Today the Basmanny Court must decide the issue of the arrest of the former chairman of the board of VIP Bank Alexei Frenkel. The Prosecutor General's Office calls him the mastermind behind the murder of the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank of Russia, Andrei Kozlov. Mr. Frenkel became the seventh and, according to investigators, the main detainee in this high-profile case. The crime was solved largely due to the stinginess of the organizers: they entrusted the murder of one of the country's main bankers to inexperienced killers, paying only $10 thousand for it.

Banker Alexei Frenkel was detained in Moscow at one in the morning on January 11. His detention, according to the Prosecutor General's Office, was the finale of a four-month investigation into the murder of Andrei Kozlov. And although, according to Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika, arrests in this case are still possible - some accomplices have yet to be identified - investigators are confident that in general the crime can be considered solved, since all the main participants in the murder of the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank are already behind bars.

Earlier, the Basmanny Court of Moscow authorized the arrests of the direct perpetrators of the murder of Andrei Kozlov and his driver Alexander Semenov, Ukrainian citizens Alexey Polovinkin, Maxim Proglyad and Alexander Belokopytov. At the end of last year, two intermediaries in organizing the crime were taken into custody. They turned out to be the killers' fellow countryman Bogdan Pogorzhevsky and the capital's businessman Boris Shafrai. And last Friday, a court arrested Liana Askerova, co-owner of the Moscow restaurant Trish, for two months.

The investigation believes that Alexey Frenkel decided to liquidate Andrei Kozlov out of personal hostility, after on June 15 last year the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank decided to revoke the license of his VIP bank for money laundering. According to banking market experts, a personal conflict between Andrei Kozlov and Alexei Frenkel arose back in 2005, when the Central Bank refused to include VIP Bank in the deposit insurance system. This decision of the Central Bank was challenged in the arbitration court. Then Alexey Frenkel resigned as chairman of the bank’s board and personally began to represent the bank in court hearings.

In court, he threatened the Central Bank with millions of claims for compensation for damage to the VIP bank, which it suffered by not being included in the list of selected banks - members of the insurance system. And outside the court, he, according to eyewitnesses, sought to personally communicate on controversial issues with Andrei Kozlov and other heads of the Central Bank, for which he attended all receptions and parties with the participation of heads of the Bank of Russia. Andrei Kozlov diligently avoided such communication. At the same time, Mr. Kozlov began to receive calls from top officials of the Prosecutor General’s Office, in particular, Deputy Prosecutor General Vladimir Kolesnikov (he held this position until last summer) and the FSB with requests to include the VIP bank in the deposit insurance system. True, it later turned out that other people were calling on the turntables on their behalf. Kommersant's sources in the Central Bank believe that these calls were organized by Alexei Frenkel.

Nevertheless, Alexey Frenkel still won the case against the Central Bank. On May 6 last year, the Moscow Arbitration Court declared illegal the Central Bank’s refusal to include VIP Bank in the deposit insurance system. Then, on the personal order of Andrei Kozlov, the Central Bank conducted an extraordinary inspection of the VIP bank, as a result of which its license was revoked. Alexey Frenkel also challenged the Central Bank’s decision to revoke the license in arbitration, and, according to investigators, decided to simply eliminate Andrey Kozlov. Moreover, after the decisions of the Central Bank, billions of rubles were stuck in the accounts of the VIP bank, which supposedly should have been cashed out, and clients made claims to Mr. Frenkel.

According to the Prosecutor General's Office, having no connections in criminal circles, banker Frenkel asked his friend Liana Askerova to organize the murder of Mr. Kozlov for a reward. The banker met her while visiting her restaurant, Trish. Ms. Askerova, in the presence of Mr. Frenkel, allegedly said more than once that she was familiar with criminal authorities. In addition, Ms. Askerova herself was previously at odds with the law: in 1995, she was put on the wanted list on suspicion of fraud, but then the case fell apart.

Ms. Askerova, according to law enforcement agencies, agreed to help the banker Frenkel. But the “authorities” she knew turned out to be far from the godfathers of the criminal world, so she was unable to attract professionals to the case.

Together with Ms. Askerova, her business partner, Ukrainian businessman Boris Shafrai, decided to make money from the murder of Andrei Kozlov. It was he who found, as investigators believe, a middle-class “authority” from his native Lugansk, Bogdan Pogorzhevsky, known in the criminal circles of this city as Bonya. During the negotiations, the liquidation of the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation was estimated at only $10 thousand. Bonya intended to keep half of this amount for himself, and with the remaining $5 thousand he bought two pistols and hired killers - also residents of Lugansk Polovinkin, Proglyad and Belokopytov. All three drove taxis in Moscow in their old Zhiguli cars.

Investigators believe that the stinginess of the organizers and the unprofessionalism of the killers largely helped to quickly solve the crime. They went to the VAZ-2108 of Alexander Belokopytov to eliminate Andrei Kozlov. At the same time, they even tried to drive this car into the territory of the Spartak sports complex, where the deputy chairman of the Central Bank was playing football on the day of the murder. The guards did not let them in, and one of them wrote down the license plate number of the suspicious car. After the murder, Alexander Belokopytov realized that he had made a mistake. He decided to get rid of the “exposed” car and went to sell it in Stavropol, where he was detained a week after the murder. Belokopytov immediately betrayed his accomplices, who were soon detained in Moscow. All three were extremely frank with the investigation, for which they were issued a confession.

However, the investigation then stalled for several months. Bogdan Pogorzhevsky was detained only in the second ten days of December last year. He also did not lock himself up and handed over Boris Shafrai. The Ukrainian businessman was detained on December 27. Then there could have been a hitch in the investigation: Boris Shafrai did not cooperate. He did not admit his guilt and did not testify against Liana Askerova, who was the only one who knew about the customer - banker Frenkel. But Mrs. Askerova gave herself away. Having learned about the arrest of Mr. Shafrai, she became nervous and began to look for a lawyer for him, coming to the attention of the operatives. Ms. Askerova was placed under surveillance and her phones were tapped. By January 10, it became clear to the investigation that she was the last intermediary who would lead the investigation to the customer. Liana Askerova was detained in Moscow on the same day. During interrogation, she was informed that her accomplice Shafrai allegedly testified against her, which in fact was not the case. But this technique worked, and Mrs. Askerova told investigators about Alexey Frenkel.

Evidence in court of the need for her two-month arrest was a confession and a foreign passport with numerous unexpired visas. The prosecutor argued that she could flee the country. The court treated the words of lawyer Evgeny Martynov, who claimed that his client was not guilty of anything and was going to go abroad for treatment after a recent operation, with distrust.

