summarized in the title of the book and its closing phrase: “... the clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and international order based on civilizations is the most reliable means of preventing world war. ”

I did not seek to write a sociological work. On the contrary, the book was conceived as an interpretation of global politics after the Cold War. I have sought to present in it a general paradigm, a global policy review system that is clear to researchers and useful to policymakers. The test of its clarity and usefulness is not whether it covers everything that happens in global politics. Naturally not. The test is whether it provides you with a clearer and more useful lens through which to view international processes. Moreover, no paradigm can last forever. While international [ c.8] This approach may be useful for understanding global politics in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, but this does not mean that it will be equally effective in the mid-twentieth or mid-twenty-first century.

The ideas that were then embodied in the article and this book were first publicly expressed at a lecture at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington in October 1992, and then outlined in a communication prepared for the project of the Institute. J. Olin "Changing the Security Environment and American National Interests", which was realized thanks to the Smith-Richardson Foundation. Since the article was published, I have participated in countless workshops and discussions with government, academia, business, and others in the United States. In addition, I was fortunate enough to take part in discussions of the article and its abstracts in many other countries, including Argentina, Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, Spain, China, Korea, Luxembourg, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Taiwan, France, Sweden, Switzerland, South Africa and Japan. These meetings introduced me to all major civilizations except Hindu, and I gained invaluable experience from communicating with the participants in these discussions. In 1994 and 1995, I taught a seminar at Harvard on the nature of the post-Cold War world, and I was inspired by its lively atmosphere and sometimes quite critical remarks from students. My colleagues and associates from the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University also made invaluable contributions to the work.

The manuscript was read in its entirety by Michael S. Dash, Robert O. Keohan, Farid Zakaria, and R. Scott Zimmermann, whose comments contributed to a fuller and clearer presentation of the material. In the course of writing [ c.9] Scott Zimmermann provided invaluable research assistance. Without his energetic, skilled, and dedicated help, the book would never have been completed on such a date. Our student assistants - Peter June and Christiane Briggs - also made constructive contributions. Grace de Magistries printed an early version of the manuscript, and Carol Edward has revised the manuscript with inspiration and enthusiasm so many times that she must know it almost by heart. Denise Shannon and Lynn Cox of Georges Borshart and Robert Ashania, Robert Bender and Joanna Lee of Simon & Schuster, energetically and professionally guided the manuscript through the publication process. I am eternally grateful to everyone who helped me with the creation of this book. It turned out much better than it would have otherwise, and the remaining flaws lie on my conscience.

© Samuel P. Huntington, 1996

© Translation. T. Velimeev, 2006

© Edition in Russian by AST Publishers, 2014

Samuel P. Huntington THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS

Edited by K. Korolev and E. Krivtsova

Computer design by G. Smirnova

Reprinted by permission of Samuel P. Huntington QTIP Marital Trust and Georges Borchardt, Inc. and Andrew Nurnberg

All rights reserved. No part of the electronic version of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, including posting on the Internet and corporate networks, for private and public use without the written permission of the copyright holder.

© The electronic version of the book was prepared by Litres (www.litres.ru)

* * *

Foreword by Zbigniew Brzezinski

The book "The Clash of Civilizations" is extremely rich in design and implementation. It provides a new understanding of today's global chaos and offers a new vocabulary for interpreting the rapidly growing problems of our increasingly small world. Huntington's analysis of tectonic shifts in such basic areas as faith, culture and politics is at first stunning, but becomes more convincing with each page. There is no doubt that this book will take its place among the few truly deep and serious works necessary for a clear understanding. state of the art the world.

The author's breadth of outlook and keen insight arouse genuine admiration and even, paradoxically, some skepticism (especially at the beginning of reading): at first glance, he too easily overcomes the traditional lines of demarcation between the social sciences. Sometimes there is even a desire to challenge some of Huntington's personal assessments or develop his views in the Manichean spirit. This book has gained a truly global readership, which is clear evidence that it is much better suited to the now widespread desire to deeper and more accurately understand the incredibly complex historical reality of our day than the classical social disciplines.

First, I want to admit that Sam and I have been close friends for most of our adult lives. We went to graduate school together at Harvard and then taught. Our wives also became friends. After Sam moved from Harvard to Columbia University, he persuaded me to follow him. We parted ways when he returned to Harvard and I stayed at Columbia University, but we did manage to write a book together. Later, when I was already working in the White House, he again joined me and was engaged in a comprehensive strategic examination of the global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Carter and Reagan administrations took his opinion seriously.

