Austria during World War 2. The solution to the Austrian question after the Second World War - audi0sam – LiveJournal

Indeed, while the Western powers were making concessions to the fascist countries, the latter were gaining power and were preparing to seize the initiative in international politics. In 1938, Germany took more active action in the Austrian issue. In January 1938, Goering informed the Austrian Secretary of State Schmidt that the Anschluss was inevitable. When the latter proposed regulating Austro-German relations on a reasonable basis, Goering said that if the Austrians did not like the word “annexation,” they could call it “partnership.”

Meanwhile, Nazi conspirators were arrested by the police in Vienna. Law enforcement officers seized documents that were called “Tafs papers.” They contained instructions from Hitler’s deputy in the party, R. Hess, to the leaders of the Austrian Nazis Leopold and Tafs: “The general situation in Germany shows that the time has come for action in Austria. England is busy with the conflict in the Middle East, moreover, it is still embroiled in the Abyssinian crisis and the Spanish conflict, which poses a threat to Gibraltar. France is unable to take decisive action due to internal social problems, the difficult economic situation and the uncertainty of the Spanish situation. Czechoslovakia is in a difficult situation due to the sharp increase in the activity of the party, the Slovak and Hungarian minorities, and the weakening of the situation France in Europe. Yugoslavia fears the restoration of the monarchy, which will revive the old conflict between the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, it welcomes any action that will once and for all remove the question of the Habsburg restoration in Austria. Finally, the position of Italy was weakened as a result of the war in Ethiopia and the Spanish conflict to such an extent that it now depends on German friendship and will not actively oppose any actions that do not affect its immediate vital interests. The new Brenner border guarantees are expected to ensure Mussolini's neutrality."

At the end of January, in the hope of regulating Austro-German relations, the Austrian Chancellor K. von Schuschnigg, who replaced Dollfuss, who was killed by the Nazis in 1934, informed Papen of his intention to meet with Hitler. Schuschnigg agreed to the meeting subject to a number of conditions:

• 1. He must be invited by Hitler;
• 2. He must be informed in advance of the issues brought up for discussion and must receive confirmation that the agreement of July 11, 1936 will remain in force;
• 3. Hitler must coordinate with me (A.N. Schuschnigg) a communiqué following the meeting, which will confirm the agreement of July 11.”

Papen approved of Schuschnigg's initiative, but, arriving in Berlin at the height of changes in the Nazi leadership, he did not find support for his initiative from Hitler.

Papen was soon relieved of his post as ambassador in Vienna, but Hitler suddenly changed his mind and instructed him to organize a meeting with Schuschnigg.

Papen conveyed Hitler's words to Schuschnigg: “Hitler invites you to a meeting in Berchtesgaden to discuss all the differences resulting from the agreement of July 11, 1936 between the two nations. This agreement between Austria and Germany will be preserved and confirmed. Hitler agrees to accept your proposals and speak with a joint communique which will include the agreement of July 11, 1936." Schuschnigg informed the Austrian cabinet of his decision to go to Germany. In addition, Mussolini, the British and French ambassadors, and the papal nuncio were informed of his plans.

On February 12, 1938, Papen, Schuschnigg and State Secretary of the Austrian Foreign Ministry Schmidt arrived at Hitler's Villa Berghof, near Berchtesgaden. Already the first conversation between Hitler and Schuschnigg had the character of an ultimatum. For two hours, Hitler spoke to the Austrian Chancellor about his incorrect - un-German - policy and concluded that he had decided to resolve the Austrian question one way or another, even if this required the use of military force. He assured Schuschnigg that Austria could not count on the support of any power. “Don’t believe that anyone in the world can prevent this! Italy? I’m not worried about Mussolini, I have close friendship with Italy. England? She won’t lift a finger for Austria... France? Two years ago we entered the Rhineland zone with a handful of soldiers, then I risked everything. But now the time of France has passed. Until now, I achieved everything I wanted!"

A few hours later, the Austrian delegation led by Schuschnigg was received by the Reich Foreign Minister J. von Ribbentrop. In the presence of Papen, she was given a draft agreement - “the limit of the concessions made by the Fuhrer,” as Ribbentrop said. The project contained the following requirements:

• 1. Appoint the leader of the Austrian Nazis A. Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Public Security with the rights of complete and unlimited control over the police forces of Austria;
• 2. Another National Socialist G. Fischbeck - member of the government on issues of Austro-German economic relations and related areas;
• 3. Release all imprisoned Nazis, stop legal cases against them, including those involved in the murder of Dollfuss;
• 4. Restore them to positions and rights;
• 5. Accept 100 German officers for service in the Austrian army and send the same number of Austrian officers to the German army;
• 6. Grant the Nazis freedom of propaganda, accept them into the Fatherland Front on an equal basis with its other components;
• 7. For all this, the German government is ready to confirm the agreement of July 11, 1936 - “to again declare recognition of the independence of Austria and non-interference in its internal affairs.”

During the negotiations, Schuschnigg only achieved agreement that Fischbeck should be appointed not a member of the government, but a federal commissioner; the number of officers to be exchanged for service in the armies of both states should be at least 100.

Go in two queues, 50 people each. After this, Schuschnigg was again brought to Hitler, and the latter stated that there was nothing more to discuss the document, it must be accepted without changes, otherwise he, Hitler, would decide what to do during the night. When Schuschnigg replied that only President V. Miklas could grant an amnesty and that the three-day period could not be met, Hitler lost his temper and left the room. Half an hour later, Hitler again received the Austrians and told them that for the first time in his life he had changed his mind. Schuschnigg was asked to sign the document and report it to the president. Hitler gave three more days for all demands to be fulfilled, saying: “Otherwise things will take their natural course.” On the same day, February 12, 1938, Schuschnigg signed the agreement without further discussion.

Returning from the meeting, the Austrian chancellor said: “I fought with a madman for ten hours.” Schuschnigg calls the remaining four weeks after the Berchtesgaden meeting Austria's time of agony. The agreement of February 12, 1938, imposed by Hitler on Austria and marking the beginning of the end of its independence, did not meet with protest from Western democracies, although European diplomats were well aware of the nature and results of the “conversation” between Hitler and Schuschnigg. Thus, the French ambassador in Berlin, after a conversation with Ribbentrop, reported to the head of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I. Delbos, that the meeting of the two chancellors in Berchtesgaden was “only a stage on the path to Germany’s absorption of Austria.”

Hitler continued to convince Paris that the solution to the Austrian issue would serve as an impetus for improving Franco-German relations. The French Ambassador to Germany, A. Francois-Poncet, responded by emphasizing France's great interest in this issue. He told Hitler that “the French government will be happy with everything that will strengthen the existing peace, everything that will help ensure the independence and integrity of Austria.” The Austrian government itself informed the friendly powers that the agreement of February 12, 1938 did not change the essence of the agreement of July 11, 1936.

Based on all this, Delbos said that there was no reason for France to protest the Berchtesgaden Agreement.

The Reich Ambassador to France, J. von Welczek, wrote to Berlin that it seemed that Paris did not have a clear plan of action regarding the Austrian events. “In France,” the ambassador wrote, “they do not see a moral basis for active opposition to German plans. Austrian independence was guaranteed by the Stresa Front and the League of Nations - both institutions are now practically dead. Paris is unlikely to decide on any actions that do not have a legal basis basis Many people in France already say "Fini Austriae".

• On February 18, a new telegram arrived in Paris from the embassy in Berlin. François-Poncet reported that Ribbentrop again told him that the Austrian problem concerned only Germany and Austria, and that Berlin would regard “as unacceptable interference any initiative by a third party.”
• On February 18, a message from the United States arrived in Paris, in which the charge d'affaires noted that the US government would not intervene in the German-Austrian conflict on Austria's side. There was growing concern in France about the threat to Austrian independence. Under pressure from these sentiments, on February 18, the French government invited Chamberlain to make a joint demarche in Berlin. It was to emphasize the importance of Austrian sovereignty for peace and the balance of power in Europe and stated that any attempt on the part of Germany to change the status quo in Central Europe by force would be met with decisive resistance from the Western powers. Delbos proposed that the British government, together with the French cabinet, make a special statement in Berlin before February 20.