Last Friday, the Basmanny Court was supposed to consider the petition of the Prosecutor General's Office for the arrest of Alexei Frenkel. However, lawyer Igor Trunov managed to get the hearing postponed because he was not familiar with the case materials and was not allowed by the investigator to see his client. “In order to ensure the suspect’s right to defense,” the court postponed the hearing to January 15, leaving the banker in custody. His period of stay in the temporary detention center of the Moscow City Internal Affairs Directorate expires at two o'clock on Monday.

“I am absolutely innocent,” Mr. Frenkel told reporters in court. He called the detention “a provocation by the Central Bank against its opponent.” And lawyer Trunov explained that the provocation was related to the consideration in the appellate arbitration court of VIP Bank's claim against the Central Bank regarding the revocation of its license. According to the defense lawyer, Mr. Frenkel “resolved all issues with the Central Bank only by legal means, and the fact that he was detained is an influence on the arbitration judges, who now cannot be objective.” “There was a huge distance between Andrei Kozlov and Alexei Frenkel,” says the lawyer. “Figuratively speaking, it’s like someone ordered the murder of the mayor of Moscow because his entrance was poorly cleaned. If Frenkel had been involved in the murder, then After the arrest of the alleged perpetrators and intermediaries, he had a lot of time to hide. But he was in the country all this time. It turns out that he was just waiting for them to come for him?"

Nikolay Kommersant-Sergeev

In 1982 he entered the Faculty of International Economic Relations of the Moscow Financial Institute, which he graduated in 1989. His studies were interrupted for two years - 1983-1985 by military service.

Andrei Kozlov went into his specialty after college. This is what Mikhail Eskindarov, former dean of the Faculty of International Economic Relations of the Moscow Financial Institute, now rector of the Financial Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation, remembers about him: “Even in his student years, Kozlov began to show the makings of a statesman rather than a businessman. He entered our institute in 1982, and in 1983 he was drafted into the army - that was still the practice then. He served in the prestigious military space forces. He returned as a foreman and a candidate party member, which was still very rare. He studied excellently - he graduated with honors. But the main thing I remember about Andrey is his special character. I called him a revolutionary cavalryman. He was a maximalist. Principled. Some people didn’t like him for that.”

It is quite possible that he owed his determination and uncompromisingness to the upbringing of his father, a career military man. Already at school (No. 703 on Marshal Biryuzov Street in Moscow), many were convinced of the firmness of his fists and intentions - the reason, as Kozlov himself later said, was often his last name.

In 1989, immediately after graduating from the institute, Kozlov took the position of senior economist at the State Bank of the USSR. In 1995, at thirty years old, he became deputy chairman of the Central Bank - the youngest in the history of the country. And it took him a little more than seven years to turn from a minor official into the second person in the financial hierarchy - in 1997 he was appointed to the post of first deputy chairman of the Central Bank of Russia. The climb is truly breathtaking.

Labor activity:

1989-1990 - senior economist, category II expert of the Monetary and Economic Administration of the State Bank of the USSR.

1990-1991 - economist, category I expert, leading expert, head of the department of methodology of stock operations of the Securities Department of the State Bank of the USSR.

1991-1992 - Head of the Department for Securities Operations of the Main Directorate for Regulation of Money Turnover of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

1992-1995 - Head of the Securities Department of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

1995-1996 - Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation - Director of the Securities Department.

1996-1997 - Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

1997-1999 - First Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation Sergei Dubinin.

Soon after S. Dubinin’s resignation in 1999, he went into private business.

1999-2000 - Chairman of the Board of CJSC Russian Standard Bank.

2000 - Private consultant on problems of reengineering of banking business processes.

2000-2001 - General Director of the company "World of AEROFLOT".

2001-2002 - Managing Director of Volunteer Financial Services Corps (USA)

In April 2002, a month after the appointment of Sergei Ignatiev as head of the Central Bank, Andrei Kozlov returned to the Central Bank as first deputy chairman.

April 2002 - First Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. He became one of the first people invited to his team by the new Chairman of the Central Bank, Sergei Ignatiev. He received the position of first deputy chairman, a seat on the board of directors of the Central Bank and the key post of chairman of the banking supervision committee, which makes decisions on the issuance and revocation of banking licenses.

With the adoption of the deposit insurance law in 2003, its role increased sharply. It was this body that made decisions about whether a particular bank could be accepted into the insurance system and accept deposits from individuals. For this, in particular, banks were required to disclose information about the real owners.

Having completed the selection process for the insurance system, the Central Bank began a campaign against banks involved in money laundering and cashing out.

He spoke English and German, was married, and had three children.

Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin called Kozlov “a very brave and honest person.” According to Anatoly Chubais, Kozlov was “an absolutely honest, principled and absolutely non-commercial person.” Alexander Khandruev described Kozlov as “an amazingly talented and hard-working person.”

Idealist-statist

In 1989, immediately after graduating from the institute, Kozlov took the position of senior economist at the State Bank of the USSR. In 1995, at thirty years old, he became deputy chairman of the Central Bank - the youngest in the history of the country. And it took him a little more than seven years to turn from a minor official into the second person in the financial hierarchy - in 1997 he was appointed to the post of first deputy chairman of the Central Bank of Russia. The climb is truly breathtaking.

Kozlov stood at the origins of the formation of the Russian securities market, in particular, he was one of the leading developers of government short-term bonds (GKOs). Naturally, after the 1998 default, his logical resignation followed.

But he did not sit without work for long - just a few months after leaving the Central Bank, together with Alexander Zurabov (brother of the former Minister of Health and Social Development), he began leading an ambitious project for organizing an “ideal” bank. And the name was chosen accordingly - “Russian Standard”. But either you can’t build anything worthwhile in Russia without budget money, or the management let you down, but the first year brought nothing but losses to Russian Standard. The realities of domestic business have made their own adjustments to the utopian project of an exemplary honest bank. The owner of the bank, Rustam Tariko, was understandably not happy, and Kozlov had to leave. To another job in private business. And also without much luck. It seemed that the career of the revolutionary financier was not going well. However, remember: “He is more of a statesman than a businessman”?

In 2002, Andrei Kozlov again became the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank - curator of banking supervision, the most “powerful”, but also the most conflict-ridden area of ​​activity. He was involved in cleaning the banking system from “gray” schemes. And his main achievement, of course, was the state deposit insurance system (SDI), designed to protect depositors from unscrupulous bankers and financial crises in general. In accordance with the Federal Law “On Insurance of Individual Deposits in Banks of the Russian Federation,” adopted in the fall of 2003, all credit institutions that planned to serve private depositors were required to prove to the Central Bank their reliability and financial stability. Otherwise, the bank was deprived of the right to accept deposits from citizens, as well as additional contributions to already opened deposits: all that was left for it to do was pay off depositors adequately and retrain for other types of activities.

