Modern Russian-Japanese relations. The history of Russian-Japanese relations

In the period of the 1990s. Russia's relations with Japan were for our country central to APR. The priority role of the country of the rising sun for Russia was explained by several reasons. As already noted, first, Japan was a highly developed economic power, cooperation with which the interests of Russian economic modernization answered, and Japan was the main strategic ally of the United States in Asia, which made it useful for the development of the entire Western direction of Russia's foreign policy. For its part, Japan experienced interest in Russia as an alternative supplier of raw materials and energy carriers. No less important for Japan was the role of Russia as a possible counterway to China as a new regional superpower.

Russian-Japanese relations in the 1990s. continued within the framework of the line, which was still scheduled for M.S. Gorbachev in the second half of the 1980s. Its essence was attempts to find ways of development of mutual contacts, primarily in the economy, without serious political concessions on both sides. The most important problem of bilateral political relations was still the territorial question.

In his relations with Russia, Japan tried to associate the decision of the territorial problem with the development of economic cooperation. On the hand of the Japanese in this matter were the collapse of the USSR, and the deepening of the economic crisis in the Russian economy in the early 1990s. For this reason, the first official visit to Japan President B.N. was postponed. Yeltsin. On 1992, he took place only in October 1993. His most important outcome was the signing of the Tokyo Declaration, in which Moscow assured Tokyo in what intends to be positive for Japan to resolve the territorial dispute around the group of Islands of Habomai and Islands Shikotan, Kunashir and ITUP. The timing of the decision of the territorial problem was not stipulated.

Wanted B.N. Yeltsin give impetus to solving a territorial problem or only imitated such a desire, it is still unknown. But his visit, although he did not lead to a breakthrough in a relationship, nevertheless, a positive effect on the development of the economic relations of the two countries. By 1995, the volume of bilateral trade reached 6 billion dollars. Having a positive balance in trade with Japan, Russia supplied raw materials, metal and energy to this country, and purchased machinery and equipment. In the 1990s. The volume of Japanese investments in the Russian economy, however, is at a fairly low level, and among foreign investors in terms of investment, Japan occupied only 11th place.

In 1997-1998 The level of political relations increased somewhat - the contacts of the leaders of the two countries were held first in Krasnoyarsk, and then in the Japanese city of Kavan.

In November 1997, during the summit in Krasnoyarsk, "Plan Yeltsin - Hasimoto" was agreed by the expansion of investment cooperation between the two countries and the assistance of Japan reforms in the Russian Federation, which was expressed in the allocation of loans for the purchase of Japanese goods by Russia. Despite the trustful nature of the negotiations "Without ties", the breakthrough in the political relations of the parties did not happen again, and the peace treaty was not concluded. Progress in the relations of the two countries did not take place, including because the exacerbated internal problems distracted leaders of Russia and Japan from the decision of bilateral issues in favor of national.

Summing up with Russian-Japanese relations in the 1990s, it should be noted that at this time there was a chance, first, improving the economic climate of these relations, and secondly, the gradual transformation of the controversial island territories to the object of Russian-Japanese interaction and mutually beneficial cooperation.

With the election of Russian President Vladimir Putin Russia's policy towards Japan has become more open. In relation to the territorial issue, Russia assumed tactics, which Japan applies for many years in its territorial disputes with China. It is expressed by the following formula - "This is our territory, but you challenge them, we have no problem with you, this is your problem." In terms of cooperation, the parties tried to satisfy private, often spontaneously arising interests that, ultimately, spread almost to all areas, including contacts along the line of special services and military. "In the Japanese direction, Russia has policies, but there is no long-term strategy, equally, as it does not have it from the Japanese side. And therefore, we build all our relationships on solving current problems "- noted in 2005 the head of the Japan Research Center Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences

V. Pavtenko. The absence of such a strategy is not a mistake of politicians and diplomats, and a consequence of a low level of confidence between countries both at the level of political leaders and at the level of ordinary citizens. In this regard, Russian-Japanese relations resemble the relations of Japan and China in something - in the economy of affairs go fine, and many unsolved issues remain in politics and at the level of interpersonal contacts. Thus, Russian-Japanese relations are the missing relations of partners who are forced to address the issues of mutual interest.

Central place in bilateral relations in the 2000s. occupied the economy. Meetings V.V. Putin with the Prime Minister of Japan E. Mori in 2000 and 2001, as well as a visit to Russia in January 2003 of the Japanese Premier D. Koizumi confirmed mutual intention to deepen mutual economic cooperation. The parties began to carry out major projects in the field of joint development of oil and gas fields in Siberia, Primorye and the Sakhalin shelf. The Japanese government has provided financial assistance in the form of trading and allocating loans for these projects.

