How many Soviet people died in World War II? They did not return from the battle: the number of those killed in the Great Patriotic War has been declassified.

The Second World War was the most destructive war in the history of mankind. There are disputes about its consequences to this day. It was attended by 80% of the world's population.

Many questions arise about how many people died in the Second World War, since different sources of information give different information about the loss of life in the period from 1939 to 1945. The differences are due to where the original information was obtained and which method of counting was used.

Total death toll

It is worth noting that many historians and professors have studied this issue. The number of those killed by the Soviet Union was calculated by the staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. According to the new archival data, the information of which is given for 2001, the Great Patriotic War in total claimed the lives of 27 million people. Of these, more than seven million are military personnel who have been killed or died from their injuries.

Talk about how many people died from 1939 to 1945. as a result of hostilities, they continue to this day, since it is almost impossible to calculate the losses. Various researchers and historians cite their data: from 40 to 60 million people. After the war, the real data was hidden. During Stalin's rule, it was said that the losses of the USSR amounted to 8 million people. During the Brezhnev era, this figure increased to 20 million, and during the perestroika period - to 36 million.

The free encyclopedia Wikipedia gives the following data: more than 25.5 million military personnel and about 47 million civilians (including all participating countries), i.e. in total, the number of casualties exceeds 70 million.

Read about other events in our history in the section.

The change in the alignment of forces in the international arena is also associated with the process of revising the role of the participants in the anti-Hitler coalition in the victory over Nazi Germany. Not only in modern media, but also in a number of historical works, old ones are supported, or new myths are created. The old ones include the opinion that the Soviet Union achieved victory only thanks to innumerable losses, many times greater than the enemy's losses, and the new ones - about the decisive role of Western countries, mainly the United States, in victory and a high level of their military skill. We will try, based on the statistical material available to us, to offer a different opinion.

As a criterion, total data are used, such as, for example, the losses of the parties for the entire war, which, due to their simplicity and clarity, confirm one or another point of view.

In order to select from the sometimes contradictory data those on which one can rely with a significant degree of reliability, it is necessary to use specific values ​​in addition to the total values. Such values ​​may include losses per unit of time, for example, daily losses, losses attributable to a certain section of the front length, etc.

The team of authors under the leadership of Colonel General G.F.Krivosheev in 1988-1993. a comprehensive statistical study of archival documents and other materials containing information on human losses in the army and navy, border and internal troops of the NKVD was carried out. The results of this major study were published in the work "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century."

During the Great Patriotic War, 34 million people were drafted into the Red Army, including those drafted in June 1941. This amount is practically equal to the mobilization resource that the country had at that time. The losses of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War amounted to 11,273 thousand people, that is, one third of the number of those called up. These losses, of course, are very great, but everything is learned by comparison: after all, the losses of Germany and her allies on the Soviet-German front are also great.

Table 1 shows the irrecoverable losses of the Red Army personnel over the years of the Great Patriotic War. The data on the values ​​of the annual losses were taken from the work "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century." This includes the killed, missing, prisoners and those killed in captivity.

Table 1. Losses of the Red Army

The last column of the proposed table shows the average daily losses incurred by the Red Army. In 1941, they were the highest, since our troops had to retreat in very unfavorable conditions, and large formations were surrounded, in the so-called cauldrons. In 1942, the losses were much less, although the Red Army also had to retreat, but there were no longer any large cauldrons. In 1943, there were very stubborn battles, especially on the Kursk Bulge, but from this year until the end of the war, the troops of Nazi Germany had to retreat. In 1944, the Soviet High Command planned and carried out a number of brilliant strategic operations to defeat and encircle entire groups of German armies, so the losses of the Red Army are relatively small. But in 1945, the daily losses increased again, because the stubbornness of the German army increased, since it was already fighting on its territory, and German soldiers courageously defended their homeland.