No one argued that such a system was needed. The problem was that the adopted law meant the need for a total relicensing of Russian banks, and in the shortest possible time. At the same time, the criteria that the credit institution had to satisfy remained very vague. For example, one of the indicators of financial stability was the “quality of management” of the bank. And it was assessed by experts by making a so-called motivated judgment. It is clear that the expert assessment depends entirely on the views and preferences of the controller - such a mechanism opened up wide prospects for corruption and abuse.

Naturally, in a country where “gray” imports accounted for 4/5 of the total volume of imported products, and the shadow sector of the economy accounted for up to a third of GDP, a complete victory over banks using “gray” schemes would lead to a shutdown of the economy. But complete victory was impossible. Kozlov’s power was clearly not enough to impose common and fair rules of the game on everyone. However, where circumstances allowed, he acted harshly and decisively, without showing the slightest desire to compromise with his opponents.

At the same time, the activities of the Central Bank were doomed to unfair selectivity. And not only because the inspector’s judgment could be motivated by self-interest, but also because the actual repressive practice could only be directed against those who did not have the “right roof.” It was precisely this kind of subjectivity and bias that the bankers who were not admitted to the SSV accused the Central Bank of...

BANKER VS BANKERS?

Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank Andrei Kozlov is getting rid of the burden of the past. This burden may turn out to be Russian banks.

The new “universal” regulator of the Russian financial market - the Federal Service for Financial Markets (FSFM) - unfortunately, has not yet managed to become fully operational. The newly created service in March of this year, reporting directly to the Prime Minister, received the functions of the now abolished Federal Commission for the Securities Market, the inspection of non-state pension funds under the former Ministry of Labor and the Audit Department of the Ministry of Finance of Russia.

The FFMS, which does not have the right to carry out legal regulation, was given only specific functions of supervision, licensing and control over exchanges, investment and management companies, depositories, registrars, pension funds and many others.

Financiers have been waiting for the appearance of such a structure for a very long time - the fault, as it turned out, was the isolation of the Federal Commission for Securities from the real situation on the market. “Many of the regulations,” says Brunswik UBS President Marlen Manasov, “which were issued by FCSM officials, essentially not knowing the rules of the game in the market, were incredibly difficult to implement.”

However, the most attractive and capable part of the domestic financial system, namely the banking sector, did not fall under the control of the new regulator of the Russian financial market. Regulation and supervision of banking activities remained with the Central Bank. The law “On Banks and Banking Activities” prevented the transfer of these powers to the FFMS.

There is nothing strange in the fact that the Russian banking sector has always lived according to the orders of the Central Bank. On the contrary, it would be strange if supervisory functions over banking activities were taken away from the Central Bank and transferred to the Federal Financial Markets Service, that is, to the Russian government. As they say, to Caesar is Caesar's, and to God what is God's. But, as many analysts believe, in our country it is the supervisory functions of banks that should belong to at least the government, but not the Central Bank. Because in fact, today's system of control over banks is of aggressive foreign origin. It turns out that Russian banks do not live under the orders of the Central Bank at all, but according to far from friendly American laws and rules.

As always happens in our country, everything often moves around one single person.

Craft is the golden breadwinner

When the Federal Service for Financial Markets was just defining its powers, the Central Bank, or rather its banking supervision department, headed by First Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank Andrei Kozlov, had already prepared a program of so-called effective supervision.

So, in the very near future, according to the deputy chairman of the Central Bank Andrei Kozlov, who is actively promoting his vision of the Russian banking sector, about 450 banks should lose their licenses. First of all, “effective” supervision will affect those banks whose own funds amount to less than a million euros.

Interestingly, the mass extermination of Russian commercial banks was presented as a good intention to introduce in Russia a system of guaranteeing household deposits, developed by Andrei Kozlov. In short: this insurance system “from Kozlov” is mandatory for all banks, but the Central Bank will decide which bank is allowed into it and which is not. That is, Andrey Kozlov.

The main instrument of the deposit guarantee system will be checks designed to find out whether a particular bank is facing bankruptcy within the next three years. If the Central Bank (Kozlov) considers that the credit institution does not comply with this clause, the bank will not be allowed into the deposit guarantee system. And the results of checks here will be an empty formality.

However, Andrei Kozlov himself not only does not hide what actually stands behind the deposit guarantee system, but also believes that today the Central Bank lacks supervisory functions: “We talk a lot about consolidated reporting, control of bank shareholders, corporate governance... - on everything These areas need to be considered for tightening. If we want to launch a deposit insurance mechanism and not burden taxpayers and the federal budget with excessive spending, then there is no alternative to strengthening supervision.”

In general, the Russian banking sector will soon experience rampant subjectivism based on “motivated judgments” and “effective supervision.” Why, apparently, Andrei Kozlov had to reform the supervisory unit in the Central Bank. “Next year we have to begin a lot of work on checking banks before they enter the deposit guarantee system,” the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank anticipates. “I intend to place more serious emphasis on formalizing and strengthening the system of supervisors for commercial banks in the process of their daily activities.” As a result of all the changes planned by Kozlov, there will be three key figures in the supervisory sphere of the Bank of Russia: the curator, the inspector general and the head of the temporary administration. Trouble, as they say, brings seven troubles.

The actions of Andrei Kozlov, who intends to carry out mass “licensing” of Russian banks against the backdrop of today’s growing public confidence in the entire banking system, cannot be called anything other than strange. Indeed, now, according to the overwhelming majority of analysts, Russians’ faith in the domestic banking system, undermined by the 1998 crisis, is gradually being restored. As a result, there is an increase in household deposits in commercial banks.

Thus, according to the State Statistics Committee, in the first half of last year, household deposits in Russian banks increased by 21.5% - to 1.272 trillion rubles. At the same time, Russians began to prefer “long-term” deposits - from one year.

The growth of savings of our fellow citizens is, of course, a positive moment for the entire Russian economy, really indicating that Russians now not only live, but also have the opportunity to save for the future.