Meanwhile, on February 20, 1938, Hitler made a speech in the Reichstag in which, expressing satisfaction with the signing of the agreement on February 12 with Austria and thanking Schuschnigg for solidarity in matters of policy of both countries, he again threateningly recalled: “Only two states adjacent to our borders cover "A mass of ten million Germans. A world power, full of its own dignity, cannot long tolerate the fact that the Germans who stand on its side are subjected to severe suffering because of their sympathies or because of their close attachment to their people."

The French "Tan" reacted to Hitler's speech in the following way: “The Fuhrer spoke of the “spirit of mutual understanding.” Schuschnigg said that everything in Berchtesgaden was done “for the sake of peace.” But what kind of world can be based on a ruthlessly imposed dictate?”

The British Times criticized its own government for abandoning its interests in Central and Eastern Europe.

On February 23, in a conversation with German Foreign Minister K. von Neurath, Fracois-Ponce warned the German minister that France could not agree with the annexation of Austria by the Reich, whose independence was guaranteed by international treaties. In response, Neurath stated that he did not see any possibility of French intervention in what he considered Germany's internal affairs. In response to the French ambassador's remark that an 80 million Reich in the center of Europe would threaten the security of France and the entire balance of power in Europe, Neurath noted that the same could be said about the mobilization of blacks from French colonies to create military superiority in Europe. When François-Poncet said that in order to restore the balance of power, France would have to once again get closer to the Soviet Union, Neurath only wished him good luck in this endeavor.

Meanwhile, Schuschnigg decided to give a response to Hitler's speech. On February 24, he made a radio address to the Austrian people. Analyzing the agreements of July 11, 1936, and February 12, 1938, he stated that there could be no more concessions.

The ruling circles of European states understood Schuschnigg's speech as a will to resist, and Hitler's speech as a threat to stop at nothing, even before a war with Austria. The Italian dictator B. Mussolini, who received a copy of the text of the speech of the Austrian Chancellor even before the speech itself, assessed it positively. French politician E. Herriot admitted that Schuschnigg's speech made him cry.

On February 25, at the Foreign Office, French Ambassador Charles Corbin was presented with a memorandum containing the British government's response to the French request. In it, the French government was reproached for the fact that its proposals on the Austrian question were exposed only as verbal formulas, “not supported by indications of specific actions.” The British cabinet, for its part, indicated that after the “agreement” reached on February 12 between Hitler and Schuschnigg, events in Austria could take on the character of a “normal evolution.” The German ambassador in Paris, Welczek, wrote to Neurath that the British Foreign Secretary Eden had advocated taking decisive action regarding the situation in Central Europe, but had met with stiff opposition from Chamberlain, for whom the region and Austria were only part of the Anglo-Italian relationship.

There were serious differences between Eden and Chamberlain on foreign policy issues. As a result, on February 21, 1938, the head of the Foreign Office was forced to leave his post. Eden's departure instilled even more confidence in Hitler. Berlin felt that since Chamberlain was ready to sacrifice his own Foreign Secretary to appease dictators, they should not fear decisive action from Great Britain. After a conversation with the British ambassador in Vienna, Papen reported to Hitler that “Eden’s resignation took place not so much because of his position regarding Italy, but because of his readiness to identify with France on the Austrian issue.”

Eden's resignation removed the last obstacle to British appeasement. The new Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, saw no point in a joint Anglo-French demarche in support of Austrian independence. The British government refused even verbally to give any warning to Hitler and stubbornly sought to “solve” the Austrian problem on the basis of the provisions that Halifax expressed to Hitler on November 19, 1937. The level of stability of the Versailles system was rapidly decreasing.

On March 2, Delbos sent a note to Corbin in response to the British memorandum of February 25, which expressed regret over the refusal of the British government to issue a joint warning to Berlin on the Austrian question. It stated that “the Western powers’ avoidance of joint action inspired the Reich government to take new measures towards the implementation of the German plan for Austria.”

On the same day that Corbin handed the note to Halifax, on March 3, the British Ambassador Henderson tried to find out Hitler's intentions. Hitler stated that “in the settlement of her relations with kindred countries or with countries with a large German population, Germany will not allow third powers to interfere... If England continues to oppose German attempts to bring about a fair and reasonable settlement here, then the moment will come when will have to fight... If they ever shoot at the Germans in Austria or Czechoslovakia, the German Empire will immediately intervene... If there are explosions from within in Austria or Czechoslovakia, Germany will not remain neutral, but will act with lightning speed.”

On March 6, the British press directly raised the question of the advisability of British support for Austria. The author of the article asked whether Austria is a harmonious state. “This raises great doubts. A significant part of the population is actively demanding a closer union with the Reich. Conflict will mean war. This is a family affair of the German race. We have nothing to do there,” noted one of the most influential British periodicals.

At the same time, in order to strengthen his position against Hitler's claims, Schuschnigg decided to hold a popular plebiscite on the issue of the country's independence.

On March 9, 1938, Schuschnigg, in a speech delivered over the radio in Innsbruck, announced a vote on March 13 “for a free and German, independent and social, Christian and united Austria.” Declaring his intention to hold a plebiscite, Schuschnigg did not consult with representatives of Western democracies. At the same time, the chancellor turned to Mussolini for advice. The Duce's answer was: "The plebiscite is a mistake." But this time Schuschnigg did not listen to advice from Italy; he never heard from Mussolini again. And Henderson commented on the announcement of the plebiscite: “I am afraid that Dr. Schuschnigg is risking the independence of Austria in an attempt to save his own position.”

Ribbentrop arrived in England for a farewell visit (in connection with his transfer to another job - Foreign Minister of the Reich). Immediately upon arrival, he began sounding out the British position regarding the Austrian question. From conversations with Halifax and the British Minister of Defense Coordination T. Inskeep, Ribbentrop concluded that England would not come out in defense of Austria. After this conversation, Ribbentrop, answering questions from Berlin, wrote: “What will England do if the Austrian question is not resolved peacefully? I am deeply convinced that England will not do anything on its own initiative at the present time; on the contrary, it will have a calming influence on other powers. It will be completely different if there is a big international conflict over Austria, that is, with the intervention of France. Therefore, it is important to pose the question: how will France and its allies behave? I think that neither France and its allies, nor Italy will enter into war because of the German solution to the Austrian question. But this is provided that the Austrian question is resolved in the shortest possible time. If a violent solution drags on for a long time, serious complications will arise."

The news of the plebiscite caused extreme irritation in Berlin. Hitler rightly believed that as a result of the vote, the Austrian people would vote to preserve the independence of their country, which would make the Anschluss very problematic.

• On March 9, Hitler authorized Seyss-Inquart, who was appointed Austrian Minister of Internal Administration and Security on February 16, to seek the abolition of the plebiscite. After a conversation with the head of the Wehrmacht High Command, W. Keitel, and other generals, the Fuhrer approved the plan for an operation to capture Austria called “Otto”. The international situation favored the Reich's dynamic actions to resolve the "Austrian question."
• On March 10, 1938, the French cabinet of ministers C. Chautan resigned. Until March 13, France was left without a government. Mussolini retired to his country residence Roca del Caminate; in response to attempts to contact him, the Italian Foreign Minister G. Ciano stated that this was impossible. By this time, few people had doubts about England's position on the Austrian issue.
• On March 11, 1938, Nazi demonstrations began in all major cities of Austria. At one o'clock on March 11, Hitler signed an order for the invasion of German troops into Austria on March 12 at 12 o'clock. On the morning of March 11, information began to flow into European capitals about the closure of the Austro-German border and the movement of German troops towards Austria. However, official Berlin and its embassies denied everything.