In 2004, the volume of trade between countries reached a record level, exceeding $ 8.8 billion (48.4% more than in 2003). The commodity structure of Russian exports in general has not changed significantly. The basis of exports traditionally accounted for metals, including colored and precious (37%), seafood (27%), timber (11%). Noticeably 2.3 times - the supply of mineral raw materials and fuels (coal and petroleum products, whose share has increased from 13 to 20%). In imports from Japan, machines and equipment prevailed: vehicles, road construction equipment, electrical goods and communications. Among the most important problems of Russian exports to Japan is an extremely low degree of processing of delivered raw materials and food products. This is especially true for seafood, in the export of which Russia annually loses hundreds of millions of dollars due to lack of capacities in the Russian Far East on their deep processing.

In November 2005, an official visit to Japan V.V. Putin, during which he refused to discuss with Japanese politicians the territorial question, thus, thus, from the principles of the Tokyo Declaration. This position of the Russian leader proceeded both from the increased economic relics of the country and due to confusion and disagreements between Japanese politicians in the territorial issue. The softening of the Japanese position was caused primarily by the growing power of China, pushing official Tokyo to the creation of a system of regional balances of this country, with participation including Russia. For these reasons, the firm line of the Russian president in the territorial issue was perceived in Japan as a given and did not affect the development of the economic relations of the two countries, and the decision of the Japanese government to give their fundamental consent to Russia's accession to the WTO.

In 2005-2007 Especially noticeably improved the attitude of a large Japanese business to the idea of \u200b\u200bcooperation with Russia. In particular, the automotive companies "Nissan" and "Toyota" decided to build in Russia motor assemblies. Other companies - Mitsui, Magnienie, Mitsubishi, "Nissø Ivan", "Sumito-Mo" also increased their activity in the Russian market. This trend is based on the recognition of the Japanese business world of the fact of strengthening political stability, the obvious economic progress of Russia and undertaken by the Russian leadership measures to improve economic legislation. At the same time, Japanese businessmen continue to talk about the problems of Russian tax, currency and financial legislation, the inefficiency of their execution.

Soviet-Japanese relations 1927-1941.

Performed:

Student IV Course 42 Groups

Podgorno Ekaterina Igorevna

Scientific adviser:

k.I.N. Buranok S.O.

Samara, 2011.

Plan

1. Introduction .............................................................................. 3.

2. Chapter 1. Soviet-Japanese relationship: to. 20 - 30s .................. ... 4

3. Chapter 2. Armed conflict in the area of \u200b\u200bLake Hassan .................. 11

4. Chapter 3. Soviet-Japanese relations on the eve of World War II ...............................................................................................

5. Conclusion ............... ... ...................................................... ... 22

6. Used literature ......................................................... 24

Introduction

The relevance and scientific significance of the topic. The problem of the Japanese-Soviet rivalry in 1927-1941. It is one of the least studied in historical science. This fact cannot be explained by the lack of interest from domestic and foreign researchers to the Japanese-Soviet relations themselves of this period. It was during these years that the foundations of the relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union were laid, mutual contradictions were reanimated and sharpened.

In the Japanese-Soviet rivalry, as in every rivalry of this kind, along with the confrontation, confrontation and hostility, elements of mutual pragmatism, cooperation and even partnership were manifested. In the conditions of a rapidly changing world, the lack of any intentive stability in the outside environment, the fall in the prestige and the weakening of the military-political power and the socio-economic potential of the Democratic Russia will not be superfluous to recall the joint interests, once not only separated, but also connected these Countries, experience, let it be short-term, but so fruitful and fateful for both countries of partnerships of the 30th-early 40s.

The documents and other sources have become available recently, allow you to raise the question of the presence of rivalry relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union in the Far East and, especially in China. It requires a deeper study now not only the confrontational component of the Japanese-Soviet relations, as was taken earlier, but also a study of numerous facts and evidence of a compromise, even with elements of partnerships of the policies of two Pacific powers in relation to each other, without which rivalry is unthinkable.

The purpose of this abstract is a comprehensive study of the relations of Japan and the Soviet Union for this period.

Chapter 1. Soviet-Japanese relations: to. 20 - 30th.

In April 1927, famous Militarist General Hiiti Tanaka formed a new office. The coming to power Tanaka meant that the ruling circles of Japan took the top of the most reaction elements. The most famous Memorandum of Tanaka, granted to the Emperor in July 1927, was set out in it an aggressive foreign policy program of Japanese militarism.

In difficult conditions, at that time, it was necessary to work in Japan to the Soviet embassy and the USSR police station in Japan Alexey Antonovich Trojanovsky (from November 16, 1927 - to 1933). The Soviet government set a clear task before its diplomats: to create a healthier atmosphere in relations with Japan and actively fight against the attempts of the military to unleash the war against the USSR. And the reactionary Japanese newspapers wrote about the "Devil's hand of Red Russia", which invades the internal affairs of the country. They called on to follow the actions of the Russian embassy of the "Palace of the Hidden Devil's Bolshevization of Japan".