Financial experts believe that the consequence of the “reforms” introduced by Kozlov could be a banking crisis similar to the default in 1998. In this case, the fragile trust of the Russian population, two-thirds of whom have lost all their deposits during the years of advent of capitalism, in the banking system will be lost forever. The apocalypse will come for the entire Russian economy - without private deposits there is no banking sector, and without the banking sector there are no working market relations. In this case, a completely logical question arises: who benefits from declaring Russia bankrupt? To get the answer to this question, you need to carefully read the biography of Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank Andrei Kozlov.

"Godfather" GKO

Almost all of Andrei Kozlov’s work in senior government financial positions took place, apparently, under the banner of close cooperation between the deputy chairman of the Central Bank and the American Volunteer Corps for the provision of financial services (VCOFU). Most likely, it began in the very beginning of the 90s, when DKOFU volunteers helped Andrei Kozlov “deal with what later became the GKO market.”

The advice was taken into account by the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank. It turned out that the entire chain of state bonds, that is, a system of non-inflationary covering of the budget deficit by borrowing on the domestic market through government bonds, was developed by Andrei Kozlov, who, by the way, at that time also held the position of first deputy of the Central Bank and was in charge of banking supervision.

We must pay tribute: the “father” of GKOs left his post at the Central Bank immediately after the default. But this was apparently some kind of maneuver. “And you, Kozlov, I will ask you to stay,” the new head of the Central Bank, Viktor Gerashchenko, called on Andrei Kozlov to restructure government securities and settle interbank payments.

Kozlov did not remain the “savior” of the Russian economy for very long - about one year. And even then, Kozlov’s actions at that moment turned out to be ineffective. Experts are confident that the role of the Central Bank in restoring the banking system after August 1998 was greatly exaggerated: “The bank did nothing conceptual. Fiddled around for three or four months<...>, held several auctions, issued several stabilization loans - that’s it! All further prosperity is built on petrodollars...”

In January 1999, Andrei Kozlov resigned from the Central Bank and became chairman of the board of Russian Standard Bank. Things didn't work out for the bank under Kozlov. Many explain this by saying that Kozlov was more of a bank official than a real banker. In any case, this is the official reason for the failed almost year-long cooperation between the former deputy chairman of the Central Bank and a commercial bank.

Andrei Kozlov’s next place of work came as a surprise to many. The former second-in-command at the Central Bank at the beginning of 2000 left for the travel industry as general director of the 100% subsidiary of the largest Russian air carrier Aeroflot, the travel company Aeroflot World. Kozlov was given truly ambitious tasks: in two or three years to occupy more than a third of the entire tourism market. Fortunately, the starting opportunities for this company were enormous - the authorized capital of the travel agency alone was 15 million rubles.

Whether Andrei Kozlov coped with this task is not known for certain. However, already in the middle of last summer, Aeroflot World ceased operations, and Aeroflot itself sued its former “daughter”. In total, 6 lawsuits were sent to the courts for a total amount of about one and a half million dollars. The scheme was simple: Aeroflot World, despite the airline’s refusal to increase the credit for air tickets, continued to sell them without paying off its “ancestor”.

American expansion

Economic education was useful to Andrei Kozlov in the winter of 2001. It was then that he became managing director of the Moscow branch of the Volunteer Corps for the provision of financial services. DCOFU was created by former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The activities of this organization are formally defined as “promoting the construction of reliable financial infrastructure in countries undergoing a transition to a market economy or experiencing a financial crisis.” In Russia, DCOFU, financed by subsidies from the US Agency for International Development, as well as by private corporations and individuals, provides advisory and legal assistance not only to private but also to government agencies.

In particular, as stated by the former director of the Moscow office of the DKOFU, Adam Blanco, the corps “advises the Duma on relevant issues, and also provides consulting services to the Central Bank.” In addition, the Volunteer Corps “had a hand” in almost all basic financial laws, such as “On Banks and Banking Activities” and “On the Central Bank”.

Now it becomes clear why the new Federal Service for Financial Markets, designed to be the only and impartial regulator of the Russian financial system, lost the ability to control the banking sector. But “thanks to” the law “On Banks and Banking Activities” they themselves developed, the Americans received this opportunity.

It’s not difficult to guess how this threatens the Russian economy. Moreover, DKOFU has long ago decided on the size of its own appetite. Speaking at one of the international banking congresses, Adam Blanco estimated the resources of regional Russian banks alone at $20–50 billion. Now the Volunteer Corps annually implements 50–60 projects, the main goal of which, according to Andrei Kozlov, is to “increase the overall level” of financial services.

Game over?

The next stage of Andrei Kozlov’s career continues to this day. In April 2002, the head of the Central Bank, Sergei Ignatiev, invited Kozlov to be his first deputy. At the same time, the old new deputy chairman begins to oversee banking supervision, which is painfully familiar to him.

Andrei Kozlov clearly approached “effective” supervision with knowledge of the matter. The deprivation of licenses began in the spring of this year, and on May 29, the license to conduct banking operations from the Novocherkassk City Bank was revoked. The same fate awaits the Kredittrust bank in the very near future. And just recently, the public was announced that under the same “article” “On combating the legalization (laundering) of proceeds from crime and the financing of terrorism” at least 10 more credit institutions should lose their licenses.

Moreover, among the already defeated banks there were those whose financial performance was in order at the time of license revocation. In such conditions, very soon real panic will begin among Russian depositors: the only way out for many will be to go and withdraw their money, which will lead to the complete collapse of the Russian banking system.

However, to whom the dead man, and the ass a merchant. Most experts agree that all real and potential victim banks have become clear evidence of the “motivated judgments” of the Central Bank.

It must be said that Andrei Kozlov’s judgments do not diverge from the case. In one of his recent interviews, Kozlov literally stated the following: “The trend now is getting rid of the unpleasant burden of the past.” And, despite all the assurances of the Central Bank that “we cannot talk about any campaign to liquidate banks,” the unpleasant, according to Andrei Kozlov, burden of the past is still being thrown off the board.

This is how, immediately after the American financial organization, Andrei Kozlov became the arbiter of the fate of the entire Russian banking sector.

DO RUSSIA NEED FOREIGN BANKS? Our author’s material states categorically no. And Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank Kozlov works in the interests of foreign financial institutions, clearing the Russian banking field for them.

MOSCOW, January 25 - RIA Novosti. The trial in the criminal case of the murder of the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation Andrei Kozlov in relation to the suspect in the execution of the crime will be held in the open, hearings on the merits are scheduled for Monday, January 25.

On the evening of September 13, 2006, two attackers seriously wounded First Deputy Chairman of the Bank of Russia Andrei Andreevich Kozlov with shots to the neck and head in the parking lot near the Spartak indoor arena in Moscow. In addition, the driver of the banker's official car, Alexander Semenov, was shot in the chest. Kozlov was taken to the 33rd Moscow City Clinical Hospital and, after a complex neurosurgical operation, died on September 14 without regaining consciousness.