Secondly, despite our friendly relations, we sometimes disagreed. In truth, I was rather skeptical about the main idea of ​​his book when he first expressed it in an article published in 1993 in the July issue of Foreign Affairs. Like many others, I was impressed by the breadth of the author's analysis, but I was somewhat embarrassed by the attempt to fit into some general intellectual scheme the unimaginably complex dynamics of contemporary national, religious and social conflicts taking place in the world. However, after listening to Sam's arguments in response to criticism in various discussions, and after reading the entire book, I completely got rid of the initial skepticism. I became convinced that his approach is important not only for understanding modern world relations, but also for the rational impact on them.

One more point needs to be emphasized. Along with a superb interpretation of the complexities of political evolution, Huntington's book provides an intellectual launching pad for new politicians. These are people who consider passive surrender to simplified historical determinism unacceptable and do not consider the conflict of civilizations an inevitable moral imperative of our time. Some proponents of such extreme views after 9/11 have succumbed to the temptation to reduce the civilizational challenges of the world opposing America to a simple slogan: "We love freedom, they hate it." And it is not surprising that the political conclusions drawn from such a simplistic and even demagogic opposition have led to discouraging results when they are tried to be applied in real life.

From the point of view of political science, The Clash of Civilizations is a great warning. Almost ten years before September 11, Huntington warned that in the modern, politically awakened world, our awareness of the peculiarities of different civilizations requires us (just like atomic weapons, which pose a danger to all of humanity) to focus on intercivilizational coalitions, on mutual respect and restraint. in an effort to rule other nations. This is why Huntington's work is not only intellectually innovative but also claims to be real political wisdom.

Foreword

In the summer of 1993, Foreign Affairs magazine published an article of mine entitled "A Clash of Civilizations?" According to the editors of Foreign Affairs, this article has generated more resonance in three years than any article they have printed since the 1940s. And of course, it caused more excitement than anything I wrote earlier. Feedback and comments came from dozens of countries, from all continents. People were more or less amazed, intrigued, outraged, frightened and bewildered by my statement that the central and most dangerous aspect of nascent global politics would be conflict between groups of different civilizations. Apparently, it struck on the nerves of readers of all continents.

Taking into account the interest the article aroused, as well as the number of controversies around it and the distortion of the stated facts, I think it would be desirable to develop the issues raised in it. I would like to note that one of the constructive ways of posing a question is to put forward a hypothesis. The article, whose title contained a question mark ignored by everyone, was an attempt to do just that. This book aims to give a more complete, deeper and documented answer to the question posed in the article. Here I have made an attempt to refine, detail, supplement and, if possible, clarify the questions formulated earlier, as well as develop many other ideas and highlight topics that were not previously considered at all or touched upon in passing. In particular, we are talking about the concept of civilizations; on the issue of universal civilization; about the relationship between power and culture; about a shift in the balance of power among civilizations; about the cultural origins of non-Western societies; conflicts generated by Western universalism, Muslim militancy and Chinese ambitions; balancing and "adjusting" tactics as a reaction to the growing power of China; the causes and dynamics of fault line wars; about the future of the West and world civilizations. One of the important issues not covered in the article is the significant impact of population growth on instability and the balance of power. The second important aspect, not mentioned in the article, is summarized in the title of the book and its closing phrase: "... the clashes of civilizations pose the greatest threat to world peace, and the international order, taking into account the interests of different civilizations, is the most reliable measure of preventing world war."

I did not seek to write a sociological work. On the contrary, the book was conceived as a treatment of global politics after the Cold War. I have sought to present in it a general paradigm, a global policy review system that is clear to researchers and useful to policymakers. The test of its clarity and usefulness is not whether it covers everything that happens in global politics. Naturally not. The test is whether it provides you with a useful clarifying lens through which international processes can be viewed. Moreover, no paradigm can last forever. While an international approach may prove useful in understanding global politics in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, this does not mean that it will be equally valid in the mid-twentieth or mid-twenty-first century.

The ideas that were then embodied in the article and this book were first publicly expressed in a lecture at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington in October 1992, and then outlined in a communication prepared for the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Research project “Changes in Global Security and American National Interests ”, which was realized thanks to the Smith-Richardson Foundation. Since the article was published, I have participated in countless workshops and discussions with government, academia, business, and others in the United States. In addition, I was fortunate enough to take part in discussions of the article and its abstracts in many other countries, including Argentina, Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, Spain, China, Korea, Luxembourg, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Taiwan, France, Sweden, Switzerland, South Africa and Japan. These meetings introduced me to all major civilizations except Hindu, and I gained invaluable experience from communicating with the participants in these discussions. In 1994 and 1995, I taught a seminar at Harvard on the nature of the post-Cold War world, and I was inspired by its lively atmosphere and sometimes quite critical remarks from students. My colleagues and associates from the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University also made invaluable contributions to the work.