Around the personality of Trojanovsky also injected unfavorably. The newspaper "Zarya" with a provocative purpose wrote: "We must congratulate Japan, which received a specialist in Soviet Russia as a gift from their neighbor in Soviet Russia to the destruction of Asia - Trojanovsky." Not only the reaction press, but also individual political figures did not cease to decline on all the Lada "Communism", "Red Danger", called the Trojanovsky "Hazardous Person". Soviet diplomats used any opportunity to bring to the attention and consciousness of the wide layers of the Japanese people. The basic principles of the USSR foreign policy.

On the proposal of the Soviet Polirand, to conclude a non-aggression pact in March 1928 (and such proposals were made by the Soviet government and in 1926, and in 1927), - Tanaka's answer was one: "For this, it has not yet come time. Events should develop gradually. We will not rush. If you immediately climb too high, you can fall. " G.V. Chicherin - People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR - called Japan the country of the most subtle diplomacy in the world. And for many years this diplomacy was aimed at exercising - consistent stages - broad expansion in the Pacific Pool. To the development of military attack plans for the USSR, the Japanese Military raised since 1928, these plans were significantly different from ordinary operational

plans, the compilation of which was the function of the General Staff. War plans against the USSR "Code name - OCU" never wore a conditional, theoretical nature, they have always differed concreteness and thoroughness of development. The global economic crisis led to a serious exacerbation of the international situation. In Japan, the production was reduced, unemployment grew, the position of the workers worsened. The way out of the crisis, Japanese ruling circles, were looking for expansion paths. On September 18, 1931, Japanese troops attacked China and took the occupation of its northeastern provinces. Materials of the Tokyo process were irreversible: "As the occupation of Manchuria, and the invasion of China proceeded from the final strategic goal of Japan - war against the USSR." The Japanese military began to develop a military attack plan for the USSR since 1928. These plans differed significantly from conventional operational plans, the compilation of which was the function of the General Staff. The plans of the war against the USSR code name - "Father" never wore a conditional, theoretical nature, they always differed concreteness and thoroughness of development. Thanks to these plans, the Japanese intended to seize: Primorye, Amur region, Transbaikalia, Kamchatka, Northern Sakhalin and other territories of the Far East.

"Anti-Soviet Sweetheart" in Japan, as Polioturn Trojansky said, reached his apogee. White Guards, who were settled on the Japanese Islands. Tokyo complained to the Belogvardeysky General Semenov. Aggressive imperialist circles called on the government to discard the oscillations and attack the USSR, without postponing things in a long box. Military Minister Araki argued that sooner or later the war between Japan and the USSR is inevitable that the country must be prepared for this war.

Araki, convinced fascist, was one of the most active participants in the occupation of the Soviet Far East. The activities of the Soviet ambassador, he called "intrigues" and spoke to his approximate, which does not believe in the frankness of the Russians when they wear french and cylinder. Trojanovsky managed to meet with Araki in October 1932. By his visit, Trojanovsky caused confusion in the circles of the Japanese military, forcing it to change the offensive tactics, lavish. The impact of the impact of realistic thinking Japanese politicians who considered the war against the USSR trap for Japan, in which she wanted to draw interested western powers. Sharply condemning the Japanese aggression against China, the Soviet government at the same time sought not to give the opportunity to the militaristic reaction forces in Tokyo to exacerbate the relationship between the USSR and Japan. It took a series of flexible diplomatic steps aimed at preventing a new anti-Soviet intervention. Trying to prevent, stop the further development of Japanese aggression, Soviet diplomacy tried to convince the Government of Chan Kaisha in the need to combine the efforts of both states.

On December 31, 1931, taking advantage of the passage of Japan Iosidezava scheduled for the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, NKID offered to conclude a Soviet-Japanese nonsense. It was stated that the USSR concluded the non-neutral pacts and neutrality with Germany, Turkey, Afghanistan, paraffin the pact with France, which negotiates with Finland, Latvia, Estonia and Romania. "We will be connected by the Covenants with all neighbors. Japan is the only neighbor of the USSR, who did not conclude the nonsense with him and does not negotiate such a Cove. This situation is abnormal. Negotiations on the Covenant Troyanovsky was held for a long time. Representatives of the Japanese government tightened them in every way, talked about the desirability of the conclusion of the "Union" between Japan, the USSR and Germany or the Union between Japan, the USSR and the Puppet State of Manzhou. "

The Japanese government gave an answer to Soviet proposals only a year later. On December 13, 1932, it rejected the proposal to conclude the Covenant under the pretext of the fact that Japan and the USSR are members of the Multilateral British Covenant - Kellog, and this makes it over the conclusion of a special nonsense. As another pretext, a consideration was made that "the moment has not yet matured for the conclusion of the nonsense Covenant." It is very significant that the nonsense pact was rejected by the Japanese government on the other day after publishing a report on the restoration of relations between the USSR and China. Japanese diplomacy considered such a turn of events as its major defeat. In the future, the Soviet government again raised this issue. However, Japan, irrevocably staging on the path of aggression, constantly having in mind the future war against the Soviet Union, rejected peace proposals. The USSR diplomacy was forced to hold a cautious policy. Given the incessant provocations of the Japanese military to the CER and wanting to deprive Japanese imperialists of any occasion to provoke a war, the Soviet government in June 1933 suggested that Japan purchased this road. On June 26, negotiations began on this issue, which, however, were delayed for almost two years. They took place in a very difficult situation, with great breaks, the Manchurian delegation, which the Japanese actually led the Japanese clearly, offered a clearly non-serious price - 50 million yen (20 million gold rubles).