In October 2006, three Ukrainian citizens, natives of Lugansk, were detained and charged with direct execution of the murder.

In December 2006, Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika announced that the murder had been solved.

On January 11, 2007, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation announced the arrest of the mastermind behind the murder of Andrei Kozlov. Lawyer Igor Trunov said that the suspect in this case is his client, former chairman of the board of VIP Bank Alexey Frenkel. On January 15, a preventive measure was chosen for him in the form of detention.

On January 12, the Basmanny Court of Moscow issued a warrant for the arrest of Liana Askerova, a Muscovite associated with financial structures and suspected of involvement in the murder of Kozlov.

On January 17, 2007, the Prosecutor General's Office charged Frenkel with organizing the murder of Kozlov. The charge was brought under the article “intentional causing the death of another person, committed in connection with the performance of official activities by this person, by a group of persons by prior conspiracy, for mercenary reasons, for hire.”

According to the investigation, Alexey Frenkel was involved in the creation of financial and credit institutions, in particular, VIP Bank and Sodbiznesbank. The investigation believes that as a result of Andrei Kozlov’s activities in depriving the licenses of banks that violate the law on money laundering, “the suspect suffered multi-billion dollar losses.”

On May 22, 2007, it became known that the Prosecutor General’s Office had completed the investigation into the murder of Andrei Kozlov. According to investigators, the murder was organized by Frenkel, for which he attracted perpetrators and accomplices. Frenkel was charged under Part 3 of Article 33, paragraphs “b”, “g”, “h” of Part 2 of Article 105 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (organizing the murder of a person in connection with his official activities for mercenary reasons, hired by an organized criminal group). This article provides for punishment up to life imprisonment.

On January 23, 2008, the Prosecutor General's Office sent a criminal case against those accused of the murder of First Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation Andrei Kozlov to the Moscow City Court for consideration on the merits.

There were seven defendants in total in this case: Alexey Frenkel, Liana Askerova, Boris Shafrai, Bogdan Pogorzhevsky, Alexey Polovinkin, Maxim Proglyada and Alexander Belokopytov. Frenkel, Askerova and Shafrai were charged with organizing the murder, and the rest of the defendants were charged with executing it. In addition to murder, the latter were also charged with illegal weapons trafficking. Another participant in the crime escaped and was put on the international wanted list.

According to investigators, Frenkel paid 300 thousand dollars for the murder of Kozlov. At the same time, the perpetrators of the murder received from three to eight and a half thousand dollars, and the intermediaries - from 80 thousand dollars.

On February 5, the Moscow City Court began a criminal trial of the murder of the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Andrei Kozlov. Since March 24, the process has been held behind closed doors. A representative of the Prosecutor General's Office petitioned the court to close the process. According to the state prosecutor, the widow and her relatives received anonymous threats.

On October 20, the Moscow City Court extended until January 24, 2009 the detention of businessman Alexei Frenkel and other accused of the murder of First Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation Andrei Kozlov.

On the radio station “Echo of Moscow” by phone: Alexander Khandruev, head of the consulting group “Banks. Finance. Investments", former Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

The broadcast is hosted by Sergey Buntman and Marina Maksimova.

S. BUNTMAN: We continue the daily “U-Turn”, and after the murder, the attempt on the life of Andrei Kozlov, who died in the hospital without regaining consciousness from his injuries, we continue to talk about this topic. And now on our telephone line is Alexander Andreevich Khandruev, former deputy. prev Central Bank of the Russian Federation and head of the consulting group “Banks. Finance. Investments". Hello, good afternoon, Alexander Andreevich.

A. KHANDRUEV: Yes, Sergey, hello.

M. MAKSIMOVA: Good afternoon.

S. BUNTMAN: We have already spoken and we heard you on the “Echo” program, after all, everything here revolves around the version of the murder, and, most importantly, the consequences that... a very important figure has been knocked out. Who could have knocked her out? For what purposes? What if we recognize the possibility, but abstract from some personal or everyday motives?

A. KHANDRUEV: Sergey, I think that here we still need to separate the causes and consequences of this terrible crime. The reasons will be established by the investigation, now we can only guess.

S. BUNTMAN: Yes.

A. KHANDRUEV: And the consequences can be completely definite, because Andrei Andreevich was a professional of the highest class, the highest class. He did a lot for banking supervision and to increase confidence in the banking system. And I am very afraid that now everything positive that Andrei Andreevich has done may depreciate, and the saddest thing that can happen is the so-called forceful pressure on the banking sector, this will already be a blow to professionalism.

S. BUNTMAN: Why force, why forceful pressure on the banking sector?

A. KHANDRUEV: Because the suspicion immediately arises that this was done by those, let’s say, renegades of the banking sector who were somehow dissatisfied with the integrity shown by Andrei Andreevich. But you understand what the matter is, it was always difficult to talk to Andrei Andreevich, but he was principled, he was a transparent person for negotiations. If he said yes, that’s yes, no, that means no. They knew this well.

S. BUNTMAN: Why is it difficult?

A. KHANDRUEV: It wasn’t, because it’s always difficult to talk to a person who has principles.

S. BUNTMAN: It’s impossible, impossible, in quotes, to come to an agreement, right?

A. KHANDRUEV: It was impossible to come to an agreement with him, you see, it was impossible to come to an agreement with him. But he never closed the door or the window, he always gave the opportunity, so I can’t even imagine who benefited from doing this, because even those people, even those who lost their licenses, they had the opportunity to buy new banks, but they had dealing with the predictable behavior of the supervisory authority, in particular, in the person of Andrei Andreevich.

M. MAKSIMOVA: Alexander Andreevich, tell me, is there a message about the fact that the Central Bank this year began to rapidly lose claims to commercial banks, which were just trying to prove in court that their licenses were unfairly taken away, that their financial stability was incorrectly assessed? The most important thing is that some banks already seem to have won these cases.

A. KHANDRUEV: Absolutely right, this means what it says, that our legislative framework is imperfect. Indeed, if you take the law on combating money laundering, tax crimes, cashing as such are not the subject of a crime, are not grounds for revocation of a license. Yes, this is a question for our legislators.

M. MAKSIMOVA: So, for example, Alexey Mamontov, head of the Moscow International Monetary Association, says that there was an imperfect system for assessing these banks, that it was the Central Bank that assessed incorrectly, because it had such criteria, some incorrect, imperfect.