The Austrian Chancellor did not dare to repel German aggression. At 2 p.m. on March 11, Seyss-Inquart informed Goering of Schuschnigg's decision to cancel the plebiscite. But Goering replied that this was not enough. After a meeting with Hitler, he informed Seyss-Iquart of a new ultimatum: the resignation of Schuschnigg and the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as chancellor, about which Goering was to be informed within two hours.

In the current critical situation, Schuschnigg first of all turned to Mussolini for help. However, no response was received from Mussolini. On March 10, Mussolini I and Ciano informed Berlin that they opposed the holding of a plebiscite and, moreover, intended to completely abstain from participating in Austrian events. When the French government approached with a proposal for a joint demarche of England, France and Italy against Berlin's actions, Ciano responded negatively. “After the sanctions, non-recognition of the empire and other unfriendly actions of 1935, do they really expect the restoration of the Stresa front now that Hannibal is at the gates?” Ciano explained, “thanks to their policy, England and France lost Austria, and at the same time we acquired Abyssinia.” .

According to the American Ambassador in Berlin, H. Wilson, an Italian high-ranking official told the diplomat literally the following: “We have already sent troops to Brenner once, a second time under the existing circumstances will mean war.” By order of the Italian leadership, from March 12, Italian news agencies were to emphasize that the development of the Austrian crisis would not in any way affect Italian-German relations.

When news of the new ultimatum reached France, a meeting was urgently convened there with the participation of Chautan, Delbos and various officials of Quai d'Orsay, who were formally still in office. Paris urgently contacted London and Rome. The French charge d'affaires tried to get in touch with Ciano, but the Italian Foreign Minister rejected the idea of ​​a joint demarche of England, France and Italy in Berlin.

At three o'clock in the afternoon on March 11, Schuschnigg asked for advice from the British government. The answer came to Vienna within an hour and a half. During this time, a meeting took place between Ribbentrop and Halifax. After this conversation, the British embassy in Vienna was instructed to convey to Schuschnigg that “we very sharply drew Ribbentrop’s attention to the impression such direct interference in Austrian affairs as a demand for the resignation of the Chancellor, backed by an ultimatum, would make in England, and, especially after "as it was promised to cancel the plebiscite. Ribbentrop's answer was not encouraging, but he promised to contact Berlin by telephone." Halifax also added that "the British Government cannot assume the responsibility of advising the Chancellor of any action which may bring danger to his country against which the British Government is unable to guarantee protection."

Meanwhile, realizing that London would not support France in decisive action aimed at protecting Austria, Paris decided to once again turn to Rome. The French charge d'affaires was instructed to find out from Ciano whether Italy would agree to consultations on the Austrian question. The British ambassador in Rome, Lord Perth, received the same order from his government. However, Ciano replied to the French representative in Rome through his private secretary that if the purpose of the consultation was the question of Austria, then “the Italian government does not consider it possible to discuss it with France or Great Britain.”

Under these conditions, Schuschnigg was forced to concede. At 19:50, Schuschnigg made a speech on the radio about his resignation and stated: “President Miklas asked me to inform the Austrian people that we are yielding to force, since we are not ready in this terrible situation for the shedding of blood, and we have decided to order the troops not to to offer serious—not to show any—resistance.” Seyss-Inquart telephoned to Berlin that the ultimatum had been accepted. Under the terms of the ultimatum, the invasion of troops was to be canceled. However, Hitler said that it was now too late. At the same time, Goering dictated to Hitler’s special representative in Austria W. Kepler the text of the new chancellor’s telegram: “The provisional Austrian government, seeing its task after the resignation of the Schuschnigg government as restoring calm and order in Austria, appeals to the German government with an urgent request to support it in fulfilling this task and to help prevent bloodshed. To this end, it asks the German government to send German troops as soon as possible."

On the evening of March 11, Halifax invited the British ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, to protest to the German government against interference in the internal affairs of Austria. Protest was also expressed by the French side. Both protests noted that Germany's violation of Austrian independence could have unpredictable consequences in Europe. Henderson obtained Goering's reception, and at the same time he sent a letter to Neurath.

Goering assured the ambassador that the Austrian National Socialists had presented an ultimatum to the Chancellor of Austria, and that the German troops that had entered Austria would withdraw as soon as order was established, and that they had been invited by the Austrian government. Neurath, in a reply note, stated that the British government has no right to pretend to be the defender of Austrian independence, since relations between Austria and Germany are an internal matter of the German people.

At the same time, German propagandists spread rumors about the alleged entry of Czechoslovak troops into Austria, the arrival of French communists in Austria with the aim of organizing a revolution, the seizure of power by the “Reds” and the murder of National Socialists, and Seyss-Inquart’s request in this regard for German troops to enter Austria to maintain order. At ten o'clock in the evening, Seyss-Inquart entered the room where the President of Austria and her chancellor were discussing the latest events, and declared: “Göring just called me and said: “You, Seyss-Inquart, must send me a telegram asking for German military assistance.” in view of the fact that the communists and others have caused severe disturbances in Austrian cities, and the Austrian government is no longer able to independently control the situation." (Of course, this was all a lie; in fact, the Nazis, intoxicated with victory, spent the night robbing Jewish stores and beating passers-by). Soon Kepler, on the orders of Seyss-Inquart, sent a telegram with one single word: “I agree.”

There was no resistance to the Wehrmacht invasion. True, not everything went according to plan, which W. Churchill later sneered at: “The German war machine thundered heavily across the border and got stuck at Linz.”

About half of the tanks broke down on the road to Vienna. It can be assumed that if Austria had decided to resist, its army of fifty thousand would have been able to hold off the Wehrmacht in the mountains. But that did not happen.

On March 12 at 8 o'clock Hitler flew from Berlin to Munich, at 15:50 he was already in Braunau on Austrian territory, and at 20 o'clock Seyss-Inquart greeted Hitler in his hometown of Linz. In his response speech, Hitler said that Austria would be annexed to Germany and this would be approved by a plebiscite. Hitler also gave a new name to his homeland as part of the Third Reich - Ostmark.

On the same day, Seyss-Inquart forced the President of the Austrian Republic, Miklas, to resign, after which he signed and published the Anschluss law, which stated that Austria was now one of the states of the German Empire and that on Sunday, April 10, 1938, "free and secret vote on reunification with the German Empire." historical politics international

On March 13, 1938, Austria was annexed by Germany. For Hitler, the Anschluss not only created a springboard for an attack on Czechoslovakia, but also became a personal revenge on the Motherland for non-recognition in his youth.

Bluff in Berchtesgaden

Austria, defeated after the First World War, was annexed by Germany as a result of a referendum. However, Hitler's original plan included an armed rebellion and the overthrow of the government of Chancellor Guido Schmidt Schuschnigg. However, the latter was informed about the “neighbor’s” plans. Outraged, he went to Berchtesgaden, the dictator’s country residence, where the heads of state, in their native German, were supposed to come to a definite decision. Hitler greeted the guest outwardly affably, introducing his three generals who “accidentally found themselves” there. But during a personal conversation, Hitler quickly dropped his mask. Subsequently, Schuschnigg recalled that he argued with a madman for several hours. Adolf shouted at him, insisted that the very existence of Austria was the result of its betrayal, “which he intended to end,” and threatened to send troops: “You will wake up one morning in Vienna and see that we have arrived like a spring thunderstorm. I would like to spare Austria from such a fate, since such an action would mean bloodshed.” He did not propose, he demanded that Austria sign an agreement with Germany on terms favorable to him: amnesty for the National Socialists, the appointment of moderate Nazis as ministers, of which Hitler’s protege Seyss-Inquart was to become the Minister of the Interior with the right of unlimited control over the country’s police forces.
When the first attack did not go through, Hitler resorted to another method, gently hinting that Schuschnigg’s stay in Berchtesgaden could end for the latter, at best, with imprisonment, at worst with execution, after which German troops would enter Austrian territory. The bluff was a success; the treaty was signed and ratified in three days.