The conference went to the deadlock and stopped its meetings. Refusing to occupy any constructive position in the negotiations, the authorities of Japan and Manzhou strengthened the earnestness at the CER, damage the paths, raids, etc. In the report of the USSR Installation in Tokyo, the Japanese policy was characterized as follows: "1933 was one of the most tense in Soviet-Japanese relations. Special tension has achieved this relationship in the fall, when the Japanese made an attempt to actually capture the CEG into their own hands, and when the propaganda of the war from the USSR, from the Japanese military reached the highest size. "

The Soviet government was forced to go for large concessions, having sold the road for the price much lower than its valid value for the sake of peace in the Far East. On March 23, 1935, an agreement was signed on the acquisition of the road by the authorities of the Manzhou-go for 140 million yen. It was significantly less than those funds that were invested in the Russian government in the construction of the CER.

After the military coup in Japan in February 1936, the relationship between Japan and the USSR continued to remain tense. Describing these relations, the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Sigamitsa in December 1936 noted that neither one border of the USSR there is no such anxiety as on Soviet-Manchurian. Especially it should be noted, emphasized the drugs, raids on Soviet territories, and the resistant refusal of Japan from the conclusion of the nonsense.

If adding agitation and promotion in the Japanese press and books in favor of the expansion of Japan at the expense of the USSR, "then it does not have to be surprised that we were forced to be against the will, with large material costs to focus large military forces in the Far East for the purpose of self-defense." When planning a war against the Soviet state, the Japanese militarists gave themselves aware that Japan one hardly would be able to defeat him. And so they sought to find an ally, which completely coincided with the plans of the Nazis. Despite the serious warnings of the Soviet government on November 25, 1936, Japan signed the so-called "Anti-Comintern Pact" with Germany. In a secret agreement, which became known only in 1946 at the Tokyo process. The Soviet Union was named as the main "goal" of the Covenant. The direct result of the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Covenant was a sharp aggravation of Soviet-Japanese relations. Not a single month did not take place without two or three in our newspapers, and sometimes 8-9 reports of violations of the Japanese side of normal relationships and forced statements and protests from the Soviet government. In November 1937, Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. So the political unity of three aggressors was reached.

In government and military circles of Japan, the preparation of the "big war" against the USSR increased. The main elements in it were the acceleration of the creation of a military and military-industrial bridgehead in Manchuria and Korea, the expansion of aggression in China and the seizure of the most developed areas of the Northern, Central and South China. The program was approved by the Government of General S. Hayashi, who came to power in February 1937 at the first meeting of the government, General Hayashi said that "with the policy of liberalism in relation to the communists will end." This meant that Japan chose the path of decisive actions in accordance with the terms of the Anti-Comintern Covenant. In the Japanese printing began to appear frankly anti-Soviet articles with

calls "to march to the Urals".

The Hayasi Cabinet was soon forced to resign, giving way to the new government led by Prince F. Conoe, whose political platform was opened by Anti-Russian. The Soviet government took energetic measures to preserve the world in the Far Eastern borders. On April 4, 1938, the USSR offered Japan peaceful by resolving all the controversial issues. The proposal did not meet a positive response from Japan.

In May-June 1938, the Militarist Krugs of Japan launched a wide propaganda campaign around the so-called "controversial territories" on the border of Manzhou-go with Primorye.

Thus, in the period under review, the ruling circles of Japan stood on the platform of militant anti-Sishetism and unrestrained aggression, which could not not lead to the exacerbation of relations between our countries.

Relations from the first contacts until the end of World War II

Russia and Japan are neighbors, but the contacts between them began to establish about three centuries ago. In 1702, in the village of Preobrazhenskaya near Moscow, Peter I and Dambea - Japanese from the ship, who was shipwreck from Kamchatka took place. In the Russian archive, its signature has been preserved. In 1733, two more Japanese arrived in St. Petersburg - Sodah and Gondza. They were arranged a meeting with the queen Anna John, and they were transferred to the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, where regular Japanese learning was organized. In decree on April 17, 1732, the Empress emphasized emphasized "about what concerns Japanese islands and commerce with Japan, to come ... with anyone with those Japanese people - Lasch." In 1791, another Japanese - Dike Codaue, from the ship's craft ship was brought to St. Petersburg and passed Catherine II. Good attitude to Coda helped to start immediate filament with Japan. For his return in 1793, the expedition of Adam Laxman was sent to Japan. The grades received by A. Laxman from the Japanese authorities became essentially the starting point for the beginning of the relationship between Russia and Japan as two neighbors. In 1803, Emperor Alexander I sent an expedition to the Messenger N. P. Rezanov and I. Kruzenshtern, who arrived in Japan in 1804. Although N. P. Rezanov's mission did not bring the results expected by the Russian side, she gave impetus to the mutual study and rapprochement of the two countries. As a result of the expedition on the basis of scientific and geographical research, a map of the Japanese coast, which was used by many nautical worlds.