A. KHANDRUEV: Let's do this again, let's distinguish between two different things, yes, the criteria were imperfect, yes, there was still no necessary transparency in the selection of banks (INAUDIBLE) for insurance. But there was no proper parliamentary oversight. The State Duma has never (INAUDIBLE) considered the selection process of the insurance system. But it’s one thing - the imperfection of the procedures, perhaps there were those who were unfairly offended, and another thing - a villainous act, do you understand? Disproportionality.

M. MAKSIMOVA: Yes, of course.

А. only, excuse me, in a country that is not civilized, to put it mildly.

S. BUNTMAN: Alexander Khandruev, I remind you, we are on air by phone. Here I have a lot of messages on the pager, SMS, which say - so what, they killed a certain high-ranking official, and what is this, like Alexey, and what is this for the province, what is this for Russian life in general. You said that professionalism may somehow be depleted here, but, in principle, such a figure has been knocked out, what is this for Russian life, for the same province?

A. KHANDRUEV: This, Sergey, is an irreparable loss, firstly, this is a person, this is a personality who has three children left. These scum, scum-customers, performers, they encroached on the most sacred thing, took a person’s life, took a father away from his children. Then, Andrei Andreevich was the face of banking supervision, believe me that over the past 2-3 years, banking supervision has done more than in 15 years. In many ways, this was the personal merit of Andrei Andreevich. Therefore, you see, every person is irreplaceable, and people like Andrei Andreevich, I would say, even doubly and triply.

S. BUNTMAN: However, I would like to return to how justified are the fears of a decrease in professionalism, a decrease in the level of rigidity and transparency. After all, he didn’t work alone.

A. KHANDRUEV: Absolutely not, of course, of course, not alone, certainly not alone. But what I fear is that I am afraid that forceful methods of solving very complex, delicate professional banking issues will gradually begin to prevail.

S. BUNTMAN: Some kind of simplicity.

A. KHANDRUEV: The whole team, the whole team that worked in supervision, it was historically connected with the Central Bank, even the State Bank of the USSR, if you say so, you know, these were already personnel trained by the Central Bank system itself. And the arrival of people who do not understand the peculiarities of banking regulation, what it is, that the banking supervisory authority is not an appendage of law enforcement agencies. And this can have negative consequences.

S. BUNTMAN: Another such question, that now we are just a little before the last question, we talked about ways to resolve conflicts, about ways to satisfy grievances and, for example, from punished bankers or something like that , that we have moved somewhat away from this method, because there are other, other opportunities to somehow restore our trampled, say, honor or wealth. Are we not returning to such simple methods from this side of conflict resolution too?

А.

S. BUNTMAN: Ivan writes to us, as a person, I simply cannot accept this, this is meanness, but, on the other hand, what kind of banking system and supervision is this, when the population is again robbed, the dollar has lost weight, etc., is this, Russian money has halved. Those. he talks about the effectiveness of activities specifically for the population.

A. KHANDRUEV: I think that, firstly, the listener confuses different things. Strengthening of the ruble, please switch to rubles, leave the dollar, this has nothing to do with banking supervision. But, Sergey, now more than 30 percent of the assets of the banking sector are deposits of the population, by the way, over three trillion rubles; it was in the last two years that the deposit insurance system was launched. And now I can say that 190 thousand rubles. completely, completely insured in the banking system, this is the greatest merit of the Central Bank.

S. BUNTMAN: Tell me simply in human terms, I remind you, Alexander Khandruev, do we have the feeling that this case, at least this case will be investigated with all care, efficiency and, most importantly, honesty, no matter who we are talking about ?

A. KHANDRUEV: I think that we will have a new version of the Listyev case and the Kholodov case, unfortunately.

S. BUNTMAN: Alas, alas. Thank you very much, Alexander Khandruev is here with us, I would like to, it’s just that listeners are calling here, they want to ask their questions, I remind you that your phone number, the line that is free, is 783-90-26, 783-90- 26, you can call on this phone. Yes, of course, here Alexander from Tver says - gentlemen, please tell me the driver had a first and last name. Yes, the driver had a first and last name and a patronymic. His name was Alexander Dmitrievich Semenov. And judging by some information, he was mistaken for Kozlov, so they hastened to, excuse me, finish him off.

A. KHANDRUEV: Yes, because Andrei Andreevich was quite young, they probably mistook the driver for Andrei Andreevich.

S. BUNTMAN: In general, there is something in this murder, just like at one time there was some kind of, if I may say so, amateurish crap in the murder of Yushenkov at one time, some kind of crooked, almost homemade there’s a pistol, there’s a homemade silencer, there’s something in this, some kind of vileness, yes, Marina, was there?

M. MAKSIMOVA: Yes, there is.

S. BUNTMAN: There is one in this. And the question, please, to Alexander Khandruev by phone, hello, good afternoon, hello, we are listening to you. We've switched off. In any case, I repeat, 783-90-26, take the opportunity to ask Alexander Khandruev a question, hello, good afternoon. For some reason I switched off. It's a shame they are switching off. So, Natalya writes - Sergei Aleksandrovich, it is still not clear whether the forceful methods that Khandruev is talking about will prevail on whose side, on the side of the renegades of the banking sector or criminals or the state?

A. KHANDRUEV: No, we are talking about state power.

S. BUNTMAN: About state power, which can cut.

A. KHANDRUEV: Which can, yes, which can use this as a pretext for forceful pressure.

S. BUNTMAN: Ruslan from Makhachkala writes that there is no escape from banditry anywhere, but did you have any illusions before, Ruslan from Makhachkala? That no position can save you? But still, please tell me why everyone is saying now that the FSO is not entitled to protection, this is understandable, because the Central Bank is, in fact, not a completely state institution. Does the Central Bank itself at least provide security for its senior employees?

A. KHANDRUEV: No, here’s the thing, some employees of the Bank of Russia have security. And Andrei Andreevich, he just voluntarily refused security, in general he was very democratic in communication. Our last meeting was in Sochi at a conference, it was completely open.

S. BUNTMAN: Just a person who wasn’t afraid of anything or what? Or did he think that he was doing everything right, so there was nothing for him?

A. KHANDRUEV: He was very open, he was open, emotional and yes, he believed that he was doing this for the banking system, it would be the best banking system. The most important thing is that he was right about it.

S. BUNTMAN: Marina?

M. MAKSIMOVA: Alexander Andreevich, tell me, do you predict that this year or next year the number of banks whose licenses will be revoked will increase? Those. over the last year, the previous year, this year the number of banks has increased, in connection with the death of Kozlov, what do you think will happen?