Allied Betrayal

In his aspirations to preserve the sovereignty of Austria, Schuschning counted on the support of the Entente countries. After all, the Treaty of Versailles prohibited the Anschluss. In 1931, Germany and Austria were even denied a customs union. However, by 1938, defeated Austria was no longer a political force; it was a non-viable country that had lost its industrial strength and agricultural land. When Schuschnigg responded to Hitler's threats that Austria was not alone in the world and that an invasion of the country would probably mean war, Hitler grinned contemptuously: “Don't believe that anyone in the world can prevent this! Italy? I'm not worried about Mussolini; I have a close friendship with Italy. England? She won't lift a finger for Austria... France? Now her time has passed. So far I have achieved everything I wanted!” Austria's potential allies themselves saw in the Anschluss only a guarantee of peace and the pacification of fascist states through concessions. At an emergency London meeting, Chamberlain announced the verdict on Austria: Anschluss is inevitable, not a single power will say: “If you go to war because of Austria, you will have to deal with us. In any case, this is not the question now,” he said, noting that the fait accompli does not matter much.

Uncompromising newsletter

Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg pinned his last hope for abandoning the Anschluss on a voluntary referendum of the Austrian people, hoping for the nationalistic and patriotic sentiments of the masses. It seemed that the people supported the chancellor and were ready to fight for a free, independent Austria. His supporters walked the streets shouting: “Heil Schuschnigg!”, “Heil freedom!”, “We say yes!” Even Hitler’s protege, Minister of the Interior Seyss-Inquart, took his side. On the eve of the referendum, the chancellor was confident that victory was in his pocket. However, Hitler’s propaganda and beautiful phrases: “One people, one Reich, one Fuhrer!” have already taken root in the minds of the Austrians. And the election process itself was influenced by the fascists, who had already, in fact, established control over the country. As a result, on some ballots there was only a “for” column, while on others, “JA” (yes) was several times larger in size than the modest line “nein”.

Mussolini's oath

One of Hitler's main opponents in the Anschluss issue was, oddly enough, Benito Mussolini, who supported the previous Austrian government led by Chancellor Engelbert Dolfius. He had already saved Austria once from a German invasion in 1934, after the latter was assassinated. Then a war almost broke out between the two fascist dictators. But times changed, Mussolini lost interest in Austria, and the alliance with Hitler was now much more important to him. Therefore, to Hitler’s cautious letter, which spoke about anarchy in Austria and the need for German intervention to preserve the country, the Duce reacted indifferently. Prince Philipp von Hesse conveyed his answer to Hitler: “I have just returned from Mussolini,” he told Hitler. “The Duce took the news very calmly. He sends his regards to you. The Austrian question no longer interests him.”
Hitler was truly inspired by this news: “Tell Mussolini that I will never forget this! Never! Sign any agreements he proposes. Tell him: I thank him with all my heart, I will never forget him! When he is in need or in danger, he can be sure: I will be with him, no matter what, even if the whole world is against him!” Hitler kept his oath, he stayed with Mussolini when everyone turned their backs on him. In 1943, he organized the special operation "Oak", which freed the captive dictator in the Gran Sorro mountains in southern Italy, where he was kept in the utmost secrecy. Hitler's associate Otto Skorzeno entered the hotel and addressed Mussolini. “Duce, the Fuhrer sent me to save you.” Mussolini replied: “I always knew that my friend Adolf Hitler would not leave me in trouble.”

Maneuvering

Hitler knew how to conduct diplomatic negotiations, he managed to maneuver perfectly between “two fires.” For example, he successfully intimidated the British government with his other "secret" ally - the Soviet Union. At a meeting with the British Ambassador Neville Gendersen on March 3, 1937, when the topic of maintaining peace in Europe, the Austrian problem and weapons issues came up, Hitler, without giving the Ambassador the initiative, went on the offensive. He argued that the Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak pacts were a threat to Germany, which was simply forced to arm itself. Any restriction in the army, he said, depended on the Russians: “trusting the good will of such a monster as the Soviet Union is the same as trusting the understanding of mathematical formulas to savages. Any agreement with the USSR is completely useless, and Russia should never be allowed into Europe.” With this change of thesis, Hitler managed to reduce conversations with the ambassador to zero and avoid the concessions that England had hoped for.

Sentimental Journey

Hitler's triumphant return to his homeland, which was nothing more than the entry of troops and a demonstration of military power, resembled more of a “sentimental journey” than a military occupation. By this point, most of the population supported the idea of ​​the Anschluss. The 2nd Panzer Division moved using a tourist guide and refueling at local gas stations. The Austrians warmly welcomed the soldiers: “They shook our hands, they kissed us, there were tears of joy in the eyes of many,” General Heinz Guderian later recalled. Austria rejoiced; it saw new hope in the German troops, not knowing that if the Anschluss had not been conquered, the same tanks would have driven through its ruins.

Vendetta

Eyewitnesses of Hitler's triumphant entry into Austria noted the madness in which the fascist leader was during his entry into Vienna. He would either launch into sensual speeches or begin to feel angry. His closest associate Papen recalled that the leader was in “true ecstasy”: “I believe that by the will of God, as a young man, I left this country and went to the Reich, who raised me, made me the leader of the nation and allowed me to return my homeland to the fold of the Reich. I praise the Almighty for allowing me to return to my homeland so that I could bring it into the Reich. Let every German remember this tomorrow and humbly bow his head before Almighty God, who created a miracle for us in three weeks!” Hitler said to the residents of Vienna. However, after leaving, he discussed the Austrians with undisguised anger: “Here the Fuhrer began to talk about the Viennese with boundless, I would say, incredible anger... At four o’clock in the morning he uttered a phrase that I want to quote now for historical reasons. He said: “Vienna should never be allowed into the union of great Germany,” Nazi governor Balder von Schirach said during the investigation.
Soon, Schuschnigg's worst fears came true: Austria left the historical arena. They even took away the historical name Osterreich, which meant “Eastern Reich”, now it was only “Eastern Mark (Ostmark)”, which soon began to be called simply “Earth”. The Austrian, unrecognized in his homeland, who was once not accepted into the Art Academy, became a dictator, erased his homeland from the political map, depriving its once brilliant capital of the remnants of glory and splendor. Austria became just a springboard for a further attack on Czechoslovakia.

Anschluss(German, Anschluss- annexation, union) - the idea of ​​​​unifying Austria with Germany and specifically - the annexation of Austria by Germany on March 12-13, 1938. Austria's independence was restored in April 1945, following its occupation by the Allied forces during World War II, and was legitimized by the 1955 State Treaty prohibiting the Anschluss. In a figurative sense, the concept of “Anschluss”, due to its connection with the history of Nazism, is used in a negative sense as a synonym for the concept of annexation.
After the collapse of Austria-Hungary as a result of the First World War, two German states appeared on the political map: Germany and Austria. The latter was considered an unviable and artificial formation due to its small size and the loss of basic industrial capacities and agricultural land. The movement for their reunification was very strong on both sides, especially immediately after the war; however, it was artificially restrained by the victorious countries, which included articles prohibiting the Anschluss in the texts of the Treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain (1919) and the Geneva Protocols (October 1922).