The most important for Russian-Japanese relations was 1855, when the mission of Vice Admiral E. V. Putyatina visited Japan. As a result of the negotiations, the first Russian-Japanese agreement was signed (the Simed Treatise), which became the result of the Mission E. V. Putyatina. The first article of the contract read: "From now on, there will be a permanent world and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan." The treatise was ratified by the Emperor of Russia Alexander II and the Japanese government in 1856

The capitalist development of Japan in the last third of the XIX century was significantly accelerated. The reforms of the 1870-1890 years have died out of international isolation, joined the world economy, contributed to major changes in social and political development. Japan's economic potential increased: the number of monopolies, banks increased, the railway network increased, agricultural productivity increased. The state by subsidies encouraged the development of industry, giving, but the preference of firms worked on the equipment of the army and the fleet. This led to an increase in the military potential of Japan, and at the same time the rapid development of the military industry, however, the narrowness of the Japanese domestic market, the lack of a sufficient resource base made expansion to the Far East of the objective foreign policy line. Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century, foreign policy expansion in Japan has gained paramount importance as a national strategy and the path to the modernization of society.

The first object of expansion on the mainland became Korea. "Conflicts on the Korean Peninsula resulted in the Japanese-China War of 1894-1895, which ended with the defeat of the Chinese army and the signing of the Simonoski peace treaty 1895."

Japan's war against China aggravated the Japanese-Russian contradictions on the Korean Peninsula and in Southern Manchuria. Both states needed new spheres of influence, not wanting to give them to each other. In 1896, Russia signed an agreement with China about the Defense Union and about the construction through the territory of Manchuria of the Sino-Eastern Railway (FC). In 1897, the royal ministers led by the Minister of Finance S. Yu. Witte achieved from the Chinese ruler Lee Hong Zhana consent to the lease of the Liaodo Peninsula and the creation of a naval base in Port Arthur. This allowed Russia to have a non-freezing port for his Pacific fleet on the Chinese coast. In the period Russian-Chinese negotiations, 1901-1902, Russia has made the consolidation of his interests in Manchuria. Such a strengthened policy of Russia in China could not not worry the Japanese political circles and not contribute to the exacerbation of relations between states.

Russia and Japan openly went to meet the war with each other. But unlike the "new" Japan, "Tsarist Russia was poorly prepared for war, which was explained by the technical and economic, state and cultural retardation of the country." The main obstacle to warfare was the unpreparedness of the Russian army. Unable to mitigate the tensions of relations between Japan and Russia neither negotiations in St. Petersburg nor the subsequent exchange of suggestions of foreign ministers in 1902-1903. January 27, 1904 followed the attack of the destroyer to the Russian squadron, which was standing at the external raid in Port Arthur. " So the Russian-Japanese war began, determined the nature of the relationship between these two sides throughout the twentieth century.

At this time, with the established revolutionary situation, the dominant classes of Russia began to rush the royal government with the conclusion of peace with Japan. "In the end of the war, the Japanese government was interested. Too much power voltage led to the extreme exhaustion of all its resources. The country was on the eve of the financial collapse and the first spoke about the need for peace, developing active activities in this direction. Russia, like Japan, "kept preparations for the conference, developing the foundations of the future peace treaty in advance and the wording of its possible conditions."

As a result, according to the peace agreement, Japan received a dominant position in Korea and South Manchuria, which was used in subsequent Japanese imperialism to attack China and the Russian Far East. Portsmouth world has deprived Russia to exit the Pacific Ocean. The loss of southern Sakhalin puts at risk of communicating Vladivostok with Kamchatka and Chukotka. These links could have been violated by the Japanese at any time. The Russian-Japanese war ended with the defeat of tsarism due to the economic, political and military backwardness of Russia. In the victory of Japan, the help was played by her largest capitalist powers as the United States and the United Kingdom.

"After the Russian-Japanese war, the tributary of the Japanese to South Sakhalin and Kuriles increased sharply. It was associated with the development of fishing concessions that Petersburg provided Japan in Kamchatka. By 1913, 4 to 6 thousand people were serviced on the islands. In 1914-1918, the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin survived economic growth. The World War I deprived Europe of the Baltic Fish. In connection with this rapid pace, cod mining, herring, cambals were developed; A new wave gained whale fishing. In 1920-1930, the Kurilla and Sakhalin was created in the zone of the Sea of \u200b\u200bthe Sea, a large fishing processing complex, which turned into a highly organized conveyor. On the islands there were modern fishing factories, which in turn were controlled by the largest concerns "Mitsui" and "Mitsubishi".