A. KHANDRUEV: This is very difficult to predict, firstly, it depends on the banks themselves, if banks do not engage in operations that fall under the relevant legislation and there are no grounds for revoking licenses, then they will work. But, of course, banking supervision will need some time to reorganize, perhaps consolidate, its ranks; I think that for some time there may be some kind of calm. Although, I repeat, it is very difficult to predict this process. Ultimately, licenses are revoked not because it is someone’s whim, but because banks are either not liquid, not solvent, or violate current legislation.

S. BUNTMAN: I see, thank you very much, Alexander Khandruev was with us.

A. KHANDRUEV: Thank you, Sergey Alexandrovich.

S. BUNTMAN: Thank you, all the best. Alexander Khandruev, former chairman, deputy. prev Central Bank, head of the consulting group “Banks. Finance. Investments".

“I brought an anti-tank mine in my briefcase”

Andrei Kozlov’s father, also Andrei Andreevich, was a career military man; the family moved often. Andrei Kozlov was born in Moscow, but a few years later everyone ended up in the Far East near Ussuriysk. There, in 1972, he went to school, by this time he read and counted well. Studying came easily to him, although penmanship was not his strong point. I fell in love with reading; in the second grade I read The Three Musketeers. Then, on his own initiative, he entered a music school to study accordion. However, the enthusiasm passed quickly: two years later, Andrei Kozlov’s parents divorced, he and his mother returned to Moscow. Before leaving, he said that he didn’t want to play anymore.

In Moscow he went to third grade. They say that little Andrey dreamed of a model railway for a long time, but when he received the gift, it turned out that there was no place to even lay it out - the dimensions of the apartment did not allow it.

Almost every day we sewed on the handle of his briefcase that was coming off, since it was always full of various iron finds

In 1977, Andrei Kozlov’s father was transferred to serve in Georgia, and the family made an attempt to reunite. There he went to sixth grade. “Like other children, he loved to collect shell casings at the shooting range, sometimes he brought home grenades, reassuring me that they were for training purposes,” recalled his mother, Alla Vsevolodovna. “Almost every day we sewed on the detached handle of his briefcase, since it was always full of various iron finds. One day Andrei brought an anti-tank mine in it, and we had to carry out educational work.”

Three years later, mother and son returned to Moscow again, where Andrei Kozlov graduated from school. He decided to enroll in MFI - apparently, he was influenced by his uncle, who graduated from this institute. To enroll, I had to study with tutors in geography and English.

Worked for a future billionaire

In 1988, when the law on cooperation was passed, Andrei Kozlov’s classmates Mikhail Prokhorov and Alexander Khloponin created a structure for “boiling” jeans. Andrey Kozlov worked part-time for them. Entrepreneurs collected orders, and then made fashionable “varenki” in the rented premises of the bath and laundry plant. For this purpose, the first Soviet jeans “Vereya” were taken, which then cost 8-30 rubles, and foreign ones cost from 100 rubles. The semi-finished product was placed in a large drum and a new quality was produced using soda and bleach as a bleach.

The hired workers, among whom were mainly students from a financial institute, worked for the future billionaire in hazardous production for 10 hours a night shift, receiving good money for that time - 25 rubles. However, Andrei soon developed a severe allergy, and he stopped participating in this “business”.

The most “correct” employee of the Central Bank

“Now you will see something you have never seen before”

Many who were familiar with Andrei Kozlov in one way or another know that he never drank alcohol, did not like feasts and, under any pretext, tried to distance himself from both the glasses on the tables and from people drinking. However, in this regard, one story is remembered about him. When Kozlov left the Central Bank in 1999, he gathered his employees and gave them a kind of surprise. “Now you will see something you have never seen,” he said then with a smile and drank a glass of champagne. Everyone gasped: no one had ever seen Kozlov drink or, say, light a cigarette. The Central Bank simply did not have a more “correct” employee.

They remember another story from the 90s, when Andrei Kozlov was already deputy chairman of the Central Bank. One of his colleagues of the same rank accidentally found out that he lived with his family in a small two-room Khrushchev house. Moreover, by that time several of Kozlov’s subordinates had already received new service apartments. The question was raised with the head of the Central Bank, Dubinin, and the apartment was found.

"Absolutely non-commercial person"

As Bella Zlatkis, deputy chairman of the board of Sberbank, said, Andrei Kozlov was an absolutely non-commercial person, his job was to come up with models. In 1999-2000, having left the Central Bank, he actively participated in the formation of Russian Standard Bank as chairman of the board. After leaving the bank, he said that he had fulfilled his mission as a start-up project manager. Then he worked for several months as a private consultant on the problems of reengineering banking business processes.

In the same year, he became the general director of the Aeroflot World travel company, and this project received wide publicity. Then he stated that the company would occupy 30% of the market and even introduced the sale of tours on credit, which almost no one did then. But already in 2001 he went on vacation, from which he did not return to the company, and in 2003 Aeroflot World itself disappeared.

“Kozlov was a non-profit person. As a person, he was formed in the state system,” said people who worked with Kozlov. - I'm used to doing everything according to the rules. And in business, because of this, you can sometimes lose to competitors. If he sold a product for 10% more, he said so directly, did not try to disguise the price like others.”

“He sometimes combined incompatible things - he was completely childishly receptive and at the same time a principled professional when carrying out supervision and regulation activities,” said one of Andrei Kozlov’s colleagues.

Allowed myself to say a lot

For the time being, Andrei Kozlov happily gave interviews to journalists. Like Viktor Gerashchenko, he allowed himself to say what was known only in narrow circles. For example, he could declare from the podium that the Central Bank was receiving proposals from the State Duma of an “overtly material nature” and the law on deposit insurance had become “the subject of political bidding,” but the Central Bank “does not intend to pay for it.” He also said that commercial banks were “planning biased attacks” on the Bank of Russia, and warned that the regulator would give a fitting rebuff.

Then the license of Sodbiznesbank was revoked, the Central Bank for the first time used the wording “for the laundering of criminal proceeds”

In the summer of 2004, a banking “crisis of confidence” began. Then the license of Sodbiznesbank was revoked, the Central Bank for the first time used the wording “for the laundering of criminal proceeds.” Problems in the interbank lending market, rumors about “black lists”, panic among depositors - while many blamed the Central Bank for the crisis, which made careless statements and actions. All this resulted in a campaign against Andrei Kozlov. A website has appeared on the Internet with “compromising evidence” on the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank. A performance with a striptease and negative comments about the management of the regulator was held in front of the Sodbiznes building.