In March 1931, the German and Austrian governments proposed a customs union. However, the victorious countries opposed this.
With Hitler coming to power in Germany, the Anschluss became the official foreign policy of the Nazi government, which persistently introduced its agents into all state structures of Austria. On the contrary, in Austria the idea of ​​an Anschluss with the Nazi dictatorship is beginning to cause active rejection. In October 1933, the Anschluss clause was removed from the program of the Austrian Social Democrats. Even earlier, on June 19, Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss prohibited the activities of the NSDAP in Austria. After government troops and the Heimwehr defeated the February uprising of 1934, Dollfuss consolidated the regime of the alliance of right-wing forces and the church and carried out the so-called “May Constitution” of 1934, which borrowed the main provisions from the Mussolini regime. Unlike other far-right regimes of those years, Austrofascism relied on the strong support of the clergy, and denied the very possibility of foreign (German) influence on Austrian politics.
On July 25, 1934, around noon, 154 Austrian SS men from the 89th Austrian SS Battalion, dressed in the uniform of the Austrian Civil Guard, burst into the chancellery and captured Chancellor Dollfuss, demanding that he resign. Dolphus, who was seriously injured, categorically refused. They put pen and paper in front of him, deprived him of any medical care, and again began to demand his resignation. Having received neither a doctor nor a priest, Dolphus died a few hours later, but never violated his oath. Meanwhile, troops loyal to the government surrounded the parliament building. By evening it became known that Mussolini, who had openly supported Dollfuss, had mobilized five divisions in response to the coup attempt, which immediately moved through the Brenner Pass to the Austrian border. At 19:00 the rebels were forced to surrender.
Realizing that crude methods of influence did not give the desired result, Hitler changed tactics, involving the SD and the Gestapo in the work, and with redoubled energy began to exert diplomatic pressure on the new Austrian government led by Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg. At the same time, German intelligence services intensified their activities among the Austrian Nazis. For example, one of the leaders of the Austrian Nazi Party, engineer Reinthaler, had been secretly receiving a salary of 200 thousand marks a month from Munich since the fall of 1934. Trying to delay the outcome, Schuschnigg concluded an agreement with Germany on July 11, 1936, according to which Austria actually pledged to follow the policies of Nazi Germany. For its part, Germany recognized the sovereignty and independence of Austria and promised not to exert any pressure on its foreign policy. To confirm the provisions of the treaty, Schuschnigg appointed Austrian Nazis to various administrative posts, agreed to admit some of their organizations into the Patriotic Front, and finally declared an amnesty for several thousand Nazis.
An even more favorable situation for Hitler arose in 1937, when the Western powers began to view the seizure of Austria not as an act of aggression and a revision of the Versailles Treaty of 1919, but as a step towards “pacifying” Germany.
In November 1937, the British Minister Halifax, during negotiations with Hitler, agreed on behalf of his government to the “acquisition” of Austria by Germany. A little later, on February 22, 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain said in Parliament that Austria could not count on the protection of the League of Nations: “We should not deceive, and especially should not reassure small weak states, promising them protection from the League of Nations and appropriate steps on our part, since we know that nothing of the kind can be done.” Such connivance made it easier for Hitler to carry out the Anschluss.
On February 12, 1938, Chancellor Schuschnigg was summoned to Hitler’s Berchtesgaden residence, where, under the threat of an immediate military invasion, he was forced to sign a three-point ultimatum presented to him, which actually put the country under German control and turned it practically into a province of the Third Reich:
the leader of the Austrian Nazis, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, was appointed Minister of the Interior and Chief of the Detective Police, which provided the Nazis with complete control over the Austrian police;
a new political amnesty was announced for Nazis convicted of various crimes;
The Austrian Nazi Party joined the Patriotic Front.
March 13, 1938, residents of Austria meet German troops
It became clear that the final disappearance of Austria from the political map of the world was only a matter of time. In a desperate attempt to avoid the inevitable, on March 9, Schuschnigg announced a plebiscite on the question of Austrian independence for the following Sunday, March 13, 1938. Hitler demanded the cancellation of the plebiscite, Schuschnigg's resignation in favor of Seyss-Inquart, and ordered preparations for the invasion.
On March 11, Schuschnigg was forced to resign. Austrian President Miklas refused to entrust the formation of a new government to Seyss-Inquart, but at 23:15 he capitulated. On the night of March 11-12, 1938, German troops, previously concentrated on the border in accordance with the Otto plan, entered Austrian territory.
The Austrian army, having received orders not to resist, capitulated. At 4 o'clock in the morning, Himmler arrived in Vienna as the first representative of the Nazi government, guarded by a company of SS men, accompanied by Walter Schellenberg and Rudolf Hess. The Gestapo set up its main headquarters at Morzinplatz, where Schuschnigg was detained. He was treated very roughly for several weeks and then sent to a concentration camp, where he remained until May 1945.
The government formed by Seyss-Inquart included Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner as Minister of Security and Goering's son-in-law Huber as Minister of Justice.
On March 13 at 19:00, Hitler solemnly entered Vienna, accompanied by the chief of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW), Wilhelm Keitel. On the same day, the law “On the reunification of Austria with the German Empire” was published, according to which Austria was declared “one of the lands of the German Empire” and henceforth began to be called “Ostmark”. Speaking on March 15 at Vienna's Hofburg Palace to people gathered at Heldenplatz, Hitler said: “I announce to the German people the most important mission of my life.”
On April 10, a plebiscite on the Anschluss took place in Germany and Austria. According to official data, in Germany 99.08% of residents voted for Anschluss, in Austria - 99.75%. An observer (William Shirer) characterizes the mood of the Austrians during the plebiscite:
... It was clear that the majority of Austrians who would have said “yes” to Schuschnigg on March 13 would say “yes” to Hitler on April 10. Many of them believed that a strong alliance with Germany, even Nazi Germany, was desirable and inevitable for Austria, that Austria ... could not exist on its own for long, that it could only survive as part of the German Reich. In addition to adherents of this point of view, there were also ardent Nazis - unemployed or employed, whose number in the country was constantly growing. They were attracted by the opportunity to improve their situation. Many Catholics ... were attracted by Cardinal Innitzer's widely published statement welcoming the Nazis to Austria and calling for a vote for the Anschluss.
By annexing Austria, Hitler received a strategic springboard for the capture of Czechoslovakia and a further offensive in South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans, sources of raw materials, human resources and military production. As a result of the Anschluss, the territory of Germany increased by 17%, the population by 10% (by 6.7 million people). The Wehrmacht included 6 divisions formed in Austria.
A number of Hitler's events turned out to be painful for Austrian patriotism. Thus, Hitler officially abolished the name “Austria” (Österreich - literally “Eastern Reich”), due to the fact that there was now only one Reich, and replaced it with the ancient name, known since the time of Charlemagne, Ostmark (“Eastern Border”). Vienna has become one of the ordinary cities in Germany. The Catholic Church, very influential in Austria, was also persecuted. Nevertheless, the Austrians were generally loyal to Hitler until the fall of the Third Reich.
Germany issued a whole series of medals dedicated to these events. Medal "In Memory of March 13, 1938" established on May 1, 1938. It was awarded to soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht and SS troops, Austrian military personnel and functionaries of Nazi organizations who took part in the annexation of Austria to Germany. The total number of recipients was 318,689 people.
The front side of the medal depicts two human figures, one of which, symbolizing Germany, helps the other (Austria) to rise onto a kind of pedestal, which represents the outstretched wings of an eagle clutching a swastika in its talons. On the reverse side there is the inscription “13 März 1938” in the center and in a circle - “Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer” (one people, one state (Reich), one leader (Fuhrer)). The medal was made of copper (sometimes with silver plating). It was supposed to be worn on a red ribbon with white, black and white stripes along the edges. Awards ceased on December 13, 1940.

From the second half of 1937, the development of events in the capitalist world, which increasingly drew humanity into war, accelerated significantly. The fascist states - Germany and Italy - took the path of accelerated preparations for a war for world domination. On November 5, a secret meeting of Nazi leaders took place in Berlin, at which Hitler proclaimed the main thesis of his policy of expanding “living space”: “There can only be one way to resolve the German question - the path of violence.”