In addition to them, there was a forest processing plant on Kunashir, several kitokombinats. By agreement with the USSR, sands and foxes were delivered to the central smoke. A new wave of animal work began, hindrances, reserves, farms appeared. By 1939, there were already 133 settlements of 50-100 houses on the islands. " The rapid economic growth of the islands at the beginning of the twentieth century facilitated the interest on the part of Japan to them. South Sakhalin and Kuriles became increasingly drawn into the system of the Yapan farm, giving her tangible profits. The fact that the economic development of the islands attracted an increasing number of workers, which led to an increase in the population in this region. Despite this, the Japanese government believed that Russia did not completely reimburse the losses incurred by its concessions in the Portsmouth peace treaty. "It planned to cut off Russia from the Pacific Ocean, to seize the rich spaces of Siberia and the Far East, finally assign Sakhalin Island."

After the establishment of Soviet power in Russia in 1917, the country was in political isolation. In the 1920s, the USSR was able to conclude a number of contracts with foreign states, thereby eliminating political isolation. Since the USSR was not only a close neighbor, but also a profitable market for the sales of goods, then, in 1925, the Convention on Fisheries, Japan, fearing to fall behind the leading powers of the world, also discovered the path of economic expansion in the USSR.

The Japanese government was preparing the invasion of Kamchatka. But already in 1922, the Red Army managed to free the territories of the Far East occupied by the Japanese, and in May 1925, Northern Sakhalin returns with the help of peace negotiations.

But, despite the foreign policy settlement of relationships, already in 1927 the Japanese developed a plan for the seizure of the Far East, the partial implementation of which was the occupation of Manchuria in 1931-1933. This was due to the fact that in 1928-1931 in the country there was a replacement for a civil office for military, the process of the country's militarization began.

As a result of internal reforms, the military-economic power of the Soviet Union increased, and the fights of Lake Hassan and the Khalkhin-goer river proved it. Foreign policy situation at the beginning of World War II began to change.

Territorial acquisitions in the West of the USSR in 1940 could not not encourage I. V. Stalin, since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, began to decide on the controversial territories not only Sakhalin, but also the Kuril Islands.

Documents signed during Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences directly showed the fuzziness of a number of wording in relation to the intentions of the Allies on the transfer of the USSR of the required territories, especially the Kuril Ridge. Having enlisted with the support of the allies in solving the issue of relationships with Japan, Stalin together with the pros (exit to the Pacific, the possibility of creating naval databases on the smoke, strengthening of the Far Eastern Lights) received a big minus - constant spoiled relations with one of the strongest states of the world. This led to new difficulties in the relations of the USSR and Japan.

Thus, for its almost 250-year history, Russian-Japanese relations have undergone significant changes. Beginning as friendly at the very beginning of the XVIII century, by August 1945 they acquired a hostile character. Attempts to conquer the Japanese Sakhalin and North Kuril led to cooling relations and made a "territorial question" the main unresolved problem in the relations of the two countries.

Soviet-Japanese relations in 1945-1991

Japan, restoring his strength after surrender, began to make requirements for the territories of the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin engaged in the territory of the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, relying on the Portsmouth Peace Treaty. "In 1948-1950, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Sigar Josid developed a package of documents on the territorial issue, which introduced to Washington," where the answer was followed that the loser Japan could not claim anything.

Seeing the growing discontent of Japan by the post-war distribution of territories, in 1951 the San Francisian peace conference was held, the result of which was the signing of a peace treaty. It was the last major international document directly concerning World War II. On him, Japan refused complaints about Sakhalin Island.

In the fall of 1954, a change in political forces took place in Japan, and in January 1955, the Prime Minister of Japan Hatoyama pointed out that "Japan should offer the USSR to normalize relations with him. In accordance with this, on June 3, 1955, official negotiations between Japan and the USSR began to terminate the state of war in London, to terminate the state of war, to enter into a peace treaty and restore diplomatic and trade relations. Despite the fact that attempts to force the USSR to go to territorial concessions did not have any international legal grounds, the Japanese delegation in London continued to seek to satisfy their claims. Moreover, in the Japanese draft of the contract presented on August 16, 1955, a provision on the transfer of Japan southern Sakhalin and all the Kuril Islands was again launched. N. S. Khrushchev on September 21, 1955, he stated that "Habomai and Shikotan are so closely suitable for the Japanese Islands that Japan's interests should be taken into account." As followed by subsequent events, the Japanese side did not want or could not under pressure from the United States to appreciate the "generous gesture" N. S. Khrushchev, who believed that the concessions already owned by the USSR will encourage the Japanese to conclude a peace treaty under these conditions. But the position of the Japanese side was adamant. As a result, not finding a compromise decision, on March 20, 1956, the negotiations were interrupted indefinitely.