Let us compare the losses of Germany with the losses of Britain and the United States on the Second Front. We will try to evaluate them based on the data of the well-known domestic demographer B. Ts. Urlanis. In the book "History of War Losses", Urlanis, speaking about the losses of England and the United States, gives the following data:

Table 2. Losses of the British Armed Forces in World War II (thousand people)

In the war with Japan, England lost "11.4% of the total number of soldiers and officers killed," therefore, in order to estimate the size of England's losses on the Second Front, we need to subtract losses for 4 years of the war from the total amount of losses and multiply by 1 - 0.114 = 0.886:

(1 246 - 667) 0.886 = 500 thousand people.

The total losses of the United States in World War II amounted to 1,070 thousand, of which about three quarters were losses in the war with Germany, thus

1,070 * 0.75 = 800 thousand people

The total total losses of England and the United States are

1,246 + 1,070 = 2,316 thousand people

Thus, the losses of Britain and the United States on the Second Front account for approximately 60% of their total losses in World War II.

As mentioned above, the losses of the USSR amount to 11.273 million people, that is, at first glance, they are incomparable with the losses of 1.3 million people suffered by Britain and the United States on the Second Front. On this basis, it is concluded that the Allied command fought skillfully and took care of the people, while the Soviet High Command allegedly filled up the enemy trenches with the corpses of their soldiers. Let us disagree with such views. Based on the data on daily losses given in Table 1, it can be obtained that from June 7, 1944 to May 8, 1945, that is, during the existence of the Second Front, the losses of the Red Army amounted to 1.8 million people, which only slightly exceeds the losses of the Allies. As you know, the length of the Second Front was 640 km, and the length of the Soviet-German front was from 2,000 to 3,000 km, on average - 2,500 km, i.e. 4-5 times more than the length of the Second Front. Therefore, on a sector of the front equal to the length of the Second Front, the Red Army lost about 450 thousand people, which is 3 times less than the losses of the allies.

On the fronts of the Second World War, the armed forces of fascist Germany proper lost 7,181,000, and the armed forces of its allies - 1,468,000, for a total of 8,649,000.

Thus, the ratio of losses on the Soviet-German front turns out to be 13:10, that is, for 13 killed, missing, wounded, captured Soviet soldiers, there are 10 German ones.

According to the chief of the German General Staff F. Halder, in 1941-1942. The fascist army daily lost about 3,600 soldiers and officers, therefore, in the first two years of the war, the losses of the fascist bloc amounted to about two million people. This means that over the next time, the losses of Germany and its allies amounted to about 6 600 thousand people. During the same period, the losses of the Red Army amounted to approximately 5 million people. Thus, in 1943-1945, for every 10 Red Army soldiers who died, there were 13 dead soldiers of the fascist army. These simple statistics clearly and objectively characterize the quality of troop driving and the degree of respect for the soldiers.

General A.I.Denikin

“Be that as it may, no tricks could diminish the significance of the fact that the Red Army has been fighting skillfully for some time now, and the Russian soldier is selfless. It was impossible to explain the successes of the Red Army by mere numerical superiority. In our eyes, this phenomenon had a simple and natural explanation.

From time immemorial, the Russian people were smart, talented and inwardly loved their homeland. From time immemorial, the Russian soldier was immensely hardy and selflessly brave. These human and military qualities could not drown in him twenty-five Soviet years of suppression of thought and conscience, collective farm slavery, Stakhanov's exhaustion and the substitution of international dogma for national identity. And when it became obvious to everyone that there was an invasion and conquest, and not liberation, that only the replacement of one yoke with another was foreseen, the people, postponing accounts with communism until a more suitable time, rose behind the Russian land in the same way as their ancestors rose during the invasions. Swedish, Polish and Napoleonic ...

The infamous Finnish campaign and the defeat of the Red Army by the Germans on the road to Moscow took place under the sign of the International; under the slogan of defending the Motherland, the defeat of the German armies took place! "

General A.I. Denikin is especially important for us because he received a deep and comprehensive education at the Academy of the General Staff, had his own rich experience in military operations, acquired in the Russo-Japanese, World War I and the Civil War. His opinion is also important because, while remaining an ardent patriot of Russia, he was and until the end of his life remained a consistent enemy of Bolshevism, so one can rely on the impartiality of his assessment.