The main goal of the Nazis' aggressive program was the destruction of the Soviet Union. But most of the German monopolists believed that Germany was not yet prepared for a war with such a strong enemy as the Soviet Union. Therefore, the conquest of the USSR was envisaged only at the final phase of the struggle for dominance in Europe, when, according to their calculations, it would be possible to use the military-economic resources of all of Western Europe. “...The war against the Soviet Union,” noted the German diplomat Kleist, “remains the last and decisive task of German policy” (231).

At the first stage of the war, Hitler said, “German policy must keep in mind two sworn enemies - England and France, for which the powerful German colossus in the very center of Europe was a thorn in the side...” (232). But first of all, the fascist leaders planned to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia, which would significantly strengthen the military-industrial potential of the Reich and improve its strategic position both against England and France, and against the USSR.

The plan to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia was based on the calculation of using the favorable situation that had developed as a result of the policy of the Western powers, which rejected the proposals of the Soviet Union to create a collective security system in Europe. The political myopia of the bourgeois leaders of the West, generated by class hatred of the Soviet Union and the fear of losing their privileges, gave the German fascists the confidence to destroy their opponents one by one with impunity. Continuing their policy of condoning aggression, the ruling circles of England, France and the USA at the end of 1937 - beginning of 1938 made more and more open attempts at direct collusion with the fascist states.

British diplomacy was most active. The rise of the revolutionary movement in Western Europe, the victory of the popular front in France and Spain, the international solidarity of the working people, clearly manifested during the German-Italian intervention against the Spanish Republic - all this caused deep concern in the ruling circles of Great Britain. The owners of the City saw “natural” allies in the fascists of Germany and Italy and were in a hurry to achieve complete mutual understanding with them in the fight against the “Red Peril”. Back in 1936, in Cliveden, the headquarters of the British “appeasers,” the idea of ​​a secret meeting between Prime Minister Baldwin and Hitler was hatched (233). Having taken charge of the cabinet, Chamberlain returned to this issue. It was decided to send one of the pillars of the Cliveden clique, Halifax, who was part of the cabinet as Lord Chairman of the Council, for a confidential conversation with the Nazi dictator.

On November 19, 1937, a meeting between Halifax and Hitler took place in Obersalzberg. The British representative, calling Germany “the bastion of the West against Bolshevism,” announced his government’s desire to achieve “better understanding” with Germany in order, in the future, with the participation of France and Italy, to create the basis for “lasting peace in Europe” (234). Hitler easily recognized in Halifax’s proposals the familiar features of the anti-Soviet “Pact of Four,” the creation of which remained a fixed idea in British diplomacy throughout the entire pre-war period. The head of the Reich put forward his own conditions: to remove from Germany the “moral and material stigma of the Treaty of Versailles” and to reconsider in its favor the fate of the colonies that Germany lost as a result of the First World War.

Having expressed the readiness of the English government to return to the colonial problem in the future, Halifax hastened to move on to discussing issues of changes in the European system of states. “These issues,” he said, “include Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia. England is only interested in ensuring that these changes are brought about through peaceful evolution...” (235) Thus, if until recently fascist diplomacy could only guess that the British government had “quietly” discounted the countries of Central Europe, now she received confirmation from his official representative.

There was a rapid change of course in French politics: from an alliance with the USSR and collective security to a secret conspiracy with the Nazis and granting them “freedom of action” in the East. In the fall of 1937 in Paris, French Prime Minister Chautan discussed European problems with Hitler's emissary Papen. Expressing full understanding of Germany’s intentions to increase its influence in Central and Eastern Europe, the prime minister said: “Tell the Fuhrer that if we were able to transfer European relations with him to a new, healthier basis, it would be a major milestone in world history” (236 ) .

American diplomacy moved in the same direction. US representatives established increasingly close contacts with the Nazis. In November 1937, the United States Ambassador to France, Bullitt, met with Goering and Reichsbank President Schacht. Göring informed Bullitt that Germany would soon annex Austria and the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia (237). The American representative made no comments. In the same month, Hitler’s personal adjutant Captain Wiedemann visited New York to negotiate with American leaders to give Germany “free hands” in the East 2 (238). At the same time, a secret meeting of German diplomats Tippelskirch and Killinger with representatives of the largest American monopolies. The subject of discussion was issues of cooperation “in developing the richest markets of Russia and China” (239).

The results of the policy of encouraging aggression were not long in coming. If in September 1937 Hitler believed that Germany would not provoke an “explosion” on Austrian soil in the near future, and, planning an attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria, conditioned this on favorable opportunities - the involvement of France in a conflict with Italy in connection with the events in the Iberian Peninsula peninsula, now he has sharply changed tactics.

Germany began accelerated preparations for the invasion of Austria. Plans for its annexation in Berlin have been hatched for a long time. In the program for creating a “greater Germany” set out in Mein Kampf, Anschluss was considered a priority task (240).

Fascist intelligence played an active role in the preparation and implementation of the Anschluss. Guided by Hitler’s instructions that “Austria must be returned to the great German homeland” (241), the Reich’s intelligence services launched violent activities against this country since 1933. According to the Otto plan, they were responsible for undermining it from the inside with the subsequent seizure of power by the Nazis.

The main directions of subversive activities of fascist intelligence in Austria were: conducting Nazi agitation and propaganda on a large scale aimed at undermining the state; the creation of extensive fascist organizations, groups and armed formations and the leadership of their anti-government activities; creation of a wide network of agents in the most important parts of the state apparatus; active support for the fascists in their quest to seize power. For this purpose, the German intelligence agencies sent their career intelligence officers and agents to Austria under the guise of businessmen, members of the “German-Alpine Union,” athletes, etc. Employees of the German embassy in Vienna were also involved in active subversive activities.

Hitler's intelligence relied on the illegal fascist organizations that existed in Austria; Having established contact with the leaders of these organizations, she directed and coordinated their subversive activities.

German intelligence services provided the Austrian Nazis with great and varied assistance. Significant sums of money were systematically transferred to their disposal; In December 1935 alone, the “Austro-German Relief Committee” received 110 thousand marks from Germany. In 1936, on the orders of Hitler's minister Schacht, 200 thousand marks were transferred monthly to the Austrian fascists. For purposes of secrecy, the money was addressed to certain industrial enterprises in Austria, from where they were transferred to the Nazis.

Nazi intelligence supplied weapons, ammunition and other equipment to Austria through illegal channels; A large amount of fascist literature was systematically thrown into the country.

Along with using the fascist organizations that existed in Austria, Hitler’s intelligence took measures to create new ones. It was with its help that a number of assault and security detachments arose, which operated under the direct leadership of one of the leaders of Nazi intelligence - Kaltenbrunner.

To prepare for the Anschluss, the secret services of Nazi Germany, relying on their agents, together with the Austrian Nazis, took control of the main links of the state apparatus. As a result of pressure on the chancellor and president through recruited government officials, the Nazis managed to appoint their agents to important government positions.

During 1936 - 1937 German intelligence officers and Austrian fascists managed to penetrate the Chancellor's Department, the Main Directorate of Public Security, the Ministries of Finance, Justice, Trade, Defense, Railways, the Vienna Political Directorate, the Presidential Secretariat and other important government institutions. As a result, by 1938, Hitler’s intelligence agents, together with the Austrian fascists, actually held key positions in the Austrian state in their hands.

The German intelligence agencies used this situation not only to obtain espionage information, but also to exert serious pressure on the Chancellor, President and other members of the Austrian government in order to force them to pursue a political course beneficial to the Hitler clique, ultimately aimed at the absorption of the Austrian state by Germany.

The active subversive activities of the German fascists were greatly facilitated by the position of the Austrian government, as well as the financial and industrial circles behind it. Pursuing a policy of fascisation of the country, the government banned the Communist Party, dissolved the armed organization of social democrats "Schutzbund", and brutally dealt with the participants in the armed uprising of workers provoked by the fascists in Vienna, Linz, Graz and other cities. An anti-democratic constitution was introduced in the country. In foreign policy, the Austrian ruling circles cooperated with the fascist states.