Kozlov was then “mortally offended” by the publications that published frivolous photos from this performance; the “betrayal” of the journalists hurt him greatly. But, they say, the leadership of the Central Bank also demanded to remain silent.

Kept a “black list of banks” in the closet

During the banking “crisis of mistrust” in 2004, a huge folder stood in a prominent place in the closet in Andrei Kozlov’s office. On the spine of the folder was written “Black List of Banks.” As Alexey Savatyugin, at that time director of the financial policy department of the Ministry of Finance, recalled, this folder interested him very much.

“Andrei Andreevich, seeing my curiosity, asked slyly: “Wouldn’t it be interesting to take a look?” he said on his Facebook blog. - I was still a young official, so how could I refuse such a unique insider offer? He pulled out a folder and handed it to me. It contained one piece of paper on which it was written: “This list is empty. The Central Bank will never maintain a blacklist of banks!”

I like to invite journalists and go somewhere during the conversation, leaving them alone in the office

“I like to invite journalists and go somewhere during the conversation, leaving them alone in the office. As soon as they see a folder, they immediately grab it! And here it is such a disappointment. But what is written on this piece of paper is the pure truth!” - said then an extremely pleased Andrei Andreevich.

Favorite child

Introduction Deposit insurance systems are called the most significant achievement of Andrei Kozlov. This bill was discussed for ten years, and at the end of December 2003 it came into force. Banks were given six months to submit an application to the Central Bank to join the system. Selection for it took place in two stages: the first lasted 9 months, the second - 6 months.

Andrei Kozlov insisted on accepting only banks that meet certain requirements into the Deposit Insurance System. For example, financial stability, reliability of reporting, and compliance with Central Bank regulations were important. The regulator carried out inspections, which for banks were comparable to re-obtaining a license.

Selection into the system was carried out under the slogan of the struggle for transparency of banks. Andrei Kozlov stated that not a single bank that hides its owners will enter the system. During the entry process, many credit institutions publicly disclosed the ultimate beneficiaries. Although, by and large, the regulator did not require this, it was enough for the Central Bank to know about the real owners. An important aspect was also the fight against “inflated” capital. Some of the bankers had to sell their villas on the Cote d'Azur to close the “holes”.

“Very many people hated him,” Kozlov’s colleagues told reporters. “Those whose licenses he revoked, those whom he did not accept into the deposit insurance system...”

Why else was Andrei Kozlov hated?

Since the beginning of 2006, Andrei Kozlov began an unprecedented campaign to revoke licenses from problem banks. Under his leadership, since the beginning of 2006, the Central Bank has revoked the licenses of 46 banks; in August alone, 7 credit organizations were deprived of their licenses, and the last bank lost the right to operate in the market shortly before its death - on September 7. The wording “laundering of illegal income” was used more and more often. Moreover, in the coming years, Kozlov promised to liquidate more than 400 small banks in order to “consolidate” the Russian banking system.

In 2006, at a banking forum in Sochi, the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank proposed to disqualify for life bankers who had at least once been found guilty of money laundering.

In 2006, at a banking forum in Sochi, the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank proposed to disqualify for life bankers who had at least once been found guilty of money laundering. The problem was that the owners of banks whose licenses were revoked, after a while they registered new banks where they did the same thing. Andrei Kozlov proposed obliging audit companies to inform the Central Bank if their clients (banks, companies and associated individuals) were found to be involved in illegal activities.

Fatal football

Andrei Kozlov loved football very much. It was he who created the Central Bank team and regularly invited his colleagues to play. At friendly matches with colleagues from other government agencies, Kozlov was the team captain.

Football played a fatal role in his life. On September 13, 2006, a traditional football match between Central Bank employees took place in the building of the Spartak football arena. After the match, when Kozlov was heading to his car, an armed attempt was made on him and his driver. The driver died on the spot, Andrei Kozlov was seriously wounded and taken to the hospital in critical condition, where after a five-hour operation he died without regaining consciousness. He never had bodyguards or security guards.

With the participation of the Association of Russian Banks, 12 years ago, in memory of Andrei Kozlov, the National Banking Cup was established in his name. Football teams from Russian banks and the Central Bank take part in the annual tournament.

“His idol was General Robert E. Lee.”

He said that “dirty money” and criminal capital played a very big role in the victory of the northerners

Andrei Kozlov had an unusual hobby - he was interested in the history of the American Civil War. As his widow Ekaterina Valerievna recalled, he read a lot on this topic, bought books while traveling abroad, and ordered them on the Internet. “He came to the conclusion that what they told us in schools and institutes - that the war was fought over the abolition of slavery, to put it mildly, was not true,” she said in an interview. - He said that “dirty money” and criminal capital played a very big role in the victory of the northerners. And for him, southerners were people who fought for their ideals. And, of course, his main idol was General Robert E. Lee - a man whose courage and generosity was recognized even by his most sworn enemies.”

When preparing the material, fragments of Nikolai Krotov’s book “Andrei Kozlov. Economic history and the fate of man" (from the series "Economic Chronicle of Russia"), publications in the publications "Vedomosti", "Kommersant", "Izvestia", "Finance", "Novye Izvestia", "Vremya Novostey", National Banking Journal.

Biography of Andrey Kozlov

Born on January 6, 1965 in Moscow, in 1982 he entered the Faculty of International Economic Relations of the Moscow Financial Institute, from which he graduated in 1989 (his studies were interrupted for two years - 1983-1985 - by military service).

In 1989-1990 - senior economist, category II expert of the Monetary and Economic Administration of the State Bank of the USSR, in 1990-1991 - economist, category I expert, leading expert, head of the department of methodology of stock transactions of the securities management of the State Bank of the USSR, in 1991-1992 - Head of the Department for Securities Operations of the Main Directorate for Regulation of Money Circulation of the Central Bank, in 1992-1995 - Head of the Securities Department of the Central Bank, in 1995-1996 - Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank - Director of the Securities Department, in 1996-1997 - Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank, in 1997-1999 - First Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank.

In 1999-2000 - Chairman of the Board of Russian Standard Bank, in 2000 - private consultant on the problems of reengineering banking business processes, in 2000-2001 - General Director of Aeroflot World, in 2001-2002 - Managing Director "Volunteer Corps for the provision of financial services" (USA).

Since 2002 - First Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank. He became one of the first people invited to his team by the new Chairman of the Central Bank, Sergei Ignatiev. He received the position of first deputy chairman, a seat on the board of directors of the Central Bank and the key post of chairman of the banking supervision committee. Killed in an assassination attempt in September 2006.