Consider the ratio of losses of the Allied and German armies. In the literature, the total losses of the German army are given, but data on the losses of Germany on the Second Front are not given, probably deliberately. The Great Patriotic War lasted 1418 days, the Second Front existed for 338 days, which is 1/4 of the duration of the Great Patriotic War. Therefore, it is assumed that the losses of Germany on the Second Front are four times less. Thus, if the losses of Germany on the Soviet-German front amount to 8.66 million people, then it can be assumed that the losses of Germany on the Second Front are about 2.2 million, and the ratio of losses is about 10 to 20, which would seem to confirm point of view about the high military skill of our allies in the Second World War.

One cannot agree with this point of view. Some Western researchers also disagree with it. “Against inexperienced, albeit eager to fight Americans and war-weary cautious, the British could have been fielded by the Germans, in the words of Max Hastings,“ which had gained a historical reputation for being undaunted and reached its zenith under Hitler. ” Hastings states: "Everywhere during the Second World War, whenever and wherever the British and American troops met head to head with the Germans, the Germans were victorious."<…>Most of all, Hastings and other historians were struck by the ratio of losses, which added up in a ratio of two to one and even higher in favor of the Germans. "

American Colonel Trevor Dupuis conducted a detailed statistical study of German actions in World War II. Some of his explanations for why Hitler's armies acted so much more effectively than their opponents seem unfounded. But no critic questioned his main conclusion that on almost every battlefield during the war, including Normandy, the German soldier acted more effectively than his opponents.

Unfortunately, we do not have the data that Hastings used, but if there is no direct data on the losses of Germany on the Second Front, then we will try to estimate them indirectly. Considering that the intensity of the battles waged by the German army in the West and in the East was the same, and that the losses per kilometer of the front are approximately equal, we find that the losses of Germany on the Eastern Front should be divided not by 4, but, taking into account the difference in the length of the front line, by about 15-16. Then it turns out that Germany lost on the Second Front no more than 600 thousand people. Thus, we find that on the Second Front the ratio of losses is 22 Anglo-American soldiers to 10 German soldiers, and not vice versa.

A similar ratio was observed in the Ardennes operation, which was carried out by the German command from December 16, 1944 to January 28, 1945. As the German general Melentin writes, during this operation the allied army lost 77 thousand soldiers, and the German one - 25 thousand, that is, we get a ratio of 31 to 10, even exceeding the one obtained above.

Based on the above reasoning, one can refute the myth about the insignificance of German losses on the Soviet-German front. It is said that Germany allegedly lost about 3.4 million people. If we assume that this value corresponds to the truth, then we will have to accept that on the Second Front, German losses amounted to only:

3.4 million / 16 = 200 thousand people,

which is 6-7 times less than the losses of Britain and the United States on the Second Front. If Germany fought so brilliantly on all fronts and suffered such insignificant losses, then it is not clear why she did not win the war? Therefore, the assumptions that the losses of the Anglo-American army are lower than the German ones, as well as that the German losses are much lower than the Soviet ones, must be rejected, since they are based on incredible numbers, does not agree with reality and common sense.

Thus, it can be argued that the power of the German army was decisively undermined by the victorious Red Army on the Soviet-German front. With an overwhelming superiority in men and equipment, the Anglo-American command showed amazing indecision and inefficiency, one might say mediocrity, comparable to the confusion and unpreparedness of the Soviet command in the initial period of the war in 1941-1942.

There is a wide range of evidence to support this statement. First, we give a description of the actions of the special groups, which were led by the famous Otto Skorzeny, during the offensive of the German army in the Ardennes.

“On the very first day of the offensive, one of Skorzeny's groups managed to get through the breach made in the allied lines and advance to Yun, which stretched near the coast of the Meuse. There she, having changed from the German uniform to the American one, dug in and fortified herself at the intersection of roads and watched the movement of enemy troops. The group leader, fluent in English, had gone as far as strolling around the neighborhood to "familiarize himself with the situation."