An important step towards the implementation of the expansionist plans of the Nazis was the Austro-German agreement concluded in July 1936. Although Germany formally recognized the sovereignty of this country, it imposed on the Austrian government a policy towards the Reich, which stemmed from the fact that Austria is a “German state " (242) . In practice, Austria found itself in the wake of German foreign policy.

At the beginning of January 1938, the Austrian fascists received instructions from Berlin to prepare for a putsch. On February 4, a reorganization of the central apparatus of the Reich and the command of the Wehrmacht was announced. Hitler concentrated in his hands the functions of head of state and supreme commander in chief. Following this, Germany began to implement its aggressive plan against Austria.

On February 7, Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg received an invitation to arrive at Hitler's residence in Berchtesgaden (Bavarian Alps). To intimidate the Austrian Chancellor, Keitel, in his presence, reported to the Fuhrer about the readiness of the German army to invade Austria. Hitler forced Schuschnigg to sign a protocol that actually provided for the establishment of German control over Austria's foreign policy, the legalization of the activities of the Austrian National Socialists, and the appointment of a number of Austrian Nazis to key government positions. Hitler's agent Seyss-Inquart was given the post of Minister of the Interior and Minister of Security.

The implementation of the protocol would mean the elimination of Austrian independence. The Austrian people, and above all the working class, led by the Communist Party, decisively rejected the plan to join the country with Nazi Germany and demanded the suppression of the activities of Hitler's agents. Under pressure from the masses, on March 9, Schuschnigg announced that a plebiscite would be scheduled in three days, which would decide the future of Austria. This threatened the failure of the seizure of Austria prepared by the German fascists through “peaceful evolution.” On the morning of March 10, Hitler demanded the immediate implementation of the Otto plan - the invasion of Austria. In response to the concerns of military experts, the Fuhrer stated that neither England nor France would support Austria (243). Directive No. 1, approved on March 11, provided for the operation to be carried out, preferably “in the form of a peaceful entry” (244). Meanwhile, Seyss-Inquart demanded a postponement of the plebiscite.

The Austrian government tried to find support from England, but received a categorical refusal (245). France these days was experiencing a government crisis: not wanting to take responsibility for the country's position towards Austria, Chautan resigned on March 10.

On March 11, the Austrian government capitulated. At dawn the next day, the German army began to occupy the country. On March 14, Hitler signed a decree declaring Austria a province of the Reich. Repression fell on Austrian anti-fascists, tens of thousands of patriots were thrown into prisons and concentration camps. On April 10, a referendum was held in Austria. The voter had to answer the question: “Do you agree with the reunification of Austria with the German Empire?” In an atmosphere of unbridled demagogic propaganda and terror, as well as direct falsification of voting results, out of 4 million 484 thousand ballots, 4 million 453 thousand were recognized as containing the answer “yes” (246).

Without waiting for the end of the referendum comedy, the Western powers recognized the capture of Austria as a fait accompli and converted their diplomatic missions in Vienna into consulates general. The governments of England, France and the USA pretended not to notice the disappearance of an independent state from the political map of Europe.

The position of the USSR was fundamentally different. The Soviet government never recognized the annexation of Austria in any form. It strongly condemned Hitler's aggression, warning of the disastrous consequences that could result from connivance with the aggressive policy of the German fascists. “The current international situation,” said the statement of the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, “raises all peace-loving states and especially the great powers the question of their responsibility for the future destinies of the peoples of Europe, and not only Europe” (247). The government of the Soviet Union insisted on immediate discussion with other governments in the League of Nations or outside of it on practical measures dictated by circumstances. Humanity paid a heavy price for the fact that these proposals of the Soviet Union were not supported by the Western powers.

The capture of Austria played an important role in the implementation of the political and military-strategic plans of Nazi Germany. The Nazis grew more confident in the impunity of their aggressive actions. As a result of the Anschluss, the territory of Germany increased by 17 percent, and the population by 10 percent, that is, by 6 million 713 thousand people. Almost all 50 thousand soldiers and officers of the Austrian army were included in the Wehrmacht (248). Austrian industry and economy were subordinated to the military needs of Nazi Germany. Old strategic highways and railways were reconstructed and new ones were laid in the direction of the borders of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, and airfields were built. As General Jodl, the head of the operations department of the Wehrmacht Supreme Command, later admitted, the Anschluss strengthened the strategic position of the Reich. Czechoslovakia found itself in a pincer movement. The new border with it facilitated the implementation of fascist aggression.

On March 12-13, 1938, one of the key events preceding the Second World War took place - the Anschluss of Austria to Germany. What does it mean? The Anschluss of Austria has the following definition - “union”, “annexation”. Today, this term is characterized by a negative connotation and is often used as a synonym for the concept of “annexation”. Anschluss is the name given to the operation to incorporate Austria into Germany.

History and background. After the war

The annexation of Austria to Germany took place in several stages, and there were certain prerequisites for this.

After defeat in the First World War, the Central Powers found themselves in a very difficult situation. Germany lost all its colonies, was obliged to pay reparations and reduced its armed forces to a minimum. And Austria-Hungary completely disappeared from the political map: the numerous peoples that united this country gained independence. Thus, Hungary and Czechoslovakia arose. A number of territories passed to Yugoslavia, Poland, and Romania. Austria itself was sharply reduced in territory and now united lands with a predominantly German population. It is noteworthy that until October 1919 this state was called “German Austria” (Republik Deutschsterreich), and the plans were, in principle, for a full unification with Germany.

However, this was not destined to come true: the Entente countries in no way wanted to strengthen or enlarge the losing Germany, so they forbade Austria to unite with Germany, which was fixed by the Saint-Germain and Versailles treaties. These treaties obliged Austria to maintain its independence, and for any actions concerning sovereignty to resort to the decision of the League of Nations (an organization similar to today's UN). The name of the republic changed to "Austria". Thus began the history of Austria, which continued until the Anschluss of 1938.

First Austrian Republic

Before, Austria was a full-fledged parliamentary republic. Since the 1920s, a difficult confrontation between left-of-center and right-wing political forces has emerged. The first serious clash between left-wing and right-wing armed formations was the July Uprising of 1927, the reason for which was the acquittal of right-wing radicals by the court, who killed many people during the shelling of a demonstration of leftist forces. Only with the help of the police was it possible to restore order, which, however, cost many lives - 89 people were killed (85 of them were representatives of leftist forces), more than 600 were injured.

As a result of the global economic crisis of 1929, the socio-economic condition of the country sharply deteriorated, which again caused an aggravation of the internal political crisis. In 1932, the left - Social Democrats - won the local elections. Right-wing political forces, fearing to lose the national parliamentary elections, decided to retain power by force. This became one of the prerequisites for the Anschluss of Austria by Germany.

Reign of Engelbert Dollfuss

In March 1933, during the parliamentary crisis, Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss decided to dissolve the then parliament, after which measures began to be taken that led to the dictatorship of the Fatherland Front, an ultra-right Austrofascist political party. Elections were cancelled, the Communist Party and the NSDP were banned, and the death penalty for murder, arson, and vandalism was reinstated.

At the same time, the National Socialist German Workers' Party, led by Adolf Hitler, began to gain strength in Germany, one of whose tasks was the reunification of Austria and Germany.

However, Engelbert Dollfuss had an extremely negative attitude towards the idea of ​​Austria joining Germany. In June 1934, he banned the activities of the NSDP in the country. In addition, Dollfuss for some time became close to the leader of the Italian fascists B. Mussolini, who at that time was also not interested in the Anschluss of Austria with Germany and considered the first country rather as a sphere of his interests. In May 1934, Dollfuss adopted the so-called May Constitution, which was based on the Mussolini regime.