The manuscript was read in its entirety by Michael S. Dash, Robert O. Keohane, Farid Zakaria, and R. Scott Zimmermann, whose comments contributed to a fuller and clearer presentation of the material. During the writing, Scott Zimmermann provided invaluable research assistance. Without his energetic, skilled, and dedicated help, the book would never have been completed on such a date. Our student assistants - Peter June and Christiane Briggs - also made constructive contributions. Grace de Magistries printed an early version of the manuscript, and Carol Edwards revised the manuscript with inspiration and enthusiasm so many times that she must know it almost by heart. Denise Shannon and Lynn Cox of Georges Borshart and Robert Ashania, Robert Bender and Joanna Lee of Simon & Schuster, energetically and professionally prepared the manuscript for publication. I am eternally grateful to everyone who helped me with the creation of this book. It turned out much better than it would have otherwise, and the remaining flaws lie on my conscience.

My work on this book was made possible by financial support from the John M. Olin and Smith-Richardson Foundations. Without their assistance, the writing process would have dragged on for years, and I am very grateful to them for their generous help in this endeavor. While other foundations focus on domestic issues, the Olin and Smith-Richardson Foundations are commendable for contributing to the study of war and peace, national and international security.

S. P. Huntington

Part 1
World of civilizations

Chapter 1
A new era of world politics

Introduction: flags and cultural identity

On January 3, 1992, a meeting of Russian and American scientists took place in a hall of one of the government buildings in Moscow. Two weeks earlier, the Soviet Union ceased to exist and the Russian Federation became an independent state. As a result, the monument to Lenin, which had previously adorned the stage of the audience, disappeared, but a Russian flag appeared on the wall. The only problem, one American noted, was that the flag was hung upside down. After the comment was passed on to the representatives of the host side, during the first break, the error was quickly and calmly corrected.

In the years since the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed the beginning of tremendous changes in the self-identification of peoples and the symbols of their identity. Global politics began to line up along new cultural lines. The upside-down flags were a sign of transition, but more and more flags are flying high and proudly, and Russians and other peoples rally around them and other symbols of their new cultural identity.

On April 18, 1994, two thousand people gathered in Sarajevo, waving the flags of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Raising these banners over them instead of the flags of the UN, NATO or the United States, these residents of Sarajevo identified themselves with their Muslim brothers and showed the world who their real and "not so real" friends are.

On October 16, 1994, 70,000 people took to the streets in Los Angeles with a "sea of ​​Mexican flags" to protest Amendment 187, which was put to the referendum, which removed many government benefits for illegal immigrants and their children. “Why did they take to the streets with the Mexican flag and demand that this country give them free education? - the observers were interested. "They should be waving the American flag." Indeed, two weeks later, protesters took to the streets with the American flag upside down. This flag stunt ensured the victory of Amendment 187, which was approved by 59% of California residents eligible to vote.

In the post-Cold War world, flags matter, as do other symbols of cultural identity, including crosses, crescents and even headdresses, because culture matters, and for most people, cultural identity is the most important thing. People discover new and often old symbols of identity and take to the streets under new and sometimes old flags, which leads to wars with new, but often old, enemies.

In the novel by Michael Dibdin "The Dead Lagoon" through the mouth of a Venetian nationalist demagogue, a very gloomy, but characteristic of our time view of the world is expressed: “There can be no real friends without real enemies. If we do not hate who we are not, we cannot love who we are. These are old truths that we are painfully rediscovering after more than a century of sentimental hypocrisy. Those who deny these truths deny their family, their heritage, their birthright, themselves! And such people cannot be easily forgiven. " The deplorable veracity of these old truths cannot be denied by either the scientist or the politician. Enemies are important to people seeking their roots, and the most potentially dangerous hostilities always arise along the “fault lines” between the world's major civilizations.

The main idea of ​​this work is that in the post-Cold War world, culture and awareness of different cultural identities (which in the broadest sense coincide with the identity of civilization) determine patterns of cohesion, disintegration and conflict. In five parts, the book deduces the implications of this basic premise.

Part I: For the first time in history, global politics is both multipolar and polycivilizational; modernization is separated from "westernization" - the spread of Western ideals and norms and does not lead to the emergence of a general civilization in the exact sense of the word, nor to the westernization of non-Western societies.

Part II: The balance of influence between civilizations is shifting: the relative influence of the West is decreasing; the economic, military and political power of Asian civilizations is growing; the demographic explosion of Islam has destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbors; non-Western civilizations are reaffirming the value of their cultures.