On April 22, 1960, the USSR was stated that the territorial issue between the USSR and Japan was resolved as a result of World War II "relevant international agreements that should be observed." Thus, the position of the Soviet side completely reduced to the denial of the existence of a territorial problem between states.

Conclusion In the 1960s of the Military Union, Japan and the United States forced the USSR to abandon the signing of a peace treaty and, respectively, the transfer of Japan 2 islands of Kuril Rud: the Islands of Habomai and Shikotan Islands, since the Soviet government realized that these islands could become direct military bases not only Japan, But the largest power of the world is the United States. It would weaken the Far Eastern List of the USSR.

Thus, a real chance of restoring peaceful relationships and permission from the territorial issue by Japan was missed. The policy of post-war years in the Far East did not lead to any results and did not leave the prerequisites for further cooperation of the USSR and Japan. There was an obvious need to conclude a peace treaty with a clear arrangement of boundaries.

The new stage in international relations between Russia and Japan as a whole was associated with the name of M. S. Gorbachev. The USSR began to actively pass positions in Europe, which was expressed in the cancellation of the Warsaw Treaty, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany, consent to the reunification of 2 German states. The "beginning" of restructuring in the USSR was marked by major personnel changes in the Union Foreign Ministry. In 1985, E. Shevardnadze was appointed to the place of the representative of a rigid foreign policy line A. A. Gromyko. In January 1986, he visited Japan, where he held consultations with the Japanese Foreign Minister S. Abe. A number of issues were discussed at the meeting, although E. A. Shevardnadze did not recognize the presence of a territorial problem. However, the communiqué was concluded, where the basic principles of the conditions of the peace treaty were held. Thus, consultations, though they did not include a discussion of the territorial problem, but were of great importance for both countries, since they mean the resumption of direct political dialogue between the USSR and Japan.

"For the final resolution of territorial and other problems in the relationship between the USSR and Japan, the official visit of the USSR President M. S. Gorbachev to Japan from April 16 to 19, 1991 was held. 6 rounds of meetings with Prime Minister T. Kayfa were held to develop a single position on controversial issues. A joint Soviet-Japanese statement was concluded from April 18, 1991, where it was said that there were a detailed and in-depth negotiations on the entire complex of issues, including the problem of territorial dressing of the Islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and ITUURUP. In addition, it was stipulated that the entire positive will be used, since 1956, when Japan and the USSR jointly declared the cessation of the state of war and the restoration of diplomatic relations. "

That is, with the change of ideology and a change in the foreign policy frame, the Soviet side officially recognized the existence of a territorial issue in relations between the USSR and Japan. Contained areas were clearly defined: Habomai Islands, Shikotan, ITUURUP and Kunashir. Nevertheless, about the return of Japan of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan after the conclusion of a peace treaty said nothing.

In addition, at a meeting in Tokyo, the Soviet side proposed to expand the cultural relations of the population as two states. On the Soviet initiative, a visa-free entry into southern chickens of Japanese citizens was established.

The Soviet-Japanese statement stopped a tough confrontation in the territorial issue between Japan and the USSR, putting mutual relations to new starting positions. This fact confirmed and held "from October 11 to 17, 1991 to the USSR of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan T. Nakayama, after which a permanent organizational structure was created to discuss the territorial problem."

Despite this, the Japanese side, failed to achieve the requirements of the Northern Territories nodded by it, blocked the provision of economic and financial assistance from Japan in the form of investments in the Soviet economy.

Thus, Russian-Japanese, and then Soviet-Japanese, relations throughout the 20th century changed very much. Two wars have undermined mutual trust, but despite this, the Soviet leadership was ready to meet Japan in the decision of the "territorial issue", but at one time Japan did not appreciate this step and the "territorial issue" again remained unresolved by going to the new, already Russian , management in the XXI century.

Japan, restoring his strength after surrender, began to make requirements for the territories of the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin engaged in the territory of the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, relying on the Portsmouth Peace Treaty. "In 1948-1950, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Sigera Josid developed a package of documents on a territorial issue, which introduced in Washington" in the same place. 110. Where did the answer come from that the loser Japan cannot claim anything.

Seeing the growing discontent of Japan by the post-war distribution of territories, in 1951 the San Francisian peace conference was held, the result of which was the signing of a peace treaty. It was the last major international document directly concerning World War II. On him, Japan refused complaints about Sakhalin Island.