First attempts

On July 25, 1934, 154 soldiers of the 89th Austrian battalion burst into the chancellery and captured Engelbert Dollfuss, demanding his resignation in favor of Anton Rintelen, who sympathized with the Nazi movement in Germany. Dolfuss was seriously injured, but categorically refused to sign his resignation. As a result, he died a few hours later. By evening, the rebels, surrounded by government troops, were forced to surrender. On the same day, Mussolini demonstrated his determination to resist the coup d'état by mobilizing and moving 5 divisions to the border.

The failure of the first attempt, although it showed Hitler that crude methods could not solve the problem at the moment, did not convince him to abandon his intended goal.

On the way to Anschluss

After the failure of the coup, the German government put serious diplomatic pressure on the new Austrian government led by Kurt von Schuschnigg. At the same time, the German intelligence services sharply increased their activities, recruiting various representatives of political forces. Trying to temporarily smooth out German pressure and the growing conflicts with internal nationalist political forces, Schuschnigg went to negotiations with Hitler in July 1936. The result of the negotiations was the signing of the “Friendly Agreement” on July 11, 1936, according to which Austria actually obliged to follow the policies of the Third Reich. Germany pledged not to influence the internal affairs of Austria.

In addition, Schuschnigg agreed to an amnesty for several thousand Nazis, as well as the admission of some to administrative leadership positions. Such an agreement did not cause much resonance in Western countries. On the contrary, many believed and argued that such agreements would contribute to a quick resolution of the conflict, and, consequently, to strengthening the independence of Austria.

Schuschnigg himself hoped for agreements with the Entente countries. After all, it was they who recorded the independence of Austria after the war. They even refused to create a customs union between Germany and Austria in 1931. However, times have changed.

Treaty with Hitler

With the National Socialists coming to power in Germany, the Versailles agreements were repeatedly violated. The most noticeable blow was the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, the increase in the German armed forces, and Italian aggression in Ethiopia. By 1938, more and more politicians appeared in the West who adhered to the idea that conflicts with small countries in Central Europe were not worth another big war.

At the beginning of 1938, Goering, in a conversation with the Austrian Secretary of State Schmidt, expressed the opinion that, most likely, the Anschluss of Austria by Germany (the date you already know) cannot be avoided, and if the Austrians do not like this wording, then they can interpret it as a “partnership” .

Meanwhile, in Vienna, a group of conspirators were arrested, and certain papers, later called the “Tafs papers,” were confiscated. These papers, addressed by Hitler's deputy R. Hess to the Austrian nationalists Leopold and Tufs, reported that there was too little likelihood that any of the leading powers of Europe would stand up for Austria, since all were immersed in their own social, economic and military crises.

Desperate, Schuschnigg went to Berchtesgaden, Hitler's country residence, for negotiations. In the conversation, Hitler presented his demands to Austria, adding that none of the world powers would stand up for them in the event of Germany’s forceful intervention.

Under German control

Under threats of immediate invasion, on February 12, 1938, Schuschnigg signed the three-point demands presented to him, which effectively brought the country under German control:

1. Seyss-Inquart (who occupied a leading position among the Austrian nationalist groups) assumed the post of Minister of the Interior of Austria. This allowed the Germans to directly influence security forces and law enforcement agencies.
2. Another broad amnesty for the Nazis was announced.
3. The Austrian Nazi Party was obliged to join the Fatherland Front.

Without seeing any serious support from Great Britain and France, Schuschnigg, in order to strengthen his position on the independence of Austria, urgently scheduled a referendum for March 13, 1938 on how the people would react to unification with Germany. At the same time, he neglected to convene a meeting with his own government, which the constitution provided for in such cases.

Plan "Otto"

Hitler, fearing the will of the people of Austria in favor of independence, which could greatly interfere with his plans in the future, on March 9, 1938, approved the “Otto” plan to seize Austria. On March 11, Hitler signed an order to send German troops into this country. On the same day, mass Nazi demonstrations began in the cities of Austria, and European newspapers began to report on the closure of the Austro-German border and the gathering of German troops to it.

Upon learning of this, Schuschnigg announced his decision to cancel the plebiscite, which, however, did not satisfy Hitler. The next ultimatum for Austria suggested the following: the resignation of Schuschnigg and the appointment of Seyss-Inquart to his post.

Schuschnigg urgently turned to Mussolini for help, but there was no response. Much has changed since 1934: it was more important for Mussolini to maintain friendly relations with Germany.

On the reunification of Austria with the German Empire

Seeing no other way, at 6 p.m. he accepted an ultimatum, hoping to prevent an invasion by German troops, while at the same time ordering the army not to resist if such an invasion did occur. However, Hitler could no longer be stopped. That same evening, the Germans “concocted” and sent to the German ambassador in Vienna a false telegram from the new Chancellor of Austria, in which Seyss-Inquart asked the German government to send troops to ensure order in the country. The “author” himself was informed about this telegram after it was sent. The necessary groundwork for the implementation of the Otto plan had been laid. On the night of March 11-12, German armed forces crossed the Austrian border. The Austrian army, having received orders not to resist, capitulated. Already at 4 a.m. Himmler, Schelenberg, and Hess arrived in Vienna. Former Chancellor Schuschnigg was taken into custody and a few weeks later sent to a concentration camp, where he remained until May 1945.

On the evening of March 13, Hitler himself arrived in Vienna. On the same day, the law “On the reunification of Austria with the German Empire” was published. From now on, Austria became part of Germany and was called Ostmark.

Hitler himself was extremely inspired by this victory. Eyewitnesses described how he repeatedly launched into sensual speeches, claiming that “by the will of God, he went to Germany as a young man and is now returning his homeland to the bosom of the Reich.” Schuschnigg's worst fears came true: the history of Austria was over. She temporarily disappeared from the historical arena.

The Anschluss of Austria and its consequences. Western reaction

But, like any historical event, the Anschluss of Austria and Germany had a number of consequences.

The world accepted the events that took place as a fait accompli. Great Britain, which at that time was heading towards a policy of appeasement, did not show much desire to stand up for Austria, openly speaking about its lack of any obligations to this country. Italy, represented by its leader Mussolini, did not interfere with the Anschluss of Austria by Nazi Germany in 1938, realizing that it was more important for the country to maintain friendly relations with the Third Reich.

Perhaps the only country whose interests were affected by the disappearance of Austria was France. Concerned about their security and the future of the Versailles system, French politicians made a number of statements about the need to consolidate efforts with London and try to save the existing security system, however, having received no support either in London or in Rome, they were unable to do anything. -or significant.

Ostmark

In order to consolidate the success, on April 10, 1938, a plebiscite was organized in Germany and Ostmark in support of the unification that had already taken place. According to German data, more than 99% of plebiscite participants voted in support of the Anschluss. For the Austrians, the Anschluss initially brought great hopes, the expectation that the people would live better in a large empire. And at first, their expectations were partly justified - already in April 1938, a program of economic assistance to Austria was launched. This was followed by monetary reform. In 1938-1939, economic growth was observed - 13%. Many social problems were solved. Thus, in January there were about 37 thousand unemployed in Upper Austria. A year later, thanks to the influx of capital from Germany, their number decreased to 11 thousand. However, all this disappeared with the outbreak of the war - Austria was used as a resource.

In addition, grief came to those nationalities that, following the fascist ideology, should not have existed in Germany. However, in general, until the fall of the Wehrmacht, the Austrians were quite loyal to the existing regime. Only in April 1945 would Austria be liberated by the Allied forces, and it would receive full sovereignty in 1955.

Munich agreement

The Anschluss of Austria was a huge victory for Hitler, symbolizing the defeat of the entire Versailles system. Having become convinced of the inconsistency of the leading powers, their weakness and reluctance to get involved in a new protracted conflict, Hitler later acted much more decisively, roughly rejecting all possible Versailles restrictions. The clearest proof is that, without stopping there, the German government immediately began to demand a revision of the territorial borders of Czechoslovakia. Already in September of the same year, the well-known Munich Agreements will be signed, which can rightfully be considered a prologue to the Second World War.