A few hours later an armored regiment marched alongside them, and its commander asked them for directions. Without batting an eye, the commander gave him a completely wrong answer. Namely, he said that these “German pigs have just cut several roads. He himself received the order to make a big detour with his column. " Very happy that they had been warned in time, the American tankmen did indeed follow the path indicated by "our man".

Returning to the location of their unit, this detachment cut several telephone lines and removed the signs posted by the American quartermaster service, and also planted mines in some places. Twenty-four hours later, all the soldiers and officers of this group returned in full health to their troops, bringing interesting observations about the confusion that reigned behind the front lines of the Americans at the beginning of the offensive.

Another of these small units also crossed the front line and advanced as far as the Meuse. According to his observations, the Allies can be said to have done nothing to protect the bridges in the area. On the way back, the detachment was able to block the three highways leading to the front edge by hanging colored ribbons on the trees, which in the American army means that the roads are mined. Subsequently, Skorzeny's scouts saw that the columns of British and American troops, in fact, avoided these roads, preferring to make a big detour.

The third group found an ammunition depot. Waiting for the onset of darkness; the commandos "took down" the guards and then blew up this warehouse. A little later, they found a telephone cable collector, which they managed to cut in three places.

But the most significant story happened to another detachment, which on December 16 suddenly found itself right in front of the American positions. Two companies of "ji-ai" prepared for a long defense, lined up pillboxes and set up machine guns. Skorzeny's men must have been somewhat confused, especially when an American officer asked them what was happening on the front lines.

Pulling himself together, the squad leader, dressed in the fine uniform of an American sergeant, told the Yankee captain a very interesting story. Probably, the confusion that was read on the faces of the German soldiers was attributed by the Americans to the last skirmish with the "damned boshes." The commander of the detachment pseudo-sergeant - said that the Germans had already bypassed this position, both on the right and on the left, so that it was practically surrounded. The amazed American captain immediately gave the order to retreat. "

We will also use the observations of the German tanker Otto Karius, who fought against Soviet soldiers from 1941 to 1944, and from 1944 to 1945 against the Anglo-American. Here is an interesting event from his front-line experience in the West. “Almost all of our Kübel cars were out of order. Therefore, one evening we decided to replenish our vehicle fleet at the expense of the American one. It never occurred to anyone to consider it a heroic act!

The Yankees slept in houses at night, as it should be for the "front-line soldiers". Outside, it was one hour at best, but only if the weather was fine. At about midnight we set off with four soldiers and returned pretty soon with two jeeps. Conveniently, they didn't require keys. One had only to turn on the toggle switch, and the car was ready to go. It was only when we returned to our positions that the Yankees opened fire indiscriminately into the air, probably to calm their nerves. "

With personal experience of the war on the eastern and western fronts, Karius concludes: "After all, five Russians were more dangerous than thirty Americans." Western researcher Stephen E. Ambrose says that the only way to minimize casualties is "by ending the war quickly, not by exercising caution during offensive operations."

Based on the evidence cited and the relationships obtained above, it can be argued that at the final stage of the war, the Soviet command fought more skillfully than the German command and much more efficiently than the Anglo-American command, because “the art of waging war requires courage and intelligence, and not only superiority in technology and the number of troops. "

Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. M. "OLMA-PRESS". 2001 p. 246.
B. Ts. Urlanis. History of military losses. SPb. 1994 onwards 228-232.
O'Bradley. Soldier's notes. Foreign literature. M 1957 p. 484.
Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. M. "OLMA-PRESS". 2001 p. 514.
Colonel General F. Halder. War diary. Volume 3, book 2. Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense. P. 436
D. Lekhovich. White versus red. Moscow "Sunday". 1992 p. 335.

F. Melentin. Tank battles 1939-1945. Polygon AST. 2000 year
Otto Skorzeny. Smolensk. Rusich. 2000 p. 388, 389
Otto Carius. "Tigers in the Mud". M. Tsentropoligraf. 2005 p. 258, 256
Stephen E. Ambrose. Day "D" AST. M. 2003.S. 47, 49.
J. F. S. Fuller World War II 1939-1945 Foreign Literature Publishing House. Moscow, 1956, p. 26.