In the fall of 1954, a change in political forces took place in Japan, and in January 1955, the Prime Minister of Japan Hatoyama pointed out that "Japan should offer the USSR to normalize relations with him. In accordance with this, on June 3, 1955, official negotiations between Japan and the USSR began to terminate the state of war in London, to terminate the state of war, to enter into a peace treaty and restore diplomatic and trade relations. Despite the fact that attempts to force the USSR to go to territorial concessions did not have any international legal grounds, the Japanese delegation in London continued to seek to satisfy their claims. Moreover, in the Japanese draft of the contract presented on August 16, 1955, a provision on the transfer of Japan southern Sakhalin and all the Kuril Islands was again launched. N.S. Khrushchev on September 21, 1955 stated that "Habomai and Shikotan are so closely suitable for the Japanese Islands that it is necessary to take into account the interests of Japan." As the subsequent events have shown, the Japanese side did not want or could not under pressure from the United States to appreciate the "generous gesture" N.S. Khrushchev, who believed that the concession provided for them was already belonging to the USSR, the territories will encourage the Japanese to conclude a peace treaty under these conditions. But the position of the Japanese side was adamant. As a result, not finding a compromise decision, on March 20, 1956, the negotiations were interrupted indefinitely. Cuthakov L.N. The history of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations. M., 1962, p.447.

On April 22, 1960, the USSR was stated that the territorial issue between the USSR and Japan was resolved as a result of World War II "relevant international agreements that should be observed." Cashkin A. Problems of peaceful settlement with Japan. Historical aspect. // Questions of history, 1997, №4, p.138-145. Thus, the position of the Soviet side completely reduced to the denial of the existence of a territorial problem between states.

Conclusion In the 1960s of the Military Union, Japan and the United States forced the USSR to abandon the signing of a peace treaty and, respectively, the transfer of Japan 2 islands of Kuril Rud: the Islands of Habomai and Shikotan Islands, since the Soviet government realized that these islands could become direct military bases not only Japan, But the largest power of the world is the United States. It would weaken the Far Eastern List of the USSR.

Thus, a real chance of restoring peaceful relationships and permission from the territorial issue by Japan was missed. The policy of post-war years in the Far East did not lead to any results and did not leave the prerequisites for further cooperation of the USSR and Japan. There was an obvious need to conclude a peace treaty with a clear arrangement of boundaries.

The new stage in international relations between Russia and Japan as a whole was associated with the name M.S. Gorbachev. The USSR began to actively pass positions in Europe, which was expressed in the cancellation of the Warsaw Treaty, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany, consent to the reunification of 2 German states. The "beginning" of restructuring in the USSR was marked by major personnel changes in the Union Foreign Ministry. In 1985, a representative of a rigid foreign policy line A.A. E. Shevardnadze was appointed Gromyko. Already in January 1986, he visited Japan, where he held consultations with the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Abekurily: Islands in the Ocean of problems. M., 1998, p.283 .. A number of questions were discussed at the meeting, although E.A. Shevardnadze did not recognize the presence of a territorial problem. However, the communiqué was concluded, where the basic principles of the conditions of the peace treaty were held. Thus, consultations, though they did not include a discussion of the territorial problem, but were of great importance for both countries, since they mean the resumption of direct political dialogue between the USSR and Japan.

"For the final resolution of territorial and other problems in the relationship between the USSR and Japan, the official visit of the President of the USSR MS was held. Gorbachev to Japan from April 16 to 19, 1991. 6 rounds of meetings with Prime Minister T. Kayfa were held to develop a single position on controversial issues. A joint Soviet-Japanese statement was concluded from April 18, 1991, where it was said that there were a detailed and in-depth negotiations on the entire complex of issues, including the problem of territorial dressing of the Islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and ITUURUP. In addition, it was stipulated that the entire positive will be used, since 1956, when Japan and the USSR jointly declared the termination of the state of war and the restoration of diplomatic relations. "Curious: Islands in the ocean problems. M., 1998, p.287.

That is, with the change of ideology and a change in the foreign policy frame, the Soviet side officially recognized the existence of a territorial issue in relations between the USSR and Japan. Contained areas were clearly defined: Habomai Islands, Shikotan, ITUURUP and Kunashir. Nevertheless, about the return of Japan of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan after the conclusion of a peace treaty said nothing.

In addition, at a meeting in Tokyo, the Soviet side proposed to expand the cultural relations of the population as two states. On the Soviet initiative, a visa-free entry into southern chickens of Japanese citizens was established.

The Soviet-Japanese statement stopped a tough confrontation in the territorial issue between Japan and the USSR, putting mutual relations to new starting positions. This fact confirmed and held "from 11 to 17 October 1991 to the USSR of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan T. Nakayaama, after which a permanent organizational structure was created to discuss the territorial problem" Kuril: Islands in the ocean of problems. M., 1998, p.336 ..

Despite this, the Japanese side, failed to achieve the requirements of the Northern Territories nodded by it, blocked the provision of economic and financial assistance from Japan in the form of investments in the Soviet economy.

Thus, Russian-Japanese, and then Soviet-Japanese, relations throughout the 20th century changed very much. Two wars have undermined mutual trust, but despite this, the Soviet leadership was ready to meet Japan in the decision of the "territorial issue", but at one time Japan did not appreciate this step and the "territorial issue" again remained unresolved by going to the new, already Russian , management in the XXI century.