Part III: A world order based on civilizations emerges: societies with cultural similarities cooperate with each other; attempts to move society from the conditions of one civilization to others and aliens are fruitless; countries are grouped around the leading or pivotal countries of their civilizations.

Part IV: The universalist claims of the West are increasingly leading to conflicts with other civilizations, the most serious - with Islam and China; at the local level, the wars on the fault lines, mostly between Muslims and non-Muslims, cause "cohesion of kindred countries", the threat of further escalation of the conflict and, consequently, the efforts of the main countries to end these wars.

Part V: The survival of the West depends on whether Americans reaffirm their Western identity and whether Westerners accept their civilization as unique rather than universal, and their union to preserve civilization against the challenges of non-Western societies. A global war of civilizations can be avoided only when world leaders accept the polycivilizational nature of global politics and begin to cooperate to maintain it.

Multipolar, polycivilizational world

For the first time in history, politics in the post-Cold War world has become both multipolar and multi-civilizational. For most of the existence of mankind, civilizations have been in contact with each other only from time to time or have had no contact at all. Then, with the beginning of the modern era, around AD 1500. e., global politics received two directions. For more than four hundred years, the nation states of the West — Britain, France, Spain, Austria, Prussia, Germany, the United States, and others — have constituted a multipolar international system within Western civilization. They interacted and competed with each other, waged wars against each other. At the same time, Western nations expanded, conquered, colonized and exerted an undeniable influence on all other civilizations (see Map 1.1). During the Cold War, global politics became bipolar and the world was divided into three parts. A group of the most prosperous and powerful powers, led by the United States, was embroiled in a large-scale ideological, economic and at times military confrontation with a group of poorer communist countries, united and led by the Soviet Union. This conflict has largely manifested itself outside the two camps - in the third world, which often consisted of poor, politically unstable states that only recently gained independence and declared a policy of non-alignment (Map 1.2).

In the late 1980s, the communist world collapsed and the Cold War international system became history. In the post-Cold War world, the most important differences between people are no longer ideological, political or economic differences, but cultural ones. Peoples and nations are trying to answer the simplest question that a person can face: who we are. And they respond in the traditional way - by referring to the concepts that matter most to them. People define themselves using concepts such as origin, religion, language, history, values, customs and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations and - at the broadest level - civilizations. Having not decided on their identity, people cannot use politics to pursue their own interests. We only know who we are after we know who we are not, and only then do we know who we are against.

West and the rest: 1920

Cold War World: 1960s

The world of different civilizations: after the 1990s

National states remain the main players in the field of world politics. Their behavior, as in the past, is determined by the desire for power and prosperity, but it is also determined by cultural preferences, communities and differences. The most important groupings of states are no longer the three Cold War blocs, but rather seven or eight major world civilizations (Map 1.3). Non-Western societies, especially in South Asia, increase their economic wealth and create the basis for increased military power and political influence. As power and self-confidence rise, non-Western countries are increasingly asserting their own values ​​and rejecting those that the West "imposes" on them. "The international system of the twenty-first century," noted Henry Kissinger, "will be made up of at least six major powers - the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia and possibly India, as well as many medium and small states." The six Kissinger powers belong to five different civilizations, and, in addition, there are influential Islamic countries, whose strategic location, large population and oil reserves make them very significant figures in world politics. In this new world, local politics is politics of ethnicity or racial affiliation; global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers gave way to the clash of civilizations.

In this new world, the most large-scale, important and dangerous conflicts will occur not between social classes, rich and poor, but between peoples of different cultural identities. Tribal wars and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilizations. Clashes and outbreaks of violence between countries of different civilizational affiliation carry with them the potential for escalation, as they are fraught with the involvement of "fraternal peoples" in the conflict. The bloody clash of clans in Somalia does not threaten the expansion of the conflict. The bloody clash of tribes in Rwanda has implications for Uganda, Zaire and Burundi, but no more. Bloody clashes of civilizations in Bosnia, in the Caucasus, Central Asia or big wars in Kashmir can escalate. In the Yugoslav conflict, Russia provided diplomatic assistance to the Serbs, while Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, and Libya provided financial aid and weapons to the Bosnians, not for reasons of ideology, power politics or economic interests, but because of cultural affinities. “Cultural conflicts,” noted Vaclav Havel, “are intensifying, and today they have become more dangerous than ever before in history”; and Jacques Delors agreed that "the coming conflicts will ignite from the spark of a national factor rather than an economic or ideological one." And the most dangerous cultural conflicts are those that take place along the fault lines between civilizations.