The myth of Germany's military losses in World War II

The main myth of Germany's military losses, cultivated in Soviet times, was the assertion that Germany's losses on the Soviet-German front were quite comparable to those of the Red Army. In this regard, the number of German casualties in killed and captured at 13.6 million people was put into circulation, of which 10 million people allegedly died or were captured on the Eastern Front.

In fact, these figures do not in any way reflect both the total irrecoverable losses of the Wehrmacht and the losses on the Soviet-German front. The total losses of the Wehrmacht who died on the battlefield and died from other causes, according to an estimate made by the German historian General Burkhart Müller-Gillebrand (during the war years, he was in charge of accounting for personnel), amounted to about 3.2 million people. Another 0.8 million people died in captivity. Of these, about half a million did not survive captivity in the East, where a total of about 3.15 million German soldiers were captured. In the West, out of about 8 million prisoners died about 300 thousand. The death toll in the East of the German military personnel, based on the data of Müller-Hillebrand, we estimate at 2.1 million people, and taking into account the deaths in captivity - 2.6 million people. Müller-Hillebrand's data are based on a centralized accounting of German losses up to November 1944 and on an estimate of losses for the last half a year made by the German General Staff, verified by a sample post-war population survey in individual German states.

In the USSR, where there were cases of starvation in the Red Army, and among the civilian population of the eastern regions there were even cases of cannibalism, in reality there were no necessary food resources to supply millions of prisoners. An equally important role in the refusal to comply with the relevant clause of the Geneva Convention was played by the fact that Stalin considered the prisoners, at worst, as traitors to the Motherland, and at best, as soldiers who could not be used until the end of the war, and therefore, they were useless to achieve victory. As a result, the captured Red Army men were deprived of the opportunity to receive help from their homeland and were largely doomed to death by starvation.

The same problems that Germany experienced with Soviet prisoners was experienced by the Soviet Union with German prisoners and their allies. While there were few prisoners (before the start of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad - less than 20 thousand), there was an opportunity to keep them in full compliance with the Geneva Convention and brag about it to the whole world. But when Soviet troops in the course of the counteroffensive and the liquidation of the groupings encircled in Stalingrad captured over two and a half months more than 150 thousand prisoners, most of them frostbitten and exhausted, insoluble problems immediately arose, primarily in terms of providing the prisoners with food, warm clothing and medicines. As a result, from the beginning of the war to May 1, 1943 in the camps and reception centers of the NKVD, out of 292,630 registered prisoners, 196,944 people died, or 67.3%. This was due to the fact that hunger reigned in the country and too low food standards were set for the prisoners. The calorie content of the daily ration of prisoners of war was 1750 kilocalories, and of working prisoners - 1945 kcal, which did not cover the energy costs of a person, even in complete rest, especially in winter conditions. Lack of food led to dystrophy and vitamin deficiency. These diseases then accounted for 70% of other diseases and were the cause of 80% of all deaths. The calorie content of the ration increased to 2200 kilocalories only in the second half of 1943, which already made it possible to avoid starvation. For example, just over 10 thousand Italian prisoners returned home from a total of 45 thousand people (according to other estimates, even 70 thousand), and half of the prisoners died from dystrophy, that is, from malnutrition. Even in May 1945, 60% of all Italians who fell ill with dystrophy suffered.

The USSR and Germany waged a cruel war at the limit of their capabilities, and neither the Russians nor the Germans could provide the necessary food for the large masses of prisoners - otherwise, famine would threaten their own populations and the armies of both countries.

The German military historian Rüdiger Overmans' estimate of the irrecoverable losses of the Wehrmacht at 5.3 million people seems overstated. Overmans' calculations are based on data from a centralized file registering the dead German servicemen of the FRG. Here 3.1 million people are people who undoubtedly died at the front or died in captivity. There are reports of them or eyewitness accounts. 2.2 million is the number of servicemen about whom at the time of receipt of the request to the tracing service it could not be reliably established that they were alive. However, some of these military personnel, especially among the wounded and disabled, could well have died after the war from natural causes, while others might not have been found due to a change of residence, especially if they lived in the GDR or Austria, as well as due to emigration. to other countries. Some of them could have appeared only due to the distortion of the surname. It can be assumed that there could be up to half of the 2.2 million missing persons who survived. Therefore, the most likely value of the irrecoverable losses of the Wehrmacht in World War II should be considered the estimate of 4 million deaths given by Müller-Hillebrand.

The ratio of Soviet and German losses on the Eastern Front is thus approximately 10: 1. Interestingly, it turns out to be only slightly more than the ratio of irrecoverable losses in the second half of 1916 between the tsarist army and the German troops on the Northern and Western fronts, where it was 7: 1.

According to the calculations of the Russian historian S.G. Nelipovich, in the period from May 22 (June 4) to December 18 (31), 1916, the troops of the Southwestern Front lost 202.8 thousand soldiers and officers killed, 1091 thousand wounded and missing missing (mainly prisoners) - 152.7 thousand. The total losses amounted to 1 446.3 thousand people. During the same period, the Austro-Hungarian troops in operations against the Southwestern Front, as well as in the battle at Baranovichi with the troops of the Western Front and on the Romanian Front, lost 45 thousand soldiers and officers killed, 216.5 thousand wounded and about 378 thousand soldiers. prisoners. The losses of the German troops operating on the Eastern Front reached approximately 38 thousand prisoners and 29 thousand killed and 195.5 thousand wounded. Turkish troops operating against the Southwestern Front and on the Romanian Front lost about 10 thousand killed, wounded and captured. In total, in the strip of the Southwestern Front, the central powers lost 846 thousand people, including 66.2 thousand killed, 360 thousand wounded, and 409.8 thousand prisoners. The overall loss ratio was in favor of the central powers - 1.7: 1. The prisoner ratio was in favor of the Russian troops - 2.7: 1. On the other hand, the number of killed in the armies of the central powers was 3.3 times less than in the Russian army, and the number of wounded was 3.6 times less. But on other fronts, the loss ratio was even worse for Russia. The total losses of Russian troops here amounted to 594 thousand people, including 60 thousand killed, 472 thousand wounded and 62 thousand missing. To this must be added the losses of the Romanian army of 17 thousand killed, 56 thousand wounded and 237 thousand missing. The Central Powers lost 7.7 thousand killed, 52 thousand wounded and 6.1 thousand missing. In addition, the German and Bulgarian troops lost in Romania 8 thousand killed, 40 thousand wounded and 3 thousand missing. The total loss ratio is 7.5: 1, and 15.2: 1 for the killed and captured. Even if we exclude the losses of the Romanian front, the Russian losses will amount to 54 thousand killed, 443.6 thousand wounded and 42.4 thousand missing. Then the ratio of total losses will be 8.2: 1, and for irrecoverable losses - 7: 1. The actual ratio was somewhat more favorable for the central powers, since the losses of Austria-Hungary on the Romanian front were not deducted here. According to the estimates of the same Nelipovich, during the Gorlitsky breakthrough by the Austro-Hungarian troops of the Russian South-Western Front in May 1915, the ratio of irrecoverable losses was even less favorable for the Russian side - 15: 1.

During the First World War, German troops fought against the Russians several times more effectively than the Austro-Hungarian ones. The fighting efficiency of the latter was undermined by the instability and unwillingness to fight the Czech, Slovak, Serbian and Romanian regiments. In the fight against the German troops, the Russian troops were never able to carry out a single successful operation. All battles ended with either a German victory or a draw. Affected both the superiority of the Germans in artillery, including due to a much better supply of shells, and the superiority of the Germans in the training of soldiers and commanders. The Russian officers, well trained in theory, had a poor command of command and control in specific combat conditions. It should also be noted that during the Second World War, the analogue of the Austro-Hungarian army on the Russian front was the Romanian troops. The losses of the Romanian army in killed were approximately equal to the losses of the Soviet troops opposing it.

You can also assess the ratio of Soviet and German losses to the losses of officers, who are always considered more accurate than the rank and file. According to the data cited by Müller-Gillebrand, the ground army lost in the East from June 41st to November 44th 65.2 thousand officers killed and missing. The total irrecoverable losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to 2,417 thousand people over the same period. Thus, for one killed officer, there were 36 privates and non-commissioned officers. The share of officers in these losses is 2.7%. Irrecoverable losses of officers of the Soviet ground forces, according to calculations completed only in 1963, amounted to 973 thousand. If we exclude from this figure the sergeants and foremen who held officer posts, as well as losses in 1945, then the irrecoverable losses of officers of the Soviet ground forces for 1941-1944 years, excluding the political composition, absent in the Wehrmacht, as well as persons of the administrative (quartermaster) and legal composition, the Germans represented by officials, will amount to about 784 thousand. These 784 thousand must be compared with 65.2 thousand German losses officers brought by Müller-Hillebrand. The ratio is 11.2: 1. It is close to the ratio of the losses of the fallen armies of the USSR and Germany. In the irrecoverable losses of individual units of the Red Army, the ratio of soldiers and officers was close to that which existed in the Wehrmacht. For example, for the period December 17-19, 1941, in the 323rd rifle division, the loss of commanding personnel among the killed and missing was 3.36%, which gives a ratio of 28.8: 1, and minus the political and quartermaster personnel - 36: 1. For the 48th Rifle Corps of the 69th Army in the period from July 1 to July 16, 1943, these ratios will be 17.2: 1 and 19.9: 1.

And the 193rd Guards Regiment of the 66th Guards Division from July 10 to October 9, 1943, excluding possible replenishment, lost 56 officers and 1554 sergeants and privates in killed and wounded, which gives a ratio between soldiers and officers of 27.8: 1. Meanwhile, on July 10, by the time the regiment entered the battle, there were 2022 sergeants and soldiers for 197 officers, which gives a ratio of 10.3: 1. Taking into account that by the beginning of the fighting there were more officers in the regiment than was required by the state, in the possible replenishment the share of officers was probably lower than their share in losses, so that the real ratio of soldiers and officers in losses could be more than 28: 1.

Since in the German army all the orderlies were men, and in the Red Army almost exclusively women, a German soldier wounded on the battlefield had a much better chance than a Red Armyman to be evacuated from the battlefield. Also, the total number of those killed in battle in the Red Army was an order of magnitude greater than in the Wehrmacht. As a result, a much larger part of the Red Army died on the battlefield without waiting for help. Therefore, in the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, the number of those killed on the battlefield was close to the number of wounded, while in the Wehrmacht there were on average 3-4 wounded per one killed on the battlefield.

It is not possible to accurately estimate the total losses of Germany who died during the Second World War. If the losses of the Wehrmacht can be estimated at about 4 million people, including here also the Austrians, Alsatians, Sudeten Germans and other foreigners who fought in the Wehrmacht, then the civilian losses are incalculable. It has only been established that about 538 thousand civilians within the borders of Germany in 1937 became victims of the bombing of the Anglo-American aviation of German cities, and about 40 thousand more in Austria, Alsace-Lorraine and the Sudetenland. The total losses of the German and Austrian civilians, including victims of repression by the Nazis, Jews killed as part of the "Final Solution to the Jewish Question", victims of bombing, as well as those who died during the hostilities in Germany and Austria in 1944-1945 or died of hunger in the last months of the war , different researchers estimate from 2 to 3 million people. Taking this into account, the total losses of Germany and Austria in World War II can be estimated at 6-7 million people. However, these estimates are extremely rough. Demographically, the balance of the pre-war and post-war populations of Germany and Austria cannot be made due to the movement of almost 12 million Germans to Germany from the eastern German lands, torn away from her in 1945, as well as from the states of Eastern Europe. In the USSR, 272 thousand Germans were interned from among the former activists of the Nazi Party, police officers, representatives of the "exploiting classes" who worked to restore the Soviet economy. Of these, 66.5 thousand died.